Royal Institute of Philosophy

John Locke and Natural Law Author(s): W. von Leyden Source: Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 116 (Jan., 1956), pp. 23-35 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749204 . Accessed: 22/08/2013 10:12
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JOHN LOCKE
W. VON

AND NATURAL
LEYDEN, D.Phil.

LAW

IT has been said, and fewwould deny,that JohnLocke is as imof philosophical liberalism as he is as the portantas the founder ofknowledge. he was a most oftheempiricist theory Though founder education, on philosophy, politics, medicine, versatile thinker, writing on all these the knowledge of an and with religion, and economics, his fameno doubtderives of an authority, expertand the influence on Toleration on the one hand from his treatises and CivilGovernon the other. his Essay on Human Understanding ment,and from thepolitical theseare expounded writings are Whenever by scholars, oftheEssay and theEssayindependently of discussed independently The reasonforthisis obviously that scholars the political writings. between little Locke'sprincipal works. connexion This haveseenvery of a manuscript in whichare withthe appearance has been changed written by Lockein Latin preserved eight essayson thelaw ofnature of i66o and thirty years beforethe shortly afterthe Restoration has been appearancein printof his majorworks.This manuscript to recognize thatLocke'stwo published by me,and it is nowpossible and histheory hispolitical of mainbodiesofdoctrine, namely theory have a commongroundand that this lies in his early knowledge, thenotion ofa natural lawcan be ofnatural law.Admittedly, doctrine in his treatise on CivilGovernment seento be ofcentral importance littleis and it also playsits partin the Essay. But disappointingly ofthesewritings, and it is said by Locke about thisnotionin either not untilthe appearanceof his essayson naturallaw that we learn thetwomainpartsofhis relation between is an important thatthere is. and whatthisrelation teaching Locke'sarguments concerning the In thispaperI wishto examine of naturallaw. I have alreadytouched force and binding existence intheintroduction tomyedition, ofthisquestion uponcertain aspects to their historical and other sidebut there setting theywererelated I am also concluding this issues.Now my purposeis morespecific. which contains certain in an Locke's basic with Journal, paper entry has forsomereasonor ofnaturallaw and which ideas ofhis theory otherescapedpublication. in Locke'sphilosophy is notthesame as it occurs The law ofnature of nature: it is notconlaws Newton's so-called as one ofGalileo'sor In the motion or their cernedwithphysical regularity. phenomena, it refers to human behaviour uses the and Locke sensein which term, a of notion of law nature has had the a to a morallaw. In thissense and well-known jurists, amongmoralists, politicaltheorists, history Locke's time. and after before theologians
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PHILOSOPHY theidea was Aristotle. to introduce He contrasted The first perhaps with thevarieties in nature ofhuman ofthings behaviour theuniform where codesofbehaviour. Fire,he said,alwaysbumsalikeno matter or a thousand in Greece orin Persia,to-day orwhenit is lit; whether of men,theirmoraland yearsago. On the otherhand the customs one time laws varyfrom place to place and changefrom municipal law of one form moral there is for Aristotle However, to another. has the same force everywhere; and is eternal and immutable which to be as uniform as a law governing and becausethislaw is supposed refers to it natural as a morallaw, sharply he naturalphenomena laws whichhe calls conventional. it from man-made distinguishing law obtained the greatinfluence throughout Thisidea ofa natural periodwhenthe Roman Empirespreadand the wholeof civilized one universal in which to form was thought humanity community, rationalnature.The all menwereequal by virtueoftheircommon and the Romanlawyers elaborated thisidea and stoic philosophers He speaks of truelaw as being Cicerogave it a famousdefinition. of universal withnature, and reasonin agreement application right is no needforus to lookoutsideourselves for thatthere unchanging; ofthislaw and thejudge Godis theauthor ofit,though an interpreter it. who enforces thevacuumcausedby thebreakdown of That Christianity, filling in a law ofnature can be seen adoptedthebelief theRomanempire, from the factthat the idea of naturallaw appearsas a basic conoftheChristian bothin thelaw-books and emperor Justinian ception the Middle Ages the ultimateappeal in Canon law. Throughout law and also divinity was to naturallaw, politics, regarding morals, meanta law promulgated law theschoolmen and by natural by God in a naturalway and known by reason,i.e. a law otherthan God's Naturallaw together is known law which with by revelation. positive was thusregarded as constituting thelaw laid downin theScriptures thewholeofthe divinelaw. As suchit was acceptedas an objective an absolutecontrolling 'ruleand measure,' principle. and sixteenth as we know,witnessed The fifteenth the centuries, of humanism of a secularmorality, and the newoutlook emergence It was in connexion withthisnew outlookand of the Renaissance. which advocatedthe'priesthood of withtheadventofProtestantism oftoleration and thenecessity thatnatural all believers' law cameto as a bodyofindividual of subjective be regarded rights, claimsand as a liberating, rather thancontrolling During thusmainly principle. and eighteenth centuries the studyof naturallaw the seventeenth on the Continent whothought thislaw to be was pursued by jurists of and the result ofa purely presuppositions independent theological of mathematical a matter At the scientific deduction. construction, moralists same time,whileBritish attempted to provide ethicswith
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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

in thelightofcontemporary a rational foundation, Anglicans sought to redefine the place of naturallaw withinChristian knowledge apologetics. to theadvanceofcritical thenineteenth Throughout century, owing there was a marked to reject and sceptical arguments, tendency many and to adopt positivist of morality criteria of the traditional apin legal theory.In fact,the rise of modem proaches, particularly is characterized of the theory jurisprudence by the abandonment of naturallaw. Also most modernphilosophers, analystsas well as have cometo regard thisnotionas obsolete. positivists, Yet we find the two wars and again in recenttimesa number that between of thattheycannotdispense withthisconcept. have admitted thinkers somewouldnevertheless maintain Whileadmitting thatnatural this, is pure superis with which this associated law and the theology in law include For themit is onlybecausethefactsinvolved stition. or supernatural theideasmenhave ofcertain characteristics general intoaccount. musttakethem On theother thatthelegalphilosopher thinkers whogenuinely arecontemporary believe in some hand,there sortofnaturallaw and makethisthe basis of theirowntheories. in thisconnexion to notethatit is only It is certainly interesting have existedat any in Russia that no tracesof natural-law theory time.ThoughRussia, like the West, has a Christian it tradition, tradition. from theWestin havingno humanist And theidea differs of a naturallaw, as I have triedto show,was derivedin the first theStoics, from thatofAristotle, instance and pre-Christian thought, linkedwiththehumanist belief in theefficacy it is intimately Cicero: ofhiswill,and hismoralresponsibility. thefreedom ofman'sreason, oftheidea ofnatural thehistorical Havingsketched development in hispublished Lockecontributed whatdoctrine law,let us consider can be works.His teachingin the Second Treatiseof Government as follows: summarized of God's willand a standard The law ofnatureis a declaration of It is a law thatalready thestateofnature, and wrong. right governs all menarefree and equal,and in which statein which i.e. a pre-social to one another in peace. If menmakepromises in theylive together themselves boundby them, the stateof nature, theymustconsider 'for truthand keepingfaithbelongto men as men, and not as to thislaw and prior It is likewise ofsociety.' to members according is determined. civillawsthateachman'sprivate anypositive property to menin common, ThoughGod has giventheearthand all itsfruits the law of naturesets boundsto what each man is allowedto apSincewithin theseboundsa person's and keepforhimself. propriate therecan be littleroom for 'rightand conveniency' go together, forLocke partofGod's purpose aboutproperty. in quarrels Further, of to him under man was creating 'put strong obligations necessity, 25

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PHI LOSOPHY as wellas to convenience, and inclination to drivehimintosociety, and enjoyit.' fithimwithunderstanding and languageto continue man'slifein society and under the Throughout political government, of thelaw ofnatureremain valid,and it is onlyas they obligations on thislaw thatthemunicipal laws ofcountries are just are founded in so for is faras only laws. In general, political power Locke justified of those lifeand property. men'snatural it preserves rights, especially law and by men'srights, is thuslimited bothby natural Government forLocke. On the other and thesetwo came to be almostidentical hand, what man did not possessin the state of naturehe cannot it: sincehe had no arbitrary to thecommunity whenhe enters resign in the state of natureto act againstthe law of nature, i.e. to right is nothis, or others, or to take awayproperty which destroy himself in society. shouldnotbe any sucharbitrary there power It can be seen that the part played by naturallaw in Locke's It is becausehe believesthis is indeedfundamental. political theory and thisstateofnature to be law to be thelaw ofthestateofnature, whenit is superseded by men'slifein society, notaltogether annulled valid in societyand in factsets that forhim naturallaw remains To put thepointless metaphorically: limits to political government. to Locke,is eternally subject becausehe is rational, man,according of whether or not he to natural a rational law,itself law,regardless livesin an established society. of naturallaw for Unfortunately, despitethe basic importance is littlereal discussion ofit in any of Locke's political theory, there In a passageofhisSecondTreatise his mature of published writings. he evenexpressly declines an investigation oftheparticuGovernment likehimto tellus particularly is larsofthislaw; yetwhatwe should how he thinks we cometo knownaturallaw, and how and to what In myview,Locke tended in his extent it can be said to be binding. ofa law ofnature as a merepremise lateryearsto regard thenotion ofhis thought, he believedin but barelyinvestigated. as something I think, is to be found in difficulties The reasonforthisattitude, he had in reconciling the notionof thislaw withsome of his mature ofhishedonistic For instance, viewsand doctrines. thedevelopment his philosophy forhim oflanguage in theEssay had madeit difficult to attempt a fullexposition of naturallaw or even to believein it whole-heartedly. of Locke's early manuscript on However,with the discovery naturallaw we are in a position to fillin the picture whichis left rather vague in his mature works. We can see nowthatmostofhis remarks in theSecondTreatise and theEssay aboutthelaw ofnature have their originin his early essays. In particular, two crucial at all in his questions(about whichthereis hardlyany discussion mature writings) obviously exercised his mindwhenhe was writing
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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

the essays,i.e. the epistemological question-how do we knowthe law ofnature?-and themoralquestion-howand to whatextent is thatlaw binding? fullaccountwhichthe essays provide Because of the relatively of Locke's viewson naturallaw, it is also possiblenow to pointto in his theoryand to state one's criticisms definite weaknesses in In a senseit is not surprising precise terms. to find thatthethought his earlyworkon naturallaw recededfromLocke's of publishing of his youthwerenot wholly mind and that the moral doctrines of his maturity. absorbedin the writings Thereis a greatdeal of in this notion of a law of and a philosopher ambiguity nature, natuto feels calledupon disentangle the complex of different rally issues that it contains. thathas givenriseto confusion in theories The concept ofnatural and I propose law is thatofreasonor rationality, nowto investigate in so faras it concerns ofthisterm themeaning us here. form If asked exactlywhatcommands partof the law of nature, I believe, wouldincludethefollowLocke and mostothertheorists, to worship ing:to preserve life,to begetand bring up children, God, to benefactors, to showgratitude to respect to obeyparents, another's and to live in society withother men.Now all thesecomproperty, or reasonand implydutiesthatwould mandshave a showof truth seemto be obviousand readilyacceptableto common sense.Howofthislaw might not seemto be equallypatent, dictates ever,other beenconsidered forman,in order and it has therefore that necessary to employ hismental he mayknowhisduties, i.e. hissenses faculties, One of the reasons, in fact,whynaturallaw and hisunderstanding. law is thattheknowledge ofit is said to be has beencalleda natural i.e. sense-perception and reason, acquiredby man'snatural faculties, ofwhichconstitutes whatLocke and others the jointexercise called the 'lightofnature.'The 'lightofnature'is thusreasonand thelaw a law thatdoesnotbindchildren, ofnature is a law ofreason, idiots, because theyare by naturedevoid of underor animals,precisely in the ordinary sense. standing oflaw as a law ofreason has no doubtadvantages, To conceive parthat of makingit capable of treatment man's ticularly apart from forit complete natureand thereby emotional securing impartiality. has said, 'is reasonfreefrom all passionand a 'Law,' as Aristotle But-and here we come to the crucialpointneutralauthority.' oflaw as a law ofreason thatit is possible doestheconception imply if has of the and one to justify it rationally, so, any manytheorists have made in the this direction been whothroughout ages attempts successful? I am inclinedto answerboth these questionsby sayingthat a ofnaturallaw is boundto failbecauseit is liableto defence rational
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PHILOSOPHY ideas about reason.Issues that shouldbe clearly involveconfused from one another in any truly are rational exposition distinguished statements of fact if one passes from concerning matters obscured to about ways of knowledge, to definitions, thenceto statements throughof and to truths, assuming finally logical judgments value, out that each of the passagesis a stepin one and the same sortof and thateachis concerned withone and thesame inferential process, ofrationality. meaning I believe, ofthiskindoccursin It can be shown, thata confusion ofnatural law: I can onlygiveone example here,and I every theory arisesin Locke'stheory. The line willtryto showhowtheconfusion willfollow what I take to be the logicalstepsofhis of my enquiry these: Locke passes fromthe factual argument. They are briefly reasonto theconclusion thatreasonis statement thatmanpossesses and henceto the assumption characteristic thatreason his essential ofmoraltruths to employed, leads to the discovery and,ifproperly ofoneand thesamesetofmoral i.e. natural law. thediscovery truths, ethicalassertions to the effect that the Fromthishe is led to infer discovered rationaland moralstandards by reasonare themselves on all men.Fromthishe passesto thattheyare commands binding ofsuchcommands thatthevalidity canbe proved byreason, thebelief in the same way as a geometrical and even shownto be necessary or a logicaldeduction. demonstration issimple: it is thefactual thatmen statement Locke'sstarting-point reason.The factthatsomemencannot possessreasonand use their by Locke, reasonand thatsomeofthosewhocan do notis admitted and to thosewhobecauseoftheir and he refers to idiotsand children orbecausetheyarelazyorcareless, makeno proper nature emotional hisnextstepis to assert In spiteofthisadmission, reason. use oftheir is their canreason butthatreason property thatmennotonly defining is their function to i.e. that exercise and thattherefore special they it, reason. to use their are obliged thematter-of-fact it proposition-if Locke's inference hereis from all men are rational,to the is a matter-of-fact proposition-that in order is a definition-that to be truly men,men statement-which is notso much Thisstatement aboutan indisputable mustbe rational. derived from Aristotle's idea of'fixed natures.' factas a belief Though definitions theyare notempirical dependin somesenseon evidence, i.e. statements about fact,whichcan be eithertrueor statements, cannotbe validatedor invalidated by statefalse;hencedefinitions a statement mentsof a purelyfactualkind.Moreover, from about i.e. a statement a moral man'sdefining thatis neither characteristic, is inferred thathe has one nora necessary one,themoralproposition with hisessential a dutyto livein conformity nature. Thisconformity it maymeanthatit is man'sdutyto use reason twofold: is in itsturn 28

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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

i.e. to acceptthefindings and also thathe has a dutyto obeyreason, thatthe in Locke's wholeargument it is implied ofreason.Further, characreasonis an essential whether at issue,namely veryquestion obligedto use it is theyare therefore of men and whether teristic I concludethenthat we are by reasonitself. decidedaffirmatively of the termreason which with variousmeanings here confronted of different and also with statements Locke does not disentangle, one to the other kindsso thatit is not alwayspossibleto pass from and to applyto each the same sortof proof. howmencome to thequestion Locke'sanswer Let us nowconsider to knownaturallaw. reasonwillhave to be in connexion withthisquestion, Obviously, ofmanleading as a mental'activity' on twolevels:firstly, discussed as the of moral truth;secondly, or discovery to the production of a body of rational consisting productof this activity, spiritual between to distinguish Lockeis careful or rulesofconduct. principles the dishe understands of reason.By the first the two meanings by forming truth seeksto discover ofthemindwhich cursive faculty By the secondhe unknown. to things known from things arguments whichcan becomean object of a set of moraltruths understands and a rule of action,and this he calls 'rightreason.' knowledge like the organsof senseis faculty Whereasforhim the discursive inbornin man, 'rightreason' is not. And forhim also, the moral by human before the mindare not made or dictated coming truths in a way it. Thus by and interpreted discovered but merely reason, is the truth humanreasonas a sortofcause ofwhich he stillregards but it leads to its knowintoexistence truth it does notbring effect: canbe regarded reason whether thequestion ledge.I willnotraisehere someas a wayofdoingor considering as a cause rather thansimply rulesof conductare discovered thing;nor will I examinewhether would suggest.I ratherthan made, as the studyof anthropology ofreasonwas in thecausal efficacy however thatLocke'sbelief think to himreasoncannotbe regarded one sinceaccording a half-hearted no he wouldsay,reasonprovides By itself, as a sourceofknowledge. whichcan some material requires notions and it therefore primary to him the According forits operations. serveas a starting-point is provided by sense-perception. in question material of naturallaw that withhis earlytheory It is here,in connexion by the on knowledge his well-known emphasis Locke's empiricism, of my has its origin. For thisreasonI said at the beginning senses, namelyhis theory paperthat Locke's two mainbodiesof doctrine, and ground havea common andhispolitical philosophy, ofknowledge ofnatural law. thatthislies in his earlydoctrine in Locke's viewreasonleads to the knowledge The stepswhereby these: suchdata as the sensessupplyare briefly ofnaturallaw from
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PHI LOSOPHY Our sensestellus notonlyofbodiesand their motions but also of beautyand regularity in all partsoftheworld. Sincethisbeautyand regularity mustbe the resultof somesuperior design, reasoninfers the existence of a mostwise and powerful Creator. This argument from design together withtheso-called anthropological argument are singledout by Locke fromamongthe traditional proofs of God's existence precisely because thesetwo arguments are derivedfrom sense-experience and,apartfrom rational inference, require no further support, whereasall othersuch proofspresuppose a priorinotions which Lockeis unwilling to accept.Lockegoeson to showthatsince God is notonlypowerful butalso wise,He has designed theworld for somepurpose and thatwe find in everything a definite ruleorpattern appropriate to its nature. God's purpose in creating manwas thathe should live accordingto reason. Two particularfunctions he is intended to perform are to worship God and to live in societywith othermen. What Locke has endeavoured to establishso far is firstly that thereexistsa law-maker, i.e. some superior powerto whichman is rightly subject,and secondly that this law-maker has expressed a will,thisbeingthelaw ofnature. Thusin Locke'sviewit is reason in withsense-experience co-operation whichrevealsthe existence of a naturallaw and also the dictatesof thislaw. The wholeof Locke's hereis derivedfrom argument the scholastics and thereis nothing aboutit exceptperhaps original hisinsistence on thepartplayedby sense-perception. Whether novelor not,one maywonder iftheargumentforms theright approach to thequestion at issue.Whenasking himself whether naturallaw can be known,Locke does not fora moment the possibility consider of that this law, and expressions value generally, not belongto the class of things might of whichit makessenseto say thattheyare known in theordinary senseofthe word,i.e. that statements about themcan be justified by reference to empirical facts,to rules of inference, or to self-evident truths. Locke does notfacethisissueand insteadmakestheproper employment of man's naturalfaculties a necessary and sufficient condition for theknowledge ofnatural law. Yet no matter to whatextent men's sensesand their reasonare found to be efficient, thisefficiency is no criterion to decidewhether by which natural law is a proper objectof Such a decision mustbe derived knowledge. from an analysisofthe ofnatural law rather concept different from theone Lockeoffered. The nextstepin Locke's argument ofan inference: again consists he passesfrom whathe has hitherto established to ethicalassertions thebinding force ofnatural concerning law. Havingshown thatman's reason can lead to thediscovery ofcertain rational he goes principles, on to conclude thatman is morally obligedto acceptthesefindings of his reason.In otherwords, Locke startswithcertain statements
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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

no judgoffact, i.e. statements about human nature,containing ments ofvalue; he thenpassesto certain and theologimetaphysical no moralwords from thesestatecal statements contain which either; mentshe drawsa conclusion about what men ought to do, as if the conclusion ofa validargument couldcontain anything, e.g.an 'ought,' is notcontained which in thepremises. The pointthatit is impossible to deducean ethicalconclusion from that are non-ethical premises was madeforcibly by Humein a celebrated passage.'In every system proceedsfor some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning humanaffairs; whenofa suddenI am surprised to find, thatinstead oftheusualcopulations ofpropositions, I meetwithno is, and is not, proposition thatis not connected or an ought withan ought, not.... As thisought, or ought oraffirmation, notexpresses somenewrelation it is necessary thatit shouldbe explained; and at thesametimethat a reason be given... howthisnewrelation should can be a deduction from others, whichare entirely different from it.' Hume concludes fromthese observations that they would 'subvertall the vulgar of morality, systems and let us see, thatthe distinction ofvice and Let us consider briefly at whichpointin Locke's argument moral are introduced. assertions Theyappearin twocontexts. One is where Locke advances his proofof God's existence and the 'voluntarist' thatlaw or men'sdutiesare the exprestheory (orrather definition) sionofa superior will.For Locke thenmoralobligations are binding becausetheyarisefrom Nowfrom God's commands. thatGod saying us to do certain commands actionswe cannotinfer thatwe oughtto do them, notevenifwe add thefurther thatGod commands premise us to obeyHis commands. The ethical statement ourduty concerning to do certain actionscan be derived another onlyfrom ethicalstatementsuchas thatwe oughtto do whatGod commands. For Locke sucha derivation is in factpossible sincehe argues to thatobedience God's willis right, thatis, obligatory. Howeverany deduction from thispremise orfirst moralprinciple, i.e. thata creature to obey ought thewishofhisCreator, maybe said to be compelling onlyif thepremise is self-evident, in Locke's example,forit whichis doubtful wouldnotbe self-contradictory to rejecttheprinciple thatobedience to God's willis right. the 'voluntarist' with Moreover, theory carries it an implication which Locke obviouslyfounddissatisfying, for withthe concept of willit introduces an arbitrary element together intomorality. In order to makehistheory more Lockeattempts to derive perfect, moral obligation in some otherway. He does this as part of his to arriveat a purelyrationalfoundation of ethics.For endeavour
3I

of morality,'he says, ' . . . I have always remarked,that the author

virtue is not . . . perceived by reason.'

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PHILOSOPHY or teacheswhatman's duties himhumanreasonnot onlyindicates it is thusa selfare,but at thesame timemakeshis dutiesbinding; depending sourceof obligation. He maintains that naturallaw is coevalwiththehumanraceand thatall menare subjectto it sinceit is in thesoil ofhumannature.'In his viewthere is 'so firmly rooted in fact a 'harmony' or 'conformity' betweenmoral (convenientia) valuesand man'srationalnature;foras man's natureis alwaysthe ruleof morals. a fixed and permanent same so reason'pronounces' at a theory theseviewsLocke can arrive One maywonder howfrom nature, man'srational ofmoral To derive natural law from obligation. in creating man suchthat and this,in its turn, from God's wisdom is to drawan ethicalconfrom his constitution certain dutiesfollow Therefore thesameobjecentirely non-ethical premises. clusion from oflaw. theory tionapplieshereas in connexion withthe'voluntarist' To put the pointdifferently one might say thatreasoncan perhaps withman's natureand declarewhattypeof actionis in accordance in somesensenecessary; provea is therefore but it does notthereby Locke's contempomoralobligation to perform the action.Grotius, ofright reason as a dictate thatnatural law,ifdefined rary, admitted and necessary, or not an action is morally only indicates whether before him Suarezhad pointedout thatin thiscapacityit wouldbe sense, ofthenature ofa directive rulerather thanofa law in thestrict a law havinga binding force. But thisdifficulty, can be overcome by estabLocke wouldargue, and mathemalishinga close analogy betweenmoral knowledge if exampleofa doubtful, nowis a further tics.The stephe proposes For to another. not illegitimate, one kindof discourse passagefrom thatthe from assertions about moralruleshe passesto theassertion oftheserulescan be proved, to be necessary and evenshown validity in thesameway as a geometrical demonstration. in connexion withhis notion Locke advanceshis new argument of a harmony nature.Thus between naturallaw and man's rational from the just as necessarily he says: 'In factit seemsto me to follow natureofman that,ifhe is a man,he is boundto love and worship to therational God and also to fulfil other nature, things appropriate the natureof a i.e. to observethe law of nature, as it follows from anglesare equal to tworight its three triangle that,ifit is a triangle, Locke here ennecessity angles.' By analogy with mathematical to establish of moralrules.It is not deavours the necessary validity ofmoral in thispassagehe thinks whether altogether clear,however, self-evident truths as self-evident or as deductions from principles he wantsto makeclearthat Fromanother passagewhere principles. it might from his verynature man'sdutiesnecessarily follow appear theway for thathe regards he compares moraltruths as self-evident; in which to theway in which men,so longas theseare apprehended

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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

cometo knowthe mustofnecessity theycan see and thesun shines, and colours between and thedifferences ofday and night alternations line.The pointhe seemsanxiousto a curvedand a straight between the conceptof man's nature, makein bothpassagesis that from if moral obligationwould concerning propositions suitablydefined, or by therulesofdeductive just inference, either analytically follow we acceptsomeprodefinitions, certain granting as in mathematics, as demonstrable. and others as self-evident positions of naturallaw, we meet of his earlydoctrine Here,in the setting contention thatmatheexampleof Locke's celebrated withthe first in thatthey bothcontain self-evident areparallel andmorality matics Severalof his contempoand are capable of demonstration. truths British moralists following him, and also certain e.g. Grotius, raries, view. found view a similar this attracheld They Clarke, e.g. Samuel an improvement on a legisit presented tivefortworeasons:firstly, as of the because lative ethicswhichtheyregarded unsatisfactory view it the of the demonsecondly, ofarbitrarinesscontains; element to allowmoral rules to be regarded to them seemed ofethics strability willand at thesametimeas necessarily ofa superior as independent but binding.Whateveradvantages directive valid, i.e. not merely thisview,it raisesdifficulties Locke mayhave hopedto derivefrom in theessays. forhis argument On theonehand,Locke to be considered. Therearetwoalternatives as the startingto acceptmoraldefinitions may have been tempted ofethics;he did so, forinstance, deduction pointofa demonstrative he derives theprotheEssay (IV. III. i8), where in hismature work, thereis no injustice' from that 'wherethereis no property position and of as a rightto anything of property definitions preliminary Herehe is confronted withthe ofthatright. as theviolation injustice to draw an ethical as in the case of someonetrying same problem forto deducean ethicalprofrom non-ethical conclusion premises; shouldbe just as impossible. On the other from definitions position moraltruths as the first principles hand,ifLocke acceptsself-evident ofethics theonlyjustification he has for science ofhisdemonstrative moralknowledge and mathein theanalogybetween thisis hisbelief It is farfrom that obvious,however, matics,or visionrespectively. is thatthere AllthatLockehas shown can be accepted. sucha parallel and thatcertain in mathematics empirical are self-evident principles Withouta can in some sense be called self-evident. propositions on which he relies oftheanalogy he cannot ofthetruth demonstration moralproposiof self-evident the existence claimto have indicated scienceof ethics.In of a demonstrative tions,or, forthat matter, fromthose of are different and ideas moral very judgments fact, a of is kind thatdiffers moral and necessity obligation mathematics, In causal other from as it does words, from necessity. logicalnecessity c 33

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PHI LOSOPHY is doomedto fail to provethata moralruleis binding any attempt to provethat a geoto be thesame as an attempt ifit is considered is valid. demonstration metrical of I concludethat,forthe reasonsI have given,Locke's theory that becausethe difficulties which naturallaw is open to criticism; in any philosophical defence are liableto be present besethis theory no suchdefence can eversucceed.To ofthislaw as a law ofreason, say thisis not to denythatnaturallaw is acceptableas thebasis of which if one regardsit as a premiseof thought moral obligation offaith, or an i.e. as an article by reason, justified cannotbe further I have thatwhich issuefrom ideal.But thiswouldbe a verydifferent a philosophical in thispaper,and becauseit is notprimarily discussed into it further. It shouldbe reto I do not go propose problem, in his later came to that Locke years, himself, however, membered, of mere nature as a his thought, of a law of premise theidea regard in certaintheoretical difficulties and that he musthave perceived to publishhis own this notion,for he could neverbringhimself in the essays. doctrine ofwhatI have triedto say in thispaper. Here thenis a summary of the idea of naturallaw from First I outlinedthe development ofwhatLocke times. account ThenI gavea brief to modern antiquity that law in his Treatise and showed ofGovernment saysaboutnatural forhispolitical and importance law it is offundamental as a rational themostdetailedaccountofhis we find However, moralphilosophy. discovered ofnatural law in recently essays,theworkofhis doctrine so fully intothe particulars he enters and it is becausethere youth, to a close of thislaw thatit is possibleforus to subjecthis theory lie. We the weaknesses and to pointout exactlywhere examination in the central arisesfrom an ambiguity saw thatthe chiefdifficulty is liable to notion,that of reason.I explainedthat this ambiguity ofnatural that in anytheory law to theextent giveriseto confusions an attempt to justify the moral rationally represents such a theory ofjustification wouldbe in the law as a law ofreason.Sucha process but sincethemainterm, thatofreason, ofa logicaldeduction; form in different senses,thereare bound to occur would be employed fromone kindof discourse to another.The inferences illegitimate are fromfactualstatements in Locke's argument coninferences to statements reasonto definitions reason;thence concerning cerning from whichcertain made by reason, ethicalstateabout discoveries ofrational force are derived; thebinding principles ments concerning in their are thought to be like statements in thesestatements, turn, an analogy which obscures i.e. capableoflogicalproof, mathematics, moraland logicalnecessity. between the distinction forI5 July, i678 (Bodleian is Locke'sJournal entry [The following 34

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JOHN

LOCKE

AND

NATURAL

LAW

MS. Locke f.3, pp. 20I-2), headed Lex naturae. The chronological ofLocke's essays it fallsis discussed in myedition context in which it forms a part on natural law,pp. 66-7; themoraldoctrine ofwhich is to my mindbest explainedby H. Sidgwick in his Outlines ofthe the History of Ethics,6th ed., 1946,pp. 175-8. I have modernized spelling and punctuation of the passage,published hereforthe first time. creatures 'God havinggivenman above other ofthishabitable partof ofhimself theuniverse a knowledge whichthe beastshave not,he is thereby under obligations, which thebeastsarenot,forknowing God to be a wiseagent;he cannot butconclude thathe has thatknowledge inhimself which he finds and thosefaculties abovetheother creatures the givenhim forsome use and end. If therefore he comprehends relation between father and son and finds it reasonable thathis son whom he has begot (only in pursuanceof his pleasurewithout ofhis son) and nourished thinking shouldobey,love, and reverence to him,he cannotbut find himand be grateful it muchmorereasonable thathe and everyother man shouldobeyand revere, love and thanktheauthoroftheir beingto whomtheyowe all thattheyare. If he finds it reasonable to punishone of his children that injures he cannotbut expectthe same from another, God the Fatherof all ifhe finds it reasonable thathis men,whenany one injures another; should assist and one another and it from children them help expects as their duty,willhe notalso by thesamereasonconclude thatGod thesame ofall menone to another? expects If he finds thatGod has made himand all othermenin a statewherein theycannotsubsist without to discern what is societyand has giventhemjudgement that society, can he but concludethat he is capable of preserving and thatGodrequires himto follow thoserules which conduce obliged to thepreserving ofsociety?'] University ofDurham.

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