T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu M. B. SHAH, J.

- Unprecedented action of the Tamil Nadu Government terminating the services of all employees who have resorted to strike for their demands was challenged before the High Court of Madras by filing writ petitions. Learned Single Judge by interim order inter alia directed the State Government that suspension and dismissal of employees without conducting any enquiry be kept in abeyance until further orders and such employees be directed to resume duty. That interim order was challenged by the State Government by filing writ appeals. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the interim order and arrived at the conclusion that without exhausting the alternative remedy of approaching the Administrative Tribunal, writ petitions were maintainable. It was pointed out to the Court that the total detentions were 2211, out of which 74 were ladies and only 165 male and 7 female personnel have so far been enlarged on bail, which reveals pathetic condition of the arrestees. The arrestees were mainly clerks and subordinate staff. The Court, therefore, directed that those who were arrested and lodged in jails be released on bail.

Now coming to the question of right to strike - whether Fundamental, Statutory or Equitable/Moral Right - in our view, no such right exists with the government employees. (A) There is no fundamental right to go on strike Law on this subject is well settled and it has been repeatedly held by this Court that the employees have no fundamental right to resort to strike.

(B) There is no legal/statutory right to go on strike There is no statutory provision empowering the employees to go on strike. Further, there is prohibition to go on strike under the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. Rule provides that no Government servant shall engage himself in strike or in incitements thereto in similar activities. It states that for the purpose of this

rule the expression similar activities shall be deemed to include the absence from work or neglect of duties without permission and with the object of compelling something to be done by his superior officers or the Government or any demonstrative fast usually called hunger strike for similar purposes.no Government servant shall conduct any procession or hold or address any meeting in any part of any open ground adjoining any Government Office or inside any Office premises (a) during office hours on any working day; and (b) outside office hours or on holidays, save with the prior permission of the head of the Department or head of office, as the case may be. (c) There is no moral or equitable justification to go on strike Apart from statutory rights, Government employees cannot claim that they can take the society at ransom by going on strike. Even if there is injustice to some extent, as presumed by such employees in a democratic welfare State, they have to resort to the machinery provided under different statutory provisions for redressal of their grievances. Strike as a weapon is mostly misused which results in chaos and total maladministration. Strike affects the society as a whole and particularly when two lakh employees go on strike en masse the entire administration comes to a grinding halt. In the case of strike by a teacher, entire educational system suffers; many students are prevented from appearing in their exams which ultimately affect their whole career. In case of strike by Doctors, innocent patients suffer in case of strike by employees of transport services, entire movement of the society comes to a stand still; business is adversely affected and number of persons find it difficult to attend to their work to move from one place to another or one city to another. On occasions public properties are destroyed or damaged and finally this creates bitterness among public against those who are on strike.

The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers Union, Madras v. The Registrar of Trade Unions

ANANTANARAYANAN, J. The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers Union is a Services Association which has been recognised by Government, and the membership of which is open, to all Non-Gazetted Government Officers employed under the Government of Madras except the Executive Officers of the Police and Prisons Departments and the last grade Government servants The Association represented by ten of its members applied on 23-12-1957 to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madras, for registration as a Trade Union. The Registrar rejected this application, in which, he held that such an Association of ministerial employees of the Administrative Departments of offices of the Government of Madras could not claim to be a Trade Union at all and was not eligible for registration under the Act. We shall set forth, a little subsequently, the relevant definitions and provisions of the Indian Trade Unions Act, though the learned Judge was definitely of the view that these two enactments are not in pari materia and do not together constitute any code or legislation it is at least indisputable that sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are also very relevant for purposes of comparative analysis. But before doing this, it is essential for an appreciation of the basic issues, to summarise the grounds upon which the learned Judge rejected the petition before him. After referring to the definition of Trade Union in the Trade Unions Act, the learned Judge pointed out that a vital consideration would be the content or significance of the word workmen . And he was of the view that this word primarily signify only manual labourers or workers of that class. This was one ground upon which the learned Judge ultimately concluded that civil servants of the present Association could not be considered as workmen at all. Next the learned Judge pointed out that the concept of collective bargaining, which is the rationale behind the

Trade Union movement and the existence of the Trade Unions was wholly inappropriate when applied to Government servants. This was all the more so in this country where the civil service was not a mere tenure at the pleasure of the Crown, as in the United Kingdom, but where constitutional safe-guards were themselves the subject of elaborate statutory rules. A strike, the acknowledged weapon of Labour organisations, must be considered inconceivable as a normal feature of the relationship between the State and its civil servants, at least with regard to essential state functions. This was another vital ground on which the learned Judge considered that this Services Association was not a trade union and could not be registered as such. Finally, the learned Judge referred to the Memorandum of Association and the objects, to which we have made earlier reference. He stressed that those objects were benevolent and ameliorative and that they could not sustain the interpretation that the association existed for regulating the relations between workmen and employers (State) or, in brief, for collective bargaining with the State. Upon all these grounds, the petition was dismissed. The Act entitles a Trade Union to apply for registration, and provides that the application shall be accompanied by a copy of the rules of the Trade Union, and statement of specified particulars. Where a Trade Union has been in existence for more than one year before the making of the application for its registration, a further general statement of assets and liabilities is required to be submitted. Under the act, the Registrar may call for further information, for the purpose of satisfying himself that an application complied with the provisions of the Act and that the Trade Union is entitled to registration. The Registrar may refuse to register a Trade Union until such information is supplied. The learned counsel argues that where as in this case the Registrar did not call for any further information. He has really no jurisdiction to decline registration. This argument is obviously unsustainable.

The very terms are that the Registrar has to register the Union on being satisfied that the Trade Union has complied with all the requirements of this Act; this shows that where the definitions under the act are themselves inapplicable to the so called Union, the Registrar has every power to decline the registration.

We think it is clear that there are two broad grounds upon which the claim of the appellant Union to registration as a Trade Union could be properly resisted. The first ground is inherent to the very constitution of the Union, and the admitted facts of its structure, in relation to a basic principle stressed by the Supreme Court; we do not see how this ground of objection can in any manner be negative. The second ground is more open to controversy, but even here we are inclined to the view that at least as relative to the core of the civil services entrusted with the implementation of the essential and sovereign functions of Government, the ground of objection is valid. But the first ground alone is really sufficient to dispose of the present appeal.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees Union S.D. PANDIT, J. The Plaintiff Standard Chartered Bank against in all five defendants. Defendant No. 1, Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union, is the Union of the employees of the plaintiff Bank whereas defendants 2 to 5 are its office bearers. Out of these office bearers defendant No. 4 was working in the Loan Centre Unit of the plaintiffs branch at 17, Parliament Street, New Delhi and by letter dated 1.11.1995 he has been transferred to Darya Ganj Branch and the said order was served on the defendant No. 4 on 2.11.1995. It is the case of the plaintiff that on 3.11.1995 the defendants and its members started shouting pitched slogans against the management using filthy language for its officers and created unruly scenes, thumped the tables and caused hindrance to the officers in discharging their duties and also obstructing the customers. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants have also extended threats of physical violence to the officers of the plaintiff Bank and they have resorted to illegal strike. They had also made it known to the plaintiff that they would intensify and would instigate and resort to more violent activities and hold demonstrations, gheraos, dharnas, strike and obstruct ingress and egress of the plaintiff officers, willing employees as well as the customers. All these things are being committed in order to put pressure on the plaintiff and to coerce the plaintiff to withdraw the transfer order. Plaintiff has, therefore, filed the present suit to get a decree of perpetual injunction to restrain defendants and its employees from instigating and abetting other employees and to resort to strike, holding of demonstrations, shouting slogans, resorting to dharnas, gheraos and putting up loudspeakers within the radius of 500 metres on all sides of the plaintiffs branch at 17, Parliament Street, New Delhi. Along with the suit plaintiff has filed interim application,injunction and this Court was pleased to pass ex-parte order of ad-interim injunction with a show-cause notice as to why the ad-interim injunction issued against them should not be made absolute. In pursuance of the said show-cause notice the defendants have put in appearance. They have filed their objections to the interim application. They have also filed written

statement to the main suit and they have filed another application, to vacate the order of ad-interim injunction. It is contended by the defendants that the transfer of defendant No. 4 by the plaintiff is contrary to the provisions of Sastri Award, which is binding against the plaintiff. They further contended that they have never given any threats of causing physical violence and they had only done peaceful demonstration and that too out of the Bank building. They contended that the plaintiff has misled the Court by making false allegations against them and has obtained ex-parte order of ad-interim injunction. They further contended that it is their fundamental right to go on strike and that there cannot be any order of injunction against them from proceeding on strike. They contended that they never intended to obstruct the working of the plaintiff Bank when they themselves are the employees of the same. They had never tried to instigate any worker or had threatened any officer of the plaintiff or had obstructed any customer coming to the Bank. Therefore, in these circumstances, they seek the vacation of the ex-parte order of ad-interim injunction. Thus, in view of the controversy between the parties, I have to consider the question as to whether the defendants have got the right to go on strike and whether there could be any order of injunction against the defendants. It is the contention of the defendants that the transfer of defendant No. 4 is contrary to the provisions of Sastry Award. There is no dispute over the fact that Sastry Award is binding against the plaintiff as well as the defendants. Defendants are relying on the following observations in the Sastry Award: (1) Every registered Bank employees Union from time-to-time shall furnish the Bank with the names of the President, Vice-President and the Secretaries of the union; (2) Except in very special cases, whenever the transfer of any of the above-mentioned office bearer is contemplated, at least five clear working days notice should be put up on the notice boards of the Bank of such contemplated action; (3) Any representations, written or oral, made by the union shall be considered by the Bank; (4) If any order of transfer is ultimately made, a record shall be made by the Bank of

such representations and the Banks reasons for regarding them as inadequate; and (5) The decision shall be communicated to the union as well as to employee concerned. It is an admitted fact that defendant No. 4 has been transferred from one office to another office of the plaintiff and it is also an admitted fact that the procedure laid down by Sastry Award was not followed before issuing the said transfer order. It is not at all necessary for me to go into the question as to whether the transfer of defendant No. 4 is contemplated by the above-quoted provisions of Sastry Award because to make any observations in respect of this would amount to deciding the main suit substantially and the controversy between the parties could be decided without recording even any prima facie finding regarding the said controversy. Assuming for the sake of convenience the contention of the defendants that the transfer of defendant No. 4 is contrary to the provisions of Sastry Award whether they are entitled to go on strike or not will have to be considered. Learned Counsel for the defendants has referred to the Industrial Disputes Act and contended that if at all the plaintiff was aggrieved by their activities they ought to have approached the Government and the Government ought to have referred the industrial dispute to a Competent Authority and while making such a reference the Government is to pass an order prohibiting continuance of any strike or lockout. But the plaintiff cannot come before the Court and get the relief because it is the fundamental right of a worker to go on strike. No doubt in view of the provisions, citizens have freedom of speech, freedom to form association or union but that does not mean they can exercise the said right at any public place they please to exercise the same. According to learned Counsel for the defendants, employees are entitled to have demonstration to get their grievances redressed but it must be remembered that they have no right to indulge in undignified activities in the office premises of the employer and interfere in the working of the Company. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 lays down that no person employed in public utility service shall go on strike in breach of contract without giving the employer a

notice within six weeks before striking and within 14 days of giving of such notice. Apart from this, even assuming that they are entitled to go on strike they cannot exercise the said right so as to cause nuisance to the employer. Their right to go on strike is not unlimited. As the Indian citizens when they want to exercise the fundamental right to form a union and to have demonstrations for the redressal of their grievances, they have got to remember that they have also got a reciprocal duty so as not to cause nuisance or mental or physical danger to their employers and others. As the employer can move the Government and the Government can refer the disputes to the Industrial Court, it is equally open for defendant No. 4 to approach the Labour Court to challenge his transfer. He as well as defendant No. 1, cannot take the law in their hands and behave and act in such a manner so as to cause nuisance to others. No doubt it is their contention that the transfer of defendant No. 4 is illegal and, therefore, they are entitled to go on strike but for that purpose they must follow the procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act and after following the said procedure they can exercise their right to go on strike by bearing in mind that they cannot cause nuisance to the plaintiff or others. Learned Counsel for the defendant contended that when they are entitled to go on strike they are entitled to have posters and banners as well as demonstrations. But they cannot have the demonstrations, dharnas or sticking of posters and tying of banners within the premises of their employer. They can have peaceful demonstrations out of the premises of the employer. They can, after following the procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act, use black strips or other modes of showing their displeasure and for being on strike. They can put up banners or posters which are not obscene or obnoxious but that too not within the building of their employer. The Plaintiffs are seeking an order of ad-interim injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing and circulating or displaying any pamphlets or any other material within the plaintiffs premises as well as carrying on themselves mouth masks, caps, any playcards, badges and/or any improper apparel or to participate, organise or to sit on relay

hunger strike. Similarly, the using of badges or putting mask on the mouth or wearing some caps indicating that they are going to strike if they happen to fulfil the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Court cannot restrain them from doing so. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of B.R. Singh v. Union of India (supra) that strike is a form of demonstration against the activities of the employer and goslow, sit-in, work-to-rule, absentism are the modes of demonstrations and the workers have got right to make such demonstrations. Therefore, the claim made by the plaintiff could not be absolutely allowed. They cannot make use of the premises of the plaintiff for displaying their banners, pamphlets or hand-bills but they cannot be prevented from making use of the same out of the premises of the plaintiff. If there happened to be any defamatory or obscene banners of pamphlets the plaintiffs have got the proper remedy under the law taking action for the same but Court cannot pass an order in anticipation of commission of such acts. 13. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, order passed will stand modified in the following terms: Defendants 1 to 5 and their employees, members, office-bearers and agents are restrained by ad-interim injunction from instigating and abetting other employees other than the members of defendant No. 1 to resort to strike. Defendants 1 to 5, their employees, members, office-bearers and agents are hereby further restrained by an ad-interim injunction from resorting to strike unless they comply with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5, their employees, members, office-bearers and agents are hereby further restrained by an ad-interim injunction from holding any demonstrations in front of the office building or adjoining office building within an area of 50 sq. metres around the building by putting up loud-speakers between office hours. However, it is made quite clear that they can hold peaceful demonstrations if they happen

to proceed on strike or they intend to proceed on strike during lunch hours and before and after office hours of the plaintiff Bank in the parking area adjoining Bank of Baroda and in front of DLF building without causing obstruction to public at large. Defendants 1 to 5, their employees, members, office-bearers and agents are hereby further restrained from posting or putting up any pamphlets and banners on any walls or in the building of the plaintiff Bank. Defendants 1 to 5, their employees, members, office-bearers and agents are further restrained from raising slogans or preventing ingress and egress of any office bearer, members of the staff and customers of the plaintiff Bank. The prayer of the plaintiff to restrain the defendants, its employees, members, office bearers and agents from putting up badges or mouth-masks or cards on their clothes or wearing caps are rejected.