An Investigation of La Voix et le phnomne

Eui Geun Ryu Abstract This paper starts by recalling the philosophical importance and significance of Derridas criticism of Husserl. We reconstructed and reviewed under the subtitle of strat egies of deconstruction how Derrida unfolded Husserl's phenomenology in La Voix et le phnomne. We examined critically Husserls phenomenological concept of sign focuse d on indication, expression, and temporality. His reflection is so much centered on prese nce that sign results in nothing. This result is not what his phenomenology of sign was i ntended to do. But it happens. With this, his linguistic reduction is revealed to neither m ake complete nor be accomplished with self-evidence. Derrida explains this phenomeno logical limit is drawn from some kind of structure which is referred to as the complicity between ideality and voice. By relying on this delimitation, we recognize the original in sights of Derridas reading of Husserl. It lies in the fact that the naivet immanent in Hu sserls presence is supported originally by non-presence, that is, diffrance. While we cl assify and reply to objections raised against Derrida, it is shown that he is defendable. A fter this is successful, we suggest what we were able to learn from Derridas confrontati on with Husserl. Keywords Derrida Husserl presence origin deconstruction differance sign indication expression temporality 1. Introduction

In 1967 at the age of 37, Derrida (1930-2004) publishes three books successively in which he criticizes and deconstructs Husserls phenomenology and presence of metaphy sics: La voix et le phnomne1; De la grammatologie2 ; LEcriture et la diffrence3. Of c ourse, he had previously done other related work. In 1966 at the age of 36, there was an essay La Phnomnologie et la clture de la mtaphysique; 4 in 1962 at the age of 32, he translated and wrote the introduction for Edmund Husserls, LOrigine de la gomtr ie5, and also in 1959 at the age of 29, he presented the article Gense et structure et la p hnomnologie.6 All of them are concerned about interpretation, criticism, and deconst ruction of Husserls phenomenology.

Admittedly, the three books distinguished Derrida as a genius in international philo sophical circles while the rest count as introductions to deconstructive philosophy and cr iticism of Husserls phenomenology. Starting his professional life as a Husserl scholar, Derrida authored La voix et le phnomne the best among writings on philosophy. The r eason is that this book, even though looking like a branch of De la grammatologie and LEcriture et la diffrence, was written with classical philosophical rigor and radicality.7 This self-evaluation was confirmed by the high praise of the English edition after it s being translated and introduced to English-speaking readers. Many a Husserl scholar a cknowledges that Derridas La voix et le phnomne measures up to the highest standard s of scholarly rigor.8 But when it comes to criticism and appraisal, the story get different.
9

The spectrum of responses to Derridas text which aims at phenomenological deconstr

uction is very broad. In other words, regarding Derridas criticism of Husserls phenome nology, some support, some admire, some criticize, some sympathize, some reject, some agree and some waver. Comparing the American response to the Korean one10, we discover there seems to be a virtually similar situation. The difference simply lies in the fact that many scholars in America participate in responding to Derridas text while in Korea, a small group of s cholars respond. Nam In Lee, as Husserl specialist, is clearly critical. Jin Seok Kim acce pts Derridas analysis of Husserl and is trying to treat it critically. Eui Yong Bae makes a n effort to be fair to Derrida and Husserl while he agrees overall with Derridas criticism of the metaphysics of presence. Koung Sil Hong focuses on Derridas reading of the phe nomenology of Husserl and notes that Derrida's understanding of it is unilateral. More o n the outskirts of phenomenology, Jean Sou Moun is against the deconstructivism of De rrida. In terms of genetic epistemology or general systems theory, he objects to Derrida

s criticism of metaphysics of presence as a kind of metaphysical reduction. Jin Seok Ki m agrees. Whether these various responses to Derridas critique of Husserls phenomenology are objective and justified or not, the criticism of the metaphysics of presence and the ac cording strategy which Derrida supplied in La voix et le phnomne is clear and presents a very severe and fundamental challenge to the reader. This is a fatally important issue b ecause ones philosophical direction depends upon ones position on La voix et le phno mne. Moreover, this is an extremely profound issue because La voix et le phnomne is not only the climax of fifteen years of Husserl studies but also the continuation of his pr oject in Le Problme de la gense dans philosophie de Husserl, 11 the thesis he submitt ed in 1953 for his Master of Arts degree. To be honest, this is a problem for the new futu re and possibility of philosophy as well as for critically responding to and assessing Der ridas La voix et le phnomne. The shock which La voix et le phnomne has caused an d its aftermath can be seen as being mitigated by the critical replies and objections on th e part of the Husserlian school. But recently, Derridean faith, which accepts the facts tha t life rejects absolute origin and is riddled with non-presence, has been established firml y. So, we can ask the question: does non-presence distinct from presence function as a s hibboleth12 for phenomenology? Is it a final court for phenomenology? Does it effect a c losure of phenomenology, not an end of phenomenology? Is Husserlian phenomenology the Ephraim of sibboleth, Derridean phenomenology the Gilead of shibboleth?

2.

Strategies

of

deconstruction

As Husserls own phenomenology develops from constitutive phenomenology into ge

netic phenomenology, the basic problem of phenomenology comes to be revealed. So to speak, we can ask how phenomenology is possible. This is a problem of the possibility or ground of phenomenology itself. The key concepts and principles underlying Husserl s phenomenology turned out not to be self-evident and presuppositionless. For Husserl s phenomenology, we can plead that constituting and constituted, active synthesis and p assive synthesis, subjectivity and otherness, originating and originated, reducing and bei ng reduced, presenting and being presented, signifying and signified, factual and essenti al were involved and interwoven with each other. We call this the paradox of phenomen ology. The paradox of phenomenology can be referred to as the phenomenology of phe nomenology or phenomenological critique in the sense that we illuminate it by investiga ting phenomenology immanently or internally or, in other words, phenomenologically. On the other hand, it can be described either as trans- or super-phenomenology or transor super-phenomenological critique in the sense that we deconstruct phenomenology thr ough internal, i.e. phenomenological, critique or, in other words, on its own grounds. Derridas interpretation of Husserl can be characterized as a paradox of phenomeno logy, phenomenology of phenomenology, or phenomenological critique of phenomenolo gy. He starts with defining the basic problem of phenomenology to be the problem of ge nesis. What we call the problem of the origin of the world, in Husserls expression, is th e problem of Weltlichkeit der Welt.13 This task is to reveal the mystery of the world and of reason and to seize the meaning of the world as that meaning comes into being 14 Con sequently, Husserls phenomenology is basically static phenomenology, but also leads to genetic phenomenology which investigates the fundament and ground of genesis. At the same time, Derridas interpretation of Husserl is centered on the problem of how genesi s is possible. Therefore, for Derrida, the strategy of deconstruction is to reveal the contr

adictions embedded in Husserls genetic investigation. This is to set down and demonstr ate various contradictory or untenable propositions within Husserls phenomenology, an d to attempt thereby to institute a kind of insecurity and to open it up to the outside. 15 Th is also shows that the origin of the world cannot be determined as presence and sense w holly, and intuition and evidence must also be determined as non-presence and non-sens e even though these can be determined as non-mundane and non-existence. 16 In additio n, for Derrida, his own phenomenological critique is to expose phenomenologically wha t Husserls phenomenology presupposes unconsciously and on his way Derridas critiqu e of phenomenology becomes a critique of metaphysics, because Husserls phenomenol ogy would turn out to be a metaphysical project itself.17 Derrida will confess his own philosophical hypothesis on Husserls phenomenolog y and attempt to prove it to be justifiable.

First, he attempts to prove that beneath the serene use of these [phenomenological] co ncepts is to be found a debate that regulates and gives its rhythm to the progression of th e description, that gives to the description its animation, and whose incompleteness, w hich leaves every major stage of phenomenology unbalanced, makes new reductions an d explications indefinitely necessary; second, that this debate, at every instant endangeri ng the very principles of the method, appears [] to force Husserl to transgress the pure ly descriptive space and transcendental pretention of his research.18 Derrida attempts to demonstrate this hypothesis in La voix et le phnomne. His phe nomenological critique aims at Husserls phenomenological concept of sign. We should take notice of the fact that Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserls Phenom enology is the subtitle attached to the original title of this book. Derrida converts the pr

oblem of genesis into the problem of sign. In what follows, we will unfold some kind of dogmatism, speculation, naivet19 that lurked in Husserls phenomenology by scruti nizing Derridas war of language20 against Husserls theory of sign. First of all, we examine how Husserl reduces the sign phenomenologically. Genera lly, expression and indication are included under the heading sign. Certainly, indicatio n is a sign, like expression. But the two are heterogeneous and different. An expression delivers meaning. An indication is not what expresses anything at all. So then, indicatio n is a sign deprived of Bedeutung or Sinn, meaning, but expression is a meaningful sign. Thus, meaning is the essential element which distinguishes expression from indication. For Husserl, the expressiveness of expression always supposes the ideality of a Bedeutu ng.21 This is the first abstraction from sign. After dissociating a duality or heterogeneity of sign, Husserl pays now attention to a duality of expression. That is, besides the function of expressing meaning, expression has an indicating function like indication. When I am speaking to other people, my expr ession carries a meaning. At the same time, it operates as an indicative sign to them, and mutatis mutandis, in being spoken to me, the same happens. In brief, the same speech ac t can be grasped as an expression or indication. Therefore, the difference between indica tion and expression is not a substantial difference but a functional one. At first glance, it follows from this that the essential distinction between expression and indication is unte nable. But for Husserl, it is not. How is it so? Since indication is a sign without meaning, it must not hold an expressive function. If it is accepted, the first abstraction falls into a contradiction in terms. Thus, an expressi ve sign should not be considered a type of indication. So, Husserl has to prove expressio n is not that. He claims that expression must be separated from indication. It seems to us

that every expression is caught in any indicative process, but for Husserl, expression, if i t does not have a meaning-expressing function, can only occasionally perform an indicat ive function. So, the indicative function is never essential to expression. It is simply a ca sual property. At last, indicativity must be excluded from expression. This second abstra ction is evidence of the expressiveness of expression. The physical side or communicati ve function of sign has nothing to do with what the expression is. Therefore, the essence of expressivity of sign is cut from the interpersonal arena, and is described from the van tage point of the solitary life of the soul which means ones own private inner life. This i s the second reduction of sign. In Derridas view, a common problematic with the first and second reduction, whic h Husserl leaves untouched and pending, is as follows. First, for Husserl, the condition f or communicative possibility lies in the expressiveness of expression or the ideality of s ense, and this is a necessary consequence of Husserls abstraction. Although spoken lan guage is a highly complex structure, always containing in fact an indicative stratum, whi ch is difficult to confine within its limits, Husserl has nonetheless reserved for it the po wer of expression exclusively.22 In this context, Husserl does not consider that the possi bility of meaning is not covered wholly by pure logic and grammar and can depend upo n the possibility of language. He affirms that there is a pre-expressive stratum of lived e xperience or sense.23 He still holds that ideal object, that is, constitution of sense is essen tial to consciousness, but he looks down on the fact that it supposes history and that the element of consciousness and the element of language are difficult to discern from each other. Self-consciousness is never perfectly foreign or anterior to the possibility of lang uage.24 He ferrets out the unshaken purity of expression in a language without commu nication, in speech as monologue, in the completely muted voice of the solitary life of th

e soul.25 Second, since the expressiveness of expression presupposes the ideality of sense, th e expression is interpreted as want to say (something) in the sense that a speaking subj ect wants to say something by expressing himself about something. At this point, Bedeu tung or bedeuten is defined to be want to say (vouloir-dire). 26 However, since it is true that want to say, whether in monologue or dialogue, is always bound by the indicative thing, every expression contains the communicative value, and thus, the indicativeness p ertaining to expression cannot be attributed to the contingent quality of the expressive si gn. This factual necessity of the interweaving of indication and expression affects the es sential distinction according to the reduction of both. The essential distinction between e xpression and indication made possible by the phenomenological reduction of sign is te mporary only. How is it possible for Husserl to find a phenomenological situation in w hich expression is no longer caught up in this entanglement , no longer interwoven with indication?27 Can there be the solitary life of the soul, where expressions no longer ser ve to indicate anything?28 For Husserl, what is next is to describe the essence of expression in the solitary life of the soul. How does he describe the non-existence of indication in that field? We saw how he separated expression from indication. According to Husserl, expression as mea ningful signs are a twofold going-forth beyond itself of the sense ( Sinn) in itself, existin g in consciousness, in the with-oneself or before-oneself which Husserl first determined as the solitary life of the soul.29 At this point, we have to notice that meaning cannot go forth beyond consciousness into the outside. It is because meaning is not what exists in world. Accordingly, meaning which expression wants to say is reduced to inner monol ogue,30soliloquy immanent in consciousness. Finally, in expression, all empiricality of

oral discourses is excluded from meaning since such a thing is of the world. This is how the indicative field is removed from the viewpoint of the solitary life of the soul. The gr eat cost for this reduction, as we saw, was that expression remained inner voice, silent s ound. Thus it is present not in nature, but in consciousness, it is therefore present to the self in the life of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world, space, o r nature. In leading to this, we learn to realize that indication as the whole surface of lan guage is the process of death at work in signs. 31 But we know that indicative language is not what can be effaced. For Husserl, the reduction of expression changed the meaning of expression into in ner soliloquy. Husserl welcomes this result because it serves to remove all empirical and worldly thinghood, such as the physical, from language itself. If this bracketing is succe ssful, meaning does not necessitate its indicative sign. In other words, it has no need to be signified. It is immediately present to itself. It is living consciousness.32 This is why Husserl believes there is no indicative sign in the solitary life of the soul. Once again, in the interior soliloquy, my lived-experience departs from empirical objective reality. Owi ng to this conviction, Husserl tells us that in speaking to myself about my mental life, I communicate nothing to myself, and indication also is not needed. Shall one say that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e., as indications of ones own inner experiences? I cannot think such a view acceptable.33 On the contrary, we do not think Husserl is. Nonetheless, Husserl is trying to show his own opinion is right by proposing two kinds of argument. The first one is like the fol lowing.

(1) In inward speech, I communicate nothing to myself, I indicate nothing to myself. I c

an at most imagine myself doing so: I can only represent myself as manifesting somethi ng to myself. This, however, is only representation and imagination.34 The core word of this argument is representation and imagination. What I perform i n the inner monologue only serves to represent and imagine. In doing so, I do not comm unicate anything. I simply engage myself in representing. I am not engaging the real or actual world. I am not communicating in effect. I am just representing or imagining som e kind of actually void communication. According to Husserl, when we represent or ima gine a word, there is a radically different or heterogeneous order among the existing wor d, the imagined word, the imagination of the word, and the content of this imagination. I n the interior monologue, we are indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of the wor d. In the inward language, representation is a simple exteriority.35 So, as Husserl said, in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one t ell oneself anything: one merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. 36Through this argumentation we are led to the second one.

(2) In inward speech I communicate nothing to myself because there is no need of i t; I can only pretend to do so. Such an operation, the self-communication of the s elf, could not take place because it would make no sense, and it would make no sense because there would be no finality to it. The existence of mental acts does not have to be indicated (let us recall that in general only an existence can be ind icated) because it is immediately present to the subject in the present moment.37

The point here is that the indicative sign is not needed for us. It is misleading to say t hat in inner self-communication consciousness speaks to itself. The speaking subject,

when speaking to itself, cannot and need not send something to itself. However, do we agree that the actuality of what was spoken is excluded and red uced in this way? Indeed, was it excluded and reduced at all? If it was, Husserl could speak without language. He can speak without the medium of language. I do not spea k language. For me, language is impossible. If so, what is the language which Husserl uses when he reduces and describes the signs? According to Derrida, the sign and its meaning is always involved, always caught up, always contaminated in an indicative system.38 If Husserls language is once contaminated in an indicative relation, his red uction of the expression is delayed infinitely. It is because the exclusion and reduction of the language used has to be performed. This task is without end. As a result, the re duction becomes impossible. In a practical speech act, representation is not a contingent addition attached to s poken discourse. This view distorts the essence of linguistic expression. That represen tation is essential to the effective practice of language is what happens in language. L anguage in general is this thing as such.

When in fact I effectively use words, and whether or not I do it for communicative ends, I must from the outset operate a structure of repetition whose basic element can only be an irreplaceable and irreversible empirical particular. A sign which would take place but once would not be a sign.39 In the end, thanks to the result of reduction of the expression, the difference between rep resentation and reality is erased in the area of the sign. The sign is originally wrought b y fiction.40 The sign was eliminated in the phenomenological reduction. We can ackno wledge that the sign is the experience of the absence and uselessness of signs. 41 This g

oes against Husserls intention. In the second argument, we recognized that the meaning of expression is immediat ely present to the subject in the present moment. It is conceived as immediate presence of the living present. This self-presence appears as the undivided unity of a temporary p resent. There is no alterity42, no difference with it. This means there is no signification in it.43 It is primordial perception or intuition as the principle of the principles which holds sway. However, what if there is a signification in there? This claim leads to the refutation of the second argument. I mean the self-present moment of the lived-experience is not si mple and undivided. The self-identity of present now, actual now implies the non-identit y of itself. This deconstructive work is realized by examining the structure of temporaliz ation in Husserl.44 Self-presence always happens at the present moment. The present is a stream whic h consists of present perception, primary memory (retention), and primary expectation (protention). These three phases cannot be identical and must be distinguished. The act ual now is necessarily something punctual and remains so. 45 Undoubtedly, no now can be isolated as a pure instant, a pure punctuality. It belongs to the essence of lived experi ences that they must be extended, that a punctual phase can never be for itself. 46 Howe ver, despite all the complexity of its structures, temporality has a nondisplaceable cente r, an eye or living core, the punctuality of the real now.47 In this view, Husserl resolute ly maintains that there is no mention here of a continuous accommodation of perception to its opposite.48And yet, Husserl also says the following: The antithesis of perception is primary remembrance (retention) and primary expectation (protention), whereby perc eption and non-perception continually pass over into one another. 49 Furthermore, he sa

ys this: In an ideal sense, then, perception (impression) would be the phase of consciou sness which constitutes the pure now, and memory every other phase of the continuity. [] Moreover, it is also true that even this ideal now is not something toto caelo [entirel y] different from the not-now but continually accommodates itself thereto. The continua l transition from perception to primary remembrance conforms to this accommodation. 50 We can understand easily that Husserl rejects a continuous accommodation of livin g present to the second memory, i.e., reproduction. But it is difficult to understand that h e accepts a continual transition of perception to non-perception, i.e., of primal impressio n to the primary memory, that is, retention. This is because he said that both reproductio n and retention was non-perception. Since the reproduction as non-perception is disconti nuous with perception, the retention defined as non-perception must be discontinuous w ith perception. For Husserl, the retention can be a perception, in that he describes the ret ention as a modification of the present in terms of the present phase. So, he says that the retention can be continuous with perception. In this context, we can understand his prete nsion. But, if in this way a continual transition of perception to non-perception is possibl e, we have a problem with non-perception. The reproduction is a non-perception, and th e retention is also a non-perception. If the reproduction is discontinuous with a percepti on, the same stands for the retention. Now the retention can be continuous. Therefore, th e reproduction can be so. By the same logic, the reproduction is not just non-perceptiona l, and both reproduction and retention are the opposite or antithesis of perception. Now t he retention is perceptional. Therefore, the reproduction also becomes a perception. Fina lly, the reproduction is, at first, a non-perception, and now is defined to be a perception.

We are seeing retention as perception and non-perception, reproduction as perception an d non-perception. Thus, the retention which is the opposite of reproduction can be both t he opposite of reproduction and the same as reproduction. What is it that is implied in this? It is implied that the retention is both different fro m and the same as the reproduction. The retention is itself and is not. It is the same and i t is not the same. The retention is grasped as the undecidability phase which can be neit her this nor that. It remains as an undecidable moment which can be neither the present nor the past. The retention is both what is determined as the finite and what is determine d to be opened either way to the perceived now or the reproduced now, which according ly means to be delayed infinitely. The temporary phase or momentum is ambiguous, unc lear, undetermined, overlapped, accorded, differed and postponed. If the lived-experience, as Husserl admitted, is confined within the continuality of now and non-now, perception and non-perception, it is turned out that the now as punctu ality is the same and is not the same. We see that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention). Th ese nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do they occasionally accompany, the actual ly perceived now. They are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility. 51 We are accepting the alterity in the self-identity at the same instance in which the experi ence is present. The presence of the perceived present is with its non-presence and nonevidence. There is some kind of duration with the self- presence of the present as much as a moment of the blink of an eye. There is a dividable duration, unclear ambiguity lurk ing in the blink of an eye. This non-presence and otherness is the very condition of possi bility for presence, presentation, representation. Derrida considers the engagement, inter

vention, performance of this non-presence and otherness as irreducible in presence or in self-presence. What we call this trace or differance is always older than presence and p rocures for it its openness, prevents us from speaking about a simple self-identity im sel ben Augenblick.52 This constitutes, in the pure immanence of experience, the divergenc e involved in indicative communication and even in signification in general.53 Contrary t o Husserls belief, the point is that at the very instant it is perceived, the lived-experienc e is not a sign of itself, not present to itself without the indicative detour. For Derrida, if it is a sign of itself(index sui), it comes down to not to be a sign of itself. 54 This is why t he expressive language cannot be reduced to and exhausted by the moment of the blink of an eye.

3. Supplement of origin

From what we discussed, we found out that deep intimacy lies between presence an d non-presence or alterity. What is now at stake is why Husserl did not look sharp to thi s relation. This carelessness can count as an example for the natural attitude in the transc endental, phenomenological attitude. This is to show what the principle of the principles of Husserls phenomenology presupposes unconsciously. And it is an irreducible stuff. T he possibility for Husserls phenomenological reduction lies in the irreducible unity of p resence and non-presence. The reduction is impossible without this unity. So, the possib ility of reduction is the impossibility of reduction. Derrida attempts to show and supple ment the limitation of this phenomenology. He calls this work the supplement of origin. 55 In Husserl, the ideal object is what is reiterated infinitely and freed from the worldl

y space since it is a pure noema, which is expressible without going through the world. I n principle, it is independent of the world and has nothing to do with it. In this sense, thi s ideal being is nothing outside the world. 56 Since its presence to intuition has no esse ntial dependence on any worldly or empirical synthesis, it must be constituted, repeated, and expressed in a medium that does not impair the presence and self-presence, a mediu m which preserves both the presence of the object before intuition and self-presence. 57 It necessitates an element whose phenomenality does not have worldly form. The name of this necessary medium is the voice.58 To figure out this element is Derridas excellent in sight. He calls this element the complicity between voice and ideality59 Owing to this complicity, the subject points to an ideal object or sense which is hea rd from the voice without needing to go outside itself. The problem is how the voice can do the work. For this, the voice can know to hear itself and the expressed meaning is im mediately present in the act of expression. This business occurs without signification. In order that the speaker hears him- or herself on the inside of the voice, the signified with out the signifier must be possible and thus the signifier as such must be ideal. That is, th ere is nonsignification.60 At this point, the difference between the signified and the sig nifier is erased. This nonsignificative phonic signs are heard by subject. The voice dispo ses of, and is on a guarantee of ideality. The complicity between ideality and voice is alr eady pre-installed in the phenomenon. For Husserl, this complicity is presupposed as a p henomenological axiom. This is a last world, reality, which is not bracketed out and red uced. The transcendence of the voice is only apparent. The phenomenological voice gi ves itself out61, and the phenomenological consciousness lives on in this apparent tran scendence of the voice62The subject must not go forth to the outside of the ideality whe n explaining the transcendence of the phenomenological voice. The subject should perfo

rm an act of expression without going out to the outside of it, existing in the inside of lif e which is immediately present to itself. This means the subject is auto-affected purely a nd spontaneously. Now, the operation of hearing oneself in the voice is considered as pu re auto-affection. The voice is experienced and produced as an absolutely pure auto-affe ction. This auto-affection is no doubt the possibility for what is called subjectivity or th e for-itself, but, without it, no world as such would appear. 63 This auto-affection involv es the unity of sound, which is in the world, and voice in the phenomenological sense. O n this account, the subject needs not indicate or communicate anything to itself, and also the inward language about accusation or blaming is seen as nothing other than fictional. As pure auto-affection, the phenomenological voice sounding without sound, to tell the t ruth, is to produce sameness as self-relation within self-difference, to produce sameness as the nonidentical.64 This is the way the transcendental subject becomes the infinite one in Husserl, for the subject produces a difference infinitely within itself. This movement of difference which takes place endlessly along with the auto-affection is referred to as t he ultra-transcendental life65, that is, differance. Only this is what all metaphysics and phenomenology presuppose. Husserl did not appreciate the originality and radicality of t his movement, which requires another name because of its having never ever been inscri bed in language.66 In addition, we should not forget that the unity of sound and voice wa s only presupposed, not proven.

4. Objections and replies

Much criticism and many objections were raised against Derridean deconstructive philosophy including Derridas interpretation of Husserl.67 Herein we are limiting oursel

ves to the criticism against how Derrida interprets Husserls phenomenology. The critica l response to Derridas interpretation of Husserl in La Voix et le phnomne can be arran ged in four categories: first, against criticizing the essential distinction between indicatio n and expression and the essence of the expression; second, against criticizing the pheno menology of temporality; third, against being critical of it by labeling Husserls phenom enology as a metaphysics of presence, and, fourth, against assuming a biased criticism t oward Husserl by not distinguishing genetic phenomenology from static phenomenolog y. We will summarize each objection and reply to it point-by-point. First, Husserl posits the essential difference between indication and expression. Th e indicative relation between A and B is not the expressive one between A and B. In the former, we motivate B by A, that is, we believe or surmise B when seeing A. This is ho w to use A indicates B. For Husserl, this indicative relation is an external, subjective o ne, not necessary one. In the latter, the meaning of expression has nothing to do with A or B, which forms the indicative relation. The expression points to the referent through i ts meaning, but nonetheless, the meaning of the expression is not the referent to which i s being referred through the meaning. This referent is simply an occasional object. Thus, the essence of expression is different from the essence of indication. It is an intentional constituting act distinguished from physical realization or accomplishment. Husserls pu rpose or intention in this difference between indication and expression is to bracket emp iricality and psychology, out of language. In this sense, the essential difference between indication and expression is tantamount to the process of the phenomenological reductio n. So, if we do not accept the essential difference as the exclusion from comprehensive coverage of indicative surface, the reduction of indication can be misread or distorted. D erridas double reading, the constructive deconstruction of Husserl, is such a case.

But, to be loyal to Husserls text does not mean that it needs no interpretation. If H usserls intention and his text must continue to be honored, Derridas specific intentions should be respected as well. Both Husserls claims and Derridas aims must be respecte d if an interpretation even potentially persuasive to all parties is to be mounted. 68 The p roblem is whether we can present justifiably how the result of the reduction brings abou t what is at odds with itself. Derrida is claiming that the phenomenological reduction ha s a limit. Husserl dismisses an indication which conceives the objective ideality and nec essity by setting aside, abstracting and reducing the indication as an extrinsic and empiri cal phenomenon.69 The reducing process of indication prompts us, on the one hand, to a ccept the existence of a pre-expressive layer of sense and, on the other hand, to suppose the freedom of this sense-layer from the indicative empirical reality. However, differentl y from Husserl, we believe that the expressive meaning of language cannot be liberated from the linguistic community and its historical embodiment. Even though we admit the pre-linguistic sense layers, it has a relative autonomy regarding the expressive meaning of the spoken discourse, not absolutely dominion over it. This means that the complete r eduction is impossible and that the reduction is accomplished in part. It is acknowledged that Husserls reduction misses some part of the essence of motivation within the indicat ion and the essential part of the expression. Second, according to Husserl, the living present which Derrida designated as sourc e-point is used in a variety of senses in terms of the developmental phase of the phenom enological description.70 For Husserl, on the one hand, it is used as the timely moment w ith which the specific temporal object begins, on the other hand, as when the primal imp ression is appointed as the starting point for the generation of retention. Now-phase is a constituted intentional co-relative, and primal impression is a momentum of constituting

consciousness. Both are discerned in accordance with the placement of the context. Ther e must be no confusion about it. The same is with perception. 71 In the context of tempor al extension, perception can be described as a transition to retention. The context, in whi ch perception is conceived as an impression, points to the fact that perception is depend ant on consciousness. In taking these things into consideration, it is not contradictory to claim that perception can be continuous with retention as non-perception. But For Derrida, it is not important for Husserl to use the concept of perception in s everal senses according to context, or to conform the living present with the now-phase or primal impression. What is important is the fact that each one of the three phases of t he consciousness of inner time is exposed to non-evidence, inapodicticity in describing t he streaming of absolute consciousness in terms of the triple structures of retention, pres ent, protention. Derrida puts the privilege of the present in suspicion. For Husserl, the pr esent self-presence of consciousness has the privilege because without this, any percept ual phenomenon is not given. Derrida launches the investigation on this privilege of the living present. Derridas suspicion on the phenomenological evidence of the presence is based on the fact that living present or presence is more than itself, not simpliciter. It is t he phenomenological data which resists the metaphysics of presence, surpasses the valu e of the metaphysics of presence. There is the phenomenological givenness which is not incorporated within the problematic of the metaphysics of presence. Owing to a surplus which is not present to the living present, Husserls texts unfold thoroughly within the f ield of tension which pervades the opposition between the ideal of an absolute, perceptu al presence of the flow itself, and the impossibility, evinced in the phenomenological an alysis of the flow, of ever realizing this ideal. This tension marks the relationship betwee n perception and re-presentation, between primordial impression and retention.72 It is re

marked that the phenomenology of consciousness of internal time is confined within the metaphysics of presence, as uncritically caught in the desire for and the will to presence. Derrida discovers the other Husserl while seeing the essential Husserl. Third, in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl discriminates between genuine metaphysi cs and ungenuine metaphysics, that is, historically degenerate metaphysics, and affirms positively that metaphysics in the ungenuine customary sense by no means conforms to the sense with which metaphysics, as first philosophy, was instituted originally. 73 Accor ding to Husserl, the earliest and most original concept of philosophy is restored in the tr anscendental phenomenology and philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation.74 This philosophy is identical with the philosophy which in the a ncient Platonic and again in the Cartesian sense is truly science. Precisely, this idea of p hilosophy is extremely Greek and metaphysical,75 and thus, the phenomenological meth od as such is also a metaphysical project. The problem lies in how Husserls idea and m ethod of philosophy successfully surpasses traditional classical metaphysics to overcom e the metaphysical speculation. The corroborative evidence is that he does not ask the q uestion, what is the sign in general, when he goes about defining the concept of sign. The question yields the sign to the paradigm of traditional metaphysics. That approach r equires that an essential unity is presupposed within sign. This way of thinking is incons istent with the phenomenological attitude since it is infected with a certain naivet. By means of the phenomenological epoch and reduction, the sign is considered as the stru cture of an intentional movement.76 By virtue of the success of the phenomenological method, Husserl could claim that phenomenology does not exclude metaphysics as suc h, but excludes all naive metaphysics. 77 In keeping this point in mind, Husserls phenom enology cannot be blamed as being the metaphysics of presence. Even though the pheno

menology of Husserl, as a historical repetition of the Greek metaphysics, was dominated by metaphysics, the value and control of presence is not what must be given up. As Moh anty retorted, phenomenology as metaphysics can absorb the absence in the framework of metaphysics of presence.78But, if this explanatory objection can be accepted fully, a f undamental problem still remains for Husserl. It is the belief that for phenomenology as metaphysics of subjectivity, there is no such thing as sign in self-presence of consciousn ess. Husserl conceives of a presence and self-presence of the subject before speech or i ts signs, a subjects self-presence in a silent and intuitive consciousness. 79 In other wor ds, he believes the transcendental subject bestows a sense to the language without langu age. Consciousness of speaking is not linguistic.80 Consciousness, as a speaking subject, is the subject which produces the sense of language by the intentional act. However, it is questionable that consciousness could be self-present transparently when it is signifying as the meaning-source of linguistic sign. Is consciousness, in the transcendental self-refl ection, the absolutely autonomous being, which is never dependent on langue or parole? Is consciousness resolutely irreducible and ungenerated?81 This conviction supposes th at prior to signs and outside them, and excluding every trace and difference, something s uch as consciousness is possible. It supposes, moreover, that, even before the distributio n of its signs in space and in the world, consciousness can gather itself up in its own pre sence.82 The privilege which consciousness enjoys in the metaphysics of presence is inf ected with a certain naivet. We have to put this privilege in doubt. We can call it trans cendental sleep which is comparable to the anthropological sleep of Foucault. When awaking from this sleep, it is manifested that the privilege is unconscious metaphysical presupposition and desire. We thus might go further to posit presence, consciousness, th e being-next-to-itself of consciousness as a determination and effect within a system w

hich is no longer that of presence but that of difference. 83 Similarly, according to what Saussure reminded us of, we have to notice not that language is not a function of the spe aking subject, but, vice versa, that the subject is a function of language. Because one be comes a speaking subject only by conforming ones speech to the system of linguistic pr escriptions taken as the system of differences, or at least to the general law or differenc e, by conforming to that law of language which Saussure calls language without speech. 84 To say the least, insofar as the speaking subject is speaking or signifying, it cannot ex ist and persist simply as evident, translucent self-consciousness. Fourth, Husserls phenomenology is a genetic phenomenology as well as a static p henomenology. The one engages in describing the immanent structure of pure conscious ness to found the validity of scientific knowledge. The other describes the genesis and st ructure of the constituted consciousness, not the constituting consciousness. 85 For exam ple, it analyzes the passive synthesis. An authoritative Husserl specialist goes so far as t o say it is a generative phenomenology. 86 This phenomenology describes the origin and genesis of the transcendental constitution of life by means of the generative dimensions of social, cultural, historical world beyond the ontology of life-world along with static a nalysis. It is remarkable that Husserls constitutive analyses entail static, genetic, and g enerative methods.87 The static phenomenology functions as a leading clue to a genetic one, and the genetic phenomenology functions as a leading clue to generative one. The r elationship among the leading clues is a law of necessary succession, a law of genesis. 88 So, the system of static phenomenology cannot be completed without the genetic investi gation. The one can be investigated separately without the other, but they are reciprocal, complementary, and mutually dependent. Therefore, the strategy of Derridas deconstru ction might be applied to Husserls early phenomenology, but it does not account for the

constitutive analyses in his late phenomenology. This clarification can be helpful to a certain extent. However, we want to ask the q uestion: what is implied in the transition from the static constitutive description of consc iousness to the genetic constitution? What does it mean that Husserl comes to the analys es of passive synthesis from the noema-noesis structure of transcendental consciousness through constitution of inner-time consciousness? This phenomenological development suggests what the consciousness cannot be conscious of is given within a simple self-ide ntity im selben Augenblick. To tell the truth, there is an unconscious content that would only subsequently become conscious.89 Consequently, the genetic phenomenology lead s to a possibility of unconscious thinking. On the basis of this possibility, consciousness is not necessarily consciousness in each of its phases, 90 and what I do not know can dete rmine me as a spirit,91 and moreover, what is not intentionally included in my lived expe riences can motivate me even unconsciously.92 It follows that the condition of conscious ness is unconsciousness, the possibility of consciousness is the possibility of unconsciou sness, the phenomenology of consciousness is the phenomenology of unconsciousness. Surely, there is a certain alterity93 which is invisible within the self-presence of th e living present. The supplement, sign, writing, or trace 94 of the otherness in wh ich the subject is lacking is called differance95 which is older than presence and histor y. Husserl will perform the phenomenological reduction and description without rest in order to appropriate all the incidences of primordial non-presence for self-presence of c onsciousness. Unfortunately, this task is forever incomplete. There is non-presence as m uch as presence, difference sameness, split unity, deficiency aseity. In the end, in Analys en zur passiven Synthesis (1918-26), Husserl comes to admit the consciousness which c an be constituted only subsequently96 while he denies the possibility of unconscious thin

king in Zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewutseins (1905).97 For Husserl, the alterity of the non-identical will have to be appropriate for the tran scendental subjectivity someday. The non-identical otherness is in need of reduction, but it is still out of reduction. The possibility of reduction is the impossibility of reduction. The difference always brings the impurity which was excluded back into self-conscious ness. This dialectics between difference and identity is why Husserl promulgated that th e phenomenologist exists as a perpetual beginner, and emphasized all through his life to his students to orientate themselves to the phenomenological reduction thoroughly an d vigorously.98 For this alterity, it seemed to Husserl that the only way out to it was to ex ercise vocationally and repeatedly the phenomenological attitude of epoche, which is co mparable to the complete personal transformation, greatest existential transformation , religious conversion.99 The phenomenological reduction may be compared to libid o, which fills its lack of being with complete oneness with the non-identical. However, t o satisfy this desire is deferred according to Freuds principle of reality. For a psychoana lysis-oriented philosophizing critic, Husserls phenomenology might have a suspicion o f being an unconscious obsessive neurosis.

5. Concluding remarks

Why did Husserls phenomenology fail to uncover a more primordial non-presence than presence? The answer is simple and clear. First, it is that his thought is dominated b y the schema of an absolute will-to hear-oneself-speak.100 He asserts the unbounded range (Schrankenlosigkeit) of objective reason.101 He has established the privilege of pr esence as consciousness, and is content with the founding value and validity of presenc

e. These, as a truism, have maintained a sort of hold on phenomenology down throug h the ages.102 This hold is already and powerfully at work in Husserls phenomenology. As this hold persists, in the linguistic field the essential difference between indication an d expression is believed to be able to be described in objectively fixed fashion, even tho ugh such attempts are as plainly vain as an inaccessible ideal.103 This essential difference is never respected from fact and reality, and it vanishes from right and ideality, since it li ves only from the difference between fact and right, reality and ideality. Their possibilit y is their impossibility.104 In the area of reduction, the possibility of reduction is its impo ssibility in that reduction is not only impracticable, for reasons of complexity, but also c annot in the vast majority of cases be carried out at all and will, in fact, never be capable of being carried out.105 Truly, the reduction is infinitely deferred.106 Further, Husserls determination of absolute subjectivity would also have to be crossed out as soon as we conceive the present on the basis of difference, and not the reverse. The concept of subje ctivity belongs a priori and in general to the order of the constituted.107 Presence as con sciousness can be historically constituted and demonstrated.108Second, since Husserl abs olutized presence as consciousness and had a strong tendency to be obsessed with transc endental subjectivity, he did not describe fully the role of language which is engaged in t he active constitution of meaning. He was so immersed in the schema of the metaphysic s of presence that he could not specify explicitly the non-presence and difference at the heart of presence in connection with language. Although he had not made a theme of ar ticulation, of the diacritical work of difference in the constitution of sense and signs, he at bottom recognized its necessity.109 Since the unity or combination of signifier and sig nified, which is as the central question for phenomenology of language, is the only reall y positive fact of language,110 the answer which Husserls phenomenology of language p

rovides is not thoroughgoing enough, and has not escaped from being naive to the probl em of the origin of language. Third, by being founded on this linguistic phenomenological simplicity, he, in the e nd, seeks the origin or foundation of language not in the physical voice, bodily speech i n the world, but in the phenomenological voice, transcendental breath, spiritual flesh wh ich continues to speak, be present to itself, and to hear itself in the absence of the world.
111

This intentional animation is nothing other than Geist. It is natural that the ideal essen

ce of expression is to be taken as an act of the transcendental subject. By its becoming i ncreasingly more difficult to discern between the element of consciousness and the elem ent of language regarding the relationship of consciousness to ideal object, the role of la nguage is despised and omitted, but the voice, as a medium which transforms the body o f the word into flesh and keeps the ideal object, occupies the phenomenological stage. B eing stuck on the phenomenon of voice, the phenomenological voice is called on to take on a larger role than language does. Fourth, Husserls phenomenology of temporality has a metaphysical presuppositio n, namely the conception of presence as the living present. This present is a now which all objects are given unto consciousness. In Husserl, the privilege is conceded to the pre sent, as a source-point for all phenomena, differently from retention, protention and so o n. This privilege of the present-now is acquired at the price of giving up or bypassing th e unconscious in the cogito in the temporal phase. Because an inaccessible unconscious thinking is implied in the moment of the blink of an eye in which the present is constitut ed, Husserl also says that the now-apprehension is the nucleus of a comets tail of retenti ons.112 This only regards the transition from now to retention. How does it regard tempor al transit other than this? I mean there are a lot of unconscious folds in the instances of d

efinite phases of absolute flow. Lets say it again about retention. There is not just a mod ified present. The present is dependent on the past. There is a past which has never bee n a present.113 There is a past which will not ever be present, whose future will never b e produced or reproduced in the form of presence. 114 This kind of past and present is th e aporia of what Husserl calls the living present, because for the living present, the pa st and future which was cut off or absent from the present cannot be anything but nothin g.115 In this way, regarding the question of temporal constitution, Husserl confirmed the self-same identity of the actual now, while Derrida raised an objection to the privilege o f the present-now and broke up presence. He supplemented the origin of Husserl by diff erance. It is assessed that he articulated some of the problematics of Husserls phenome nology of time. Fifth, by his strategy of deconstruction and supplement of origin, Derrida tells us more t han what Husserl says in his own phenomenological reduction and description. In this s ense, it is learned that Husserl does not know fully for himself what he says. Derrida kn ows Husserl more than Husserl knows himself. The text does not accord with the author of the text. The text is more than the text. The writing of the author is more than the auth or. The author, Husserl, could have seen the differance in his own writing, but he did no t. When we learn to experience the shock of differance in Derridas deconstructive writi ng, i.e. archi-writing, we might be able to participate in the experience of the dying of th e transcendental ego, which is fond of transforming difference into indifference in the se lf-same identity of presence. Whether this narrative results in the myth of Icarus is uncer tain. What is certain is only the fact that Derrida abandons the metaphysical libido of Hu sserls transcendental ego. This is Derridas original excellent insight and philosophical contribution to the history of metaphysics and phenomenological movement. What is lef t behind is the question of how to figure out what to do with Husserlian subjectivity vis-vis Derridean subjectivity. What sort of new subjectivity is possible needs to be asked. This problem is seen as an unheard-of thought and question,116 which Derridean phen omenology opens up to, and is also seen as a challenge Derrida throws to us in his readi ng of Husserl. We need to seek a possible way for productive dialogue between Derride an deconstruction and Husserls phenomenology.117 References
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1his article was made possible by attending at a graduate seminar on Husserl and Derrida (Fall 2009) by Anthony J. Steinbo
ck. I thank him for his scholarly hospitality in every respect. This paper was read to the Research Group of Phenomenology Research Center at SIUC. This was also advised and proofread in English writing by Steven Stegeman , a lecturer in philoso phy at SIUC. E. G. Ryu ( ) Phenomenology Research Center, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Department of Philosophy, Silla University, Bus an, Korea e-mail: egryu@siu.edu Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le phnomne (Paris: PUF, 1967).

2 Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967). 3 Jacques Derrida, LEcriture et la diffrence (Paris: Seuil, 1967). 4 Jacques Derrida, La Phnomnologie et la clture de la mtaphysique, Epoche (Athens), 1966. 5 Jacques Derrida, LOrigine de la gomtrie (Paris: PUF, 1962). 6 Jacques Derrida, Gense et structure et la phnomnologie (1952), which was registered with a little
revsion in LEcriture et la diffrence (1967).

7 Derrida (1972, pp. 4-5). 8 For example, Rorty and Gadamer. See Evans (1991, pp. -). 9 Ibid. 10 I will not refer to textual evidence as it is in Korean. 11 This thesis was published in 1990. Jacques Derrida, Le Problme de la gense dans philosophie de
Husserl (Paris: PUF, 1990).

12 iek, Slavoj (1998, pp. 2-3); The Bible, Judges, chap 12:4-6 13 Merleau-Merleau-Ponty (1986, p. ) 14 Merleau-Ponty (1986, p. ) 15 Derrida (1973, p. 57 note). 16 Lawlor (2002, pp. 22-23). 17 Husserl delivered an inaugural address in 1887 under the title of ber die Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik during
his professor appointment at Halle University. 18 Derrida (1978, pp. 156-157).

19 Derrida (1973, pp. 4-5). 20 Derrida (1973, p. 14). 21 Derrida (1973, p. 18). 22 Derrida (1973, p. 18). 23 Derrida (1973, p. 19). 24 Derrida (1973, p. 15). 25 Derrida (1973, p. 22). 26 Derrida (1973, p. 18). 27 Derrida (1973, p. 22). 28 Ibid. 29 Derrida (1973, pp. 32-33). 30 Derrida (1973, pp. 41, 43). 31 Derrida (1973, p. 40).

32 Derrida (1973, p. 43). 33 Derrida (1973, pp. 41-42). 34 Derrida (1973, p. 48). 35 Derrida (1973, p. 49). 36 Derrida (1973, p. 57). 37 Derrida (1973, p. 48). 38 Derrida (1973, p. 20). According to Wilke, Derrida fixes on Husserls metaphors of interweaving, mirroring, and layerin
g to expose how the physical aspect of language turns against content and to show the extent to which the phenomenologica l reductions is itself forced to use this expressive material layer of language. Wilke (1990, p. 164). 39 Derrida (1973, p. 50).

40 Derrida (1973, p. 56). 41 Derrida (1973, p. 60). 42 French language, altrit connotes mainly alteration, alternation, alternative, along with alter ego and otherness. Its origi
nal nuance is about nonidenticality. 43 Derrida (1973, p. 60).

44 Lawlor (1993, pp. 9-11). 45 Derrida (1973, p. 62). 46 Derrida (1973, p. 61). 47 Derrida (1973, p. 62). 48 Derrida (1973, p. 64-65). 49 Derrida (1973, p. 65). 50 Ibid. 51 Derrida (1973, p. 64). 52 Derrida (1973, p. 68). 53 Derrida (1973, p. 69). 54 Derrida (1973, p. 61 note). 55 Derrida (1973, p. 88). In this phrase, take notice of the fact that of means both the subjective and objective case altoge
ther. 56 Derrida (1973, p. 75).

57 Derrida (1973, p. 76). 58 Ibid. 59 Derrida (1973, pp. 75, 77). 60 Derrida (1973, p. 60). 61 Derrida (1973, p. 76). 62 Derrida (1973, p. 77). 63 Derrida (1973, p. 79). 64 Derrida (1973, p. 62). 65 Derrida (1973, p. 15). 66 Ibid. 67 On the detailed classification for a variety of objection raised against Derridas interpretation of Husserl, see Lawlor (19
95, pp. 151-152) and Kates (2005b, pp. 55-64). 68 Kates (2005a, p. 116).

69 Derrida (1973, p. 27). 70 Alexander (1995, pp. 131-133). 71 Alexander (1995, pp. 137-138).

72 Bernet (1982, pp. 110-111). 73 Husserl (1973, p. 139, 60). 74 Husserl (1973, pp. 152-157, 64). 75 On the idea of phenomenology as first philosophy, ontology, and perennial philosophy, see the
following citations. Husserl, "Phenomenology", in Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th edition, 1929); Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenological and the Confrontation with Heidegger, edited and translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), pp. 159-179, esp. pp. 175-179; pp. 185-194, esp. pp. 191-194.

76 Derrida (1973, p. 25). 77 Husserl (1973, p. 156). 78 Mohanty (1985, p. 160, pp. 156-157). 79 Derrida (1973, p. 146). 80 McBride(1983, pp. 241-242). 81 McBride(1983, pp. 215). 82 Derrida (1973, pp. 146-147). 83 Derrida (1973, p. 147). 84 Derrida (1973, pp. 145-146). 85 On the historical and conceptual context, see Edmund Husserl, Analyses concerning Passive and
Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Husserliana ), translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), Translators Introduction, pp. -.

86 On the concept of generative phenomenology, Anthony J. Steinbock, Home and Beyond:

Generative Phenomenology after Husserl (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), pp. 1-15.

87 Ibid., p. 7. 88 Husserl (2001, pp. 633-634). 89 Husserl (1991, p. 123). 90 Ibid. 91 Husserl (1989, p. 243). 92 Ibid. 93 Derrida (1973, p. 151). 94 Derrida (1973, p. 103). 95 Ibid. 96 Husserl (1966b, s. 182); Husserl (2001, pp. 231-232, Part 2, Division 3: Association, 38). 97 Husserl (1966a, s. 119); Husserl (1991, p. 123). 98 Logical Investigation (1905) is a way into phenomenology. The Idea of Phenomenology (1907) initiates the phenomenol
ogical reduction at first. The subtitle of Ideas(1913) is a general introduction to pure phenomenology. Formal and Transc endental Logic and Cartesian Meditations (1929) are also an introduction to phenomenology, respectively. The Crisis (193 7) has an introduction to phenomenological philosophy as its subtitle. Moreover, as Husserls collaborator, Finks Sixth Ca rtesian Meditation bears the idea of a transcendental theory of method as the subtitle of its first part. Cf. Berger (1972, pp. 44-47). 99 Husserl (1970, p. 137).

100 Derrida (1973, p. 102). 101 Derrida (1973, p. 100). 102 Derrida (1973, p. 16). 103 Derrida (1973, p. 101).

104 Ibid. 105 Derrida (1973, p. 100). 106 Ibid. 107 Derrida (1973, p. 84). 108 Derrida (1973, p. 16). 109 Derrida (1973, p. 101). 110 Kates (2005a, pp. 180, 182). 111 Derrida (1973, p. 16). 112 Derrida (1973, p. 62). 113 Merleau-Ponty (1986, p. 242), (1945, p. 280). 114 Derrida (1973, p. 152). 115 Descombes, (1980, p. 143). 116 Derrida (1973, pp. 102, 103). 117 This footnote is a part of my response to Anthony Steinbocks question during the discussion about a possibility of dial
ogue between the two. For an example of productive dialogue between the Husserlian side and the Derridean side, see Marti n Schwab, The Fate of Phenomenology in Deconstruction: Derrida and Husserl, Inquiry (2006) , vol. 49 no. 4, pp. 353-37 9. I believe that Husserls philosophy of ego can make a contribution in pursuing and constructing new futural conceptions o f otherness-centered subjectivity