NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE

lighter than an'eslo mayor. Such criteriOll is reflected both in

the old Spanish Penal Code and in the Revised Penal Code.
In the graduated scale of Article 71 the lawmaker has placed
destierro below aTresto mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact
or in law for holding that destierro is a higher penalty than arresto
mayorand that an offense penalized with destierrofalls under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. (Peof)le vs. Eduarte,
G.R No. 88232, February 26, 1990)
Chin Hua and Santor were decided under the Judiciary
Act of 1948 but there is no mention in said Act of crimes for which
the penalty is not imprisonment. These cases were decided on the
premise that "there exists a gap in the law as to which court shall
have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destielTo or
banishment." (ill.)
Art. 88. ArTesto menor. - The penalty of arresto menorshall be served
in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the
surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in it'l
decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other
reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.
314
L
TITLE FOUR
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 89. How criminal liability is t o t a l ~ ' Y extinguished. ---':.'Criminalliablli.y
is totally extinguished:
I. By the death of the convict, as to the persoual penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs@finaljudgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By anmesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
it'l effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article
344 of this Code. (Modified by tlze Anti-Rape Law of 1997.)
Art. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardoil"'shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indenmity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Art. 23. Effect ofpardon lJy the offended party. -Apardon by the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344
of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured
party is extinguished by his express waiver.
What causes the total extinction of criminal liability?
a. Death of convict (pecuniary liability is extinguished if
death occurs be{oTefinaljudgment);
315
NOTES AND CASES ON TIlE RIWISlm PENAL CODE
b. Service of the sentence;
c. Amnesty;
d. Absolute pardon;
c. Prescription of
f. Prescription of penal ty;
g. Marriage of the offended woman under Articles 266--C
and 344; and
h. Express repeal of penal law (because the act is decriminal
ized) .

What is the effect of death of the offender on his criminal and
civil liabilities?
Death of convict extinguishes criminal liability at of
the proceeding but his civil liability shall be extinguished if death
occurs be/we final judgment. The reason is that the penalty requires
personal service of sentence. If death occurs, there will be nobody to
serve the penalty for the crime. (Peoplevs. Bayotas, Sef)tember 1994). The
rule is that a person can act personally or thru his agents but there
arc certain act<; which can only be done personally such as service of
sentence, personal military service, and contracting

What is the "final judgment" in paragraph 1 of Article 89?
"Sentenciajirrna"should be understood as one which is definite.
Because it is only when such that a judgment is confirmed. When a
defendant dies before judgment is executory, there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action mi!!ht arise exists for the reason that there is no
defendant. ,
The legal import of the term final judgment is
reflected in Articles 7'2. and 78 of the Code, which mention the term
final judgment in the sense that it is already enforceable. Also Section
7 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served or the defendant has expressly waived in writing the right
to appeaL (id.). Or by applying for probation because that constitutes
an express waiver of the right to appeaL
The term final judgment in the Code meansjudgment beyond
recall. As long as the judgment has not become executory, it cannot
316
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAl. LIABILITY
be truthfully said that the accused is deflnitely guilty of the felollY
charged against him. (icl.)
Does Article 30 of the Civil Code authorize the appellate court

to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability exdelicto when death supervenes during appeal?
No. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action, which may be brought to demand civilliahility arising
from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with
civil liability and that is preponderance of evidence and not guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Whether asserted in a acti9
I1
or in'aseparatedvil actiop, civil liability ex-delicto is ex.tinguished
by tIi.C'deaih or the accused while his conviction is on appeal. In
recovering civil liability ex-delicto, the same has to be determined in
a criminal action rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. (peoj)le V5. BayoUts, G.R. No.
102007, September 2, 1994)
What is the intendment of Article 100 on civil liability?

It is that civil liability ex-delicto must be ro('ted in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In such
cases, extinction criminal action due to the death ofthe accused."
signifies the concomitant.extinction of
MoTS omnia so/vi. Death dissolves all things. In sum,
in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to
the prosecution of the civil action such that when the criminal action
is extinguished by the death of the accused pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive.
Relate Article 30 of the Civil Code to Articles 89(1) and 100 of

the Revised Penal Code.
317
NOTES AND CASES ON HIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Accused Elmer died on April 3, 1990 while under detention.
The fact of his death was reported by the provincial warden to the
trial court, which should have dismissed the case against said accused.
Onder Article 89(1), the criminal liability of an offender is totally

.f";J"... ... .. ,t:'"<.....
..offender.,gles
(People vs. Villagracia, C.R. No. 94311, September
14, 1993)
Should the period of time during which the evader of sentence
was at large be included in the service of his sentences?




Moreover, Article 89 stipulates. that penalties like those meted
the petitioner "shall be executed and served in the places and
penal establishmenLs provided by I,he Administrative Code in force
or which may be provided by law in the future." The Code. tlrus

VS. l,auanw, 2 SCRA)
What are the effects of pardon by the ()ffenc:ied party?
It does not extinguish criminal liability. The only exception is in
Article 266-C (amendment by the Anti-Rape Law) and Article 344 of
the Code which requires a valid marriage between the offender and
to effect an extinguishment of criminal liability. But civil
lial;mt; is extinguished by 'express waiver of the offended.
Compare pardon by the offended and pardon by the President.
Pardon by the President extinguishes the criminal
but not the civil; on the other hand, pardon by the offended does
not so extinguish the liability except in rape by the valid marriage
of the victim and the offender and in crimes against chastity under
Article 311. But the offended can waive the civil liability: Pardon
by the President is given after final judgment; that of the offended
party must be given prior to the institution of the criminal case to be
effective.
An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to
'It' buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when

318
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LlABILI1Y
coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the
truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial. (People vs.
November 1996). All that the accused offered as defenses
mainlyconsisted ofdenial and alibi which canIlot outweigh the positive
identification and convincing testimonies by the prosecution.
Hence, the aflidavit of desistance which the victim herself intended to
disregard mllst have no bearing on the criminal prosecution
the accused particularly on the trial court'sjurisdiction over the case.
vs. Echegaray, C.R No. 11 Feb-rua-ry 7,
What are the limitations on the pardoning power of the Chief

Executive?
1. That the power be exercised final conviction, and
2. That such power docs not extend '.0 cases of impeachment.
When does a judgment of conviction become final?

1, When no appeal is seasonably perfected;
2, When the accused commences to serve the sentence;
3. When the right to appeal is expressly waived in WrIting,
except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial
court; and
1. When the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. vs. Salle. Jr.. GR. No. 103567, December 4,
1995)
What is the effect of an appeal on the power of the President to

extend pardon?
An appeal brings the entire case within the exclusivejurisdiction
of the appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of
separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the
appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. Had not
the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
limitation, the President could, at any time and even without the
knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to anyone whom
he in good faith or otherwise believes to merit presidential mercy.
There could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also a
frustration of administratioIl of justice in view of the derogation of
the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is
not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose
any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. (id.)
319
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE

What procedure should be followed in the grant of pardon to a
convict who appealed his judgment?
Before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must
first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, the appealed conviction
must first be brought to finality. The "conviction by
limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution prohibits
the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court
application therefor should not be acted upon or the process
toward its gr,Ult should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Th(' acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment
or waiver of the appeal and the release of an accused by virtue of a
commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal
of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those who have custody or the accused must not
solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement.

In rape cases, is the pardon of the parents of the victim without
the concurrence of the minor victim herself effective?
No. There are authorities holding that pardon must be granted
not only by the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor
herself to be effective as an express pardon under Article 344 (now
Article 266-C, R.A. 8353). Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson,
(CA) 55 OG 9460: "Neither must we be understood as supporting the
view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it,
for we too are of the belief that the pardon hy the parents, st.anding
alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case that: "The
express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor,
gr;mted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal
responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of
the girl herself." (US vs. 1 Phil. 360). In the present case, the
supposed pardon ofthe accused was allegedly granted by the mother
without t.he concurrence of the offended minor. Hence, even if it
be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of
the mother from taking any action against the accused constitutes
pardon, it is dear that such pardon is ineffective without the express
concurrence of the minor herself. (Pelfpie 'liS. Tad:ulan, G.I{ No. 117407,
1997).
What is amnesty? What are its effects?

It is one or the prerogatives of the President to grant to an
offender besides reprieve, commutation of sentence, pardon and
remittance of fines and forfeitures. Amnesty is an act of grace,
which relieves the offender not only from suffering the penalty but
obliterates the effects of the conviction as if the act were not criminal.
It is usually given to political offenders.
Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offenses with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (People vs.
Casirio, G.R. No. I March 7, 1997,80 SCAD). It is a public act of
the President which courts take judicial notice of especially since it is
concurred to by Congress.
Distinguish between amnesty and absolute pardon.

AMNESTY PARDON
to ordinary crimes
generally to political
crimes and offendel's
and olIenders
relieves the offender of penalty
I.
obliterates the effects
of conviction as if the
2. Effecl
t.he effects
act were not criminal
of conviction stay
concurrence required concurrence not needed
3.
even before conviction after final conviction
4. When given
usually to a class of to a snecific individual
5. Towhom
persons
act of the Presi-
act of the President;
6. Nature
dent; courts must t.lke nojudicial notice
judicial notice
"Pardon is given by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty is by Proclamation
of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
"Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
321
320
TOTAL EXTINGrION OF CRIMINAl. LIABILITY
AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
of political generally before or after the inf,titutioll of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
"Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason does
'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms ofthe pardon,' and it 'in no case the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.'
(Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the otTenses with which he is charged that the person
released hy amnesty stands before the law precisely as thou!!h he had
committed no offense." (Peovle vs. Casido,
Is novation a means of extinguishing criminal liability?
No. It is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. It may
prevent the rise ofcriminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing
of the criminal informa6on in court. In this case, the new agreement
which petitioner claims he emered into with tlte cOInplainant hefixe
the filing of the information in conrt, never took effect, as petitioner
did not comply with his undertaking to payor make good the had
checks. (Diongzon vs. C(lUrt of Der:emlier 1999) .
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishahle hy death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescrihe in 20 years.
Crimes punishable hy other afflictive penalties shall prescrihe in 15
years.
Those ptmishable by a correctional penalty shaH prescribe in 10
years; with the exception of those punishable hy arresto mayur, which shall
prescribe in 5 years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in 1 year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescrihe
in 6 months.
Light offenses prescrihe in 2 months.
When the penalty fixed bylaw is a compound one, the highest penalty
shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the
lirst, second. and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by R.A No.
4661,june 19, 1966.)
What are the laws on prescription of offenses?

For felonies under the Revised Penal Code, the governing law
on prescription is found in its Articles 90 and 9 L For those penalized
under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
For instance, Act No. 3326 governs the commencement of
prescription of any act in violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law), to wit:
"Sec2. Prescription shall begin to ""Url from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from th(;
discovery thereofand the institution ofjudicial proceedingsforits investigation
and /lUnishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, arul shall begin to run again if the
are dismissed Jor reasons not constituting jeopardy" (Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans {/s. Ombudsman, August 2(01).
Will the principle of constructive notice by registration apply to

the crime of bigamy?
No, as judicial notice may he taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the
spouse of the previous subsisting maniage. Also, a bigamous marriage
is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known
to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impedimept
to contract another marriage. (People {/s. Reyes, July 1989)
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction
any right or interest therein is made in the Register of
Deeds of the place where the said property is located. Verification
in the Office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions
involving the said property can easily be made by any interested party.
In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended
person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult
as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender
is not known to be still a married person. (id)
It should be noted that in the criminal cases cited by the peti tioner
wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or
property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
Is the non-application to bigamy of the rule on constructive no

tice not contrary to the liberal construction of penal laws?
No, for to compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving
323
322
NOTES AND CA<;ES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
the offenders from liability therefor. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public
record by its registration, the offender, however, is not truthful as
he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to
them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his
legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts
the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still
a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which
circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered
quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that
the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted
only from the day OIl which the said (Time was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. Considering such
concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were 10 be counted
from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators
of the said offense would almost be impossible. Such interpretation
would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished
and protected by law. (id.)
More importantly, while Section 52 of P.O. J 529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all per'soIls of
every conveyance, mortgage, leaDe, lien, attachment, order,judgmcnt,
instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the
office of the Reg'ister of Deeds for the province or city where the
land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing
or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753
(Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Articles 407 to 413 ofthe Civil
Codc, which leads to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for
applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in
the Civil Register.
Art. 91. Computation prescription of offenses. - The period of
prescription shall commence to nm from the day on which the crime ,is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to nm again when snch proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term, of prescription shall not nm when the offender is absent
from the Philippine Archipelago.
refers to the loss of the right of the State
to prosecute offendersi' It is

prescription has set in,
the The basis of prescription is the higher pellalty ifscveral were
TOTAL EXTIN(:TION ()FCRIMIN.>L IJABII,lTY
What is prescription of crime?

pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 90.
When does the period of prescription start to run?

The running of the period starts from the discovery of the
crime by the otlended or the authorities or their agents. This list is
exclusive ("express mention implies exclusion" or "inclusio unius est
exr:lu,,\ion niter-ius'); hence, discovery hy other than these enUlw::rated
persons will not even make the period start. to run. For instance, the
discovery of the crime by a neighbor of the victim will not commence
the running of the period.
What causes the interruption and the resumption of the running

of the period?
The runlling of the period is interrupted by the .filingof the
complaint or information or when the oUender is out of the country.'
The period runs again when the proceedings are terminated without
acquittal or conviction for reasons not attributable to the offender.
The duration of the resumed period should be the unexpended
portion only for to give the period a fresh start every time it is
interrupted is prt:judicial to the offender.
Where should the complaint or information be filed to cause

the interruption of the running of the period?
In declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaiu! or information," Article 91 does not
distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminaryexamination
or investigation only or for an action on the merits. Thus, in Francisco
vs. Court ofAppeals and People vs. Cua:resrna, the filing of the complaint
even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations. (Rwdica vs. Court o/AjJj!f?ah,
In Zaldivia, what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance. Thus, the applicable law was not Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, but Act No. as amended, entitled
"An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription [or Violations Penalized
by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
325
324
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Prescription Shall Begin to Run." [Jnder Section 2 thereof, the
period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings
are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, it was held that the
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the liIing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute
a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period
there was only the filing of the in the proper court. (id.)

What is the effect of the delay in the reporting of crimes in its
prosecution?
None. The law on prescriptjon would be meaningless if the
proposition that delay in the prosecution of crimes would be f;ltal
to t.he SL:'lte and the offended party is countenanced. In fixing the
differerH prescriptive periods on the basis of the gravity of the penalty
prescribed, the law taLes into account or allows reasonable delays in
the prosecution thereof. In a number of cases, a delay of 17 days, 35
days or even 6 months by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on
her honor does not detract from the veracity of her charge. (People V.I'.
254 SCRA.)
Who is the offended party in Article 91?
Article 91 does not define the term offended party but its
definition is found in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as
"the person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed." The said Section reads as follows: "Sec. 12.
Name of the o/Ji:ruled party. - A person against whom or against
whose properly the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there
be no better way of identifying him, he must be described under
a fictitious name." More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that
the offended is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in the
light of Article 100 of the Code, which expressly provides that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Invariably
then, the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is
the offended party. (Gar-cia VS. COUll ofAppeals, jamJ,wy 1997)
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely
incorrect to state that only the State is the offended parly in such
case, as well as in other public ofI(.'nses, and therefore, only the State's
discovery of the crime could effectively commence the running or
the period of prescription. Article 91 provides that the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
326
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRJMINAL LIABILITY
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private
crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents.

Can brief trips abroad qualify as "absence" contemplated in
Article 911
No. These trips were very brief, and in every case, the private
respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made
long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the
aggregate number of days of these trips were considered, still the
information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.
.. What rule on prescriptive period applies in reckless imprudence
resulting to variant felonie.s?
Pursuant to Article 90, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On
the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
in the amount of P8,542, being a less grave felony whose penalty is
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five
years.

Relate Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure regarding
commencement of prosecution and the rules on prescription.
Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides
that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by impris
onment not exceeding 6 months, "the prosecution commences by
the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC
or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or inves
tigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities,
said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this
Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is inter
rupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a
matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.
327
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Art. 92. }t'hen and how penalties prescribe. The penalties imposed by
final sentence prescribe as foUows:
I. Death and reclusitm perpetua, in 20 years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in 15 years;
3. Correctional penalties, in 10 years, with the exception of the
penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in 5 years;
4. Ught penalties, in 1 year.
Art. 93. Comfrutation 0/ the prescription ofpenalties. - 'Ine period of pro
scription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign
counttywith wt.tich his Government has no extradition treaty, or should wm
mit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
What is prescription of penalty?
..
It is the
Prescription of penalty occurs
when the convict or ..
senteJ'lce. EvasioD of service of sentence is a condition precedent to
the running of the period of prescription.
What are the prescriptive periods of felonies?
a.
b.
Death and reclusion perpetua
Reclusion disqualification,
-20 years
and Prisi(Jn mayor
15 years
c.
Prision correccional, suspension, and
d.
destierro
Arresto mayor
10 years
-5years
e.
Arresto menorand public censure
- I year

How is the running of the period of prescription of penalty
which has commenced tolled?
The toIling ofperiod of prescription of penalty occurs when the
convict:
a. gives himself up;
b. is captured;
c.
goes to another country with which the Philippines has
no extradition treaty; and
328
TOTAl., EXTiNCTION OF CRIMINAL l.IAJ31LITY
b. another crime before the expiration of the
period of prescription.

Compare prescription of crime and prescription of penalty.
Prescription of crime is the loss of the right to prosecute
whereas prescription of penalty is the loss of the right to enforce the
penalty for the crime committed. In the former, prosecution has not
yet begun, whereas in the latter, trial on the merits has already been
concluded. In prescription of crime, the culprit may not have been
apprehended or taken into custody yet whereas in prescription of
penalty, the convict has been under the custody of the law. In the
former, the condition precedent is the discovery of the crime whereas
in the latter, it is the evasion of service of sentence.

What are the two kinds of repeal and their effect on the criminal
liability of the accused/convict?
1. Express or total repeal of penal laws, which decriminalizes the
act such as repeal of the anti-squatting law or the anti-subversive
law. Such repeal extinguishes criminal liability for the act is
no longer criminal and its effect shall retroact favorably to
offenders whose sentence has become final and even to those
who are already serving sentence provided they are not habitual
delinquents. (Article 22)
2. Implied or partial repeal ofpenal laws which has favorable effect
on the accused or convict such as the illegal possession of arms,
ammunitions and explosives law which lowered the penalty
on the basis of the caliber of the guns possessed. This has the
effect of partial extinction of criminal liability for it reduces the
penalty imposed on the accused or cOllvict.
For instance, in a case, the crime was committed before July
6, 1997, when R.A. 8294 took effect. This law is advantageous to the
accused as it spares him from a separate conviction for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm. Hence, said law should be applied
retroactively. (Peaple us. Lazaro, C.R No. 112090, October 26, 1999). In
Bergante, February 1998, it was conceded that violation of P.D. 1866
should have been punished separately under the ruling in Peapte
us. Quijada. Nevertheless fortunately for Bergante, P.D. 1866 was
recently amended by R.A. 8294. The third paragrdph of Section 1
of said Act provides that "if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
329
NOTES AND CASES ON TI-IE REVISED PENAL CODE
shall be considered as an aggfavating circumstance." In short, only
one offense shall be punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and
the use of the unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Being favorable to Bergante, this provision
may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22, he not being a
habitual criminal.
330
Chapter Two
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Art. 94. extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is
extinguished partiaDy:
1.
2. By commutation of the sentence; aad

3. For which the culprit may earn while
he is serving his sentence.
What are the causes of partial extinction of criminal liabilities?
Under Section 94:
3. Conditional pardon;
b. Commutation of sentence; and
c. Good conduct allowance.
JrtadditioQ:
d.
e. Probation under P.D. l\J," .. QI';.Q ;

f. (supra)
Art. 95. Obligation incurred fry (L person granted conditional pardon. - Any
person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation
of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein; otherwise, his
non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the
revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shaD be applied
to him.
What are the requisites for conditional pardon?
It must be and fuust
because of the condit.ions urhirh must be

For, if the offender violates the condition of
his pardon an thepenalty remitted is less than six years, he shall be
meted an additional penalty by virtue of Art.icle 159, 1Jiz.
331
PARTIAL EXTINGfJON OF CRIMINAl.
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAl. CODE
LIABILITY
"Art. 159. Other cases ofevasion ofservice (isentence. -The penalty
-b
of shall be imposed upon
4...,5
the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall
However, if the peIlally remitted by the granting of such pardon be
,than .six the convict shall then suffer the
portion sentence." .,"," . "''''' ....

What are the nature and effects of a conditional pardon?
A in the nature of a contract between the
sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal
to the effect that the former will release the lauer to the
condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon,
he will be .. PPIJ1qp..of
(Alvam V.I. Di"ector of Prison, 80
Phil. 50). By the to the terms stipulated in this
contract, he has thereby placed himself u,ltdef..
who is duty-hound to see to it that

... ...


.. ..pf
CIIJrres 115. Dir. of Bureau of Corrations, December 199.5)
.....
May the grant of pardon be subject to the review of the
courts?
No. It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that
this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive. The
pat'donee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional
pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it cannot
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be
upon which his recommitment was ordered. (Tesoro vs. Vir. olPrisons,
68 Phil. 154)
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he had allegedly
been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him
suhsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirtecn (13) years in apparent violation of his rie:ht to a
speedy trial. (id.)
332
Is a petition fer writ of habeas corpus the remedy for a person

incarcerated because of violation of the terms of conditional
pardon?
Habeas co'/frUS lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty
has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant
petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that,
were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been
revoked because of a breach there.of, the determination of which is
beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his sentence for
his first conviction until November 2, 2000.
solely vested ill the Chief Executive, who in the first
place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its
revocation, is the corolla,y prerogative to reinstate Ihe pardoll if in
his ownjudgment, the acquittal of the from the subsequent
charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority
to interfere with the grant bv the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal.
What are the effects of conditional pardon as to the civil liabil

ity?
A conditional pardon, when granted does not extinguish the civil
liability arising from the crime. (Article 36). (Monsanto (IS. F(U:toran, jr.,
170 SeRA [l9R91: PeoiJl.f! VI'. Naciorutl, G. R Nos. 111294-95, September 7,
1
What is the consequence of a violation of the conditions of

conditional pardon?
..Qf
..

It has been t.he court's fortified ruling that a final judicial
pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement
ror the President to determine whether or not there has been a
breach of the terms or a conditional pardon. There is likcwise
nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatcment of a
conditional pardon revoked the President in the exercise of
powers unclisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. (In
the maller of the petition /01' habeas corpus of Wilf1'erl0 SW1tuiong Tl)rres
(Torres vs. Dir. o/Bureau o/C01"rections, C.R No. 122338, December 29,
1995])
333
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Art. 96. EjJect of commutation of sentlmce. - The commutation of the
original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have
the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Art. 97. Allowance fm- good conduct. - The good conduct of any prisoner
in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from
the period of his sentence:
1. During the1m2 he shall
a deduction of5
2. During the inclusive, of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of for each month of
good behavior;
3. During the .. .. 8t, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shafCtie allowed a deduction of for
each month of good behavior; and
4. During of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of IJJliI;Jaffor each month of good
behavior.
Art. 98. Special time allowance fm- lo}alt}. - A
shall be granted to any prisoner who, having
evaded the service of his sentence under the circmllstances mentioned in
Article 158 of thi.. Code,
.. of
referred to in said article.
In what instances can a convict be released before he serves
the full term of his sentence?
A convict's rele* from prison before he serves the full term of
his sentence is to good conducCallowances, as provided
r ,nder Act No. 1533 and Article 97, of the Revised Penal Code, or
t';:iI:hrough the approval of the convict's application for A good
conduct allowance under Act No. 1533 and Article 97 may be granted
by the Director of Prisons while the approval of an for
parole is sanctioned hy the Board of Pardons and Parole. In addition,
r.:\ a convict may be released from prison in cases where he is granted
(Y by the President pursuant to the latter's pardoning power
under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution.
The provisions of Section 5 and 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court (Bail, when fUJt requiTed; Teduced bailor recognizance) apply only to
all accused undergoing preventive imprisonment during trial or on
334
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
L1ABIIJIT
appeaL They do not apply to a person convicted by final judgment
and already serving sentence. (White lJS. Bugtas, infra)
When is good conduct allowance given?

There must be the following requisites:
1. The occurrence of disorder resulting from a conflagration,
earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe or a mutiny in
which the prisoner did not participate;
2. The convict must evade the service of his sentence;
3. He must give himself up within 48 hours after the issuance of
a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing
away of such calamity-
The offender who :;hall give himself up under those conditions
shall be given a loyalty award equivalent to 1/5 of the period of his
sentence by the Director of Prisons.
What is the condition precedent for entitlement to the loyalty

time allowance provided in Article 98 in relation to Article 158?
To be entitled to the time allowance, the prisoner must evade
his sentence by leaving the prison. If he does not leave, he does not
belong to the class of convict'> who,having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution give them up within 48
hours. There is no assurance that had they left the penal institution,
they would have returned ,voluntarily to take up the privations of
prison life impelled by that sense ofloyalty to the Government, which
ought to be rewarded with a special allowance.
What calamities are covered in Article 158?

Article 158 states that a convict, who shall evade the service of
bis sentence, by leaving the penal institution where he shall have been
confined, on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration,
earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in
which he has not participated, shall suffer an increase;: of one-fifth of
the<lLme still remaining to be serlJepmder the original sentence, which
in no case shall exceed six months, if he shall fail to give himself
up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of
such calamity.
Article 158 covers disorders resulting from conflagration,
earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe (such as lahar flow,
335
NOTES AND ON THE REVISIW PENAl. CODE
volcanic eruption, landslide, etc.,) and mutiny. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, only circumstances of a nature similar to those
previously enumerated shall be covered by the general term of
"similar catastrophe." Notice that mutiny is not given any analogous
TITLE FIVE
situation, hence, riots are not included in this provision but ill Article
CIVIL LIABILITY
157 which uses "violence" as a means of escaping.

How is evasion committed in Article 158?
Chapter One
Evasion lies in the failure to return, not in leaving the penal
PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
establishment because leaving the penal institution is encouraged in
cases of disorders enumerated therein. This is shown by the fact that
there is premium for those who leave and thereafter return after Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person
disorder ceases but none tor those who did not leave. Thus: o.iminally liable for a felony is' also civilly liable.
1. Leaving without returning within the time period prescribed
What is the basic principle in civil liability ex-delicto?
-1/5addition to the remaining sentence which should not be
That every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime
more than () months, that is, 1/5 oHhe balance of the sentence
being one of the five sources of obligation under the Civil Code.
to be served or 6 months whichever is lesser.
However, if a person is acquitted from a criminal charge, it does
2. Not leaving - no deduction, no additio;l to the penalty (as
not mean that he is civilly free also because the quantum of proof
is);
required in criminal prosecution is proof beyond reasonable doubt
3. Leaving aIld thereafter returning within the time period
whereas, in civil the quantum of proof required is merely
prescribed -- 1/5 deduction from his sentence as provided
preponderanc;e of eYidencjY.1'o be free from civil liability on account
under Article 98. '
of acquittal, therefore, this must be based on the fact that he did not
commit the offense. For, if his acquittal is based merely on reasonable

Compare the increase/decrease of penalty under Articles 158
doubt, he may still be liable. In such case, it does not mean that he
and 159.
did not do the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved
Article 98 granting loyalty allowance states that the decrease in
did not constitute the offense charged or the prosecution failed to
the penalty of the loyal convict shall be "1/5 of the period of his
prove an element of the crime.
sentence," whereas Article 158 imposes "an increase of one-fifth of
Civil liability niay be waived by the'offended:
the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence."
When the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation, only What are the two kinds of acquittal and their effects on the civil

application. Moreover, if there be an'idoubt, it should be construed liability of the accused?

in favor of the offender and of the lesser penalty.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
\i"lole {
the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, c,ri..
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such
...
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex-delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the silUation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court, viz.:
!A'l (S
- of the. 'Il"'e, kittd'
/
or
337
336
e,,-dtlie.t-o
- arisi 0 lit of cr
NOTES AND CASES ON TI [E REVISED CODE
"Sec. 2. Institution ofseparatl' civil action.
xxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in afinal judgment
that thefactfrom which the ci.ril might ansI' did not exist. "
The secondinstance is an acquittal based
Ile the guilt of the accused. Tn this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
I

{
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civilliabiliu:,
j b\e. which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
I
Ill\; situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the
f
two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil
[
case are similar to those discllssed in the criminal case. However, the
judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in c>,idence in
,
r
the civil. action to establish any fact there determined, even though I
both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this f
rule is that the partics are not the same and secondarily, different
rules of evidence arc applicable. Hence, notwithstanding petitioner's
r
a<:quittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29
was not precluded from looking into the question of
I
t
n
petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence. (Manantan vs. Grurf
ofAjJpeals, 350 SCRA 387, January 29, 200l)
[
Article 29 of the Civil Code provides:

"When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages far the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
r
only a preponderance of evidence. U/)(In motion of the defendant, the court
t
may require the plaintiff to .file a bond to answer .Jilr damages in case the
cmn/Jl.aint should befound to be malicious.
[lin a criminal case thejwlgment ofacquittal is based uj)on reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. [n the absenu ofany declaration to that ifftr:t,
it ma}! be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground."
Jn the case at bench, the acquittal of accused extinguished both
their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting
them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute
a violation of B.P. 22. Consequently. no civil liability arising from
the alleged delict may be awarded. (Mansion Biscuit Corp. vs. Court
G.R. No. 94713, November 1995)
338
PERSONS (:IVIU.Y UABI FOR FEr ONIES

Compare the effect of death on civil liability ex-delicto and civil
liability based on quasi-delict.
of the even if based on a finding that he is
not guilty, carry with it the of the civil liability
"i
"A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is crimiIlally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally to recover damages 011 both scores.

assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
"In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
paragraph [hJ, Section lll, refers exclusively to civil liability
f()Unded in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Whereas, the civil
liabili ty fin the same act considered quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.
"The civil case for damages is not barred since the cause of
action of the heirs is based on quasi-delict. Even if the damages are
sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of the
bus driver will 1I0t bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was
based not OIl a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt." (Guaring. Jr. vs. Court ofl1ppeals, March 1997)

What is the effect of acquittal of the accused in a criminal
action?
Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where thejudgment of acquittal holds that:
L The accused did not commit the acts imputed to him;
2. He was not guilty of criminal or civil negligence.
But, his acquittal will NOT bar a civil action in the following
cases:
L Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only a
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
2. Where the court declared that accused's liability is not criminal
but only civil in nature;
3. Where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon
the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
339
NOTES AND CASES ON THF, REVISED PENAL CODE
An accused :lcquitted of a criminal charge may nevertheless be
held in the same case civilly liable where the facts established by the
evidence so (Sesfm!'tlo vs. Court of sutJra; Salazar vs.
C. R. No. 15193I, September 20(3)
Can the court trying the criminal case award damages in favor
of the accused in a counterclaim filed by the latter?
No. A coUrl trying a criminal case cannot award damages in
favor of the accused because its task is limited to determining the
guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A
criminal case is not the proper proceeding to determine the plivate
complainant's civil liability, if any. The trial court erred in ordering
the petitioner and the prosecution witness, as pan of the jlldgment
in the criminal case, to reimburse the expenses and pay damages to
the accused. Cab(l(':rt) vs. Hon. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997) directed
the trial court to limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the
accused; the counterclaim and cross-claim or third party complai
shollkl be set aside or refused cognizance without pre:Jlldice to their
filing in sep,u'atc proceedings at the proper time. (lvlua;ay
G. R. No. 145823, M(m'h 11,
The 2000 Rules on Cl'iminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims
in criminal cases. Secu<" I I ofRu\e til provides: "Section 1.lnslit'll,lion
of criminal and civil acliuns. (a) xxx No counterclaim, cross-claim
01 third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. This paragl'aph
addresses thctlacuna mentjoned in Cabaeroon the "abscnce of c1ear
Cllt rules govcnling thc prosecHtion of impliedly instituted civil
action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof."
The civil liahilitv of pelitioue!";'; for swindling respondent and for
a baseless suit mllsl be
a separate
Art. 101. RILles in (:(atain rases. - The .exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Article
12 and in subdivision4 ofArticle II ofthis Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First: In cases of subdivisions 1,2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability
for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under
9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such a person under their
340
/V\CvU\ct
()v 'Y'f 0,. fIAtT
PERSONS CTVILLYLIAl\LE FOR FELONIES
legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was6iOJiii!iLQi)
their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile, or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own
eroperty, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
the civil law.
Second: In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article II, the persons
for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion t;;the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third: In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the
persons nsing violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
always to !he latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability ofinnkeepers, tavernkeepers, and projn'ietors
tblishrnents. - In default of the persons Crimin. ally liable, innk .. et;p,ers,
and any other persons or shall be
for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where :!.
some or
have been committed by them or theIr
Imlkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the
from guests lodging therein,
or for the thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such
goods. ...

341
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Give the rules on civil liability in particular cases.
A. A person insane, imbecile, under 9, or over 9 but under 15
(Article 12,p:;agraph;r 2, and'3'): --""... ....-"",,,,
1. is on the person who has control or au
thority over them, unless he is without fault or negligence;
2. is on the property of the minor or
insane, if the;e'be no such person, or if he is insolvent,
except property exempt from liability.
B. A person who evil or injury (Article 11,
-'-"-
Plj!p.. is on the
aygj,!i':D.e. If there were benefited, the court
shall determine their
C. In irresistible force or uncontrollable fear (Article 12,
--,----
1. is on the or
.
2. Se:,!.UMlaJ;.y,liabi.liJ:y is save for
their property exempt from execution.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary
civil liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Who are the persons subsidiarily liable for criminal offenses?
They are innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of estab
lishments (Article 102); and employers, teachers, persons, and cor
porations engaged in any kind of industry for crimes committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen or employees, respectively (Article
103). This subsidiary liability is based on their employer-employee
relationship. The employer should be engaged in any kir:td of indus
try, which means a habitual undertaking for profit where labor and
capital are utilized.
What is the statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary
liability?
The statutory basis is found in Article 103 of the Code. Courts
have since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the
342
PERSONS CIVILLY LlAllLE FOR FELONIES
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty,
on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the
execution process of the judgment.
Unacceptable is the assumption that since the petitioner did
not aver any exculpatory facts in her motions which could have saved
her from liability a hearing would be futile and a sheer rigmarole.
The employer must be given her full day in court. (Yonaha vs. Court of
AppeaL5, C. R. No. 112346, March 29, 1996)
What are the requirements for subsidiary civil liability of the

employer?
The employer'S suhsidiary liability authorized under Article 103
is enforceahle in the same criminal proceeding where the award is
made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there
must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of:
1) The existence of an employer-employee relationship;
2) That the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
3) That the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while
in the discharge of such duties);
4) That said employee is insolvent as shown by the non
satisfaction of the execution against the employee (Basilio
vs. Court ofAppeaL5, March 2001); and
5) The decision of conviction must have attained finality.
(PangoTOnorn vs. People)
There must be proof that the employee is insolvent which
can be supplied by the sheriffs return showing the non-satisfaction
of the writ of execution. Further, the decision of conviction must
have attained finality, otherwise, execution against the employer is
premature. (PangoTOnorn vs. People, infra)
The employer must be involved in any kind of industry. An
industry is one where capital and labor are habitually employed for
the purpose of gain.
Is there necessity for a hearing to determine the presence of

the requirements for subsidiary civil liability of the employer?
Yes. Execution against the employer must not issue as just a
matter of course. It behooves the court, as a measure of due process
to the employer, to determine and resolve priori, in a hearing set for
e;t prt Or-I 343
- Whl10t ho.ype..-,ed
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAl, CODE PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
the purpose, the legal applicability :l.nd propriety of the employer's
liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied. The
COllrt. must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in
the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry
of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which
civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duty as such;
and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of
insolvency, (Yonaila VJ, Court ofAppeal5)
What is the nature of the subsidiary liability of the persons
secondarily liable?
The liability can either be [11 direct and criminal or [2J
subsidiary and civiL
It is a basic postulate in criminal law that the criminal act of
one person cannot be charged to another without a showing that the
other participated directly 01' constructively in the act or that the act
was done in furtherance of a common design or purpose lor which
the parties were united in interllion. In cases of employer-employee
relations, an employer is not criminally liable for the acts of his
employee or agent unless he, in some ways, participates in, counsels
or abets his employee's acts or omissions. In such case, the employer
himself becomes a participant to the criminal act of his employee.
His liability under the circumstances is direct and criminal.
However, under Article 102, in relation to Article 103, the
employer'S liability for the criminal negligence of his employee is
subsidiary in nature and is limited only to civil indemnity. (Fernando
VS. Ocampo, 37SCRA). Thus, an employer is party to a criminal case for
the criminal negligence of his employee by reason of his subsidiary
civil liability under the law. (Yumy vs. Adit, 164 SCIM)
In what instances may the existence of the employer-employee
relationship be determined?
There are two instances when the existence of aI). employer
employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle
owner may be determined during the criminal proceeding and
during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both
instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process. (Basilio -os. Court March
2001)
.fG\CA'e.,
344
- ih tAC!'; G\ f t,f.>t 5:1" t; tat tirs+ VI'

Is there a need for the court to pronounce subsidiary liability of
the employer?
No because the provisions of Articles 102 and 103 are ipso facto
applicable once the requisites therefor are satisfied. These provisions
are deemed written into the judgment" in cases to which they are
applicable. (Pnngoronom vs. People, infra)
345
--
Chapter Two
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
1
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established
in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indenmification for consequential damages.
Art. 105. Restitution - Haw made. - The restin.tion of the thing itself
mIL'.t be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration or
diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the
possession of a third person who acquired it by lawful means, saving to the
latter his action against the proper person who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing ha.. been
acquired by the third person in the mauner and under the requirements
which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
Art. 106. Reparation How made. - The court shall determine
the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing,
whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the irtiured party,
and reparation shall be made accordingly.
Art. 107. Indemnification V}'hat is included. Indemnification of
danlages shall include not only those caused the injured
party, but ai'>O those suffered by his fanilly or by a third person by reason
of the crime.
Compare Articles 38 and 104.
There are only two pecuniary liabilities in favor of the offended
party - [l] Restitution or reparation and [2] indemnification.
Reparation shall only be made if restitution is not possible. This is
in accord with Article which states that the pecuniary liabilities
owing to the offended party are reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages.
WHAT CIVIL I .lABILITY INCLUDES
What are included in civil liability?

1.
Restitution which is the return of the
itself whenever
possible.
2.
If restitution is not possible, reparation of the damage caused
shall be made. The court shall determine the amount ofdamage,
into consideration the price of the thing, whenever
possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party.
Indemnification for consequential damages which shall include
not only those caused the party, but also those suffered
by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime. The
Civil Code enumerates those cases when third persons can
recover damages bv reason of the crime. (Articles 2206 and
2219)
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
(Article 100). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death,
includes indemnification for consequential damages (Article 104)
and said consequential damages in turn include those suffered by bis
or by a third person by reason of the crime. (Article 107)
3.
What items of liability are provided for in the Civil Code for

death caused by crime?
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall he at least P3,000.OO, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shan be liable for the
and the indemnityshall be paid to the h:r;;;;f
tEe latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at tbe
time of his death;
(2) Ii the deceaseg
t!l,e
called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
sllccession, may demand support from the person causing the
the exact duration to be fixed
by the court;
(3) The
of the moral..
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
-
346 347
NOTES AND CASES ON THE. REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 2219. lI1w.-al. in the following (md
cases:
(1) A criminal oflense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other from of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in Article
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 27,28,29,
30, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No.3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No.9 of this article, in the order
named.
.. .. the
arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, sul::!ject to
the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book
IV, regulating damages. (Art. 1161, Civil Code). The following are the
items of damages the offender shall be liable to the offended party:
--T-:-"""&"t;demnity for the death of the victim of the offense
PI2,OOO [now P50,OOO], 'ithoutthenef:d of anY-evidence
or proof of!,iamages; and even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances attending the commission
of the crime.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
-- an amonnt to be fixed according to the circumstances
of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of
death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity
to be assessed and awarded by the court as a matter of
duty, unless the deceased had no capaCity at said
time on ofpennanentdisabHity not caused by'
the accused. ,f the deceased was to give support,
under 291, Civil Code, the recipient who isnot an heir,
348
WHAT CavIL UABILITYINCLUDES
may demand support from the accused for not more thall
five years, the exact duration to be fIxed by the court.
As moral damages for mental anguish an amount to
be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the
illegitimate descendants and ascendants ofthe deceased.
As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by
3.

one or more aggravating circumstances - an amount to
be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be
considered separate from fines.
As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation the actual
5.
amount thereof (but only when a separate civil action to
recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary
damages are awarded.) .
The recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of
actual or compensatory damage is allowed under the
circumstances provided t()I" in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (Peopli! TiS. Bnglmte, G. R. Nos. 120369
-70, Felm.tary 27, 1998)
6.
Interests in proper cases.
In addition to the above are the following alternative
items of damages:
7. As actual damages which must be supported by receipts
such as hospitalization and funeral expenses, or -=
8. As temperate damages to substitute for actual damages.
The trial court erred in granting the heirs of the deceased
victim an additional amount of P21,307 representing funeral
expenses. Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, a party is entitled to
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as proven.
(PelYP
le
()s. Lopez, 312 SCRA, 1999). The recovery thereof must be
premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable,
such as receipts, by the injured party showing the actual expenses
incurred in connection with the death, wake or hurial of the victim.
The list of expenses incurred for the wake, funeral, and burial of
the victim amounting to P21,307 submitted by Arlene's father is self
serving and not proved. (Petple 115. Ereiio, 326 SCRA; People vs. Nullan,
305 SCRA). Thus, the trial court's award of P21,307 for funeral
expenses cannot be affirmed.
349
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
However, the reason Arlene's father was unable to present the
reeeipt for the funeral parlor was that the latter's representative
refused to issue a receipt until he had fully paid the entire amount,
which he had not done at the time of the trial. Under Article 2224
of the Civil Code, tem erate dama 11. may be reeovered if it is shown
that such party suffered som ecuniar oss but the amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be approved with certainty. (People V.I'.
l.opez). As there is no doubt the heirs of the victim incurred funeral
expenses, although the amount thereof ha<; not been proved, it is
appropriate to award P15;000 by way of temperate damages to the
heirs of the victim. (Peopl.e 1).1'. Principe, GR. No. 135862, May 2, 20(2)
It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
capaeity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000 (now
P50,000) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death,
and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased...QI
lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating cireumstances.
(Heir 0/ Raymundo l.Astro "s. Bustos, 27 SCRA; People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,
G.li. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995)

How is life expectancy computed? Net earning capacity?
The life expect.'lncy (LE) is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the
difference of 80 and the age of the deceased. Thus,
LE =0 x [80 - age1
3 .
The life expectant.-y is then multiplied by the total net earning
capacity (gross earning capacity less necessary living expenses of
50%) to determine the total net earning capacity. (People vs. Dando,
February 20(0)
Formula for computing said damages: net earning capacity
(NEC) = life expectancy (LE) multiplied by gross annual income
(GAl) less necessary living expenses (NLE) which is 50% of GAl
(People 1)S. More, December 1999), viz.:
NEC=LE x NLE
{ ~ x [80 agel}x {GAl- NLEJ
or{! x [80 agel} x{ G ~ }
WHAT ervrL LIABILITYIN( ;LUDES
What is loss of earning capacity? When is it awarded?

The P1.84 million unearned income awarded by the trial court
should be deleted. Awards for the loss ofearning capacity partake of the
nature of damages and must thus be proved not only by credible and
satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof. (People V.I. Colas, 332
SeRA)
Is it correct to award lump sum for actual and moral damages?

No. The two awards- one for actual damages and the other for
moral damages-cannot be dealt with in the aggregate; neither being
kindred terms nor governed by a coincident set of rules, each must
be separately identified and independently justified. A requirement
common to both is that all injury must have been sustained by tbe
claimant. The nature of that irUury, however, differs for while it is
pecuniary in actual or compensatory damages, it is non-pecuniary in
the case of moral damages.
Actual and moml damages belong to different planes, e.g.:
1. In actual or compensatory damages
a. The pecuniary loss must not only be capable of proof
but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty.
b. Actual damages cannot be presumed and the courts in
making an award must point out specific acts which could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
aetual damages are horne.
2. In moral damages
a. The loss is incapable of exactness and no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded.
h. The amount of indemnity is left to the discretion of the
court. It is imperative, however, that
L Injury must have been suffered by the claimant and
2. Such injury must have sprung from allY of the cases
expressed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code. (People vs. Morales)
The lower court erred in categorizing the award of P50,OOO to
the offended party as moral damages. In C.ementiza, January 1998,
the indemnity categorized by criminal law as civil liability ex-delicto
for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
350
351
NOTES AND CA.I)ES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
and aside from other proven actual damages, is
to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to
be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on
differentjuraI foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of
sound discretion. (People '!!s. Victor, G.R No.
As for the civil aspect, the judgment of civil liability in favor
of the heirs of the deceased is in consonance with Article 100
which provides that "Every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable." The award of the civil indemnity for cases not calling for
the application of death penalty is fixed by current jurisprudence
at P50,OOO (PeojJle vs. Es/)anola, 271 SeRA), no other proof is
necessary than the fact of the death of the victim and the accused's
responsibility therefor. Moral damages can be awarded only when
the same is supported by evidence in the records. (People '!!s. Ort(,ga,
85 .
indemnity, payment should be made not only to the
mother of each victim but also to all his heirs. (People vs. Rimorin. 332
SCRA)
Moral damages may not be imposed in substitution for civil
indemnity. (People vs. Maramara, October 1999)
How much should be awarded as moral damages?
Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative
response has been in the form of higher penalties. On like
cOllsiderations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should
also follow the same direction. Hence, if the crime of raEe is
committed or effective! ualifie by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is aut orized by the present amended law.
the for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not
less than P75,OOO. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of penal law and the financial fluctuations over
but also' an expression of the displeasure over the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity.
The recent case law on rape permit'> the automatic grant of
civil indemnity and moral damages to the victim once the fact of
rape has been established. The award of civil indemnity is mandatory
upon the finding of the fact of rape. The indemnification for the
victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,OOO if the crime of
rape is effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws,
352
WHAT CIVIl, LIABiLITY INCLUDES
vict!
practiced. (People vs. Palermo, GR. No. 120630, June
28, 2(01). The fact that complainant in rape has suffered the trauma
of mental, physical, and psychological suffering which constitute the
basis for moral damages arc too obvious to still require recital thereof
at the trial by the victim. (peoJ)le 11S. C.R. No. 136737, May 23,
9346 did not affect the of heinous crimes
for purposes of the award of proper amount of ci.vil indemnitv and
moral
With respect to the award of the amount of
awarded as indemnity lor the death of Noel should be increased to
P50,OOO pursuant to current rulings. But the award of P37,OOO for
actual damages should be reduced to P22,OOO. As held in Fuentes, Jr.
vs. Court of A/Jpeals, only expenses supported by receipts and which
. appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death
of the victim should be allowed. The award of actual damages cannot
be based on the allegation ofa witness without any tangible document
to support such claim. In this case, only P22,OOO is supported by a
tor funeral expenses. ([)(Lvi(l vs. Court olA/J/Jeals, June 1998).
But the award of civil indemnity needs no documentary evidence to
for the occurrence of such death. (Pu1Jle

What is the measure of damages that the heirs of the deceased
may recover?
The loss or damage that dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased may sust.ain by rcason of the is not the full
amount of the deceased earnings, but the u or they received or
would have received from him had he not died. (peojJle vs. Alvero,]r.,
June /993)
In addition, the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,OOO in accordance with Article 2219 ofthe Civil Code for the
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock
caused by the manner by which AA was raped and killed. (PeojJle vs.
G.R. No. 128088 & 2001)

When are moral damages not imposed on the convict for
homicide?
In Zulueta vs. Pan Am, 43 SCRA 397 [1972], the award for moral
damages was reduced hecause the plaintiff contributed to the gravity
353
\VHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
NOTES AND CASES ON TilE REVISED PENAl, CODE
the victims not
attack by damaging
and business. Considering appellant's standing
in the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the
victims' actuations were designed to humiliate him and destroy his
reputation. Thus, the moral and material suffering of the appellant
and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability. (Pett/Jle vs,
Narvaez, supra)

When is exemplary damages imposed?
Where the crime resulted in the death of the
indemnity granted by the Court has commor
absence of circumstances
In the instanl case, a heavier indemnity is appropriate, bearing in
mind the tender age of the victim and the close blood relationship
and niece) that existed between appellant and the victim.
These circumstances indicate an unusual degree of moral depravity.
Accordingly, the grant of exemplary damages of P20,000 and moral
damages, in additioll to the regular indemnity i<)r death of P50,OOO.
The moral damages should, however, be reduced to 1'30,000. (Pelrple
vs. Rernolle, October 1993)
The grant of exernjJlary darnages is called for by the circumstances
of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, in addition to the
award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective dawai!es,may be
adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the
future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the
courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences.
Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts
of an offender.
Appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen,
a girl in the prime of her youth who as well as her companions was
gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason.
Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and
their hunilies. Considering the soaring crime rate, the imposition of
exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from taking the
lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since
the killing of Maureen was attended by and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, an award of Two Million pesos
as exemolarv damages against appellant for the death of Maureen is
vs. Teehanhee,Jr., C.R. Nos. 111206-08, Octab(.'T 6, 1995)
What factors are considered in the grant of exemplary damages?

Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there
was "lingering doubt" whether the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be considered an aggravating circumstance to
justify such an award. Pea Ie vs. Catubig settled the "lingering doubt."
The attendance of a ravatin circumstances in the perpetration
of the crime serves to increase the penalty
aspect), as well as to justif-y an award of exemplary or correctiYe
(the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity
of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as
may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of
commission, (: the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5)
the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or
both. There are various types of aggravating circumstances, among
them, the ordinary and the qualifying.
As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against
chastity, such as rape and acts oflasciviousness, whether the offender
is a higher or a lower degree relative of the offended
What is now the prevailing doctrine on relationship as an

aggravating circumstance on the grant of exemplary damages?
Somehow doubts linger on whether relationship may then be
considered to warrant an award fix exemplary damages where it is
used to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element
thereof, as would subject the offender to the maximum penalty.
Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a specific rule,
preferring instead to treat the issue on a case to case basis.
In Fundano, Rarnos, Medina, Dim(tpilis, Galayca, Tamon, mlyona,
Bayya, and NU,nez, along with still other cases, the Court has almost
invariably appreciated relationship as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance in simple rape and thereby imposedexemplarydamages
upon the offender whether or not the offense has been committed
to or after the effectivity of RA. 7659. Exceptionally, Decena,
and Arnlrray denied the award of exemplary damages following
the of that law. In qualified rape cases, Magdata, Arizapa,
and Alicante, allowed exemplary damages to the offended party but it
did not so do as in Alba, Mengote, and Maglente.
In Orilla, the Court decided to abandon its-1pro hac vice stance
and provide, for the guidance of the bar and the bench, a kind of
standard on the matter.
354 rro vice 355
- -fuf this. -rrt\cvltil
r
occas.
iOVl
NOTr:S AND CASES ON THE REVISED r&"IAL CODE
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always,
used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use
of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to
feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an iruury that has been malkiously and wantonly
the theory being that there should be compensation for the
hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross
ii'aud - that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species ofdamages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
The term "aggrdvating circumst.ances" used by the Civil
the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad
or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the puhlic as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufTerings, each of which
is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
f'Or the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores
the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability, which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended f'Or
tile offended partywho suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
aWdrd ofexemplary damages to be due the private ofTended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be witbheld when il. is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
circumstance is a distinction that should only be ofconsequence to the
rather than to the civil, liability ofthe ofIender.
In fmc, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifYing, should entitle the of
fended party to an award ofexemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Art.icie 2230 of the Civil Code.
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
In Gatubig; the alternative circumstance of relationship serves as
basis for an award ofexemplary damages because the t.erm "aggravating
circumstances" must be understood in broad or sense.
However, this interpretation is only applicable to the civil aspect,
not the criminal aspect of rape, which involves the imposition of the
proper penalty. When the penalty to be imposed on the accused is
teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term "aggravating
circumstance" in Article must be understood in the strictest sense.
The "aggravating circumstance" that would spell the ditlerence
between life and death for the accused must be that specifically listed
in Article 14 Code. rof course, the death penalty has been outlawed.)
Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of
exemplary damages of P25,OOO plus ]>50,000 moral damages and
P50,OOO civil indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of
moral damages to a rape victim without need ofproQfbecause from
the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate
and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically
upon proof of the commission of the crime by the
(Peotlle (IS. Orilla,
What are the civil liabilities against the offender in rape?

In rape, civil indemnity to the offended woman for the
wrong done to her is separate and distinct from the award of moral
damages. The indemnity provided in criminal law as civil liability, is
the equivalent of ru:tual or cornjlensatory damages in civil law, and is
distinct from moral damages. As currently fixed, the indemnity for
rape is but if qualified by any of the circumstances which
would justify the imposition of the [death] penalty, the indemnity
shall be not less than P75,000. (Peo/)I.e rJS. MnlajJo, GR. No. 12311.5,
AU,L,fUSl 2.5,
The offended party in the crime of rape is entitled to lnoral
in the amount of at least P50,000. Where multiple rapes
were committed, as where the victim sufferetl four rapes by four men,
the victim should be awarded no less than the amount ofP200,OOO
x P50,000] as moral damages. (people vs. Mala/lo,
Can moral damages be increased if the rape victim dies but the

information charges forcible abduction with rape?
In spite of the death of the victim in this case, the heirs cannot
get the higher amount of PI 00.000. the civil inrll'rnnitv awarded
357
356
NOTES AND (;ASI/5 ON TIlE REVISI,:O Pl':NAL CODE
in cases of rape with homicide. The information in the case at bar
is merely for forcible abduction with rape and not for rape with
homicide. rPeoble vs. Magat, 332 SeRA 51
in the amount of P50,OOO should also be
to the heirs of the victim. The award of moral damages may
be made to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without
the need for or proof of the basis thereof. The tact that
trauma of mental or physical and psychological
which constitnte the basis [(Jr moral damages under the
Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at trial. Here,
the mother testified as to the inconsolable loss that she felt when her
only daughter was abducted, ravished and killed. (PeojJle vs. Magat,
332 SCRA 5J7[2000])
What is the civil liability of a person convicted of the crime of rape
when an offspring results from the rape?
Arlide 345 provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction or
ahduction, shall be sen tenced to;
(a) indemnify the offended woman;
(h) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevellt
him from doing so; and
(c) in every case to support the offspring.
Under Article 2H3 of the Civil Code, the Either is
recogllize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, ,UJUllCL
,llld seduction when the period of the offense
less, with the period of conception. It has been held, however, that
acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with
only support for the as part of the sentence.
over
children on the mother and likewise provides for their
entitlement to support in therewith. A" such there is
no more need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
of the offender who is a married man, which would vest
in him. under Article 345, the offender
in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the
victim and support the if there be any. In the instant case
the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate
offspring but in the light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the
amount and terms thereof are to be determined by tbe trial court
358
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCU lI)ES
only after due notice and hearing. (People liS. Bayani, C.R. No. 120894
October 3, 1996)
The award of P50,OOO civil indemnity is :w,andatory upon th(
finding of the fact of rape (People <IS. de Leon, December 1999) and iI
statutory rape (People vs. NaTido, October /999). Said indemnity e,
delicto should be awarded, without need of further evidence, excep
the conviction of the accused. (People liS. Santiago, December 1999)
When is compulsory acknowledgment of the offspring of rap.
proper?
Compulsory acknowledgment, as well as the support of the chih
is indeed proper there being no legal impediment in doing so, as i
appears that complainant and appellant are both single. The crim
of rape committed by the accused carries with it, among others, th
obligations to acknowledge the oflspriIl2: if the character of its
does not prevent it and to
Phil. 689; PeafJle liS. Nama"Jan.
consequenmu aamages and action to deman(L the same
whom it devolves. - The obligation to make restoration or reparation f(J
damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upo
the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation and indemnificatio
likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured.
Art. 109. Share oJau:h civilly liable. -. If there are two or mOl
person" civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amoUl
for which each must respond.
Art. 110. ,<,'evcral and subsidiary liability of trriru:ij){lL5, acwmjJlirt
and (l(;C((uones of a jdony PreFerence in payment. - Notwithstanding tl
provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, an
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (
solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those c
the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property 4
the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against th
of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability h
been enforced, the person by whom payment has been made shall ha'
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NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective
shares.
What is the nature of the civil liability of co-conspirators?
When conspiracy among the accused-appellants was clearly
established, each of the conspirators is liable for the criminal act ofthe
others. The accused-appellants should, therefore, each suffer a three
fold penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as be held solidarily liable for
the civil indemnity which, by reason of the added repugnance of the
bestial act being committed on a pregnant woman in the presence of
her husband, is increased to PSO,OOO.OO for each rape committed on
her. (People vs. Reyes, July 1995)
Art. Ill. Obligation to rnake restitution in a certain case. - Any person
who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be
bound to make restitution in an am.ount equivalent to the extent of such
participation.
360
Chapter Three
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF
CIVIL LIABILITY
Art. 112. Fxtinctiort of civil liability. - Civil liability established in
Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the
sam.e manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Law:
Art. 113. Obligation to satisfY rivilliability. - Except in case of extinction
of his civil liability a.... provided in the next preceding article, the offender
shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resultirig from the
crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served .hU
sentenceconsisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, orhas not been
required to serve the sam.eby reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence or any other reasons.
What should be the effect of a decision in a criminal prosecution
on the criminal and civil liability of the accused?
As a rule;, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the
recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes oj
both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused.
Tn one case, the trial court promulgated only the civil aspect oj
the case, but not the criminal, thus, the promulgation of the decision
was not merely incomplete; it was also void. Tn excess of its jurisdiction.
the trial judge rendered a suhstantially incolllplete promulgation on
4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order.
Thus, grave abuse ofdiscretion rendered the afc)rementioned act ofthe
trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not been terminated
the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, doublejeopardy cannot
prosper as a defense (Cu.ison us. Cou.rt GR No. 128540, Apri
15,1998).
Is a court-approved compromise agreement as to the civil
liability entered into by the culprit's lawyer without his express
authorization valid?
Without a special power of attorney, the counsel for the accused
cannot bind nor compromise his client's civil liability. Both Articlt
361
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVlSED PENAL CODE
1878 of the Civil Code and Section 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court require a special authority from the client for an attorney
to validly compromise his client's civil liability. That the trial court
approved the compromise did not legalize it and should not be given
force and effect for being violative of law and jurisprudence. (PeojJle
Vi. Cartw, April 2001)
.... ""
BOOK TWO
Crimes and Penalties

362