For: Dennis Smyth & Vasilis Dimitriadis

Asses the Importance of Britains Contribution to the Ultimate Defeat of Napoleonic France Due: November 21, 2012 HIS103Y1 Statecraft and Strategy: An Introduction to the History of International Relations

By: Geoffrey Alexander Low Student #: 996692798

Depicted as a small man with a raging temper in popular cartoon shows in modern times, Napoleon Bonaparte was anything but a joke at the turn of the 19th century. His armies conquered Europe and threatened the balance of power in Europe. His only obstacle to total domination of Europe was the small island nation of Britain. Isolated and surrounded by the sea, it is hard to imagine how an island nation triumphed over a man that defeated not just one great European power, but three: Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Britain ultimately helped defeat Napoleon by seizing control of the sea for great effect allowing the British to empower their allies on the continent with subsidies and a wealth of supplies; as well as sailing diplomats to Europe, by-passing the threat of Napoleon, in order to spread the ideas and objectives of the British Government- a European balance of power. The Napoleonic Wars of Europe were won on the continent but would not have been possible without the victory at the Battle of Trafalgar, attained by Horatio Nelson. This single battle ensured British dominance at sea from 1805 to the end of the war. With the control of the seas the British were able to survive and defend their home state, help dictate the commerce and trade of Europe, and keep diplomatic communication open. Nelson won the Battle of Trafalgar because he was willing to take risks and break tradition, due in part to his adoption of a new naval strategy. Nelsons new battle tactic was the breaking of the line; a strategy that involved sailing perpendicular into an enemy fleet and then cutting off ships from escape.1 This new tactic allowed for more decisive results in battle than the previous method of navy combat, lineof-battle. As a result more ships were critically damaged or destroyed in combat compared to that of line-of-battle. The combined French-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar was almost completely annihilated with many of their ships even being captured by the British. However, the British

John Keegan, Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), 51.

did owe some part of the victory to the French. During the French Revolution older and more experienced members of the French navy were exiled because they were a part of the aristocratic class. The new French officers commanding the fleet were not as experienced as their British counter parts. This was due to the fact that many of the officers were promoted from within the lower ranks of the navy; these were men who before the revolution, were manning the canons or rigging the sails.2 Apart from the exile of the French officers, the abolition of the French corps of seamen gunners was a devastating blow to the effective battle readiness of the French Navy. 3 The French revolution effectively amputated the combat expertise of the French navy before the war. With the victory at Trafalgar, Britain was able to ensure the lifeline of the island was maintained. Britain was able to maintain its connections and trades with its colonial assets and Europe. Napoleon, unable to cut Britain off at sea isolated Britain from land by forcing all nations and states under his control and influence to stop all trade and diplomatic relations with the island nation, this was to be known as Napoleons Continental System.4 British goods still reached Europe, mainly through Spain and Portugal and states along the Baltic Sea; Sweden was also major route for smuggled goods and trade for the British.5 The British eventually responded to Napoleon with their own economical attack, the Orders in Council- a move that resulted in Napoleon losing much revenue from the customs and taxes associated with sea based trade.6 With the Orders in Council the British blockaded the ports of Europe, and Napoleon was unable to stop them; the blockade did allow for neutral vessels to access ports and trade. However any

2 3

Ibid., 38-39. Ibid. 4 H.T. Dickinson, Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815 (New York: St. Martin's Press 1989), 140. 5 Rory Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 179-180. 6 Ibid., 8, 380.

vessels looking to trade in Europe had to obtain a special permit though the British- all sea faring trade was effectively under British scrutiny and control.7 Even though it effectively cut off France and Spain from colonial assets, potential allies of Britain such as Russia, Prussia, and Austria were victims of this economic warfare as well. Land based trade was slower and had smaller payloads than that of ships. Unlike the Orders in Council, Napoleons Continental system did not have any real adverse effects on Britain.8 Britain had adjusted to its physical isolation from Europe and was more independent, it had grown to rely less on imported resources. The islands iron and steel industry saw a huge growth from 68,000 tons produced in 1788 to 258,000 tonnes produced in 1806.9 Even the need for lumber was not greatly in demand as the Battle of Trafalgar destroyed all opposition to the British Navy and there was little need for new ships and repairs from battle were not major.10 With victory at Trafalgar the British were given a means to strike back at Napoleon. They were able to access almost any part of Europe unimpeded, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and used this advantage decisively. They could deliver money, supplies, and even men with ease. No longer were the British constricted to their island in fear of attack on their homelands, but now had the freedom and choice of where to fight Napoleon. Almost 3 years after the pivotal Battle of Trafalgal, Napoleon crossed the Pyrenees with his army, his intent to control Spain and Portugal. Napoleon wished to assume direct control and re-salvage what worth was left of Spain. Signs of impotent leadership were apparent with the lack of enforcement of the Continental System and the weakened state Spain was in.11 They had

7 8

Ibid., 8. J.R. Jones, Britain and the world 1649-1815 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1980), 289. 9 Ibid. 290. 10 Ibid. 289-290. 11 Dickinson, Britain and the French Revolution, 142.

lost almost their entire navy at the Battle of Trafalgar, had been cut off from its colonial assets due to the British Blockade, and was facing opposition to its monarchy in the winter of 1807.12 After the French occupied the Iberian Peninsula Napoleons means of direct control were put into place by supplanting the King of Spain with his own brother, Joseph. The ousting of their monarch helped to start the Spanish uprising. It was this moment the British seized that bled Napoleon of his resources and assets, greatly contributing to his downfall. Britain having heard of the uprisings in Spain was reluctant at first to provide assistance to an enemy state, wanting to confirm the facts first.13 However the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, judged the facts and proceeded to turn Spain from an enemy to an ally14. He addressed the public, stating that any state willing to resist and fight Napoleon becomes our instant ally.15 The uprisings eventually spread to Portugal and in August 1808 the British landed a force of 12,000 men led by Sir Arthur Wellesley- driving the French out of Portugal by May the following year.16 With a base of operations firmly established on the Iberian Peninsula, the British were now ready to assist the Spanish. Supporting the Spanish meant the French lost the use of Spains navy and ports, easing the burden of the British Mediterranean Fleet. Napoleon no longer could utilize and depend on the resources and income from the Spanish colonial islands to finance his conflict in Europe. Wellesleys participation in the Spanish uprising was a diplomatic victory for the British. With a weak relationship with Russia, Britain was in a poor position to convince Russia to openly resist Napoleon. With Britain nowhere on the continent before 1808 Russia thought of Britain as an opportunist, always intervening on the continent but

12 13

Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983), 325. Jones, Britain and the world, 315. 14 Ibid., 315. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 315, 317.

never committing itself fully to the war.17 As well the Russians were displeased with the Orders from Council, having to traverse the British blockades.18 The support of the Spanish Rebellion proved to Russia how committed Britain was to the matters of the continent. The Iberian conflict had succeeded in diverting a minimum of 300,000 French soldiers into the conflict, many of them Frances most experienced soldiers- ones that could have been used to greater affect in the march on Moscow.19 The war on the Iberian continent would prove highly advantageous to the Russians when Napoleon invaded Russia in the summer of 1812. At the onset of the uprising the Spanish resistors were in no position to face the superior French army as they had to resort to guerilla war fare, a move that led to the survival of the resistance army. Commanding a multi-national force, General Wellesley, later to be known as the Duke of Wellington, would fight a war of survival for many years. Despite surviving against a superior force and winning victories across the region, the guerrilla tactics impeded large and decisive advances against French Revolutionary forces. The French were never able to muster a force greater than 70,000 men at one time against Wellington.20 This was a stark contrast to the style of battle waged by Napoleon on the continent where large scale battles in the hundreds of thousands could be waged; where a single battle could decide the victor of the entire war. However Wellingtons success in the Iberian Peninsula was ensured because of support from home. In Britain members of parliament worked endlessly to support his campaign. Parliament approved of much aid and support for the uprising, in the first summer Spain received 1,100,000 with Portugal receiving 60,000. It was later that same year in the fall when Parliament saw an opportunity; they sent a representative, John Frere, to negotiate commercial
17 18

Muir, Britain and Defeat of Napoleon, 180. Ibid. 19 McKay and Scott, Rise of Great Powers, 327. 20 Ibid.

treaties with the Spanish colonial islands.21 The commercial treaties Frere helped to negotiate helped finance future British subsidies. The native forces on the Peninsula were heavily financed, having been paid almost 10 million in subsidies from 1808-1815.22 This was apart from Britains own costs of financing her troops in the area, 40 million during the same period.23 With the failure of two coalitions and half a dozen wars in the past, the British realized just financing an army wasnt good enough. It was more cost effective to enable and equip an ally then directly financing them. In 1809 Foreign Minister Canning changed foreign policy such that allies would receive funds as well as weapons, supplies, and clothing. The Spanish and Portuguese forces even received pay from the British government as a part of their subsidies.24 In 1812 the British Parliament gave financial control of the subsidies for the Spanish/Portuguese forces to Wellington. He was to distribute the funds as he saw fit; ensuring more key strategic regiments were funded and smaller groups of fighters still received a fair share.25 This gave much more direct control of Spanish and Portuguese forces than ever before. It made sure no money was wasted or funneled away because of corruption. Already having established strong relationships in the region with Spanish and Portuguese leaders since he first landed in 1808, Wellington was a welcome and familiar face to the diplomatic scene in the region. His influence and reputation as a General was well poised to gain favor for the British. With his victory at Vitorria, Wellington finally drove the French completely out of Spain. Wellingtons campaign helped empty the coffers of France, and diverted important resources and troops from mainland Europe. By the end of the Iberian conflict, Napoleon had invested four billion livres with

21 22

Christopher D. Hall, British strategy in the Napoleonic war, 1803-15 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) 173-174. John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) 354. 23 Sherwig, Guineas and gun powder, 355. 24 McKay and Scott, Rise of Great Powers, 326-327. 25 Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 212.

300,000 casualties.26 Napoleon was quoted as saying the Spanish Ulcer killed me.27 The slow war of attrition proved highly successful against the French army. The victory in Spain was nonetheless a very costly investment for the British but still the most economically logical. The cost of maintaining an English army was greatly more than that of subsidizing an ally but it had its disadvantages. A subsidized army might not have the same overall goal as the British; as well the assurance of the quality of men the subsidy went to was a gamble. Even if the allied force was of outstanding quality there was no guarantee all the money would go towards the war effort. It is why when Wellington assumed direct control of the entire British/Spanish/Portuguese force it was such an important achievement. He knew exactly where the money went and who needed it the most. Over the course of the entire war, 1793-1815, the British spent 830,000,000 on their navy, army, and other general war expenditures; over the same period subsidies to all allies and states amounted to 65,840,338, half of this in the final three years of the war, 1812-1815.28 The British financing of allied states was not only the smartest economic choice that would lead to the defeat of Napoleon, but the only way possible. However subsidizing allies in Europe was not an easy achievement. Napoleon had crushed armies and in the process destroyed three separate coalitions since the beginning of the war, resulting in many European states being extremely hesitant to join the British in fear of retaliation.29 To fight this, the British used their free access to the seas to keep diplomatic ties with continental Europe open and pressure her allies to resist and fight Napoleon. Britains need for alliances with European states was based upon the lack of man power. Britain had everything else: money, industry, supplies, transportation, but what was needed most was people.

26

McKay and Scott, Rise of Great Powers, 327. Richard Glover, Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), 25. 28 Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 380. 29 Dickinson, Britain and the French Revolution, 140.
27

There simply were not enough people to pick up muskets and fight. The British needed Russian, Austrian, and Prussian assistance, specifically their strength in fighting population, to help defeat Napoleon.30 At the onset of the Revolutionary Wars, the eastern European states were in a very poor position to resist the French. Prussia was near bankrupt, the Austrians were borrowing heavily, and Russia was in financial ruin due to their conflict with Turkey.31 Britain was needed financially from the very beginning to help fight the Revolutionary French.32 During the first three coalitions Britain sustained allied armies by giving away large amounts of subsidies, with maximum annual amounts approximately 2,600,000.33 During the third coalition the British gave aid of 25,000 muskets, 25 siege weapons, and five batteries of field artillery to the Prussians.34 Even with the formation of three coalitions the British were weary of financing allies who at the time were looking out for their own interests; Austria was looking to take more land in Naples and Prussia was looking to annex more of Poland.35 It wasnt until Napoleons disastrous attack and subsequent retreat through Russia in 1812 and the years that followed that the final coalition against Napoleon would be formed. With Napoleons military crippled Britain spent the final years of the war heavily financing the three big eastern European powers: Austria, Prussia, and Russia. During Russias battles with Napoleon in 1812 the British sent 100,000 muskets and other supplies to help enable the Russian forces.36 In 1813 almost one million muskets and roughly 7.5 million in subsidies

30 31

Ibid., 131. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, 11. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 354. 34 Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 189. 35 McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, 285, 300. 36 Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 225.

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were sent to the European states that were resisting Napoleon. The subsidies given to allies were not handed out blindly. In 1813 the new British Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh promised 2,000,000 to be split between Russia and Prussia, two thirds and a third respectively; in return the Russians had to maintain an army of at least 200,000 soldiers and the Prussians 100,000.37 In 1814 the combined size of the Russian and Prussian forces were roughly 700,000 strong, in 1793 at the beginning of the war it was only 350,000.38 Castlereagh also negotiated with the Russians and Prussians setting terms that they had to promise to engage to unite arms and their councils and to not negotiate or seek peace with Napoleon separately.39 In late 1813 the need for a more personal approach for diplomacy was thrust upon Minister Casltereagh when he was transferred to the continent to meet with allied coalition leaders. There was the risk of European states starting to lose sight of the overall objective: Napoleons defeat. 40 In June 1813 the Russians and Prussians had even signed a six week armistice with Napoleon.41 Even Sweden was unwilling to deploy their army until Britain helped them subsidize their takeover of Danish Norway.42 Castlereaghs task was ensuring that allied unity would be maintained, first until Napoleon had been decisively defeated as J.R Jones states, and then to preserve the peace settlement.43 The previous coalitions failed because of individual objectives however this time Castlereagh proved successful in keeping the allies united. Castlereagh helped draft what would be known as the Treaty of Chaumont and sent it to the foreign ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. They all agreed and signed the treaty; a

37 38

Ibid. Ibid., 11. 39 Ibid., 11. 40 Jones, Britain and the world, 318, 321. 41 Ibid., 319-320. 42 Ibid., 318. 43 Ibid., 321.

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European Balance of Power would now be possible.44 The four powers agreed to remain allied for twenty years and made it clear that all major decisions would be made with consultation of the other major powers.45 As well, each state would have to send 60,000 soldiers to any state that was attacked to help defend it.46 The only major obstacle in the proposal was the 5,000,000 subsidy agreement; the subsidy would be split equally among the three allied states. 47 The Austrians and Prussians were happy with this part of the treaty, especially Prussia as it had always received a smaller share of subsidies compared to that of Russia or Austria.48 However Russia, who had grown accustomed to receiving a larger share of subsidy agreements, was now an equal among its state peers. The agreement of a larger amount of money at the conclusion of the war, known as return money, made up for the dissatisfaction of the initial subsidy money. 49 With Britains guidance the final coalition against Napoleon guaranteed a balance of power throughout Europe once he was defeated. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont the final coalition captured Paris in the late of March, with Napoleon abdicating shortly after on April 6th, 1814.50 Napoleon was then exiled to the island of Elba, eventually returning to France where he would make battle one last time. Napoleon was defeated by Wellington and the Prussians at the Battle of Waterloo, only to be exiled once again, but never to return to Europe again. Only the combined forces of the four great powers in Europe were capable of defeating Napoleon. Those on the continent, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had the man power while it was Britain on the lone island that had the means to empower the armies on the continent. Without
44 45

Ibid., 321. Ibid., 321. 46 Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, 318. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 317. 49 Ibid., 319. 50 McKay and Scott, Rise of Great Powers, 337.

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British dominance at sea their subsidies and supplies would have never been able to reach continental allies with Napoleon controlling the land. It was with this superiority at sea that the British were able to seize the opportunity the Iberian uprising gave; landing Wellington and establishing an army that created a southern flank on France. By leading a guerilla army and driving the French out of Spain, Wellington bled billions of livres from France and inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties upon some of the most experienced battalions in the French army. After Wellingtons victories in Spain, it was Castlereagh that kept the coalition leaders on track to the final push that defeated Napoleon. Castlereagh used his diplomatic skills to personally keep the final coalition of the four powers focused on Napoleon to ensure a future with a balance of power in Europe. Alone Britain could never have achieved the victories against Napoleon that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian forces accomplished; although they would have never been able to defeat Napoleon if not for guidance and assistance from the British.

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Bibliography
1. Dickinson, H.T. Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815. New York: St. Martin's Press 1989. 2. Glover, Richard. Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973. 3. Hall, Christopher D. British strategy in the Napoleonic war, 1803-15. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 4. Jones, J.R. Britain and the world 1649-1815. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1980. 5. Keegan, John. Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare. New York: Viking Penguin, 1989. 6. McKay, Derek and H.M. Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815. London: Longman, 1983. 7. Muir, Rory. Britain and the defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996 8. Sherwig, John M. Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.