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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. 1 1NC ................................................................................................................................................. 2 *CONTENTION FRONTLINES* .............................................................................................. 5 AT-INTENTION FORESIGHT DISTINCTION ...................................................................... 6 AT-HERMAN ............................................................................................................................... 8 AT-RETRIBUTION ................................................................................................................... 10 AT-FORFEITURE ..................................................................................................................... 12

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1NC
I value Morality. Morality must flow from practical reason. First, only practical reason can avoid infinite regress. Looking to an external authority allows us to question why we should act on that desire. Practical reason is the only meta-ethic that doesnt beg the question since asking why we should act on reasons implicitly concedes the authority of reasons. Second, proper understanding of the world around us first requires a unified conception of the world, which only practical reason allows. Korsgaard:1
The parallel point about theoretical reason comes in two steps. First of all, unity is needed for our conception of the world, because the business, the function, of a conception of the world is to enable you to find your way around in it and to act effectively in it.

In order to conceive the world as the sort of place in which

you can find your way around and act effectively, you have to conceive it as a unified place. What that means is that [so that] the relations between the various things in the world can be traced and established. If we can say nothing about
how two things or events or regions of space-time are related to each other, we cannot think of them as parts of a single unified world.

If we cannot trace causal

relations, in particular, we cannot act effectively, since we cannot take means to our ends. So it is the business
of a conception of the world to establish these various relations. Further argument is required, of course, but I suppose that we may think of the relations in question as logical, spatiotemporal, and causal. Speaking very roughly, these are the relations established by the principles of logic and what Kant thought of as the a priori principles of the understanding.

But and this is the

second step -

in unifying our conception of the world, we are also unifying our minds themselves, and unifying

them

in a way that makes us the agents of that conception that is, in a way that makes us active knowers. This is because

the unity of the mind and the unity of its object are interdependent. Unless we conform our beliefs to logical and rational principles, our minds themselves are a mere heap of unrelated ideas that cannot really qualify as beliefs. A mere heap of unrelated ideas is not about anything, and therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything. It follows from practical reason that our judgments must be universally consistent. Velleman:2
Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from which they not only see the same things but can also see the visibility of those things to all rational creatures. Consider, for example, our capacity for arithmetic reasoning.

Anyone who adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that the sum is 4, but also that

anyone who added 2 and 2 would see that its 4, and that such a person would see this, too, and so on. The facts of elementary arithmetic are thus common knowledge among all possible reasoners, in the sense that
every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows them, and [so on] knows that every reasoner knows that every reasoner knows them.

As arithmetic reasoners,

then,

we have access to a perspective that is constant not only across time but also between

persons. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in the sense that we would only get the same answer on any other occasion; and each of us can

1 2

Christine Korsgaard. The Normative Constitution of Agency. Harvard University. David. Velleman Self To Self. 2006. Cambridge University Press.

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compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in the sense that the others would only get the same answer. Whats more, the universality of our
perspective on the sum of 2 and 2, we are aware of computing it for all, from a perspective thats shared by all arithmetic reasoners.

In this sense, our judgment of

the sum

is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all. Therefore the standard is rejecting contradictory maxims. Contradictory maxims are

maxims whose willing is internally inconsistent with the structure of universalizable reasons. I contend that affirming violates the standard. First, deadly force is not universalizable since willing that I may kill a person entails accepting that others may kill me. In giving myself the power to kill I will the extension of my freedom and the limitation of others freedom, while also willing the extension of others freedom and the limitation of mine. Thus, deadly force is contradictory because it involves both the extension and limitation of my own and others freedom. And, even if we could universalize a more specific maxim like self-defense, we should always err on the side of caution because the resolution lacks a context by which we can definitively create universalizable maxims. There are millions of different victims with their own unique experiences and there is no way of classifying all of them into one maxim of self-defense. The only thing we know for certain is that the victims use deadly force; thus, there is always a risk the aff violates universal law. Second, the resolution is not self-defense: A. Since deliberate is defined as premeditated 3 the threat isnt imminent because victims kill when they arent being abused. This also destroys the necessity of deadly force because if the victim has the freedom to plan out their attack then they also have the freedom to pursue alternatives to deadly force. B. Empirics prove the intent is retaliation. Thompson et al:4
Two studies did not support that self-defense is a predominant impetus for womens IPV (Olson & Lloyd, 2005; Sarantakos , 2004).

Olson and Lloyd (2005)

interviewed 25 women who described 69 episodes of IPV with only 1 mention of selfdefense. Sarantakos (2004) concluded that 47% of women initially reported using IPV for self-defense, but this number decreased to 23% when women were told that other family members would be corroborating their attribution of self-defense. The reasons that women changed their statements were unclear and could
reflect initial social desirability bias or concerns about a violent partners response to their self -defense assertion.

Retaliation was a listed motivation in

15 studies (Carrado et al., 1996; Dobash & Dobash, 2004; Flemke & Allen, 2008; Hamberger, 1997; Hamberger & Guse, 2005; Hamberger et al., 1994; Kernsmith, 2005; Miller &
3 4

The Free Dictionary. Deliberate. Adjective. Why Do Women Use Intimate Partner Violence? A Systematic Review of Women's Motivations Megan H. Bair-Merritt, Sarah Shea Crowne, Darcy A. Thompson, Erica Sibinga, Maria Trent and Jacquelyn Campbell Trauma Violence Abuse 2010 11: 178

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Meloy, 2006; OLeary & Slep, 2006; Rosen et al., 2005; Seamans et al., 2007; Stuart et al., 2006; Swan & Snow, 2003; Ward & Muldoon, 2007; Weston et al., 2007), with 1 study

documenting this as womens primary motivation (Kernsmith, 2005). Women described using IPV to retaliate for both physical and emotional abuse (Miller & Meloy, 2006; Seamans et al., 2007). For example, in a study of Seamans et al. (2007), a participant was arrested
after shooting her husband because he had been emotionally abusive over the course of a 19-year marriage.

And, prefer Thompson because: A. It questions initial victim motives and then follows up with subsequent victim reports once the victims are told their stories will be checked upon, so its more likely to accurately account for victim motives because it forces victims to tell the real story. B. Thompson conducted a meta-analysis comparing numerous different studies and their results on victim motives and concluded self-defense was a rare motive in comparison to retaliation. Prefer meta-analysis because individual studies are subject to methodological flaws so combining as many studies as possible reduces the probability for margin of error. Third, the aff recognizes that humans have dignity worthy of respect, but simultaneously denies that dignity in killing the abuser. This yields a logical contradiction. Camus:5
But are we still living in a rebellious world? Has not rebellion become, on the contrary, the excuse of anew variety of tyrant? Can the "We are" contained in the movement of rebellion, without shame and without subterfuge, be reconciled with murder?

In assigning oppression a limit within which begins the dignity

common to all men, rebellion defined a primary value. It put in the first rank of its frame of reference an obvious complicity among men, a common texture, the solidarity of chains, a communication between human being[s] and human
being

which makes men both similar and united. In this way, it compelled the mind to take a first step in defiance of an absurd world. By this progress it rendered murder would only give rise to logical

still more acute the problem that it must now solve in regard to murder. On the level of the absurd, in fact,

contradictions; on the level of rebellion it is mental laceration. For it is now a question of deciding if it is possible to kill someone whose resemblance to ourselves we have at last recognized and whose identity we have just sanctified. When we have only just conquered solitude, must we then re-establish it definitively by legitimizing the act that isolates everything? To force solitude on a
man who has just come to understand that he is not alone, is that not the definitive crime against man? Logically, one should reply that murder and rebellion are contradictory.

If a

single master should, in fact, be killed, the rebel, in a certain way, is no longer justified in using the term community of men from which he derived his justification. If this world has no higher meaning, if man is only responsible to
man, it suffices for a man to remove one single human being from the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it. When Cain kills Abel, he flees to the desert. And if murderers are legion, then this legion lives in the desert and in that other kind of solitude called promiscuity.

From the moment that he strikes, the rebel cuts

the world in two. He rebelled in the name of the identity of man with man and he sacrifices this identity by consecrating the difference in blood. His only existence, in the midst of suffering and oppression, was contained in this identity. The same movement, which intended to affirm him, thus brings an end to his existence.
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Albert Camus [Philosopher], The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage International (1991, originally published 1954), p. 280-282

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*CONTENTION FRONTLINES*

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AT-INTENTION FORESIGHT DISTINCTION

1. In order for the intention-foresight distinction to matter, the aff has to prove that the ultimate end of the victim is self-defense. But, my number 2 in the contention proves that the intent is not self-defense. So, if I win the number 2, this argument doesnt apply. 2. There is no way to verify which intent qualifies as the ultimate end of the action and which intent is merely a foreseen consequence because conflicting intentions are knowable only by the person who experiences them. It is impossible to get inside the heads of victims and know which intent came first. The only thing we do know for certain is intent to kill, as per the word deliberate in the resolution. Thus, the intention-foresight distinction is unverifiable because you cant know which intent is the ultimate end. Unverifiable arguments are bad because they lead to judge interventioninstead of the debaters explaining how arguments function, the judge inserts his own arbitrary discretion, which is bad because it takes debate out of the debaters hands. 3. Proportionality is a constraint on the intention-foresight distinction because in order for the distinction to make deadly force permissible, the ultimate end of the action must outweigh the foreseen consequences. But, if deadly force is not proportional, the ultimate end is more harm done than was necessary to combat the abuse. And, deadly force is a disproportionate response because the victim kills the abuser even though most cases of domestic violence are not severe. Milgram:6
Highlights of the 2008 domestic violence statistics are listed below:

There were 70,613 domestic violence offenses

reported by the police in 2008, a 2 percent decrease compared to the

71,901 reported in 2007. Murders increased 50 percent in 2008 (57) when compared to 2007 (38). Assaults accounted for 43 percent (30,429) and harassment accounted for 43 percent (30,023) of t he reported offenses in 2008. Arrests were made in 31 percent (21,665) of the offenses reported for 2008, a decrease of 3 percent when compared to arrests made in 2007. The most frequent day of domestic violence occurrences was Sunday (12,397). For th e twenty-sixth consecutive year, the most frequent hours of domestic violence incidents were between 8:00 p.m. and midnight, when 26 percent (18,679) of the offenses were reported. Children were involved or present during 33 percent of all domestic violence offenses occurring in 2008. Specifically, 5 percent (3,519) were involved and 28 percent (19,583) were present. Wives were the victims in 19 percent (13,637) and ex-wives were the victims in 3 percent (2,406) of the reported domestic violence offenses in 2008. Overall, females were victims in 76 percent (53,810) of all domestic violence offenses. The number of domestic violen ce complaints that had prior court orders issued against the offender decreased from 15,481 in 2007 to 13,872 in 2008. This is a decrease of 10 percent. Alcohol and/or drug s were involved in 28 percent (19,691) of the reported offenses occurring in 2008. Alcohol involvement alone accounted for 25 percent (17,808) of the total domestic violence offenses reported. Persons age 60 or over were victims in 3 percent (2,345) of all reported domestic violence offe nses that occurred in 2008. Elderly were the vic tims in 21 percent (12) of the domestic violence murders (57). Domestic violence does not occur at a regular frequency, but when viewed as a ratio of its occurrence to a fixed time interval, one act of domestic violence would occur every 7 minutes and 26 seconds. Domestic violence offenses arising from a dating relationship accounted for 15 percent (10,468) of the state total. There were 2,966

total arrests involving domestic violence restraining orders reported by police in 2008. Of these, 1,793 were arrests for violations of a restraining order only, while 1,173 were arrests for violations of a restraining order with an of fense arrest.

Twenty-seven

percent

(19,076)

of all domestic violence complaints resulted in injury

. This is a decrease of 3 percent when compared to the (19,647) that occurred in 2007.

Of all the domestic violence offenses involving weapons (32,052), hands, fists, feet, etc. were used in 91 percent (29,279) o f these offenses. Domestic violence offenses involving a gun decreased 13 percent when compared to 2007.

Serious injuries

were reported in 1,497 offenses

, a 4 percent increase when compared to the 1,445 reported in 2007.

Anne Milgram [Attorney General, State of New Jersey], Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes [Superintendent, New Jersey State Police], Major James S. Beshada [Commanding Officer, Identification and Information Technology Section, New Jersey State Police], Chief Robert Coulton [Ewing Township Police Department, President, New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police], Twenty-Sixth Annual Domestic Violence Offense Report, Domestic Violence in New Jersey, December 2008.

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RG 2012 SUPERBAD NC TOC 4. The intention-foresight distinction doesnt morally existit is nothing more than an attempt to shirk responsibility. Enoch:7
Think again of the appropriate question test. What is the moral flaw exhibited by the person asking while deliberating about the causal order of the relevant consequences? Intuitively, the flaw exhibited seems to me to be a kind of an attempt to evade responsibility.

Attempting to find out about the causal order of the

(foreseen) consequences looks here not so much as an honest attempt to unearth the morally relevant features of the circumstances but as an attempt to prepare a line of defense 24 . Once you know about the consequences of your actions (or inactions), an attempt to pick and choose among them those you are more and those you are less responsible for (those you intend and those you merely foresee, respectively) looks like an attempt to evade (full) responsibility for the merely foreseen consequences. A responsible agent, it can be
argued,

accepts responsibility for all (foreseen) consequences of her actions, both intended and unintended. This hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction is really just evading

suspicion that

responsibility is arguably at least a part of the rationale for the entrenched doctrine of the criminal law, according to which under certain circumstances foresight can substitute
for intention 25 . The point here is not an empirical one, namely that people invoking the intendingforeseeing distinction are, as a matter of sociological fact, merely attempting to evade responsibility, and are being disingenuous in invoking the distinction. My point here, rather, is that thinking about such cases in terms of responsibility (and not just in terms of permissibility) helps to emphasize a feature of the moral situation that is perhaps not as clear otherwise. Thinking in terms of responsibility, it just seems overwhelmingly plausible that

agents are

responsible for all the foreseen consequences of their actions. Furthermore, it seems just as plausible that they

are equally responsible for all the

foreseen consequences of their actions. Prefer this argument to their warrants for the intention-foresight distinction because it has the strongest internal link into the warrants of the framework. Under deontology individuals accept responsibility for all their intentions, so making judgments after the fact in saying that some of our intentions dont really qualify as intentions is a blatant attempt to avoid responsibility for wrongful actions.

David Enoch. Intending, Foreseeing, and the State. Associate Professor of Philosophy and Jacob I. Berman Associate Professor of Law, The Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

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AT-HERMAN
1. Herman assumes no act-omission distinction because she says that you are morally responsible for being passive and allowing your agency to be used by another. But, under the NC framework there is an act-omission distinction because rationality manifests itself in the mental beliefs of agents, and our beliefs can only be connected to our intent. Bad consequences are merely bad things that happen to us, but not things we are morally responsible for. 2. Herman says that the intent of self-defense is permissible if carried out in a way that resists the use of agency by another. But, there is a missing link as to why victims of domestic violence act in this way. If I win the number 2 in the contention, victims of domestic violence dont kill in self-defense, but rather retaliation. Thus, the intent is not to respect their own agency, but to violate the agency of their abusers. 3. Herman assumes that deadly force does not devalue the agency of the abuser. But, deadly force treats the aggressor as a means to an end because it countenances the death of the abuser as a means of saving the victims life. Thus, even if Herman is right that we are morally responsible for allowing violations of agency, deadly force is still impermissible. 4. In order for Hermans justification to apply, the aff has to show that the abuser intends to disrespect the agency of the victim through domestic violence. But, nowhere has the aff shown that the abuser manifests such intent, so you cant just assume its true. In fact, most abusers of domestic violence dont intend to disrespect human agency because their abusive behavior is a mental disease that they cant be held responsible for. Niolon:8 Mental illness has been generally linked to domestic violence, but there is no Abusive Personality Disorder because the types of mental illness seen with domestic abuse are varied, and not all people with the same diagnosis abuse. Some have tied personality issues such as fears of abandonment, extreme jealousy, and impulse control problems to domestic
violence, while others have focused on diagnosable

disorders such as Borderline Personality Disorder, a Depressive

Disorder[s], and even Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [to domestic violence] (Riggs et al, 2000). Disorders
that have received considerable attention include substance abuse and dependence. Leonard (1985) found that 44% of alcohol men presenting for treatment had been violent with their spouses, compared to a similar estimate in a control sample of non-alcoholic men of 15%. Murphy and O'Farrell (1994) found higher numbers in their samples, with 66% of alcoholics reporting relationship violence compared to 20% of a control sample. Some studies have found that 25% of the specific incidents of abuse are tied to alcohol consumption (Kantor and Straus, 1987). Others have obtained higher estimates of an association between alcohol use and a specific incident of violence (46%), but similar estimates (23%) for intoxication and a specific incident of violence (Pernanen, 1991). Farley (1996) found that 47% of gay male abusers reported alcoholism in their family of origin. Further, 40% admitted to substance abuse themselves, and of the nonusers, 73% of male abusers admitted to other additions and compulsions. This is consistent with other estimates (see for example Cruz and Peralta, 2001), but contrasts greatly with prevalence estimates from Narrow and colleagues (2002) indicating that 11.5% of adults have some problems with alcohol, while 7.6% would meet criteria for an alcohol abuse or dependence disorder. Some early studies (Shaefer et al, 1987) reported that gays were at three times the risk of straights for developing alcoholism. Again, some might argue that being gay causes alcoholism, for

Dr. Richard Niolon, Ph.D., Choosing to Abuse: Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, 2002, online, http://www.psychpage.com/gay/library/gay_lesbian_violence/choosing_substances.html
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example, drawing on the stereotype that there is a reliance on gay bars as the main area for gay socialization. However, studies have not supported this (e.g. Kus, 1989); heavy drinkers tend to drink heavily in bars, as well as at home, and most people in bars do not drink to alcoholic levels. Another possibility is that alcoholism stems from internalized homophobia and a negative gay identity (Kus, 1989). Alcohol and other drugs also function as disinhibitors, allowing one to act on urges and impulses that otherwise would be repressed by negative social messages, and ignore shaming self-statements taught to them for a while. They could help men who are uncomfortable with their identity to have intimate relationships, and attribute any negative reaction from others to "being drunk" or "out of control just that once." For men who do not need to deny their sexual orientation, given the absence of exposure to socially presented models of male intimacy, alcohol and drug use may still be the only way they learned to engage with other males, overcome shame and self-doubt, and feel connected and desired (Guss, 2000). Substance use has also been studied in victims of abuse, some of who explain that substances became a way to cope with the abuse. For some, substance abuse became a problem after the abuse began; for others, substance use was a problem before the abuse began, and the violence led to relapse (Cruz and Peralta, 2001). Thus, in so far as substance use is linked to domestic violence (see for example, Schilt et al., 1990), negative social messages and shame placed on gays and lesbians by churches, politicians, teachers, and other public figures could lead to greater use of alcohol and other substances in some gay men. This, in turn, could lead to greater levels of domestic violence due to the loss of inhibition and good judgment, as well as the lack of adaptive coping skills associated with substance use. Of note, some argue that

there is a neurological underpinning to abusive [behavior] and violent people. In other words, brain

abnormalities, problems in frontal lobe functioning, head trauma could all lead an abuser to become more prone to violent behavior. Thus, abusers cannot reasonably be held culpable for their actions to the point where they are due death.

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AT-RETRIBUTION
1. Retribution still requires proportionality. For instance, we wouldnt kill someone for robbing a grocery store because the punishment does not fit the crime so cannot respect their rational capacities. But, deadly force is a disproportionate response because the victim kills the abuser even though most cases of domestic violence are not severe. Milgram:9
Highlights of the 2008 domestic violence statistics are listed below:

There were 70,613 domestic violence offenses

reported by the police in 2008, a 2 percent decrease compared to the

71,901 reported in 2007. Murders increased 50 percent in 2008 (57) when compared to 2007 (38). Assaults accounted for 43 percent (30,429) and harassment accounted for 43 percent (30,023) of the reported offenses in 2008. Arrests were made in 31 percent (21,665) of the offenses reported for 2008, a decrease of 3 percent when co mpared to arrests made in 2007. The most frequent day of domestic violence occurrences was Sunday (12,397). For the twent y-sixth consecutive year, the most frequent hours of domestic violence incidents were between 8:00 p.m. and midnight, when 26 percent (18,679) of the offenses were reported. Children were involved or present during 33 percent of all domestic violence offenses occurring in 2008. Specifically, 5 percent (3,519) were involved and 28 percent (19,583) were present. Wives were the victims in 19 percent (13,637) and ex-wives were the victims in 3 percent (2,406) of the reported domestic violence offenses in 2008. Overall, females were victims in 76 percent (53,810) of all domestic violence offenses. The number of domestic violence compl aints that had prior court orders issued against the offender decreased from 15,481 in 2007 to 13,872 in 2008. This is a decrease of 10 percent. Alcohol and/or drug s were involved in 28 percent (19,691) of the reported offenses occurring in 2008. Alcohol involvement alone accounted for 25 percent (17,808) of the total domestic violence offenses reported. Persons age 60 or over were victims in 3 percent (2,345) of all reported domestic violence offe nses that occurred in 2008. Elderly were the victims in 21 percent (12) of the domestic violence murders (57). Domestic violence does not occur at a regular frequency, but when viewed as a ratio of its occurrence to a fixed time interval, one act of domestic violence would occur every 7 minutes and 26 seconds. Domestic violence offenses arising from a dating relationship accounted for 15 percent (10,468) of the state total. The re were 2,966

total arrests involving domestic violence restraining orders reported by police in 2008. Of these, 1,793 were arrests for violations of a restraining order only, while 1,173 were arrests for violations of a restraining order with an offense ar rest.

Twenty-seven

percent

(19,076)

of all domestic violence complaints resulted in injury

. This is a decrease of 3 percent when compared to the (19,647) that occurred in 2007.

Of all the domestic violence offenses involving weapons (32,052), hands, fists, feet, etc. were used in 91 percent (29,279) o f these offenses. Domestic violence offenses involving a gun decreased 13 percent when compared to 2007.

Serious injuries

were reported in 1,497 offenses

, a 4 percent increase when compared to the 1,445 reported in 2007.

2. Even if retribution is consistent with the framework, it does not follow that the victim can exercise that retribution. Only the state is permitted to use deadly force. Ripstein:10
The ground for punishing theft, however, is not the fact that the thief chooses to violate the basic norm of property. Instead, the grounds for punishment reflect the fact that his choosing to do so must be understood as choosing to exempt himself from the authority of the law. Kant writes that

any transgression of the law can and must be

explained only as arising from a maxim of the criminal (to make such a crime his rule). His rule may be one of exemption, without formally renouncing obedience to the law. such self-exemption need not expressly repudiate
the law in the way that Kant supposes that a revolutionary or regicide doesit is not, as Kant says Diametrically opposed to the law.

The criminals choice of means is

inconstant with the rule of law and so with a civil condition, because she

unilaterally determines which mans are available to her,

rather than accepting the omnilateral judgment of public law. She thereby asserts a claim to what Kant elsewhere calls wild, lawless freedom. The inconsistency parallels the inconsistency between theft and property, but does not merely replicate it.
The structure of a civil condition is that omnilateral public law replaces unilateral private judgment. Through their representatives, the citizens as a collective body give themselves laws, together.

No private person is entitled to make, apply, or enforce laws. Only officials acting in their official capacities are entitled do so. Much of the matter of these laws is dictated by innate right or private right: public law contains no further or other
duties of human beings among themselves than can be conceived in a state of nature; the laws of the condition of public right accordingly have to do only with the rightful form of their

Anne Milgram [Attorney General, State of New Jersey], Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes [Superintendent, New Jersey State Police], Major James S. Beshada [Commanding Officer, Identification and Information Technology Section, New Jersey State Police], Chief Robert Coulton [Ewing Township Police Department, President, New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police], Twenty-Sixth Annual Domestic Violence Offense Report, Domestic Violence in New Jersey, December 2008. 10 Arthur Ripstein. Force and Freedom: Kants Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England. 2009.

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association. In making crime her rule, the criminal violates not only the duties of human beings among themselves that make up the matter of most familiar crimes, but also the rightful form of public law, because

the criminals rule is one of unilateral exemption from omnilateral law. If

unilateral choice could cancel omnilateral law, there could be no omnilateral law.

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AT-FORFEITURE
1. Forfeiture is nonsensical under deontology because deontology says that human worth is intrinsic, which means that it cannot be sacrificed or lost, since all persons have it merely by virtue of being persons. 2. Deontology evaluates actions through their intent, but forfeiture is nonsensical when tied to intent because people manifest harmful wills all the time without losing their rights. For instance, we wouldnt say someone loses all their rights for thinking that they want to kill someone, even though their intent is obviously ill willed. 3. No thresholdforfeiture cant be a justification for killing because it is impossible for an agent to determine if the person has forfeited their right. Even if they witness a crime or wrongdoing, a third party or even the victim can never be certain that their right to life has been forfeited. Also, repeated abuse doesnt answer, it still becomes a question of unperceivable degree. The agent can never know when the right has been forfeited or not. 4. Moral forfeiture doesnt doesnt justify reciprocal violations of liberty. Quinn:11 The appeal to forfeiture as an independently intelligible moral mechanism is, however, problematic. The proper authorities are entitled to punish Jones, a generally decent young man who has foolishly stolen Smiths car, by depriving him of up to the amount of liberty forfeited in the theft. But suppose that before any such punishment takes place, Smith, for reasons having nothing whatever to do with the theft, kidnaps Jones and deprives him of exactly that amount of liberty. In this situation it is natural to suppose that Smith not only wrongs Jones but
specifically

violates his right to liberty. Perhaps this is because Jones forfeits his right to the community

as a whole and not to Smith in particular. But suppose that the community in which Jones lives has the unjust practice of seizing and confining
political dissenters. And suppose that shortly after his crime Jones, who also happens to be a dissenter, is officially seized and, for a time, quarantined to prevent the spread of his political views (views having nothing to do with his theft.) Again, we would naturally suppose that Joness right to liberty had been violate d by his community, even if he were confined only for a period that would constitute an acceptable punishment for his theft and were never punished thereafter. But surely all this strongly suggests that

the conditionality of Joness

right to liberty (the conditionality invoked by the doctrine of forfeiture) makes essential reference to punishment. Jones has not forfeited it in that he may be subjected to a certain penalty
(presumably those with the right to punish him). It seems,

therefore, that the idea of forfeiture in this kind of case comes to no more

than the idea that the criminals rights do not in fact stand in the way of his being punished. The appeal to forfeiture does not, as it first seemed, provide an explanation of why this is so.

11

Warren Quinn. Morality and Action. 1993. Philosophy.

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