TITLE IX: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAIDA TOMIO alias SATO TOSHIO and NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO alias YAMADA TAKAO, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 74630 September 30, 1991 DAVIDE, JR., J.: FACTS: Appellants were arrested at about 3:45 o'clock in the afternoon of May 12, 1986 at the main branch of the RCBC in Makati, Metro Manila, while allegedly receiving the partial payment of the ransom money from Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese tourist. On May 15, 1986, an Information for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC was filed against them with the RTC of Manila. The evidence for the prosecution shows that: Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila for a 5-day vacation tour. One day, while having lunch alone, 2 Japanese men (who later became known as Maida Tomio alias Sato Toshio and the other Mitamura) approached his table and asked him if he were a Japanese, to which he answered in the affirmative. They joined him at the table and offered themselves as his guides in Manila. Eventually, they ended at Leos restaurant for dinner. Before leaving the restaurant, Mitamura placed a pack of cigarettes on his shirt pocket and instructed him to wait as he will talk to a taxi driver. Thereafter, 5 plainclosthesmen who identified themselves as policeman from Southern Police District, approached him, conducted a bodily search and found the pack of cigarettes which they claim to contain marijuana. Nagao was brought to the police station. At the police station, Tomio and Tagahiro Nakajima alias Yamada arrived and acted as interpreters for him. They informed him that he is found guilty of possession of marijuana and that he should pay the policeman for US100,000 for his release. Nagao agreed. They also said that they already advanced the bribe money. When Nagao returned to his hotel, escorted by the appellants and a policeman, he was not allowed to leave the hotel. They demanded that he call his family in Japan to pay the bribe money that they had already advanced. The 3 escorts stayed with him up to 10:00am the following morning. Thereafter, they checked out, transferred to Intercontinental Hotel, and then to Philippine Village Hotel. He was again asked to call his father in Japan about the money. Nagaos father refused to pay the amount demanded but when Tomio talked to him over the phone, he agreed to pay 3M yen. They transferred to Virra Condominium. Then they proceeded to RCBC and withdrew the amount of US1,850 which Nagao gave to them. Upon leaving the bank, they were met by policeman from the Western Police District. Appellants whose held had been earlier sought by the Japanese Embassy in Manila and Nagao were brought to the Western Police District for investigation. Appellants were subsequently charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ISSUE: Whether the appellants are liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

HELD: The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Nagao in order to obtain ransom from him. During the period from May 3 until the arrest of appellants on May 12, Nagao was moved from one hotel to another by appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. While it may be conceded that Nagao had the freedom of locomotion, he did not have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever he pleased. That the money involved was not ranson money, but rather payment of hotel bills or for reimbursement of the sum they advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and additional expenses spent for Nagao cannot be given credit. If indeed, the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the money "paid" to the police, and that they were merely motivated by a desire to help a fellow Japanese in distress, why did they have to bring him from one expensive hotel to the other, thereby incurring more expenses? Why did they not bring him to their homes, as the trial court asked, if only to show their genuine concern for him? Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan contract between appellants and Nagao, as asserted by appellant Tomio, the deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. In People vs Akiran, the SC held that even if the kidnapping were to compel the victim to fulfill his promise of defraying the hospital expenses of a brother of one of the accused, there is still kidnapping for ransom, since if that were indeed the purpose, the accused need not kidnap the victim. "Ransom" under American rulings, as used in statutes making kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been held to mean in its ordinary sense as "money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity." Since the accused in this case demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a person from captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled them to do so, the money is still ransom under the law. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FEDERICO MERCADO OR ALBERTO MERCADO, defendant-appellant. RELOVA, J.: Accused Mercado was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant Yvonne Baylon. Susan left the family residence for an unknown place. The accused suspected that it was her elder sister Yvonne who instigated her to leave. At about 8:30am on the following day while Yvonne was walking on a road, without any warning, the accused suddenly grabbed Yvonne by the neck and pointed a knife on her throat. Thereupon, the accused dragged Yvonne to the house of Norma Guerrero, a friend of his. The accused demanded that she produce her sister, Susan.The brothers of Yvonne and some neighbors arrived asking the accused to release Yvonne. The accused raised the blouse of Yvonne and inserted his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. Thereafter, the accused dragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police and some policemen talked to him. The accused told the Chief of Police that he wanted to see Susan and also demanded that he be given transportation and money. This situation lasted up to about 12:00 noon. After being given some food to partake, the barrio captain arrived and he was able to take hold of the accused and subdue hint him. Yvonne suffered injuries, abrasion on her neck and a small wound on her stomach.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention HELD: Yes.The elements of the crime of illegal detention, as defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:(a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or(b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or(d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. The records of the case are convincing enough that Mercado forcibly brought Yvonne from place to place so that the latter would reveal the whereabouts of Susan, his common-law-wife. For almost five (5) hours, he held Yvonne in a store before he was subdued. Pictures of the incident clearly show appellant's hand around the neck of complainant, with a knife poked at it. The extant evidence on record shows that "the accused held complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who was the common-law wife of the accused." PEOPLE v. DEL SOCCORO GR No. 84048 February 15, 1990 Padilla, J.: FACTS: while Evelyn Sanchez was in her residence at No. 162 Kalentong St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, cooking food for lunch, her fouryear old daughter named Claire Sanchez went out of the house to play with other children. After she had finished cooking, Evelyn called her child to get inside and eat her lunch. Receiving no response, she went out of the house and looked for her child in the neighborhood. But the child was nowhere to be found. She inquired from the other children who were playing where her daughter Claire was and she was informed that Claire was taken by a woman whom the children thought was the aunt of Claire. She was also informed that her child had resisted in going with the woman and cried for her mother, but the woman carried the child and got on board a jeepney and left the place. The disappearance of Claire Sanchez was, consequently, reported to the Mandaluyong police. She was later informed that a certain doctor, Dr. Apolonia Merced Villamayor, had bought a child. The doctor brought the child to his spinster aunt. The doctor testified that the accused came to her clinic and asked for donation. she wanted the lady physician to take care of the child, whom she referred to as her daughter because her husband just died and she could not afford to feed her brood of four (4) girls and two (2) boys. The doctor gave the accused P400.00 which she had at the time, and told her to come back the following Saturday for the balance. After the accused had left, she gave the child to her spinster aunt. When the accused came back for the balance. She was arrested by the police officers. ISSUE: Whether accused is liable for kidnapping. HELD: YES.

The claim of the defendant-appellant that the child, Claire Sanchez, went voluntarily with her, cannot be given credence. Evelyn Sanchez, the mother of the child, Claire, declared that when she asked her daughter upon their reunion if she went voluntarily with the defendant-appellant, the child answered that she did not. Evelyn further declared that when she asked the children in the neighborhood, with whom her daughter was playing, if Claire had resisted, the children answered that Claire had resisted, so that the accused had to carry her to the jeep. 6 Besides, the defendant-appellant herself testified that when she picked up the child in Mandaluyong, her only thought was to bring the child to Dr. Villamayor in Angono, Rizal. 7 She did not bring the child to her (defendant's) own home in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal even if this place is nearer than Angono, because, according to the defendant, she already has many children of her own and they have no food to eat. 8 But if she really pitied the child whom she described as crying on the sidewalk, why, it can be asked, did she not bring her to the nearest police station in Mandaluyong And, why did she think only of Dr. Villamayor who, according to her, she did not even know personally, but only in name. G.R. No. 86454 October 18, 1990 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CARMEN LIM @ "MAMENG LIM", defendant-appellant. Prosecutions version of facts: Aida and Avelyn were sent on an errand to buy rice in Masbate. In the afternoon of the same day while they were in front of the Helen Theatre, they were called by the accused Carmen Lim "Come here Nene" and asked them to go to her house. Aida and Avelyn went to the house of the accused and got inside passing through the front door. From July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the house of the accused doing household chores such as cleaning the kitchen, scrubbing the floor, washing the plates including removing lice from the head of the accused and fanning her. Avelyn, the younger sister of Aida, was brought by Carmen's sister. Defense version:The sisters proceeded to appellant's store which she was tending at that time. She inquired from the sisters as to the whereabouts of their parents as they were apparently alone. The sisters claimed that they were driven away by their father and that they were not given any food to eat. Concerned for their safety, appellant offered to shelter the sisters.To help in the house, Aida would go to the market to buy bread, fish and salt for appellant's household. Aida also helped watch over appellant's store from time to time. ISSUE: WON kidnapping was committed HELD: NO There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone. The fact of detention is also denied by the testimony of one of the prosecution witnesses. There is no motive whatsoever for the appellant to kidnap the two children. The appellant is a woman of sufficient means. It is undisputed that she is the owner of a store and was the employer of two maids at the time of the incident. She did not know the two children prior to the incident.No motive was

ever propounded by the prosecution. We are thus ushered to applying the precept that though proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction, yet a void in the evidence in this respect discloses a weakness in the case for the prosecution. PEOPLE VS RAMOS G.R. No. 132135 May 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO SABARDAN CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: NImfa left their house when she was scolded by her parents. The appellant invited Richelle to his apartment, and to spend the night therein. Richelle agreed. She felt happy, thinking that she was in good hands. The appellant led Richelle to a room on the second floor of the apartment, where she slept without removing her pants and underwear. One night, the appellant entered the room completely naked. Surprised, Richelle asked what he was doing in the room, but the appellant did not respond. Richelle kicked him and pulled his hair, and told him to get out. The appellant left the room.The next morning, Richelle told the appellant that she wanted to go home already. The appellant dissuaded her from leaving and told Richelle that her mother might get angry if she found out that she had slept in his apartment.The appellant later left the house. When Richelle tried to open the door, she found out that it was locked from the outside. On the fourth day of her detention, Richelle was seated on a coach in the sala on the ground floor of the apartment. The appellant forced her to drink a glass of ice cold beer. When she refused, the appellant threatened to kill her. Afraid for her life, she drank the beer from a glass. The appellant then embraced her, kissed her and touched her breasts. Richelle resisted. Momentarily, she felt dizzy and fell unconscious.Early the next morning, Richelle woke up and found herself lying in bed completely naked. She felt severe pains in her vagina. She saw the appellant beside her, also completely naked. Charger for serious illegal detention with rape, the appellant appealed the case. ISSUE: What was the crime committed by the accused? HELD: The original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code. The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of serious illegal detention. We agree with the appellants assertion that he is not guilty of serious illegal detention, but we do not agree that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment from September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on September 30, 1991. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellants apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to go. She believed,

at that time, that she was safe with the appellant, who was their neighbor and her brothers friend. However, when the appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her that her mother, Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her mothers anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellants apartment. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult would. She could not have foreseen the appellants evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellants apartment, she could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the fourth day of Richelles stay in the appellants apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith raped her. PEOPLE vs BALUYA G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant. PANGANIBAN, J.: Doctrine: Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. FACTS: Yvonne was only eight years old when she was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead he held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, while the accused was holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.Yvonne asked the accused where they were going and accused answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying.While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. The groups noticed the accused kept on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken. The group brought Yvonne home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five meters away. ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of kidnapping. vs.

HELD: No. The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code. A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of "locking up." Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.

damage to the Suzuki tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver and the passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for more than 30 days. Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help or render assistance to them, without justifiable reason. Issue: Whether the information filed for reckless imprudence bars the prosecution of separate offense for abandonment of victim. Held: The information were for separate offenses the first against a person and the second against public peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. The two information filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code. Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege. Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Civil Code.

GRAVE THREATS REYES vs PEOPLE The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam." At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he

KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR ABANDONMENT OF ONES VICTIM G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991 ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Facts: On or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, accused being then the driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas '85, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precautions to avoid damage to property and injuries to person (sic), drive, manage and operate (sic) said Owner Jeep in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, as a result of which said motor vehicle being then driven and operated by him, hit and bumped a tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas '85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing

became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away. The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lwphi1.et ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable of grave threats HELD: NO. The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats. The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said: The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the

person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats. GRAVE COERCION G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983 JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents. ESCOLIN, J.:+.wph!1 FACTS: . At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business. Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement. ISSUE: WON the accused is liable of grave threats HELD: NO. Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2 The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.

FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents. G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991 MEDIALDEA, J.: FACTS: At 10am, Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, complainant, was fetched from her house by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee, upon the instruction of Francis Lee, Branch Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. Upon arriving at the office of the bank, she was not attended to immediately by Lee. After an hour, Lee confronted her about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check, which the latter allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, Lee was shouting at her with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay at the said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the family way, was watched by the bank's employees and security guards. It was about 6pm of the same day when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises. ISSUE: Whether Lee is liable for grave coercion. HELD: NO. Grace coercion under Art. 286 of the RPC punishes any person, who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.

threat to file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right todo so. The complainant cannot also be said to have been intimidated and compelled into disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the Lee's threat to detain her at the bank. The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the aforesaid acts. Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check, the complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious. As to his length of stay at the bank, the same was not due to Lees threat. It was due rather to her desire to prove her innocence. The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner. American authorities have declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety."

G.R. No. 142024

July 20, 2001

P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. MENDOZA, J.: On June 23, 1991, at around 8pm, complainant Josephine PicosMapalad and her then boyfriend, complainant AnastacioMapalad (now the former's husband), were dating at the Garcia Sports Complex. Petitioner Sarabia, then a member of the city police force, on that particular evening was passing by, and carrying with him his service gun and flashlight. He saw the two lovers and focused his flashlight on them. Petitioner, with intimidation, pointed his gun at the two lovers and forced them to perform sexual acts against their will. Petitioner then extorted P100.00 from them. Petitioner made complainant AnastacioMapalad buy him a cigarette outside the complex, and, while he was gone, petitioner forced complainant Picos-Mapalad to masturbate his penis. Afterwards, petitioner allowed complainants to leave with the threat that he would kill them if they reported the incident to anyone. The following morning, complainants went to Panglao and stayed there for several days to recuperate. With the help of their relatives, they reported the matter to the police. As a result, three informations for grave coercion were filed against petitioner. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of grave coercion HELD: Yes.An erroneous reckoning or misestimation of time, such as that which complainants committed by giving different time periods as to how long they stayed in Panglao or varying

Considering that the present case does not involve violence from intimidation, the provisions of Art. 1335 of the NCC on intimidation is relevant. It states that there is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures. She is a graduate of Business Administration major in Banking and Finance from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in graduate school. She also worked with the Insular bank of Asia and America as a bank teller. It also appears that complainant actively participated in the deposit and withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check. In light of the foregoing circumstances, Lees demand that the complainant return the proceeds of the check accompanied by

estimation of the length of time that they had been sweethearts prior to the incident in question, is too trivial and immaterial to discredit their testimonies, especially in this case where time is not an essential element or has no bearing on the fact of the commission of the crime. They refer to matters of minor detail or to the precise sequence of events that do not detract from the central fact that petitioner compelled complainants to perform sexual acts at gunpoint against their will, on which the latter had consistently and candidly testified. The non-disclosure by witnesses to police officers of petitioner's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not necessarily against human experience. Complainants cannot be faulted for this considering that their tormentor was no ordinary delinquent but a city policeman. He threatened complainants at gunpoint that he would harm them if they reported the matter to anyone. Complainants are both unschooled. At the time of the commission of the crime, Josephine Picos-Mapalad was a 17-hear old laundry woman, while AnastacioMapalad was a simple grocery bagger. It needs no stretch of the imagination that when petitioner threatened to kill them if they reported the matter to the authorities, they believed entirely and utterly that he could and would make good on his threat.

violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in the second paragraph. The offense falling under the second paragraph cannot include violence as an element; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise it would come under the first paragraph. Another view we take of the case is that the information, though wrongly calling the offense charged as coercion, alleges facts sufficiently constituting unjust vexation, now mixed with coercion and also penalized under the second paragraph of Article 287. Under the old Penal Code, other coercions and unjust vexations were considered misdemeanors against persons treated under a separate chapter. The principal feature of coercion under the first paragraph is that there be a taking by a person of his debtor?s property for the purpose of applying it to the payment of debt. This feature is recited in the information, consummated not by violence (distinguishing element specified in the first paragraph of Article 287), but thru deceit and misrepresentation no less effective than actual force in depriving the offended party of his free will. The contention of Defendant-Appellees that the present appeal would place them in double jeopardy is unfounded. ?Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped from alleging in the second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was valid.? (Morgan, Comments on the Rules of Court 52 ed., Vol. II, p. 802.)

UNJUST VEXATION PEOPLE v. REYES GR No. L-7712 March 23, 1956 Paras, CJ.: FACTS: Accused took possession of passenger jeep bearing plate No. TPU2695 belonging to Agustin Blasco, without the knowledge and consent of the latter, for the purpose of answering for the debt of the said owner, and despite repeated demands made upon them to return the said jeep, they refused and still refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner. Upon motion of the Defendants, the court dismissed the information because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged was coercion under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, in the first paragraph, that ?Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor, for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.? An appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila having been dismissed for lack of merit, the prosecution has elevated the case to us in third instance, contending that the offense charged is coercion or unjust vexation under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that ?Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both,? under which violence is not an essential element. ISSUE: What is the liability of accused? HELD: Although the offense named in the information is coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of ?coercions?. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include

PEOPLE vs ANONUEVO