TITLE VII: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS PUBLIC OFFICERS [G.R. No. 145368.

April 12, 2002] KAPUNAN, J.: SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent. President Ramos issued EO No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Senate Blue Ribbon Committe investigated the anomalies connected to EXPO. Among the Committees recommendations was the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, for violating of the anti-graft law.The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. HELD: YES Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The characteristics of a public office , according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not. We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a

usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, it is a public office, nonetheless. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said commission less of a public office. This element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior. BRIBERY AND OFFICIALS CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC

MANIPON vs SANDIGANBAYAN DACUMAS vs SANDIGANBAYAN SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman G.R. No. 145368 KAPUNAN, J.: April 12, 2002 A.

FACTS: The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman directed petitioner, Chairman of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), to submit his counter affidavit on the charges of anomalies found by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Saguisag Committees. The Blue Ribbon Committee recommended his prosecution for violation of the rules on public bidding on the award of centennial contracts and manifest bias in the issuance of the Notice to Proceed in the absence of a valid contract, while the Saguisag Committee recommended the further investigation of petitioner for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019, Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner moved to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction claiming that he is not a public officer and that NCC is a private organization. The motion was denied by the Ombudsman, hence, the instant recourse. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a public officer. HELD: It is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads: SEC. 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt

practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e)Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows: SEC. 2.Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term (b)"Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Italics supplied.] It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial. To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define "public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is: . . . any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class. Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, on the other hand, states: Officer as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee," refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function. It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a

"public official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus: "Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. Which of these definitions should apply, if at all? Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term "compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many meanings. Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to include allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages. How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted? Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation. Would such fact bear any significance? Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial court from resolving them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court's Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION G.R. No. L-18428 August 30, 1962

MARIANO G. ALMEDA, SR., and VALERIANA F. ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. LABRADOR, J.: FACTS: Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza filed a complaint with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. with having acquired, during his incumbency as government employee, cash and properties from unknown sources in the total amount of P121,407.98 which acquisitions, according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful

income of said Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law. Pursuant to the provisions of said Act, a preliminary investigation was conducted by a committee of investigators. On the basis of the findings of the investigators, the Solicitor General filed a petition for forfeiture against Almeda, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 44693. Petitioners filed their answer and thereafter the case was set for hearing.Subsequently, the Solicitor General filed a "Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture, which the judge granted. The Solicitor General filed the amended petition for forfeiture, adding other counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements. Petitioners objected to the amendment on the ground, inter alia, thatsince the proceeding under RA No. 1379 is criminal in nature, the petition may not be amended in substance without petitioners consent. ISSUE: WhetherR.A. No. 1379 is penal in substance.

Section 12 of the law provides a penalty to the public officer, but said penalty is against the employee or officer for the transfer or conveyance of any unlawfully acquired properties. The law therefore penalizes an officer for transferring or conveying properties unlawfully acquired but does not do so for making the unlawful acquisition; it merely imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired. As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the law, is not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil actions, amendment of the charges or the petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial or in the course of trial without need of another investigation. It also follows that amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the petition without obtaining the consent of the respondent.

CABAL vs CAPUNAN HELD: No. A study of the provisions of RA No. 1379 readily discloses that the proceeding for forfeiture is civil in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the petitioners. A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or criminal, thus: . . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provision where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for recovered in a civil action. In the first place a proceedings under RA No. 1379 does not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it been a criminal proceeding there would have been, after a preliminary investigation, a reading of information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a trial thereafter, with the publication of the judgement in the presence of the defendant. But these proceedings as above set forth, are not provided for in the law. REPUBLIC vs CA G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants. FERNANDO, J.: Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3 Facts: One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause. Issue: Whether the filing of a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities violates due process. Held: No. Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device. The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption. As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain

Jaravata vs Sandiganbayan No. L-56170 January 31, 1984 Facts: Ramos, Lloren, Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones Barangay High School with accused Hilario Jaravata as their assistant principal Conrado Baltazar as the administrator. Accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary differentials for 1978 and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses. The classroom teachers actually received their salary differentials and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts but as Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to him by Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista, and accused complied. By virture of the amounts given, the accused was charged with violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding the accused guilty. Issue: Whether the conviction should be upheld? Ruling: Republic Act No. 3019 provides, inter alia: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even normal from the government." It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. In Our opinion, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction. There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from

exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials. G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986 GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent. ALAMPAY, J.:

b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. The new Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that: Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen. Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation.Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President.The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement. Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC. In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of stocks. Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations:Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award. The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen. In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment. Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers for the purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers. The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can

FACTS: The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases. Petitioner stressed that he did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass. ISSUE: Whether petitioner violated Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act HELD: No.The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;

safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them., What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power.There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen. Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction. Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality. ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 CORTES, J.: FACTS:Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer. As a rightof-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners. Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the owners and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally June 30, 1987

assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty in violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. HELD: YES.Sec. 3. Provides thatin addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term.the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them. On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled.The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-ofway-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.

PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners, vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998 NARVASA, C.J.: FACTS Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan, all holding regular executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC), together with two other officers, were designated by the NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for NPCs "Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project." In the pre-qualification and bidding procedures, the lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively. Later, the Contracts Committee declared both Joint Venture and Urban disqualified. The Committee also stated that on a review of the relevant factors, it was needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. But despite unanimous approval for a re-bidding, the project was eventually cancelled. Urban then filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee, without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC was "already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture" but because Urban protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; that, however, instead of awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding and ultimately canceled the project. These acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners were then charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, i.e. causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The People then filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, invoking Sec. 13 of RA 3019. ISSUE Whether it is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019.

HELD Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. RA 3019 implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions including preventive suspension should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment. The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service. It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition therefor is the existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a speedy determination of the issues involved in the case. The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to determine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The accused should be given adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him. But once a proper determination of the validity of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The court has no discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order denying the latter's motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws. The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

G.R. No. 175457

July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175482 ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. VILLARAMA, JR., J.: A letter from Atty. David B. Loste was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused for the crime of murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In an Information, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. The Sandiganbayan, First Division, found petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 HELD: Yes.In order to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. As regards petitioner Apelado, Sr., his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar. The power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Section 3 refers to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalims safety. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer. SANTIAGO V. GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993Quiason, J.: FACTS: Petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with a criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed.

The information alleges that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. Petitioner claims, among others, that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is may be liable under sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. HELD: YES. She may be liable. (this is just a petition for certiorari. No decision yet as to her liability). In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that: (1) She was a public officer;

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held: The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur. ISSUE 2: whether petitioner is liable for a delicto continuado. HELD: NO. We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.). According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54). The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; (3) (4) Those aliens were disqualified; She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions." The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial. Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. PLUNDER [G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: Petitioner Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) assail the constitutionality of the law on the following grounds (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are:Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" xxxSection 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties xxxSection 4. Rule of Evidence. ISSUE: WON the plunder law is unconstitutional HELD: NO 1. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. The words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. 2. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence.What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

3. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. SERAPIO vs SANDIGANBAYAN MALVERSATION G.R. No. 71581 March 21, 1990 CARMEN LABATAGOS, petitioner, SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Padilla, J.: FACTS: Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State University MSU General Santos City. She filed a leave of absence for the months of March, April and May 1978 and did not discharge her duties for the said period. Based on the official receipts and the record of remittances for the period from January to August 1978, the audit examination disclosed that the petitioner collected the total amount of P113,205.58 and made a total remittance to DBP the depository bank of the university, in the amount of P78,868.69, leaving an unremitted amount of P34,336.19. She was charged with malversation with public funds. vs. HON. OF THE

In her defense, she claimed that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that her shortage would amount to only P2,000.00; that she could not be held accountable for the collections for March, April and May 1978 because she was on maternity leave; and that several disbursements in the total amount of P49,417.12 were not credited in her favor by the auditors. She claimed further that she should not be held accountable for the alleged misappropriations between the months of January 1978 and August 1978 in the amount of P34,336.19 because those who appropriated the amounts were her superiors and that the amounts taken were properly receipted but that the receipts were lost. ISSUE: Was the accused guilty of malversation? HELD: Yes. There is no merit in the accused's defense. Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement of collections and deposits prepared by the audit team of Francisco Rivera on the understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied by the figures clearly reflected on the said documents. Exhibit A, the audit report which she signed without exception, shows that she incurred a shortage of P34,336.19 for the period from January to August 1978; while Exhibit A-1, the statement of her collections and deposits for the same period which she certified as correct, indicates the same amount of P34,336.19 as her shortage. Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution's rebuttal witness, confirmed that she assisted the accused in the collection of fees; that the accused filed application for maternity leave in March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that month; that the accused did not report for work in April 1978; and that she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. Miss Guanzon, however, explained that she turned over all her collections to the accused during all the times that she was assisting her in collecting the fees; and that even in April 1978 when the accused was physically absent from office, she also turned over her collections to the accused ill the latters house with the duplicate copies of the receipts she issued which the accused signed after satisfying herself that the amounts I turned over tallied with the receipts. There is color of truth to Mrs. Guanzon's explanation. All the collections for the months of March and April 1978 are fully accounted for they are itemized in the reports of collection, and shown to have been duly remitted in the remittance advices for those months. The auditor was correct in refusing to credit the accused with the three (3) different amounts mentioned in her letter of October 22, 1980. The first sum, P7,140.20, purporting to be refunds of tuition fees to students granted tuition privilages is hot supported by any official authorization for such refunds by the University authorities. Besides, the supposed list of students who were recipients of the refunds is incompetent evidence being a mere xerox copy uncertified as a true copy of an existing original.

LEONARDO N. ESTEPA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-59670 February 15, 1990 EN BANC FACTS: In the morning of 24 January 1980, Leonardo N. Estepa, then a senior paymaster of the Cash Division of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, together with nine (9) other paymasters and Cesar R. Marcelo, their Supervising Paymaster, went to the Philippine National Bank ("PNB") to encash checks amounting to P7,640,000.00 representing the cash advances then being requisitioned by the ten (10) Paymasters. It turned out, however, that the cash value of those checks was not available at the PNB. Hence, the personnel from the City Treasurer's Office, among them Estepa, accompanied by some officials of the PNB, proceeded to the Central Bank. In the presence of Marcelo, and the ten (10) paymasters, P7,640,000.00 in cash was counted out and placed inside two (2) duffel bags which, after being properly sealed, were loaded inside an armored car and immediately transported to and deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila. Mr. Marcelo testified that there was a power "brownout" at about 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. on that day and the central vault, where they customarily distribute the cash advances was dark; that he decided with the concurrence of Atty. Kempis, the head of the Cash Division, to distribute the cash to the paymasters at the latter's (Kempis') room which was well-lighted by the rays of the sun coming in through a side window. Marcelo stated that in order to deter third persons from entering that room during the distribution, the door was closed and a guard was posted outside the room by the door. In the presence of Atty. Kempis and the ten (10) paymasters, Marcelo opened the two (2) duffel bags and again counted out the amount of P7,640,000.00. The bills were segregated and bundled in denominations of P100.00s, P50.00s, P20.00s and P10.00s up to the last coin, and placed on a big chaise lounge and on a table inside Atty. Kempis' room. Some of the paymasters were assigned to take charge of the bundles of money, one paymaster for each denomination; however, Estepa was not one of those so assigned. As each paymaster was called, each paymaster in charge of a denomination handed to the requisitioner the number of bundles of that denomination corresponding to the amount being requisitioned. Thus, one at a time, the paymasters were called and given the amounts they had requisitioned. When Estepa's turn came, Mr. Marcelo asked the paymasters in charge of the bundles of differing denominations to hand to Estepa the amount of P850,000.00. After all the ten (10) paymasters had gotten their money and while all of them were still inside that room, Mr. Marcelo, as was his usual practice, in a loud voice asked them in Pilipino if everything was fine. No complaint or protest was made by anyone of them, including Estepa, and all left the room uneventfully. However, ten (10) minutes later, Estepa reported to Mr. Marcelo that the amount of P50,000.00 was missing from his cash advance. The latter immediately summoned back all ten (10) paymasters and with the help of the Assistant Cashier, counted once again the money just delivered to each of the ten (10) paymasters. It turned out that the

amount received by each of them, except Estepa, was correct. Pacita Sison, an examiner from the Commission on Audit testified that on 25 January 1980, she had examined Estepa's cash and accounts which showed that the latter's account was short by P50,000.00. Thereupon, she reduced her finding into writing which document was signed by Estepa. Estepa, upon receipt of a formal letter from the City of Manila demanding the amount of P50,000.00, submitted a written explanation denying his liability therefor. He alleged that he had only received the total amount of P800,000.00 and that the loss of the amount of P50,000.00 occurred before that sum was delivered to him. Estepa also executed on 5 February 1980 a sworn statement to that effect. Unconvinced, the Legal Office of the City of Manila filed a complaint against Estepa with the Tanodbayan. In turn, the Tanodbayan, after conducting a preliminary investigation, filed an information in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner with the crime of malversation through negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation. HELD: The Sandiganbayan, addressing the question of whether or not petitioner Estepa had been negligent in the handling of the money that he, along with the other nine (9) paymasters had received from the Supervising Paymaster, analyzed the foregoing explanation of petitioner Estepa in the following manner: His fault is not only limited to such inaction. By his own account, people were starting to enter the room of Atty. Kempis. Yet, he left the bundles of bigger denominations at the sofa without even asking somebody to watch for them and proceeded to the table of Mr. Pangilinan where he left the money of smaller denominations. In short, accused's inexcusable negligence consisted of the following: (1) failure to check and recheck the denominations by him before the paymasters dispersed; (2) not sounding off that he was not absolutely certain of the amount received when Mr. Marcelo asked the paymasters, "Ayos na ba kayo diyan?" (3) failure to ask Atty. Kempis or any other person to watch over the money of bigger denominations at his cage before he returned to the table of Mr. Pangilinan for the smaller denominations. Had he not been remiss on these, there would have been no opportunity for an unknown hand to surreptitiously get hold of the money." After careful examination of the records of this case, including the detailed testimony of the witnesses, we find no reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the Sandiganbayan that petitioner had indeed been negligent in the handling of the funds which had been turned over to him. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he

could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds involved. Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation where the accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. As this Court has pointed out, this presumption juris tantum is founded upon human experience. G.R. No. 102356 February 9, 1993 CALINICO B. ILOGON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. CAMPOS, JR., J.: FACTS: Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to January, 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed during the period of his incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a duly-appointed cashier. On September 19, 1983, COA Auditors conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his accounts. Petitioner was thus charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner argues that he never misappropriated the amount of P118,003.10 for his own personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to his co-employees. He pleads:The act of petitioner in giving out vales and/or cash advances should not be condemned or be considered as a criminal act but should instead be lauded not only because the same was done purely for humanitarian reasons and that is to alleviate the plight of his coemployees during those hard times when the salaries of lowly government employees were very much below the ordinary level of subsistence and his desire to see to it that the public interest will not be jeopardized, but also because this has been the undisturbed practice in their office since time immemorial, even before the accused's incumbency . ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of malversation of public funds. HELD: YES. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as

long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P118,003.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same. he would invoke what he calls "humanitarian reasons" as the justification for the said shortage. But, like the accused Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner herein knows that his granting of "chits" and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and regulations. The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements". The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P188,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance. AZARCON vs SANDIGANBAYAN INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS RODILLAS vs SANDIGANBAYAN EN BANC G.R. No. L-59670 February 15, 1990 vs. THE

bags and again counted out the amount of P7,640,000.00. One at a time, the paymasters were called and given the amounts they had requisitioned. When Estepa's turn came, Mr. Marcelo asked the paymasters in charge of the bundles of differing denominations to hand to Estepa the amount of P850,000.00. After all the ten (10) paymasters had gotten their money and while all of them were still inside that room, Mr. Marcelo, as was his usual practice, in a loud voice asked them in Pilipino if everything was fine. No complaint or protest was made by anyone of them, including Estepa, and all left the room uneventfully. However, ten (10) minutes later, Estepa reported to Mr. Marcelo that the amount of P50,000.00 was missing from his cash advance. The latter immediately summoned back all ten (10) paymasters and with the help of the Assistant Cashier, counted once again the money just delivered to each of the ten (1) paymasters. It turned out that the amount received by each of them, except Estepa, was correct. A complaint was filed against Estepa for malversations of public funds through negligence with the Tanodbayan. In turn, the Tanodbayan, after conducting a preliminary investigation, filed an information in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner with the crime of malversation through negligence. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable. Ruling: Yes. We consider that it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P850,000.00 had in fact been distributed to petitioner Estepa. the facts showed that before distribution a count was made and in the recount after Estapa had reported his loss, the total amount of P7,590,000.00 was accounted for (P7,640,000 P50,000.00). The loss reported by Estepa occurred after turnover to him of the entire amount of P850,000.00. During the moment when Mr. Marcelo asked the paymasters if they had received the correct amount by directing the question, "Ayos na ba kayo diyan?" No one answered including accused. This is one phase of his negligence. If he had not yet fully counted the money he received, accused should have voiced himself out. Instead, he let the occasion pass in silence giving the impression that the money he had received was in accordance with the amount due him. His fault is not only limited to such inaction. By his own account, people were starting to enter the room of Atty. Kempis. Yet, he left the bundles of bigger denominations at the sofa without even asking somebody to watch for them and proceeded to the table of Mr. Pangilinan where he left the money of smaller denominations. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds involved. Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation where the accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming

LEONARDO N. ESTEPA, petitioner, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, respondents. FELICIANO, J. Facts:

Leonardo N. Estepa, then a senior paymaster of the Cash Division of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, was together with (9) other paymasters and Cesar R. Marcelo, their Supervising Paymaster, went to the PNB to encash checks amounting to P7,640,000.00 representing the cash advances then being requisitioned by the 10 Paymasters. However, the cash value of those checks was not available at the PNB, hence, they proceeded to the Central Bank. In the presence of Marcelo, and the paymasters, P7,640,000.00 in cash was counted out and placed inside 2 duffel bags which, after being properly sealed, were loaded inside an armored car and immediately transported to and deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila. Due to power "brownout" it was decided to distribute the cash to the paymasters at the Atty. Kempis' room which was well-lighted by the rays of the sun coming in through a side window. Marcelo stated that in order to deter third persons from entering that room during the distribution, the door was closed and a guard was posted outside the room by the door. In the presence of Atty. Kempis and the ten (10) paymasters, Marcelo opened the two (2) duffel

any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly authorized officer. As this Court has pointed out, this presumption juris tantum is founded upon human experience. EN BANC G.R. No. 102356 February 9, 1993

CALINICO B. ILOGON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. CAMPOS, JR., J. Facts: Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to January, 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed during the period of his incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a duly-appointed cashier. On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors Robin S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his accounts amounting to P118,871.29. The amount of shortage was later reduced to P118,003.10. On November 27, 1984, petitioner was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner would try to evade the application of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code by arguing that he never misappropriated the amount of P118,003.10 for his own personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to his co-employees. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable. Ruling: Yes. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P118,003.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same. he would invoke what he calls "humanitarian reasons" as the justification for the said shortage. But, like the accused Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner herein knows that his granting of "chits" and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and regulations. Such practice, it was held in Cabello, is also prohibited by Memoramdum Circular No. 570, dated June 29, 1968, of the General Auditing Office. This Court went

further to state that "giving vales" is proscribed under Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, specifically Section 69 thereof, which provides that postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank whenever their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted." The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements". The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P188,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance. THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 116033 1997 February 26,

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J. Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earthmoving business and his services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises. On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985. Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue," assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIR's Regional Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to cease his operations with his business which is evidenced by the fact that sometime in August, 1985 Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from Azarcon's custody. Thereafter, along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon, as a private individual, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the RPC. Azarcon was convicted while Ancla remains at large.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property. Ruling: No. The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers. Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election nor does he qualify as appointed by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. While the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring "any person" to preserve a distrained property. However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that "Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code . . . defines the individuals covered by the term 'officers' under Article 217 39 . . ." of the same Code. And accordingly, since Azarcon became "a depository of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted under Article 217 . . . ." The Court is not persuaded. The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. The Court thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. As aptly and correctly stated by the petitioner in his memorandum, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.