A n A p ology for Henry Kissinger

U.S. Cold War Foreign Policy and the Neglect

of East Timor: An Apology for Henry Kissinger

daniel henebery

the island of Timor lies in the southeastern corner of the Indone-

sian archipelago. For hundreds of years, Timor was divided between
two colonial powers: the Dutch, who controlled the western half
of the island, and the Portuguese, who controlled the eastern half
as well as an enclave on the western half and a few small outlying
islands. The western half of the island became part of the newly cre-
ated nation of Indonesia in 1949 when the Dutch granted indepen-
dence to its Southeast Asian colonies. Portuguese Timor, however,
remained a badly neglected backwater of Portugal’s colonial hold-
ings. In the wake of the 1974 “Carnation Revolution” in Lisbon,
the Portuguese Government renounced any claim to those colonial
possessions and expressed interest in starting them on the road to
independence. Under pressure from Indonesia’s military leadership
President Suharto reacted in the summer of 1975 by making co-
vert and overt attempts to seize the colony that winter. Against this
aggression stood a vaguely leftist East Timorese organization called
Fretilin, and its military wing Falintil led by Xanana Guzman and
represented abroad by Jose Ramos-Horta, which sought immediate
independence for East Timor. The ill-equipped Fretilin melted into
the mountains of central Timor, and waged a guerilla war for the
next 24 years. In 1999, Indonesia relinquished control of the ter-
ritory and a U.N. sponsored provisional government took charge
until Timor became fully independent in 2002.1
In January 2002, The East Timorese Provisional Govern-

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ment (UNTAET) created the East Timor Commission for Recep-

tion, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) in order to ascertain re-
sponsibility for the invasion and 24-year occupation by Indonesia.
On 19 January 2006 the President of East Timor, Xanana Guzman,
submitted that report, entitled Chega! (Enough! in Portuguese) to
the United Nations; eleven days later the full report was made pub-
lic. The extensive report details the only official investigation ever
conducted to determine exactly what happened in the twenty-four
years from the initial invasion in late 1975 to the difficult process of
independence in 1999. 2
Two pages in the “Responsibility” section of this report deal
with the role the United States played in the invasion of East Timor.
The report examines what the United States knew about Indone-
sia’s intentions, what its motivations were, and the exact nature of
the United States’ role in the invasion. It concludes that the United
States “failed to support the right of the East Timorese people to
self-determination, and that its political and military support were
fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation.” 3
The report deduces that the U.S.’s assessment of “the impor-
tance of good relations with Indonesia” was the primary motivating
factor for the United States, and that the emphasis on Indonesia
combined with the assumption that the invasion could not be re-
versed was what maintained that position of inaction for twenty-four
years even though it was fully within the abilities of Henry Kissinger
and other policymakers at the time to dissuade the Government of
Indonesia.
This assessment coincides with the near universal consensus
of the rather small group of cold war scholars such as Matthew Jar-
dine, Noam Chomsky, Brad Simpson, and Christopher Hitchens4 as
well as members of concerned activist organizations such as the East
Timor Action Network (ETAN). They hold that because the United
States did not intervene, did not cease its sale of arms, and essen-
tially gave Indonesia carte blanche to do as it pleased in East Timor,
the United States is partially to blame for the 24-year occupation
and, by extension, all of the abuse that occurred in that time. Henry

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Kissinger, in particular, is the target of much criticism for his role in

this event. Christopher Hitchens, even went so far as to argue that
Henry Kissinger ought to be tried as a war criminal for his part in
this event.5
The limitation on this position is not in its spirit. The crimes
committed in East Timor can be counted the 20th among the worst
of this century. Estimates as to the number of people killed range
from 102,800 to as many as 300,000.6 Rather, the dominant in-
terpretation of the East Timor invasion has tended to judge these
events outside the proper context of mid-1970s old war foreign
policy, which followed it from the mid-1970s. As a consequence,
there is a temptation to judge the motivations for the actions of U.S.
policymakers such as Henry Kissinger based on present standards
with no eye to the Cold War mentality which dominated policy in
that era. While it is tempting to heap all the blame on Kissinger’s
shoulders, it is more important to understand how easily Kissinger
could have cast aside all consideration for East Timor for the sake of
U.S. interests. In order to learn from this mistake it is first necessary
to understand how it could happen so easily. Thus, the best way to
examine the invasion is to understand East Timor as Kissinger did.
When this is done properly the question, “what else could have been
done?” becomes harder to answer.
To this end I shall evaluate the United States’ role in the In-
donesian invasion of East Timor, using the declassified documents
the National Security Archive gave to CAVR in combination with
other period documents obtained through the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. In this way I will clarify that Kissinger’s actions, while
certainly supportive of the invasion, reflected the U.S. foreign policy
mindset of his time. While these actions were reprehensible, the pre-
vailing logic could not have allowed for any other outcome.
To ground this examination in the mindset of U.S. policy-
makers in 1975, I will first examine the historical background of
Southeast Asia and the United States’ role there in the years leading
up to the invasion. Next, I will examine the invasion itself and how
the United States responded during and in the early aftermath of the

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invasion. Finally, I will examine the response of the United States as

the Indonesian invasion failed to secure rapid victory and an insur-
gency grew in the interior.

I: Prelude to Invasion

At the most general level, the background of the Indone-

sian invasion of East Timor was the Cold War. Thus, the first and
perhaps most fundamental element of the prelude was the general
mentality that pervaded the Cold War.
In this mentality, fear of communist The best way to
expansion and the creation of anti-
examine the invasion
communist bastions to contain com-
munism were key concerns, and merit is to understand East
considerable attention in any discus- Timor as Kissinger
sion of the East Timor invasion. More did. When this is done
specifically, however, the background properly the question,
to the invasion can be broken down “what else could have
into three broad topics: the United
been done?” becomes
States’ perception of the internal po-
litical disposition of Indonesia; the harder to answer.
United States’ strategic interests in
South East Asia in 1975; and the United States’ other foreign policy
concerns at the time.
The internal political disposition of Indonesia affected the
United States’ role in East Timor in two ways. As far back as 1960
and possibly as early as Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch,
Indonesia had a preoccupation with the liberation of East Timor
from Portugal. Aware of Indonesia’s interest in Timor, the United
States made contingency plans in anticipation of Indonesian aggres-
sion on the island. Though these plans in some ways resemble those
of twelve years later, they reflect a more anti-Indonesian course of
action on the part of the U.S.
This early policy viewed an independent East Timor as an
unviable possibility. Walt W. Rostow, the Deputy Special Assistant

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to the President for National Security Affairs at the time, admitted

as much in a report delivered to Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs William A. Harriman. “There is little or no sense of
national or territorial identity,” Rostow wrote of East Timor, as “the
Portuguese have pursued a policy designed to isolate the population
from the outside world.” Hence he concluded, “Portuguese Timor
could hardly exist as an independent entity. Realistically, it has only
one possible future—as a part of Indonesia.” The report acknowl-
edged that Indonesia maintained no official claim to East Timor but
observed that, “they do have a right to press, under the U.N. charter,
for economic social and political progress.”7 Thus, the U.S. frowned
on Portuguese neglect of East Timor, and recognized the optimal
course for the colony lay in integration into Indonesia.
The United States, however, could not endorse an Indonesian
takeover of East Timor. The paragraph entitled “U.S. Interests” pin-
pointed the determining factor of policy in Timor as preserving the
U.S. naval bases in the Azores, to which, the document stated, “we
attach great importance.”8 The document reveals that, surprisingly,
the deciding factor had nothing to do with Indonesia. The United
States resolved to side with Portugal in order to preserve its military
bases in the Azores. The lesser importance of Indonesia in this policy
reflects the mentality before the fall of South Vietnam, when the
spread of communism in Europe was still seen as the greater threat.
There is, however, evidence of some concern. The memo implied
that if Indonesia were to invade East Timor, it would be highly det-
rimental to U.S.-Indonesian relations and would make “large scale
economic aid impossible.”9 This concern is one which also arises in
1975. Unable to condone Portuguese colonialism, Indonesian ag-
gression or East Timorese independence the document suggests that
the United States’ best course of action would be to maintain the
status quo by using various incentives and warnings to encourage
Indonesia to refrain from acting aggressively in Timor. The course
of action suggested in the report, and the factors and assumptions
which governed it, bear a significant resemblance to those of a de-
cade later. The decision not to act in defense of East Timor was not

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an arbitrary or hasty decision on the part of one administration, but

rather the implementation of a long-standing element of the United
States’ foreign policy in Southeast Asia.
Next, there is the question of the state of Indonesia’s inter-
nal political situation in 1975. The political situation in Indonesia
in the months and years leading up to the decision to invade was
deeply scrutinized by the United States due to the importance of
Indonesia to the American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. To un-
derstand the political situation in Indonesia at the time, one must
understand the crucial role the military played in the Indonesian
Government. President Suharto was, like his American counterpart,
the Commander-in-Chief of his armed forces, but Suharto owed far
more to his military chiefs and advisors than the president of the
United States. This is due in part to historic precedent and in part
to the fact that Suharto himself was once a general. Many of the
embassy dispatches and the CIA briefing papers mention not only
Suharto’s intent but also what his generals were urging him to do.
In these papers and other accounts Suharto seems far more reluctant
to press forward on the compulsory takeover of East Timor than
his generals. Suharto’s main concern was maintaining good relations
with the United States, which he speculated any aggression against
East Timor would sour. Brad Simpson, the director of the National
Security Archive’s Indonesia/East Timor Documentation project,
speculates that the generals, unlike Suharto, were motivated by a
perceived threat posed by an independent nation in a region notori-
ously prone to separatist sentiment, by the lure of possible economic
gain in the form of oil which was known to exist in the Timor Gap
between Timor and Australia, and by the assumption that the sub-
jugation of Timor would be simple and quickly resolved.10
The event that defined Indonesia’s internal political situa-
tion, at this time occurred in 1965 with a coup attempt, allegedly
conducted by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian
Communist Party. On 1 October 1965, several Indonesian generals
were kidnapped and subsequently executed by various junior offi-
cers. In the aftermath of these assassinations, a new government was

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declared. General Suharto, with the backing of the army violently

suppressed the coup and denounced PKI as the perpetrator. Dis-
credited for failing to denounce the PKI for its supposed role, and
suffering from ill health, President Sukarno yielded his position to
General Suharto in 1966. Suharto’s denunciation of the PKI ignited
a furious anti-communist backlash. Between 1965 and 1966, about
500,000 alleged communists were killed by the Indonesian Army
and Indonesian vigilante groups. The
Suharto seems far violence that followed the coup deci-
more reluctant to mated the PKI and definitively estab-
press forward on the lished Indonesia as an anti-communist
compulsory takeover nation.
11

As declassified State Department

of East Timor than his documents reveal, however, the PKI
generals. Suharto’s had no role in the coup. Rather, the
main concern was coup, the denunciation of the PKI, the
maintaining good backlash, and the transfer of power to
relations with the Suharto were all part of a plot by the
Indonesian Army to oust Sukarno’s re-
United States, which
gime for one of their own which would
he speculated any take a harsher stance against commu-
aggression against nism. Although the State Department
East Timor would was privy to all of this information, it
sour. turned a blind eye since the entire event
would ensure that a wedge would be
driven between Indonesia and the communist powers in the world.12
In the aftermath of the coup, Suharto initiated his “New
Order” Government, which was far more authoritarian than its
predecessor. It banned the PKI along with labor parties, and insti-
tuted state-sponsored censorship of the press. Meanwhile, Indonesia
began to take a more active role in the international community.
Suharto paid particular attention to Western nations while distanc-
ing himself from China, which had maintained friendly relations
with the Sukarno regime. Suharto also opened Indonesia to Western
aid—something his predecessor had refused to do.13

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A State Department briefing memo prepared for President

Ford shortly before his meeting with the Indonesian Foreign Minis-
ter Malik in September of 1974 noted that in the wake of the coup
and President Suharto’s “New Order,” Indonesia had experienced
some degree of economic progress. Nonetheless, “popular dissatis-
faction over rising prices, urban employment and high-level corrup-
tion” plagued the country. The memo specifically cited the “January
15 Affair” which consisted of “two days of rioting in the capital city
in mid-January.” The event caused the State Department to ques-
tion “the stability of the Suharto Government particularly in light
of evidence of in-fighting among the military leadership.”14 This in-
fighting posed a threat of a breakdown in the uppermost echelons
of Indonesia’s military leadership, which concerned the U.S. and
Suharto alike. In an effort to stem the infighting, President Suharto
demoted five of his chief generals because, they “had threatened the
military unity on which the Suharto regime rests.”15 Because the
military was key to Suharto’s power, U.S. military aid to Indonesia
had more significance than for most other countries. It was feared
that an interruption in that aid might have serious consequences for
the Suharto regime. In addition, if Suharto and his generals became
divided over the question of East Timor, such disagreement might
further weaken the Indonesian government.
The U.S. attached importance to Indonesia for many rea-
sons. In 1975, Indonesia was one of the world’s largest countries,
both in terms of population (over 120 million) and in area (Indo-
nesia extends along the equator for over 5000 kilometers). Indone-
sia also was widely assumed to possess huge amounts of untapped
natural resources.16 There were, however, three major elements of
Indonesia’s strategic value which distinguish themselves as being im-
portant above the rest: a fear of a cascading communist takeover in
Southeast Asia, the oil which Indonesia exported, and the strategic
value of the sea lanes which Indonesia controlled.
The fear of communist expansion is a theme throughout
the Cold War, but initially this fear focused specifically on Europe.
Influenced by the “domino theory,” policymakers thought that if

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the communists were able to win just a few key countries in Europe,
then the rest would all follow eventually. Gradually, however, this
theory came to be applied to other parts of the world besides Europe.
Thus, the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces in April 1975
represented not only a serious setback to U.S. interests in the region,
but also the most significant influence on U.S. policy in general in
1975, including on U.S.-Indonesian relations. Also significant was
the success of the Khmer Rouge in seizing power in Cambodia in
early 1975, as it deepened Henry Kissinger’s fear of the complete
loss of Southeast Asia to communism. He believed the American
defeat in Vietnam had “further eroded Jakarta’s confidence in U.S.
intentions towards Asia,” which was already weak after two years of
“declining U.S. support for Indochina, as well as over what it saw as
reduced support for Indonesia itself.”17 His advisors, however, espe-
cially Winston Lord, assured him that these blows to U.S. interests
in the area did not represent a critical problem as long as the United
States redoubled its efforts to improve relations with countries in the
region.18
Oil likewise had an effect, albeit a smaller one, on the U.S.’s
decision making process. The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 heightened
the importance of oil. When most countries in OPEC raised their
prices by ten percent in protest over the Yom Kippur War, Indonesia
raised theirs by only four percent. Even though the new price was
on par with that of Arab oil (Indonesia’s oil had been overpriced
prior to the embargo), U.S. officials were pleased with Indonesia’s
actions during that crisis. In a meeting in late October with Presi-
dent Suharto’s Chief Advisor, General Ali Moertopo, General Brent
Scowcroft, the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, was
advised to speak with the general about various issues, including
the future of U.S.-Indonesian trade status. The tone and nature of
General Scowcroft’s talking points suggested that the U.S. was eager
to build closer ties to Indonesia, and cited the lower price increase in
oil as the factor which would most likely win sympathy for Indone-
sia in the U.S. Congress. As a final note to their discussion, General
Scowcroft assured Muertopo that the United States would not seek

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to involve itself in events transpiring on the island of Timor, but

nonetheless urged the general to advise his government to act with
prudence.19
Perhaps most important was Indonesia’s placement on the
map. As an archipelago of islands between mainland Asia and Aus-
tralia, Indonesia was in a unique position to control the sea lanes be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Strait of Malacca, which
passes between the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra, an
Indonesian territory, in particular is of vital importance both to
world trade and the U.S. Navy. A huge amount of shipping passes
through this strait every year including oil from the Middle East
bound for Japan, a U.S. ally.20 Essentially, the southwestern corner
of the Pacific Ocean revolved strategically and economically around
Indonesia.
Indonesia’s geographic and economic significance enhanced
its political significance in the battleground of the Cold War. Thus,
the United States’ policy of containment looked to Indonesia as a
country of particular importance. In contrast to Indonesia’s per-
ceived importance, then, East Timor did not seem to merit serious
consideration in the mind of Henry Kissinger.

II: Invasion

Throughout the period of Indonesian aggression against East

Timor, from the winter of 1974 to the winter of 1975, the Indone-
sians made an effort to maintain the façade of legitimacy. President
Suharto regarded with apprehension the Indonesian takeover of East
Timor, as he realized that it would cause an uproar in the inter-
national community, especially in Australia and the United States,
with whom Indonesia had good reason to maintain close ties. Twice
in the months leading up to the invasion, major Indonesian policy
changes towards East Timor occurred immediately after Suharto
consulted with President Ford and Henry Kissinger: once, on 5 July
1975, just before Suharto first declared the possibility of integrating
East Timor into Indonesia; and on 6 December 1975, the day before

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Indonesia invaded.21 On the other hand, as Suharto also had to deal

with internal pressure from his generals, he adopted a cautious ap-
proach to the invasion and continuously tested the waters with the
United States.
While overt military action against East Timor commenced
on 7 December 1975 with an airborne invasion of Dili, Indonesian
military preparations actually began in January 1975. At that time,
a military project known as Operation Komodo was launched with
the aim of undermining stability in Portuguese Timor so as to dis-
credit the possibility of gradual independence that Fretilin’s leader-
ship had proposed earlier in the previous year. This operation began
with a fairly overt propaganda campaign designed to stir up rival-
ries between Fretilin, UDT (the Timorese Democratic Union), and
Apodeti in East Timor. 22 In 1975 these political groups were distin-
guished by their differing ideas of what East Timor’s future ought to
be. Apodeti, by far the smallest group, supported integration into
Indonesia; UDT initially supported autonomy under Portuguese
sovereignty, but after the Portuguese indicated they had no interest
in such an arrangement, violence broke out between these two fac-
tions and UDT ultimately sided with Apodeti against Fretilin. The
most popular of the groups, Fretilin won control of East Timor and
moved the country toward full independence in spite of Indonesia’s
best efforts to the contrary.
Then, in February of 1975, the Indonesian military carried
out an amphibious exercise in South Sumatra, which the United
States Consulate in Surbaya viewed as a rehearsal for a possible inva-
sion of East Timor. The consulate reported being “struck by similari-
ties between terrain and style of this exercise, and [what] would be
involved in [an] Indonesian operation to seize Dili.” The exercise
observed in February matched in great detail the operation to take
Dili later in December of that year. Just as with the actual invasion,
“[the] exercise included [a] vertical envelopment… [an] amphibious
assault of nearby beach area[s], and naval bombardment…”23 While
U.S. intelligence noted this event, the general population ignored
the exercise with no major newspaper in the United States covering

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either the operation or the ways in which it foreshadowed the actual

invasion.
In East Timor, Operation Komodo’s initial goals of propa-
ganda and intelligence gathering began to expand greatly in March.
The Indonesian military initiated a second operation, Flamboyan,
which would work concurrently with Operation Komodo, but em-
phasize the use of East Timorese insurgents—primarily Apodeti
members—who might directly influence the political future of East
Timor. Kopassus, the Indonesian Special Forces Command, or-
dered that a special forces group begin training for operations in the
borderlands of East Timor. In late April, these soldiers deployed to
Atambua, the Komodo headquarters, and began training Apodeti
volunteers and conducting reconnaissance patrols into East Timor
in preparation for intervention.24
Their chance came later that summer. The Portuguese an-
nounced on 17 July that East Timor would be fully independent by
the summer of 1976, and on 29 July that district elections would
take place. The results of that election heavily favored Fretilin, with
UDT winning roughly a third of the popular vote and Apodeti left
nearly unrepresented. After the vote, UDT made an attempt to seize
control of Dili, but Fretilin swiftly responded and before the end
of August East Timor was under Fretilin’s control.25 Soon after, the
Apodeti volunteers and the Indonesian Special Forces, crossed into
East Timor with the intent of initiating an insurgency along the
border and undermining Fretilin’s control of East Timor, both prac-
tically and in the eyes of the international community. As govern-
ment-controlled Indonesian press played up the turmoil in Timor,
Indonesia hoped that the image of an island about to rip itself apart
in civil war would be enough for Portugal to authorize Indonesia to
intervene militarily.26
Indonesian forces began to openly assist in the border in-
cursions shortly before 8 October, when Henry Kissinger was in-
formed by his staff that Fretilin had reported increased Indonesian
military activity of the increased aggression.27 Two months later, on
7 December 1975, Indonesia made its intentions absolutely explicit,

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beginning with a combined airborne and amphibious attack on Dili

supported with offshore artillery. While the attack quickly subdued
Dili and the surrounding countryside, Fretilin forces, having an-
ticipated it, retreated to the mountainous interior where they had
weapons, ammunition, and other supplies cached.28
These actions presented a problem for the United States.
On the one hand, just as President Suharto surmised, Kissinger
and Ford knew they could not support such a blatant violation of
the post World War II ideal of the
As government- right to self-determination, especially
controlled Indonesian since this invasion flew in the face
press played up the of the wishes of Portugal, one of the
United States’ NATO allies. Portugal
turmoil in Timor, had stated since the resolution of the
Indonesia hoped Carnation Revolution that its intent
that the image of an for its Timorese colonial possessions
island about to rip was a gradual process towards libera-
itself apart in civil tion. Nonetheless, Kissinger and Ford
war would be enough also knew that they could not issue an
outright condemnation of Indonesia,
for Portugal to lest it pit Suharto against his generals,
authorize Indonesia cause a rift between the United States
to intervene militarily. and Indonesia, and generally under-
mine the stability and the amicability
of what the U.S. viewed as a very important nation in Southeast
Asia. Thus, the United States chose to adopt a middle course and
adopt a policy which U.S. policymakers hoped would neither com-
promise the state of U.S.-Indonesian relations nor sully the United
States’ reputation.
For his part, Henry Kissinger resolved to “eschew involve-
ment in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the Indo-
nesians, Portuguese, Australians and Timorese themselves.” As he
explained in a brief given to President Ford two weeks before their
trip to Indonesia in December, “There are no present calls for our
involvement, with the parties concerned in direct touch with each

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other and none seeking our help.” 29 At President Ford and Henry
Kissinger’s meeting with President Suharto in December 1975, Pres-
ident Ford articulated the above policy to the Indonesian president.
He assured President Suharto that “our country-to-country relation-
ships are very important” and vowed to continue the U.S.’s “strong
interest in and influence in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Asia…
despite the severe setback of Vietnam.”30 Ford’s statement empha-
sized the primacy of U.S.-Indonesian relations and did not deal spe-
cifically with East Timor, however, only giving a broad outline of the
U.S.’s policy priorities in Southeast Asia. Later in the conversation,
Suharto directly asked how the U.S. would react to any action taken
by Indonesia in East Timor. Kissinger urged Suharto: “It is impor-
tant that whatever you do succeeds quickly,” adding that he would
“be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens,
happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of
people talking in an unauthorized way.”31 True to his word, almost
immediately after the invasion, Henry Kissinger announced that the
United States would not recognize Fretilin as the legitimate govern-
ment of East Timor, at the same time making no acknowledgement
of Indonesia’s claims to East Timor.
This course of action still left the United States and Indone-
sia with a dilemma which Kissinger alluded to in his briefing to Ford
prior to the December meeting with Suharto. Kissinger cautioned
Ford that any “overt Indonesian military move into the territory,
[would] inevitably us[e] U.S.-supplied weapons in the process.”32
The weapons used in the invasion of East Timor would undoubt-
edly be provided to Indonesia as a result of programs such as the
Foreign Military Sales Act (FMS) and the Military Assistance Pro-
gram (MAP), both of which had become the primary source of aid
for Indonesia’s military. By the terms of those programs, however,
these weapons could only be used for defensive purposes. The laws
surrounding FMS and MAP state that any country which was found
“in substantial violation” of the terms under which the aid was given
would be “immediately ineligible” for the direct aid granted by MAP
and the “cash sales, credits, or guarantees” offered through the FMS

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Act.33 Kissinger knew that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor

would require the use of U.S. military equipment in an overtly of-
fensive role. This use of these weapons, he feared, could incite Con-
gress to compel a withdrawal of U.S. aid much in the same way the
U.S. withdrew support to Turkey due to its use of weapons against
Cyprus. This withdrawal of support, in turn, would create a rift be-
tween the United States and Indonesia, something which both sides
wanted to avoid. 34
In order to preserve an amicable relationship with the U.S.
while continuing to pursue its policies in East Timor, Indonesia
needed to maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, Indone-
sia launched a propaganda campaign designed to obscure the true
nature of the violence in East Timor. In the latter part of 1975, the
state-controlled newspaper, the Indonesian Times, ran two or three
articles a week about East Timor designed to propagate misinfor-
mation about the situation there to suggest that Indonesia had the
popular support of the East Timorese. On 5 December 2006, for
instance, the Indonesian Times reproduced East Timor’s declaration
of integration. UDT, Apodeti, and two other minor political parties
signed this document requesting formal integration of East Timor
into Indonesia. Between them, these parties claimed they had the
support of the majority of East Timor.35 On another occasion, when
the Indonesians began using AC-47 “Spooky” gunships against
Fretilin, the Indonesian Times reported that East Timorese native and
advocate abroad, Jose Ramos-Horta, had accused Australian civil-
ians of using a private airplane to bomb Fretilin positions.36 The
most infamous example of deception occurred on 16 October 1975
when five Australian journalists were killed in Balibo while attempt-
ing to validate Fretilin’s claim that there were Indonesian soldiers
actively participating in the violence in the borderlands. In response,
Indonesia blamed the violence on Apodeti and even went so far as to
discredit the reporters’ story by characterizing them as combatants.
Days later, the Indonesian Times ran an article which suggested Aus-
tralian civilians had been discovered in East Timor supplying arms
to Fretilin.37 Collectively, these articles reflect the extent to which

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the Indonesian government went to obscure their activities.

In addition, Kopassus utilized, as much as they could, the
Soviet military hardware that remained in Indonesian arsenals from
the Sukarno era in order to avoid violation of the treaty and to dis-
guise the fact that they were supplying Apodeti with arms. The In-
donesian Special Forces armed themselves and their Apodeti allies
with Soviet-style AK-47 assault rifles and 90mm Yugoslavian rocket
launchers. Though the quality of these arms was inferior, the Indo-
nesians did not use the M-16 and other readily available American
arms until after the invasion had taken place. In the rare cases when
they could not avoid using U.S. arms, such as the AC-47 gunship,
the Indonesian markings were painted over and their use denied.38
This propaganda was more for consumption by the general
population in Indonesia, the U.S., Australia and elsewhere than by
U.S. policymakers. The CIA was aware at least in September of the co-
vert military action of Kopassus39 and Henry Kissinger was informed
of the increase in overt Indonesian activity in early October.40 As far
as the general public in the U.S. was concerned, however, the situa-
tion in Timor seemed far less interesting. The New York Times ran a
dozen or so articles on East Timor before the invasion, all of which
reported a version of events which closely mirrored Indonesia’s ac-
count as presented in the Indonesian Times. Both newspapers report,
and fail to report, the same facts about the situation in East Timor.
For instance, like its Indonesian counterpart, the New York Times
repeatedly described Fretilin as “leftist” or “Maoist,” implying that
the conflict in East Timor was one of communist expansion. A State
Department report from the same period, in contrast, more aptly
characterized Fretilin as primarily a nationalist movement and only
“vaguely leftist,” with no major connections to the world’s major
communist powers.41 In general, Indonesia’s strategy for maintaining
good relations with the United States in the course of their subjuga-
tion of East Timor largely relied upon a campaign of misinforma-
tion. The Indonesian military reasoned (correctly) that relatively few
people would care about East Timor due to its small size, low impor-
tance, and its dubious status as an independent nation.

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However, there is some indication that Indonesian propa-

ganda may have had an effect within the upper echelons of U.S.
policymakers, as well. In one of Henry Kissinger’s staff meetings in
August of 1975, Assistant Secretary Habib referred to Fretilin as a
“communist-dominated group.”42 Kissinger’s own interpretation of
Fretilin is not clear, nor is the degree to which he believed that the
communist powers of the world would attempt to exploit an inde-
pendent East Timor. As long as the invasion “succeeded quickly” he
saw little chance that any trouble would come of East Timor. He
reasoned that to do anything at all would only draw attention to the
invasion and the U.S.’s connection to it, and that the best course of
action would be to do nothing and deal with the opposition when
it arose. Domestic opposition to the invasion was predictable and
(as will be shown in the next section) could be circumvented. Inter-
national opposition was limited to a handful of nations who were
unlikely to act on East Timor’s behalf and the United Nations.
The most likely foreign power to come to East Timor’s assis-
tance was the People’s Republic of China, one of the few nations to
recognize the sovereignty of East Timor and a source of funds for the
East Timorese government in exile in Mozambique. The Chinese
even toyed with the idea of dispatching arms and advisors to Timor,
but refrained due to Indonesian naval superiority.43 Furthermore,
the small ethnic Chinese population in East Timor represented a
significant force in the country’s economy.44 Despite this, the U.S.
did not fear that East Timor would become the Cuba of Southeast
Asia. During President Suharto’s meeting with Henry Kissinger and
President Ford, the question of Chinese aggression was discussed.
When Suharto asked what likely Chinese foreign policy changes
could be expected in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam, Henry
Kissinger replied, “We believe that China does not have expansionist
aims now. We cannot predict what the situation will be in five years.
Right now their first concern is the Soviet Union and their second
Vietnam.”45 Kissinger believed that despite their sympathies towards
Fretilin, the Chinese would not risk an international incident over
East Timor.

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The initial reaction from the United Nations was swift and
direct. On 12 December 1975, the United Nations General Assem-
bly passed a resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops.
Indonesia balked at this, and on 22 December the U.N. Security
Council passed a resolution to dis-
patch a “fact finding expedition” and The most likely
again called for Indonesia to remove foreign power to
its troops. A third such call was issued come to East Timor’s
on 22 April 1976.46 The United States
assistance was the
and Indonesia reacted predictably. The
United States abstained in all of those People’s Republic of
votes, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, China, one of the few
the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. re- nations to recognize
ceived instructions to vote against the sovereignty of
or abstain from any resolution that East Timor and a
would antagonize Indonesia. For its
source of funds for
part, Indonesia maintained its defense
that it had the support of the East Ti- the East Timorese
morese, and did little else apart from government in exile
protesting the calls for its withdrawal. in Mozambique.
According to the CIA, the Indonesians
did not take seriously the U.N.’s resolutions and regarded them as a
mere “slap on the wrist.”47
The invasion of East Timor presented U.S. policymakers
such as Henry Kissinger with a difficult choice between alienating
Indonesia and creating a potentially unstable, leftist country in an
area which had considerable significance for U.S. strategic interests.
In addition, the U.S. risked alienating Indonesia either by prevent-
ing them from invading, or by allowing the invasion to take place
and thereby risk breaking the terms of FMS and MAP. Given such
a choice, Kissinger and Ford followed what they perceived would be
the least detrimental course in terms of U.S. interests in the region
as a whole. The initial response of the United States, in giving tacit
approval and support for Indonesia’s invasion with the hope of mini-
mizing the political repercussions from the use of U.S. weapons,

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ultimately did not turn out as Kissinger had hoped it would. The
U.S. had encouraged Indonesia to see that the invasion was carried
out quickly and without much trouble. Yet, Fretilin had escaped
and continued to resist in the mountains. Thus, the United States
continued to face pressure from the U.N. General Assembly, from
Congress, from East Timor itself, and from Indonesia for years after
the invasion took place.

III: Aftermath of the Invasion

The Indonesian occupation of East Timor lasted until 1999,

when Indonesian troops withdrew and the U.N. provisional govern-
ment took control in East Timor. In actuality, however, a sense of
complacency with the Indonesian occupation in East Timor only
grew in the United States as time went by. While concerned parties
in the U.S. continued to protest the occupation, the issue generally
receded from the spotlight it had never occupied. The bulk of U.S.
policy changes with regard to the 24 year occupation of East Timor
occurred in the first few years, and though the issue was not forgot-
ten afterwards its importance faded greatly.
Henry Kissinger had hoped that the invasion of East Timor
would end quickly and with minimal conflict. In this way, the for-
mer colony would be peacefully incorporated into Indonesia and the
governments of the United States and Indonesia could avoid embar-
rassment. This assumption seemed reasonable at the time since East
Timor had been a possession of another country for over four hun-
dred years. However, perhaps due to the brutality of the Indonesian
tactics used leading up to the invasion, this did not come to pass.
As a report from the U.S. Consulate in Surabaya predicted in early
1975, Indonesia’s logistics capabilities and support from the popu-
lace were insufficient support for a campaign in the difficult terrain
of Timor’s interior.48 Fretilin used this to its advantage, retreating
to the interior and holding out for the twenty-four year duration of
the occupation. Indonesia thus found itself entangled in a situation
from which it could not easily extricate itself.

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Indonesia responded brutally to East Timorese resistance,

with numerous attempts to purge the interior of Fretilin forces.
These attempts claimed the lives of far more East Timorese civilians
than they did of members of Fretilin; by 1999, countless Timorese
had lost their lives. These atrocities were mostly ignored by the in-
ternational community, due to apathy and to the stranglehold Indo-
nesia had on information moving in and out of Timor. Nonetheless,
allegations of human rights violations surfaced, and Indonesia was
forced to revert once again to a campaign of misinformation to con-
ceal its policies in East Timor. In 1980, the Chief of Information
Affairs at the Indonesian Embassy issued a press release enumerating
the benefits Indonesia provided for the people of East Timor and
denying any wrongdoing by the government of Indonesia.49
Though the United States had intended to distance itself as
much as possible from the invasion, Indonesia’s problem became the
United States’ problem. As U.S. policymakers in the State Depart-
ment had anticipated, Indonesia’s use of U.S. weapons in the inva-
sion did not go unnoticed by the U.S. Congress. Almost immediate-
ly, lawmakers such as Senator Tom Harkin and Senator Gary Hart
began to protest that the Indonesians had used U.S. weapons in an
offensive role, thus calling into question the validity of Indonesia’s
participation in the MAP and FMS programs.50 This was something
which Henry Kissinger desperately wanted to avoid, since cutting off
Indonesia from military aid would both weaken the U.S.’s key ally in
Southeast Asia and compromise the U.S.’s reputation in the area.
On 14 April 1976, Senators Hubert Humphrey and Clif-
ford Case launched a Congressional inquiry to determine whether
U.S. FMS and MAP aid to Indonesia should continue in light of
the illegal use of U.S. arms in East Timor. The senators requested
information from the State Department on the use of Indonesian
weapons in East Timor, citing concern over the legality of this use of
American weapons as well as concern that precedent would encour-
age other countries involved in the program to use in a more aggres-
sive manner the weapons the U.S. had given them.51 In response,
the State Department dispatched a summary of the events which

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transpired in 1975.52 Based on this, the congressional inquiry con-

cluded that the issue of continued military aid for Indonesia should
be tabled until the Security Assistance Bill for the fiscal year 1977
was put forward. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recom-
mended, however, that no further aid be provided to the Govern-
ment of Indonesia.53
Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted to avoid any in-
terruption of aid to Indonesia for fear that it would harm U.S.-Indo-
nesian relations. To this end, the State
These atrocities were Department prepared a contingency
mostly ignored by plan whereby the U.S. would continue
the international to provide aid to Indonesia indirectly,
community, due if the congressional inquiry led to a
termination in Indonesia’s participa-
to apathy and to tion in MAP and FMS. The memo-
the stranglehold randum which details this warns that
Indonesia had on in the event of a congressional suspen-
information moving sion in aid, there would be no other
in and out of Timor. means to prevent a strong Indonesian
reaction other than to have “programs
ready on basis of which we can hopefully reassure Indonesians that
they will still have access to equipment of American type and manu-
facture.”54
In addition to finding ways to circumvent a congressional
ban on military aid to Indonesia, Kissinger and the State Depart-
ment made efforts to deceive Congress. For instance, when the con-
gressional inquiry requested specific information on exactly which
weapons were used and in what capacity, the State Department’s re-
port did not include this information, although the National Secu-
rity Council had compiled a very detailed account of U.S. military
equipment used by Indonesia by 12 December 1975.55
Kissinger also realized that there would not be a congressio-
nal suspension in aid if Congress already believed aid had been cut
off. Therefore, while no cutoff in aid was ever authorized, Kissinger
attempted to make Congress believe it had been. A memo from

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the State Department dated 17 May informed General Scowcroft

that, “at Secretary Kissinger’s direction, [the Department of State]
in January 1976 quietly stopped certifying to [the Department of
Defense] the delivery of further military equipment to Indonesia.”
While this did not constitute an official suspension in aid, without
this certification, the Department of Defense could not give any
weapons or training to the Indonesian Military.56 In actuality, how-
ever, aid to Indonesia never ceased. In Kissinger’s staff meeting on 1
June 1976 Kissinger asked Assistant Secretary Habib if the “military
supply position” had been reopened with Indonesia. Habib replied
that “the supply position ha[d] never been shut down.” To this, Kiss-
inger retorted, “Come on—you know what I’m asking you.” Habib
answered that, “new commitments [were] being made.”57 A less am-
biguous example is the State Department’s reply to an Australian
inquiry as to the future of U.S. aid to Indonesia. Australia asked if it
were true that aid was being suspended. In reply, the Department of
State assured its ally that, “there had been no suspension of aid and
that Secretary [Kissinger]…was firm in his desire to avoid any such
action.”58 Kissinger’s efforts to preserve the flow of U.S. military aid
to Indonesia succeeded, despite Congress’s threats to the contrary.
In 1977, the year in which Indonesian aid was scheduled for con-
gressional review, Indonesia received an additional $23.1 million in
FMS credits.59
Though the cutoff of aid had been avoided, the U.S. still
desired that Indonesia end the conflict in East Timor as soon as pos-
sible. Despite the best efforts of Indonesia and the U.S. to minimize
the political fallout of the invasion, the Soviet Union, China, and
many third world and nonaligned countries were still leveling criti-
cisms at both nations. The United States, in turn, began to tailor
its military aid grants to fit the needs of the Indonesian problem in
Timor in the hope that this would expedite the destruction of Freti-
lin and bring an end to the conflict. The U.S. began to provide OV-
10F “Bronco” attack/observation aircraft,60 which had been used to
good effect in Vietnam as an anti-insurgency platform. The aircraft
could also be used in the deployment of chemical defoliants and her-

74
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bicides, which would deprive insurgents of concealment. Over time,

the situation in East Timor reached a stalemate. Fretilin could not
push the Indonesians out of the country, and Indonesian military
force could not dislodge Fretilin from the country’s highlands.
Meanwhile, the United States grew complacent, if not com-
fortable, with the situation in East Timor. For the policymakers at
the time, East Timor became a non-issue. Henry Kissinger has rarely
spoken of his role in East Timor, and his substantial memoirs do not
mention Timor at all. Carter’s and Ford’s memoirs similarly avoid
this issue.61 Jimmy Carter’s silence on this issue is particularly note-
worthy as human rights were one of the major tenets of his foreign
policy. In fact, from approximately 1977 on, East Timor disappears
almost entirely from high level State Department and White House
documents. In a 1977 memo entitled “East Asia: Where do We
Stand, Where are We Going?” from Jimmy Carter’s National Secu-
rity Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the subject of East Timor is never
mentioned. Moreover, the issue of human rights in Asia is men-
tioned only once towards the end, at which point Brzezinski writes,
“Our example, remains our most effective source of influence.” Not
even in a similar memo written specifically about the United States’
relations with Indonesia does the topic of East Timor arise.62
The East Timorese, recognizing that their only chance for
independence lay in moving external powers to pressure Indonesia
to end the occupation, became as vocal as they possibly could on
the international stage. As a result, the champions for East Timor
became that group of scholars and concerned individuals who sup-
ported East Timor in the ways they could. Jose Ramos-Horta cam-
paigned endlessly for his country; however, his pleas fell on deaf ears.
It was not until late in the Clinton administration that U.S. policy,
freed from Cold War concerns, began to withdraw aid and pressure
the Indonesian government to end the occupation of Timor. When
Suharto resigned, it became only a matter of time before Indonesian
troops were finally withdrawn.

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Conclusion

Today East Timor is one of the world’s newest, smallest, and

poorest countries. Its passage to independence is a truly remarkable
accomplishment, as East Timor had next to no support and yet was
able to sustain itself using stolen and
homemade weapons for twenty-four The United States
years in the face of extreme brutality at grew complacent,
the hands of Indonesia. When Noam if not comfortable,
Chomsky says that the United States’
with the situation
inaction in East Timor’s time of need
was criminal, he is correct.63 But how in East Timor. For
could this have happened? the policymakers at
As it turns out, quite eas- the time, East Timor
ily. The decisions made and policies became a non-issue.
implemented by Henry Kissinger and
his State Department, while certainly distasteful, coincided with the
logic of the Cold War. Furthermore, any potential course of action
in which the United States sided with East Timor against Indonesia
was inconceivable due to the state of Southeast Asia in 1975. In
1975, the fall of South Vietnam was a huge blow to U.S. interests in
Asia. It seemed as though the domino theory was about to be con-
firmed. Indonesia represented a chance for the U.S. to stop commu-
nism in an area which held immense importance for U.S. strategic
interests, while to the United States, East Timor represented nothing
more than a stumbling block.
Kissinger had two courses of action. The U.S. could side with
a poor, leftist, strategically unimportant colony which had lacked
determination for centuries, and whose viability as an independent
nation was in doubt. Alternatively, the United States could side with
a large, fairly well-off, firmly anti-communist nation, that was also
a producer of oil, de facto gatekeeper of the sea routes between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, and an established ally of the United
States. Perhaps that is why Kissinger rarely spoke of East Timor—he
never saw it as significant enough to mention.

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The eleventh of July 1995, however, was one of the rare oc-
casions on which Henry Kissinger spoke on his role in East Timor.
He was confronted by Constancio Pinto, a native of East Timor
who once acted as the head of the East Timorese underground for
several years before being arrested and tortured. Pinto asked Hen-
ry Kissinger about his justification for the United States’ inaction
despite its foreknowledge of the event. Kissinger replied, “We had
so many problems to deal with…We had just been driven out of
Vietnam…We were conducting negotiations in the Middle East and
Lebanon had blown up.” He also pointed out that Goa, a former
Portuguese colony had previously been absorbed into India without
incident and that Angola, another Portuguese colony was racked by
civil war. In both these cases, the United States had ample reason
not to become involved, and East Timor seemed at the time to have
elements of both. He went on to admit that, “regrettably we weren’t
ever thinking about Timor....Nobody had the foggiest idea of what
would happen afterwards….Now there’s been a terrible human trag-
edy in Timor.”64 Indeed, 1975 was, as Kissinger points out, a very
difficult year for the United States, and nowhere more so than in
Southeast Asia. After the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, the
last thing the United States wanted was another significant foreign
policy loss in that region.
Finally, Kissinger’s response to Pinto matches the sentiment
of the meeting transcripts, dispatches, and memoranda detailing the
policy choices made regarding Indonesia and East Timor in 1975.
It is difficult to trust Kissinger’s memoirs in this matter, as it seems
that his choice to abstain from mentioning East Timor, and to barely
ever mention Indonesia, reflects the negative light in which the issue
casts him; the fact that this portion of his memoirs was published in
1999, the same year that East Timorese Independence was assured
may also have influenced the admission. Kissinger’s memoirs do re-
veal that in 1975 the U.S. government was primarily concerned with
the defeat of South Vietnam, the expansionism of North Vietnam,
the collapse of Cambodia, and the improvement of Sino-American
relations.65

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The CAVR report is entirely correct when it states that the

United States was partially responsible for the invasion of East Timor.
Likewise, it is appropriate for individuals such as Noam Chomsky
and the members of ETAN to express indignation at this failure
in U.S. foreign policy. However, to
criticize the decisions of policymakers Indonesia
three decades after the fact, without represented a chance
an appreciation for either the events for the U.S. to stop
which influenced those decisions, or communism in an
for the mindset of the Cold War that area which held
framed them, serves little purpose.
immense importance
Without this kind of understanding,
one cannot claim to have learned from for U.S. strategic
the mistakes made by Henry Kissinger interests, while to the
and fellow policymakers which caused United States, East
the tragedy in East Timor. Timor represented
nothing more than a
Endnotes
stumbling block.
1
Costancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine. East
Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston, MA: South
End P), 1996, 1-59; James Dunn, East Timor: a Rough Passage to Independence
(Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books), 1983, 45-101.
2
“Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor.”
International Center for Transitional Justice. 21 Nov. 2006 Available from
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html
3
Ibid., 91-92.
4
Jardine and Pinto, 1-3; Foreword by Noam Chomsky in Richard Tanter,
Desmond Ball, and Gerry Van Klinken, eds., Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s
Military and Violence in East Timor (New York: Rowman & Littlefield), 2006, ix-
x; Brad Simpson, “’Illegally and Beautifully’: the United States, the Indonesian
Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76.” Cold War
History 5 (2005): 305; Christopher Hitchens, Trial of Henry Kissinger (New
York: Verso), 2001, 90-95.
5
Christopher Hitchens, interview by Eugene Jarecki, The Trials of Henry
Kissinger, 2002, DVD.
6
For low estimates of the number killed, see Romesh Silva and Patrick Ball, The
Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999. Benetech Human

78
 A n A p ology for Henry Kissinger

Rights Data Analysis Group 2006, 21 Nov. 2006 <http://www.hrdag.org/

timor>. For a higher estimate see Gabriel Defert, Timor Est: Génocide Oublié.
Droit d’un Peuple et Raisons d’Etats (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan), 1992.
7
Memo from Walt Rostow to William Harriman, “Indonesia and Portuguese
Timor,” 5 February 1963, attained through FOIA request by author.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Simpson, 286.
11
Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of
Tolerance (London: Routledge), 1995, 23-24.
12
John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin
Press), 2006, 176-178.
13
Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
1998, 70-71, 77, 147-162, 181.
14
F. Thomas, State Department Report: “Indonesia: Current Political Situation,”
19 September 1974, retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of
Brad Simpson.
15
Ibid
16
C.A. Fisher, “Indonesia: a Giant Astir.” The Geographical Journal 138 (1972):
154. Available from http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0016-7398%28197206%291
38%3A2%3C154%3AIAGA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K.
17
Memo from Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, “Meeting with the Indonesian
President,” 5 July 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.
18
Memo from W. Lord to Kissinger, “US Strategy in Asia: Trends, Issues, and
Choices,” 16 October 1975, attained through FOIA request by author.
19
Memo from T. Barnes to Gen. Scowcroft, “Your meeting with Indonesian
Leader General Ali Moertopo,” 23 October 1975, retrieved from the National
Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
20
Michael Liefer and Dolliver Nelson, “Conflict of Interest in the Straits of
Malacca,” International Affairs 49 (1973): 190-203. Available from http://links.
jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28197304%2949%3A2%3C190%3ACOIITS%
3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
21
Telegram 1579, “Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford and
President Suharto,” 5 July 1975, 6, attained through FOIA request by author;
“Transcript of Meeting Between Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto,” 6 December
1975, 10, attained through FOIA request by author.
22
Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox),
2003, 205-207.
23
Memo From U.S. Consulate in Surabaya to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, “Joint
Military Exercises Using East Java Forces Relevant to Portuguese Timor,” 20
February 1975, retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad
Simpson.

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24
Conboy, 179-237.
25
Telegram 108443, “Department of State Press Summary,” 4 September 1975,
20, attained through FOIA request by author.
26
From September 1975, the Indonesian Times ran two to three articles a week
on the situation in East Timor; these articles contain some of the more blatant
claims: “Children Smashed to Death Against Rocks,” Indonesian Times 1
Oct. 1975: 1; “No Invasion of East Timor,” Indonesian Times 9 Oct. 1975: 1;
“Apodeti, UDT Forces Advancing,” Indonesian Times 15 Oct. 1975: 1.
27
Transcript of Secretary Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 8 October 1975, 19; Telegram
1103537, “Cables to Security Council about Portuguese Timor from Fretilin,”
11 October 1975. Both retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy
of Brad Simpson.
28
Robert Miller, “Briefing Memorandum: Reported Indonesian Intervention
in Timor and US Interests.” 7 December 1975, 2, retrieved from the National
Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson; “People Resistance Forces Liberate
Dili,” Indonesian Times 8 Dec. 1975: 1.
29
Department of State Briefing Paper, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor,” 21
November 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.
30
Ibid.
31
Transcript of Meeting Between Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto, 6 December
1975, 1-2, attained through FOIA request by author.
32
Department of State Briefing Paper, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor,” 21
November 1975, 2, attained through FOIA request by author.
33
Department of Defense Brief, “Legal Implications,” 1 December 1975,
retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
34
Memo from W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 4 March 1975; Transcript of Secretary
Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 17 June 1976, 24-27; Kissinger, Enclosure to State
Department Briefing Paper, “Indonesia and East Timor,” 21 November 1975.
All retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
35
“Proclaimation of Integration of Portugese Timor in Indonesia.” Indonesian
Times, 5 Dec. 1975, A4.
36
Conboy, 224; “Horta Accuses Australians of Bombing Timor.” Indonesian
Times, 4 Oct. 1975, A1.
37
Telegram 3070 From US Embassy Canberra to Secretary of State Kissinger,
“Timor: Investigation of Death of Five Australian Journalists,” 28 April 1976.
Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.;
“Australian Civilians Supply Arms to Fretilin?” Indonesian Times, 14 Oct. 1975,
A1.
38
Conboy, 211.
39
CIA Brief 151-75. 29 September 1975. 8-10. From the CIA electronic archive
at University Park, MD
40
Transcript of Secretary Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 8 October 1975, 2.

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41
Department of State Briefing Paper, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor,” 21
November 1975, 1.
42
Transcript of Secretary Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 12 August 1975, 3. Retrieved
from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
43
Ian Storey, “China and East Timor: Good, but not Best Friends.” Jamestown
Foundation 21 (Nov. 2006) Available From: http://www.jamestown.org/
publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3789&article_id=2371248
44
Department of State Briefing Paper, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor,” 21
November 1975, 2. Attained through FOIA request by author.
45
Telegram 1579, “Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford and
President Suharto,” 5 July 1975. Attained through FOIA request by author.
46
Telegram 06872 From U.S. Mission to the UN to Secretary of State, “USUN
Unclassified Summary No. 79,” 17 December 1975; Telegram 06948 From U.S.
Mission to the UN to Secretary of State, “Portuguese Timor--U.N. Security
Council Adopts Resolution Unanimously,” 23 December 1975; Telegram
009013 From U.S. Mission to the UN to Secretary of State, “Portuguese Timor
- Message from ‘Provisional Government of East Timor’ to President of UN
Security Council,” 23 December 1975. All Retrieved from the National Security
Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
47
Telegram 15438 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State and U.S. Mission UN, 17
December 1975; CIA National Intelligence Daily, 2 January 1976 Cited in Brad
Simson, “’Illegally and Beautifully’...” 299.
48
Telegram 2784 from U.S. Consulate in Surabaya to U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,
“Indonesian Military Capabilities,” 3 Mach 1975. Attained through FOIA
request by author.
49
Ngurah Gedhe, “What is Happening in East Timor.” New York Times, 26
January 1980, A20. Obtained through Proquest Historical Newspapers.
50
Kathleen Teltsch, “Portuguese Priest Seeks Backing for an Independent East
Timor.” New York Times, 14 December 1979, A20; Letter from Senator Gary
Hart to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 16 December 1975. Both
retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
51
Telegram 101116 From Department of State to U.S. Delegation in Jakarta, 30
April 1976, 1-3. Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad
Simpson. This telegram contains copies of both the Senators’ letter requesting
information and the reply given by the State Department.
52
Ibid. 3-6.
53
Letter for Robert J Mcclosky from Senators Hubert Humphry and Clifford
Case, 26 April 1976. Attached to Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from
Thomas Barnes and Les Janka, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee View on
Suspending Military Assistance to Indonesia Because of Its Use of U.S. Arms in
Portuguese Timor,” 4 May 1976. Retrieved from the National Security Archives
courtesy of Brad Simpson.

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54
Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Thomas Barnes, “Contingency
Planning for Military Supply to Indonesia,” National Security Council, 18
February 1976. Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad
Simpson.
55
Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Col. Clifton Granger, “Indonesian
Use of MAP Equipment in Timor,” National Security Council, 12 December
1975. Retrieved from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
56
Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Thomas Barnes, “Military Equipment
Deliveries to Indonesia,” National Security Council, 17 May 1976. Retrieved
from the National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
57
Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 1 June 1976, 22.
Attained through FOIA request by author
58
Telegram 0886 From U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, “Australian
Query RE: U.S. Military Assistance,” 27 February 1976. Retrieved from the
National Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
59
Telegram 215034 From Department of State to U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,
“FMS Financing for Indonesia,” 8 September 1977. Retrieved from the National
Security Archives courtesy of Brad Simpson.
60
Telegram 303047 From U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Henry Kissinger, 1
October 1977. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB174/00000002.pdf
61
Henry Kissinger, The Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999);
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Gerald Ford, A
Time to Heal, (New York: Harper & Row, 1979)
62
Zbigniew Brzenzinski, Memorandum for the President, “East Asia: Where
Do We Stand? Where are We Going?” 16 May 1977; Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Memorandum for the President, “Initiatives to Deepen Relations with
Indonesia.” 1 August 1977. Retrieved from the National Security Archives
courtesy of Brad Simpson.
63
Matthew Jardine and Noam Chomsky, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise
(Boston, MA: South End Press, 1999), 7.
64
Henry Kissinger, Ask Kissinger East Timor Action Network. Available from
http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm.
65
Henry Kissinger, The Years of Renewal, 463-598, 868-901.

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