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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation. ISSUES: 1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). 4. QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does

not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO. RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets andliabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separationwas

promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of t he couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a completeseparation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.
5. Bernabe vs. Alejo G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabes estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA

ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CAs ruling to be of error due to RTCs ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. 6. Bernabe vs. Alejo G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabes estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CAs ruling to be of error due to RTCs ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. 8. ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR. (Voidable Marriage) Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever hes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes. Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with him. He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage was void.

ISSUE: WON Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity? HELD: No. Dismissed from service. RATIO: 1. FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code. 2. Bad faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary. 10. Ablaza v. Republic, G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010 Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind HAD8J5EKCNKC FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code? RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

(Art 15,16,17,50,51 NCC; Art 26 FC) 12. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. 13. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. 14. Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his

status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. 18. GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer. RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made. HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.