SEPARATION OF POWERS

provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara;, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature. The possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

IN RE MANZANO 1988 Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courtsestablished by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). ISSUE: Whether the function of a member of the Committee on Justice an administrative function HELD: YES. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon thea dministrative agency by the organic law of its existence An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are to receive complaints against anyapprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;and to recommend the revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. Thus, the membership of Judge Manzano in theIlocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty nonjudicial in character. Dissenting Opinions: "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. Membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve anyregulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will theCommittee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasilegislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. The Committee on Justice cannot belikened to an administrative agency of government. It is a study group withrecommendatory functions.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. Summarizing, we conclude: (a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. (f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 1936 In the elections 1935, Jose A. Angara and the respondents Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. the

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. (j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Held: No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed. The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office.

ISSUE: (2) Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature. "As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. (2) Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?. NO its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the

CASIBANG VS. AQUINO 1979 Facts: Respondent Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Casibang filed protest against the election of the former on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally (Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2of Article XI) a political question has intervened in the case. Issue: Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question.

TANADA vs. CUENCO 1957 After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ 1994 Facts: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution Held: CONSTITUTIONAL Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress. The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. Philconsa v. Enriquez described the pork barrel system, particularly the procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities, as imaginative as it is innovative. In a resolution on Sept. 4, 2001, the high tribunal in Andres Sarmiento et al. v. the Treasurer of the Philippines et al. reiterated the constitutionality of CDF based on its decision in Philconsa v. Enriquez.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC 1976 The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 2012 assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioners argues that the Members of Congress do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive."33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality."

DAZA vs. SINGSON 1989 Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganizedand 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Becauseof this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional representation Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. Issue: whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Held: No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution.