CASES PARAS COMELEC (1997)

V.

FACTS Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The Coelec scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, above the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC petition for injunction. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, hence the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.

ISSUES AND RATIO Issue: WON the recall election to be held on January 13, 1996 is barred by the SK election to be held on May 1996. Ratio: Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ." Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. Davide, Concurring: I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118). Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local). ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and

PARAS V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 123169 (NOVEMBER 4, 1996)

FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74

of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. ISSUES 1) Whether the Resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections; Whether the Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall. HELD, RATIO 1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not barred by the May 1997 Barangay Elections. The one-year bar finds no application in the case; Resolution No. 96-2951 is therefore valid on this ground. Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election." For the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. 2. YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. The petition, however, does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. Section 69 [d] of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective municipal official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected". The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate recall proceedings. The law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters but rather it must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy (Garcia v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 100, 1993). Recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates. It is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. It must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purpose as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. The Supreme Court (1) granted the Petition for Certiorari; (2) declared COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 null and void; (3) set aside the same; madepermanent the restraining order it issued.

ANGOBUNG VERSUS COMELEC G. R. NO. 126576 (MARCH 5, 1997)

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 (15 October 1996) issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter, private respondent Ma. Aurora S. de Alban, against petitioner incumbent Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung; set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on 09 November 1996; and in case the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on 02 December 1996. The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining COMELEC from implementing and enforcing the assailed Resolution. FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. In September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angubong. Said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval. Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted to the COMELEC en banc, a Memorandum (08 October 1996) which recommends the approval of the petition for recall filed by de Alban and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69[d] of the Local Government Code of 1991. The COMELEC en banc, acting on said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951. Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid.

CLAUDIO COMELEC (2000)

V.

Facts: Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998. On May 19, 1999, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula was

Issue: WON Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution Held: Yes

designated chair. The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating Claudios recall. The petition for recall was filed on the Office of the City Mayor. The comelec also posted the petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places. Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction. The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.

Ratio: We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.[5) However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion. First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings[6) but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official. The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent. To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b); Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date. Issue: WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the LGC includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election

Ratio: The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n) o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable." Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people. To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p) aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office." Issue: WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified

Held:

Yes

Ratio: Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin. This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now. CLAUDIO COMELEC VS FACTS: LGU concerned: Pasay City Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City Contested Law/Ordinance: Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the Local Government Code HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election itself) which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA. RATIO: Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the

of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas throughout the City. Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was filed within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition was filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.

filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official. The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings. Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent. The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74 of the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held. The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is included for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is

designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable." PANDI (2004) V. CA Facts: On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM, issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH) Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOHARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating Dr. Amer Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a complaint with the RTC challenging the memo of Macacuao. Saber filed with the CA a petition for quo warranto claiming that he is the lawfully designated officer in charge of IPHO-APGH. President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM. Macacua, again, issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandis designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sanis detail to the Regional Office of the DOHARMM in Cotabato City. The CA ruled that that Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA ruled that Lanao del Sur Governor Mutilan has the power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under Section 478[10] of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, and the Memorandum of Agreement entered between the DOH of the National Government and the ARMM pursuant to Executive Order No. 133, did not render moot and academic the issues raised in the proceedings before it. Neither did the Court of Appeals give credence to Pandi and Macacuas argument that the passage of the ARMM Local Code puts to rest the issues in the instant case. The Court of Appeals maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU Code. The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 457 (b) and (d) of the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM Regional Governor, and not the Provincial Governor, who exercises a recommendatory prerogative in the appointment of the provincial health officer. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that there is nothing in Section 18,[15] Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which explicitly or even impliedly vests in Macacua, as DOH-ARMM Secretary, the power to make such an appointment or designation. Issue: WON an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so, who can order such assignment. Second, who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health. Third, who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health. The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the powers and functions of a Provincial Governor under the 1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed, as a minimum, by a Provincial Governor in the ARMM. Thus, the Provincial Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latters salary comes from provincial funds. If the provincial health officer s salary comes mainly from regional funds, then the ARMM Local Code applies, in which case the Regional Governor is the appointing power but he must appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor. Moreover, the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer because the ARMM Local Code has classified him as a provincial government official. This is now the present state of the law on the appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM. This is actually the same as the law after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code but prior to the passage of the Organic Act of 2001. The only difference is that the Regional Assembly cannot amend the ARMM Local Code to reduce or diminish this power of the Provincial Governor because this devolved power, emanating from the 1991 LGU Code, is now part of the Organic Act of 2001. Application of the law to the designation of Saber. Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993. On this date the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office. The Court of Appeals reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilans authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides th at [T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments, is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989. Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 1988. He was appointed as Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5th Step), Office of the Regional Health Director, Regional Health Office No. XII, Cotabato City. Sani was appointed provincial health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order No. 119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressly stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region. The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officers to any province within the region. Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to that office. Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As of that date, the powers and functions of the Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sa nis detail or assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum was issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Depa rtment of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health. In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod, this Court ruled

that the power of administrative control encompasses the power to transfer personnel who under the law may be reassigned to other stations. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issued on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid. Application of the law to the designation of Pandi Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi on November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise general super vision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government. Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officerin-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. PANDI V. CA FACTS - August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director & Sec. of Health of the DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designating Dr. Pandi (then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of the IPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur. Dr. Macacua also designated Dr. Sani (then the Provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH) to the DOHARMM Regional Office. - September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor issued Office Order NO. 07 designating Dr. Saber as the OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. -Dr. Sani challenged the Memorandum transferring him in a complaint filed with the RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity. -Dr. Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is lawfully designated OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from further discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH. -Dr. Sani filed a Motion for Intervention. - November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issued E.O. 133 transferring the powers & functions of he DOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM, Dr. Macacua (as DOH-ARMM Sec.-Designate) issued a 2nd Memorandum reiterating the designation of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the IPHO-APGH and the detail of Dr. Sani to the Regional office in Cotabato City. -Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr. Sabers ISSUE WON the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (WON the appointment of Saber is valid) at that time HELD (NOTE: MAY MAHABANG HISTORY PART SA ORIGINAL CASE. Just see the case) NO. Reasoning. When Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on September 15, 1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. - The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office. -on reliance on Section 478, LGC: misplaced; not a grant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers but simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so; LGC did not amend the Organic Act of 1989 -as regards SANI: his first appointment was void. When he was detailed in Cotabato City, the powers and functions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Thus, the regional Director/ARMM Secretary of Healths directive assigning Sani to Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. As regards the November 6, 1993 Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail, since it was issued after the issuance of EO 133 which expressly transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of the

petitioner on the ground that the issues therein had become moot & academic because of the enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution of the Memo of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the ARMM Regional Government. -CA: designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH upheld; the Provincial Governor has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer because he was not appointed by the Provincial Governor.

Regional Department of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health, and since it is within the authority of the ARMM Secretary of Health, it is valid. -as regards Pandi: August 9, 1993 designation by the ARMM Secretary of Health is VOID since at that time, the latter did not exercise yet supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, November 6, 1993 designation is valid. The designation of Pandi as OIC, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made.-As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. -Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officerin-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as Officerin-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void. On the other hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs. SO ORDE ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months. RATIO: [R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

CATU VS. RELLOSA

FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. DiazCatu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. Facts. Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where Respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable

WILFREDO M. CATU VS. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA A.C. NO. 5738, FEBRUARY 19, 2008

Issue. At issue here is whether the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper. No. Rationale. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03, CPR as this only applies to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the instant case, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.

settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Respondent was then recommended for suspension from the practice of law. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of the CA Facts: The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business taxes and other fees. The judgment was affirmed by the SC and became final and executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution. In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPCs gross sales for the purpose of computing its business taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by the release and quit claim documents executed by the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiolas motionfor examination and execution of judgment. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713. Moreover, while under RA 7160, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession. Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.1 For this failure, responded violated his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey the laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for not complying with the ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon 7, CPR. Ruling. Respondent was found GUILTY of professional misconduct, SUSPENDED from the practice of law and was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL V. COURT OF APPEALS

Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in court for and in behalf of the municipality of Pililla Held: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. 1. Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall represent the province or any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or (b) in cases where the municipality or municipal district is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council. Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer is limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it . For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified must appear on record. 2. The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office.

Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides that no officer or employee shall engage directly in any profession without a written permission from the head of the Department.

claiming that the total liability amounted to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted that the mayor cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services and attorneys fees amounting to more than P12M. The RTC, however, denied his MR. A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to represent the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of the law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA. GARCIA COMELEC V. FACTS: On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227. The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution. However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. 3. The legality of a private counsels representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.

ISSUE: w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative? Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside? HELD: The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside. RULING: The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials. Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein. The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely: 1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution 2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation 3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

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