Nancy Sherman - Aristotle On Friendship and Shared Life

International Phenomenological Society
Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life Author(s): Nancy Sherman Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Jun., 1987), pp. 589-613 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230 . Accessed: 30/09/2013 03:13
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Vol.
and Phenomenological Philosophy Research

XLVII,
No. 4, Junei987
Aristotle on Friendship andtheShared Life

NANCY SHERMAN
Yale University
In thispaper I wantto consider thevalue of friendship from an Aristotelian pointof view.The issue is of current interest givenrecent challenges to takemoreseriously to impartialist ethics thecommitments and attachof a person.' In what followsI wantto enter ments thatdebatein onlya restricted the challengearticulated in Aristotle's way by strengthening defenseof friendship and the sharedlife. systematic I begin by considering After some introductory Aristotle's remarks, or happiness(eudaimonia)2 foran individual notionthatgood living necessarilyincludesthe happinessof others.Shared happinessentailsthe rational forjointly commonendsas wellas thecapaccapacity promoting withand coordinate notionof ityto identify separateends.This extended and nextI happinesspresupposesthe extensionof selfthrough friends,
Altruism, and Morality (BosRecentchallenges come from LawrenceBlum,Friendship, ton: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); BernardWilliams, "Persons,Characterand Press, i98i), pp. i-id; Morality"in Moral Luck (New York: CambridgeUniversity JohnCottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," PhilosophicalStudies43 (i983): 84-99; and AndrewOldenquist,"Loyalties," The Journalof Philosophy79 (i98z): 173-93. claimswe treatselfand thoseextensions of selfas one amongothers, The impartialist of othersthesame weight as we giveour own. The opponentargues giving theinterests and attachments of a persondeservespecialtreatment, and withthatthecommitments The debate has stirred out themlifelacks value and meaning. Kantiansand utilitarians their theories within thatare friendlier to thegoods of friendship. aliketo find positions and Kantianreplyin "Impartialist Ethicsand StephenDarwall exploresthe utilitarian A morerecent PersonalRelationship"(unpublished). versionof his paper is "WhyParShould be Liberals" (forthcoming). Barbara Hermanarticulates the Kantian ticularists positionin "Rules, Motives, and Helping Actions,"PhilosophicalStudies45 (i984): 369-77. Cf. her"Mutual Aid and RespectforPersons,"Ethics94 (i984): 577-60? and and Impartiality," The Monist 66 (i983): ?33-50. "Integrity is theactivity ofsoul inaccordancewithvirtue Eudaimonia,as thefinal good forhumans, to eudaimoniaas good livingand doing also refers and reason (iog8a3-i8). Aristotle well (iog8bzi).
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considercertainminimal conditions necessary forattachment. I Finally, discusshow Aristotle's notionof a friend as "anotherself"is compatible bothwitha conception of theseparateness of the individuals and of the distinctive ways in whicheach individual realizesvirtue withina shared life. Aristotle and Kant Beforesetting out Aristotle's view,it is worthanticipating a reply on his part to the Kantian position on friendship as it has been articulated recently by Stephen Darwall and BarbaraHerman.3 The reply will bring into focus aspectsof Aristotle's ethicaltheory I that presupposein my account. Accordingto Darwall, reasons for an agent to act based on friendly motives are constrained byreasonsbased on principles of right. This deontological constraint on friendship is developedbyHerman.Her claimis thattheimpartial pointof view of the CategoricalImperative is requiredboth to set the conditionsof permissibility for actingout of friendly motivesas well as to imposeobligatory ends whichthenmight best be fulfilled by friendship.4 Thus, Herman speaks of a double from acknowledgment, suchthatin acting we recognize friendship thatin additionto thatmotive, our actioneither satisfies a dutyor is within permissible In thisway motives constraints. of friendship are constrained by an overallrespect for personsas endsinthemselves, suchthatinacting out of friendship we neither overlooktheautonomy of a friend, nordisregard our dutiesto othersto whom we are not attached. Herman'sand Darwall's defense offriendship is ofa piecewiththegeneral Kantiantenetthatthepursuit of happiness(of whichfriendship is a part)5 is framed moralvalue whichhas itssourcenot bya lexically higher in thesentiments, butin principles ofpractical reason.6 Whilefriendships
Darwall, "Impartialist Ethics"; Herman, "Rules, Motives and HelpingActions." "What is required is thatagentswho act from emotionalso act permissibly. And where thereis an obligationto help,we are requiredto acknowledgethismoral claim,even though we may give help out of compassion, etc." "Rules, Motives and Helping Actions,"p. 376. On Kant'sviewfriendship is a partofhappiness inso faras itis based on emotion or inclination.Friendship in contrast, based on mutualrespect, willhave intrinsic moralworth. Cf. Doctrineof Virtue, trans.Mary I. Gregor(Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,i964), pp. 140-45. NeitherHerman nor Darwall discussthiscase. I raise some difficulties forthiscase at the end of mypaper. So Kant says: "And since none the less reason has been imparted to us as a practical power- thatis,as one whichis to haveinfluence on thewill;itstruefunction mustbe to producea willwhichis good . . . Such a will need noton thispurposebe thesole and ofall therest, complete evenofall good, butitmustbe thehighest good and thecondition our demands forhappiness.In thatcase we can easily reconcilewith the wisdom of
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NANCY SHERMAN
a moralmotive(in thatthey provide maybe instrumental to actingfrom conditions for its and in faras inculcation flourishing), so thesupporting oftheir arebased on emotions, lack intrinsic moralworth own.7 they they on manycounts.But one Now Aristotle's positionis quite different is this:ForAristotle, theethicalsphere that (literally, central disagreement between moraland whichrefers to character (ethos)) does notdistinguish that distinction. Thus, non-moralvalue, as the Kantian understands of character and good birth strength not excellence will includephysical ofthemoral;and attachments to theKantiansphere and easilyassignable while excluded froma Kantian view of the moral, will be sentiments, the factthatwe can be among motivesforethicalaction. Accordingly, blindedbyfriendship, or because of it act withtoo parochialan interest, remove itfrom theethicalsphere ofvaluadoes not,for Aristotle, thereby thatfactmerely tion.8Rather, opens it to adjudicationwithotherclaims in light ofthoseother and to judgments about itsappropriateness considof thatmustbe giventheir due. Thus Aristotle includesmotives erations conattachment withinthe ethical sphere,while still acknowledging So in general, are to on their Aristotle straints says,friends permissibility. in theassignment of our helpand aid (Ii 55a7-9; i i6oai-8) be preferred to help butnotalwaysand notat all costs.Forexample,itwould be wrong due others, or to givea loan to friends a friend before benefits returning a friend fine is especially before a creditor, repaying "exceptwhenhelping in is inappropriate or necessary" partiality (i i64bz5-i165 a4). Similarly, wherethefair suchas inthecase ofa publicofficial adjuspecific contexts, dication of claims is a part of the description of that office view, this is just to say that the (1134a33-35bi).9 But on Aristotle's
and forthefirst of reasonwhichis required thatthecultivation natureour observation of theattainment purposemayin manyways,at leastin thislife,restrict unconditioned - whichis alwaysconditioned," Groundwork happiness thesecondpurpose- namely, of Morals, trans.H. J.Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), of theMetaphysics p. 64. value thoughnot may have intrinsic Accordingto Herman and Darwall, friendships way inwhichcertain is a restricted intrinsic moralvalue. Note on Kant'sown view,there will mayhave moralworth- see note 5 above. On a Kantianview,friends friendships and nourish are neededto sustain value inso faras social relations also haveinstrumental instruas merely of friendship thecapacitiesof a selfas a rationalchooser.A criticism of Kohlberg. Cf. Carol Gilseemsto be at theheartof Carol Gilligan'scriticisms mental Press, Voice (Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University lingan,In A Different
I98z).
8
For the claim that Aristotlenonethelessdoes have a moral theory,see T. Irwin's of theBoston in Proceedings "Aristotle's Conceptionof Morality"and mycomments Vol. I, ed. JohnCleary(New York: University Philosophy, Area Colloquiumin Ancient Pressof America,i986), pp. I15-50. betweenan objectionableand unobjecdistinguishes In a similar vein,in IX.9 Aristotle
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expression of virtue through friendship mustbe harmonized withother ends in thegood life.And thisis a consequenceof his moregeneralview thatparticular choicesmustbe attentive to all theethically relevant parofone's situation. a choiceis appropriate ticularities Accordingly, (or hits in thisholisticway. the mean) onlyif it givesdue consideration on the permissibility of an action,in so faras Moreover,constraints arisefrom theexpression ofother do notappeal to principles they virtues, of sentiments. In makingan all considered exclusive of whatis judgment bestin a particular an agentappeals bothto thepassionaldisposituation, sitions (hexeis)and rational judgment (logos) ofthephronimos, or person ofpractical wisdom.To theextent thatthephronimos a point represents of view of experienceand reflective judgment removedfromirrelevant biases (NE 11.9i io9bi-9) we might is something say there likean appeal to an impartial pointof view in the assessment of action. However,for Aristotle, the point of view is always thatof humanexcellence, constituted,as it is, by emotionalas well as rationalcapacities.The considerationsof friendship are within, rather than outside,thatpointof view. Furthermore, itis thepointofviewofa specific personconcretely reactAs suchthepointofviewofthephronimos circumstances. ingto specific is in thesenseof applying neverreallya legislative one, either generalrules from thetop down,or in thesenseof constructing laws from thebottom up (as I believe the Kantian does in testingmaxims). In deliberating betweenthe competing claimsof near and far,'0 the virtuous agentwill forbiasesthatprejudice. correct Butthisnever theabstract delibrequires erative facetheoptions.My antecedpointof viewofanyonewho might ofinterests and knowledge enthistory ofmypast are notdetachablefrom fortheAristotelian, moralreasons mydeliberative position.Accordingly, foractionand thedeliberations ofa moralagentwillappeal to these. They as well as the reasons foraction. limitthe optionspresented As a result of thesesortsof assessments, it mayturnout thatclaimsof those more distantlimitthe claims of friendship. But these claims,of widergenerosity, justiceor thelike,do not have a privileged positionin
case an individualis partialto himself in the towardself.In the first tionablepartiality for"or scarce (perimasense thathe takes morethan his fairshareof certain"fought forhisactionsinvolvea violationofjuscensure thisindividual chata) goods. We rightly what othershave a legitimate claim tice; theyare a case ofpleonexia,takingforoneself to makehisown is partialin thesensethathe desires to. In thesecondcase an individual Thisindividual is notguilty ofa theseatofvirtue. virtuous and to makehimself character he does not violateothers' forin wantingthathe be virtuous, criticizable self-interest, is not a scarce resourcedividedup by is thattheend of virtue claims.The implication MM izizb8-z3. justice.Cf. ii68b15-i6,69a3z; principles of distributive to himforencouraging meto clarify some is Thomas Hill's. I owe thanks The expression section. issues in thisintroductory
IO
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SHERMAN
thegood life.Theydo notalwaystrump other virtues, norarethey constitutedanyless bypassional dispositions."Moreover,thesepassionaldispositionsare neither blindnor irrational but rationally informed forces, and guidedintentional states. UnliketheKantian,then, Aristotle does not merely permit attachment a theory ofmorality within constituted primarily byimpartiality. Rather, he makesattachment essential to theexpression of virtue and living with friends a structural feature of good living, as I shall be arguing shortly. These are some broad differences betweenKant and Aristotle on the questionoffriendship. Theyhaveto do generally withthesourcesofvalue foreach,and themethod of arbitrating between competing claims.Atthe ofthepaper I shalltakeup a final conclusion difference. Butto appreciate this,we mustfirst exploreAristotle's positionin some depth. Friendsas ExternalGoods To beginwith,we mustsetdown some definitional points.By friendship (philia) Aristotle typically meansthemutually acknowledged and reciprocal relationof good will and affection that existsamong individuals in each otheron thebasis ofvirtue, who sharean interest pleasureor utility(NE VIII.z). Also includedamongfriendships are thenon-chosen relaand care thatexistamong family and fellow tionsof affection members in citizens (NE VIII. i z; VIII.9,IX.6).In thispaperI willbe mostinterested theway in whichbestsortof friendship, thefriendship of virtunamely, ous individuals call "character (whatI willsometimes friendship") figures in the accountof happiness.To a limited I shall also discussthe extent, on mygeneral as itshedslight account.I shouldalso stress philiaoffamily from thestart thatwhilewomen,on Aristotle's view,are excludedfrom thebestsorts offriendships the that lackthecapacitiesfor (on ground they I shall nonetheless fullvirtue), tryto overlookthishistorical prejudice, and forthepurposesof thispaper,allow myself exampleswhichwould to women. open the ranksof the virtuous to understand theway in whichfriends in Withthissaid,let'stry figure schemeofgoods. In NE 1.8Aristotle Aristotle's general arguesthatvirtue, and requires in additioncerforhappiness, as a good, is alone insufficient tainexternal is roughly this:Happiness,conceived goods. The argument ethical of as doing well and livingwell (iog8bzi), requiresnot merely (and intellectual)virtues,but activitieswhich manifestthose excelof attachment would thatappeal to some sortof wide sentiment maintains So Aristotle urgefriendship ideallyreplacethemoredetachedpointofviewofjustice:"For lawgivers thereis no need for justice" more than justice . . . for where thereis friendship
(11I55az4-8).
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lences.'2Withregard to ethicalvirtue, endsof character mustbe realized in action.'3 But for this, the proper resourcesand and implemented mustbe at hand. Amongtheseresources or external opportunities goods are friends:
Yet evidently, as we said,happiness requires in addition external goods; foritis impossible or not easy to do excellent deeds withoutresources. For an individual performs many actionsthrough theuse ofinstruments, wealthand politicaloffice. And the through friends, lack ofothergoods spoilsone's happiness, suchas fine birth, good children and beauty.For one would hardly be happyifone werethoroughly or bornoflow birth or solitary ugly, and childless.(io99a3 i-b4)
In this passage, Aristotle has in mindtwo classes of externalgoods (whichhe recapitulates at ioggb27): thosewhichare instruments ofhappiness,i.e. - thosethings whichare bynaturecooperative and usefulas tools (io99bz7), and thosewhichare notmerely butwhich instrumental, are necessary forand intrinsic to happiness(i.e., "belong necessarily" huparchein anagkaion ioggbz7 and the lack of whichmars happiness in thelistof bothtypesof external goods. The ioggbz).'4 Friendsfigure first class of goods is somewhatstraightforward. Friendsmaybe instruments and toolsin thesenseinwhichmoneyand politicalconnection are. They provideus withthe means forthe promotionof particular ends. Thus we dependupon the aid and supportof friends foraccomplishing ends we cannot realizeon our own. The way in whichfriends in thesecondclass of goods,however, figure is moredifficult to grasp.For while friendship has intrinsic worth(certakesthelove parents to be an end Aristotle show towardchildren tainly in its own right - MM iziibi-z, and friendshipin general, foritsown sake" 1159az 5), itdoes so not in thesenseof "choiceworthy havingsome isolatedvalue, like thatof an "adventitious" pleasure (cf. ii6gbz5-7) which mightbe added to happinessas one more separate worthis of a muchmorepervasive constituent.'Ratheritsintrinsic sort,
I do notsubscribe to theinterpretation of NE X.6-8 in whichintellectual contemplation is a dominant good of happiness.Cf.J.L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia,"Proceedingsof theBritish Academy 6o (1975): 339-59. I argue the case also in myreviewof
(i98i):
3
Anthony Kenny's The Aristotelian Ethics, Journal of theHistory of Philosophy i9

100-104.
Accordingly, Aristotle comments thathappinesscould neverbe ascribedto a person, however virtuous, who sleptaway hislifeor out of inertia failedto realizehiscapacities (io99ai-6). My remarks hereare indebtedto T. Irwin'sclassification of the two typesof external goods in "Permanent Happiness:Aristotle and Solon" presented to theBostonAreaColloquiumin Ancient Philosophy, January, i985. Irwindoes notexplore,as I do, thespecial way in whichfriendship is an intrinsic good. Gauthier-Jolif imply something liketheviewI criticize intheir accountofthesecondclass
14
'5
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NANCY SHERMAN
providing thevery form and mode of lifewithin whichan agentcan best realize her virtueand achievehappiness.To have intimate friends and in one's life, in an ubiquitious family is to have interwoven way,persons toward whom and with whom one can most fullyand continuously expressone's goodness. In whatfollows I wantto pursuethisnotionoffriendship as structuring thatit is because of thisrole thatAristotle thegood lifeand suggest calls friends the"greatest" and "mostnecessary" ofexternal goods (i i69bio, whomwe wouldn'tchoose to live "even ifwe had all II54a4), without 5 othergoods" (I 55a5-6, cf. i i69bi6-I7). As suggested, crefriendship a or for of and ates context arena the expression virtue, for ultimately happiness.This can be seen in variousways. It providesbeneficiaries for virtuous foractionand sentiment action,as wellas opportunities unavailable to the solitary or childless.'6 However,I want to suggestthatit is essentialto the good lifein a more fundamental it way. In particular, and redefines in sucha way thatmyhappinessor extends itsboundaries, complete good comesto includethehappinessof others. Thus happiness or good living is ascribableto me,not as an isolatedindividual, butas an extendedselfwithattachments, or friends. Happiness as Including the Happiness of Others The kernelof this is in Aristotle'sremarksin 1.7 regarding the selfof good living.Self-sufficiency is a criterion of the good life sufficiency that a lifeis "lackingin nothing,"therebeingno othergood entailing whichwhenadded to itwould makethatlifedesirable(io97bI5-zz). But sincefriends are amongthegoods whichmake a lifeself-sufficient, selfis relational and thegood lifea lifedependent sufficiency upon and interwoven withothers: wedon't mean for a solitary for a life self-sufficient one but By individual, living alone, andwife, andingeneral for andfellow citizens since for allfriends a parents, children, human cf.ii69bi8-ig) being is bynature political andsocial. (io97bg-ii; For humanbeingsthe self-sufficient lifeis a lifelargerthanthatof one individual. So theMagna-Moraliareminds us, "we are not investigating
Universitaires, 1970), ofexternal goods: L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain: Publication Vol. Z.I, p. 71. virtuous On thenotionthatfriends allow forsustained cf.IX.9 I I7oa5-8. John activity, in thisway in opportunities discussesthe second class of goods as providing Trooper Aristotle on theGoods of Fortune"PhilosophicalReview94 (i985): 173-96. Martha as an externalgood whichprovides Nussbaum takes up a relatedview of friendship in chapteri z of The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and objectsfortheexerciseof virtue
'6
in GreekEthicalThought: The TragicPoets,Plato,and Rational Self-Sufficiency
Aristotle Press,i985). (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
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the self-sufficiency of a god, but of human beings" (izi8a8), and the Eudemian explains, "for our well-beingis relational (kath'heteron), whereas in the case of a god, he is himselfhis own well-being" Aristotle has in It is important to emphasizethat the self-sufficiency butto living well. notmerely to living, mindis self-sufficiency withregard sortoffriendship does notmerely enable themostimportant Accordingly, find expression These considerations us to live,butenablesus to flourish. in NE IX.9 and EE VII.iz whereAristotle again takes up the relationof So in IX.9 he reports theviewof some,that friendship to self-sufficiency. "forthethings thatare theself-sufficient persondoes notrequirefriends, he requires further" nothing good belongto him,and beingself-sufficient, (ii69bzz-8, and EE iz44b6ff.) (ii69b5-7). Aristotle'sdisagreement A person who lacked of self-sufficiency. centerson the interpretation might have contemplation, friends, who perhapsspenthis lifein solitary minimal formaterial be moreor less selfgoods. He might requirements of living.But he could neverbe selfin thematerialconditions sufficient The problem to good activity. withthosewho claim sufficient withregard as based on something is thatthey failto conceiveof friendship otherwise or transient as something morethanutility pleasures,and self-sufficiency broader (i i69bz3-7).'7 Thus, these later passages correspondingly in 1.7 of self-sufficiency as relationalby specifying sharpenthedefinition whatsortof relationship theself-sufficient moreprecisely (or friendship) involves. lifenecessarily soliThe upshotof thesepassages,then,is thatwhiletheself-sufficient forliving as meansor instruments (or onlyminitary maynotneedothers mallyso), he will stillneed othersto shareends and designa lifetogether withthose ends in mind:
Forwhen then we all seekothers ourenjoyto share we arenotinneedofsomething, inneed, Andwecanjudge them when weareself-sufficient than when andwe ment. better whoareworthy ofliving with us. (EE Iz44bi8-22) most needfriends together (iz45bi8-i9).
Thus thebestsortof friendship providesus withcompanionswithwhom in a jointlypursuedlife.This sortof we can share goods and interests the truly sharedhappinessconstitutes self-sufficient life. There is considerablefurther evidencefor the claim that friendship intosome sharedconception of happientailsa weavingof livestogether in these issues with some the Eudemian ness. Aristotle insight pursues
17
In the EE Aristotle says thatthe mostself-sufficing personwill need usefulfriends and and will not value too highlysuch relations friends that amuse him only minimally, with regardto these means is only one aspect of self(I244b5-I5). But sufficiency as I have argued above. sufficiency,
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Ethics,and I want to considerthosetextsnow. In theEE Aristotle adds a newdimension to hisdiscussion offriendship as itappearsin theNE and MM. At I z3 6b3-6 he arguesthatthebestsort of friendship among virtuousadults (character friendship) displaysnot onlythe acknowledged reciprocation of affection and goodwill,but the acknowledged reciprocation of a choice of one another:
from Itis apparent thesethings thattheprimary sortoffriendship, thatamonggood persons,requires mutualaffection (antiphilia) and mutualchoice (antiprohairesis) withregard to one another . . . This friendship thusonlyoccursamong humans,fortheyalone are consciousof reasonedchoices (prohaireseis).
Again,at EE Iz37a3off. he makes a similarpoint:

If the activity of friendship is a reciprocalchoice, accompanied by pleasure,of the acquaintanceof one another, it is clear thatfriendship of the primary kindis in generala reciprocalchoice (antiprohairesis) of the thingsthat are withoutqualification good and pleasant,because theyare good and pleasant.
The significance of the claim restson Aristotle's technical term, proa prohairesis hairesis.As I have arguedelsewhere, is a reasonedchoice thatis expressive of a character and theoverallends of thatcharacter.'8 The choiceof a friend exposes thiscapacityof practicalreasonin a perself" spicuousway. For in choosinga character friend, we select"another and ends,and a sense (I I7ob6-7) who sharesa senseofour commitments ofwhatwe taketo be ultimately We choose "good and pleasant"inliving. in thejointpursuit of theseends. In so doing,we to be a partner another choose to arrangeour lives around a loyalty to another,and around a to choose ends and pursuitswithinthe contextof thisloywillingness alty.'9 Aristotle therealtest(peiran)offriendship comesin However,sincefor timetogether spending (suzesai Iz37b3 5-37), thechoicesthatare constias thosethat are notso muchtheinitialovertures tutive of thefriendship indicatea capacityto share and coordinateactivities over an extended two livescan be interperiodof time." Theyare thechoicesthatindicate
i8
Cf. my "Character,Planningand Choice in Aristotle,"Review of Metaphysics34 (I985). life withregard to certain ends.Itis as a capacity to arrange Cf.EE I 2I4b7 on prohairesis the and implicitly phronesis to notethatin theNE Aristotle characterizes also interesting (orthoslogosI I44bz2-8), and judgment of thepersonof wisdomas a right prohairesis ii ff.). Here too,inthenotionof ofwhatis takento be best(NE III.3 i i i 2zb as a judgment (to a friend, is present. The friendship reflects a stablejudgment theterminology choosing decision(krisin orthenI237bI2), as deterbebaion I237bi i), and correct kekrimenon minednot so muchin advance,but as borne out by timeand trust(i237bi3-i8). butonlywishto thetestof timeare notreal friends without "Those who becomefriends be friends" (EE IU37bi7-i8).
'9
10
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woven together into some coherent pattern of good living. Significantly, Aristotle does discuss these sortsof choices underthe notionof homonoia,literally samenessof mind,or moreidiomatically, consensusbetweenfriends. Homonoia, he arguesin theEE, is arriving at the same choice about practicalmatters (heaute prohairesis), as in the case ofcivicfriendship, wherefellow citizens agreeabout who shouldrule and who shouldbe ruled(Iz4ia3 '-3; cf.NE IX.6). In thecase ofintimate friendships, the consensusis not about who should rule,but about how and whatsortoflife to livetogether: "Some havethought friendship to be unanimity of feeling and thosewho have sucha consensusto be friends. is not a consensusconcerning But friendship everything, buta consensus concerning practical mattersfor the parties involvedand concerning thosethings thatcontribute to livingtogether" (hosa eis to suzensunteThe notion of consensuscan be seen as an extensionof Aristotle's In choosinga friend, notionof reciprocalchoice (antiprohairesis). one chooses to make thatpersona partof one's lifeand to arrange one's life withthatperson'sflourishing (as well as one's own) in mind.One takes ofa sharedconception ofeudaimonia.Through on, ityou like,theproject friends mutualdecisionsabout specific practical matters, beginto express thatsharedcommitment. can take various forms. So, forexample, Consensus betweenfriends two friends cometo a mutualdecisionabout how to act fairly and honoror abouthow bestto assista ablytowardanother who has wronged them, fellowcitizenwho has come upon hard times.Anyhappinessor disapthese actionsbelongsto bothpersons, forthe thatfollows from pointment is thusshared.This decisionto so act was joint and the responsibility notionof jointdeliberation providesan important interpretation of Arisremark thatcharacter livetogether, notin totle'smorecompressed friends in argutheway animalsdo, bysharing thesamepasture, but "bysharing mentand thought"(koinoneinlogon kai dianoias I I 7ob i i -i z). But equally, consensusmay expressonly a more generalagreement Two friends thattemabout ends and pursuits. maysharetheconviction perancein their personallivesis of utmost importance, yeteach realizes and manner. One does itthrough a scrupulous thatend in a different style to take part in frivolous diet,the otherby refusing gossip about others. is to an end,rather thanto particular Theircommitment waysofexpressing it.
nei 1z4iai6-i8).
sortof consensusin friendship. Buttheremaybe a morecharacteristic ofthe realizesharedendswhichare constitutive In thissortofcase friends
598 NANCY SHERMAN
friendship and whichdo not pre-exist it."' Thus specific commoninterestsdevelopwhicharea product rather thanpre-condition oftherelation, so, together, myfriend and I developa love forGeorgianhouses having had no real interest in themearlier.Aristotle's emphasison developing friendships through timeand through a sharedhistory of mutualactivity suggests thisnotionof thecommongood. But a qualification is in order and sharedways of being virtuouswill be among here.While specific thosevalues peculiarto a specific theacquisitionof virtuous friendship, statesof character mustpre-exist anyfriendship based on virtue. That is, inpart, theagents on thebasisofa firm mustchooseeach other, and stable theparticular thecommitments character. Through ofcharacfriendship, ter will deepen and express themselvesin ways peculiar to and Butevenso, a well-cultivated conditioned bythatfriendship. senseofvirin a way in whicha love of Georgian tue mustbe in place from the-start, houses need not be. Withinfriendship happinessis sharedin otherways too. Individuals withone another, suchthatevenwhereactivities cometo identify are not one individual's thehappiness joint,or endsnotshared, happinessaffects Whena friend of theother. does well,I feelhappytoo. Aristotle explains thissortof "singleness of mind" (miapsucheEE I z4obz,bg-io) through thenotionsof sympathy and arguesthatthesesentiments and empathy, a friendship. So at IX.io, Aristotle are heightened themoreintimate says, to a friend, thebetter themoreexclusive theattachment able I am to minister to a friend'sneeds and to identify with her joys and sorrows (II7ia6ff.) It may be because of my intimate knowledgeof her,I can or knowinghow I would feelor imaginehow she feelsin thatsituation, inthatsortofsituation, and knowing sheis similar to mein cer(havefelt) tainways,imagineshe mustfeelthatway. In theEE Aristotle indicates of some thatfriends identification might expressnot merely sympathetic sort(ou moon sullupeisthai), butempathy, thesamepain . "feeling (alla kai tin autin lupe-n) (forexample,when he is thirsty, sharinghis if this were possible, and if not, what is closest to it" (EE thirst), thatthisHumean-like suggests empaIz4oa36-9). But thequalification thesameeffect, to feel thy, i.e.,coming mayintheendbe neither necessary be enoughthatI be able to nor sufficient forpracticalconcern.It might whatI taketo be thatofmy from imagine myown pointof view,or from Aristotle friend's, what she is experiencing. Thus, in tragedy, says, we withpityand fearwhenwe imagine whatitwould be likeforus, respond to suffer in our own circumstances, a similarfate (peri to homoion).zz
" I am grateful Trianoskyforurgingme to develop thispoint. to Gregory Cf. Poetics 1453a4-6, RhetoricI385bI3-I4.
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To appreciate thecharacter's plight we needn'tfeeljustwhatthecharacter feels. Thereis a further way in whichwe experience a friend's happinessor and failures, whichare notexplicsorrowas our own. Accomplishments an extensionof self,sourcesof itlyour own, are nonetheless, through pride and shame. So Aristotle says in Rh. 11.6: "And individualsfeel shame whenever theyhave acts or deeds which bringsome disrespect, either their own,or thoseoftheir ancestors, or thoseofother persons with whom theybear some close relation"(I385ai-3). Thus, whenour children do well, we feelpride in theirachievements, and when theydo poorly,shame,as ifwe ourselveshad fallenshort.It is not thatwe are responsiblefor theirerrors(thoughas parentswe may be), but that through the sense of belongingand attachment, we identify with and sharetheirgood. But friendship of two livesin quitea difmayinvolvetheinterweaving ferent way. This can be seen as follows:Withina givenindividual's life, in some unified choices(prohaireseis) articulate theendsof character and a sense of planreflects comprehensive way over time.So, deliberation ning,and an abilityto make choicesthatbestpromotenot a singleend, of ends. Choices of action are with regardnot but a coherentsystem butwithregardto thewhole,and the to thepartsof good living, merely unityof ends thatentails(II4oaz6-z8, iI45ai-z). This model of planningis extendedto thesharedlifeof friends. Ends notmerely are coordinated within lives.Thus,justas a lives,butbetween of objectives particular choiceI make is constrained by mywidersystem and ends,so too is itconstrained So, for bytheendsofa friend. example,if a a contemplated actionofmineprecludes friend from an imporrealizing tantgoal of hers,thenthatconsideration will figure in myjudgment of whoseinterwhatis overallbest.Itmaynotbe an easymatter determining estsshouldprevail, and as withanydecisionofthemean,deciding whatis to all relevant will requiregivingdue consideration concerns. But right thenature of thesolution, thepointto be stressed is thatwhatis whatever relevant to thedecisiongoes beyondtheeudaimoniaof a single, isolated The endsofmyfriend mustbe takenintoaccount,justas mine individual. in theoverallassessment of whatis to be done. Indeed,thesurvival must, in this to exhibitloyalty of the friendship dependsupon our willingness way.
and Wider Altruism Attachment

an individual's I have arguedthatthrough friendship happinessbecomes extendedto include the happiness of others.This presupposessome I want or a selfenlarged attachments. notionof an extended self, through
600 NANCY SHERMAN
to explorethismomentarily, proposing certain minimal conditions necesas attachment. But first saryforfriendship I wantto contrast attachment witha widersense of altruism. Altruistic sentiments such as goodwill (eunoia), kindness(charis)and pity(eleos) are constitutive of variousvirtues in Aristotle's scheme,e.g. generosity (eleutheriotis) magnificence (megaloprepeia), and magnanimity(megalopsuchia). The definition of kindness in Rhetoric 11.7is useful for Itis a willingness ourpurposes. to give"assistance(hupourgia) toward someonein need" (I3 85ai 8), and "is greatifitis showntowardsomeone in greatneed,or in needofwhatis important or whatis difficult to get,or someonewho has needina crisis, or ifthehelper is theonlyone or first one or themostimportant one" (I385aig-zI).73 Accordingly, in actingout of kindness, our sympathy goes out to an individualbecause of the circumstances he happens to findhimself in, and not because of who the specific individual happensto be. Thereis a kindof anononymity in our response.The situation in friendship. is different We act out of a more fora particular concern specific person,and because itis thatpersonwho is in need (and not another), what we can do and are willingto do, and whatothers counton us to do, is often (cf.NE IX.8 ii 69ai 8-34). greater Theseremarks might thefollowing suggest objection:thatwhenwe act out of kindness rather thanfriendship, we somehowoverlooktheperson who is theobjectofour goodwilland consider himmerely as an occasion for theexercise ofourvirtue. We might evenseemto careina priggish way more forour virtue, than forthe particular persontoward whom it is But on Aristotle'sview, I act for the sake of the being expressed.24 or notI havean enduring whether or priorattachment beneficiary, to him. Even though in widercases of altruism in thebeneficiary a is senseintersubstitutable thisdoesn'tdiminish byothers, myconcernforthisperson now. Aristotle makes the point as follows: To be a friendis to wish another welland desire forhim,"forhissake and notfor good things your own'> (Rh. I38ob37; cf. I38ib37). But equally, kindnessoutside of friendship dependsupon offering assistance"not in return forsomething, nor forsome advantageto the helperhimself, but forthat of the one
ingeneral Although kindness can be described terms, acting from kindness does notcome down to following a generalrule.To have a reliabledisposition, there mustbe, as a part of thatdisposition, some cognitive in which graspof thegeneralsortsof circumstances that dispositionwould be appropriately exercised.But this involvesa flexibility to respondto new and oftenunfamiliar occasions. The objection might be answered ifwe say,notthatI act forthesake ofmyvirtue, butfor thesake of thispersonbecause of myvirtue. That is, myvirtue explainswhyI am motivated to make this person the object of my concern.Cf. Barbara Herman, "Rules, Motivesand HelpingActions,"pp. 370-71.
23
24
ARISTOTLE
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6oi
helped" (Rh. I385a18-i9)."5 as itis directed toward Thus,friendship goes beyondgoodwill,insofar byothers(cf.NE IX.5). So I may a specific person,noteasilysubstituted or evenbe a friendly senseofaltruism sortofperson havea wellcultivated ofthosevirtumyfriends well,buttheexercise and one who tendsto treat For that,I secureforme thegood of friendship. ous statesdoes not itself and another personto me, to a particular person, haveto becomeattached in a way thatdisplaysmutualregardand affection (II5bz8-56a5) as of sharedactivities. statesof well as a history Moreover,whilevirtuous fortheir theabsence conditions exercise, character dependupon external them.But thisis not destroy of favorable conditions does notnecessarily thana state For friendship is morean activity so in thecase of friendship. and a virtuous unlikeothervirtuous that activities, of character, activity, In conditions6 theabsence personas itsexternal dependsupon a specific of thatperson,thereis no friendship. ConditionsforAttachment inAristotle's discussion is a theme whichrecurs The notionofattachment butmostexplicitly within theaccountof naturalphilia,or of friendship, therelation of affection and caringbetween parentand child.Thoughhis have been forthe mostpartignored, theyare remarks about the family crucialforan account of the way in whicha selfbecomesextendedor The primary textshereare NE VIII.i z and others. attachedto particular Pol. 11.I. inrather theconditions forattachment broad We can beginto consider of Diotima in Aristotle's viewswiththeteachings outlineby contrasting that The ascentof eros,accordingto Diotima,requires theSymposium. be transformed intoa morenoble love thelove of a particular individual of the repeatableand universalqualitiesof that individualas theyare such as foundin otherpersonsas well as in impersonal embodiments, of claim that the reinstantiation those feaand The is institutions sciences. to makethosenewindividuals in other individuals suffices objectsof tures
25
z6
a friend moreforhis between thetwo cases is notthatI treat forAristotle The difference a deeperwrongand show butthatwhenI failto,I commit own sake thanI do a stranger, in being says, "a wrongbecomesintensified As Aristotle of character. a greater failing thing so thatitwillbe a moreterrible friends, towardsthosethatare morefully exhibited thana and moreterrible not to help a brother than fellowcitizen, to defrauda friend thananyoneelse" (NE VIII.9 ii6oa4-6). and moreterrible to wound a father stranger, friendship saythisand leavesitopen at I I 55a4 as to whether does notexplicitly Aristotle that It is also noteworthy accompaniedbyvirtue. (e.g.,activity) or something is a virtue listsphiliaas a passion,butherehe seemsto have in mindfriendly at I io5b22 Aristotle as opposed to friendship. feeling
6oZ NANCY SHERMAN
love. Aristotle's argument, we shall see, impliesthata notionof friendship based on Diotima's model violates certainpsychologicalfeaturesof attachment. It violatesthe strongsense of friendship as self-referential, and is treated is myfriend as sheis becauseshestandsina i.e.,thata friend to me. For on Diotima's model,there particular relation is no clearsense that the reduplicated that and objects retain strong special relationof of the initialattachment. "beingmine" characteristic, The presumably, has beendiluted, senseof belonging Aristotle will suggest, bythere being justtoo manyindividuals withwhomI can reasonably expectto develop an intimate relation. The psychological feature of exclusiveness, characteristic of friendship, is absent. Let's considerthesepointsmore closelyin the contextof Aristotle's remarks in PoliticsII.i." Here Aristotle make thesepoints in arguing againstPlato's radical claim in Republic V thatpoliticalharmony and In its place will be the unity requiretheabolitionof the nuclearfamily. of a communistic establishment in whichthe youthsof the city family becomethecommonchildren oftheoldergeneration. Platodescribes itas follows:
Forno matter whomhe meets, he willfeelthathe is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a a son, a daughter or the offspring or forebearers of each. (Rep. 463c) mother, is bestordered in whichthegreatest That city, use theexpression "mine"and "not then, mine" of the same things in the same way . . . (Rep. 462c)
Now Aristotle's view is that a notion of philia which requiresthis extended use of "my mother,""myson," etc.,cannotbe sustained:For when "mine" is used as in the Republic "each of two thousandor ten it to thesame thing"(iz6za8), "the expressions thousandapplying 'my son' or 'my father'become less frequent"(hbkista tonemonelegein huioni z6zbI7). The notionof standing in a spehuion epatera patera cial relationto an individualbecomes weakened,on the one hand, by common ownership(for a son becomes only fractionally one's own (iz6zaz-6)), and on the other,by havingtoo manysons withwhom to spreadone's love. thismoreprecisely of two closelyrelated formulates in terms Aristotle "Thereare two things above all thatmakeperpsychological principles: is one's veryown or sons love and care: Theyare a sensethatsomething
The importance ofthesetexts was brought to myattention byM. Nussbaum,in "Shame, and PoliticalUnity: Criticism of Plato" in Essays on Aristotle's Separateness, Aristotle's of California Press, i980), pp. Ethics, ed. Amelie 0. Rorty (Berkeley:University 395-435.
27
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properto oneself(to idion) and a sensethatthatobjectis all one has, i.e., notionis mostpoignant in itmustdo" (to agapeton) (iz6za8). The latter is a sensehereinwhichthischildor this thecase ofnatural philia,forthere is fixed parent must, bydefault, suffice as myown. The relation or permanent(EE i z6ob3 5), and theattachment thrives on itsexclusiveness. When the relationbecomes too inclusive,and the objects of attachment too numerous,any given attachment becomes diluted,literally, "watery" in distinct Bothprinciples expressexclusiveness, though ways.The first thatthewhole of an objectis one's own, i.e., itis notcollectively suggests takencare of.The secondsuggests thatthere owned or collectively are no othersuchobjectswithwhomone standsin thesame relation;thatis,the In the extendedfamily is not substitutable. of the object of attachment are violated.He illustrates the Republic,Aristotle argues,bothprinciples as a violationof thefirst the with house(to idion) by following analogy: whenitis takencareofbytoo manyservants, holdthatis neglected so too of many are neglected whentheyare thecommonresponsibility children on to someoneelse,with Foreach parent individuals. passes responsibility the result that the children are in the end inadequately cared for (i z6 i b33-8). The children, in turn, lackinga sensethatthey belongexcluto a particular individual(hos hekastou)(insteadof as theydo, to sively failto developtheintensity of feeling any one of many(tou tuchontos)), relation(iz6ib3g-6zaz). The inability of theparent-child characteristic is explainedbytheabsenceof a senseofto agapeton to form attachments - a sensethata given parent cannotbe exchangedforanother. The impliis thatalthough and children oftheRepublicrefer to cation,then, parents one anotheras "mine," the sense of belongingrequisiteforattachment cannot be sustainedin the absense of exclusiveness. It is worthnotingthatAristotle's remarks seem to runcounterto the would advocateforthehousehold(NE sortofdivision oflabor he himself i i6zazo-z9, as well as thevarious Pol. I.). For on hisview,each parent, in has the of the The division different roles slaves, management family. thanimpedes,efficient care. However,I think rather increases, Aristotle, of divisionof labor. Rather, evenhere,does not abandon thesystem the is thatPlato,in requiring thatthemanyparents of a cruxof his argument thesame function, rulesout thepossibility of an effective childall fill systemofsharedcare.Indeed,Aristotle's twopsychological would principles be consistent witha notionof divisionof labor, so long as he stipulates thatit is a specific one's own aspectof thecare of a childthatis primarily to be con(to idion),and thatthechildin turn, dependsupon thatrelation filledby one particular individual(to agapeton). sistently
(hudareiz6zbi6).
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dwells on the case of naturalphilia, his remarks AlthoughAristotle by the have more generalapplication,as suggested about exclusiveness arguesthatthe numberof intidiscussionin NE IX.io. ThereAristotle
mate friendshipsany individual can have is highly limited (I I 7iaio-I
devotion requirea considerable cf.EE I3 8a9-io). For such friendships but and time,and precludenot only othersuch friendships, of energy at the and sustained Theyare cultivated and commitments. loyalties other to note oftimeand interest. Here itis significant investments costofother of friendships, to thecultivation not merely are relevant thathis remarks of interests in general. but to the cultivation his continues in NE VIII.iz, Aristotle In the discussionof the family that a account of the conditionsfor attachment)8The requirement lovofparents in terms be "one's own" or to idionis herespecified friend to themselves" (hos heautonti "as in some way belonging ing children from "as insomedegree deriving in turn loving parents onta) and children them" (hos ap ekeinon ti onta) (ii6ibi8-i9, ii6ibz7-3o). The love at least,a love rootedin on Aristotle's view,is initially, between siblings, to parents(i i6ib3o). thiscommonsense of belonging make some appeal to biologicalconnections, theseremarks Although or mostcentakesto be relevant thesebyno meansexhaustwhatAristotle The sense of belonging betweenparentand child is tralto attachment. to product(poiema): in bothcases likethatof craftsman moregenerally the makers "are favorablydisposed (eunoi) to what theythemselves which make" (MM iziib35-39). Here, belongingis an attachment thesense a product. The senseofone's own requires from creating results as one's own. This seemsto be true,on Aristotle's of makingsomething "mold" each Forhe suggests adultfriends view,evenamongadultfriends. and influence the course of life greatly other(apomattontaiII7zaiz), each follows. are not merely efforts theproductive Moreover,in thecase of parents, and raisingthem: intothe world,but of nurturing children of bringing and from existence and nurture, "For parentsare thecause of children's education"(i I 6za6-7). The parents' birth productheir onward,oftheir and hope" (MM "guidedbymemory tion,thus,is ongoingand constant, a mother's i z i i b38). Whileitis important describes to notethatAristotle him to be we needn'tunderstand claiming love as greater thana father's, withherchilis morebiologically connected thatit is because a mother to children is morelaborious" dren.For he goes on to say, "givingbirth and labor (to (NE ii68azO-8, ii6ibz7, EE Iz4ib5ff.). It is theactivity
z8
5;
ofMoralEducaTheory Aristotle's inmy dissertation, issues these andrelated I discuss

I982. tion,HarvardUniversity,
ARISTOTLE
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AND THE SHARED
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605
prattein)that makes for the greaterattachment. So he generalizes: "Everyone lovesmorethethings they have brought about through effort, forexample,thosewho have workedfortheir moneylove it morethan it . . . and forthesereasons,mothers those who have inherited love morethanfathers" seemsto be theirchildren (i i6zazzff.). This reading confirmed byAristotle's biologicaltheory, according to whichthemothin whichtheform, er's body is regarded as merely theaccidentalmatter As such,it is the father, carriedby the father's sperm,is instantiated.9 and not the mother, who bears the essentialbiological relationto the a who has no genetic child.The idea of purely gestational mother, relation to thechildshe bears,would notbe a terribly notionto Aristotle. strange It is also worthspeculating thatgivenAristotle's view of themother's primary function on thehousehold,herlabor will extendto thenurture and earlyupbringing of children. While she herself will lack education and by nature,the fullauthority and controlof rationalpowers (Pol. i z6oaI4), will be capable of executingorders for she nevertheless running a householdin whichthe children's earlyeducationis a part.30 Her love and intimate will be important knowledgeof her children elein thateducation, and significant ments counterparts to thelesspersonaldoes ized aspects of public education (ii8ob8-iz). AlthoughAristotle not develop thesepoints about women, theydo not seem in principle and rationality. inconsistent withhisviewofwomen'ssubordinate virtue in turn, ofchildren to parents, is notmerely or primarThe attachment to theaffecilybiological,on Aristotle's view,butan intentional response tionand nurture towardthemas belovedobjects.This emerges displayed love from Aristotle makes.For a start, he says "children severalremarks when after are of undertheir timehas elapsed parents only they capable in this standingand discrimination" (ii6ibz4-6). Most fundamental own parents from their otheradults.So in Physprocessis distinguishing ics I. I, Aristotle call all men 'father' and all explains: "Childrenat first and later each of from women 'mother,' them other only distinguish
29
30
in Aristotle's claimthatmothers love Thereis clearer evidenceforbiologicalattachment labor but because "theyknow better than their children morenotonlybecause of their is accithemother's matter fathers thatthechildren are their own" ( i i 68a26). Although can be certain of herown contribution in a nonetheless dentalto thechild,themother way the father cannot. On therole of womenin ancientsociety, cf.Images of Womenin Antiquity, ed. Averil Cameronand AmelieKuhrt(London: Croom Helm, Ltd. i983), esp. Mary Lefkowitz, "Influential Women"; Susan Walker, "Women and Housing in Classical Greece: the "Women and Wealth." Cf. also thehelpful Archaelogical Evidence"RietVan Bremen, source book by Mary Lefkowitzand Maureen Fant, Women's Life in Greece and Rome (London: Duckworth,ig82).
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NANCY SHERMAN
adults" (i84biz-I4). The implication from thesepassagesis thatas chilof dren become capable theirown parentsfromother discriminating theirparents'special affection adults,theycome to recognize forthem. themselves "as" (hos I I68 bI8) belonging in a specialand Theyperceive exclusiveway. In additiontheyperceiveparents'love as unfailing and abundant.So Aristotle says,"Of all thekindsof friendship we have diskinthatlove is present inthegreatbetween cussed,itis in thefriendships est degree(malista),and especially so in the relationof parentto child" thestart as soon as a childis born(NE (MM i 2iibi8-zo). Itis givenfrom i i6ibz5), and is given non-instrumentally, for its own sake (MM Izi ibz7-3 5), without debts incurred for benefitsconferred(MM EE Iz39ai8). The child'sattachment Iziibzz-z7, is a responseto these of love. perceptions
A Friend as Another butSeparate Self

The senseofbelonging and exclusivity thatmarksthefilial relation is also of adult friendships. characteristic However, in the relationbetween parentand child,the childis in a significant way not yetseparate. For the child, lacking in mature rational capacities (NE IIIib8-95 is dependentupon the II44b8-iz, EE Iz4ob3I-33, Pol. Iz6oaII-I4) fora childand parent'sreason. A parentmakes choices (prohaiareseis) promoteshis good in a way thatwould be inappropriate withinadult friendship. So Aristotle is "anotherself,"but equally,in his says an adult friend own words, "a separateself" (autos diairetos)(EE I245a3o, a35; NE thatsuchfriends each II7ob7, MM 12I3aI3, a24). This entails promote other'sgood in a privileged way (as onlyanotherselfcan), but in a way mindful of the maturerationalagencyof each. So, that is nonetheless oftherelation, ofcharacter and theexclusivity giventhesimilarity friends and how to helpin to knowhow bestto helptheother, each is ina position and pleases. In thosecases wheredecisionsare a way thatmostreassures notjoint,intimate knowledgeof each other'sabidinginterests putseach in a positionto offer counseland supportforthesortof choicesthatgive thisextendedand interwoven real shape to each other'slives.Yet within retaintheirseparateness. nonetheless life,the individuals
3I
fromtheMagna Moralia: "For theredoes not remark This is explicitin the following - any or a servant and his master seemto be any justicebetweena son and his father, morethanone can speak of justicebetweenmyfootand me,or myhand or any of my so limbs.For a son is,as itwere,a partofhisfather (hospermerosti),and remains other from him,and becomes until he takestherankof manhoodand is separated(choristhei) thenan equal and a peer withhis father"(MM II94biI-I7).
ARISTOTLE
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the is important in understanding Aristotle's notion of self-sacrifice In yetseparatethrough friendship. way in whicha selfbecomesextended and willthere is a levelofpractical concern intimate and deep friendships ingness to help one another thatfarexceedsthesortof concernshowna in a way one does friend lesserfriend. One comesto counton an intimate notupon a stranger or mereacquaintance(NE VIII.9). Aid is givenwithout even having to ask (Rh. I386b35), and oftenwithout a return to help is in the willingness expected.But it is not clear thatthisgreater of as self-sacrifice. For if friendship bestthought case of truefriendship inthe theself, then one is notso muchsacrificing as acting extends oneself, interests of thisnew extendedself. butfor Aristotle is indeedloatheto viewsuch actionsas self-sacrifices, different, though relevant reasons.In IX.8 oftheNE and I1.I3 oftheMM, thatgiving a friend material he suggests goods,and eventheopportunities foractionand choice (i i 69a32-4), does not constitute of self, a sacrifice namely For whatmatters mostto theself, (indeeditis a case of self-love). reason (ii68b28-69a3) and the capacityto choose excellentdeeds in So thereis no accordancewithreason,is by thatveryaction preserved. his real sacrifice here because the virtuousindividualdoes not forfeit or thedesireto use itin making himself theseatofexcelrationalcapacity findthisdeeplyunsatisfying. For it failsto distinguish lence. We might our rationalnatures, and theoutchoicewhichexercises betweena right comeofthechoicewhichliterally endsin thedeathofour reason.The latthepleateris of coursea sacrifice. The distinction parallelsthatbetween ofa stateand thepleasurewhich exercise theexcellent surewhichfollows theend forwhichtheactivity was undertaken. comesfrom accomplishing in our result to accomplish endsmay making unhappiness, Thoughfailing on Aristotle's well our abilitiesbrings, the right choices and exercising agent's view,itsown rewards.Perhapsin thisnarrowsense,thevirtuous fora friend what theexternal outis not a loss. For no matter sacrifice of abilwill have the satisfaction well his the having exercised come, agent
ities.3'
on whata charin thisregard forreasonis a certain limitation Implicit acterfriend can giveanother. How one can help,is limited, amongother of In so faras a of the rational each. an agency things, by acknowledgment an individual cannotpre-empt is anotherself,in helpinga friend, friend or desireto make choicesforhimself with thatfriend's rationalagency, individual values For itis justbecausethatother to virtuous regard living. and somevirtue and practicalreasonthathe has beenchosenas a friend inpart,because can be spent. one withwhoma life Theyarevirtue friends,
3z
ofii698a2o ff. andiii7bi-zo. combined force This seems tobethe
6o8
NANCY
SHERMAN
in relation to one another in a waythatdoes not they are capable ofliving The result is thatsuchindividuals promakeone theslave of theother.33 ways notbydirectly making moteeach other's interests onlyin certain choices for each other (unless these are jointlydeliberatedchoices or for choice, and homonoia), but by givingeach greateropportunities greater meansfortherealization ofends.Thesemeansmayincludescarce as Aristotle material suggests here,butthey may (perimachata) resources, goods, such as supportand esteem also includesoughtforpsychological in theRhetoric: It inour endeavours. So Aristotle remarks and confidence offriends, that"they praisethegood qualitieswe possess, is characteristic and especiallythose which we fear mightnot in fact belong to us" in support and confidence (I 38 ia3 5-bi; cf.I 38ibIo-I4). We givefriends theirseparateness. theseways,withoutminimizing fortheseparateness ofselveswithin evidence character Thereis further the possibility of a friendship. We can take up the issue by considering of ideals of virtuouscharacters. On Aristotle's view,havinga diversity virtuouscharacterimplies having all the virtues,or completevirtue For the virtuesimplyone anotherand are io98aI7-i8).34 II45ai-z, in of unified virtues might be different inseparable. However,thepattern be especially might honest, thisvirtue different persons.So one individual over others,while anotherindividualis seemingto gain pre-eminence herinteractions above all, by a sense beingmarked, especially generous, of kindnessand bounty.Each individualhas all the othervirtues, and as external exercises themappropriately, conditions allow. Butas a result and resources, ofnature, certain virtues have gainedgreater development in each individual'slife.35 and prominence expression as character friends might be simiNow individuals thatcometogether in theabove sensethatwhilethey sharevirtue as an overlaryetdifferent in waysthatare distinct all end,they yetcomplemenexpressit,at times,
34
3"
ofAristotle's remarks at I I 24b3 I thatthemagnanimous Here I drawon theimplication " See to another, Forthatwould be slavish. person"cannotlivein relation excepta friend. T. Irwin'snoteson thispassage inhistranslation oftheNicomacheanEthics(Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Company,i985), p. 327. Aristotle's remarks can be understood as making either theweakerclaimthatthevirtues are in principle or thestronger claim thatin actual cases of action,theycan consistent, I understand him to be makingthe first, nevercontingently conflict. weakerclaim. evidenceforsomething likethisin Aristotle's Thereis implicit viewat PoliticsI 3z9a9ff. virtues or character Therehe arguesthatdifferent traits at different gain pre-eminence life:"Inasmuchas thesedifferent timesin an individual's functions belongto a different wisdomand theotherstrength, prime of life, and one requires are to be assignedto they different thispassage to myattention. persons."I owe thanksto T. Irwinforbringing
ARISTOTLE
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suggests this Aristotle Theyare notmerelook alikesof one another. tary. of theclaim thata friend is at EE VII.'z. In assessingthetruth thought anotherself,he comments:
forall to and itis difficult individual maybe scattered, ofa particular butthecharacteristics one is what is mostsimilar, For althoughby naturea friend be realizedin one individual. or one in one partof in body,one in character (psyche), his friend mayresemble individual and anotherin another(i245a30-34). the body or character,
The notion that anotherself may not realize all of one's ends or thatwhilefriends desireto profurther to remark leads Aristotle interests each othchoosemostofall to promote thisthey motesharedends,failing er's separategood (Iz42b7-9). in this notion of characterfriends as There are severalimplications in character trait and point differences one another. First, complementing may a lifeof consensusand coordination, of view,whilenot precluding theother.In to grow and learnfrom enable each individual nonetheless in NE IX he alludesto these on friendship remarks concluding Aristotle's and theirrole in adult ethicaldevelopment: differences
and of good personsis good, beingincreasedby theircompanionship; The friendship and by improving each other;for too by their activities to becomebetter theyare thought theyapprove. (II7zaIO-I 5) from each othertheytake the mold of characteristics
degree friends realizeto a different The suppositionis thatcharacter to develop virtues. Each is inspired manner) particular (and in a different realized morecompletely as he sees admirable qualities,not fully himself in anotherwhom he esteems.RemarksAristotle in himself, manifest in theRhetoric are pertinent here: makesabout thenotionof emulation nature is "before those whose Emulation, he says,is feltmostintensely valued and are thatare highly like our own and who have good things as extended possibleforus to achieve" (I388a3I-z). Characterfriends, suitedas models foremulation. selves,are eminently yetdifferent character forAristotle's claimthatthrough Thereare also implications In NE IX.9 and MM the partiesgain in self-knowledge.6 friendships thatwe learnabout ourselves byhavinganother suggests IL.I5, Aristotle a more we can studyfrom us whose similaractionsand traits selfbefore better detachedand objectivepoint of view: "We can studya neighbor thanour own" (i i69b3 3-35). For in and hisactionsbetter thanourselves our own case, passion or favor at times blind our judgment(MM we different, another justlikeus,yetnumerically I II23 ai6-zo). Through
36
facilitates selfCf. JohnCooper's excellentdiscussionof the way in whichfriendship knowledge,"Aristotleon Friendship,"Essays on Aristotle'sEthics, ed. Amelie 0.
pp. 301-40. Rorty,
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can see ourselves from a pointof view outsideourselves, and so at a distance. But if anotherselfneed not be exactlysimilar,thenself-knowledge mightinvolvecontrasting oneselfwith another,and considering how another would have actedin thesame circumstances giventhatindividuinMetaphysal's different pointofview.Aristotle's introductory remarks ics A have application here: "All human beings desire to know by nature . . . and especially delight in discriminatingdifferences" as a sub-speciesof knowledge,requires, (98oazz-z8). Self-knowledge, the discrimination of what is peculiarly ultimately, one's own. Another and separateselffacilitates thatdiscovery. I beganthispaperwiththepromise to strengthen theAristotelian challengeagainst impartialist ethics, and in particular againstKantiantheory. Withtheseremarks about self-knowledge, we are now in a positionto It is a feature ofKantiantheory advanceinthatdirection. thatin assessing maxims, partof theassessment will dependon whether themaximssinour motives. cerely reflect Indeed,to be persuadedof theunacceptability of certainmotivesis not merelyposteriorto recognizing what one's motives are,butoften accomplished bythatrecognition. The issueis one of transparency.37 Yet knowing and theheart,Kant tellsus, is a difficult inscrutable We can neverbe fully sureifwe have told matter.8 seemingly ourselvesthe truth. Howeverthere arewaysofknowing theheartexplicit in an Aristotelian accountoffriendship thatneedto be explorediftheissueoftransparency is indeedto be takenseriously. These involve, as we have justseen,informal methods ofself-reflection thatseempossibleonlywithin and intimate trusting relations. a friend, Before Aristotle we can bareourselves, and acknowlsuggests, and weaknesses we hidefrom others(Rh. 11.6).Stories we edgethefoibles abouthow we failedto helpanother havetoldourselves becauseofinadenot hold up in thepresenceof an quate means or resources may simply intimate companion.It maybecomeclear in such a contextthatthereal another's needsor did not reasonI failedto actwas becauseI undervalued me. Wheredeceitis not the regard theoccasion as sufficiently benefitting issue,butdeeperambivalences before are,theconflicts mayonlysurface thanwe knowourselves. thosewho seemto knowus better Thus,through intimate we cometo a visionofourselves thatis moreresolute and friends, thanour purely definite internalized viewaffords. The issueis notsimply thatour own eyesare biased,butmoregenerally, thattheprojectof selfSee Onora O'Neill, "Kant after Virtue,"Inquiryz6 (i983): 387-405. The Doctrineof Virtue, pp. 440, 445-46.
37 38
ARISTOTLE
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knowledgerequiresexternaldialogue and audience. We need "to live withfriends and sharein argument and thought" in orderto be together fully consciousof thesortsof liveswe are leading(I I7obi i-iz).2 Without friends, we act in blindness about who we reallyare,and indeedlack truepracticalreason. I wantto suggest thatthisconception ofself-knowledge, so deeplytied to friendship, is not adequatelyaccountedforin Kantiantheory. On Kant'sview,friendship can be viewedinvariousways.As I said earlierin thispaper,in so faras acts of friendship are based on emotionand inclination, theycan be thoughtof as a componentof our happiness. While we do not have a dutyto happiness,happiness(and friendship a fortiori) are constrained bymoralconsiderations. Equally,friendship and social relations as themeansforpromoting otherduties,such mayfigure and in generalas a meansforsustaining as beneficence, and nurturing our in Rawls' capacitiesas a moralagent.(I believethepointis wellillustrated Well OrderedSocietyin whichfamily and social relations play an essential rolein thenurture and maintenance of themoralpowersconstitutive of free and equal persons.)In boththesecases, friendship maybe thought and/or to have intrinsic instrumental value, but not moral worth. Kant suggests But in theDoctrineof Virtue, something else. Therehe What he has in itselfis a positivedutyof end.40 arguesthat friendship in whichmutualrespect are friendships mind,moreprecisely, conditions such friendships, he says,we have a dutyto promote.Yet even intimacy; of such intihere,Kant is deeplyskepticalabout thepracticalpossibility how willwe know macy(how willwe knowwhattheotherreally thinks, or hold us in contempt thatshe will not revealour confidences forour of respect"thatrequires[friends] and openlyurgesa principle to faults), keep each otherat a properdistance."4' It thusseemsthatthekindof intimacy Aristotle as a permaenvisions of thegood lifewill be absentin theKantianmoralscheme. nentfeature in Kant's genMuch moreneeds to be said about theplace of friendship eral moral theory.But for the time being, the Aristotelian challenge - thatgenuine and practical is a permanent of remains feature friendship contextin whichto scrutinize our our lives,and thatit is the privileged moralmotives. The apparently insufficient accordeditintheKantweight on theKantianaccountofpractical ian theory revealsa limitation reason,
I9
40
at I argument ofthe arduous conclusion this tobethe I take of I I7obI I-14. theconclusion cisely,
pp. 140-45. The Doctrineof Virtue, p. 141. of Virtue, TheDoctrine
7oa I 5-b14,
preandmore
4'
6i2z
NANCY SHERMAN
and morespecifically, a limitation on the CategoricalImperative to test successfully our motives.42
of North of thispaper wereread to audiencesat BrownUniversity, 41Versions University fromthose Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Wesleyan.In additionto helpfulcomments I am grateful to MarthaNussbaum,Larry audiences, Blum,and R. I. G. Hughesfortheir I also owe thanks to theNationalEndowment and interest. fortheHumanities criticisms forfellowship thispaper. supportduringthe period in whichI was writing
ARISTOTLE
ON FRIENDSHIP
AND THE SHARED
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6I3

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International Phenomenological Society

and Phenomenological Philosophy Research

Aristotle on Friendship andtheShared Life

AND THE SHARED

AND THE SHARED

AND THE SHARED

Anthony Kenny's The Aristotelian Ethics, Journal of theHistory of Philosophy i9

in GreekEthicalThought: The TragicPoets,Plato,and Rational Self-Sufficiency

Aristotle Press,i985). (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

AND THE SHARED

Again,at EE Iz37a3off. he makes a similarpoint:

AND THE SHARED

598 NANCY SHERMAN

and Wider Altruism Attachment

600 NANCY SHERMAN

AND THE SHARED

6oZ NANCY SHERMAN

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ofMoralEducaTheory Aristotle's inmy dissertation, issues these andrelated I discuss

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A Friend as Another butSeparate Self

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ofii698a2o ff. andiii7bi-zo. combined force This seems tobethe

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pp. 301-40. Rorty,

and morespecifically, a limitation on the CategoricalImperative to test successfully our motives.42

AND THE SHARED

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