De Gruyter

De Gruyter
Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Justice Author(s): Howard J. Curzer Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 207-238 Published by: De Gruyter Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913767 . Accessed: 02/10/2013 11:05
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Account Aristotle's ofthe Virtue ofJustice

HowardJ.Curzer
of Ethics to thevirtue of his Nicomachean devotesone tenth Aristotle and virtue in Aristotle's interest Yet ethics, ethics, although justice. has been ofjustice ofthevirtue account Aristotle's is on therise, justice ofjusaccount Aristotle's this is because somewhat Perhaps neglected. andevenunAristotelian tobe contradictory, ticeis reputed implausible, of thedoctrine Aristotle's itdoes notfit architectonic, (in thesensethat On my ofjustice. account Aristotle's torehabilitate themean).I shalltry Ethics V accountof justicein Nicomachean Aristotle's interpretation, trait of the character of account scattered his by sketchy, supplemented and Aristotelian a consistent, nemesis constitutes description plausible, ofjustice. ofthevirtue I shallbeginbyexploring five Thepaperaddresses major problems. itfrom theother Aristotle and how matter ofjustice thesubject separates oftwo, SinceAristotle virtues. onlyto one viceinstead opposesjustice fits his account ofjustice willbe toshowhowAristotle's project mynext makesseveral Aristotle doctrine ofthemean.Third, puzzlingremarks. totreat oneself 'itis notpossible He saysthat (EN 1138al4-15), unjustly' and beingunbetween is intermediate that'justaction unjustly acting senwho and that a treated' (EN 1133b30-l), knowingly judge justly either of an share at excessive 'is tencesprisoners unjustly aiming I these remarks shall or of (EN 1136b34-7al). explain gratitude revenge' of account ofAristotle's them to support and utilize myinterpretation is the set of actions that the set of believes Aristotle Fourth, just justice. actions he but the set of actions just byjustpeople, performed typically of that couldnotbe motivated actions includes describes by thevirtue from which flow I shallarguethat theactions he describes. justice justice theactions trait ofnemesis match character specified plustheassociated
andscience for ancient APEIRONa journal philosophy & Publishing Academic 207-238 $3.00 0003-6390/95/2803 Printing
208 Howard J.Curzer
rulefor Aristotle's account ofjustice justice. Finally, byAristotle's right common sense intuitions about several seemsto ignore contemporary, that want to the intuition other justpeople people have justice including I shallarguethat Aristotle's account ofjustice whatthey deserve. plus nemesis these intuitions. captures
The SphereofJustice ofthe ofa virtue Aristotle's account alwaysbeginswitha description with a starts broad virtue. Aristotle of the ho) range (peri typically sphere the sphereof the virtuein stages.For of objectsand thennarrows thatcourageconcerns withthe suggestion starts example,Aristotle after case until he maintains and case then fearful finally rejects things, Aristotle ofcourageis deathin battle that thesphere (EN 1115al7-24). that different to ensure the spheresof the virtues narrows partially Aristotle restricts the For havedifferent virtues sphere objects. example, inthefollowing oftruthfulness ofthevirtue way.'We arenotspeaking that in his agreements, of theman who keepsfaith i.e.,in thethings another this would to or to virtue)' (for belong pertain justice injustice wanteachvirtue tobe about Notonlydoes Aristotle (EN 1127a33-bl).1 Aristotle there is nooverlap. tomakesurethat hewants different things, virtues to have wantshis disjoint spheres.2 ofthesphereofjustice Aristotle by limiting beginshis description havetodo' (EN andadversity which tothegoods'with prosperity justice andhurtful' toall 'useful andequivalently (EN 1134a71129b2-3) things
from Aristotle aretaken Allquotations from and1122a3-7. 1 SeealsoEN1117b31-18al Princeton Barnes ed. Works The Press, Aristotle, (Princeton: J. University of Complete than 'excellence'. rather I translate arete as Virtue' that 1984), except but haveoverlapping andmagnificence that doesthink 2 Aristotle spheres, liberality a separate is notreally becausemagnificence a counterexample this is notactually 'A Great is merely virtue. (H. Curzer, Instead, greatness-of-liberality magnificence of Treatment Virtue: Aristotle's Great of Great Account Not So Philosopher's 20[1990], ofSoul"',Canadian "Greatness 534).AtEN 1130a28-32 journal Philosophy of actions inbattle as unjust ofa comrade and desertion describes Aristotle adultery refer must buthere'unjust' and cowardice, byself-indulgence produced typically to an obstacle constitute does not EN 1130a28-32 togeneral Thus, ascribing injustice. toAristotle. ofdisjoint thedoctrine spheres
Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice209
also describes the sphereofjusticeas 'honor, 8). However,Aristotle which and is a muchsmaller collection of (EN 1130b2) money, safety' concern? Since all Which set of does sorts of justice goods things goods. orunjustly from caketopunishment distributed, maybe justly birthday a charitable of Aristotle's 'honor,money,and safety' interpretation him musttake to be merely ofthesphereof remark giving examples rather thandescribing theentire The sphere ofjustice is sphere. justice rather than and safety. all ofthegoodsoffortune honor, merely money, two virtues: Aristotle distinguishes general justice(holedikaiosurw) meros andparticular General 'is complete dikaiosurie). (kata justice justice - notabsolutely, but in relation to others' excellence (EN 1129b25-7, The moststraightforward the'in rela1130a32-b2). way to understand that toothers' is consists ofthose tion justice qualification general simply all of the other virtues which to of other pertain aspects people. So who acquireexcessive in soldiers their comrades safety by deserting and both cowardice battle who the general injustice. display People give amount ofmoney totheir bothliberneedyfriends appropriate display And so on. It is possibleto act virtuously or alityand general justice. in which do not affect but such actions are not others, viciously ways ofgeneral matters ofgeneral is limited Thus,thesphere justice. justice to to thedistribution of goods of fortune others. Noticethatgeneral is nota virtue theothers. Aristotle's doctrine ofdisjoint justice alongside spheresdoes not apply to general justicebecause it is composedof I shallindicate oftheother virtues. thisdifference portions by calling a second order virtue while to justice general referringcourage, temperetc.as first order virtues.3 ance,particular justice, Sinceparticular is a first ordervirtue, Aristotle's doctrine of justice that the of does not disjoint spheres implies sphere particular justice intersect thespheres ofanyoftheother first order virtues. Aristotle says thatparticular a in 'is of the wide sense,and injustice part injustice intheonesenseofjustice intheother' (EN 1130bl4-16). justice similarly the of unlike theother first order Thus, sphere particular virtues, justice, is a propersubsetof the sphereof general Particular justice. justice concerns ofthegoodsoffortune toothers, but onlycasesofdistribution
3 Aristotle's that remark inevery virtue wouldseemtobe characteristic of 'greatness a proudman(megalopsychos)' that (EN 1123b29-30) suggests prideis also a second order Aristotle obscures thispoint as if virtue, although by sometimes speaking is limited tothesphere ofhonor (Curzer, 517-37). pride
210 HowardJ.Curzer
Diagram1
in theways notall suchcases.Thus,theAristotelian virtues arerelated 1 illustrated above. bydiagram and itssphere, Insteadofdirectly Arisdescribing particular justice describes and assumes that and totle particular injustice particular justice will the same Aristotle that have sphere. suggests injustice particular is pleonexia whichmeansroughly, excessive (EN 1130al6-22) injustice for an excessive amount of and desire desire, something /orexcessive Butan excessive amount ofdesire for amount ofdesire for something.4 a non-excessive amount ofsomegooddoesnotseemtobe injustice. For a personwitha burning desireforan appropriate shareof example, butnotunjust. Has Aristotle madethesphere of wealth seemsilliberal, In the desired amount is too broad? No. cases where justice particular ifthedesireis notexcessive, no one willbe deniedhis or herdeserts for non-excessive amounts are desire satisfied. Thus,casesofexcessive
as wellas 4 Under list'tobe greedy, Liddelland Scott grasping, arrogant7 pleonecto more than one'sdue',and 'togetorhavetoomuch'. 'tohaveorclaim
do notevenfall into thesphere areinvolved. others notcaseswhere They let alone ofgeneral justice. particular justice, is desire ofparticular feature thedistinguishing So pleonexia, injustice, To havemorethanone'sownis amount ofsomething. an excessive for thesphere ofparticular calledgain(keros)' Thus, (EN 1132bl3-14). injus'The is motive ofparticular tice(andtherefore [of particular justice) gain. that arisesfrom is thepleasure gain'(EN 1130b4).5 injustice] from theother virtues? Buthow does thisseparate justice particular of to establish the existence most concerted Aristotle's particular attempt is thefollowing passage. justice
in action theother forms ofwickedness Whilethemanwho exhibits the man who throws butnotgraspingly actsunjustly away his (e.g., bad orfails or cowardice shield harshly through temper speaks through when a man acts withmoneythrough to help a friend meanness), - no,norall together, noneofthese he often exhibits vices, graspingly andinjustice. weblame ofsomekind butcertainly wickedness (for him) kind which answers toa part ofwhat another ofinjustice There is,then, See also 1130a28-32) inthewidesense... (EN 1130al6-23. is unjust
whoactspleonectically theperson HereAristotle (i.e.,from distinguishes his shield thepersonwho throws a desireto makea gain)from away and the who fails to desire for an excessive from safety person helphis is not excessive an excessive desirefor from friend Thus, money. gain A person who desires or anyother gaindoes not good.6 money, safety, After desireanygood in particular, all,if perhapsincidentally. except of some then actions an excessive amount were good, merely gain
desiresforan excessive amountof 5 People may have moreand less excessive ofone'sdesire involves the for So particular degree gainas well something. injustice as theamount ofgain. a desire maintain that action flows from togainsafety, 6 Could Aristotle pleonectic a desire lose flows from tonot meanaction etc. while action safety, cowardly money, lose I think not.Cowardly a desire tonot etc.? actions flows from money, mayflow than Forexample, theperson from a desire togainrather tomaintain who safety. is seeking inorder toflee the battle faster toincrease rather throws awayhisshield meanactions thanmerely to conserve his safety (EN 1130al6-23). Similarly, may than a desire totaketoomuchrather tonotgiveorspendenough flow from (EN 1121b31-32).Andsoon.
212 HowardJ.Curzer
and safety for couldbe accounted motivated money, bygainofhonor, Aristotle would meanness, cowardice, respectively. by over-ambition, to account fortheseactions. notneed to postulate injustice particular a of for constitutes almost Moreover, sphere application everygood excessive desireforalmost and a pairofvices.Therefore, somevirtue for tothat gain good.Ifdesire anygoodis oneofthevicescorresponding otherpeople),then were excessivedesireforsome good (involving virtues justicewould turnout to be thepartsof theother particular Particular with ofgoods(toother distribution concerned justice people). be general wouldsimply Therefore, justice. interpreting gainas merely withAristotle's amount of some good notonlyconflicts an excessive fail butalsomakes Aristotle mainattempt toexplicate justice, particular that a virtue a demonstration there is toachieve one ofhismajor goals, and from all of the othervirtues of particular justiceseparatefrom if ofsome it is not an excessive amount is What, then, gain general justice. from the other to be And is how justice distinguished particular good? virtues and from justice? general Aristotle triesto carveout a nichefor Whilediscussing liberality, desirefor thatmeanness is excessive justiceby suggesting particular is excessive desire for whileparticular ofmoney smallamounts injustice That Aristotle here takes amounts of is, 1122a3-7). (EN gain money large this movefails ofmoney. ofsomeamount tobe theacquisition However, notonly ifAristotle moveconsistently tworeasons. for First, appliedthis the of he would butalso tohonor, tomoney, etc., impoverish rest safety, for a sphere ofapplication inorder virtues tocreate the justice. particular that cowardice shouldinvolve for It seemsimplausible, only example, ofextra excessive desireforsmallamounts Peoplewho excessafety. are surelycowards,too. sivelydesirelargeamountsof extrasafety if excessivedesirefor to Aristotle's architectonic, Second,according desireforlarge thenexcessive is meanness, ofmoney smallamounts or brutish of meanness of moneymustbe a higher amounts degree sort of vice.7 other rather than some meanness, from Could Aristotle virtues) (and the other liberality distinguish and mean aspects unjust particularly justice bydistinguishing particular
man differs remarkthat'the magnificent 7 This shows, by the way, thatAristotle's withsmall ones' deals withlarge sums, the latter fromtheliberalman; the former (EN 107bl7-19)clashes withhis doctrineof themean.
Account Aristotle's ofJustice213 oftheVirtue
an action is always ForAristotle, on thesameaction?8 oforperspectives The same behavior(thesame set of a behavior-under-a-description.9 and therefore different motions) maybe descriptions, mayhaveseveral exhibit a different Eachaction actions. different several vice,so the may under different different vices samebehavior descriptions. mayexhibit hisbehavior inorder tohavesexwith IfParisleavesa battle Helen,then of a comradeand an intemperate actionqua desertion is a cowardly itcouldalsoexhibit action injustice particular quaadultery. Presumably, is not whether the same But the under somethird question description. butrather the is whether the same twovices, behavior canexhibit question butnotbehaviors, exhibit twovices.Actions, action can exhibit disjoint of a singleaction the possibility rejects explicitly spheres.Aristotle andsomeother vicewhenhe says,'if both injustice exhibiting particular ofwickedness but is ascribed tono form hisaction a manmakesa gain, as we haveseen,Aristotle (EN 1130a31-2). explicitly Similarly, injustice' different virtues that a single caninstantiate thepossibility passion rejects tries to distinguish ofliberality whereAristotle notonlyin hisaccount butalso inhisaccount and particular meanness (EN 1122a3-7), injustice wherehe saysthat ofcourage fearing disgrace, poverty, appropriately but rather are cases of modesty, etc.are notcases of courage, insult,
and profligacy are tobe saying 8 YoungtakesAristotle that, 'although prodigality both in itis possible for oneandthesameacttodisplay distinct vices, vices, though ofthe actinquestion'. virtue ofdifferent features that, Young goesontorecommend indistinguishing from 'itisopentoAristotle tosaysomething analogous illiberality that what Itis opentohim tosay,inparticular, peoplewhogainbytaking injustice. inrespect ofgaining from sources and toothers count as illiberal improper belongs in respect sources from which as unjust oftheparticular improper they gain.'(C. 27 Supp [1989], Southern on Justice', Journal 237). ofPhilosophy Young,'Aristotle andprofligate orperspecAristotle doesnotdistinguish However, prodigal aspects claim(atEN 1119b33-20al) is that itis possible tives ofthesameaction. Aristotle's andprofligate, butAristotle a single tobe both doesnotsaythat for person prodigal a singleactionmayexhibit bothvices.Moreover, between Young'sdistinction whatbelongs to others' breaks illiberal and unjust down.The aspectsof 'taking Theilliberal sourceofthegainis improper simply bybeingunjust. aspectofthe is thesameas theaction's action unjust aspect. that between liberal and particularly O'Connor claims thedifference justactions inC. Lordand 'TheAetiology ofJustice', is a matter ofperspective (D. O'Connor, ofCalifornia Press, 1991], 155). University
D. O'Connor, eds., Essayson the Foundations Political Science ofAristotelian [Berkeley:
than 9 I shalluse theterm 'action' tostand for 'action token' rather 'action type'.
214 Howard]. Curzer
the idea of etc. (EN 1115al7-24). Moreover, good-temper, liberality, of and or mean unjustaspects perspectives the same distinguishing subset with that is a proper action sitsuneasily thefact justice particular not. but is ofgeneral justice, liberality that Irwin andparticular justice bymaintaining general distinguishes .. . of the at the common 'aims political community good general justice for insists onproper whileparticular respect particular peoplein justice Irwin arrives athisinterpretation allocation ofexternal thefair goods/10 thatAristotle links he observes of general justicein two stages.First, that the lawful has and lawful. Aristotle the person says justice general Irwin lacks the virtue of andtheunlawful Second, general justice. person thatthelawfulis thecommon infers community good ofthepolitical thatlaws 'aim at the commonadvantage statement from Aristotle's of or something ofall or ofthebestorofthosewho holdpower, either that to in call those acts tend thesort; so that one sensewe just produce for thepolitical anditscomponents andpreserve (EN society' happiness 1129bl4-19). I must disagreewith Irwin for several reasons.First,Aristotle in relation to others,' excellence describes justiceas 'complete general Aristotle's in relation tothecommon excellence notas 'complete good'. ofparticular Irwin's matches ofgeneral description justice description of than his rather Second,Aristotle justice. description general justice thelaws aimat thecommon does notclaimthat good.Laws sometimes oftheruling or the ofthebest aim at theadvantage class, advantage does linkgeneral Aristotle etc.Third, justiceand thelawful.But the view that thelaw 'bids ofthislinkis his frequently expressed ground vice' with us to and forbids excellence us practice practice any every than the mere rather to others 1130b23-4, 1129bl9-24) (EN respect the that'in one sense' just actionsare actionsthatpromote endoxa law and of some group.The factthatbothgeneral interests justice of ordervirtuessupportsmy interpretation involveall of the first virtues which order all of the first of those as aspects justice general to other people. pertain theother from I suggest that Aristotle justice particular distinguishes than one's as more and from virtues gain by defining justice general rather than one is a desireto getmore share.Thus,pleonexia deserves,
First Aristotle's 10 T. Irwin, Press,1988),424,427 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Principles
than a desire for Letmeillustrate. and particular goods.11 Sallyis welloff that showsinvarious she is not concerned with ways overly money, yet shestealsfrom merchants. Whatshedesires is notthemerchandise, but rather thepleasure ofgetting whenSarah awaywith stealing. Similarly, cheatsat gamesshe does so notin orderto acquiremoney, or evento win.Whatshedesires is towinillegitimately, togetundeserved honor. Steveseducesmarried not because he finds them not attractive, people to acquiresexualpleasure, butmerely in order to add moreforbidden tohislist. Samgetsdrunk notbecausehe enjoys thehigh, but conquests in order rather to experience thethrill ofillicit sensualpleasure. These four people desireto getaway withsomething. Theywantto acquire morethantheir share.Buttheir the pleasurecomesnotfrom getting butrather what from should not have.Thus, thedesire good, getting they for someother gaindoes notreduceto thedesirefor good.Noticethat is theplace in Aristotle's for particular injustice system peoplewho do evil foritsown sake.Butnotevery sortofevil done foritsown sake counts as particular becausenotevery sortofevildonefor its injustice ownsakeinvolves distribution ofgoodstoothers. so far, is pleonexia; So,on myinterpretation particular injustice pleonexiais a desire for for for more than one gain;anda desire gainis a desire deserves.12 Pleonexia is a desire for certain goodsnotquagood,butrather than one'sshare. Thesphere ofparticular is gain, and it quamore justice does notoverlap with thespheres oftheother virtues. One objection to my interpretation of particular is this. injustice Aristotle that unlike the incontinent the vicious says person, person 'stands anddoesnotrepent. 'Viceisunconscious byhischoice'(1150b30) ofitself(1150b36). So unjust arejust.Buthow peoplebelievethat they can they believethat their desires areright whenthey desire morethan
11 Engberg-Pederson seems toagree when hesaysthat the is 'motivated unjust person ofhaving morethan hisshare.' ButEngberg-Pederson bythepleasure goeson to the 'the ofknowing that heis "doing better" desires, saythat unjust person pleasure than theothers' which is a very different motivation Aristotle's (Engberg-Pederson, Moral Oxford [Oxford: Press, 1988], Theory of Insight 59). University 12 HereI am talking about natural that hasnotyet particular justice, particular justice been combined withpractical wisdom.Proper particular justiceis appropriate desire informed anddirected Itis notenough to appropriately byproper priorities. haveright desires. One must havethem for theright reasons.
216 HowardJ.Curzer
an unjust believe that deserve? To desire share they they gainis todesire for thesakeofitsinjustice. At one level I suggest that pleonectic peopleengagein doublethink. that This enables her to feel she is thethrill of stealing. Sallyrecognizes that On another she believes there is level, however, unjust acquisition. that with what she does. she to herself no nothing wrong Perhaps says from one willlose becauseshe takesonlysmallthings big companies. that sheisjust. Sarahknows Thisenables hertogoonbelieving Similarly, atgames, butsherationalizes that that itiswrong tocheat does everyone it it for to the fact that so is OK. is Thus, possible unjust it, people enjoy while still that are their are believing they justpeople. gains unjust for is that no type ofaction turns Another problem myinterpretation in order to to particular After outtobe peculiar all, justice. getexactly I must than I deserve, whatI deserve whatI deserve ormore getexactly which or morethanI deserve Thus,every ofsomething. typeofaction also exhibits or or some other exhibits courage liberality justice particular And similarly, of action which exhibits first ordervirtue. everytype or meanness or someother also exhibits cowardice injustice particular in exhibits both fast battle first ordervice. So standing courageand and particular bothmeanness theft exhibits injustice; justice; particular violatesAristotle's and so on. Does thismeanthatmyinterpretation disjoint spheres requirement? can exhibit No. A singleaction(behavior-under-a-description) only different actions of ofdisjoint butthedoctrine onevice, permits spheres vices if the to exhibit different a certain thefts) type(e.g.,different of theactionsdiffer. and theobjects motives Although everytypeof is also a courageous to particular actioncorresponding typeof justice individual is simultaneno action of action ora liberal action, etc., type andcourage orbyparticular motivated injustice by justice ously particular A particular theft and illiberality. by an excessive maybe motivated morethanthe or a desireforthepleasureofgetting desirefor money but notboth.13 thief deserves, by typesof object Spheresare defined is nota ofparticular thesphere than ofaction. rather Thus, justice types the desire motivated it action but rather is of certain action, by any type Andthat is gain. a certain for object object.
ofmixed motives. theproblem 13 I,likeAristotle, ignore
thatmostof thepeople considered It might be objected unjust by sensearenotpleonectic. common Theydo nothavetheviceofparticular it is it.Ifthey desireanything, as I have sketched excessively injustice in order to than steal rather acquire money, gain.They goods particular Butstealing toenrich do notdeserve. togetsomething notinorder they toAristotle, as ofparticular is notan instance oneself injustice according with common Aristotle him.I seemto be making I interpret disagree So goestheobjection. viceofinjustice. senseaboutwhich peoplehavethe uncharitable? ofAristotle Is myinterpretation sensedo excessively Mostofthe unjust bycommon peopleconsidered But a for than this is not desire good reason rejecting gain. goodsrather Aristotle narrows the account. ofAristotle's typically myinterpretation with toequatea virtue its becausehe tends toomuch ofvirtues spheres claimthatcouragemay be Aristotle's paradigmcases. For example, battles forces Aristotle totheimplaudisplayed onlyin life-threatening inother and feelings' situations doesnot 'brave behavior sibleviewthat account ofjustice makesAristotle's as courage. count Myinterpretation Theyhave parallel parallelto his accountof couragein thisrespect. flaws. as I interpret excessive desire to Aristotle him, Moreover, according butitis general for injustice, injustice. goodsis notparticular particular ofgeneral oneself is an instance to enrich (and illiberinjustice Stealing So on Arisnot of injustice. myinterpretation though particular ality), totlecan accommodatethe commonsense view thatpeople who desire people.He wouldmerely excessively particular goodsareunjust than that rather insist their viceis general particular injustice. thefollowing ofparticular injustice generates paraMyinterpretation subset ofgeneral andthesphere dox.Particular is a proper justice justice, withrespect to others. So gain ofgeneral is thegoodsoffortune justice must be understood as oneofthegoodsoffortune. Thevirtuous person whatcounts Thatis,items is thestandard for as a good offortune. are if if and are for virtuous But only they goods good people. gain is it So is not for virtuous would not intrinsically unjust. good people.They a So cannot be one of the of fortune. enjoy making gain. gain goods to this Thesolution is that thesphere ofparticular is problem justice than mere The of includes actually larger gain. sphere particular justice a desirefor loss and for a justshare, willshow. too,as thenextsection And a justshareis one ofthegoods offortune. So justpeopledesirea whileunjust justshare gainand loss. peopledesire
218 HowardJ.Curzer
and theMean Justice andinjustice todescribing thecharacter traits ofjustice As a preliminary I shallsketch five ofanAristotelian account ofa virtue. general principles virtue As we havealready order has itsown sphere seen,(1) eachfirst thespheresof all other first ordervirtues. completely separatefrom in familiar Aristotle states another the general principle following passage.
and in bothcases bothtoomuchand toolittle, [Passions] maybe felt with at theright reference totheright notwell;buttofeel them times, towards theright aim,and in theright objects, people,withtheright andbest, and this is characteristic of intermediate way,is whatis both with and toactions also there is excess, defect virtue. Similarly regard theintermediate. (EN1106b20-4)
for several is a disposition Thus, (2) eachvirtue getting parameters right. virtue tovirtue, butin eachcase differ somewhat from Theparameters Thatis, (3) people can go wrongwith theycan varyindependently. to the without to some goingwrongwithrespect respect parameter concerned with the virtue others. For example, anger, good temper, facets of anger:(a) frequency, involvesthe following (b) objects, (c) with and (e) duration. (d) amount, Peoplewhogo wrong respect people, toparameters (d),butnot(e) arecalledhot-tempered; (a) through people with toparameters whogo wrong (c),butnot(d) and (a) through respect withrespect toparameter (e) arecalledcholeric; peoplewho go wrong (e) are called sulky;and so on (EN 1125b26(e), but not (b) through ofthemeanin bothpartsofthedoctrine Aristotle 1126a27). expresses thefollowing passage.
that which twovices, is a meanbetween [Virtue] depends uponexcess it a becausethe and is mean on and that which depends defect; again inboth fallshort oforexceedwhatis right vicesrespectively passions is intermeandchooses that which finds while virtue both andactions, diate.(EN 1107a2-6)
for eachparameter Thesecondsentence (4) theright quantity saysthat For are twowaysto go wrong. there eachparameter is a mean,so for onecan getangry offrequency, totheparameter with respect example, with or just often too often, often, enough.Similarly, insufficiently
toolong,insufficiently to duration, one can stayangry long,or respect that to excess with first sentence states The (5) going justlongenough.14 with is one deficient to to vice;being respect respect anyparameter(s) These five constitute the vice. is theopposite principles anyparameter(s) virtue. architectonic. coreofAristotle's Theyapplytoevery Aristotle's account ofgeneral into There isnoproblem justice bringing in withhis doctrine ofthemean.The vice ofexcessconsists harmony with to one or more of to excess parameters general justice: respect going on too many of certain too largea quantity goods,desiring desiring theviceofdefect etc.Similarly, consists toostrongly, occasions, desiring the in beingdeficient withrespect to theseparameters. Finally, virtue with in desires to these Since medial consists having respect parameters. order virtues ofthose ofthefirst consists aspects pertainjustice general to others, ofthegoods offortune general justice ingto thedistribution order virtues. thedoctrine ofthemeanno worsethanthefirst fits (See 2.) diagram account ofparticular into Inorder tobring Aristotle's justice harmony I shalltake virtue is a mean of several with thethesis that (4) parameters, to theobject to meangoingto excesswithrespect parameter pleonexia of more someorall oftheother andperhaps parameters justice: desiring more than one'sshare on toomany than one'sshare, occasions, desiring toostrongly, etc.15 Aristotle more than one'sshare saysnothing desiring buthedoescontrast viceopposedtopleonexia,16 abouta second gainwith term.Here it does not mean losing Loss is a technical loss (zmia). lessthan has.Instead lossmeansacquiring one's onealready something In order to reconcile Aristotle's account ofparshare(EN 1132bll-20).
14 Hursthouse theidea thatthedoctrine of themeaninvolves attacks (R. quantity 'A FalseDoctrine the Aristotelian ofthe 81 Mean',Proceedings Hursthouse, of Society, I rebut in'A Defense ofAristotle's Doctrine ofthe her Mean', [1980-1981]). objections
in Ancient Philosophy. forthcoming
inthediagram theparameters ofjustice. Theparameters 15 Aristotle doesnotspecify for illustration Notethat theparameters on thenext arenot only. page arechosen involves anerror with completely independent. Injustice always gainorloss, respect totheobject parameter. manis unequalandtheunjust 16 Aristotle doessay,'since theunjust actunequal, itis clearthat is also an intermediate for theunequal'(EN 1131alO-ll). there Thismay that the character trait ofjustice as wellas the between justactisintermediate imply twoextremes.
220 Howard]. Curzer
DiagramI
that withtherequirement is bracketed ticular (5) eachvirtue justice by a two vices,I shallsupposethatpleonexia's vice is meionexia, opposite is desiring certain not but desireforloss. Meionexia qua good, goods meionexia rather one'sshare. Moreprecisely, is a deficiency qualessthan andperhaps someorall oftheother with totheobject parameter respect Meionexia meansdesiring less thanone's share, ofjustice. parameters less than less thanone's shareon too fewoccasions, desiring desiring desirefor etc.It is a sortofmasochistic one's sharetoo weakly, being cheated. (See diagram 3.) meionectic Does Aristotle mention discussing greatness people?While thatsome undulyhumble Aristotle mentions of soul (megalopsychia), but confused aboutwhatthey aremerely deserve, people(micropsychoi) what know call falsely modest. others are whatwe might they They less thanthey deserve(EN to themselves but they distribute deserve, to ofdoublethink 1125a25-7). parallel they engagein patterns Perhaps what himself of who 'robs The modest person pleonectic falsely people. meionexia is meionectic. he deserves' Moreover, (EN 1125al9-20) actually or with self-destructive a real facetof the world.People represents often desire and peoplewho lackself-respect tendencies self-sacrificial
Aristotle's Account ofJustice221 oftheVirtue
Diagram3
meionectic. So less thantheydeservebecauseit is less. Theyare often are meionectic theview thatthere to Aristotle people is not attributing SinceAristotle butrather enhances hisaccount. uncharitable, saysnotha in EN V, myintroduction ofmeionexia is, ofcourse, ingofmeionexia is a plausibleconcept to thetext. However,meionexia majoraddition and whichfleshes out Aristotle's whichAristotle developselsewhere inaccordance with hisownarchitectonic, thedoctrine account ofjustice ofthemean. I presume that As for thevirtue ofparticular justice, particular justice and meionexia. is notmerely thelackofpleonexia Peoplewiththevirtue moreor less than do notsimply lackthedesirefor ofparticular justice a content. whatthey Particular has like deserve. Justice, justice positive an an as well as internal have a has external Just goal.17 people courage,
17 D. Pears, onAristotle's Ethics as a Mean',inA. Rorty, ed.,Essays 'Courage (Berkeley: ofCalifornia Press, 1980). University
222 HowardJ.Curzer
whatgood is Thatis, no matter whattheydeserve. desireforexactly seektheir be treated that desire distributed, They they justly. they being in whether their a satisfaction feel certain fair share. due, getting They desire thegoodthey ornotthey get. Texts Troublesome of the mean I accountfitthe doctrine In orderto make Aristotle's the desire for with to a introduced meionexia, gain,so deficiency respect an a as well as excess. to defect would be that opposed justice particular introduction of rules out the that Aristotle Urmsonsays,however, have a that to which to meionexia because, right you 'being willing forgo orevenmagnificence/18 tobe a signofliberality is thought byAristotle with than ofa viceassociated rather ofa virtue, Itis evidence particular justice. andmagnificence. aboutliberality with Urmson HereI must disagree man ofa liberal characteristic 'itis highly Aristotle saysthat Although for himself so that he leavestoolittle also togo toexcessingiving, (EN mode is theerror Aristotle mustmeanthatexcessive 1120b4-6), giving thanthat excessive rather tends theliberal which toward giving person maintain that liberal Aristotle cannot ofliberality.19 is evidence people without contradictwhatthey deserve orforgo actually giveexcessively of a vice,not is evidence action mean. Excessive of the the doctrine ing the claimthatliberalpeople give excessively of a virtue. Moreover, betweenthe liberaland the prodigal would collapsethe distinction in II 7 ofmagnificence sketch Aristotle's As for magnificence, person. on not is is liberality (EN 1107bl7-19) misleading. simply Magnificence or not involve does that a largescale.Aristotle giving magnificence says 'involve which to actions but extends at to all, only 'willingness forgo' (EN 1122a21). expenditure' is of meionexia thattheintroduction maintain Hardieand Urmson to treat oneself 'it not that is claim with Aristotle's possible incompatible
77.See also, Oxford Ethics Aristotle's 18 J.O. Press, 1988), Urmson, (Oxford: University Oxford Ethical Aristotle's W.F.R.Hardie, Press, 1968), (Oxford: University Theory 184. liberal So although than common is more 19 Meanness (EN 1122al5-16). prodigality meanness. tend toward toward peopleingeneral prodigality, peopletend
ifmeionexia with conflicts theclaim (EN 1138al4-15).20 Actually, unjustly' then does that treat oneself so for are onecannot pleonexia, both unjustly, an share. Aristotle not think to desire does However, unjust dispositions for theclaimthat that there is a conflict. Aristotle's onecannot argument It what like this. seems 'to do is unjust is treat oneself that, goes unjustly becauseacting notthesameas to actunjustly' (EN 1136a27-8) unjustly 'itis impossible meansvoluntarily tobe Moreover, doingwhatis unjust. iftheother That treated doesnotactunjustly' (EN 1136a29-30). unjustly whatis unjust at the hands treated meanssuffering is,beingunjustly of whois acting Butthesedefinitions someone are incomplete. We unjustly. must add 'contrary tothewishoftheperson actedon' (EN 1136b3-5) to of actingunjustly. treated the definition means Thus,beingunjustly whatis unjustat thehandsof someonewho is suffering unwillingly what is unjust. 'a manmaybe voluntarily Therefore, voluntarily doing whatis unjust, butno one is voluntarily harmed and voluntarily suffer to be treated for no one wishes treated' (EN 1136b5-6). unjustly unjustly; and patient. oneself is tobe bothagent One must To treat both unjustly Butacting and be unjustly treated. involves actunjustly unjustly acting and being treated If involvesbeing unwilling. voluntarily, unjustly unjustly, they'could be voluntarily people could treatthemselves butwe haveseenthat that treated is impossi(EN 1138a23-4), unjustly' totreat oneself ble.So 'itis notpossible (EN 1138al5). unjustly' 'no onewishestobe unjustly WhenAristotle he is treated,' saysthat, a than a claim. rather He is not that making logical psychological claiming noonewishes tohavean unjust share. heis claiming that no one Instead, tohisorherwish.Ingeneral, wishes tohavewhatis contrary Aristotle is it that is to treat oneself because the arguing impossible unjustly concept oftreating oneself involves togetand unjustly simultaneously wishing itisimpossible nottogetsomething. So although totreat oneself unjustly, itisperfectly todistribute an unjust share tooneself possible voluntarily. And meionexia is simply a disposition to do this.The introduction of meionexia is compatible withtheclaimthat one cannot treat oneself unbecause meionexia is a disposition to be a willing victim. It is a justly
20 Hardie, 78.Joachim to theintroduction ofmeionexia because 184;Urmson, objects 'thevicecontrasted with[justice] is one, and unites initself both toomuch and too - The little' Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Oxford (H.H.Joachim, [Oxford: University itisquite for Aristotle tousethe term Press, However, 1951], 152). possible 'injustice' all vicesassociated tocover with thevirtue ofjustice.
224 HowardJ.Curzer
butnota disposition totreat oneself anunjust toaccept share, disposition that a Voluntaraffirms Aristotle Indeed, person may explicitly unjustly. ofa possibly evengivesan example whatis unjust.' Aristotle ilysuffer of gold to Diomedein WhenGlaucustradedarmor meionectic action. sufGlaucuswas voluntarily bronze for much armor, cheaper exchange than he less he he received what was deserved), (i.e., though unjust fering If Glaucus was motihimself was nottreating (EN 1136b9-ll). unjustly vatedby a desireto getless thanhis due, thenGlaucus'sactionwas actuoneself discussion oftreating meionectic. Thus,Aristotle's unjustly ofmeionexia. for theintroduction support allyprovides hisaccount ofreconciling addresses theproblem Aristotle explicitly he of the mean when with the doctrine ofparticular says 'just justice and being unjustly betweenactingunjustly actionis intermediate a person who for Butthis seemstobe a blunder, treated' (EN 1133b30-l). at all,letaloneacting be said tobe acting can hardly treated is unjustly Thatis, theperson himself as Aristotle says (EN 1136b26-9). unjustly, the not the victim.21 is the victimizer, who acts unjustly Moreover, excesbe intermediate between that virtue ofthemeanrequires doctrine actionsand/or passions;not betweenactingand sive and defective is a kind SinceAristotle 'Justice goes on to say that, being-acted-upon. virtues' butnotin thesameway as theother ofmean, (EN 1133b32-3), himto be thisblunder from to save Aristotle one might by taking try are are means because virtues the other whereas that, they maintaining aim at the acts a because is mean bracketed vices, producjust justice by distributions.22 tionofintermediate noran unAristotelian a blunder neither I shallattribute to Aristotle A bit action. as a ofunjust treated' viewbyreading type 'beingunjustly little have too act to He says:'Inthe doesjustthat. onAristotle later unjust 1134al2is to act too much to have is tobe unjustly treated; (EN unjustly' treated' as 'acting tobe glossing seems 13).HereAristotle 'being unjustly to be doing seems one endsup withtoo little'. in sucha way that (He of as the 'loss' defines when he similar contrary gain,i.e., something than rather more oftheevilandlessofthegood[EN1132al6-17], getting be an action. must treated unjustly something good.)Being losing actually victimized involve also somehow Itmust voluntarily bysomeone being
75 21 Urmson, 241 22 Hardie, 201;Young,
iftheother treated 'itisimpossible tobe unjustly because, unjustly acting 1 treated actunjustly' doesnot (EN 136a29-30). Technically, being unjustly as we saw no one is action be a voluntary cannot because, above, unjust if it But it is not a action then cannot treated voluntary unjustly. voluntarily Aristotle isspeaking a vice(EN 1135al5).So wemust exhibit supposethat aroundto defining here.He has notgotten a bitloosely 'beingunjustly He has notyetadded 'contrary tothewishofthe treated' precisely, yet. I supposethat ofacting actedon' tothedefinition Thus, unjustly. person what at treated' here means voluntarily suffering isunjust unjustly 'being In other thehandsofsomeone words, acting unjustly. 'being voluntarily tobe cheated. Forexample, here means oneself treated' allowing unjustly andGlaucus desire more andlessthan that Diomede respectively suppose that it make sense to both Glaucus is say theydeserve.Then would theunjust treatment is a voluntary treated byDiomedeandthat unjustly With tothis sort ofcase Aristotle's action on thepartofGlaucus. respect is intermediate between remark that, acting unjustly (accept'justaction likeDiomede)and beingunjustly treated too (accepting ingtoomuch, sense. likeGlaucus)'makes little, that an entirely is is notfoolishly So Aristotle saying passiveperson that Andheisnotsaying isa meanonly because as anagent. justice acting that aimatintermediate distributions. Aristotle is saying just justactions andmeionectic between actions. actions areintermediate pleonectic and Vices Actions, Virtues, thevirtue ofparticular and the Whatis therelationship between justice to this virtue Since Arisactions (particularly justactions)! corresponding a principle accusedoffailing toprovide totle is sometimes the specifying to a rule for the commentators act, virtues, right (orthos logos) right way maintain that sometimes Aristotle defines actions as actions which right and wrong issuefrom virtues actions as actions which issuefrom vices. For example,on the basis of the following Williams takes passage, Aristotle tobe defining actions as whatever actions particularly unjust thecharacter trait ofparticular issuefrom injustice.23
inA.Rorty, 23 B.Williams, as a Virtue', onAristotle's Ethics ed.,Essays 'Justice (Berkeley: ofCalifornia D. O'Connor, 'Aristotelian as a Press, 193-4; 1980), Justice University inP. French, T. Uehling, Personal andH. Wettstein, in Studies Virtue', eds.,Midwest vol.13(Notre Dame:University ofNotre DamePress, 420 1988), Philosophy
226 HowardJ.Curzer Ifonemancommits for thesakeofgainandmakes adultery money by does so at thebiddingof appetite he loses it,whileanother though and is penalized for wouldbe heldtobe self-indulit,thelatter money than butnotself-indulrather while the former is unjust, gent grasping he is reason of his therefore, unjust gent; evidently, by making gainby hisact.(EN 1130a24-8).24
a point aboutevaluation ofcharacter, this However, passageis making thanclassification of action.Aristotle's is that rather point adultery trait motivated for ofthe character ofparticular bydesire gainisevidence but adultery motivated is not. Aristotle is not injustice, by appetite a the claim that is adultery particularly unjust advancing implausible trait and from thecharacter ofparticular action whenitflows injustice does not otherwise not.As Aristotle unjustly necessarily says,'acting actions are (EN 1134al7).Thus,particularly unjust beingunjust' imply trait ofparticular notsimply whatever actions issuefrom thecharacter of thispassage is contraIndeed,Williams's interpretation injustice. next sentence. dicted Aristotle's by
to someparticular actsare ascribed unjust invariably Againall other thedesertion kindofwickedness, to ofa e.g.,adultery self-indulgence, if inbattle but a man tocowardice, violence to comrade anger; physical ofwickedness butinjustice. hisaction isascribed tonoform makes gain, 1130a28-32) (EN Here Aristotlesays that adulteryis invariablyascribed to self-indulgence, desertionof a comrade in battleto cowardice,etc.,even though (as the previous sentenceindicates) these actions are sometimesmotisuch as injustice. vated by othertraits
24 If thispassage contrasteda person who commitsadulteryforthe sake of money with a person who is motivatedby lust,thenthe passage mightbe incompatible is a desireformoreor less thanone deserves. withmythesisthatparticular injustice Luckily,the passage does not mentiona person who commitsadulterysimplyfor a personwho commitsadulteryforthesake thesake ofmoney.Instead,itmentions of gain (which,as I argued above, must mean undeserved goods), the gain in this of money.Thus, thispassage does not threaten case being in theform my thesis.
Does Aristotle define actions as actions which right (wrong) typically issuefrom virtues Atleast (vices)?Thisis a moreplausible suggestion. itis true that an if action that action courageous peopletypically perform is courageous. for the other virtues. On a this view, particularly Similarly wouldbe defined as whatever justaction particularly justpeopletypidoes notproceedin thisway withthevirtue of callydo. ButAristotle particular justice. Whether or notAristotle failsto providetheright rulefor theother in EN V 3-5Aristotle does sketch theright ruleforparticular virtues, therulesays:Whendistributing justice. Roughly speaking, goods,treat and to equals equally unequalsproportionately unequallyaccording and whenrectifying, aim forequality sure that the merit, by making restores ofequal value to theloser.Thisruledefines gainer something actions. Thus,at theendofEN V 5 Aristotle particularly justand unjust in is that virtue of which thejustmanis said tobe a doer, says:'Justice ... in by choice,of thatwhichis just,and one who will distribute with accordance ... Injustice issimilarly related tothe proportion. unjust' with'distributing in accord(EN 1134al-7). Byidentifying 'justactions' ancewith that Aristotle confirms actions are proportion' particularly just actions whichdistribute and rectify in accordwiththeright rule.They topeopleexactly whatthey deserve. assign Similarly, particularly unjust actions to more or thanthey less deserve. assign people Thispassageraises another however. Itseemstobe suggestproblem, that is character trait which ing particular justice any typically produces and particular is anycharacter trait particularly just actions, injustice which actions. (SeealsoEN 1129a6typically produces particularly unjust Aristotle doesnot define virtues as dispositions toperform 10.)But clearly, actions. Aristotle defends the of right possibility becoming justbydoing thefollowing familiar remark. arecalledjust 'Actions, then, justactswith andtemperate when aresuchas the manwould they justorthe temperate that isjustandtemperate, butthe do;butitisnotthemanwhodoesthese manwhoalsodoesthem as justandtemperate mendo them' 1105b5(EN sentence that 9). Thefirst implies justpeopletypically particularly perform an action ifthat action is particularly Thisis no surprise since just.25 what anaction makes itaccords with the rule, justisthat particularly right andparticular inaccordance involves with the rule. But justice acting right
25 Actions arejustorunjust with tospecific situations. only respect
228 Howard]. Curzer
deniesthatif an actionis particularly thesecondsentence just,then who that are the ones typically perform only justpeople particularly trait which is not the character action. Particular typically justice only Non-virtuous people(e.g.,continent justactions. produces particularly canreliably a morbid fear ofpunishment) perform peopleorpeoplewith traits ofpseudoAristotle's of virtuous actions. Moreover, description the that inENIII 8 shows that Aristotle believes peoplewhotypically courage have virtue ofcourage. actions do not necessarily the perform courageous that who also believes Aristotle people typically perform Presumably, havethevirtue ofparticular do notnecessarily justactions particularly to as thedisposition doesnotdefine So Aristotle particular justice justice. Aristotle does not define actions. (Similarly, just particularly perform actoperform as thedisposition unjust particularly particular injustice trait which is not the character tionsbecauseparticular only injustice interThus,a charitable actions.) unjust particularly typically produces EN V must at the end of 5 remark ofAristotle's (EN 1134al-7) pretation whatever trait is character not that take Aristotle tomean justice 'particular that butrather 'particular justice justactions', typically yields particularly trait whichtypically character is a particular justacyieldsparticularly trait character is a particular tions'.And similarly injustice 'particular Aristotle has actions'. Ofcourse, which unjust particularly typically yields in EN V 2 as trait ofparticular thecharacter injustice already specified a desire for gain. pleonexia, to particular does notreduceparticularly Thus,Aristotle justaction define That doesnotsimply orviceversa. is,Aristotle particularly justice from or issue which issue be the actions actions to particular typically just to be the characdefine and he does not justice particular simply justice, action. trait which ter just particularly typically produces Objections andrebut someobjections In theremainder ofthepaperI shallconsider common sense accountofjustice. to Aristotle's First, justice says that its ownsake.Just distribution for to a positive commitmentjust includes and maintain to create (and to prevent justdistributions peoplestrive are just distributions these because and rectify unjustdistributions) their for actions disinterested A justperson should just perform (unjust). even to be seem indifferent to ownsake.Peoplewho are unjust, justice forgoods or gain.ButArisdesires ifthey do nothave inappropriate and particular totle'saccountof general justicefailsto accommodate
for a fair sensebeliefs. Thedesire toobtain oneself either these common amount ofgoodsdoes nothinder shareortheappropriate peoplefrom or indifferent to the deserts of others motivate peopletoperform being for their own sake. acts just itignores A related account is that situations where gap inAristotle's is not a distributor. Aristotle seems to have overlooked the common one forjust distributions sense view thatjust people's concern does not constrain themfrom unjustactionsand motivate merely performing It also leads justpeople to have certain themto perform justactions. Evenas mereobservers aboutthegainsand lossesofothers. of feelings in and a distribution are done, justice process, justpeopledelight seeing at thesight ofinjustice. repulsed and general and injusonAristotle's account, Third, particular justice in which toactions theagentis botha distributor and a ticearelimited of of fortune. For when are only agents potential recipient goods recipifor entsdo their desires someactions However, goodsor gainsmatter. but not a recipient also seem to be wheretheagentis a distributor, I matters ofjustice. Forexample, distribute cakefairly suppose birthday a of children. to common this is a just sense, among group According butitcannot be motivated or evengeneral action, by particular justice Itcannot as Aristotle hasdefined them. be motivated toobtain bya desire for either a fair share orcakeinappropriate Thissort of quantity. myself action tobe a counter-example toAristotle's claimthat seems, therefore, an action that is justifand onlyifjustpeopletypically action perform from a distributes justice.Similarly, suppose judge unfairly punishan unjust ments Thisis clearly but action, amonga groupofprisoners. it does notseemto be motivated or as by particular general injustice them. Itdoes notseemtobe motivated a Aristotle has defined desire by toobtain for oneself. anything Aristotle tothis lastobjection that theright rule might reply bynoting that distributors should others their fair share whether or not says give the distributors are also recipients. So Aristotle does not ignorethis Butthis intuition. relocates the Thefact that Aristotle reply only problem. doesnotreduce action to or vice versa just particularly particular justice raisesthepossibility that will thesedefinitions notmesh.And indeed, there seems tobe a mismatch between theactions which accord with and violate theright on theonehand,and theactions which flowfrom rule, andinjustice, ontheother hand.Theright rulesaysthat particular justice actions wheretheagentis a distributor, butnota recipient arematters ofjustice, butAristotle's ofthecharacter ofparticular traits description and injustice does not. justice
230 Howard]. Curzer
Aristotle thejudgewhounfairly distributes is saysthat punishments to obtain for himself or herself. The is at trying something judge 'aiming an excessive shareeither ofgratitude or ofrevenge' (EN 1136b34-7al). In general, or Aristotle's is thatintentional gratitude revenge suggestion istypically motivated an excessive or maldistribution defective desire by forsomegood,though notnecessarily forthegood beingdistributed. Disinterested maldistribution is nottypical.26 Is Aristotle's or a reply tothemismatch gratitude revenge suggestion If an Aristotle's is to show that maldisobjection?27 suggestion attempt it tribution is typically motivated then is unnecbyparticular injustice, and The between essary. relationship particular injustice particularly between unjustactionsis only partially parallelto the relationship If and actions. justice particularly just particularly unjust particular anaction, then that action isparticularly unjust. peopletypically perform inmany since'itis possible tofail However, ways... whiletosucceedis in Aristotle is notcommitted to one possible only way' (EN 1106b28-31), if that an action is then that action theview (rather particularly unjust, thansome other action)is typically performed by particularly unjust a variety of different unjust people mayperform people.Particularly
or revengesuggestion'mereverbaljuggling'and 26 Urmsoncalls Aristotle's gratitude as well treat thecoward as unjustsincehe aims at an unfair observesthat, 'we might share of safety; we mightin thisway be able to reduce all defectsof characterto thatifAristotle takesparticular injusticeto be greed' (Urmson,77). Urmsonis right or revenge),thenparticular excessivedesireforsome goods (e.g.,gratitude injustice will overlap or even absorb the othervirtues.This would make it unnecessaryto vices to explain various vicious actions since these postulate various different actions could be explained solely by particularinjustice.But as we have seen, Aristotle does not take particular injusticeto be excessivedesire forsome goods. Young maintainsthat Aristotle'sgratitudeor revenge suggestionclashes with himself seems to takeit Aristotle something says elsewhere.Young says, 'Aristotle that privatejustice [appropriatedesire forgoods] need not entail public justice [assigning people what they deserve]' (Young, 244). As evidence, Young cites but own affairs, Aristotle's observation that, 'many men can exercisevirtuein their not in theirrelationsto others.That is why - "rule will show the man"' (EN between 1129b33-30a2).In this passage, however, Aristotleis not distinguishing and virtue. this but rather between and Thus, justice general private publicjustice, is not saying thatmany people passage does not supportYoung's claim. Aristotle withoutexcessivelyor insufficiently maldistribute desiringsome good. typically 27 Commentatorswho take Aristotle'ssuggestion to be a reply to the mismatch objectioninclude Hardie, 188; Urmson,77; Young, 239.
Account Aristotle's oftheVirtue ofJustice231
tothe Aristotle isnotcommitted inthesamesituation. actions Moreover, that then action is ifan action is particularly viewthat unjust, typically thanby other sorts of unjust people (rather by particularly performed with a number of be same action The bypeople may performed people). traits. character different is an or revenge even ifAristotle's Moreover, suggestion gratitude could be motivated that maldistribution to show possibly by attempt Even if an act of is insufficient. the suggestion injustice, particular or is motivated maldistribution by an excessivedesireforgratitude that that action of maldistribution is would show this only revenge, that that action of It would not show or motivated byvanity irascibility. maldistribution is motivated Thus,Aristotle's injustice. by particular the between does not resolve mismatch orrevenge suggestion gratitude which flow from theright ruleandactions which violate actions particuAristotle wouldhavetoshowthat themismatch larinjustice. To resolve could thana desireforthegoods of fortune a desireforgain rather Butalthough thejudge'smaldistribution. motivate peoplestealinorder thanmoremoney), deserve togetmorethanthey (rather peopledo not thanmore in order deserve to getmorethanthey maldistribute (rather orrevenge). gratitude asserts is or revenge WhatAristotle's actually suggestion gratitude an inapmotivated is typically that maldistribution bygeneral injustice, is nota Aristotle's for thegoodsoffortune. desire suggestion propriate it above. be read mentioned to of the Instead, might objections reply any ofthevirtue ofjustice. Footmaintains as a reply to Foot'srivalaccount that virtues at which at a point there is some eachonestanding arecorrective, or of motivation to be made ... to be resisted deficiency good. temptation Ifpeople of others as about their cared about the care own rights they of would beneeded tolook after the matter.28 novirtue justice rights andtherefore aboutthe viceofinjustice about FootandAristotle disagree Footbelieves that actions are thevirtue ofjustice. caused unjust typically
and Vices',in her Virtues and Vices(Berkeley: 28 P. Foot,'Virtues of University California is criticized fornotholding thisaccount Press,1978),9. Aristotle by and praised Williams for notholding this account (Williams, 197-8) byO'Connor [1988], (O'Connor 417-27).
232 HowardJ.Curzer
tobe a corrective ofothers. Foottakes totherights justice byindifference a takes to be corrective to the as she to thisindifference, courage just a to the to and to be corrective to flee temptation temperance temptation a for the of others. on is concern Aristotle, Thus, rights justice overindulge. are typically causedby an actions theother hand,believesthat unjust Evenin cases wherethe thegoods offortune. desirefor inappropriate maintains that the to be Aristotle distributor seems disinterested, unjust an because of excessive desire for distributor distributes gratiunfairly takes(general) orsomeother tudeorrevenge therefore, good.Aristotle, for these desire tobe an appropriate goods. justice true? or revenge Is Aristotle's suggestion Youngdescribes gratitude orrevenge as suggesting, aboutgratitude Aristotle's remark 'implausithan more must that deserve] people they injustice [assigning bly, public But thereis desireforgoods].'29 reston privateinjustice [excessive that aboutthesuggestion peoplewhomaldistribute nothing implausible that out do so because they they getsomething ofit,something typically maldistribute because arelazy, sometimes notwant. should they People or frivolous.30 However,such people are not indifferent, inattentive, Lazior revenge Aristotle's to suggestion. gratitude counter-examples desire for free time. 'The a kind of excessive is for ness, example, lazy burden.'31 after all, wantsless thanhis shareof a particular person, andfrivolity. be madefor Parallel indifference, inattention, points might Footwouldhavetoshowthat torebut Aristotle's Moreover, suggestion, motivated maldistribution is typically (notmerely bycharoccasionally) Foot thanexcessive desireforthegoods of fortune. other actertraits becausethe actions areperformed most wouldhavetoshowthat unjust thanbecausetheagents rather agentsdo notcaremuchaboutjustice, An But of it. thisis implausible. will out think that they getsomething is notoneoftheprinciofothers tothedeserts commitment insufficient is Indeed,we assume thatmaldistribution ple causes of injustice.32
244 29 Young, 243 30 Williams, 197;Young, Southern A Reply toCharles inAristotle: and Pleonexia 31 D. Keyt, Young', 'Injustice
27 supp (1989),255 Journal ofPhilosophy,
oftheir from isvery different ofothers deserts tothe 32 Indifference deserts, ignorance butconfused their that others to committed ofcourse. due, get ensuring People acts. whatothers about deserve, unjust many perform
even if the motivated by excessivedesireforthe goods of fortune 'I what to us. wonder mechanism is opaque theyare psychological maldistribute for no we of who out of it/ say people apparent getting a concern fortherights of others, a to justice, reason.A commitment in and distributions be revolted to by unjust tendency delight just a personwiththevice ofgeneral distributions injustice might prevent Butthelackofthiscommitment tojustice is not from maldistributing. ofmaldistribution. themainmotivation Nemesis PoeticJustice: his treatment of the disinterested Aristotle's replyto the objections, it is foundin his is not foundin EN V. Instead, concern forjustice, I explainAristotle's trait ofnemesis.33 After ofthecharacter description I shallarguethat nemesis ofnemesis fills these account gapsinAristotle's toa single ofjustice. So whatcommon senseattributes virtue of account and Aristotle divides justice, justice, justice, amonggeneral particular
nemesis.
inEN II 7,butnotlater Nemesis trait34 mentioned is theonlycharacter in detail.Thus,the description in theNicomachean of nemesis treated in EN II 7. In sketching Ethics ofonesketchy, sentence consists garbled35 I shall, an account ofnemesis therefore, rely primarily upontheEudemian In theEudemian Ethics Ethics and theRhetoric. Aristotle describes nemesis inthefollowing and itsassociated extremes ways.
at deserved is pain felt whilethefeeling ofthe [E]nvy good fortune, manwho rejoices at misfortunes has itself no name,butsucha man ill fortune. showshis nature overundeserved Between by rejoicing
is usually 33 Nemesis translated as proper orrighteous butI think that this indignation, itsuggests is a misleading translation for that is a type ofanger rather (a) nemesis thana typeofpleasure and that is a response to undeserved fortune (b) nemesis than a response rather toallfortune. I shallsimply transliterate the Greek Therefore, term. nemesis 34 Likeshame, is nota virtue (EE 1234a24-32). 35 See J.O.Urmson, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of theMean',in A. Rorty, on ed., Essays Aristotle's Ethics ofCalifornia 167andMaclntyre, Press, 1980), (Berkeley: University 66 for with this problems description.
234 Howard]. Curzer thenamegiven to tonemesis, them is themaninclined bytheancients ifundeserved, or tojoy felt at at either good orbad fortune pain felt A manis envious whenhefeels ifdeserved. them (EE 1233bl9-25) pain than more often heought, for eventhose who atthesight ofprosperity cause whenprosperous deserveprosperity pain to theenvious;the innotgrieving evenattheprosper... showsexcess character opposite of the (EE 1221a33-b3) undeserving. ity
nemesis trait has is a character whosesphere this As I interpret account, and bad That fortune. two main components: is, the good fortune The and generaljusticecoincide(EN 1129b2-3). spheresof nemesis and is painedby undeserved good and bad fortune personofnemesis to these Corresponding good and bad fortune.36 pleasedby deserved are fourbasic failure modes whichare of nemesis fourcomponents as the describesenvy (pthonos) excesses and defects. (1) Aristotle but at undeserved to be painednotmerely good fortune, disposition In order ofnemesis into tobring theaccount at all good fortune. rather ofthemean,I shalltaketheliberty withAristotle's doctrine harmony I shalldescribe ofenvysomewhat. thisdescription ofbroadening envy to pain at the good to be excessivewithrespect as the disposition but is painednotonlytoooften, The enviousperson ofothers. fortune undeserved also tooseverely fortune), (evenfor stayspainedfor good atEE 1221a33-b3, toa nameless is opposed, etc.(2) Envy toolonga time, to be (or pleased)at good insufficiently pained excessively disposition trait too is painedtoo seldom, The personwiththisnameless fortune. EE At 1233bl9-25 a etc. for too short time, (3) envy stays pained mildly, bad to be pleased at undeserved withthe disposition is contrasted
Aristotle tendtocluster tofeel these 36 Thefour says, together. feelings dispositions distress ofothers, 'ifyou are painedby theunmerited for you willbe example, Somemerited distress' or at leastnotpained, 1386b26-7). (Rhet by their pleased, the trait of tomean nemesis more term Aristotle usesthe times being pained narrowly ofbeing or thetrait Rhet at undeserved 1386b9-12) (EN 1108bl-6, good fortune 'On See J.Coker, (MM 1192bl7-29). good and bad fortune painedat undeserved nemesis. See usesoftheterm different ofAristotle's detailed analysis excruciatingly Nemesis in theNiand Righteous Reflection 'Ethical also R. Burger, Indignation:
17 (1992) 61-91,foran Research as a Mean', Journal ofPhilosophical BeingNemesetikos
Greek in J.Antonand A. Preus,eds., Essaysin Ancient comachean Ethics', Philosophy
M. ofNew York State Ethics IV:Aristotle's Press, 1991)127-39; University (Albany: Phronesis 30 (1985)1-12. Pathe inPlatoandAristotle', anditsRelated 'Phthonos Mills,
fortune. At EN 1108bl-6 Aristotlecalls this disposition spite I presume that, (epichairkakia). parallelto envy, spiteis thedisposition to pleasureat bad fortune. to be excessivewithrespect (4) Finally, witha namelessdisposidemandsthatspitebe contrasted symmetry tiontobe insufficiently pained)at bad fortune. pleased(orexcessively outto be theexcessand defect Noticethat envyand spitedo notturn in of a singleparameter. combined Indeed,envyand spiteare often and rashness thesame person(Rhet often 1387al-2)justas cowardice thetwonameless occurtogether traits tendto (EN 1115b31). Similarly, that nemesis occur Notice on fits the doctrine together. myinterpretation is thedisposition tobe pleasedand painedon the ofthemean.Nemesis while its associated vices aredispositions tobe pleased occasions, right and painedon toomanyor twofewoccasions, at toomanyor too few a time, etc.(See diagrams 4 and 5.) fortoo longor too short objects, IfI have fleshed out Aristotle's treatment ofnemesis then correctly, nemesis fills thegapsleft Aristotle's account of and by general particular is painedby undeserved The personof nemesis justice. good and bad and pleasedbydeserved In other fortune words, goodandbad fortune. thepersonofnemesis is painedby unjust distributions and pleasedby inthedistribution evenwhenuninvolved (Rhet justdistributions process Nemesis thus the commitment to 1386bl2-15, 1387b6-9). provides justice, the incentive 'topromote lookfor stand them, justdistributions, bythem, and so on, because thatis what theyare.'37 The personof nemesis actions for their own sake. For nemesis performs just example, provides theincentive to enactjustlaws. Thus,thecombination ofnemesis and is not vulnerable to the first two in raised the particular justice objections section. Thiscombination also blocks mostofthethird preceding objecwith tion. Theactions which accord theright rulematch those which are motivated Forexample, nemesis motibyparticular justice plus nemesis. vatesthebirthday cakedistributor. The actions whichviolatetheright rule are motivated thanby pleonexia rather and by generalinjustice and their unnamed meionexia, However, plus envy,spite, opposites. motivates theseactions general injustice onlyin theabsenceofnemesis. For example,lack of nemesis allows generalinjustice to motivethe Aristotle's account of the virtues would have maldistributing judge.
37 Williams, 197-8
236 HowardJ.Curzer
Diagram4
ifhehad explicitly beenbetter combined and nemesis,38 particular justice atjustdistributions buthe is notguilty ofignoring thedelight and the atunjust revulsion distributions felt the virtuous Nor by person. doeshe the actions motivated these and by pleasures pains,thedisinterignore andrighting ested establishment ofjustice ofinjustice. Aristotle's overall includes thepositive commitment tojustdistribution for itsown theory orrecipient. sakeevenwhenoneis nota distributor Conclusion I distinguished I havemadethree moves.First, genmajor interpretive as an appropriate eralandparticular general justice justice bydescribing and describing desireforthegoods offortune justiceas an particular
from itaffect tends toinjustice the acts 38 Aristotle doessay:'Envy another), (for arising tojustice' nemesis [tends] (EE 1234a30-2).
Diagram5
whatone deserves. General turns outto for desire injustice appropriate todistribution toother all ofthefirst-order viceswith be simply respect is a desirefor more(orless) thanone injustice people,whileparticular I brought account ofparticular into Aristotle's deserves. Second, justice I of the mean. described with of his doctrine both particuparts harmony AndI introduced larjustice as a meanofseveral meionexia, parameters. would be so that a desireforless thanone deserves, justice particular I reconciled Aristotle's account of bracketed Third, particubytwovices. larjustice withhis definition ofparticularly justaction by interpreting that nemesis that others deserve as a desire getthegoodsoffortune they and by combining nemesis withparticular Whenfleshed outin justice. Aristotle's accounts of general theway thatI have suggested, justice, and nemesis are internally consistent and compatible particular justice, with thedoctrine ofthemean. Aristotle's architectonic, virtue of Common senseholdsthat Is Aristotle about the justice? right of that desire the fortune (b) desire appropriately, justpeople(a) goods and (c) desirethatother their fair their own sharebe fair, people get as thesedesires are satisfied and share. Just peopleare pleasedinsofar as they arenotsatisfied. Aristotle's virtuous has painedinsofar person
238 Howard]. Curzer
Aristotle calls thesedesires(a) general all ofthesedesires. (b) justice, that nemesis Common sense and (c) says respectively. particular justice, moreor less thanthey unjustpeople (d) desirethegoods of fortune others and/or(e) desiregainor loss,and/or(f)desirethat should, get than Aristotle's deserve. more orlessofthegoodsoffortune theory they are(d) general allofthese failure modes. Thesedesires canaccommodate and and and (e) pleonexia meionexia, (f)envy, spite, their oppoinjustice, differs from common senseorganizationAristotle's account sites. Thus, Aristotle's accounts of On myinterpretation, butnotsubstantively. ally, and nemesis are as well as plausible justice, general justice, particular and Aristotelian. consistent ofPhilosophy Department TexasTechUniversity Box43092 TX79409-3092 Lubbock, U.S.A. email:aucur@ttacs.ttu.edu

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Account Aristotle's ofthe Virtue ofJustice

208 Howard J.Curzer

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice209

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice211

Account Aristotle's ofJustice213 oftheVirtue

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First Aristotle's 10 T. Irwin, Press,1988),424,427 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Principles

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice215

ofmixed motives. theproblem 13 I,likeAristotle, ignore

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220 Howard]. Curzer

Aristotle's Account ofJustice221 oftheVirtue

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75 21 Urmson, 241 22 Hardie, 201;Young,

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Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice227

25 Actions arejustorunjust with tospecific situations. only respect

228 Howard]. Curzer

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice229

230 Howard]. Curzer

Account Aristotle's oftheVirtue ofJustice231

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice233

Greek in J.Antonand A. Preus,eds., Essaysin Ancient comachean Ethics', Philosophy

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice235

Aristotle's Account oftheVirtue ofJustice237

238 Howard]. Curzer

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