Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FISA court judge Royce Lamberth was angry with the FBI over
misleading statements made in FISA wiretap applications. [Source: Public domain]While
monitoring foreign terrorists in the US, the FBI listens to calls made by suspects as a part
of an operation called Catcher’s Mitt, which is curtailed at this time due to misleading
statements by FBI agents. It is never revealed who the targets of the FBI’s surveillance
are under this operation, but below are some of the terrorism suspects under investigation
in the US at the time:
Imran Mandhai, Shuyeb Mossa Jokhan and Adnan El Shukrijumah in Florida. They are
plotting a series of attacks there, but Mandhai and Jokhan are brought in for questioning
by the FBI and surveillance of them stops in late spring (see November 2000-Spring 2002
and May 2, 2001);
Another Florida cell connected to Blind Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. The FBI has been
investigating it since 1993 (see (October 1993-November 2001));
Al-Qaeda operatives in Denver (see March 2000);
A Boston-based al-Qaeda cell involving Nabil al-Marabh and Raed Hijazi. Cell members
provide funding to terrorists, fight abroad, and are involved in document forging (see
January 2001, Spring 2001, and Early September 2001);
Fourteen of the hijackers’ associates the FBI investigates before 9/11. The FBI is still
investigating four of these people while the hijackers associate with them; (US Congress
7/24/2003, pp. 169 )
Hamas operatives such as Mohammed Salah in Chicago. Salah invests money in the US
and sends it to the occupied territories to fund attacks (see June 9, 1998).
When problems are found with the applications for the wiretap warrants, an investigation
is launched (see Summer-October 2000), and new requirements for warrant applications
are put in place (see October 2000). From this time well into 2001, the FBI is forced to
shut down wiretaps of al-Qaeda-related suspects connected to the 1998 US embassy
bombings and Hamas (see March 2001 and April 2001). One source familiar with the
case says that about 10 to 20 al-Qaeda related wiretaps have to be shut down and it
becomes more difficult to get permission for new FISA wiretaps. Newsweek notes, “The
effect [is] to stymie terror surveillance at exactly the moment it was needed most:
requests from both Phoenix [with the Ken Williams memo (see July 10, 2001)] and
Minneapolis [with Zacarias Moussaoui’s arrest] for wiretaps [will be] turned down [by
FBI superiors],” (see August 21, 2001 and August 28, 2001). (Hirsh and Isikoff
5/27/2002) Robert Wright is an FBI agent who led the Vulgar Betrayal investigation
looking into allegations that Saudi businessman Yassin al-Qadi helped finance the
embassy bombings, and other matters. In late 2002, he will claim to discover evidence
that some of the FBI intelligence agents who stalled and obstructed his investigation were
the same FBI agents who misrepresented the FISA petitions. (Judicial Watch 9/11/2002)
On June 29, $5,000 is wired by a person using the alias “Isam Mansur” to a Western
Union facility in New York, where Alshehhi picks it up;
On July 18, $10,000 is wired to Atta and Alshehhi’s joint account at SunTrust from the
UAE Exchange Centre in Bur Dubai by a person using the alias “Isam Mansur”;
On August 5, $9,500 is wired to the joint account from the UAE Exchange Centre by a
person using the alias “Isam Mansour”;
On August 29, $20,000 is wired to the joint account from the UAE Exchange Centre by
a person using the alias “Mr. Ali”;
On September 17 $70,000 is wired to the joint account from the UAE Exchange Centre
by a person using the alias “Hani (Fawar Trading).” Some sources suggest a suspicious
activity report was generated about this transaction (see (Late September 2000)).
(Willman 11/29/2001; Beith 12/2/2001; Eichenwald 12/10/2001; MSNBC 12/11/2001;
US Congress 9/26/2002; 9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 134-5 ; US District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia; Alexandria Division 7/31/2006 ) Hijackers Nawaf
Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar previously received a transfer from the United Arab
Emirates from a “Mr. Ali” (see April 16-18, 2000). The 9/11 Commission say this money
was sent by Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), a nephew of 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 133-5 ) Although he
denies making the $5,000 transfer to Nawaf Alhazmi, Ali will admit sending Alshehhi
these amounts and say that the money was Alshehhi’s (see March 30, 2007). He also
admits receiving 16 phone calls from Alshehhi around this time. (US Department of
Defense 4/12/2007 ) The hijackers may also receive another $100,000 around this time
(see (July-August 2000)). It is suggested that Saeed Sheikh, who wires the hijackers
money in the summer of 2001 (see Early August 2001), may be involved in one or both
of these transfers. For example, French author Bernard-Henri Levy later claims to have
evidence from sources inside both Indian and US governments of phone calls between
Sheikh and Mahmood Ahmed, head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency,
during this same time period, and he sees a connection between the timing of the calls
and the money transfers (see Summer 2000). (Swami 10/13/2001; Kak 10/18/2001; Levy
2003, pp. 320-324)
Airman Flight
School. [Source: FBI]Zacarias Moussaoui flies to the US. Three days later, he starts
flight training at the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. (Other Islamic
extremists had previously trained at the same flight school or other schools in the area
(see September 1999)). He trains there until May, but does not do well and drops out
before getting a pilot’s license. His visa expires on May 22, but he does not attempt to
renew it or get another one. He stays in Norman, arranging to change flight schools, and
frequently exercising in a gym. (MSNBC 12/11/2001; US Congress 10/17/2002)
According to US investigators, would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh later says he meets
Moussaoui in Karachi (Pakistan) in June 2001. (Schmidt 11/20/2002)
May 24-27: Marwan Alshehhi flies to Vegas (see May 24-27, 2001);
June 7-10: Ziad Jarrah takes a trip to Vegas (see June 7-10, 2001);
June 28-July 1: Mohamed Atta takes his first trip to Vegas, flying from Fort Lauderdale
to Boston and then, the next day, to Las Vegas via San Francisco with United Airlines. He
stays there three nights, then returns to Boston via Denver, and flies to New York the next
day;
July 31-August 1: Waleed Alshehri flies from Fort Lauderdale to Boston and then takes
American Airlines flight 195 to San Francisco the next day. After spending a night at the
La Quinta Inn, he returns to Miami via Las Vegas; (US District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006, pp. 1-2, 16, 18 ; US District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006, pp. 55-7 )
August 1: Actor James Woods sees four people he will later suspect are hijackers,
including individuals he believes to be Khalid Almihdhar and Hamza Alghamdi, on a
transcontinental flight (see August 1, 2001). Abdulaziz Alomari is reported to try to get
into the cockpit on a different flight from Vegas on the same day (see August 1, 2001);
August 13-14: Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi all fly to Vegas, possibly meeting
some other hijackers there (see August 13-14, 2001).
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar also made frequent car trips to Las Vegas from
San Diego, where they lived in 2000. (McDermott 9/1/2002; McDermott 2005, pp. 192)
The reason for these trips is never definitively determined, although there will be
speculation the hijackers are casing aircraft similar to those they will hijack on 9/11. The
9/11 Commission will comment, “Beyond Las Vegas’s reputation for welcoming tourists,
we have seen no credible evidence explaining why… the operatives flew to or met in
Law Vegas.” (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 242, 248) After 9/11, it will be reported
that the hijackers may use these cross-country flights to take pictures of airline cockpits
and check out security at boarding gates. During the flights, the hijackers apparently take
notes, watch the crews, and even videotape them. There are some reports that two, or
perhaps more, of the hijackers sit in “jumpseats” in the pilot’s cabin, a courtesy extended
by airlines to other pilots, during the surveillance flights (see Summer 2001) and on the
day of 9/11 itself (see November 23, 2001). (Johnson 11/23/2001; Associated Press
5/29/2002) There are reports that the hijackers drink alcohol, gamble, and frequent strip
clubs while they are in Las Vegas. For example, according to a dancer named
“Samantha,” Marwan Alshehhi stares up at her blankly while she “undulate[s] her hips
inches from his face” and only gives her $20, although he is a “light drinker.” (Fagan
10/4/2001; Thomas 10/15/2001)
The section of the 9/11 Commission’s main report that details his travel during this time
does not include a trip to the United Arab Emirates; (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp.
237)
Al-Hawsawi’s substitute for testimony at the trial of Zacarias Moussoaui does not
mention this transaction or any meeting with Almihdhar, although it deals with al-
Hawsawi’s meetings with four other hijackers and telephone conversations with
Mohamed Atta, as well as his dealings with some other al-Qaeda operatives; (US District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006 )
No mention of this transaction is made at al-Hawsawi’s Combat Status Review Tribunal
hearing, even though it again deals with the assistance provided to four hijackers and
conversations with Atta. (US department of Defense 3/21/2007 )
June-September 11, 2001: CD Cover Depicts Scene
Much Like 9/11 Attacks on WTC
June 11, 2001: FBI and CIA Hold Shouting Match over
Information on Al-Qaeda; CIA Still Withholds
Information
The FBI and the CIA hold a meeting to discuss the investigation into the USS Cole
bombing and a possible connection between it and al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see
January 5-8, 2000). However, the CIA and FBI headquarters refuse to share all they
know, and agents investigating the Cole bombing become angry over this. The meeting,
which lasts between two and four hours, is attended by CIA officer Clark Shannon, FBI
headquarters agent Dina Corsi, an FBI agent loaned to the CIA named Margaret
Gillespie, FBI agent Steve Bongardt, FBI agent Russell Fincher, and assistant US
attorney David Kelley. Although there is no agenda for the meeting and Corsi will later
say it is a brainstorming session, author Lawrence Wright will say that one of the reasons
for the meeting is that CIA officer Tom Wilshire, an associate of Shannon’s, “want[ed] to
know… what the FBI knew” about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit. Initially, Bongardt and
Fincher brief Shannon on progress in the Cole investigation. Corsi then shows the two
Cole investigators three photographs taken at al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in 2000 (see
January 5-8, 2000), showing 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and
another man, and Shannon asks if the agents recognize Fahad al-Quso, who is thought to
have attended the Malaysia meeting and has been interviewed by the FBI. However, one
of the photos shows Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and a tree, and the CIA has
already recognized Almihdhar and Alhazmi, so it is unclear how the Cole investigators
are supposed to recognize al-Quso in the photo. Corsi received the photographs from CIA
officer Tom Wilshire, but Wilshire did not provide her with all the relevant information
about them (see Late May, 2001). Bongardt and Fincher ask who is in the pictures, why
were taken, and whether there are other photos of the meeting. Shannon refuses to say,
but Corsi eventually admits one of the men is named Khalid Almihdhar. As a name alone
is not sufficient to start an investigation, Bongardt asks for a date of birth or other details
that will allow him to know which Khalid Almihdhar in the world is being discussed, but
Shannon refuses to provide them. Shannon admits that Almihdhar was traveling on a
Saudi passport and then leaves the meeting. Author Lawrence Wright will say that
providing a date of birth is “standard procedure—the first thing most investigators would
do.” Realizing that the photos pertain to the Cole investigation, Bongardt and Fincher
become angry at the lack of information being provided and the meeting descends into a
“shouting match.” (ABC News 8/16/2002; US Department of Justice 11/2004, pp. 289-
294 ; Wright 7/10/2006 ) Shannon will later admit that at the time he knew Almihdhar
had a US visa, that Alhazmi had traveled to the US in 2000, that al-Qaeda leader Khallad
bin Attash had been recognized in one of the photos, and that Alhazmi was known to be
an experienced operative. However, he does not tell any of this to any FBI agents, as he
apparently thinks he does not have the authority. He does not let them keep copies of the
photos either and will give conflicting accounts of the meeting after 9/11 (see Between
September 12, 2001 and October 17, 2002). (US Congress 7/24/2003 ; US Department
of Justice 11/2004, pp. 289-292 ) Corsi has NSA information saying Almihdhar and
Alhazmi attended the Malaysia meeting, but apparently believes that the Cole agents
cannot be told more because of restrictions on sharing intelligence with criminal agents
(see July 19, 1995). However, one of the Cole agents present is an intelligence agent, so
the information can be communicated to him immediately without Corsi obtaining
permission from the NSA and/or Justice Department. In addition, the NSA sent the
information to the FBI’s New York field office, where the Cole investigators are based, in
1999 (see December 1999-January 2000). Further, when she asks the NSA’s permission
to share the information ten weeks later, the NSA approves the request on the same day
(see August 27-28, 2001). She does not share the information at this time, but promises
Bongardt and Fincher to try to do so later. The Cole agents will not receive more
information for months. (US Congress 9/20/2002; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 269,
537) Two days after this meeting, Almihdhar has no trouble getting a new, multiple
reentry US visa (see May 2001 and June 13, 2001). (Pound 12/12/2001; US Congress
9/20/2002)
June 12, 2001: CIA Learns KSM Is Sending Operatives
to US to Meet Up with Operatives Already There
A CIA report says that a man named “Khaled” is actively recruiting people to travel to
various countries, including the US, to stage attacks. CIA headquarters presume from the
details of this report that Khaled is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). On July 11, the
individual source for this report is shown a series of photographs and identifies KSM as
the person he called “Khaled.” (Diamond 12/12/2002; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp.
277, 533) This report also reveals that:
Al-Qaeda operatives heading to the US would be “expected to establish contact with
colleagues already living there.”
KSM himself had traveled to the US frequently, and as recently as May 2001.
KSM is a relative of bomber Ramzi Yousef.
He appears to be one of bin Laden’s most trusted leaders.
He routinely tells others that he can arrange their entry into the US as well. However, the
CIA doesn’t find this report credible because they think it is unlikely that he would come
to the US (in fact, it appears he had (see Summer 1998)). Nevertheless, they consider it
worth pursuing. One agent replies, “If it is KSM, we have both a significant threat and an
opportunity to pick him up.” In July, the source clarifies that the last time he can
definitely place KSM in the US was in the summer of 1998 (see Summer 1998). The CIA
disseminates the report to all other US intelligence agencies, military commanders, and
parts of the Treasury and Justice Departments. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later
request that the CIA inform them how CIA agents and other agencies reacted to this
information, but the CIA does not respond to this. (US Congress 7/24/2003) It appears
that KSM will send at least one and probably two operatives to the US after this time and
before 9/11 (see August 4, 2001 and September 10, 2001). On July 23, 2001, the US
consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia will give KSM a US visa (he uses an alias but his
actual photo appears on his application) (see July 23, 2001). Also, during this summer
and as late as September 10, 2001, the NSA will intercept phone calls between KSM and
Mohamed Atta, but the NSA will not share this information with any other agencies (see
Summer 2001).
Between July 9 and July 16, 2001: Atta and Bin Al-
Shibh Discuss Targeting a Nuclear Plant
July 23, 2001: KSM, Using False Name but Real Photo,
Is Given US Visa
A Western Union
money transfer between Ahad Sabet (Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s alias) and Moussaoui in
Norman, Oklahoma. [Source: FBI]According to the Justice Department indictment
against Zacarias Moussaoui, Moussaoui and Ramzi bin al-Shibh are in communication
for several days. Moussaoui makes several calls from Norman, Oklahoma, to Dusseldorf,
Germany. Then, around July 31 someone using the name “Hashim Abdulrahman” in the
United Arab Emirates sends two wire transfers totaling about $15,000 to an “Ahad Sabet”
in Hamburg, Germany. Sabet is claimed to be an alias for bin al-Shibh. Then bin al-
Shibh, again using the Sabet name, wires about $14,000 to Moussaoui in Oklahoma.
(MSNBC 12/11/2001) Moussaoui immediately moves to Minnesota and begins studying
at a flight school there (see August 10-11, 2001). The passport with the name Ahad Sabet
that bin al-Shibh used appears to belong to an innocent US doctor who had his passport
stolen in Spain several years earlier. (Hirschkorn 8/7/2002)
He mentions that he and Moussaoui are carrying fighting gloves and shin guards to
practice martial arts as part of Moussaoui’s philosophy that Muslims should be ready to
fight nonbelievers.
He has not heard Moussaoui mention any specific terrorist plot, but says that Moussaoui
“is suspicious to me, too.”
FBI agents interview al-Attas again the following day, then charge him with violating the
terms of his student visa by working at a mosque in Oklahoma, and arrest him. During
the second interview, al-Attas says that Moussaoui follows the teachings of a sheikh
whose name he would not disclose to him (see August 17, 2001). The agents contact FBI
supervisors in Washington to seek approval to get a warrant to search Moussaoui’s
computer. The supervisors are aware of what al-Attas said in the interview, but
nevertheless they tell the Minnesota FBI agents that they do not want to attempt to get the
warrant because it has not been shown that Moussaoui is an agent of a foreign power. The
New York Times will note that the content of al-Attas’ interview “raise[s] new questions
about whether top [FBI] officials… were aggressive enough in responding to that
information.” (Woodward and Balz 1/31/2002; Yardley 5/24/2002; Barakat 3/21/2006)
Al-Attas will be arrested shortly after 9/11 and held as a material witness. He will later
plead guilty to lying about Moussaoui. He lied in claiming that he did not know
Moussaoui’s real name, lied about plans to go with Moussaoui to New York City in late
August 2001, lied about Moussaoui’s desire to participate in holy war, and lied about a
planned trip to speak to religious scholars who would encourage al-Attas to participate in
holy war. He will be sentenced to time served, but will be kept imprisoned until the
conclusion of Moussaoui’s trial in 2006 (see March 6-May 4, 2006). (Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation 7/22/2002; Associated Press 10/22/2002) It is also later
revealed that Moussaoui had recently convinced al-Attas to fight in Chechnya in order to
prepare for holy war. (Cohen, Carreyrou, and Gauthier-Villars 2/4/2002) Furthermore, the
person who attempts to post bond for al-Attas had been the subject of a full-field FBI
international terrorism investigation in Oklahoma. This unnamed person was a recruiter
for a radical Palestinian group and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. (US Congress
7/24/2003) In post-9/11 media accounts, al-Attas is generally portrayed as someone who
had been innocently and accidentally caught up with Moussaoui. But it appears that in the
weeks before 9/11, US intelligence will consider the possibility that al-Attas may have
been plotting with Moussaoui. For instance, a CIA cable that will be sent on August 24 is
titled “Subjects Involved in Suspicious 747 Flight Training,” (see August 24, 2001) one
that will be sent on August 28 has Moussaoui and al-Attas’ names as the title. (Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation 7/22/2002; Associated Press 10/22/2002; 9/11 Commission
7/24/2004, pp. 540)
2 - He contacts the Customs Service and verifies that Almihdhar has been placed on their
watch list. (US Department of Justice 11/2004)
3 - He requests a local criminal history check on Almihdhar and Alhazmi through the
New York City Police Department. The request turns up nothing. (US Department of
Justice 11/2004)
4 - He claims that he requests a criminal history check in the NCIC, which is a computer
database frequently used by every level of law enforcement. However, the Bergen Record
reports that he “never performed one of the most basic tasks of a police manhunt. He
never ran Almihdhar or Alhazmi through the NCIC computer. That simple act would have
alerted local cops to look for the suspected terrorists. It also would have told the agent a
local cop… had already spotted Alhazmi in [the New Jersey town of] South
Hackensack.” (Pochna 7/11/2002; Kelly 5/18/2004; US Department of Justice 11/2004)
5 - He requests a credit check. (US Department of Justice 11/2004)
6 - He requests that a national motor vehicle index be searched. However, for some
reason, a speeding ticket issued to Alhazmi in April 2001 that should have been in that
index is not detected (see April 1, 2001). Nor is a recorded interaction between Alhazmi
and local police in Fairfax, Virginia, in May, which could have led investigators to
Alhazmi’s East Coast apartment. (Clay and Ellis 1/20/2002; Eckert 9/27/2002; US
Congress 7/24/2003 ; US Department of Justice 11/2004)
7 - On September 5, Fuller and another agent contact the Marriott hotels in New York
City, since Almihdhar had indicated when he entered the US in July 2001 that his
destination was a Marriott hotel in New York. Later that same day he is told Almihdhar
had never registered as a guest at any of the six Marriott hotels there. (US Department of
Justice 11/2004)
8 - He claims that he conducts a search in the ChoicePoint database. ChoicePoint is one
of several companies maintaining commerical databases on personal information about
US citizens. The FBI has a contract to access the ChoicePoint database, but none of the
others. Fuller doesn’t find any record on either Alhazmi or Almihdhar. He suggests this is
because of variations in the spelling of names. However, the chairman of ChoicePoint
will later confirm that although the database did have information on the hijackers before
9/11, the FBI did not ask to search the database until shortly after 9/11. The 9/11
Commission will conclude the database was not searched, and notes, “Searches of readily
available databases could have unearthed” their California drivers� licenses, car
registrations and telephone listings. Thomas Pickard, acting FBI Director at the time this
search is made, will later falsely claim in public testimony before the 9/11 Commission
that the FBI was not allowed to search the ChoicePoint database before 9/11. (9/11
Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 539; US Department of Justice 11/2004; Kinkead
11/28/2004) There are additional searches he could have made that he apparently fails to
do. For instance, he apparently fails to check car registration databases. Alhazmi did own
a car, and the 9/11 Commission notes, “A search on [his] car registration would have
unearthed a license check by the South Hackensack Police Department that would have
led to information placing Alhazmi in the [greater New York City] area and placing
Almihdhar at a local hotel for a week in early July 2001. The hijackers actively used the
New Jersey bank accounts, through ATM, debit card, and cash transactions, until
September 10.” (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 539) Additionally, even though the two
were known to have previously entered the US through Los Angeles, drivers’ license
records in California are not checked. He also fails to check national credit card or bank
account databases. All of these would have had positive results. Alhazmi’s name was
even in the 2000-2001 San Diego phone book, listing the address where he and
Almihdhar may have been living up to as late as September 9, 2001 (see Early September
2001). (Lipka 9/28/2001; Drogin, Lichtblua, and Krikorian 10/28/2001; Isikoff and
Klaidman 6/2/2002) There appears to be no further mention of any further work on this
search after September 5, except for one request to the Los Angeles FBI office made on
September 10 (see September 10, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will later note, “We
believe that if more resources had been applied and a significantly different approach
taken, Alhazmi and Almihdhar might have been found. They had used their true names in
the United States. Still, the investigators would have needed luck as well as skill to find
them prior to September 11… Many FBI witnesses have suggested that even if [they] had
been found, there was nothing the agents could have done except follow [them] onto the
planes. We believe this is incorrect. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar could have been held
for immigration violations or as material witnesses in the Cole bombing case.
Investigation or interrogation of them, and investigation of their travel and financial
activities, could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11
plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the
opportunity did not arise.” (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 272)
Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher (right) in Afghanistan in 1988. [Source: Public domain]Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher (R), who has long experience in Afghanistan and even fought with the
mujaheddin there, later will claim he immediately sees the assassination of Northern
Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud (see September 9, 2001) as a sign that “something
terrible [is] about to happen.” He is only able to make an appointment to meet with top
White House and National Security Council officials for 2:30 pm. on 9/11. The events of
that morning will make the meeting moot. (US Congress 9/17/2001)
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar often frequented Cheetah’s, a nude bar in San
Diego. (McDermott 9/1/2002)
Hamza Alghamdi watched a porn video on September 10. (Wall Street Journal
10/16/2001)
University of Florida religion professor Richard Foltz states, “It is incomprehensible that
a person could drink and go to a strip bar one night, then kill themselves the next day in
the name of Islam… People who would kill themselves for their faith would come from
very strict Islamic ideology. Something here does not add up.” (Benjamin 9/16/2001)
9:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Shuts Down All New
York City Airports
The FAA shuts down all New York City area airports. (CNN 9/12/2001; New York Times
9/12/2001) A flight controller at La Guardia airport reports the taxiways, runways, and
airspace are completely clear at 9:37 a.m.m (Dwyer 12/30/2003)
Lyz Glick. [Source: NBC]In phone calls made from Flight 93,
some passengers and crew members sound as if they are able to keep surprisingly calm,
despite the crisis:
Passenger Jeremy Glick calls his wife, Lyz, at 9:37. She later recalls, “He was so calm,
the plane sounded so calm, that if I hadn’t seen what was going on on the TV, I wouldn’t
have believed it.” She says, “I was surprised by how calm it seemed in the background. I
didn’t hear any screaming. I didn’t hear any noises. I didn’t hear any commotion.”
(Brown 10/5/2001; Pauley 9/11/2006)
Passenger Lauren Grandcolas calls her husband, Jack, at 9:39, and leaves a message on
the answering machine. According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “It sounded to
Jack as if she were driving home from the grocery store or ordering a pizza.” Jack
Grandcolas later says, “She sounded calm.” He describes, “There is absolutely no
background noise on her message. You can’t hear people screaming or yelling or crying.
It’s very calm, the whole cabin, the background, there’s really very little sound.”
(Longman 2002, pp. 128; Kate Solomon 2006; Segal 4/26/2006)
Passenger Mark Bingham speaks on the phone with his mother and aunt, reportedly from
around 9:42. His aunt finds him sounding “calm, matter-of-fact.” His mother later recalls,
“His voice was calm. He seemed very much composed, even though I know he must have
been under terrible duress.” She also says the background discussion between passengers,
about taking back the plane, sounds like a “calm boardroom meeting.” (CNN 9/12/2001;
Longman 2002, pp. 129-130; Hirschkorn 4/21/2006)
Passenger Todd Beamer speaks with GTE supervisor Lisa Jefferson for 13 minutes,
starting at 9:45. Jefferson later says that Beamer “stayed calm through the entire
conversation. He made me doubt the severity of the call.” She tells Beamer’s wife, “If I
hadn’t known it was a real hijacking, I’d have thought it was a crank call, because Todd
was so rational and methodical about what he was doing.” (Beamer and Abraham 2002,
pp. 211; Jefferson 2006)
Passenger Honor Elizabeth Wainio speaks with her stepmother, Esther Heymann, from
around 9:54. Heymann later tells CNN that Wainio “really was remarkably calm
throughout our whole conversation.” (However, according to Jere Longman, although she
speaks calmly, Wainio’s breathing is “shallow, as if she were hyperventilating.”) When
her stepdaughter is not talking, Heymann reportedly cannot “hear another person. She
could not hear any conversation or crying or yelling or whimpering. Nothing.” (Longman
2002, pp. 168 and 171-172; CNN 2/18/2006)
Flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband at 9:50. He later says, “She sounded
calm, but like her adrenaline was really going.” (Cannon 10/21/2001)
At 9:58, flight attendant CeeCee Lyles phones her husband. He later says, “She was
surprisingly calm,” considering the screaming he heard in the background. Her relatives
attribute her calmness to her police training (she is a former police officer). (Townsend,
Brown, and Fraley 9/17/2001; Tsuruoka 4/18/2002)
Longman later writes, “I heard tapes of a couple of the phone calls made from [Flight 93]
and was struck by the absence of panic in the voices.” (Longman 2002, pp. xi)
Bob Blair of Stoystown: He sees the plane spiraling and flying upside down, not much
higher than the treetops, before crashing. (Black 9/12/2001)
Accounts of a sudden plunge and more strange sounds -
An unnamed witness says he hears two loud bangs before watching the plane take a
downward turn of nearly 90 degrees. (News Channel 5 (Cleveland) 9/11/2001)
Tom Fritz, about a quarter-mile from the crash site: He hears a sound that “wasn’t quite
right” and looks up in the sky. “It dropped all of a sudden, like a stone,” going “so fast
that you couldn’t even make out what color it was.” (Zapinski 9/12/2001)
Terry Butler, a few miles north of Lambertsville: “It dropped out of the clouds.” The
plane rose slightly, trying to gain altitude, then “it just went flip to the right and then
straight down.” (Silver et al. 9/12/2001)
Lee Purbaugh, 300 yards away: “There was an incredibly loud rumbling sound and there
it was, right there, right above my head—maybe 50 feet up.… I saw it rock from side to
side then, suddenly, it dipped and dived, nose first, with a huge explosion, into the
ground. I knew immediately that no one could possibly have survived.” (Carlin
8/13/2002)
Upside down and a sudden plunge -
Linda Shepley: She hears a loud bang and sees the plane bank to the side. (ABC News
9/11/2001) She sees the plane wobbling right and left, at a low altitude of roughly 2,500
feet, when suddenly the right wing dips straight down, and the plane plunges into the
earth. She says she has an unobstructed view of Flight 93’s final two minutes. (Bunch
11/15/2001)
Kelly Leverknight in Stony Creek Township of Shanksville: “There was no smoke, it
just went straight down. I saw the belly of the plane.” It sounds like it is flying low, and
it’s heading east. (Black 9/12/2001; Zapinski 9/12/2001)
Tim Thornsberg, working in a nearby strip mine: “It came in low over the trees and
started wobbling. Then it just rolled over and was flying upside down for a few
seconds… and then it kind of stalled and did a nose dive over the trees.” (Wagner and
McCall 9/13/2001) Some claim that these witness accounts support the idea that Flight 93
is hit by a missile. (Bunch 11/15/2001) While this theory certainly can be disputed, it is
worth noting that some passenger planes hit by missiles continued to fly erratically for
several minutes before crashing. For instance, a Korean Airline 747 was hit by two
Russian missiles in 1983, yet continued to fly for two more minutes. (Korean Air
8/31/1983) Kelly Leverknight, whose home is a couple of miles from the Flight 93 crash
site, adds that planes going overhead are nothing unusual here because the area is a
“military flight corridor.” (Black 9/12/2001)
Kathy Blades, who is staying about quarter of a mile from the impact site, runs outside
after the crash and sees a jet, “with sleek back wings and an angled cockpit,” race
overhead. (Bunch 11/18/2001)
Anna Ruth Fisher says, “After the crash, another jet went near over to look.” Her
mother, Anna B. Fisher, adds, “We were looking at the smoke cloud when we saw the jets
circling up there.” (Kashurba 2002, pp. 27)
Jim Brandt sees a small plane with no markings stay about one or two minutes over the
crash site before leaving. (Pittsburgh Channel 9/12/2001)
Bob Page sees a large plane circling the crash site for about two or three minutes, before
climbing almost vertically into the sky. He cannot see what kind of plane it is or if there
are any markings on it, but says, “It sure wasn’t no puddle jumper.” (Pittsburgh Tribune-
Review 9/12/2001)
Tom Spinelli: “I saw the white plane. It was flying around all over the place like it was
looking for something. I saw it before and after the crash.” (Wallace 9/12/2002)
The FBI later claims this was a Fairchild Falcon 20 business jet, directed after the crash
to fly from 37,000 feet to 5,000 feet and obtain the coordinates for the crash site to help
rescuers. (Pittsburgh Channel 9/15/2001; Heltzel and Gibb 9/16/2001) The FBI also says
there was a C-130 military cargo aircraft flying at 24,000 feet about 17 miles away (see
10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001), but that plane wasn’t armed and had no role in the crash.
(Pittsburgh Channel 9/15/2001; Heltzel and Gibb 9/16/2001) Note that this is the same C-
130 that flies very close to Flight 77 right as that planes crashes into the Pentagon (see
9.36 a.m. September 11, 2001).