Phronesis 58 (2013) 17-31

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Aristotle on the Impossibility of Anaximanders apeiron: On Generation and Corruption, 332a20-25*

Michael Wedin
Philosophy Department, 1240 Social Sciences and Humanities University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616. USA mvwedin@pacbell.net

Abstract In On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle rejects the very possibility of such a thing as Anaximanders apeiron. Characterized as a kind of intermediate stu, the apeiron turns out to consist of contraries and as such is impossible. Commentators have rightly noted this point and some have also indicated that Aristotle oers an argument of sorts for his negative estimate. However, the argument has received scant attention, and it is fair to say that it remains unclear exactly why Aristotle rejects Anaximanders intermediate stu. Indeed, it is unclear how Aristotles argument is supposed to run in the rst place. This paper oers a reconstruction of Aristotles argument for the impossibility of the apeiron, and on this basis oers to explain Aristotles grounds for rejecting Anaximanders intermediate stu. This is especially called for in light of the fact that Aristotle himself thinks that there can be intermediate stus. Finally, some attention is given to the parallel between the apeiron and Aristotles prime matter. Keywords Aristotle, Anaximander, apeiron, prime matter, actuality, potentiality, elemental qualities, intermediate

In Chapter 5 of Book II of On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle considers the view that the elements are the matter of which natural bodies
*) The central idea of this paper emerged over a decade ago in the course of teaching Presocratic Philosophy at Davis. My thanks, and belated apologies, to several ights of students who cheerfully endured my fondness for logical reconstruction. I am additionally grateful to two readers for astute and useful remarks and to the editor for able assistance in the nal version.
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15685284-12341240

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consist. The elements must be one, two or more, but, says Aristotle, they cannot be one. For instance, the candidate singleton cannot be air because for air to underlie re would require that air be or become hot. But air is cold, so it would be both hot and cold. In short, as underlying matter air would be characterized by contraries. This is impossible, however, and so air cannot be the single underlying matter. The same argument applies to the other elements, and so Aristotle concludes, in Joachims phrase: there is no single one of them out of which they all originate.1 Immediately, at 332a20-25, Aristotle extends this conclusion to Anaximanders singleton, to apeiron. Here is what he says, in the translation of Graham 2010, 53:
Nor indeed is there anything else besides them, for instance between air and water or air and re which is denser than air and re but ner than the others. For that will turn out to be air and re with a contrary qualication. But one of the contraries is the privation of the other. So it is never possible for the alleged source to exist by itself, as some claim the boundless and surrounding stu does.

Aristotle considers two candidates for the intermediate. Introduced in the for instance clause, the candidates are explained in the immediately attached which is clause. So the intermediate between air and water will be denser than air and ner than water and the intermediate between air and re will be denser than re but ner than air.2 Neither passes muster.3
1) Graham (2010) reads Aristotles Greek more strictly, and more generally, as: There is not one of these [elements] from which everything comes (322a19-20). Now, Aristotles argument implies that there cannot be a single element underlying anything that involves another element, for such a thing will be cold and dry, as air, and also hot or wet, depending on which other element is involved. So, of course, Joachim would be correct to hold that such an element could not underlie the other elements. 2) This is made explicit in Joachims more expansive translation in vol. II of the Oxford Aristotle series: But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate a something intermediate, e.g. between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but ner than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but ner than Air). For the supposed intermediate will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a privation, the intermediate never can exist as some thinkers assert the Boundless or the Environing exists in isolation. 3) Because what is intermediate between air and water is dierent from what is intermediate between air and re, presumably the apeiron could not be both intermediates. But, while it is clear that for Aristotle his candidates cannot both obtain, it is not obvious that

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This is a puzzling passage. For why should it be impossible that there be a single thing intermediate between the elements? After all, precisely because such a thing would not be a standard element, an argument excluding an elemental singleton does not automatically apply to an intermediate singleton. Nonetheless, Aristotle appears to regard the extension as unproblematic. But he may not regard it as entirely obvious, for he recommends the extension on the basis of an argument. Unfortunately, the text gives only a sketch of an argument, and it is not immediately clear how to complete it. Indeed, some would roundly deny that the passage contains an argument, citing for example one of its main claims, namely the claim that something intermediate between the elements will be air and re together with contraries. So far from yielding an argument, it is not even clear what this claim means. Nonetheless, it is the key to understanding Aristotles objection to Anaximanders apeiron. Aristotles commentators generally agree on his basic complaint, that the apeiron cannot be characterized as an intermediate entity because it would consist of contraries. More narrowly, of course, Aristotle says there can be nothing at all that is intermediate between air and water or air and re. A fortiori the apeiron could not be such a thing. What commentators remain silent about is exactly why there can be no such intermediate thing.4 After all, it surely seems that there might be such an intermediate thing, even if, as a matter of fact, there is none. Why cant there be something intermediate between air and water or air and re? As commentators rightly note, such a thing would be impossible by Aristotles lights. But why exactly is this impossible? Why, in short, must such a thing consist of contraries? This is the chief question I wish to address in this note, and I shall do so by oering a reconstruction of Aristotles argument in 332a20-25 for the claim in question.
one or the other must hold. After all, once standard Aristotelian elements are invoked as the anking terms for Anaximanders intermediate, another option emerges namely, what falls between water and earth. So he may not be entertaining his two express candidates as contradictory alternatives. It turns out, in any event, that the intermediate between water and earth is excluded by the very argument that defeats the two candidates Aristotle does introduce in 332a20-25. For how this works, see p. 26 below. 4) Williams (1982, 164), for instance, comments that: the argument at 332a20-27 repeats, rather less sketchily, that already given at II.1.329a10-13. He does not, however, state or explain the argument at either place. Indeed, he rightly observes that the earlier argument needs completing something I aim to provide in this note.

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We may begin with an observation about the structure of the passage. It consists of an extended protasis fronting the conclusion that the apeiron cannot exist. Roughly, Aristotle maintains that if there can be nothing intermediate in the way suggested, and if the apeiron is construed as such an intermediate, then the apeiron cannot exist. To make this precise will require some modest regimentation. Because the supposition that there is but one element underlying everything leads to an incompatibility, we may take Aristotle to hold that it is impossible that there be an elemental singleton. Accordingly, the general principle backing this claim may be formulated as a modal thesis, namely:
(1) (x)(x consists of F and G F is the contrary of G ).

According to (1), then, it is not possible for there to exist something that consists of contraries. On the basis of (1), Aristotle already ruled out the possibility that what underlies everything could be a standard element such as air, for that would require that air itself have contrary properties. Accordingly, when Aristotle promises to deploy the same argument against the apeiron, we can expect him to appeal to (1). So I enter it as the rst step in the reconstruction. Now Aristotle presumes, as some assume, that the apeiron is something intermediate. Thus, we add the fundamental presumption:
(2) x is apeiron x is intermediate,5

along with the rider that what is intermediate is intermediate between air and water or air and re:
(3) x is intermediate x is between air and water x is between air and re.6

A point of caution here. If taking (2) as fundamental suggests that Aristotle holds it as a general truth, then anything that is intermediate will count as the apeiron. Since he himself recognizes intermediates that do not t this description, we might replace (2) in favor of its left-to-right entailment. Alternatively, we might restrict fundamental to fundamental in the critique of Anaximander. The argument goes through on any of these construals. 6) This note does not address whether Anaximanders view is fairly captured by (2) and (3). This question is important, but at the moment I am concerned simply with making sense of what Aristotle says, given the presumptions in (2) and (3). For all I know they may be his invention.

5)

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So the apeiron of interest is not any one of the four standard elements, but falls between pairs of such elements.7 This allows us to conclude, on the basis of (2) and (3), that the apeiron falls between these same pairs of elements:
(4) x is apeiron x is between air and water x is between air and re.

While (4) may have characterized the apeiron in slightly more precise terms, no grounds have been advanced that show how the apeiron, so characterized, runs afoul of (1). For this we must appeal to Aristotles more detailed explanation of what (4) amounts to. He provides this at 332a2122, where he asserts that the intermediate as characterized in (4) is thicker than air and re but ner than the others (tn de leptoteron). The expression the others could refer to the elements other than air and re, namely water and earth. This is unlikely if only because earth is not mentioned in the passage and so a claim about earth would not obviously advance an argument prosecuted in terms of re, air, and water only. More likely, the others refers to the element that is paired with each of re and air in (4). This gives us the following reading of 332a21-22:
(5) x is between air and water x is between air and re x is thicker than air and ner than water x is ner than air and thicker than re.

Presumably, the rst disjunct on the left of the arrow entails the lead disjunct on the right side, and the second entails the remaining disjunct on the right. Thus, whatever is between air and water is thicker than air and ner than water, and whatever is between air and re is ner than air and thicker than re.8 Armed with (5) Aristotle can make trouble for the apeiron, for the right side of (5) has an entailment that will prove to be crippling, namely:

This allows us to suppose that, for the sake of argument, Aristotle is construing Anaximanders intermediate as the only element, falling between items that are not proper elements, namely the four Aristotelian elements, for no longer would these be the fundamental elements. 8) Although Aristotle does not include earth in claim (5), as we shall shortly see his argument could be pressed against a corresponding claim that does mention earth.

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M. Wedin / Phronesis 58 (2013) 17-31 (6) x is thicker than air and ner than water x is ner than air and thicker than re x is re and air with something contrary.

As it stands, (6) is a plain version of Aristotles words: that will be air and re together with a contrary. One might suppose that Aristotle is here characterizing the intermediate as a complex triple, consisting of air, re, and a contrary. But since he begins in (3) by considering a pair of alternatives, he is more plausibly supposing that each alternative in the antecedent of (6), i.e. each element there mentioned, is to be paired with a contrary. This gives us:
(7) x is thicker than air and ner than water x is ner than air and thicker than re x is re with a contrary x is air with a contrary.

Thus, what is thicker than air and ner than water is re with a contrary and what is ner than air and thicker than re is air with a contrary. Now the consequent of (7) is problematic because it is reasonable to assume that if something is F, say, and the contrary of F, then that thing consists of contraries. This amounts to:
(8) x is re with a contrary x is air with a contrary x consists of contraries.

However, the consequent of (8) is impossible according to (1), the general principle governing Aristotles argument. For if the free variables in (8) have values then there will be something that consists of contraries, contrary to the decree of (1). So we must reject the antecedent of (8) there cannot be something that is re with a contrary or air with a contrary. But the antecedent of (8) is the consequence of (7). Because it is false, we must reject the antecedent of (7) and so enter
(9) (x)(x is thicker than air and ner than water x is ner than air and thicker than re)

as the next step of the proof. Because (9) denies the consequent of (5), we may reject (5)s antecedent and so assert:
(10) (x)(x is between air and water x is between air and re).

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What (10) denies is just what (3) asserts is a necessary condition for somethings being an intermediate. So no such intermediate entity can be the underlying stu of anything; nor, a fortiori, can it be the underlying stu of everything.9 In short, we may enter:
(11) (x)(x is intermediate).

Then, given the equivalence asserted in (2), (11) allows us to conclude:

(12) (x)(x is apeiron).

Anaximanders apeiron is, in a word, impossible. The above reconstruction appears to give Aristotle a valid argument against the very possibility of the apeiron. As far as it goes, the argument is complete, at least insofar as it captures Aristotles reasoning in 332a20-25. Nonetheless, there is something unsettling about the argument. The trouble lies in step (7). It is crucial for the claim that the intermediate consists of contraries, but it stands in need of explanation, if not argument. Neither is provided in the passage. Without some account of (7), Aristotles bold claim about Anaximanders apeiron remains mysterious. What explains Aristotles condence in (7)? Or, less ambitiously, how is (7) to be explained, quite apart from its plausibility or truth? Well, one might appeal to passages such as 331a1-3, where Aristotle speaks of the elements themselves as contraries, suggesting that at 332a20-25 what it is to be re or air with a contrary is just to be re plus another element, or air plus another element. But this suggestion fails to do justice to the claim that the apeiron is held to be something besides the four standard elements, something intermediate between them. Arguably, combining canonical elements does not yield something besides the elements. A dierent explanation would be welcome.

Note that, as a matter of logic, one could deny that something was the underlying stu of everything and still hold that it is the underlying stu of something. By denying that the intermediate can be the underlying stu of anything, Aristotle blocks this move. Of course, this allows that something could be said to underlie itself, so long as it does not consist of contraries. But this is a harmless case as far as the argument goes because the apeiron just is an intermediate and so consists of contraries.

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I shall suggest, then, that in frames such as (7) Aristotle in eect replaces occurrences of elements with occurrences of the property-pairs that constitute the elements.10 Thus, air gives way to hot and wet, re to hot and dry, and water to cold and wet. This gives Aristotle a richer set of items from which to construct the alleged intermediate entity he identies with the apeiron. So the antecedent of (7) may be rewritten as:
(7*) x is thicker than hot + wet [air] and ner than cold + wet [water] x is ner than hot + wet [air] and thicker than hot + dry [re] x is re with a contrary x is air with a contrary.

The transformation encoded in (7*) enables us to see how something intermediate between elements consists of contraries and so is impossible. How, exactly? Well, consider the rst case mentioned in (7*). If something is thicker than hot + wet and ner than cold + wet, then it will have an additional determinant. By denition of the case, this must come from either air or water. The additional determinant cannot be the property wet, because where x is air, we would be adding a determinant to something that already is wet, so that the addition of wet could not make x thicker. Moreover, because x is between air and water, the additional determinant must come from water. Since it cannot be wet, it must be in virtue of having cold that x is thicker than hot + wet. Therefore, what is between air and water must be (hot + wet) + cold. But cold is the contrary of hot and so the alleged intermediate is nothing but air (i.e. hot + wet) plus a contrary (i.e. cold). So the intermediate, x, will, after all, consist of contraries. Since this is impossible, so is the intermediate. Alternatively, and this is the second option Aristotle considers, one might begin with air and re, which is hot + dry. If there is to be something intermediate between air and re, then re must have an additional determinant. This cannot be hot, because re already is hot and so addition of this would not yield anything dierent. What must be added, of course, is the other determinant of re, namely, dry. But now what is intermediate between re and air will consist of (hot + wet) + dry. The

10) In support of this suggestion, note that Aristotle pursues a similar strategy in the passage that immediately precedes the argument of 332a20-25. For an outline of the earlier argument, see our opening paragraph.

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intermediate so characterized will be air plus a contrary and, as before, it will consist of contraries and so will be an impossible object. Slightly regimented the above alternatives can be represented as:
(7a) x is between air and water x is (hot + wet) + cold

and:
(7b) x is between air and re x is (hot + wet) + dry.

These, in turn, entail corresponding contraries, namely:

(7a*) x is hot + cold

and:
(7b*) x is wet + dry.

But the terms in (7a*) and (7b*) are each others privations. Hence, there can be nothing that satises the open sentences of either formula. Alternatively, we can give + conjunctive force. Then (7a*) and (7b*) entail, respectively, that x is hot and x is cold, and that x is wet and x is dry. These express logically incompatible formulae in the sense that for any value of x a pair of incompatible propositions results. So where this value is the intermediate, as in Aristotles proof, we are left with an impossible object. This gives full force to Aristotles claim that the intermediate, and so the apeiron, will, in Grahams lean translation, turn out to be air and re with a contrary qualication. There can be no such thing, just as advertised.11 There is, of course, more to the story. I begin with two comments about Aristotles strategy of argumentation, and then press a pair of more substantive points. Regarding strategy, note, rst, that the argument is robust in two ways. Just as what is between air and water is air with a contrary, so

It is worth mentioning that, as reconstructed, Aristotles argument requires, somewhat implausibly in my view, that wet, dry and the like are what might be called non-additive properties. That is, addition of wet to wet does not result in something dierent, i.e. something yet wetter; and addition of wet to dry yields something with contrary components rather than something dierent that is neither as wet nor as dry as its components.

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also is it water with a contrary; and just as what is between air and re is re with a contrary, so also is it air with a contrary. Aristotle does not need to add these cases because they are equivalent to the cases he does give us. For what is water with a contrary is just (wet + cold) + dry and this yields (7a*), and what is air with a contrary is (dry + cold) + hot, and this yields (7b*). Note, secondly, that the argument explicitly omits the element earth. But, again, the omission is harmless because the argument applies equally to what is between water and earth. For this will be (wet + cold) together with (cold + dry) and this reduces to what is (cold + wet) + dry and so gives us something that is wet + dry, just what (7b*) records. A more substantive point concerns what might be called the modality of Aristotles conclusion. The intermediate, he concludes, can never exist by itself.12 Now, of course, one might ask why the apeiron must exist by itself. After all, in its role as the underlying stu one might suppose that it does not occur by itself. But Anaximanders single underlying stu also occurs as the surrounding, and in this function the apeiron presumably occurs as a kind of free-standing stu. Here Aristotles argument gains traction. For we can take him to argue, counterfactually, that as free-standing stu the intermediate would actually exist as something that is between re and air or air and water and so would be something that is actually hot and cold or actually wet and dry. But this is plainly impossible as his argument shows. Since the stu that surrounds is no dierent from the stu that underlies, the latter too must be declared impossible. In both cases, what is banned is the compresence of contraries existing in their full reality without qualication (334b10-13). There is, however, more to be said about the intermediates function as surrounding stu, a role Aristotle deems impossible. Thus, consider the point that a standard element such as air can occur as a free-standing element. As such, it will have the distinctive properties that comprise it, in this case hot and wet, and it will have them without qualication. Since Anaximanders intermediate occurs as a free-standing stu, it also must possess its distinctive properties without qualication. This, of course, means that it will have the contrary properties reported in (7a*) and (7b*) without qualication. Now these resulted from combining the dening properties of the anking elements, i.e. the elements between which the
Graham 2010, 53: So it is never possible for the alleged source to exist by itself. Joachim 1922 ad loc.: the intermediate never can exist . . . in isolation.
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intermediate falls. So while the intermediate is not the product of combining standard elements, it will have to be constituted by some combination of the dening properties of these elements. It is this requirement, apparently imposed by Aristotle, that ushers in the disqualifying contradiction.13 Thus nothing can be, for example, hot without qualication and also cold without qualication, but Anaximanders intermediate must be both because it functions as an (or the) element and elements by denition are things that can have their dening properties without qualication. Hence, it cannot be the underlying element of anything.14 Its probative virtue notwithstanding, Aristotles argument invites a complication. For his complaint against the apeiron as an intermediate stu requires that Anaximander combine what cannot be combined, namely, distinct elements or at least the dening properties of such elements. Yet Aristotle himself appears to embrace just such combinations. Thus, he clearly allows that earth and re may be mixed but he must deny that this results in the impossibility facing Anaximander. He does this by claiming that, when two elements are mixed, they do not actually exist as such in the resulting mixture; rather, they exist in it potentially, in the sense that they can be recovered from the mixture as stand-alone stus. For the dening properties of such elements, a parallel account holds. Thus when re combines with water, for instance, the hot of re will be cold and the cold of water will be hot not cold or hot without qualication but cold for re and hot for water.15 Likewise, hot without qualication exists potentially in the mixture because the hot that is cold is potentially hot without qualication and the cold that is hot is potentially cold without qualication. These potentialities are actualized when re and water, the

13) The requirement is actually quite strong for in eect it legislates that all dierences between stus is to be explained by diering proportions of the fundamental properties, hot, cold, wet, and dry. So these serve as something like the building blocks for stus, elemental and other. 14) I hasten to add that it is not at all clear that the historical Anaximander would view his intermediate as analogous to an Aristotelian element. 15) As Aristotle puts it, in Joachims translation: . . . so that there exist instead a hot which (for a hot) is cold and a cold which (for a cold) is hot (On Generation and Corruption 334b10-12).This uncharacteristically colorful language may be unpacked in more pedestrian terms: the hotness that is in the mixture is not as hot as the hotness of the hot when it occurs free of cold; likewise, the cold that is in the mixture is not as cold as the coldness of the cold when it occurs free of hot.

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elements of the combination, are recovered from the combination. For then we have both dening properties existing as such without qualication. So hot and cold cannot be combined. Moreover, when hot and cold are combined in this manner (as when re and water are combined), Aristotle says that the result is an intermediate entity, something that is, for example, potentially more hot that cold. So Aristotles version of an intermediate stu is acceptable but Anaximanders is not. How is this to be allowed? Well, it appears that Aristotle must reject Anaximanders apeiron for either of two reasons. On the one hand, as we have suggested, he may simply reject the existence of an alleged stu besides the standard elements because when characterized as in (3) such stu would consist of properties that are contraries and cannot be combined. Lacking the distinction between actuality and potentiality, Anaximanders hot and cold can exist in the combination only in their full actuality. On the other hand, Aristotle might adopt a somewhat more concessive tone, allowing Anaximander to combine dening properties such as hot and cold but insisting that this can only work if it accords with his own account an account that does not call for an additional stu besides the standard elements. On this reading, Anaximander makes a worthy eort but needs Aristotle to show him how such combinations work.16 Finally, there is a point of interest concerning Aristotle and the notion of prime matter. Should such a thing exist, it would underlie the most fundamental changes perhaps, changes between elements. Aristotles allegiance to the notion is, of course, not a settled matter, and On Generation and Corruption itself discusses at some length the transformation of one element into another in terms that may not require prime matter. But if prime matter exists, it is at least clear that it is strictly a potentiality, whether a potentiality of a fundamental stu to change, or the matter of the most fundamental stus earth, air, re, and water. It will, then, enjoy the potentiality canonically associated with matter and because it is the fundamental underlying stu, it will have nothing underlying it.

How Aristotles account works, of course, is hardly pellucid. Indeed, it is fraught with diculties. To get a handle on the diculties see the excellent accounts of Fine, Code and Bogen in Lewis and Bolton 1995, and the earlier account in Gill 1989. On prime matter in On Generation and Corruption, see the Appendix in Williams 1982. For astute guidance on the complexities of Aristotles theory of mixture see Fine 1995.

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So Aristotles prime matter is pure potentiality. As such, it is nothing that actually exists or, at any rate, nothing that actually exists on its own as such. By contrast, then, where P is the fundamental underlying stu, Anaximander apparently is held to:
(13) P underlies everything P actually exists as such.17

As we have seen, (13) can be attributed to Anaximander because he holds that the intermediate, as the surrounding, exists on its own as a standalone stu and also underlies everything else. Since it exists on its own, the intermediate could qualify as an element because for Aristotle an element must be capable of existing as a stand-alone stu.18 For Aristotle something like this occurs when an element ceases to underlie, i.e. when it is recovered from a mixture. This maneuver exceeds Anaximanders conceptual range. Plus, in any case, Aristotles version of an ultimate underlying stu is not subject to this constraint. Therefore, he may deny (13) and help himself to:
(14) P underlies everything P does not actually exist as such,

which is consistent with the thesis that prime matter exists as a pure potentiality.19 From this point of view, Anaximanders apeiron is less a

According to Williams (1982, 214), at 332a35-b1 Aristotle takes another swipe at Anaximander by asserting that the apeiron was held to be both perceptible and prior to the elements, whereas in fact nothing that is prior to the elements, the ultimate perceptible items, could be perceptible. It is not completely clear that Aristotle is addressing Anaximanders singleton in this passage as opposed to drawing a consequence for his own view, namely, that what would be intermediate between the elements would have to be imperceptible and inseparable. In attributing (13) to Anaximander, Aristotle takes him to award separate existence to the apeiron. It is, however, unclear that this, in turn, entails that the apeiron be perceptible, for in Aristotles scheme something can be actual without being perceptible. Perhaps, its status as an actual material or stu-like thing is sucient to generate the entailment. This would give him the requisite contrast with Anaximanders singleton, namely, his own candidate, prime matter. 18) Note here that (13) does not require that P, in its role as the underlying stu, actually exists as such (though it may, for all I know). It is enough that what serves in this role is capable, independently, of existing on its own. 19) This claim invites comment. Consider, for instance, the fact that prime matter, as a strict potentiality, is arguably nothing actual. There are two worries about this. First, it may

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plain blunder than an honorable, if unsuccessful, precursor to Aristotles notion of prime matter.20

Bibliography
Barnes, J. (1979), The Presocratic Philosophers, vol. 1. London. Bogen, J. (1995), Fire in the Belly: Aristotelian Elements, Organisms, and Chemical Compounds, Pacic Philosophical Quarterly 76: 370-404. Buchheim, T. (2010), Aristoteles: Ueber Werden und Vergehen. Berlin. Charles, D. (2004), Simple Genesis and Prime Matter in F. de Haas and J. Mansfeld (eds.), Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I (Oxford), 151-69. Cherniss. H. (1935), Aristotles Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. Baltimore. Code, A. (1995), Potentiality in Aristotles Science and Metaphysics, Pacic Philosophical Quarterly 76: 405-18. strain the parallel with how matter functions in familiar cases. For even as a potentiality, ordinary matter can hardly be nothing actual. For suppose there existed nothing but oak benches and chairs. In such a circumstance there would exist no plain oak matter, only oak shaped up in pretty denite ways. But should we care to say that oak does not actually exist, then neither will there exist oaken things. And so with matter more generally, were there no plain earth, neither would there be earthen things. And so it would seem that at the most general level of all, were there no plain matter then there would be no material things. In all these cases, it seems to me that we are inclined to arm that the oak, the earth and the matter is something actual. The principle underlying this seems to be that if x is an actual thing with matter, m, then m is actual. So it is hard to see how prime matter could underlie anything actual. Yet as with Anaximanders apeiron, so Aristotles prime matter is held to enjoy just this function. Now if earth as such is something actual, then we need to make sense of earth as such existing as such, not merely existing as this or that shaped up thing. Perhaps, we can accommodate this by appealing to the fact that earth as such would be at its natural place and in this circumstance would not be shaped up as any given earthen thing. There is, of course, no parallel for prime matter and so this further strains the analogy between it and ordinary matter. A second and related worry is this: supposing prime matter to function as something underlying, still how can something that is a mere potentiality take on any actual properties, as it must if it is to be something actual such as re or earth? One answer, due to Lewis (2008, 125 n. 5), is that prime matter has as essential properties only dispositional properties. Thus, it has the disposition to be hot, and this is realized when it serves as the matter of re. I leave to the reader whether, and to what extent, this might strain the parallel with how more ordinary matter accommodates dispositional properties. More generally, I leave to bolder hands the nuances attending Aristotles notion of an ultimate and strictly potential thing. Here Lewis 2008, Charles 2004, and Code1995 are adept guides. 20) This may oset Barness appraisal (1979, 37) that with Anaximanders notion of the apeiron, we nd ourselves in a desert of ignorance and uncertainty.

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