The U.

S Position toward the 2011 Libyan Revolution

By Hasan Karayam Under supervision Dr. Stephen D. Morris

Fall 2012

The U.S. policy toward Libya during the 2011 Libyan Revolution represented a new stage in American foreign policy toward Libya, after four decades of poor and deteriorating relations under the Qaddafi regime. In fact, those poor relations played a key role in determining the U.S. position during the revolution that eventually led to American military intervention through the United Nations, despite the domestic reaction in the United States. But, what are the motivations that pushed Obamas administration to intervene in Libya unlike other countries of Arab Spring? Did Obama consider failing of Bush administration in Iraq war? The objective of this paper is to examine the main reasons which drove U.S foreign policy during the revolution. I will also delineate American interests in Libya and how bad experience with Libyan foreign policy (Qaddafi regime) impact on this position. The U.S. position toward Libya over both the short and long terms is has multiple audiences and drivers, including U.S. interests in the Middle East in general and in Libya in particular, and U.S. allies interests (especially its Western allies) in the Middle East. So, a debate over the causes of U.S. intervention in Libya is complicated by a variety of factors. This complexity revealed itself in the ambiguity in U.S. President Barack Obamas speeches in the early months of the Libyan Revolution. For example, his first in March pointed to U.S. interests and values, but he did not delineate what exactly those interests and values were. It was fuzzy speech in term of U.S foreign policy toward Libya.1 Obama also was not enthusiastic about intervention at the beginning of the revolution, despite his concern about Libyas future which was being planned by effect of U.S. allies Bill Van Auken, Obama on Libya: A War for US interests, World Socialist Web Site, March 29, 2011, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/mar2011/obam-m29.shtml (accessed November 28, 2012); Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, 28 March 2011, White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya (accessed November 3, 2012).
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(European states).2 This impact was manifest during U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clintons meeting in Paris with the G-8 foreign ministers in early March 2011(before intervention which was on March 19) about the Obama administrations stance on intervention in Libya. Clintons unwillingness to commit the United States to a specific position led European states to wonder exactly where the administration stood on the situation in Libya. David Cameron, British Prime Minister, stated that such American ambivalence would lead Arab (Middle East states) to believe that the U.S. would intervene to secure its own security interests but not to expand democracy in the area.3 In addition to the urging of Americas Western allies, the world society encouraged the United States to act but it would not repeat its mistake in Iraq war. The failure of U.S. foreign policy in the Iraq war made the Obama administration hesitant to define a U.S. position toward Libya without close cooperation with its allies. The American President said that he would not act unilaterally, as the United States had when it launched the Iraq war in 2003.4 At another point, pointing to the cost of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Obama stated that regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.5 Therefore, the United States was reluctant to define the goals or missions in Libya--not because

Mark Mardell, Obama: Libyas Future is a Vital U.S Interest, BBC Channel, August 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14624414 (accessed November 28, 2012) 3 Josh Rogin, European Governments Completely Puzzled about U.S Position on Libya, Foreign Policy, March 16, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/16/european_governments_completely_puzzled _about_us_position_on_libya (accessed November 28, 2012) 4 Christi Parsons and Paul Richter, Obama Defends Libya Mission, Los Angeles Times, March 29, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/29/world/la-fg-obama-libya-20110329 (accessed November 28, 2012) 5 As quoted in Helene Cooper, Obama Cites Limits of U.S Role in Libya, New York Times, March 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html?pagewanted=all (accessed November 26, 2012)

it is afraid to act--but because the burden of action should not be Americans alone.6 and to give its intervention an international legitimacy by implementing the UN Resolution 1973 with its allies. In this context Obama said because contrary to the claims of some, American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are up held by all.7 Hence, the military intervention was the product of a confluence of particular circumstances and opportunities. Despite the Obama administrations insistence on sharing the burden, there was no doubt, based on earlier Libyan-American relations that the United States was interested in overthrowing the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi had supported terrorism against the Western powers and had disturbed U.S. policy in the Middle East. I have not taken any option off the table I am absolutely clear that it is in the interests of the United States and the Libya people that Qaddafi is removed,8 But the American position was often justified on humanitarian grounds to protect civilians. On the other hand, removing Qaddafi, who was described as a tyrant by Obama, would make way for the United States and its European allies to build new alliance in the region. Libya is a country where the United States could build an alliance that would protect civilians and defend U.S interests.9 The United States believed that removing Qaddafi would produce stability in the region and facilitate the transition to democracy in the neighboring countries of Egypt and Tunisia. U.S

As quoted in ibid. Ibid. 8 Political News, U.S Position on Libya, March 11, 2011, http://www.politicolnews.com/us-position-on-libya/ (accessed November 27, 2012) 9 Parsons and Richter, Obama Defends Libya Mission.
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had an important strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning the opposition forces because a massacre would have driven thousands of refugees across Libyan borders and put a strain on the transitional governments in Egypt and Tunisia on American allies in Europe.10 Obamas administration was concerned about removing Qaddafi for Egypt and Tunisia more than Libya. Robert Gates, the U.S. Defense Secretary, explained that Libya itself might not be a vital national interest to the U.S. but the? prospect of turmoil spilling beyond its borders is worrisome you had a potentially significantly destabilizing event taking place in Libya that put at risk potentially the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt and that was another consideration I think we took into account.11 Therefore, the United States concern about stabilization in the region more than anything else. Therefore, removing Qaddafi had many purposes and made Libya is not like other countries in the Arab spring. This explains why the United State did not act in other countries, Obamas justification for intervening in Libya missing word? a response to those who questioned? Why his administration acted there and not in other countries such as U.S allies Bahrain and Yemen, where civilian protesters have been killed. In Syria, a country of greater strategic importance than Libya that long has had a strained relationship with Washington, dozens have died in recent days.12 Consequently, the history of bad Libyan-American relations from 1969 until 2011 played a decisive role in determining the U.S. position on, at least in the short term, the Libyan
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Ibid. Scott Horsley, U.S. Intervention in Libya: A Noble Use of Force? National Public Radio, March 28, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134927059/u-s-intervention-in-libya-anoble-use-of-force (accessed November 28, 2012); Stephen M. Walt, Why the Libyan Revolution May Not Matter Very Much, Foreign Policy, August 24, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/23/why_the_libyan_revolution_may_not_matter_ve ry_much (accessed November 29, 2012). 12 Parsons and Richter, Obama Defends Libya Mission.

Revolution. While this helps explain the motivation that led to U.S. military intervention in Libya, it does not explain or define American interests in Libya after removing Qaddafi. Lance Selfa, an editor of the International Socialist Review and regular contributor to the Socialist Worker newspaper, pointed to U.S. and Western motivations behind the military intervention in Libya. He highlighted the Western goals of stabilizing the region and securing oil investments rather than overthrowing Qaddafi. He explains western interests including the United States interests in Libya and in the Middle East as whole, the United States and its European allies begun the year with the Qaddafi regime as an ally in the war on terror and Libya a fertile ground for Western investment. Until recently, they were prepared to accept Qaddafis continued rule in Libya, even at the cost of the rebellion against him being crushed. Only when the threat to regional stability and oil supplies become alarming to the west did they act of course, western intervention has many other motivations besides the humanitarian claims in support of Resolution 1973: preserving the flow of Libyan oil, prevent mass of Libyans to Europe, getting rid of failed state in Libya, and stopping the Arab revolution from overthrowing another dictator through its own efforts.13 Another aim of western intervention was to clearly communicate to any subsequent government in Libya after the revolution that it should be depend on the Western powers to stabilize the region under the guise of Western domination. In this context, Self states but even if the intervention plays some role in Qaddafi downfall -which is by no means certain- any regime that comes to power in Libya will be compromised from the start by its dependence on Western powers that arent concerned at all about democracy and

Lance Selfa, Libyas Revolution, U.S. Intervention, and the Left, International Socialist Review 77 (May-June 2011), http://isreview.org/issues/77/feat-libya&left.shtml#top (accessed November 27, 2012).

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justice, but about maintaining stability and reasserting their dominance in a region that has seen two victorious revolutions against U.S-backed dictators and the possibility of more to come.14 Finally, long-term goal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, including Libya, has not changed and reflects the goals of its founders during the 1950s and 1960s, especially U.S. Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. This is true despite the many significant developments that have subsequently occurred in world politics, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a post-Mao China as a global economic power.

References 1- Van Auken, Bill. Obama on Libya: A War for US Interests. World Socialist Web Site, March 29, 2011, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/mar2011/obam-m29.shtml. 2- Cooper, Helene. Obama Cites Limits of U.S Role in Libya. New York Times, March 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html?pagewanted=all. 3- Horsley, Scott. U.S. Intervention in Libya: A Noble Use of Force? National Public Radio, March 28, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134927059/u-s-interventionin-libya-a-noble-use-of-force. 4- Mardell, Mark. Obama: Libyas Future is a Vital U.S. Interest. British Broadcasting Company, August 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14624414.

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Ibid.

5- Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, 28 March 2011. White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-addressnation-libya (accessed November 3, 2012). 6- Parsons, Christi, and Paul Richter. Obama Defends Libya Mission. Los Anglos Times, March 29, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/29/world/la-fg-obamalibya-20110329. 7- Political News, U.S. Position on Libya. March 11, 2011, http://www.politicolnews.com/us-position-on-libya/. 8- Rogin, Josh. European Governments Completely Puzzled about U.S. Position on Libya. Foreign Policy, March 16, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/16/european_governments_complete ly_puzzled_about_us_position_on_libya. 9- Selfa, Lance. Libyas Revolution, U.S. Intervention, and the Left. International Socialist Review 77 (May-June 2011), http://isreview.org/issues/77/featlibya&left.shtml#top. 10- Walt, Stephen M. Why the Libyan Revolution May Not Matter Very Much. Foreign Policy, August 24, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/23/why_the_libyan_revolution_may_not _matter_very_much.