www.rusi.

org

Developing the UK's military capabilities

Digitising the battlefield

Lt Gen Baxter (Retd) explains the vital contribution of CIS to operational capability

J5F synthetic training

Moving to a 50/50 live/synthetic training mix for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Full steam ahead

A review of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier build programme

DEFENCE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Games Armies Play

Dr Jeffrey Peter Bradford looks into the importance of simulation and training, and the difference between these two critical military activities

ilitary training has gone through repeated evolutions, arguably along two lines of development tactical/ operational-level training and campaign simulation. Since ancient times, warriors have practised their tactical skills from wrestling and play-ghting with wooden weapons to the use today of low-power lasers and sensors to determine accuracy and effectiveness both individually and in formations. At the strategic end of the training equation, games such as chess and draughts through to the staff rides of the von Clausewitz and Von Moltke era, sand tables, role playing and big data strategic simulation have sought to test brain as opposed to brawn in the military arts with the aim of ensuring readiness. This article is concerned with two issues. First, in an environment of scarce resources approaching the end of military campaigns in the Middle East and Asia, how will military training adapt? Second, given the interest in harnessing the video-game generation, is there too heavy a reliance on computer-based training and simulation? Tactical training that is both the practise and use of weapons and skills to overcome local military challenges has a very long history. For the knights of the middle ages, peacetime training was relatively cheap to pursue, given that the xed costs of operations horses, armour, weaponry were already accounted for and in-service support costs

tended to be borne by the fact that the knight was, in a business sense, vertically integrated (in other words, he invariably owned the means of producing and supporting his arsenal). Fast forward half a millennium, and the situation is far more complex and indeed expensive. Weapons, equipment, the physical environment, air component computers, electronics and C4ISTAR mean that a tactical/operational training environment can and has to have multiple elements to make it realistic and worthwhile, which is very expensive. As defence budgets contract in the run-up to the end of medium-scale operations in the Middle East and Asia, the temptation will obviously be to restrict training to preserve where possible personnel levels, platforms, investment and research and development. In the twentieth century, the interwar period saw dramatic reductions in investment for military training, spurred by a societal antipathy in many cases to conict following the devastating losses of the First World War. When military exercises occurred they often involved, at the tactical level, soldiers on bicycles practising their formations, saying bang instead of ring real ordnance. It is an oft-ignored fact that the perfection of the German armoured blitzkreig was initially learnt and perfected by men on bicycles, farm tractors and light trucks as opposed to Panzer tanks and costly large-scale manoeuvres.
A soldier being trained to use a helmet-mounted virtual display

MAJ PENNY ZAMORA/US ARMY

75

DEFENCE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

At the strategic campaign level, techniques such as the staff ride, where ofcers would walk or ride on horseback on a battleeld to learn what happened, simulating battles with maps, sand tables and model soldiers, have prevailed into the electronic age.1 A military ofcer transported to a campaign simulation exercise today would probably have greater familiarity with what was occurring than a soldier at the tactical level. History offers us some guidance for the period we are now entering. The end of a series of medium- to large-scale campaigns in a particular geography and operating environment creates a need for training that emphasises core skills and re-establishes familiarity with other geographical operating environments. For example, during the Cold War most training focused on heavy-armour operations in central Europe during the era of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. However, biennial Bright Star exercises enabled formations to train and practise operations in the Middle East that were arguably critical in engendering

coordination, video games risk engendering military personnel with the mentality of being relatively invulnerable and thinking that a tactical problem can be solved with a quick eye and sufcient ammunition. This ies against the hearts and minds nature of counter-insurgency operations of the past few years in the Middle East, which have a more qualitatively complex character. At the campaign level, training in an austere environment is a more surmountable proposition. Computer-supported aids enable a command staff to interact realistically while disconnected from large military formations. The key to success at the campaign level is the quality of the environment, where role-playing can be the decisive element in training. Having people simulate NGOs, the nuances of culture from local civilians, politicians and such brings a campaign simulation to life, minimising the mathematical effects of number crunching the Lanchester Laws when military force A encounters military force B. Given the maturity of computer-based simulation at the campaign
CUBIC

Techniques such as the staff ride have prevailed into the electronic age
condence among decision-makers during the early stages of the rst large-scale conict to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1990.2 Likewise, regular training in amphibious warfare in northern Europe was essential to the capability calculus of the UK when it mobilised to reverse the invasion of the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. To the budget conscious, it is interesting to note that exercises in what are regarded as more extreme environments than conventional wisdom would presume offer glimpses of the more-likely future operational environment. The US military could be considered to have the strategic advantage of access, within its territory, to elements of every conceivable terrain in which to train. The issue, however, is whether they can cost-effectively preserve the budget necessary to exploit the potential for military readiness. For the UK, the major training budget challenge will be the workup of the new carrier group, of which the rst aircraft carrier is due to start work-up trials in 2017. Having decommissioned the Invincible-class aircraft carriers with the exception of HMS Illustrious, which is now a helicopter carrier building a cadre of skilled personnel to man these will be a major challenge. Synthetic (computer) training at the tactical level has become a touchstone for military trainers and the industry that supports them. Phrases such as the video-game generation positively suggest that the level of immersion and realism of modern computer games enables replication of the tactical military environment. Is this, however, a good thing? The video-game market moves quickly, driven by consumer demands for better graphics and playable games. Playability, however, does not arguably create a good tactical training environment. In real life, military personnel do not have multiple lives or the ability to save a position and return later, nor levels of repower beyond which they can realistically carry. While a boon in improving hand-eye

Cubics COMBATREDI system merges gaming technology with military training concepts

level, military trainers need to shift resources to bringing in expert content in order to effectively simulate the environment. In summary, the collision of budgetary issues in defence establishments and the end of a period of sustained operations will likely lead to calls for reduction in training budgets. It could be suggested that training spend should be trimmed where necessary, though refocused on the left of eld environments that could well be tomorrows campaigns. Additionally, the strategic-campaign-level training environment requires creativity and content expertise to bring training to life in such a way that commanders can reect on the intangible substance of a military campaign in order to be more effective when called to put their skills into practice.

Footnotes
1. 2. For a more detailed appreciation of the staff ride, see Robertson, WG. The Staff Ride, United States Army Center of Military History, Washington DC, 1987 The US Central Command (CENTCOM) biennial exercises grew out of the Camp David Accords in 1980. For more information, see www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ops/bright-star.htm

76

RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS 2013