Unclassified - Commission Sensitive /')

W
Outline of Team Three Monograph on Counterterrorism Policy

I. How did the United States try to fight terrorism before September 11?

A. Narrative: What did senior decision makers see as U.S. "strategy" in

fighting terrorism? Infighting al-Qa'ida?

1. How did they articulate this strategy?

2. Was it shared at all senior levels?

3. Did policymakers recognize the unusual nature of the al-Qa'ida

challenge?

4. How did the strategy evolve over time?

5. Key decision points linked to events

6. Policy statements, documents, bureaucratic changes, and other

manifestations

B. Description of each Department or Agency participation

1. Did the CIA contribute with robust covert action efforts?

a) What instruments did the CIA use?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(7) To Counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al~Qa'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument?

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

Page 1
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

e) Why did the CIA fail to "get" Bin Ladin?

2. Did DoD and the military consider the use of force properly?

a) What instruments did the military use?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument?

d) What instruments were not used?

(7) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

e) Why did the military not use force more robustly against
al-Qa'ida? Was it limited to "TLAM therapy"?

3. Did DoJ ensure a robust legal response?

a) What instruments did DOJ use?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument?

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

Page 2
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

e) How legalistic were lawyers?

f) Were there times when a legal response was not

appropriate?

g) Was the legal strategy coordinated with the overall U.S.

response?

4. Did the State Department properly emphasize counterterrorism in

overall diplomacy?

a) What contributions did these instruments make?

(7) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa'ida

b) What were the limits of each instrument?

c) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

5. Coordination

a) Did agencies coordinated with each other?

b) Did the White House ensure proper coordination and

leadership on counterterrorism issues?

6. Did support go beyond senior (political) levels of the agencies to

include the civil service (and vice-versa)

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

PageS
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

C. Were there gaps in U.S. strategy?

1. What gaps existed, if any, given the threat that was emerging?

2. Did policy makers recognize the gaps?

3. Did policy makers try to fill them?

4. Why were certain instruments not used?

5. Why was there not a more robust response to the 1998 Embassy
strikes? Why was there no response to the attack on USS Cole?

6. Given the gaps in our strategy, was sufficient attention given to

homeland defense?

II. Did we miss opportunities to stop al-Qa'ida before September 11?

A. Could we have stopped al-Qa'ida in Sudan?

1. Was Bin Ladin recognized as a problem during his time in Sudan?

Was al-Qa'ida?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Sudan?

3. What leverage did the United States have with Sudan? With its
neighbors?

4. What instruments were considered for pressing Sudan? Which

ones were used?

5. Why was Bin Ladin expelled?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

Page 4
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

B. Could we have stopped al-Qa 'ida in Afghanistan ?

1. When was Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida recognized as a problem by

senior policy makers?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Afghanistan? With
its neighbors?

3. What leverage did the United States have with Afghanistan?

Were there indirect forms of leverage (e.g. through Pakistan)?

4. What instruments were considered? Which ones were used?

5. Why did the various instruments fail or achieve only partial

success?

C. Was stopping al-Qa 'ida a priority in the many permissive environments in

which it operated?

1. Identify range of al-Qa'ida operating environments and select

several (Pakistan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia) for particular
scrutiny.

a) Describe the al-Qa'ida problem

b) Type of activity conducted in the country

c) Government response, or lack thereof

d) Degree of government cooperation with al-Qa'ida (or

penetration), if any

2. Explaining U.S. policy

a) Was al-Qa'ida recognized as a problem by senior policy

makers in the United States with regard to the various
countries?

b) What other goals did the United States have in these

countries? How much did these conflict with
counterterrorism?

c) What leverage did the United States have?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

PageS
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

d) What instruments were considered? Which ones were

used?

e) Why did the various instruments fail or succeed?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

Page 6
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

III. What problems did we have overall in fighting terrorism and al-Qa'ida?

A. Conflicting priorities/focus

B. Resources

C. Recognition of the enormity of the threat

D. Lack of popular support for dramatic change

1. How strong was the opposition

2. Was there an attempt to shape/lead public opinion?

E. Lack of foreign government support

1. Regimes supported al-Qa'ida

2. Regimes sympathetic to al-Qa'ida's ideology

3. Regimes fearful of a confrontation with Islamists

4. Civil liberties issues

5. Regime did not enjoy close relations with the United States

6. Lack of regime capacity for cracking down on al-Qa'ida

F. Poor bureaucratic coordination and communication in the U.S.

G. "Somalia syndrome'Vcasualty aversion

H. President Clinton's political troubles ?

I. Bureaucratic resistance (discuss for various bureaucracies, as appropriate,

including the U.S. military)

1. Did not see al-Qa'ida as their institution's mission

2. Did not see al-Qa'ida as a sufficient threat

3. Institution unable to contribute due to lack of capabilities

/. Many to add here

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

Page?
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

IV. Have these problems been fixed?

A. Sufficient money?

B. Sufficient focus?

C. Degree of institutionalization?

D. New problems that have emerged?

V. Are we doing the right thing now? (And is the lack of attacks tied to this?)

A. WMD, loose nukes

B. Iraq

C. MEPP

D. Draining the swamp?

E. Anti-Americanism

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

PageS