Questions for Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Peter Pace

General Pace assumed his current position on October 1, 2001

Served as Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, from 8 September 2000 -

30 September 2001
Served as Director of Operations (J3) from 5 August 1996 - 23 November 1997

General Questions
A. Background questions

Military Planning
Note: The purpose of this section is to obtain an understanding of the process that would
have led to the development of plans in DoD after August 1998, including who has
ultimate authority to "put the plans on the shelf. "

A. Describe your role in the development of military plans within the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

B. Please detail the process in which plans are developed within JCS and the
CC's upon a request for such plans from the Secretary of Defense or the CJCS
(e.g., plans for military action in Afghanistan).

1. Please detail the process of deliberation of those plans among the

commands. For example, incorporating reaction from USSOCOM,
JSOC and SOCCENT to plans developed by CENTCOM.

2. Who within the DoD structure is the ultimate decision maker for
options. For example, can the Combatant Commander of CENTCOM
determine options for military operations to take place within his
command should not be further developed and instead, "put on the
shelf?

i. What is the approval process for these plans?

3. Once a contingency plan is placed on the shelf, how often is it _

reviewed?

Khobar Towers
A. We recognize you assumed office as J3, JCS, after the 1996 Khobar Towers
attack. However, what do you recall was the attitude of those at the Joint Staff
when you assumed command of the J3 (on August 6, 1996) regarding KT?
 B. What was your view regarding the DoD response to the KT incident, which
was to increase force protection for U.S. troops

Secretary Rumsfeld's Memorandum and Military CT Efforts

Today
A. Is DoD winning the global war on terrorism (GWOT)?

B. What are some of the specific changes that have taken place within OSD
(policy formulation and structure) in its effort to win the GWOT?
a. What other changes are needed to better fight the GWOT?

C. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have discussed the defense

transformation that is central to winning the Global War on Terrorism. In January
2002, Rumsfeld outlined six key transformational goals in a Speech at the
National Defense University. General Myers stated that his goal is to foster
changes that result in a dramatic improvement over time in the way a combatant
commander wages war. Please update us on how defense transformation is
progressing regarding its effect to win the GWOT.

A. Is DoD changing fast enough to fight the GWOT?

B. How is success in the GWOT measured? What are the metrics by which
success is measured?

C. Does the U.S. have a broad, integrated and comprehensive plan to combat
terrorism? Are the various instruments working well together (diplomacy,
intelligence, military, financial, etc)
V
r \. Describe the adequacy of intelligence provided today to the warfighter? Has it
improved since 9-11? If so, in what ways?
s/
y 1. Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you receive? Is
the quality of the analysis up to your standards?

E. Assess the role of the Predator in war in Afghanistan post 9-11.

F. You were not in you current office during the October 2000 USS Cole attack.
However, we would like to hear your views on the U.S. response. For
example, the focus on law enforcement and no military response.

G. Provide an assessment of joint CT operations between the CIA and SOFs post
9-11.
 1 . Should there be a joint force of CIA paramilitary and SOFs rather than
two separate entities to combat terrorism?

H. Discuss the role of NORTHCOM, its subordinate commands and the new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in CT efforts within the
US.

I. Discuss your understanding of the decision making process leading to the

establishment of SOCOM as a supported command in the GWOT.

J. What role can the military play in winning the hearts and minds of those who
might one day become our enemies. Is this part of the DoD GWOT mission?

K. In your view, how prepared was the military to mount a large conventional
operation after 9-1 1? Do you know if there were any plans on the shelf for this
type of action? , tk^ ~? - /n^ if'
L. Lessons learned

M. Recommendations

N. What should we have asked?

 \
\

F T

V
 Pre-Meeting for Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, Myers and Pace
General Categories of Inquiry

All of these individuals assumed their current positions when the new administration took
office in January 2001. General Pace did not assume his position as VCJCS until
October 1, 2001.

I recognize that during the interviews, Philip will go through the timeline and will likely
not ask questions based on these categories. Nevertheless, I will add more detail to this
when I am back home and preparing for the actual interviews.

General categories of inquiry

I: General Background
• What is the role of his office in United States CT policy formulation?
• Provide information on his interactions with key offices in OSD/DoD/Combatant
Commands as related to CT policy formulation and operations planning:
o SecDef, USD/P, ASD SO/LIC, CJCS, J3, CENTCON, SOCOM, JSOC.

II: PC and DC Meetings Attended

• Specific meetings on the timeline.

III. Priority of the CT issue as compared to other national security issues when the
new administration came into office (not for Pace). For example:
• ABM
• Iraq

IV. The Role of the Military in CT

• What was his position in general prior to 9-11 about boots on the use of military
force in Afghanistan (including SOFs, conventional, cruise missiles, etc)
o What is the basis for these positions?
• Was it possible to have a more aggressive military position prior to 9-11?
o If so, why was this not done?
o If not, why not?
• Assess the claim that the military was not "aggressive" in CT efforts prior to 9-11.
• Should the U.S. have been the lead agency for CT efforts either here or abroad
prior to 9-11?
• Views on the assertions the USG did not want to use SOFs.
• Should the U.S. have relied on Proxies in Afghanistan?
• An assessment of the "success" of the other CT instruments as they were viewed
prior to 9-11.

(Meyers)
• His knowledge of various plans (13 options, Newbold's, possibly Frye's).
o If he has such knowledge, was he briefed on the plans?
• His knowledge of other plans within the DoD components.
 • His knowledge of what happened to the plan.
• His knowledge of discussions of plans within DC or PC meetings.
o What were the positions taken by OSD/DoD attendees?
• The rationale for these positions.
o What was the USG rationale for USG decisions regarding the use of force
in Afghanistan prior to 9-11?

V. The Role of the CSG (for Meyers)

• His view on the role of the CSG in US CT efforts.
• How were decisions made at CSG meetings integrated into the decision making
process of DC meetings and PC meetings?
• Did the military trust the decisions making process within the CSG?
• What did he think of Clarke?

VI. Intelligence Support to the Warfighter (Not Pace)

• Define actionable intelligence.
• Explain the intelligence that was required to conduct a military operation against
UBL and A-Q pre 9-11.
o Please give an assessment of what would be required for the following
types of operations: SOFs, conventional force, cruise missiles, bombers.
• His assessment of the intelligence to support military operations targeting UBL
and A-Q that existed prior to 9-11.
• Explain how the importance of actionable intelligence affected potential military
operations prior to 9-11.

VII. Transition briefings (not for Myers or Pace)

• Did he receive any?
• Who were the participants?
• Was CT briefed? If so, what priority was it given during the brief?
• What else was briefed during the transition?

VIII. SOFs and CIA Paramilitary

• Provide an assessment of joint SOF/CIA paramilitary operations prior to 9-11.

IX. The Predator (not Pace)

• What role did he play in the decision making process regarding the use of the
Predator?
• What positions did he take on the outstanding issues on the use of the Predator
and why?
• What was the major advantage of the Predator to the military?
X. Military to Military Contacts (not Pace)
• The mid-2001 decision to develop mil-to-mil contacts. Explain the decision
making process underlying this effort.

XI. The Development of USSOCOM

• Explain the decision making process leading to the decision to make SOCOM a
supported command.

XII: Homeland Defense

o Would he have supported the establishment of a NORTHCOM type command
prior to 9-11?
o If not, why not?
o If so, why?

XIII: Final Assessments

• How has the role of the military in CT policy formulation changed since 9-11?
• How is the military campaign against CT progressing today?
• What improvements must still be made in DoD to combat terrorism?
• Actionable intelligence - how is CT intelligence support to the warfighter today?
o Is it better? If so, why?
o If not, why not?
• Assess the current role of the Predator in the fight against terrorism.
• Provide his assessment of the effectiveness of SOF/Paramilitary operations
against CT today.
o Views on developing a permanent joint/single force for CT issues.
• Does the U.S. have a comprehensive, integrated CT strategy today?
• Discuss the role of NORTHCOM in homeland security and defense against
terrorism.
• Lessons learned.
• Recommendations.
Biography - GEN Peter Pace Page 1 of3

Updated: 23 Sep 2003

GEN PETER PACE

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Peter Pace is the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In this capacity, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Nation's second highest ranking military officer. General Pace is the
sixth officer to hold the position and the first Marine.

As the Vice Chairman, General Pace serves as the Chairman of the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Vice Chairman of the Defense
Acquisition Board, and as a member of the National Security Council
Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition,
he acts for the Chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System to include participating in meetings of the
Defense Resources Board.

General Pace was born in Brooklyn, N. Y., and raised in Teaneck,

New Jersey. He received his commission in June 1967, following
graduation from the United States Naval Academy. He also holds a
Master's Degree in Business Administration from George Washington
University and attended Harvard University for the Senior Executives in National and International Security
program.

Upon completion of The Basic School, Quantico, Va., in 1968, he was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, 1st Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam, serving first as a Rifle Platoon Leader and
subsequently as Assistant Operations Officer.

http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/pace_bio.html 1/13/2004