Amigable vs Cuenca Case Digest

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925." *

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement dated December 9, 1958.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case?

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

Case Digest - Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971

Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971 FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation. In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Bailed estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the

Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government immunity from suit correct? HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court decided that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law. Froilan v Pan Shipping (1954) FACTS: On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines; that he appealed the action of theShipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting on August 25, 1950,the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it suffered damages in the amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed(Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping Administration) the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the

Interest excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the session of the said vessel either under the terms of the original contract as supplemented by Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be declared to be without any rights on said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately that the said vessel be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the merits, the said vessel be delivered to its owner On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful expenses of the vessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic vessel, to comply with its obligations of delivering to it(Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan on November 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount of P162,576.96 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration for the said vessel as claimed in the complaint in intervention of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Board of Liquidators issued an official report therefore stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines brought the matter of said payment and the circumstances surrounding it to the attention of the lower court 'in order that they may be taken into account by this Honorable Court in connection with question that are now pending before it for determination. On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the amount of P162,576.96 On November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and ordered the dismissal of the latter's complaint in intervention. In the same order, the lower court made it very clear that said order did not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan and the Oriental Shipping Co. which was also pending determination in said court. This order dismissing the complaint in intervention, but reserving for future adjudication the controversy between Froilan and the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had already become final since neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippines nor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed therefrom. On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the

Counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver the vessel to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view, however, of the order of the order of the lower court dated February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by Froilan's obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and stated no cause of action. It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in connection with the counterclaim. This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952. ISSUE: Whether or not the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit. HELD: NO! because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability."The immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defense he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains: No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'".It is however,

contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complainant in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendants claim over the possession of the vessel in question.