THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE MENO Monica Burnett

Introduction In Platos Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to define piety. While at first Euthyphro believes he knows pietys meaning, after being cross-examined by Socrates, Euthyphro realizes he does not, and leaves in a baffled state. Euthyphro thus concludes in aporia, a common ending for many Socratic dialogues. Platos Meno begins in a similar manner. Socrates challenges Meno, an aristocrat and young politician, to explain what virtue is. Meno, who has given countless speeches on virtue, is certain of virtues meaning. But after Socrates cross-examines Meno, Meno is forced to conclude that in spite of his initial confidence, he does not know what virtue is. However, unlike Euthyphro and many other Socratic dialogues, Meno does not end here. A frustrated Meno turns the tables on Socrates and poses his own series of epistemological questions, now known as Menos Paradox: How will you look for [virtue] when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know (80d5-8). The paradox raises a substantial problem for Socrates, who often inquires into subjects he claims to have no knowledge of 1. Wherein lies the problem? Suppose Socrates, (or any one, for that matter) does not have knowledge of X. If knowledge of X is necessary for inquiry of X, then it seems logical to conclude that Socrates cannot inquire into X. If Menos paradox is sound, Socrates would have to turn in his thinking cap, and it would be a sad day for philosophers everywhere. Fortunately, when one investigates more closely into Menos Paradox, the argument becomes much less convincing. This paper will analyze Menos argument and Socrates response. It will eventually conclude that Socrates is able to defeat Menos paradox through a distinction he draws between true opinion and justified true belief. The response, however, is not without its flaws. The novice philosopher is still left to puzzle over how to distinguish between his/her true and false opinions.
1 The Meno and Euthyphro dialogues are prime examples.

The Learners Argument Socrates recapitulates Menos Paradox in the following manner. Do you realize what a debaters argument you are bringing up, that a man can either search for what he knows or what he doesnt know? He cannot search for what he knows-- since he knows it there is no need to search-- nor for what he doesnt know, for he does not know what to look for (80e1-5). This is Socrates recapitulation in premises. 2 (P1) Either one knows X, or one doesnt know X. (P2) If one knows X, one cannot inquire into X (P3) If one does not know X, one cannot inquire into X (P4) Therefore, one cannot inquire into X (vElim:1,2,3) This argument is valid, so to reply Socrates must reject one of the first three premises. Socrates wouldnt reject the first premise because it is a clear case of the Law of the Excluded Middle (Q V ~Q). The second and third premises, however, both seem shakier. It seems unreasonable to state that one cannot inquire into X if one knows X (P2). Suppose, to use one of Socrates examples, there is a man who knows the way to Larissa. He has traveled the route in the past and can correctly guide others to the city (97a4-6). If (P2) were true, this man would not be able to inquire any further into the route. But now, let us imagine that on a repeat trip to Larissa he discovers more benchmarks, and learns more about the foliage surrounding the path. This suggests (P2) is false; One can inquire into what one already knows. (P2) remains true only if an implicit assumption is made. One must assume that in order to know X, one must know everything there is to know about X. Under this assumption, for the man to have known the way to Larissa, he must have already known everything there is to know about that route; there would have been nothing left (no foliage or additional benchmarks) for him to inquire into. Socrates could easily reject (P2) by rejecting its implicit assumption that in order to know 3 something, one must know everything about that thing. Menos Paradox

2 This is from class 3 I will discuss Socrates definition of knowledge in greater detail later in the paper

However, the premise that is both the greatest challenge to Socrates, and the heart of Menos Paradox, is P3: If one does not know X, one cannot inquire into X. This is the premise that Socrates rejects in his response. But before analyzing Socrates reply, lets gain a greater understanding of the meaning of (P3). What would an inquiry consist of? What do Socrates and Meno mean by the term know? Lets first examine Socrates criteria for knowledge. In the beginning of Meno, Socrates denies that he knows the meaning of virtue. (71b7-71c3) But as philosopher Gail Fine points out in her paper Inquiry In the Meno, The self-confident way in which [Socrates] examines Meno about virtue suggests... he appears to have some ideas, some beliefs about virtue; and he appears to say various things about it (Fine, 201). Therefore, in order to avoid inconsistency. when Socrates claims that he doesnt know what virtue is, the knowledge he is referring to must be something other than his current opinions about virtue; the knowledge must be, in some way, of a higher calibre. Socrates sheds light on the difference between his (and others) beliefs and the higher calibre knowledge through the comparison he makes between knowledge and true opinion (97a-98c3) 4. Socrates explains that Knowledge and true opinion are both equally right. Returning to the analogy, a man with a true opinion of the way to Larissa (but who has not travelled the route nor has knowledge of it) would be able to lead others there just as as well and correctly as a man with knowledge of the route (97a1-97c1). The key disparity between the true opinion and knowledge is that knowledge is true opinion that is justified. True opinions, Socrates says, as long as they remain are a fine thing and all they do is good, but... they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving an account of the reason why. After they are tied down, they become knowledge (97e5-98a4). This explains why Socrates claims to have no knowledge of virtue in spite of his various beliefs and opinions on the subject. According to Socrates, for one to have knowledge of X, one must have a justified true belief about X. We can therefore modify (P3) to: (P3) If one does not have a justified true belief about X, one cannot inquire into X.

4 Socrates uses the terms true opinion and correct opinion interchangeably in the dialogues.

Now, let us determine what is meant by inquiry into X. There are two possible ways to interpret this expression. (P3a) If one does not have a justified true belief (JTB) about X, one cannot inquire into X at all. (P3b) If one does not have a justified true belief (JTB) about X, one cannot successfully5 inquire into X.

(P3a) is a much stronger claim than (P3b) because (P3a) means that if one does not have a JTB about X one cannot even attempt to inquire into X. In contrast, the actor in (P3b) can still inquire into X; his/her inquiry however, will not be successful-- it will not result in the correction of false opinion or acquisition of either knowledge (JTB) or true opinions. Returning to the text, (P3a) is likely closer to what Meno had in mind when he originally posed his 3 questions. Why? Meno asks How will you inquire into something, Socrates, when you dont at all know what it is (80d5-6). There is no allusion to the success of the inquiry; rather Meno is questioning Socrates ability to inquire at all. He then explains the challenge to the ability to inquire as the following: Which of the things that you dont know will you suppose it is, when you are inquiring into it? And even if you happen upon it, how will you know it is the thing you didnt know? (80d6-8). In simpler terms, Meno is saying this: You cant inquire into X, because if you dont know X, you cant recognize it. While you may assume it is X you are inquiring into, you could just as easily be inquiring into Y or Z. If you are lucky enough that you are, in fact, inquiring into X, you would never know it is the subject of your inquiry, because you still dont have the ability to recognize it. Menos intended conclusion is not that without knowledge of X, you cant successfully inquire into X, but rather that you cannot inquire into X at all. But while Meno probably intended (P3a), Socrates response attacks (P3b), the claim that one cannot successfully inquire into X6. How? Socrates attempts to give Meno an example of a successful
5 Lets define successfully as the resulting acquisition of either true opinions about X or a justified true belief about X. 6 Note that this is not a criticism of Socrates reply. Socrates is not failing to disprove (P3a) by taking on the much more challenging construction of the premise, (P3b). If Socrates can show that (P3b) is false-- that one can

inquiry by asking Menos slave, a man supposedly with no prior knowledge of geometry, to find the area of a square that is twice the size of another square. Through the guidance of Socrates questions, the slave is able to eventually solve the problem (82b8-85b6). Socrates concludes to Meno, if [your slave] were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyones. (85d1-2). In other words, Socrates is telling Meno that it is possible for an actor without knowledge of X to successfully inquire into X; his slave is a prime example. After reading this, one might wonder why is Socrates choosing the construction of (P3) that is more challenging to reject? It is much easier to prove that it is possible to inquire at all than it is to prove its possible to inquire successfully. While this is true, Socrates is challenging (P3b) for good reason. My argument Socrates explains, makes [people] energetic and keen on the search [for knowledge] (81e1). In contrast, proving (P3a)s falsity is not an especially great boon to philosophers-- even if one has the ability to inquire into X without knowledge, if there is no possibility of inquiring correctly, why one would bother to inquire at all? Therefore, it is (P3b) that is the crucial version of the P3 to rebut. Now that we have the relevant formulation of Menos Paradox, we can finally address the question: Is Socrates Reply Successful? To prove (P3b) false through his geometry example, Socrates must show 2 things. He must prove that the slave really doesnt have any JTBs about X, and that the slave has successfully inquired into X 7. In the geometry example, X represents a square with double the area to any given square-- in this specific case the first square has an area of 4 and the second square has an area of 8. Socrates seems confident that the slave does not have knowledge of X, at least at the beginning of the elenchus. In the dialogue he says things such as, For now, [the slave] does not know before the slave completes the problem (84b11) and refers to the slave after he solves the problem as the man who did not

successfully inquire into X without knowledge of X-- then he has also shown that (P3a) is false, because a prerequisite for successful inquiry into X is the ability to inquire into X at all. 7 This is because (P3b) is a conditional, which takes the form P--> Q in logic. (One could write the statement as: Person A does not have a JTB about X--->Person A cannot inquire successfully into X) To prove the P-->Q conditional false in logic, one must give a case in which P is true and Q is false. That is why Socrates must show that the slave doesnt have a JTB about X (P) and that he can inquire successfully into X (~Q).

know(85c6)8. Further evidence from the text also suggests that the slave lacks justified true belief about X: the slave correctly believes that a 2x2ft square will have an area of 4ft, and then incorrectly reasons about X, claiming that a 4x4ft square would have an area of 8ft (82d2-7). This is because the slave has false belief about a property of the square-- he believes that doubling the length of the sides of the square will result in doubling the area. As a result, the slave is not only unable to give the dimensions of the square X in question, but also has misconceptions about the mathematical properties of all squares (including square X). This is strong evidence that the slave does not have knowledge about X, especially considering the high bar Socrates has set for knowledge. Furthermore, the inquiry itself can only be classified as successful. The slave initially gave a wrong answer to Socrates geometric question (82d2-7). Through the process of elenctic examination he was not only able to identify various false beliefs he has about certain mathematical principles, but also eventually able to reach the correct answer to the problem (85c). By providing an example in which an individual had no knowledge of X and was still able to successfully inquire into X, Socrates logically proved (P3b) false. But (P3b)s paradox still sounds pretty convincing. What was the mechanism for the slaves successful inquiry into something he did not know? Earlier in this paper, I discussed the distinction Socrates makes between true opinions, which are not classified as knowledge, and justified true beliefs. Socrates explains that the key to the slaves success in the geometry example relies on this distinction. The man who does not know has within himself true opinions about the things he does not know... these opinions have been stirred up like a dream but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways you know that in the end his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyones(85c6-d1). The slave was able to inquire successfully into X because even though he does not have knowledge of X, he has true opinions about X. He was able to use these true opinions, through the
8 There are some interpretations of Meno that claim Socrates believes that the slave does have knowledge of X, even before the elenchus. Most compelling is Socrates quote, Come boy, you know that a square figure is like this, indicating that the boy has some knowledge on squares, and therefore has some knowledge of X (82b9). After giving this a great deal of thought I think the knowledge Socrates is referring to in this context is the not the knowledge of X; rather Socrates is referring to the appearance of a specific square, the first square (not X, X being a square with double the area of the first). The slaves knows of the appearance of the first square (we could call it Y) doesnt entail knowledge of X, especially as the slave does not understand the underlying mathematical principles of squares, and Socrates has set a very high bar for something to be classified as knowledge.

guidance of Socrates elenctic examination, to discover more true opinions and to gain greater understanding of mathematic principles. If he continues his quest for justified true belief in this manner his true opinions may one day become knowledge. The Personal Journey to Knowledge and Closing Thoughts While Socrates may have been successful in defeating the Paradox from a technical standpoint, the individual may still have reservations about his or her own inquiry into a subject he/she has no knowledge of. Socrates has shown that true opinions can lead to successfully inquiry, but he has not presented a dependable means for determining which of ones opinions are true or false 9. It is often the case in Socratic dialogues that individuals hold true opinions that are quickly proven to be either false or incompatible with their other true beliefs 10. One might cite the slaves ability to reject his false opinions and eventually arrive at the correct geometric answer as proof of the elenctic method as a reliable means to sort through true and false opinion. However, the slave does not accomplish this without a great deal of assistance from Socrates. His questions are undeniably leading, regardless of Socrates repeated insistence that will not explain and shall do nothing more than ask questions (84c11). Many philosophers call into doubt the slaves ability to arrive at the correct conclusion on his own, or even to reconstruct Socrates argument without him. 11 While I am sure we wish we had a pocket Socrates we could carry around with us to help us with our various philosophical conundrums and personal problems, unfortunately that is not metaphysically possible.12 Buttressing the concern that one might not be able to differentiate between true and false opinions as effectively as the slave did, philosopher Ian Mueller in his essay Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth has wisely noted the practical difference between mathematics and philosophy....
9 It is likely that Socrates brings up the Theory of Recollection to lend credibility . However the Theory of Recollection posits dualism, and reincarnation. A whole new set of problems arise pertaining to these incredibly controversial theories. Unfortunately the scope of this essay does not cover the Theory of Recollection, for the sake of brevity. However, it is likely that the Theory of Recollection does much more harm to Socrates argument than good 10 See Meno, Crito, Euthyphro 11 See Roslyn Weiss, F.J.E. Woodbridge and Jerome Eckstein (discussed in David Dieners paper, An Inquiry Into Teaching In the Meno 12 but it would be a dream come true.

In philosophy, analysis is much less likely to produce a definitive answer to a question (179-80). So while the slave was able to reject his false belief that doubling the length of the sides of the square would result in doubling the area by counting the number of 1x1 squares within a 2x2 square and a 4x4 square, there isnt a real philosophical equivalent for determining which one of two conflicting premises on the meaning of virtue (for example) to reject. This is not to belittle Socrates accomplishment. Menos Paradox posed a serious problem for the acquisition of knowledge. Socrates was able to defeat the paradox through an important distinction made between true opinion and justified true belief. While he was unable to provide a foolproof methodology for determining which of ones philosophical beliefs are true or false, he showed that its possible for one to inquire successfully into what one does not know, even if many inquiries end do end unsuccessfully or in aporia. Citations Plato. "Meno" Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 870-898. Print. Fine, Gail. "Inquiry In the Meno." The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. Richard Kraut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 200-227. Print. Mueller, Ian. "Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth" The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. Richard Kraut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 170-200. Print. Diener, David. "An Inquiry Into Teaching In the Meno." Philosophical Studies in Education Volume 38.(2007): 141-150. Print.