EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2013/5

The Syrian Civil War: A Military Strategic Assessment

Can Kasapolu
Research Fellow, EDAM

F. Doruk Ergun
Research Assistant, EDAM

02 May 2013

1 INTRODUCTION Assessing a prolonged conflict in a dictatorship like Syria is one of the hardest tasks for military analysts. First, given the lack of transparency even in times of peace, obtaining precise and reliable information about the countrys defense capabilities is pretty hard. Second, current flow of inputs is naturally plagued by heavy disinformation, manipulation, and biases. And third, objectivity of War Studies discipline might well be shadowed by the allurement of endless political debates. This study was designed as an introduction to the Syrian battleground. In order to provide an accurate assessment for readers, the authors of this paper utilized a carefully architected methodology that would be expected to avoid disinformation and misinterpretation. The paper is planned to answer two main questions as follows: (1)What are the ongoing conflicts major determinants; (2) and how can they shape possible trajectory and final outcome of this armed struggle that has been taking place right at Turkeys doorstep. In this way, we have concluded four key categories that are likely to determine fate of the Syrian civil war. The first determinant is the geostrategic aspect of the conflict which dictates the belligerents some critical imperatives to be addressed. We have realized that it is the map that has been shaping both the regimes and the oppositions moves, rather than the regime and the opposition that have been shaping the map. The second determinant is the military strategic context of the conflict. Clearly, every military effort takes place in an evolving strategic context. Be it naval warfare in blue-waters or an amphibious operation, a clash between fighter jets for maintaining air superiority, or air-land mechanized warfare in large swaths; the military strategic context defines critical terms such as victory, advantage, superiority, acceptable casualties and mission. Therefore, the paper tries to define the conflict within its strategic context for setting the right parameters of analysis. Third, regarding the very fact that the war is an organized use of force in order to impose political will over the enemy, we preferred to focus on the means of the force, namely the arms supply. Without access to weapons, be it pikes and swords or tactical nukes, human beings cannot initiate and cannot keep conducting systematic, politically motivated violence. And fourth, we focused on how the conflict is perceived and fought; namely, on operational art and tactical doctrine angle. Through this analytical approach, the paper aims to put forward critical findings that might shed light on the possible future trajectory of the Syrian civil war.

GEOSTRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT Open-source evidences suggest that the Syrian Civil War has been evolved depending on several geostrategic tracks in different parts of the country. Comprehending these tracks is critically important for getting a good grip on the conflict.

2 The first and foremost geostrategic characteristic of the Syrian military picture is a robust armed struggle for supply routes, lines of communication (LOC), major highways, and key choke points that is partially akin to the initial phase of the first Arab Israeli War in 1947, or the battle for the roads. To be precise, as a component of the Battle for Aleppo in the north; the M4 highway, which connects the Latakia coast to Aleppo, and the M5 highway, which is the main connection between Damascus and Aleppo, are the two most important supply lines; and the fight has been unfolding through key choke points controlling the M4 and the M5. In that sense, the Battle of Saraqeb between MarchNovember 2012 is a clear evidence of the Syrian battle for the roads analysis. Located at the junction of the M4 and the M5 highways, Saraqeb plays an important role for controlling Aleppos connections both with the coastal areas and the Syrian capital.1 Accordingly, following successful endeavors in Idlib, which mainly took place starting from March 2012, the armed opposition focused its efforts on Saraqeb despite heavy shelling by Assads forces. By November 2012, elements from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Idlib Martyrs Brigade (or the Syrian Liberation Army) succeeded to take control of the province to a certain extent. More importantly, other related armed struggles through the M5 highway, in conjunction with the Battle of Saraqeb, provide a clear picture for understanding both the armed oppositions and the Baathist dictatorships pushes for control over LOCs. A large number of important milestones related to the Battle for Aleppo (i.e. seizure of the Taftanaz Base, seizure of the 46th Regiments base in Atareb, Battle of Maarat al Numan, Wadi al Deif Siege) took place in key positions that rest along the major highways or their surroundings that reinforcements and military assistance can pass through. For instance, just days before the oppositions sensational seizure of the 46th Regiment base in Atareb (November 2012), a key component of Assads northern deployments, leaked videos showed the FSA elements taking control of the Al Kindi Hospital.2 The hospital was important due to its position at the hill-top controlling Aleppos connection road with the Turkish border; moreover, it was used as an arms cache by the regime, and allegedly by their Iranian allies.3 Also in conjunction with the developments in Atareb, the armed opposition has engaged in clashes with the Baathist dictatorship in the strategically key town of Maarat al Numan. Holding a crucial position, which controls critical checkpoints on the M5 highway between Aleppo and Damascus, the town is important for the flow of supplies and reinforcements from the capital to the commercial hub of the north, as well as exerting control over Idlib province. Thus, starting from October 2012, fierce clashes have taken place in this strategic choke point, and consequently Maarat al Numan changed hands several times in summer 2012, before the decisive autumn push by the armed opposition. Since
1

Syria Rebels Take Key Damascus Aleppo Checkpoints, BBC, November 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-20172102 2 Syria FSA Soldiers Conquer the Aleppo Al Kindi Hospital, Guess What Was in It, Live Leak, 14 Nov. 2012. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=35d_1352883935&comments=1 3 Syria Rebels Builds Momentum with Tactical Success, BBC, 27 November 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-20493687

3 then, the opposition has laid siege against the remaining military bastions of Assad, forcing the regime to supply its units via air-lifts. However, at the time of writing, the Baathist dictatorships forces managed to break the 6 months-long siege in Wadi al Deif and Hamidiya military compounds, and sent ground reinforcements to the town via the highway.4

The Syrian Battle for the Roads and Choke Points

In sum, as seen in the light of meaningful set of clashes, control over LOCs, mainly over the M5 and the M4 highways, and over their choke points is a key geostrategic trend of the conflict. Furthermore, this geostrategic trend is capable of determining the shifts in operational art and tactical doctrine of both sides. Briefly: More supply lines controlled by the opposition would bring about more dependence on air-lift supply chains and reinforcement movements by the regime. In this context, more MANPADS and other air-defense assets obtained by the opposition will restrict the Baathist regimes air missions, especially Assads rotary-winged assets. As a matter of fact, on 11 April 2013, leaked videos showed the opposition shooting down a

Jonathan, Dupree. Syria Update: Regime Breaks Siege of Wadi al Deif, ISW, Washington D.C., 18 April 2013.

4 helicopter, reportedly, while it was on a supply mission to Wadi al Deif to reinforce besieged units.5 Moreover, allocation of air assets on supply missions would curb their offensive potential. Thus, as the regime progresses by breaking sieges, as it managed to do in Wadi al Deif, Assads forces scope is expected to shift towards offensive re-capture missions. Besides, keeping LOCs from the capital and from the regimes strongholds to rebel held areas would naturally hinder the oppositions ability to create liberated areas and safe havens which is a very critical objective of asymmetric actors in hybrid wars and low-intensity conflicts. Likewise, should the opposition manage to control main supply lines; it can cage the regime into Damascus and force Assad to over-dependency on his already strained air force. Above all, political context of the Battle for Aleppo, and that of the northern front in a greater sense, is about securing this commercial hub and its surrounding provinces in order to establish a viable opposition governance and geostrategic enclave. Thus, the struggle for controlling the LOCs, which rest along northern parts of the country, would determine the fate of this political context, either in favor of the Baathist dictatorship or the opposition. The second important geostrategic characteristic of the Syrian civil war is the struggle for key border areas which adjoins critical hubs within Syria that can augment the struggle for the capitals suburbs with respect to possible final battle for Damascus. The Lebanese border area is a clear example of the aforementioned assumption. Similar to critical choke points on the M4 and the M5 highways, the city of Homs and the town Qusayr are also important geostrategic variables of the Syrian turmoil, especially due to their location as hubs between the capital and the Allawite-populated coastal areas, as well as being Assads (and his Iranian allies) gate to the Lebanese Hezbollah. As recently as April 18th, the opposition fighters captured Dabaa military base, a military complex that is close to both the highway between the Allawite coastal heartland and Damascus, along with Hezbollahs Hermel region in Lebanon that adjoins Syrian frontier territories.6 The confrontation close to Qusayr, and to Homs in a broader sense, have been bringing about more Hezbollah (and the Iranian Quds Forces) involvement in the Syrian civil war. For instance, press sources now draw attention to the presence of some 1,200 Hezbollah fighters operating in Syria, officially protecting Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine, but in fact participating in Assads brutal crackdown and the regimes military buildup in Damascus.7

5 6

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nSasBHOxSlk, Accessed on 22 April 2013. Syria Rebels Capture Homs Army Base, Al Jazeera, 18 April 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/201341811219359333.html 7 Jonathan, Spyer. Behind the Lines: Hezbollah Turns Eastwards, The Jerusalem Post, 20 April 2013. http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/Behind-The-Lines-Hezbollah-turns-eastwards-310317

Homs and Qusayr: The Geostrategic Hub between the capital, Allawite enclave, and Hezbollah

Due to its strategic location in several angles elaborated hitherto, Homs has witnessed endless clashes since late 2011 and the regimes intensive military efforts since February 2012 which is also known as the Siege of Homs. Geostrategic imperatives emanating from Homs, and also the political context of the armed struggle have brought about some key outcomes which are important to assess the Syrian military picture effectively: Due to the pivotal role of Homs and its surrounding hub region, Assad has allocated an important proportion of his troops in this area (and in Damascus), including the active operational participation of units from the elite 4th Armored Divison.8 Thus, concentration of mass forces left some large swaths open for the opposition takeover.

The 4th Armoured Division inherits from the 569th Armoured Division which was established following the abolishment of mainly Allawite-populated, notorious Defense Companies commanded by Rifat al Assad. Still, the 4 th Armoured is manned by a large proportion of Allawite officers, and acts as one of the major praetorian units of the Baathist dictatorship. Maher al

6 Fall of Homs into the opposition hands would be a significant blow to the connection between Damascus and the Allawite coastal geopolitical core. In that case, scenarios concerning possible emergence of a micro-Allawite state in a divided Syria may be altered. In case the opposition manages to create a sustainable momentum in Homs, and particularly in Qusayr, then it is likely to see a more active Quds Forces and Hezbollah involvement in Assads re-capture efforts. The Siege of Homs was one of the most important examples of the Baat hist dictatorships indiscriminant shelling strategy. Therefore, any growing opposition pressure on these areas might probably bring about more excessive use of force, including the wildcard possibility of WMDs and related mass displacements and massacres. In fact, right at the time of writing, (as recently as April 24th), surfacing evidences showed that both Hezbollah and the Syrian armed opposition were engaged in prolonged border clashes in Qusayr, and the conflict has been quite likely to spillover into Lebanon which is already problematic due to sectarian fault lines.9 Considering its political outcomes, active Hezbollah involvement in Syria means more than additional few thousand militiamen. First, in a more complicated fashion, Hezbollahs hostile stance against the Syrian opposition is also a destabilizing factor within Lebanon. Second, Hezbollah involvement results from the Iranian Quds Forces proxy war strategy that significantly augments regionalization of the Syrian civil war. And third, due to growing sectarian narrative of the Syrian crisis; Hezbollahs (and Irans) systematic assistances to Assads Allawite-led tyranny, along with the Gulf States supports to the opposition make the overall picture more akin to Thomas Friedmans Thirty Years War in the Arab world analogy.10 In the south, Jordanian Syrian border area is another critical geostrategic angle of the conflict. The recent opposition gains, which adjoin Jordan and critical highways to Damascus, should be seen through the greater prism of the role of King Abdullahs monarchy to the Wests strategic interests, and Jordans role in support of moderate opposition elements. These facts are likely to determine the political context of the southern front. In order to assess the geostrategic trends in the south, first, we should comprehend the geopolitical perspective of the opposition progress along the Jordanian border. Starting from March 2013, the armed opposition managed to make some important achievements. On March 23rd, the Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade, along with the participation of the al Nusra Front and some other opposition groups captured 38th Air Defense Divisions military base that is located in a strategic position close to the

Assad, the draconian figure of the Assad clan and the younger brother of Beshar, officially commands a brigade within the division. However, some suggest that he acts as the de facto leader of this formidable unit, not only his brigade. 9 Clashes Escalate on Syria Lebanon Border, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2013/04/201342432350795154.html 10 Thomas, L, Friedman. The Arab Quarter Century, The New York Times, 9 April 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/opinion/friedman-the-arab-quartercentury.html?ref=thomaslfriedman&_r=0&gwh=244360800176C52EDC05079D5B75E948

7 Amman Damascus highway.11 Notably, right after the capture, the opposition released a YouTube video showing fighters carrying ammunition to trucks, driving tanks, and questioning captured soldiers from the base.12 Just a few days following the capture of the 38th Air Defense, FSA affiliates succeeded to overrun some three checkpoints and took control of the strategic town of Dael, an important choke point between the Jordan border, Daraa, and Damascus. More importantly, videos showing the clashes for Dael gave an idea about the opposition combat capability in a hybrid warfare effort by taking out Assads armored forces through modified wheeled-assets, and taking control of urban areas through effective house to house fighting. 13 The opposition progress near the Jordan border and along the Amman-Damascus highway is critically important for several reasons: In case the opposition successfully clears Syria Jordan border, it would be tantamount to fully securing an important arms supply route. Moreover, from the border to Damascus, we are talking about some 110 kms, and from Dael to the capital is just about 85 kms. In other words, the southern front might be the real road to Damascus if the regimes praetorian forces can be kept overstretched by heavy operations in other fronts (i.e. in Homs), and captured areas can be defended despite heavy shelling and bombardment. In addition to the geostrategic aspects, the opposition progress close to the Jordanian border also poses some important military-political results: The Syrian turmoil is a significant destabilizing factor to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan due to a troublesome refugee crisis (over some 460,000 at the time of writing), due to the rise of al Nusra-type extremists right at Ammans borders that might threaten the monarchy in the future, and because of Assads WMD arsenal that may either fall into the wrong hands , or because of the fact that they are already at the wrong hands by being at the hands of a tyranny during its survival struggle. Without a doubt, Jordan cannot be isolated from regionalization of the Syrian conflict. Some press sources recently voiced signs of a supply route from Jordan to Syria that carries Saudifunded arms to moderate elements, particularly to the FSA and its affiliates.14 Both King Abdullah and the Obama administration, who has already deployed some 200 troops in Jordan, would like to see the Syrian turmoil come to an end soon, and they also
11

Syria Rebels Seize Southern Base, Border Area, Reuters, 23 March 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/23/ussyria-crisis-idUSBRE92M03K20130323 12 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9k8zKkrOv6A, Accessed: 26 April 2013. 13 Al Jazeera, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDywSoIia_M, Accessed: 26 April 2013. 14 Syria Says Jordan Playing with Fire over Assistance to Rebels Guardian, 5 April 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/05/syria-jordan-fire-assistance-rebels

8 would like to see moderate FSA elements on the rise rather than al Qaeda affiliates and sympathizers. As a matter of fact, some press sources claim that Jordanian and US Special Forces have been training FSA elements, and have sped up their efforts in the light of the critical opposition gains along border areas.15 Thus, as the opposition fosters its efforts along with the Amman Damascus highway and around the Jordan border, it would be possible to diversify and boost their supplies. At this point, selective foreign assistance to moderate elements of the opposition might also bring about an internal tension between several Syrian rebel groups which would be a negative factor to the opposition progress. Israel is one of the most concerned actors about the clashes close to both Jordan and the Golan Heights. Therefore, possible trajectory in the southern front would also be critical with respect to Israels stance in the Syrian turmoil. The military trend in the south more or less resembles the military trend in the north with respect to the struggle for major highways and supply lines. On the other hand, the scope in the north is more of a securing Aleppo as a liberated capital mission for the opposition rather than marching to Damascus; but in the south, it is essentially about isolating Assad in Damascus and opening a gateway to the capital. From this aspect, therefore, the strategic contexts in the north and in the south differ to some extent. Yet, from the south towards Damascus, the opposition has to overcome robust units such as the 1st Armoured Division at the southern outskirts of the capital, the 9th Armoured Division controlling the Damascus Amman highways northern junctions, along with the 61st Infantry Brigade that rests between al Quneitra, a critical border town that adjoins the Golan Heights, and Daraa.16 In sum, the geostrategic assessment of the conflict concludes following major findings: The Syrian civil war has been fought in more of a north south axis, rather than an east west one. This does not necessarily mean that eastern provinces and western coasts of the country are not critical battlefields. For instance, the eastern developments are important due to Syria Iraq sectarian violence merger, and Mediterranean coastal areas are key to the Allawite cohesiveness and post-Assad scenarios geopolitical aspects. On the other hand, the most decisive geostrategic struggle has been taking place on a vertical line on a Syrian map, from Idlib Aleppo to Damascus Daraa axis. Control over supply lines is critical; and trends in this angle have also been causing shifts in the conduct of warfare. For instance, more opposition progress along major supply lines would force Assads forces to rely on air-lifts and air combat capabilities, as indicated before.
15

US, Jordan Stepping Up Training of Syrian Opposition, The Washington Post, 2 April 2013. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-02/world/38220140_1_rebel-zone-buffer-zone-united-states-and-jordan
16

Jonathan Dupree, Syrian Update: The Southern Battlefronts, ISW, Washington D.C., 5 April 2013.

9 As the paper will elaborate in subsequent sections, the Baathist dictatorships military strategy and the geostrategic character of the conflict left large suburban and rural swaths to the opposition control. The struggle for major routes and supply lines brought about a recall of Medieval Warfare analogy of Siege in the modern Syrian civil war case. Both the dictatorship (i.e. the Siege of Homs), and the opposition (i.e. the Siege of Wadi al Deif) has been conducting this strategy purposefully. At this point, the struggle for controlling the suburbs of Damascus comes into the picture as a component of the overall geostrategic picture. In order to analyze prospects of the opposition laying siege to Damascus, we should remember the basics of military history. Prerequisite of siege warfare is to impose a defensive mindset to your opponent by overtaking his military capabilities in several battles. Then, you have to isolate his defensive fortress from supply lines and way outs. And finally you should either prepare for an assault to his probably wellfortified static positions, or to wait and see him suffering from numerous shortfalls. Warfare changes but the nature of war remains the same, and the possible Siege of Damascus would be no exception. The geopolitical understanding that lies behind the struggle for the suburbs (i.e. Jobar, Douma, Qaboun) is to isolate the capitals LOCs for a further final siege. In this respect, the Baathist dictatorships reaction has been pretty robust against the opposition movements around Damascus. For instance, in February 2013 Assads forces attacked the opposition elements from the Liwa al Islam brigade-sized unit with Scud missiles, although the target was well within the range of other assets.17 Critical hubs, such as Saraqeb and Maarat al Numan in the north, and Homs relatively in the south witnessed prolonged clashes and this trend is likely to continue. The struggle for frontier areas surfaces as a major trend for arms supply and connection with the rest of the region. In this respect, the regionalization of the conflict would determine further scope of the conflict for border areas, especially in the areas adjoining Lebanon and Jordan.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT Before assessing operational art and tactical doctrine of the Baathist regime, we should first define the Syrian civil war in a military strategic context to get a good grip on the major parameters of the conflict. Otherwise, it would not be possible to make a strategic prediction solely depending on comparative statistics, namely an IFV & MBT and light infantry count for both sides; because without

17

Missile Blast Wounds Syrian Rebel Commander: Activists, Reuters, 20 Feb. 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-syria-crisis-rebel-idUSBRE91J0D420130220

10 the right strategic context, military stats might be just numbers on think-tank reports and intelligence analyses. The essence of the Syrian prolonged civil war, to be precise, was ignited as a low-intensity conflict at its outset, and gradually evolved into the most recent example of hybrid warfare trend.18 For recognizing a hybrid warfare incident, military analysts have some practical tools. First of all, one should look for operational diversity and integrity through multi-modal activity at the same time. In other words, hybrid warfare can be defined as the systematic incorporation of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, terrorism, indiscriminate violence and other modes and concepts of warfare in a broad extent.19 Although it looks pretty akin to the Compound Warfare, which is basically a dual use of regular and irregular forces in a conflict20, the keyword for understanding hybrid warfare cases is meaningful operational integrity between regular and irregular capabilities, rather than just overlap. The fashionable incident that has given rise to hybrid warfare debates among military strategic community was mostly Israel Defense Forces bitter experience in the Second Lebanon War. In 2006, Hezbollah managed to fight in moderate-sized units (up to a battalion sometimes) with standoff capabilities through long range rockets, and managed to arm irregular elements with disruptive MANPAD & ATGM weapons in order to deny the IDF armor maneuver capabilities. Under a decentralized command & control (C2) structure, the Lebanese armed groups performance even influenced Israels defense modernization and combat training; for instance, the lessons-learned from 2006 encouraged production of heavy Namer IFVs that are based on strong Merkava III chasis.21 On the other hand, an insightful analysis on the first and the second Russo Chechen wars would clearly reveal the fact that the 1990s have already shown harbingers of the forthcoming hybrid trend in warfare when Dudayev successfully used a combination of conventional and unconventional methods to fight the Russians; thus, as a result of the first war, Chechen army defeated a Eurasian great powers ostensibly superior army because it was able to use conventional tactics in an unorthodox manner to concentrate against Russian Army weaknesses.22 In the light of the brief military affairs discussion hitherto, now we have a relevant analytical framework to assess the strategic meaning of Assads dictatorships military approach, which has combined ballistic missiles, air forces, and Shabiha militia within operational integrity; as well as the

18 19

Can, Kasapolu. Turkish Opposition Unable to Assess Conflict in Syria, Todays Zaman, 24 Feb. 2013. Frank, Hoffman. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia, 2007, p 8. 20 Thomas, M, Huber [ed.], Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, pp. 1 2. 21 David, E, Johnson. Military Capabilities for Hybrid War, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2010, pp. 3 5. 22 Robert, M, Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 2003, p 15.

11 opposition tactics that used both captured tanks and MANPADS, along with IEDs and explosives in urban areas of Damascus under decentralized C2 structures. For instance, given the violence trend in and around Damascus just within a week in a given period of time (between April 8th and April 15th 2013), two major incidents gave strong evidences about the hybrid warfare character of the conflict not only because of casualties inflicted, but also because of their multi-modal conducts. On April 8th car bombs in central Damascus killed some 19 and injured 20. The explosions were followed by gun-fire exchange between Assads forces and the opposition elements hiding in neighboring buildings.23 At first glance, explosions and small arms fire exchange in the capital may give the impression of urban-terrorism within the framework of a traditional lowintensity conflict. On the other hand, as recently as April 15th, Syrian Air Force had to conduct airground attacks against opposition-held areas that are very close to Damascus (Douma for instance, 1015 kms to the city center). Likewise, leaked videos show that Assad has had to deploy armed columns (including his most advanced T72s) in Darayya, a suburb of Damascus, located just about 10kms away from the capital city center.24 In this context, the rebels managed to kill leading regime figures, including Ashaf Shawkat, through the operation conducted in July 2012 by car-bombs in Damascus; and in August 2012, they also managed to down a helicopter in the capital suburb town of Jobar. 25 In sum, when assessing the Syrian conflict, we are able to see important operational and tactical diversifications even in the same period of time and in a certain place, including the capital and its suburbs. Therefore, one should both assess the conflicts geostrategic character and also all operational and tactical grounds along with arms supply issues within the framework of hybrid warfare in order to develop a good understanding on the overall military picture in Syria. To be brief, being a hybrid warfare case, the prolonged conflict poses some distinct characteristics: Assads forces had to leave their traditional centralized Soviet-type military doctrine, and had to embrace a more flexible manner of conduct in order to counter both geostrategic and tactical diversification by the opposition elements. The overall military picture has gradually become a complicated one by the involvement of air force, MANPADS, armored units and paramilitary forces acting in coordination, Along with some other factors, hybrid character of the conflict caused prolongation of the turmoil as this segment of armed conflict is more of a war of attrition rather than airland mechanized warfare-type annihilation. Thus, in order to predict the outcome of the conflict, one should focus on the game-changer factor of stamina of both sides.
23

Deadly Car Bomb Rocks Central Damascus, Al Jazeera, 8 April 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/20134810950132447.html 24 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rd_8E_KSY0o, Accessed: 27 April 2013. 25 Syria: Helicopter Crashes in Damascus, BBC, 27 August 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19389028

12 Diversification of tactical approaches should not be read in a progress or setback fashion. In other terms, both the opposition and the Baathist dictatorship are expected to conduct (and have already been conducting) wide range of military and paramilitary concepts in the hybrid warfare depending on several determinants of the conflict. Thus, judging the progress should not solely depend on tactics themselves, but other relevant factors such as coordination between different groups, combination of offensive and defensive capabilities in a wide geostrategic axis, and ability to turn tactical achievements into strategic gains.

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND CRITICAL ARMS SUPPLIES Arms Transfers If left to their own devices and resources, anti-regime forces would have very little access to heavy and sophisticated weaponry (such as anti-tank and anti-air weapons) and much needed military supplies due to the scope of army defections and seizure of military sites, and hardships related to smuggling these weapons. Arms transfers, especially if well targeted and coordinated, have the potential to augment the oppositions struggle in ways including:

Offensive capabilities: Such weapons give the combatants an edge against enemy armor and hence reduce the reliance of the regime on more sophisticated systems 26; increase the number of combat tactics and strategies that the opposition can employ against the regime; make it possible to capture heavily defended bastions; to inflict heavier losses on the regime and to increase the rate of attrition of both materiel and personnel; to hamper the morale of regime forces; and so, overall, bolster its ability to inflict damage. Defensive capabilities: The continuous flow of military supplies makes it possible for the opposition to keep up its struggle and the increased capabilities reduce the number of opposition casualties, and hence lower its attrition rate. Access to heavy and more sophisticated weapons both makes it harder for the opposition to be outgunned by pro-Assad forces, and gives it a better chance of consolidating its military progress and turn it into strategic gains.

26

White, J. (2013, March 25). Arms for Syria's Rebels: Shaping the War's Outcome. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arms-for-syrias-rebelsshaping-the-wars-outcome

13 Operational capabilities: Extended capabilities provide better efficiency to the opposition, i.e. dealing more damage while taking less, and conserving more resources; it also expands the oppositions reach, i.e. areas where the opposition can effectively conduct operations and control. Groups within anti-Assad forces with more access to better weaponry are also likely to have a stronger influence on shaping the planning and decision-making process during and after the opposition movement. On the same cannon, transfer of arms, supplies, equipment and spare parts also have similar effects for the regime forces. To this end, various states are believed to have been involved in sponsoring different sides, and different groups within these respective sides in the Syrian conflict. Transfers to the Opposition Verifying arms transfers is a challenge in itself due to their covert nature. While this is especially true with regards to the opposition, there have been a number of cases in which videos posted on Youtube have allowed experts to identify weapons that are not in the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) inventory, but have somehow found their way into the oppositions hands. According to a recent ISW report, rebels have been receiving significantly better arms from the Jordanian border near Daraa province since early February 201327. Some of these rogue weapons included RPG-22 and M79 Osa rocket launchers, M60 recoilless rifles, and Milkor MGL/RBG-6 grenade launchers, all of which were designed and manufactured in former Yugoslavia and were never purchased by the SAF, at least in the light of open arms procurement reports up until now28. In parallel, some sources suggest that RPG-75, an anti-tank weapon originating from former Czechoslovakia, has also appeared at the hands of the opposition members in Aleppo29. There are allegations that these weapons might have a Croatian connection3031, according to which the weapons were purchased by Saudi Arabia and smuggled through Jordan32. Other foreign weaponry recently sighted at the hands of the rebels includes the Chinese FN-6 MANPADS33, French SNEB 68mm rockets and their launcher, the MATRA rocket pod34. There are also some reports, including a UN Security Councils Group of Experts report

27 28

O'Bagy, E. (2013). Middle East Security Report 9: The Free Syrian Army. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War. Ibid. 29 Brown Moses Blog. (2013, April 17). New Anti-Tank Weapons From The Former-Czechoslovakia Appear In Syria. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Brown Moses Blog: http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/04/new-anti-tank-weaponsfrom.html 30 Brown Moses Blog. (2013, February 2). Foreign Smuggled Weapons Spread Northwards Into Syria. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Brown Moses Blog: http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/foreign-smuggled-weapons-spread.html 31 CBS/AP. (2013, March 28). AP: "Master plan" underway to help Syria rebels take Damascus with U.S.-approved airlifts of heavy weapons. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from CBS News: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57576722/ap-masterplan-underway-to-help-syria-rebels-take-damascus-with-u.s.-approved-airlifts-of-heavy-weapons/ 32 Brown Moses Blog. (2013, April 6). Early Signs Of The "Aleppoisation" Of Southern Syria. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Brown Moses Blog: http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/04/early-signs-of-aleppo-isation-of.html 33 Brown Moses Blog. (2013, February 15). First Sightings Of Foreign MANPADS In Syria. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Brown Moses Blog: http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/02/first-sightings-of-foreign-manpads-in.html 34 Brown Moses Blog. (2013, February 10). French Rocket Pods Sighted In Syria. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Brown Moses Blog: http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/02/french-rocket-pods-sighted-in-syria.html

14 published in early April35, to suggest that weapons, including some of the ones mentioned above, are being transferred to Syria from Libya at an alarming rate. The UN report also suggests that these weapons have made their way into Syria through neighboring states; indeed, one such shipment was intercepted by Lebanese authorities in May 20123637. It is quite plausible to assume that rebel organizations use black markets and arms smugglers to acquire arms and military supplies, perhaps even in exchange for the non-military aid they receive from outside actors. Yet according to an entry in the Atlantic Council of the United States web page dated 25 February 201338, Louay al-Mokdad, the political and media coordinator for the Free Syrian Army, verified that the rebels acquired new weapons not through the black market or by seizing government facilities, but by donations from outside actors. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute based arms trafficking expert Hugh Griffiths, 3,500 tons of military equipment have been shipped to the rebels since the traffic began in early 2012 there were at least 160 airlifts of weapons deliveries from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and later Jordan39. As for the state sponsors of the opposition, there are numerous but largely unverifiable allegations. For example, the same Atlantic Council post takes note of some Arab and rebel officials which suggest that countries including the US, its European allies and some Gulf countries are involved in supplying the rebels, and that security officials from those nations have formed a security coordination committee that consults regularly on events in Syria40. An Associated Press and CBS article adds Jordan to list and suggests that all parties hold veto power over the direction41 of the packages. A Wall Street Journal article published in late-April 2013 also confirms that the 11 core members of the Friends of Syria group agreed to coordinate all military aid going to Syria and funnel it through the Syrian Opposition Coalition's Supreme Military Council42. The same article also suggests that the recent commitment of Washington to increase its non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition to $250 million will include combat gear such as body armor and night-vision goggles43, which have significant implications for the battlefield. It should be noted here that Washington (and
35

Reuters. (2013, April 9). Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. experts. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-libya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409 36 Reuters. (2012, April 28). UPDATE 1-Lebanon impounds ship carrying Libyan weapons. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/28/syria-lebanon-ship-idUSL6E8FS1CT20120428 37 Syrian Free Press Network. (2012, May 12). Exclusive Photos of Weapons Smuggled from Libyan Terrorists to Syrian Terrorists. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Syrianfreepress.wordpress.org: http://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2012/05/12/foto-esclusive-armi-contrabbandate-da-terroristi-libici-per-terroristi-sirianiexclusive-photos-of-weapons-smuggled-from-libyan-terrorists-to-syrian-terrorists/# 38 Benitez, J. (2013, February 25). Are Syrian rebels now armed with heavy weapons from Croatia? Retrieved April 23, 2013, from Atlantic Council of the United States: http://www.acus.org/natosource/are-syrian-rebels-now-armed-heavy-weaponscroatia 39 CBS/AP. (2013, March 28). AP: "Master plan" underway to help Syria rebels take Damascus with U.S.-approved airlifts of heavy weapons. Retrieved April 23, 2013, from CBS News: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57576722/ap-masterplan-underway-to-help-syria-rebels-take-damascus-with-u.s.-approved-airlifts-of-heavy-weapons/ 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Peker, E. (2013, April 21). U.S., Allies Agree on Aid to Syria Opposition. Retrieved April 24, 2013, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578436750045050178.html 43 Ibid.

15 virtually every other state that allegedly has ties to the opposition) denies reports that it is training and supplying arms to the opposition44. Multiple accounts suggest that out of the aforementioned states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are the top two supporters of the rebel forces on the ground. In fact, it is argued that the sides have supported separate organizations not only to bring the Assad regime down, but to increase their own influence within the country, sometimes at the expense of the other GCC member 45. The aforementioned ISW study suggests that the Qataris held a private meeting for rebel commanders in Doha on November 2012 and paid rebel commanders to attend the meeting, whereas Saudi sponsors paid them not to attend. The result was a case in which in order to receive funds from both sponsors, rebel organizations nominally split, sending one commander to Doha with the other staying in Syria. Although united under the same leadership structures, commanders claimed to be associated with different rebel groups and often professed affiliation to rival units.46 One should also mention the noticeable (and increasing) Jihadist presence in the country. In addition to bringing together foreign fighters, some of which have access to weapons used in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan or other areas with Jihadist activity, these organizations have strong links to other Jihadist organizations worldwide, such as Jabhat al-Nusras recently proclaimed link with Iraqi al-Qaeda47, and these links are another source of arms transfers into the Syrian battlefield. Moreover, these organizations have noteworthy private sponsors in Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and Qatar 48, and are usually better armed than moderate forces which do not have as much access to funding and resources. Transfers to the Baathist Dictatorship Although they possess significantly more resources than anti-regime forces, the SAF and other proAssad forces also need outside aid to compensate for their attrition. For example the ISW evaluates that unless the Syrian Air Force receives a significant amount of spare parts or additional aircraft, it is likely to become combat ineffective in 201349. Russia has traditionally been a close ally of Damascus. In addition to its political and diplomatic support, such as shielding Assad at the United Nations Security Council, the country has made

44

BBC. (2013, April 26). Covert help for Syria's rebels in Jordan. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22285555 45 O'Bagy, E. (2013). Middle East Security Report 9: The Free Syrian Army. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War. 46 Ibid. 47 Alaaldin, R. (2013, April 12). The Rise of al-Nusra. Retrieved April 24, 2013, from Royal United Services Institute (RUSI): http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C5167D05802F5A/#.UXe-L7UqxyR 48 O'Bagy, E. (2013). Middle East Security Report 9: The Free Syrian Army. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War. 49 Holliday, J. (March 2013). Middle East Security Report 8: The Assad Regime. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War.

16 tremendous amounts of cash infusion to Syria, which amounted to more than two hundred tons of banknotes in the summer of 2011 alone, according to a WINEP research50. Russia has also been Syrias top military supplier; according to SIPRI, purchases from Russia accounted to 78 percent of Syrias arms purchases between 2007 and 201251. Reportedly, in addition to providing sophisticated systems such as surface-to-air defense systems, including Buk-M2 and Pantsyr-S1 (SA-22 in NATO reporting name) radar and mobile missile launch systems, Moscow also sends military advisers to help man these systems and train Syrian crews52. In addition to supplying new systems, Moscow also provides upgrades for old systems, replacements and spare parts which are vital for sustaining these military systems. In October 2012, Turkey intercepted one such transfer when it diverted a Syrian passenger jet which purportedly carried communications equipment53 and spare parts for Syrias air defense systems54. It should be noted here that Kremlin does not reject selling weapons to the Assad government, but argues that it is not selling any weapons or systems that could be used in a civilian conflict. Perhaps even more important is the support that Assad receives from Tehran. Iran is arguably one of the main reasons as to how the Assad regime can keep up with this ongoing war of attrition within the country. Like Russia, Iran has aided the regime financially, not least of which was through providing a $1 billion credit line55. Moreover, in addition to airlifts, Iranian weapons and supplies are believed to be transferred into the country through Lebanon and Iraq. Yet even more significant is the connection of the elite Iranian Quds Force. Reports of Quds involvement in the conflict began surfacing after the first few months of the conflicts inception and Iran did little to suppress these allegations. In fact, on September 2012, the Commander of the Revolutionary Corps, Mohammad Ali Jafari himself argued that while the Quds Force is indeed in Syria, they do not directly engage in the conflict, but provide training and advice56. Irans involvement and training is especially felt on the paramilitary unit that is referred to as the Peoples Army, Jaysh al-Shabi or shabiha which fights along the loyalist Syrian Armed Forces and consists mostly of

50

Borshchevskaya, A. (2013, January 24). Russia's Many Interests in Syria. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from WINEP: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-many-interests-in-syria 51 Ibid. 52 Borger, J. (2012, December 23). Russian military presence in Syria poses challenge to US-led intervention. Retrieved April 25, 2013, from The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/23/syria-crisis-russian-military-presence 53 Kenyon, P. (2012, October 11). Turkey-Syria Tensions High After Plane Is Diverted. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from NPR: http://www.npr.org/2012/10/11/162743645/turkey-syria-tensions-high-after-plane-is-diverted 54 Boxx, E., & White, J. (2012, November 20). Responding to Assad's Use of Airpower in Syria. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/responding-toassads-use-of-airpower-in-syria 55 Stott, M., & Nakhoul, S. (2013, April 24). Syria expects more financial aid from Russia, Iran. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-syria-crisis-economy-idUSBRE93N0QA20130424 56 Dehghanpisheh, B. (2012, September 17). Elite Iranian units commander says his forces are in Syria. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/elite-iranian-units-commander-says-hisforces-are-in-syria/2012/09/16/431ff096-0028-11e2-b257-e1c2b3548a4a_story.html

17 Shia and Alawite militias57. These militias are believed to be more than 50,000 strong and were likened to the Iranian Basij by Commander Jafari himself58. Both Iran and Hezbollah have been influential in training, equipping and funding the Jaysh al-Shabi, which has formed the basis of their sanctioning by the US Treasury Department on December 201259. According to the US Treasury Department, the militias have provided support to the Syrian Military Intelligence, manned security checkpoints at cities and regime facilities, were used by the Syrian military during operations and to interrogate and execute potential opposition supporters60. This force will likely retain its importance even if the Assad regime collapses, as a proxy for Tehran61, in a way similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon and numerous Shiite organizations in Iraq. Hezbollah has also trained, armed and funded the regimes paramilitaries, and extended logistical support to the Assad government62. Hezbollah has been influential in directing significant amounts of Iranian supplies to the pro-Assad forces, and was the target of US Treasury Department sanctions as well. Reportedly, Hezbollah forces have fought against Syrian rebels both within Syrian and Lebanese territory, which has left numerous Hezbollah fighters dead according to some Lebanese officials63. Under the Maliki government, Iraq is also believed to have aided the Assad government. The country continues to allow Iran to use Iraqi airspace and roads for transferring arms and supplies. Baghdad has also overlooked the passage of Iran backed Shiite Iraqi militias into Syria64 to fight alongside loyalist forces and Hezbollah fighters65, as was exemplified by Youtube videos showing the Abu Fadl alAbbas Brigade fighting alongside Hezbollah fighters near Sayyidah Zaynab, a holy Shiite site in Syria66.

57

Holliday, J. (March 2013). Middle East Security Report 8: The Assad Regime. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War. 58 Dehghanpisheh, B. (2012, September 17). Elite Iranian units commander says his forces are in Syria. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/elite-iranian-units-commander-says-hisforces-are-in-syria/2012/09/16/431ff096-0028-11e2-b257-e1c2b3548a4a_story.html 59 US Department of the Treasury. (2012, December 11). Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and Militias Supporting the Asad Regime. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from US Department of the Treasury: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1797.aspx 60 Ibid. 61 Levitt, M. (2013, February 15). The Hezbollah Connection in Syria and Iran. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-hezbollah-connection-in-syriaand-iran 62 US Department of the Treasury. (2012, September 13). Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership. Retrieved April 24, 2013, from US Department of the Treasury: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1709.aspx 63 Dehghanpisheh, B. (2012, September 26). Hezbollah increases support for Syrian regime, U.S. and Lebanese officials say. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from The Washington Post: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0926/world/35494328_1_lebanese-government-hezbollah-hasan-nasrallah 64 Knights, M. (2013, March 7). Syrian and Iraqi Conflicts Show Signs of Merging. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-and-iraqiconflicts-show-signs-of-merging 65 Karouny, M. (2013, March 3). Shi'ite fighters rally to defend Damascus shrine. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-syria-crisis-shiites-idUSBRE92202X20130303 66 Blanford, N. (2013, January 18). Video appears to show Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiites fighting in Syria. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from The Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0118/Video-appears-toshow-Hezbollah-and-Iraqi-Shiites-fighting-in-Syria

18 The involvement of these two sides has triggered the response of the Syrian opposition, fueling once again fears of spillovers. On March 4th 2013, Sunni insurgents ambushed a convoy of Iraqi and Syrian troops near the Iraqi town of Akashat. The troops were on a major supply route that connected Baghdad and Damascus through the Al Walid-At Tanf border crossing point, which is effectively the last border crossing point under the control of pro-Assad forces67. According to the ISW, the attack shows the cooperation not only between Baghdad and Damascus, but also between the Syrian resistance and Sunni insurgents across the Iraqi border. On another note, the rebels reportedly fired rockets to Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon for the first time on mid-April 201368. The attacks were followed by a statement by the Syrian National Coalition which affirmed that the attack was conducted by the rebel forces as retaliation to weeks of Hezbollah assaults on villages across the border69 and demanded that the Lebanese government exert control over its borders and put an immediate stop to Hezbollahs military operations on Syrian territory.70 Overall, one must understand that it would be beyond wishful thinking to assume that these numerous fighter groups in possession of significant military assets will simply lay down their arms and disappear in the unlikely event that a clear victor emerges from the Syrian calamity. On the contrary, it is very likely that we will see the emergence of multiple foci of power, in the shape of insurgent groups, political organizations, warlords and other factions that will compete and cooperate for influence. It is also likely that these groups will reflect the interests of their patrons, and could serve as proxies even after the potential downfall of the Assad regime. Currently, even humanitarian aid provides a major political advantage to the groups which have access to it since these groups gain influence and prestige depending on how well they distribute services to the areas under their control7172. Therefore military aid, both to the regime and to the opposition, has much further and deeper effects than simply aiding the war effort in the short run. OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE: THE BAATHIST MILITARY MACHINE IN ITS SURVIVAL QUEST The most important and concrete result of the prolonged civil war on Assads military machine is a clear erosion of its capabilities that crippled the Baathist regimes military posture to a significant

67

Holliday, J. (2013, March 8). SYRIA UPDATE 13-01: IRAQ-SYRIA OVERLAND SUPPLY ROUTES. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-update-13-01-iraq-syriaoverland-supply-routes 68 Spyer, J. (2013, April 20). Behind the Lines: Hezbollah turns eastwards. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from Jerusalem Post: http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/Behind-The-Lines-Hezbollah-turns-eastwards-310317 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 O'Bagy, E. (2013, April 15). SYRIA UPDATE: JABHAT NUSRA ALIGNS WITH AL-QAEDA. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-update-jabhat-nusra-alignsal-qaeda 72 White, J. (2013, March 25). Arms for Syria's Rebels: Shaping the War's Outcome. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arms-for-syrias-rebelsshaping-the-wars-outcome

19 extent, and turned the Syrian Arab Army into an internal security apparatus which has not refrained from committing crimes against humanity in its own territory against the Syrian people. In order to depict the degradation within the Syrian Armed Forces, it would be enough to cast a quick eye on annual military statistical reports. Put simply, London-based IISS Military Balance predicted Syrian Armys (equivalent of land forces in Turkish military terminology) manpower about 220,000 as of 2012.73 Notably, only in one year as a result of the civil war, the number drastically fell to some 110,000 including conscripts.74 On the other hand, regarding the Syrian order of battle and military doctrine, a shift from conventional posture into the current internal security campaign (or the regime security campaign, to be precise) was not an ultra-drastic change in the military mindset. The Syrian Armed Forces, being the military machine of a draconian minority rule that seized power through a coup, has been designed to accomplish regime security priorities effectively along with national defense tasks.75 In that sense, we have seen the regimes praetorian units actively participating in the crackdown with high adaptability and loyalty to their despot. As a matter of fact, starting from the early stages of the conflict Assad has relied on his praetorian units (the 4th Armoured Div., Republican Guards, and Special Forces), which were designed for dual missions of conventional warfare as well as regime security. Other conventional units were either kept in their garrisons, or deployed in small detachments under the command & control of the elite units mentioned above. This strategy has prevented mass unit defections, defection of an armored division as a whole for instance, but also restricted the Baathist dictatorships combat power to approximately one-third of the Syrian Army.76 Nevertheless, the selective deployment strategy should not be reduced to a simpler manpower calculation. Due to their reliability (especially due to their ethno-sectarian and political reliability), these praetorian units have been kept at high combat-readiness levels compared to other regular units of the Syrian Armed Forces. Thus, although Assads military machine has split; it would be fair to say that he kept the best part for himself to a certain extent. Furthermore, Assad usually allocated the lions share to his Allawitedominated, praetorian units which makes them more advantageous in fire-power. For instance, Israelbased security studies think-tank, the INSS, predicted the number of Syrias most recently upgraded T72s some 12077, and these MBTs were probably delivered to the 4th Armoured Division primarily. Besides, the proportion of Allawites in the remaining forces is now higher than it was in the pre-civil war times, and this augments the sectarian narrative of the conflict significantly. The Syrian Armed Forces pre-civil war military modernization trends have also played an important role in shaping the course of the conflict. Both the first and the second Lebanon experiences,

73 74

IISS, Military Balance 2012 Middle East and North Africa, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 349. IISS, Military Balance 2013- Middle East and North Africa, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 403. 75 IHS Janes, Janes Sentinel Security Assessment-Eastern Mediterranean: Syrian Armed Forces, August 2012, p.5. 76 Joseph, Holliday. The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, ISW, Washington D.C., 2013, pp. 14 15. 77 INSS, Middle East Military Balance Files: Syria, Tel Aviv, 2013, p 6.

20 respectively in 1982 and in 2006, have influenced Damascus military thinking deeply. The major result of the 1982 case was a shift from dependence on air forces, which were easily eliminated by the Israelis, in favor of strategic weapons systems, especially surface to surface missiles (SSM). When it comes to the 2006 experience, Hezbollahs relative- success against the IDF has impressed the Syrians, and encouraged hybrid warfare capabilities. Therefore, the Baathist regimes military modernization trends followed disruptive capabilities such as air-defense systems and anti-armor assets on one hand, along with paramilitaries and asymmetric capacity; and on the other hand, it pursued quick-fix strategic weapons systems long range ballistic missiles and rockets (with the exception of T-72 modernization in 2003).78 In the course of time, the divided Syrian military and the Baathist dictatorships approach to the conflict shaped alterations in Assads forces operational art and tactical doctrine. First, Shabiha militia has started to be systematically used as the paramilitary component of the brutal crackdown.79 Moreover, evidences suggest that this paramilitary trend, in conjunction with the hybrid warfare context, Shabiha operations are integrated with Assads conventional units.80 Second, Assads forces have been cynically conducting indiscriminate shelling via artillery, rotary and fixed-winged assets, and finally through SSMs as a tool of depopulation strategy. 81 These two major trends in the Baathist forces operational art and tactical doctrine, along with the rising sectarian narrative and over-reliance on politico-religiously trustful units operations have brought about dissolution of the Syrian nation to a considerable extent. Thus, even though the opposition successfully topples Assads tyranny, it is pretty unclear that the next regime would be able to keep the country united.
Chemical Weapons Allegations: What Does Assad Have in His Mind? This box precedes the planned follow-up EDAM Discussion Paper concerning the Baathist dictatorships WMD arsenal and strategic weapon systems. Especially after the suspicious deaths in Khan al Asal in March 2013, both the opposition and the regime accused each other for using chemical weapons. Meanwhile, important Israeli figures have openly indicated that Assads forces have repeatedly used chemical weapons. For instance, at the time of writing, top intelligence general Itai Brun reiterated Israels claims, speaking at a conference organized by Tel Aviv-based think-tank INSS. Use of CWs is critical as President Obama stressed that WMDs would be redline for a US intervention. From a military affairs perspective, this paper sees Assads WMD arsenal as the remaining part of the regimes inventory that has not been used (or was recently used) in the crackdown.

CONCLUSION: KEY MILITARY TRENDS AND POSSIBLE TRAJECTORY OF THE

Assads military preferences, which gave way the use of artillery, rot ary-winged assets, fixed-winged assets, CONFLICT and ballistic missiles respectively, have shown a gradually intensifying profile of violence and indiscriminate use of force so far. Thus, the important question at this point would be the regimes calculations about prospects of a foreign intervention, and cost-benefit calculus on using the WMD arsenal.
78 79

IHS Janes, August 2012, pp 3 5. Syria Unrest: Who are the Shabiha, BBC, 29 May 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14482968 80 The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p 30. 81 Ibid, p 41.

21 As indicated in the introduction part, the essence of this papers approach to military assessment is to first determine the key trends, which might change the course of the conflict, and then to analyze shifts and changes in these trends for understanding the trajectory of the prolonged armed struggle. Thus, the paper summarizes key findings below which are thought to be the major determinants of possible future trajectory of the Syrian civil war: The geostrategic context of the conflict is mainly about controlling main supply routes, highways, choke points, as well as frontier areas. While the capitals suburbs have been witnessing intensive clashes between the rebel forces and Assads troops, the central Damascus is surrounded by the regime supporter Allawites and religious minorities, and also by HQs of the praetorian units.82 Therefore, in case the opposition progress successfully continues, the probable final for the Syrian civil war would be the Siege of Damascus. For reaching the final Siege of Damascus, the opposition should cut the capitals supply lines by (1) fully controlling Aleppo-Damascus and Damascus coastal areas routes, as well as major civilian and military airports (2) seizing the hub city of Homs, (3) controlling frontiers, especially the Lebanese and the Jordanian border areas, (4) and finally denying the regimes air superiority and air-lift capabilities. The Syrian Air Force is a critical element of the conflict. Unlike many Western militaries, Assads Air Force also controls nearly all rotary-winged assets, and since the time of Hafez al Assad, the branch has been perceived as the privileged part of the armed forces. By relying on air-lifts, the regime managed to overcome long sieges in far distances from the capital, and also succeeded to take advantage of air superiority over the opposition forces. In order to analyze the possible trajectory of the conflict, one should monitor three major trends related with the Syrian Air Force: (1) Any drastic increase in the oppositions air defense & MANPADS capabilities, (2) Attrition in Assads air assets, along with robustness and consistency of foreign assistance by the Baathist regimes allies and friends, (3) Any shifts in the prospects of a no-fly zone on Syria.

Given the increasing sectarian narrative of the conflict and scope of the violence conducted by both sides, there should not be high expectations about further defections, especially by the regimes praetorian units. Thus, the opposition has to overcome those forces in order to
82

Ibid, p 38.

22 achieve a strategic victory. Coordination among different opposition groups is a critical factor when assessing the rebel combat capacity. In that sense, the operative elite units strains are critical to understand their (remaining) combat capability. Arms transfers are the lifeline of pro-Assad forces and are a major factor in determining the regimes stamina. They also act as major capability enhancers for the opposition both in terms of inflicting damage and in consolidating gains. Arms transfers have effects that go beyond winning the war in the short run, as the military assets that different groups control determines their current and future influence in the country. In this prolonged war of attrition, being the asymmetric force that it is, the opposition has a tactical advantage at least theoretically. Yet the Baathist dictatorship still possesses wild cards, such as chemical (and allegedly biological) weapons, and whether it will use these wild cards largely depends on the international communitys potential reaction; which Assad gauges every now and then by purposefully escalating the conflict. Another wild card is the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah in the civil war broadly, as openly declared belligerents. Since their presence is organized and has a doctrinal base, it differs greatly from the involvement of foreign fighters such as jihadists it would not be too wrong to name the Iran-Hezbollah presence in the country as a foreign intervention. In terms of shaping the ongoing war and the new order that will arise in its aftermath, the involvement of these two actors can be a game changer in itself. Fate of the countrys formidable WMD arsenal is a clear game changer. Although there is little open-source information about the locations of the chemical (and allegedly biological) sites, a large proportion is assumed to be deployed close to Damascus. Only al Safir Military Base in Aleppo is a pretty likely exception to Assads WMD deployments.