Factors of Traditionalism

In Conservative Jewish Law

Evan Hoffman
JHI 9978
Doctoral Planning
Fall 2004
2
 This paper contains four sections. The opening section is an introduction to the
history of Conservative Jewish law, paying attention to key organizations, personalities,
and decisions (1917-1972). The second section is an overview of historiography on the
subject of Conservative Jewish law. The third section contains my proposed thesis on the
factors of traditionalism in Conservative Jewish law. The final section of this paper
introduces broad historical questions which could be answered by a thorough study of
Conservative halakhah.
The development of Conservative halakhah1 began in 1917.2 Leaders of the
United Synagogue of America believed that the creation of a central authority under
recognized auspices could stem the tide of ritual deviancy becoming rampant in
constituent congregations. After much deliberation over the precise nature of rabbinic
authority and the possibility of interdenominational cooperation, the Committee for the
Interpretation of Jewish Law was formed under the chairmanship of Professor Louis
Ginzberg.3 The committee consisted of five rabbis, but Ginzberg was the dominant force
and authored all of its responsa.4
In 1927 responsibility for Jewish law in the Conservative movement shifted from
the United Synagogue to the Rabbinical Assembly.5 By establishing a Committee on
Jewish Law (CJL), the RA was creating a forum for its members to openly discuss
contemporary halakhic problems amongst peers, as opposed to doing so in the
dumbfounding presence of towering superiors. It was hoped that such discussion would
clarify those positions which RA members held in common, a starting point for the
1
For the purposes of this paper, the term “Conservative halakhah” will incorporate the halakhic activities
of any organization within the Conservative Movement (United Synagogue, Rabbinical Assembly, Jewish
Theological Seminary), or individual rabbi who self identifies as Conservative.
2
Prior to 1917 the nascent Conservative movement was devoid of halakhic deliberation. Representing the
Seminary, Solomon Schechter consciously avoided matters of practical halakhah. See David Golinkin,
“The Influence of Seminary Professors on Halakha in the Conservative Movement,” in Tradition Renewed
Vol. II, ed. Jack Wertheimer (New York: JTSA, 1997), pp. 445-467. The Rabbinical Assembly, at that
time named the Alumni Association of the Jewish Theological Seminary, had yet to develop into a fully
functioning rabbinical organization. The United Synagogue of America, founded in 1913, originally
intended to avoid the complicated realm of halakhic decision making. The preamble to its founding charter
states, “It shall be the aim of The United Synagogue of America, while not endorsing the innovations by
any of its constituent bodies, to embrace all elements essentially loyal to traditional Judaism.” Abraham
Karp, A History of the United Synagogue of America 1913-1963 (New York: United Synagogue, 1964), p.
15.
3
See Herbert Parzen, Architects of Conservative Judaism (New York: J. David, 1964), pp. 114, 143-146.
Parzen argued that Louis Ginzberg was willing to be very progressive in matters of Jewish law by both
interpreting and legislating, but that over time he had a change of heart. This position is not supported by
the evidence. My own understanding of Ginzberg’s approach to halakhah appears later in this paper. For
documentary evidence of efforts at early interdenominational cooperation see the statement by Rabbi Louis
Epstein in Karp, p. 25.
4
See David Golinkin ed., The Responsa of Louis Ginzberg (New York: JTSA, 1996) for a collection of
Ginzberg’s halakhic writings from that era.
5
The cause of the law committee’s institutional jump is a disputed point. See Sidney Schwarz, Law and
Legitimacy: An Intellectual History of Conservative Judaism 1902-1973 (Ph.D. diss., Temple University,
1982), p. 152, who argues that all debate over halakhah and ideology shifted away from the United
Synagogue, because it was forced into passivity by the traditionalist and anti-sectarian Adler administration
at the Seminary. See Pamela S. Nadell, Conservative Judaism in America: A Biographical Dictionary and
Sourcebook (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 5, who attributed the demise of the United
Synagogue’s law committee to its lack of enforcement power. Louis Ginzberg refused to continue
operating a halakhic body which was not being obeyed by its constituency.

3
emerging Conservative ideology.6 Yet the RA was aware of an existing ideological
division within its ranks between the so-called left-wing and right-wing. To prevent one
wing from dominating the CJL it was decided to split the ten seats on the committee
evenly.7 The CJL restricted itself to an interpretive role, applying the ancient
hermeneutics of halakhah to twentieth century situations. The CJL consciously refused
to legislate new halakhot or to rule in deviance from accepted Orthodox patterns.8 This
approach satisfied right-wing RA members such as Louis Epstein, Max Drob, Louis
Finkelstein, and Boaz Cohen. However the left-wing of the RA, including CJL members
Mordecai Kaplan, Eugene Kohn, Herman Rubenovitz, and Solomon Goldman were
severely disappointed by the traditional decisions emanating from the CJL.9 Almost
every year the CJL Chairman’s Report contained an apology for the committee’s slow
work ethic and traditionalist conclusions.10 In the twenty years following the creation of
the CJL, leftist and centrist elements within the RA achieved a majority in numbers and
influence. Yet while the RA as a whole became more progressive, the CJL was
dominated by Boaz Cohen, who served as secretary (1932-1940) and chairman (1940-
1948). Cohen was extremely conservative in his approach toward change in Jewish
law.11 Consequently in nearly two decades at the helm of the movement’s halakhic arm,
the only notable leniencies he approved were eating broiled fish in a non-kosher
restaurant and employing a microphone in the synagogue on Shabbat.12 A most telling
sign of disconnect between the reality of Conservative Judaism and the CJL as
administered by Cohen, can be seen regarding mixed pews. Not until 1946 did the CJL
officially sanction mixed pews even de facto, despite the prior existence of such a seating
arrangement in the overwhelming majority of Conservative sanctuaries.13
The most controversial halakhic issue facing the Rabbinical Assembly was the
Agunah, or chained woman.14 The death and destruction associated with World War I
and the transoceanic migration of Jews resulted in thousands of Agunot. In 1930 Rabbi
Louis Epstein proposed instituting a complicated halakhic mechanism into the marriage
contract (Ketubah) which would allow a woman to write her own bill of divorce in the
event she became an Agunah.15 Epstein traveled all over the world in an attempt to rally
support from leading rabbis for his proposal. His efforts were mostly in vain as the
6
David Golinkin ed., Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative
Movement Vol. I (Jerusalem: RA, 1997), pp. 7-11.
7
Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly (1928), p. 21.
8
Proceedings of the CJLS, p. 97.
9
See Mordecai M. Kaplan, “Toward the Formulation of Guiding Principles for the Conservative
Movement,” in Tradition and Change, ed. Mordecai Waxman (New York: Burning Bush Press, 1958), p.
306, who compared the activities of the CJL to that of a Lithuanian dayyan.
10
Schwarz, p. 167.
11
See Boaz Cohen, “Canons of Interpretation of Jewish Law,” in Law and Tradition (New York: JTS,
1959), pp. 39-61. Cohen believed that only the behavior of God-fearing and ritual observing Jews should
be taken into account when determining what should be normative Judaism.
12
PRA (1940), p. 33. Permission to eat fish in a non-kosher restaurants had several caveats, including
restrictions on the grill used to broil the fish and the type of plates used to serve the food, which if followed
to the letter would have rendered the overall leniency useless.
13
Minutes of the CJL, 4/13/46.
14
In Jewish law divorce occurs when the wife receives a get, or divorce document, which is only valid if
authorized by the husband. If a husband’s whereabouts are unknown, or if a recalcitrant husband refuses to
authorize the writing of a get, the wife remains a married woman indefinitely.
15
Louis Epstein, Hatsa’ah le-Ma’an Takanat ha-Agunah (New York: 1930).

4
leading rabbis of the world either ignored his written work or responded with lukewarm
support.16 The RA was very hesitant to adopt the “Epstein Plan” without support from
other rabbinical bodies, despite a firm conviction that the plan was halakhically valid.17
In 1935 the RA voted to tentatively accept the plan, while delaying implantation for one
year as further rabbinical support was sought.18 The Union of Orthodox Rabbis (Agudat
ha-Rabbanim) responded by unleashing a vicious assault in the Yiddish press on the RA
generally, Louis Epstein in particular, and any attempt by Americanized rabbis to deal
with halakhic matters. Orthodox opposition culminated with the publication of Le-Dor
Aharon, which was to serve as a testament to future generations of the incorrectness and
deviousness of the Conservative rabbinate. After failing to secure support for their plan
from either Orthodoxy or their own mentor, Louis Ginzberg, the RA dropped the Epstein
Plan in 1936.19 During World War II an emergency Agunah solution was enacted by the
RA with the consent of Ginzberg,20 but after the war ended the issue remained without a
permanent solution. Failure to adequately deal with Agunah crisis would plague the RA
for nearly forty years,21 but it was only one example of a general state of disappointment
many Conservative rabbis felt in the late 1940’s about their movement’s halakhic
progress.
In 1948 a major change occurred within the Rabbinical Assembly. The
Committee on Jewish Law was replaced by the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards
(CJLS).22 Whereas the old committee was dominated by traditionalist elements within
the Conservative movement, especially the Jewish Theological Seminary faculty, and
bound itself to the inherent hermeneutics of Jewish law, the reorganized committee was
designed to represent all RA factions, shake off the influence of the Seminary, and render
decisions based upon both halakhic and extra-halakhic considerations.23 The CJLS was
suddenly endowed with the power to solve all of the Conservative movement’s halakhic
16
Louis Epstein, “Adjustment of Jewish Marriage Laws to Present Day Conditions,” PRA (1935), pp. 227-
235.
17
Boaz Cohen, “Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of the Agunah,” PRA (1936), pp. 333-
335. Within the RA, Max Drob opposed the Epstein Plan on technical grounds (Max Drob Alumni File,
Ratner Center).
18
Louis Epstein, Le-She’elat ha-Agunah (New York: 1940), pp. 16-17.
19
Le-She’elat ha-Agunah, p. 19.
20
PRA (1942), p. 54.
21
The Agunah crisis became the “grand obsession” of the RA until its resolution in 1968. Eventually the
issue morphed from being about the chained woman to being about the struggling rabbi. As CJL chairman,
Rabbi Theodore Friedman said in 1952, “The Agunah is not waiting, what is at stake is the adequacy of
Historic Judaism.”PRA (1952), p. 52. What he meant was that women, who theoretically should be Agunot
for lack of a Jewish divorce, are in fact remarrying either through a civil ceremony or with the help of
Reform rabbis who do not require a get for remarriage. The true crisis was whether Historic (i.e.
Conservative) Judaism could live up to its expectations and reconcile law with life.
22
The debate which led to the change took place in Chicago at the annual RA convention and is recorded in
PRA (1948), pp. 110-192. The actual change of name took place at the first meeting of the reorganized
committee, upon a suggestion by Rabbi Jacob Agus. Minutes of CJLS 12/16/48.
23
Louis Epstein proposed the following resolution which was ultimately rejected. “The committee shall be
instructed to hold itself bound by the authority of Jewish law and within the frame of Jewish law to labor
toward progress and growth of the Law to the end of adjusting it to present day religious needs and
orientation, whether it be on the side of severity or leniency.” PRA (1948), pp. 171-172. The Committee
on the Scope of the Law Committee issued a ruling that members of the Seminary faculty could not
participate in the affairs of the CJLS as faculty, but could do so as individual rabbis. See minutes of
meeting 10/27/49, RA Law Archives.

5
problems through radical interpretation or outright legislation. To further facilitate the
liberalization of Conservative religious standards, a system was adopted whereby both
majority and minority reports emanating from the CJLS were equally valid and only
unanimous votes were binding. In its early years, the CJLS satisfied the progressive wing
of the RA by issuing innovative responsa. In 1950 the CJLS issued a responsa permitting
the use of electricity on the Sabbath for all activities which are not otherwise forbidden.
Rabbis Jacob Agus, Theodore Friedman, and Morris Adler jointly authored a responsum
permitting one to drive an automobile to synagogue on the Sabbath.24 In 1951 the
committee initiated a discussion on the permissibility of counting women for a minyan
and giving them aliyot. By 1955 a majority of the CJLS was willing to allow women’s
aliyot in at least some instances. Other lenient rulings from those early years included
qualified permission for a Kohen to marry a divorcee,25 permission for a Mohel to travel
to a circumcision on the Sabbath,26 permission to eat kosher foods in non-kosher
eateries,27 approval of above ground crypts,28 and approval of a shortened mourning
period.29
Lack of progress on the paramount issue of Agunah, however, dulled much of the
excitement generated over other halakhic advances. In 1952 at Atlantic City, the RA
came very close to adopting a plan prepared by Rabbi David Aronson which would have
solved the Agunah crisis by radically reinterpreting the phrase “ke-dat moshe v’yisrael.”30
In an effort to prevent the RA from doing violence to traditional Jewish law, Chancellor
Louis Finkelstein of the Seminary proposed that the RA work in conjunction with the
Seminary faculty on issues of personal status (hilkhot ishut).31 Despite strong opposition
from some elements within the RA who did not want to abdicate halakhic authority, an
agreement was reached between the RA and JTS. On halakhic issues of personal status
the Conservative movement would be led by an executive Steering Committee,
legislative Joint Law Conference, and a judicial Beth Din, to be operated jointly by the
RA and JTS. The primary achievement of the joint RA-JTS venture was the introduction
of a new Ketubah, which contained the “Lieberman clause.”32 The revised marriage
contract stipulated that both parties agree to have their marital problems settled by the

24
PRA (1950), pp. 112-137. This lenient ruling was part of a larger Sabbath Revitalization Program.
Efforts to improve the Sabbath observance of lay people failed, leaving only the lenient ruling about
driving. See Marshall Sklare, Conservative Judaism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), p. 238.
25
Minutes of CJLS, 9/13/49. The Kohen would have to renounce his priestly status. See also Isaac Klein,
Responsa and Halakhic Studies (New York: Ktav, 1975); David Novak, “Is Conservative Halakhah
Possible,” Judaism 25 (1976): 500-501.
26
Minutes of CJLS, 5/2/51.
27
Minutes of CJLS, 5/13/52.
28
Minutes of CJLS, 10/27/53.
29
Minutes of CJLS, 10/13/52. This leniency was limited to mourning over a death which occurred on the
intermediate days of a Festival.
30
PRA (1951), pp. 120-140.
31
See Michael Greenbaum, “Finkelstein and His Critics,” Conservative Judaism 47, 4 (1995): 32-36.
Finkelstein had been pondering since 1949 how to bring back the traditionalist influence of the Talmud
faculty to the CJLS. He feared that if the RA were given a free hand on matters of Jewish law it would ally
itself with Reform. Finkelstein’s distrust of the Conservative rabbinate forced him to involve the Seminary
in matters of practical halakhah, which the Seminary had a long history of avoiding. See also Golinkin,
“The Influence of Seminary Professors,” p. 460.
32
Professor Saul Lieberman authored the Hebrew version of the revised Ketubah.

6
RA-JTS Beth Din, and imposes financial penalties for non-compliance.33 Some figures in
the Conservative movement hailed the new Ketubah as a tremendous breakthrough in the
history of Jewish law.34 Other Conservative rabbis were disappointed by what they
considered a less than satisfactory solution to the Agunah issue.35 In practice many
Conservative rabbis did not utilize the new Ketubah, preferring instead the traditional
Ketubah. The national Beth Din created by the Joint Conference did not hear many
cases. In effect the Agunah problem was still unsolved, and until 1959 the RA as
represented by the CJLS lacked authority to deal with personal status issues because of its
agreement with the Seminary.36
For nearly a decade and a half following the introduction of the Lieberman
Ketubah (1954-1968), Conservative halakhah experienced a reactionary period devoid of
any substantial progress.37 The Sabbath responsum was revisited in 1960 because of a
widely held suspicion that the driving leniency was being extended beyond its original
intention.38 The CJLS continued to flounder in its efforts to solve personal status issues.
Leniencies in the field of kashruth came few and far between. Equality of the sexes in
the synagogue did not receive serious attention. The status of Yom Tov Sheni, the second
day of festivals observed in the Diaspora, was discussed time and again without definitive
conclusions. Left-wing members of the RA feared that the CJLS was suffering from the
same symptoms as had the defunct CJL, an inability to reconcile Jewish law with
contemporary Jewish life.39
The fate of Conservative Jewish law changed dramatically under the
chairmanship of Rabbi Benjamin Z. Kreitman, as the CJLS once again operated in a
progressive spirit. During a brief period of three years (1968-1970) the CJLS definitively
solved the Agunah problem, permitted swordfish, gelatin, and hard cheese, declared Yom
Tov Sheni optional, and eliminated wedding restrictions during the “three weeks.”40 The
committee was aware that its halakhic liberalism would antagonize more conservative
members of the RA. In order to reinforce the notion that Conservative Judaism accepts a
binding halakhah, the committee hoped to achieve a unanimous vote on the critical issue

33
For the full Hebrew and English texts see PRA (1954), pp. 66-68.
34
RA President Harry Halpern wrote, “The new Ketubah is indicative of our desire to shape Jewish law
without doing violence to the halakhah. We should all use it.” (Ratner Center, Papers of Jacob Agus, Box
10 Folder 40, letter dated 11/17/54). Louis Finkelstein hailed the new Ketubah as the most significant
accomplishment in the fifty year history of the Rabbinical Assembly. PRA (1954), p. 71.
35
There were a variety of reasons for RA members to consider the Lieberman Ketubah deficient. Some
argued that the Ketubah would prove irrelevant as it could not be enforced in civil courts (PRA (1954), p.
70); see also James Ellenson and David Ellenson, “American Courts and the Enforceability of a Ketubah as
a Private Contract,” Conservative Judaism 35, 3 (1982), pp. 35-42. Others opposed any solution which did
not create absolute equality between men and women. See Regina Stein, The Boundaries of Gender (Ph.D.
diss., JTS, 1998), p. 364. From a traditionalist perspective one could argue that it is halakhically invalid.
To my knowledge no Conservative rabbi openly challenged Lieberman on this point. See Norman Lamm,
“Recent Additions to the Ketuba,” Tradition 2, 1 (Fall 1959), pp. 93-119, for Orthodox objections to the
Lieberman clause.
36
George Nudell, “The Clearing House: A History of the CJLS,” (unpublished paper, 1979), p. 23.
37
Parzen, pp. 120, 146.
38
Minutes of CJLS, 1/31/61.
39
Nadell, pp. 12-13.
40
Herbert Rosenblum, Conservative Judaism: A Contemporary History (New York: United Synagogue,
1983), 53-54. According to Rosenblum, 1968 was the year in which the Conservative movement “crossed
the halakhic Rubicon.”

7
of requiring ritual immersion as part of the conversion process. When two rabbis
dissented, the bulk of the committee resigned in protest.41 The CJLS ceased to function
for two years. When it was reconstituted in 1972, with new members and leadership,
Conservative Jewish law took on a new character and faced challenges quite different
from those of the previous half century.42 Whereas previously the primary internal
criticism of the Conservative movement’s halakhic arm came from those demanding
more changes in Jewish law, by the 1970’s such criticism was coming chiefly from those
who thought the movement had strayed too far from tradition.
The above historical overview revealed that the Conservative movement’s first
half century of halakhic activity was an era marked by traditionalism. Every leniency or
measure of progress, even one considered to be of absolute necessity, was only achieved
after long and difficult struggle. Given the philosophy of Conservative Judaism,43 it is
not immediately clear why this should be the case. Conservative Judaism, which traces
its roots back to the Positive-Historical School of nineteenth century Germany,44 believes
that Judaism thrives and survives on a healthy combination of tradition and change.
Instead of focusing on theology and the origins of Jewish law,45 this school of thought
focuses on the inherent capacity of the law to adapt to contemporary needs.46 At the
Jewish Theological Seminary, Talmud was taught not in the manner of the traditional
yeshiva, but rather in a critical manner which exposed the historic development of Jewish
law. Those who believed that Conservative Judaism represented a third party within
Judaism, saw the movement as different from Reform in its recognition of the binding
character of halakhah and different from Orthodoxy in its recognition that halakhah has
changed in the past and will do so in the future.47 The guiding principle of Conservative
Jewish legal theory was what Solomon Schechter called “Catholic Israel.” Whatever
religious observances the Jewish people preserve may not be abolished by any rabbinical
authority, while those elements of tradition which get dropped naturally by the people
over time need not be maintained. It is up to the historian to find specific factors in the
history of twentieth century American Judaism which made it difficult for Conservative
Judaism to officially part from tradition. The following paragraphs are a review of the
historiography on this question.
The first non-partisan study of the Conservative movement was done by Marshall
Sklare in the early 1950’s. Although Sklare’s work was a sociological analysis, he did
offer some keen insights into why the Conservative rabbinate was failing at its self-
appointed task of liberalizing ritual law. Sklare noticed a tendency on the part of

41
Nudell, 29-31.
42
Rosenblum, pp. 123-125; Nudell, p. 34.
43
The remainder of this paragraph discusses the ideology of Conservative Judaism as expressed by its
leading rabbinical exponents. No official platform of Conservative Judaism existed until 1988 with the
publication of Emet v’Emunah.
44
Ismar Schorsch, “Zacharias Frankel and the European Origins of Conservative Judaism,” Judaism 30, 3
(1981), pp. 344-354.
45
The Historical School adopted a very ambiguous approach to theology generally and the divine origins of
the Torah in particular. See introduction to Solomon Schechter, Studies in Judaism (Philadelphia: JPS,
1896) for an example of Historical School thinking and a candid statement of theological uncertainty.
46
Robert Gordis, Conservative Judaism: An American Philosophy (New York: Behrman, 1945), p. 66.
According to Gordis, a cardinal belief of Conservative Judaism is the eternal viability of Jewish tradition.
47
See Boaz Cohen, “Towards a Philosophy of Conservative Judaism,” Conservative Judaism 6, 1 (1949),
pp. 1-31. Cohen called Orthodoxy, “a crystallized Judaism of the eighteenth century.”

8
Seminary graduates to defer to the wisdom of their teachers, over and above what is
generally found in student-teacher relationships.48 Since the Seminary was a stronghold
of the traditional wing of the movement, it followed that the RA would adopt official
positions significantly to the right of common Conservative practice. Sklare also pinned
rabbinic inaction on the theological diversity existent within the RA. He argued that
rabbinic efforts to amend the law would have exposed the laity to deep doctrinal divisions
within the rabbinate, a development the rabbis sought to avoid.49 Sklare also exposed the
inapplicability of Catholic Israel doctrine to American Judaism.50 This left the
Conservative movement struggling to find an intellectual basis on which to ground its
halakhic innovations, which often led to inaction.
Herbert Parzen, in his 1964 work Architects of Conservative Judaism, attributed
the lack of progress in Conservative Jewish law to the tenacity of the movement’s right-
wing.51 Parzen took a partisan approach to the issue, revealing that his sentiments were
with the Reconstructionist wing of Conservative Judaism.52 He was particularly hostile to
Louis Ginzberg. Parzen castigated Ginzberg, on the one hand for withdrawing from
practical matters in favor of scholarly research, and on the other hand using his reputation
and influence to preserve the halakhic status quo. He further noted that the RA was
unwilling to make its break from pure halakhic decision making until 1948, the year after
Ginzberg retired from the Seminary.53
George Nudell, in a seminar paper written at JTS in 1979 for Professor Seymour
Siegel, emphasized that the various manifestations of the Law Committee suffered from a
lack of direction and support services. The committees were often confused whether they
should initiate debate on halakhic issues or wait for specific questions to be posed. Their
activities were hindered by bad housekeeping and lack of a full-time secretary.54 As
Pamela Nadell noted, committee work was further stymied by having to repeatedly
answer routine questions. Nearly all men serving on the committee were also full-time
congregational rabbis who could not devote the hours needed to propose and draft
innovative responsa. The little time they could spare for committee work was often
squandered on procedural issues. Funds were rarely made available to hire research
consultants.55
Sidney Schwarz, in his 1982 doctoral dissertation titled “Law and Legitimacy: An
Intellectual History of Conservative Judaism 1902-1973”, developed a thesis that
Conservative Judaism survived by propagating three myths: (A) Conservative Judaism is

48
Sklare, pp. 186-187.
49
Ibid., pp. 226-228.
50
Ibid., pp. 231-234. Sklare noted that the doctrine of Catholic Israel was promulgated at a time when most
of Jewry was religiously observant. The purpose of Catholic Israel was to thwart the work of Reformers
who wanted to abrogate rituals which the masses still held dear. In America of the mid-twentieth century
the overwhelming majority of Jews were not shomrei mitzvoth in the classical sense. Application of the
Catholic Israel concept would have meant nullifying most of Jewish law. Surely the rabbis were not trying
to abet further ritual violations.
51
Parzen, pp. 118-120.
52
Ibid., pp. 146-147. Parzen referred to the left-wing of the RA as the “realistic interpreters” of Jewish law,
while he considered the right-wing approach to be “outdated.”
53
Ibid., 143. This point proves nothing. A similar myth connects the death of Saul Lieberman with the
Seminary’s decision to ordain women as rabbis. Chronological juxtaposition does not prove causation.
54
Nudell, p. 5.
55
Nadell, pp. 12-13.

9
halakhic. (B) Halakhah can and must be modified to suit the times. (C) By subscribing
to myths (A) and (B), Conservative Judaism is the heir to normative Judaism.56 Schwarz
attempted to prove that each myth was meant to satisfy a particular wing of a movement
which was not otherwise unified. Myth (A) satisfied the right-wing which was interested
in maintaining traditional halakhah and was not particularly fond of change. Myth (B)
satisfied the left-wing which was not very devoted to traditional Jewish law, and needed
to know that it was part of a movement which extolled progress. Myth (C) comforted the
centrists who needed the reassurance that a policy of tradition and change is in fact the
true nature of Judaism.57 According to Schwarz, theological polarization in the RA led to
paralysis in halakhic activity.58 The basic element of this idea had already been proposed
by Sklare. The most significant novelty offered by Schwarz is his claim that the RA
feared losing the respect of Jewish masses if the CJL/CJLS approved radical departures
from halakhah.59 This theory is tempting, but Schwarz does not supply any evidence.
Walter Jacob argued in 1979 that Conservative Judaism failed to modernize
Jewish law in its earlier years, because the RA was constantly looking over its shoulder at
the Orthodox rabbinate. According to Jacob, only in the 1970’s did the RA finally
overcome that hurdle and begin to take an independent stand on halakhah.60 Elliot Dorff
attributed decades of RA timidity on halakhah to “intimidation by the Orthodox and the
Schoolmen of the Seminary.”61 Regina Stein, in her 1998 doctoral dissertation titled
“Boundaries of Gender: The Role of Gender Issues in Forming American Jewish
Denominational Identity 1913-1963,” documented various attempts by the RA to secure
approval for its Agunah solutions from Orthodox rabbinical bodies.62 Michael
Greenbaum and David Golinkin have emphasized the efforts of Louis Finkelstein to
wrest control over Conservative halakhah away from the RA and establish it firmly in the
hands of Seminary schoolmen.63
Preliminary research into the primary sources of Conservative Jewish law, found
in the movement’s periodicals and at the RA and JTS archives, as well as the secondary
sources, has led me to propose the following thesis.

56
Schwarz, p. 154.
57
Ibid., p. 265.
58
Ibid., p. 156. See also Gilbert Rosenthal, Contemporary Judaism (New York: Human Sciences Press,
1986), p. 351.
59
Schwarz, p. 160. He argues that most religiously inclined East European Jews in America during the first
half of the twentieth century, regardless of the level of their observance, gauged the legitimacy of a
synagogue or rabbi by traditional (i.e. Orthodox) standards. Therefore traditionalist elements in the RA,
already on the defensive about the innovations introduced by their colleagues and the negative publicity
Mordecai Kaplan attracted to their alma mater, endeavored to keep Conservative halakhah as close to
Orthodoxy as possible in order to retain the allegiance of a large demographic. The weakness of this theory
is that Conservative halakhic decisions were notorious for being irrelevant in practice and largely unknown
to the public, with rare exception. Additionally, the standard notion is that second-generation American
Jews were attracted to the Conservative movement because it provided the right mix of modernity and
familiar traditions, not because of any official halakhic resemblance to Orthodoxy.
60
Walter Jacob, “Conservative Judaism and Halachah,” Journal of Reform Judaism 26, 1 (1979), pp. 17-23.
61
Elliot N. Dorff, “The Ideology of Conservative Judaism: Thirty Years after Sklare,” American Jewish
History 74, 1 (1984), p. 115. Dorff believed that these factors had been overcome by the early 1980’s
because the RA had “grown confident enough to ignore the former (Orthodox) and work cooperatively with
the latter (Seminary schoolmen).”
62
Stein, pp. 322-338.
63
See footnote #31.

10
 A progressive halakhah can exist for the Conservative movement in Judaism only
if three criteria are satisfactorily met. (A) There must be a desire by the Conservative
rabbinate to legitimize existing deviancy from traditional Jewish law, or to officially
sanction deviancy which is yet to exist.64 (B) The Conservative rabbinate must be
willing to openly state that a particularly Conservative brand of halakhah, in contrast to
traditional (i.e. Orthodox) halakhah is both possible and desirable.65 (C) An organization
responsible for halakhic decision making and committed to points (A) and (B), which has
the approbation of a broad spectrum of the movement as well as Conservative Judaism’s
leading Judaic scholars, must exist with adequate staff and support. In the period
covered by this study (1917-1972 approx.), many figures in the Conservative movement
lamented a lack of progress on the halakhic front. The Rabbinical Assembly’s proclivity
to render traditionalist legal decisions, or to take no action which is the equivalent of a
traditionalist decision,66 was the result of struggling to meet and ultimately falling short
of the criteria stated above. The specific historical factors which caused this dominance
of traditionalism over change in Conservative halakhah can be broken down into six
broad categories: Orthodoxy, competence, the Seminary, personal status, diversity, and
technical difficulties.
I. Orthodoxy
The factor of Orthodoxy in the fate of Conservative halakhah was not as
monolithic as some scholars would lead one to believe. It is correct that intimidation by
and fear of Orthodoxy did play a role in shaping CJL/CJLS decisions. But it is important
to see the nuances which distinguish fear of Orthodoxy from a desire to be part of
Orthodoxy or a grudging willingness to accept the status quo of Orthodox monopoly over
halakhah. In the Conservative movement’s early years a number of prominent members
of the RA were doctrinally Orthodox in belief and effectively Orthodox in practice.
What distinguished them from institutional Orthodoxy of their day was the nature and
location of their schooling (JTS as opposed to a yeshiva). On issues of Jewish law these
men had no desire to break away from normative Judaism by rendering fraudulently
permissive rulings. They saw themselves as part of the worldwide traditional rabbinate,
which was thoroughly committed to the preservation of halakhic Judaism. While aware
that they were culturally different from the old-world rabbis of Eastern Europe, they saw
themselves as the American version of Western European enlightened Orthodoxy.67 A

64
Legitimizing an existing deviancy is not foreign to traditional halakhic discourse. The concept of
melamed zekhut (lit. “teach merit”) is to rationalize why a particular activity done by the public is not in
violation of Jewish law, despite superficially appearing to be so. The “Driving Heter” is an example of
legitimizing an existing deviancy, while counting women for a quorum is an example sanctioning a break
from tradition before it has become popular. See Schwarz, p. 336, who claims that counting women for a
prayer quorum was the first ever instance of the CJLS taking the lead and sanctioning a leniency which had
yet to exist in practice.
65
A particularly Conservative brand of halakhah exists if it renders specific legal decisions which are at
odds with Orthodox practice. Reaching such alternate conclusions can be done either within the traditional
hermeneutics of halakhah by radically reinterpreting texts or aggressively searching for previously
discarded minority opinions, or from beyond the system by taking non-halakhic factors into consideration.
See Joel Roth, The Halakhic Process: A Systemic Analysis (New York: JTSA, 1986).
66
Inaction on the part of CJL/CJLS is the equivalent of traditionalist action, because the starting premise of
Conservative Judaism is that Jewish law is binding upon Jews. Until a recognized arm of the movement
liberalizes a given law the assumption must be that the given law is still operative as traditionally
conceived.

11
telling example of this desire by Conservative rabbis to be part of Orthodoxy68 is the
concluding section of Louis Epstein’s original Agunah proposal. “I have not come to rise
up against the tradition even slightly or to be lenient against the decisions of any posek…
I pray that my portion should be with those who toil in sorrow of Agunot.”69 This
element within the RA was never very large and over time ceased to exist, but in the pre-
1948 era such rabbis wielded much power over the CJL.
For the vast majority of RA members, official adherence to Orthodox halakhic
standards was not the product of religious conviction, but rather a conscious decision not
to challenge the Orthodox monopoly over Jewish law.70 These men wanted to create a
specifically Conservative version of halakhah, but when it came time to act they were
reluctant to enter a domain which belonged to more elder rabbinical bodies.71 Fear of the
Orthodox rabbinate played much less of a role. During the middle decades of the
twentieth century, Orthodoxy continually lost members while Conservative Judaism saw
a sharp increase. The RA had little reason to fear being publicly attacked by Agudat ha-
Rabbanim. When Agudat ha-Rabbanim did engage in such attacks during the 1930’s
(Epstein Plan) and 1950’s (driving Heter and Lieberman Ketubah), the Conservative
movement did not lose any prestige or adherents. One could argue that Conservative
rabbis engaged in halakhic restraint out of fear that they could not handle what Orthodox
scorn would do to their own sense of authenticity. Such conjecture would require further
study of the lives of individual rabbis.72
II. Competence
There is a Talmudic dictum stating, “If our fathers are angels then we are mere
men, and if our fathers were men then we are like donkeys.”73 This statement captures
the feeling of yeridat ha-dorot, that each passing generation is not as great (in the field of

67
Rabbi Max Drob, who served as president of the RA (1925-1927), wrote the following in 1929.
“Traditional Judaism as it was taught in the Seminary differs from the so-called Orthodox Judaism as
practiced in Eastern Europe only in method… With Orthodoxy as it practiced by the United Synagogue in
England or by the enlightened Orthodox congregations of Germany we are heartily in accord… As to the
content of Judaism, there really is no difference between Traditional Judaism as it was taught at the
Seminary and Orthodox Judaism. We believe in the divine revelation and the duty to practice the laws of
Judaism as promulgated in the Torah, as interpreted by the Talmud and as codified by the sages of Israel.”
Max Drob, “A Reaffirmation of Traditional Judaism,” PRA (1929), pp. 43-50.
68
In a letter to Mr. Cohen of Congregation Har Zion of Philadelphia dated 5/11/25, Louis Epstein wrote, “I
am not a Conservative rabbi, I am Orthodox.” (Louis Epstein Alumni File, Ratner Center).
69
Epstein, Hatsa’ah, p. 39. Epstein believed that Jewish law should be decided by its leading scholars. He
viewed his proposal as an impetus, provided by a lesser scholar, for the giants of Jewish learning to ponder
and decide upon the Agunah issue. Epstein was willing to abide by any learned decision of the gedolim,
not because he was intimidated by them or was assenting to their political monopoly, but rather because his
conception of halakhic Judaism demanded it. The unfortunate turn of events was a general unwillingness
by the gedolim to analyze the proposal, instead choosing to engage in polemics at the request of Agudat ha-
Rabbanim.
70
That the American Orthodox rabbinate believed it had a right to monopolize halakhah is clear from the
title page of Le-Dor Aharon. “This book tells the next generation what Agudat ha-Rabbanim did in its holy
war against the makers of new ordinances… together with letters of protest from great rabbis, leaders of
Israel, to whom the halakhah is always in accordance.”
71
This explains the RA’s decision to indefinitely postpone action on the Epstein Plan in 1936.
72
Of particular interest would be those rabbis whose fathers had been Orthodox rabbis of the East European
sort, such as Israel Levinthal (chairman of the Committee on the Scope of the Law Committee) and Morris
Adler (first chairman of the reorganized CJLS).
73
Shabbat, 112b.

12
Torah learning) as the generation which came before it. Rabbis often deem it
inappropriate to be innovative in halakhah, even when they believe their suggestions are
technically sound, either because they feel unqualified or because it does not feel right to
do something that earlier generations did not do. This sentiment has led to a significant
ossification of halakhah over the past several centuries. Even the Conservative rabbinate,
which came into existence precisely to reverse the trend of a stagnant halakhah, was not
immune to this problem. The above Talmudic quote appears quite often in the RA
Proceedings,74 though it is countered by, “Jephtah in his generation is like Samuel in his
generation.”75 The RA recognized that it had more than just past generations of Torah
scholars to overcome. As Seminary graduates, their Talmudic erudition could not
compare with rabbis who had classical yeshiva training.76 They had reason to feel
unqualified about taking the lead in halakhic decision making, when men of much greater
stature ministered to Jews in the same country at the same time. Another serious obstacle
was the nature of ordination offered at the Jewish Theological Seminary. Upon
graduation one became a “rabbi, teacher, and preacher in Israel.” Traditional semikhah of
hatarat hora’ah, license to answer questions in the area of ritual law, was not granted.77
Only two men ever received hatarat hora’ah from the Seminary (Louis Finkelstein and
Isaac Klein78). While some early Seminary graduates did receive traditional ordination
from outside sources, the overwhelming majority did not. They did not need to do so in
order to find employment in Conservative synagogues. Lack of credentials made it
difficult for the Rabbinical Assembly to staff a qualified Beth-Din under its auspices.79
Aside from the technical deficiencies in their ordination, Conservative rabbis faced the
more troubling problem that their jobs prevented them from continued Torah learning.
The Conservative rabbi had his plate full of communal and congregational
responsibilities, which left him little or no time to engage in serious Talmud study.80 This
74
PRA (1951), pp. 141, 155, and many more.
75
Rosh ha-Shanah, 25b.
76
For an analysis of the Seminary’s curriculum relative to a traditional yeshiva, see David Ellenson, “A
Seminary of Sacred Learning; the JTS rabbinical curriculum in historical perspective,” in Tradition
Renewed II, pp. 527-591. See also Charles Liebman, “The Training of American Rabbis,” American
Jewish Yearbook 69 (1968), pp. 3-112.
77
Hatarat hora’ah is customarily awarded to rabbinical candidates who pass a series of examinations on
the Yoreh De’ah section of the Shulhan Arukh, in particular the laws dealing with kashruth. This lowest
level of ordination is known as Yoreh Yoreh. A higher level of ordination, known as Yadin Yadin, is
awarded to rabbinical candidates who pass examinations in Hoshen Mishpat, laws pertaining to the Jewish
court system. The RA did not require prospective members to possess either form of semikhah, satisfying
itself with the Seminary’s form of ordination. By contrast, the Rabbinical Council of America required
members to possess at least Yoreh Yoreh, while Agudath ha-Rabbanim did not accept anyone without
Yadin Yadin. See Louis Bernstein, Challenge and Mission: The Emergence of the English Speaking
Orthodox Rabbinate (New York: Sheingold, 1982), ch. 1.
78
Klein was awarded hatarat hora’ah on January 19, 1938, nearly eight years after receiving his standard
Seminary ordination. Klein was awarded his semikhah after completing a very comprehensive course of
study in Talmud and Codes under the tutelage of Louis Ginzberg and Moses Hyamson. (Letter from Louis
Finkelstein to Mr. Loeb of Ottawa, dated 5/19/39, Isaac Klein Alumni File, Ratner Center).
79
Proceedings of the CJLS, p. 174.
80
Boaz Cohen was particularly concerned with this problem. He made repeated efforts, through the
medium of the RA, to have Conservative rabbis increase their daily Torah study. Cohen believed that
Conservative rabbis were deficient in their knowledge of Codes and responsa literature, items which he saw
as the backbone of halakhic jurisprudence. See Boaz Cohen, The Shulhan Arukh as a Guide for Religious
Practice Today (New York: 1940), pp. 34-36.

13
further reduced the credibility of the RA as an organization capable of administering
Jewish law. The factor of incompetence prevented Conservative Jewish law from
progressing beyond criteria (A) and (B) stated above. Rabbis may have wanted to
legitimize deviancy, and may have been willing to create a particularly Conservative
halakhah. What they lacked, or perceived to lack, were the qualifications needed to
achieve (C), an authoritative body to legislate for the movement.
III. The Seminary
The scholarship cited above tends to view the traditionalist influence of the
Jewish Theological Seminary on Conservative halakhah as being of one sort. The
Seminary was a stronghold of the movement’s right-wing and thus gave that wing a
dominating if not controlling voice in matters of Jewish law. I would propose that the
influence of the Seminary must be broken down into two separate categories, the
Seminary as an institution and the individual voices of selected schoolmen. As an
institution of higher learning, the Seminary had a long standing policy of denominational
ambiguity.81 While this was certainly true during the Schechter and Adler years, it
continued to an extent even during the Finkelstein administration.82 The Seminary sought
to cultivate for itself a reputation as a center of traditional Judaism. This task became
increasingly difficult over time as its relationship with the Conservative movement
crystallized and the connection between Conservative Judaism and what can objectively
be called traditional Judaism withered. The Seminary took specific steps to restrain the
Conservative rabbinate on halakhic issues. During the Finkelstein administration hatarat
hora’ah was not offered even to the most advanced students, despite repeated requests
from the student body and veteran RA members.83 Furthermore, the Seminary often
instructed young rabbis in the field not to become involved in kashruth supervision,
gittin, halitzah, eiruvin, and other ritual issues. Instead they were told to let the local
Orthodox rabbi deal with technical halakhic problems.84 Complaints mounted in the RA
that the Seminary was treating them like children. Many Conservative rabbis wanted to
play a prominent communal role in issur v’heter and gittin v’kiddushin, but were being
relegated by the Seminary to the status of glorified synagogue functionary and social
worker.85 While never publicly stating their concerns, the Seminary leadership did not
trust the Conservative rabbinate to preserve halakhic Judaism. To mitigate the damage
being caused by both leftist theology and congregational pressures, the Seminary tried to
minimize the ritual sphere of influence of the average Conservative rabbi. In effect the
Seminary was trying to halt the development of Conservative Jewish law at stage (A), by
removing the technicalities of halakhah from the mindset of the practicing rabbi. Only
when the Seminary saw the situation of Conservative halakhah reaching a critical point,

81
This point finds expression in an incident which took place in 1923. Cyrus Adler was scheduled to speak
at the Midwinter Conference of the RA in Pittsburgh. He was instructed to address the assemblage on “The
Seminary in its Relation to the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed Points of View of Judaism.” Adler
requested that the title of his lecture be changed to “The Standpoint of the Seminary.” (Letter from Cyrus
Adler to Louis Epstein, dated 12/28/22, Louis Epstein Alumni File, Ratner Center).
82
Michael Greenbaum, Louis Finkelstein and the Conservative Movement: Conflict and Growth
(Binghamton: Global Publication, 2001).
83
PRA (1940), pp. 84-85; PRA (1948), p. 139. Personal interview, 10/21/04, with Rabbi Marvin Tokayer
(class of 1962).
84
Minutes of the Steering Committee of the Joint Law Conference, 12/22/52.
85
PRA (1948), p. 138. See also Greenbaum, “Finkelstein and his Critics,” p. 31.

14
as it did in the early 1950’s, did the Seminary attempt to directly influence Jewish law for
the movement by suggesting the creation of a Joint Law Conference.86
Individual schoolmen played differing roles in the history of Conservative Jewish
law, though in every case except one the goal was to impede progress. Louis Ginzberg’s
traditionalism was certainly not the product of theological Orthodoxy. Ginzberg believed
that Jewish law could only be changed by scholars of the highest level, on behalf of a
laity which was committed to religious observance. Ginzberg saw both conditions
necessary for change to be severely lacking in Conservative Judaism.87 Having grown up
in the pious atmosphere of the Lithuanian yeshiva world, Ginzberg knew that one could
live by Jewish law as traditionally conceived and that American deviations did not need
to be legitimized.88 He viewed such deviations as part of a general disregard for religion
on the part of American Jewry. Boaz Cohen took a very restrictive view toward
changing Jewish law because he did not want to see the Conservative movement turn into
a sect outside the pale of normative Judaism. He frequently reminded his RA colleagues
that they cannot legislate for American Jewry alone, but rather must consider all of
Jewry.89 Cohen wanted to see a dynamic halakhah, which his historical studies
determined was its true nature, but was unwilling to act unilaterally. Saul Lieberman was
Orthodox in belief and practice. Only his employment at the Seminary kept him from
achieving wider acceptance in the Orthodox world. Lieberman kept himself away from
Conservative halakhah, with the single exception of his revised Ketubah.90 Of all the
Seminary schoolmen only Mordecai Kaplan endorsed a progressive and distinctly
Conservative brand of Jewish law.91 His direct impact on the CJL/CJLS was limited, but
his intellectual descendents on the left-wing of the movement were instrumental in the
eventual liberalization of halakhah. In assessing the importance of schoolmen as a factor
in the fate of Conservative Jewish law one critical point needs to be apparent. Whereas
the Seminary leadership (those responsible for school policy) had to worry about the
86
Deserving of further study would be the private memoranda between members of the Seminary
administration, leading up to Finkelstein’s “change of heart” about officially involving the school in
matters of halakhah l’ma’aseh.
87
Golinkin, p. 454. At the 1927 RA convention, as the resolution was being adopted to create the CJL,
Ginzberg warned his former students, “Hands off the law!”
88
For a full biography of Louis Ginzberg see Eli Ginzberg, Keeper of the Law (Philadelphia: JPS, 1966).
For an analysis of Ginzberg’s attitude toward halakhic decision making see David Druck, Rebbi Levi
Gintsburg (New York: 1933), ch. 11.
89
Minutes of CJLS, 9/13/49. Cohen said, “We can think in terms of the Conservative movement for
propaganda purposes, but actually we are concerned about all Jews. If we legislate only for ourselves then
we are Karaites.” See also Law and Tradition in Judaism, pp. 33-34.
90
See Golinkin, pp. 450-451 who noted that Lieberman was involved in practical affairs only four times in
his career; the denunciation of Kaplan’s prayer book in 1945, the revised Ketubah of 1953, Ben-Gurion’s
letter to Jewish leaders regarding “who is a Jew” in 1958, and his opposition to female ordination in 1979.
In the case of female ordination, Lieberman was directly involved and had no choice but to take a stance.
His letter to Ben-Gurion was in response to a privately solicited request. In the prayer book controversy
Lieberman merely signed his name to an advertisement in a Hebrew newspaper protesting the publication
of a heretical siddur. Only in the case of the Ketubah did Lieberman become heavily and publicly involved
in a controversial matter of halakhah l’ma’aseh. It is deserving of further study to uncover what or who
motivated Lieberman to break from his usual pattern, particularly considering that he proposed an
innovation which could bring him nothing but scorn from traditionalist circles.
91
See Mordecai Kaplan, “Toward the Formulation of Guiding Principles for the Conservative Movement,”
in Tradition and Change, pp. 306-312, where he chastised the movement for not progressing on the
halakhic front fast enough.

15
school’s reputation, which could be exalted or tarnished based on its own activities or
that of its affiliated denomination, individual faculty had the luxury of doing whatever
they thought was in the best interests of Judaism.92
IV. Personal Status
The Rabbinical Assembly realized that a tremendous difference exists between
hilkhot ishut (personal status laws) and the remainder of Jewish law. Liberal decisions on
synagogue practice or Sabbath observance only impact upon those people who choose to
make use of those innovative rulings. Once the prayer is concluded or the car turned off,
that action ceases to affect the rest of Jewry. The same cannot be said for a liberal
decision regarding a Jew’s personal status.93 If the Conservative movement were to take
a halakhic position legitimizing divorces not performed in accordance with traditional
Jewish law, then children resulting from remarriage would be untainted to fellow
Conservative Jews but would have the stigma of mamzerut in the eyes of Orthodoxy.94 It
was feared that Jewry would be divided into factions, each side refusing to marry into the
other. The fear led the RA to proceed with great caution whenever dealing with
marriage, divorce, halitzah, and conversion. While it took only two years to settle the
issue of Sabbath driving, it took nearly forty years to settle the Agunah issue. Eventually
the CJLS concluded that justice for the individual human being must trump a strict
construction of halakhah, even at the risk of diving Jewry.95
V. Diversity
Conservative Judaism lacked guiding principles on how to change halakhah.
That Schechter’s idea of Catholic Israel proved unworkable in America, was known to
the rabbis96 and has been documented by previous scholars. The rabbis were divided over
the idea of the layman as sinner. Some rabbis desperately wanted certain laws amended
so that their non-observant, but otherwise morally upstanding congregants not feel guilty
about being sinners. This issue found its best expression in the debate over driving to
synagogue on the Sabbath. Other rabbis emphasized that the problem was not the feeling
of guilt but rather the violation of law. Ben Zion Bokser considered those guilt feelings
to be a “divine endowment” and an opportunity to build toward positive observance.97

92
Louis Finkelstein’s public attitude toward contemporary changes in Jewish law became extremely
conservative upon his appointment to leadership positions in the Seminary. As to his general views on the
subject see, “Maimonides as a Guide in Our Attitude Toward Change in the Law,” PRA (1928), pp. 97-101.
Finkelstein also changed his tune about the historicity of the law. See his introduction to The Pharisees
(Philadelphia: JPS, 1938), in contrast to his introduction to the third edition, published in 1962.
93
PRA (1952), p. 52.
94
See Le-Dor Aharon, p. 38, where Rabbi Konvitz threatened that if the RA implemented the Epstein Plan,
Orthodoxy Jews would separate themselves by refusing to marry Jews from non-Orthodox families.
95
Simon Greenberg, “And He Writes Her a Bill of Divorcement; an inquiry into the dynamic of the
Halakhah with particular reference to the law regarding the writing of a bill of divorcement,” Conservative
Judaism 24, 3 (1970), pp. 75-141. Greenberg suggested that Conservative rabbis should meticulously
record their cases of marriage nullification, in recognition of Orthodox opposition. The relationship
between Conservative Jews and Orthodox Jews would be similar to the relationship between the House of
Hillel and the House of Shammai. Although each side had different personal status laws, they could still
intermarry by being honest about family history.
96
Robert Gordis, “Jewish Law and Catholic Israel,” in Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law, ed. Seymour
Siegel (New York: RA, 1977), pp. 59-64. Gordis redefined Catholic Israel to include only those Jews who
either observe Jewish law or at least feel guilty about their lack of observance.
97
Ben Zion Bokser, “The Sabbath Halachah- Travel and the Use of Electricity,” PRA (1950), p. 164.

16
 In the absence of any uniting principle, the movement broke down into three
factions on halakhic change, just as it broke down into three factions on theology.98 The
right-wing believed in Torah m’Sinai or Torah min ha-shamayim, a traditionalist
conception of the Torah’s origins and divine revelation.99 This group would agree to
adjust Jewish law, but only when done with the utmost care and according to the
traditional rules of interpretation. The centrist group believed in a divinely inspired
Torah. For them Sinai was not an historical event, but a theological concept.100 This
group would prefer halakhic change to be accomplished through traditional means of
interpretation, but when necessary would allow for outright legislation. The left-wing
had a humanistic conception of the Torah, totally rejecting the notion of divine
revelation. This group believed that standards of Jewish practice should be set by the
rabbis, but that halakhah as it was traditionally conceived no longer held power over
Jewry.101 The wide gap between right and left wings of the RA led to paralysis on
halakhic issues, because there was a desire to achieve denominational consensus before
taking any significant steps.102 Rabbis from across the spectrum were ready for what I
have labeled stage (C) in the development of Conservative Jewish law, the functioning of
a Committee committed to the development of a progressive halakhah specifically for
their movement. The remaining obstacle was a sharp difference of opinion which
emerged every time the selected men gathered around the committee’s table. By
declaring the equal validity of both minority and majority opinions, the post-1948 CJLS
attempted to circumvent the need for consensus.103 Yet despite the ability of the
individual rabbi to issue radical halakhic opinions in his capacity as a member of the
CJLS, for the most part this was not done. Rabbi Benjamin Z. Kreitman attributed this
reality to a sense of discipline in the RA. No rabbi dared to create a violent disruption in
Jewish law by issuing a maverick opinion alone.104
VI. Technical Difficulties
The scholarship cited above correctly pointed out that the CJL/CJLS suffered
from a dearth of funds, secretarial help, good housekeeping,105 research consultants, etc.
Consequently, official positions of the Conservative movement often lagged behind
actual practice. The movement’s halakhic arm did not have the capacity to find
justification for necessary innovations as fast as the laity was demanding such
innovations. What has yet to be explained is why a committee, whose work was regarded
98
The construct of three groups is not an entirely accurate depiction of the RA, but I employ it because it
was accepted by the RA itself in choosing prospective CJLS members and because it is basically correct.
99
See Isaac Klein, “An Attitude to Halakhah,” PRA (1958), pp. 102-107. Klein was given the honor of
presenting the right-wing’s position at the 1958 RA convention.
100
Robert Gordis, “A Modern Approach to a Living Halachah,” in Tradition and Change, pp. 377-378.
101
See Jack Cohen, “Halakhah and the Life of Holiness,” PRA (1958), pp. 90-101. Cohen was given the
honor of presenting the left-wing’s position at the 1958 RA convention.
102
Benjamin Z. Kreitman, “Toward a Creative Halachah,” Conservative Judaism 22, 1 (1967), pp. 40-41.
103
Max J. Routtenberg, “Report of the CJLS,” PRA (1963), pp. 221-230, argued for the binding acceptance
of majority rule. He believed that diversity of practice was destroying Conservative Judaism and making a
mockery of its halakhah.
104
Personal interview with Rabbi Kreitman, 11/19/04. It would be of great interest to hear from the
individuals involved what caused that sense of discipline and why that discipline lapsed in 1970.
Unfortunately many of key figures are no longer alive, including the two maverick rabbis who dissented in
1970 and caused the temporary collapse of the CJLS.
105
To this day, the Rabbinical Assembly Law Archives are not adequately catalogued or filed, making
research all the more tedious.

17
as crucial for the success of Conservative Judaism, could be treated in such a manner for
so many years? I would like to theorize that in fact the work of the CJL/CJLS, as a law
committee per se, was almost never important. The Conservative rabbinate was well
aware that their laity was not observant even by Conservative standards.106 The rabbis
themselves were satisfied to operate their synagogues according to standards they saw fit,
generally without regard for the pronouncements of the CJL/CJLS.107 The importance of
the CJL/CJLS was more theoretical in nature. Its success or lack thereof, was a
barometer for how Conservative Judaism saw itself, a major part of the ongoing struggle
for self-definition.108 As such, the RA could afford to complain annually about
administrative and technical problems facing the CJL/CJLS, while repeatedly doing very
little to solve them.
Conclusion
A study of the factors of traditionalism in Conservative Jewish law would shed
light on many hitherto little known details in the history of the movement. Such a study
would also attempt to answer several larger questions in the fields of American religious
history, American Jewish history, and Contemporary Judaism. (a) Is it possible to
develop a non-fundamentalist (non-Orthodox) form of religious law in a country which
has a separation of church and state? Unlike in Europe, where the Jewish community had
temporal power to coerce religious observance on the part of the individual Jew, in
America no such power exists. For those Jews committed to doctrinal Orthodoxy, no
coercive measures are needed to assure adherence to halakhah because belief in divine
obligation and the threat of divine punishment is usually sufficient. Once doctrinal
Orthodoxy was rejected, Jewish leadership in the form of heterodox rabbis needed to
formulate alternative reasons why the individual Jew should continue to observe his
ancestral traditions.109 Putting aside the relative merits of such reasons for observance, at
best they could only tell a Jew what he ought to do, not what he absolutely must do.110
Given this situation, it is not surprising that leading figures in American Judaism
questioned the possibility of Conservative (and certainly Reform) halakhah.111 (b) Who
106
Max Routtenberg, “The Rabbinical Assembly of America: An Evaluation,” PRA (1960), p. 211.
107
Benjamin Kreitman, “Report of the CJLS,” PRA (1968), p. 215. Kreitman quoted a statistic that thirty
percent of RA members did not require a get for remarriage, and another forty-eight percent would
voluntarily recommend such cases to a Reform rabbi.
108
Rabbi Aaron Blumenthal said that Conservative Judaism started without a philosophy in the hopes that
one would emerge from its halakhic work. PRA (1970), p. 207. The desire to have a philosophy is much
less pressing that the necessity of answering the legal questions of people wholeheartedly committed to
living in accordance with the responsa.
109
Jacob Agus, “Theoretical Evaluation of Jewish Law,” PRA (1958), pp. 81-89.
110
Max Drob best expressed the weakness of heterodox justifications for observance of halakhah. “If I did
not believe that the laws of the Sabbath are of divine origin, I would have considered myself a criminal if I
urged young men to starve rather than violate the Sabbath merely because my ancestors aped the
Babylonians and adopted their day of rest. If I believed the laws of the Torah are not of divine origin, I
would have been heartless if I urged men and women to make every conceivable sacrifice to observe these
laws merely because my oriental ancestors in a little corner of Asia promulgated that way of life.” PRA
(1929), p. 55.
111
See Solomon B. Freehof, “Reform Judaism and the Halacha,” CCAR Annual 56 (1946), pp. 276-292. In
a most bold challenge to Conservative Jewish law from the left, Freehof wrote, “It is amply clear that the
legal theory implicit in Conservatism, while attractive is unworkable… It is impossible to compromise with
Orthodox law. It must be either accepted or its authority rejected. Conservatism therefore represents a
disharmony between legal theory and religious practice… Conservatism is Orthodox theory and Reform
practice.” (p. 285).

18
controls religious legal policy for a denomination; its lays institution, its institute of
higher learning, or its association of clergymen? In my proposed study the variables
would be United Synagogue, JTS, and the RA, but the same question could be asked for
nearly every denomination in American religious life. The answer would not be the same
for every denomination, but hopefully such a study would uncover reasons why one type
of institution would come to dominate another. (c) How has the fear of a split within
world (or American) Jewry affected the halakhic policies of the various denominations,
especially in light of Orthodox rabbinical control over personal status in the State of
Israel?112 While much polemical work has been done on the divisive issue of ‘who is a
Jew,’ relatively little scholarly work exists documenting the internal policy debates of the
various movements. The case of Conservative Judaism is particularly interesting,
because the Conservative movement professed a commitment to both halakhah and the
needs of the Jewish people. Those needs, as seen through the eyes of the RA, alternated
between a need for unity and a need for religious law by which modern people can live.
(d) How can a denomination sustain itself without achieving a modicum of uniformity in
belief or practice from its elites? A study of Conservative halakhah would reveal the
secrets of the movement’s staying power, while also explaining why offshoots of the
movement were formed which ended the tripartite division of American Jewish
denominational life.

112
In a letter from Philip Sigal to Jacob Agus dated 4/9/74, Sigal detailed why the Conservative movement
no longer should make any policy concessions in the hope of securing recognition from the Israeli
rabbinate. (Papers of Jacob Agus, Box 10, Folder 40, Ratner Center). Prior to the 1970’s the Conservative
movement endeavored to prove its halakhic legitimacy in the hopes of Israeli recognition, while in more
recent years it has adopted the tactic of demanding religious freedom for all types of Jews.

19