0901598 Can negative liberty be measured?

Theorists such as Hillel Steiner Ian Carter have posited that (negative) freedom can be measured by using the following equation: Fr (Fr+Ur)

where Fr and Ur are the actions one is free and unfree to do respectively.1,2 To the same theorists, each freedom and unfreedom must be treated with equal value, as no true account of negative liberty can assign greater or lesser values to freedom. Finally, each freedom or unfreedom counted must be external to the agent, and created by other agents. Thus, any list of freedoms (L) measured by this system will be found to exist in the real number scale (0 < L 1), with 1 being the maximum amount of freedom possible. In order to achieve this, it is clear that we must eliminate unfreedoms from our political system ((Fr / Fr)=1, where Fr is countable). Whether or not this formula is acceptable or not has been debated greatly, but such debates are not the intention of this paper. Here, rather, I aim to show that, even if we accept the formula, it has incredibly undesirable results. With this in mind, I intend to present 2 ways in which it might

H. Steiner, How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, in: Carter, I., Kramer, M., Steiner, H., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) pg. 446. 2 I. Carter, A Measure of Freedom In: Carter, I., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology pg. 457. The formula for Carter is the same as that for Steiner, with the alteration that freedoms and unfreedoms are replaced by compossible lists of freedoms and unfreedoms respectively.

0901598 be possible to maximize freedom on the Steiner / Carter account of freedom. Both of these ways, I believe, give results we would find unacceptable, and thus must be rejected.

I. Anarchy So, our aim is to eliminate actions we are unfree to do. With this in mind, anarchy sounds like a reasonable starting point. By eliminating a political authority, it may be argued, we are no longer restrained in our actions, and thus are free in the way that Berlin would have attributed to, the classical English political

philosophers, that is to say, free from being coerced. 3 Taylors argument about the freedom of Albania is related to this thought; if the Albanian government enforce religious oppression, but have fewer traffic restrictions than in London, then by dint of our system of freedom measurement adding greater unfreedoms to London, Albania is freer.4 Since the sheer number of actions restricted by red lights in London every day outweighs restrictions on religious belief in Albania (as each action is weighed equally), we must support Albania as a beacon of negative liberty promotion. Surely, by this logic, a government who exercised no coercive power would free their state entirely? Steiner notes this inconsistency, and goes onto show how

I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty In: Carter, I., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology pg. 40. 4 C. Taylor, Whats Wrong with Negative Liberty in The Idea of Freedom, ed. A Ryan (Oxford, 1979) pg. 219

0901598 valuational measurements of freedom are flawed at their core. 5 He does not, however, present an adequate response to the objection; it still seems that on his system, Albania must be freer. I imagine not many would be comfortable with this system, least of all Thomas Hobbes to whom Berlin attributed the negative freedom view. For Hobbes, the so-called State of Nature was the very thing he sought to protect against. Certainly it would be difficult to find Hobbes State of Nature appealing; the lack of constraint combined with constant distrust created a life described as, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.6 Fortunately for the negative liberty theorist, it is fairly easy to rebut against such an idea. True, I have succeeding in destroying coercion by the state, but I have failed to destroy coercion in general I have in fact made the situation far worse. The government will no longer restrict my freedom to harm those who stand in my way, but neither will they protect me from harm others will possibly (or for Hobbes, certainly) inflict on me. Put in another way, none of my freedoms are protected. Even Garnett, attacking the concept of negative liberty, accepts that the, absense of legal restriction is insufficient to yield a liberty: most theorists hold that political liberty may be restricted by private individuals as well as by lawmakers.7 To this end, we can present a defence of the state; the state has the power to draft legislation to maximize my freedom. In
5 6

H. Steiner, How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, pp. 450-452. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (Forgotten Books, 2008) p. 86 7 M. Garnett, 'Ignorance, Incompetence, and the Concept of Liberty', Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): p. 431

0901598 doing so, it infringes freedoms via coercion, but these infringements are worthwhile as they increase my overall freedom (ie, my overall threat of coercion by other agents). Those contesting the negative liberty view may not be entirely convinced by this. After all, restricting some liberties in the name of others does seem to appeal to the value of certain liberties. Also notable, Steiners account gives very little power to law at all; mere threat of punishment does not infringe freedom. This, however, is beyond the scope of this essay, and for the moment I feel the negative liberty theorists defence against anarchy is satisfying enough. Restricting liberty to protect liberty seems at least feasible; it was indeed an argument made for greater restrictions of liberty in the US post-9/11. If negative liberty is maximised by restraining the extent to which other agents coerce us, then anarchy does not seem a suitable political solution to liberty. I can, however, propose another hypothetical solution in order to get around this issue.

II. Isolation Suppose a fanatic of negative liberty lets call him Walter wishes to be completely free in terms of the Steiner / Carter notation. This would involve the elimination of constraints placed upon him by other agents. There is, to my mind, only one way to achieve this: the elimination of all other agents. Thus, Walter and his team of technicians create a machine to take Walter to an alternate universe, and to a version of Earth exactly as he left the

0901598 original, except containing no people. This being a one-way machine, Walter is now unable (though importantly not unfree, on this account) to return to his original universe. Walter is totally isolated in this world; interestingly, though, Walter is also totally free. Lets take a slightly different situation. While its illegal, Jean is still at liberty, in both Steiners and Carters systems, to murder other agents: for Steiner, it isnt impossible for her to kill a person, and thus she has the liberty; for Carter, she has the specific freedom to kill others, but it does effect her overall freedom, since in her list of compossible freedoms she is more likely to be restricted (for example, to go to jail for what she has done). 8,9 Now, imagine Jean exercises her liberty to kill, and against all odds, manages to kill everyone on earth other than herself. Speaking only for herself, Jean is now also completely free, since with no other agents to impede her she has no unfreedoms. These examples are simply to show the type of worlds in which we can maximize negative freedom. Importantly, only worlds containing no other agents are worlds in which this is possible. But this seems absurd. Take the first example: suppose every person alive was given this choice to live in an entirely isolated version of earth, or to continue on with their current life, unfree though they would remain. Would the first option be desirable? I posit not, and I feel this would be the majority sentiment. There are a number of
8 9

H. Steiner, How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, pg. 449. I. Carter, A Measure of Freedom pg. 4.

0901598 possible reasons for this feeling, but first it is important to tackle a possible rebut of the negative liberty theorist. The retort I expect to receive here is that I have

misunderstood the concept of freedom; in particular, I have forgotten that freedom is a social relation. Liberty, says Steiner, is a social relation, a relation between persons. 10 Steiner makes this case in other areas, but here it is used to support the claim that it is only freedoms restricted by other agents that matters to us. But this doesnt seem to follow on from freedom being a social relation in the sense I refute. Rather, Steiners view clarifies that freedom is social only insofar as we remain unrestricted, while unfreedom is social insofar as we are restricted. We have good reasons, if we support this view of freedom, to have as few social relations in our lives as possible. They alone are sources of unfreedom. We may say then, that freedom in the negative sense is actually a most antisocial relation, and its very definition is divisive to agents. I have followed the rules of negative liberty as Steiner and Carter set out, and accounted for these in my use of their formulas; the results leave no room for valuing our social relations. It seems, then, that isolation is in fact far more defensible than maintaining community of any sort if we accept these views on negative liberty. And it is upon this view that my objection rests. Intuitively, we value our social relations. Liberty theorists who dont buy into the strong version given by Steiner and Carter may
10

H. Steiner, How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, pp. 461-462.

0901598 also argue social relations are actually valuable for freedom. In my negatively free world of isolation, it is entirely possible that I would eventually run out of food, or clean water, or medical supplies. Electricity probably wouldnt last very long at all, and due to this many of the luxuries I currently enjoy would cease to be. But, by the account given, I am still entirely free; no other agent can hinder me. If I die of starvation, or dehydration, or hypothermia in the winter, I was merely unable to stay alive; to say I am unfree is simply to confuse freedom and ability.11 For Carter, this world arguably reduces my compossible freedoms substantially (as all roads end in death), but since I have no unfreedoms imposed by other agents, my freedom is still maximized. This is where Sen makes a case for viewing freedom as both opportunities (linked to our negative account) and processes (our actual ability to achieve our freedoms). 12 By this view, the fact that I am unable to get food has an effect on my freedom to continue living (this example being of particular importance to Sen and his work on famine). In this argument, my inability to get food is as important as my liberty to not be stopped from getting food by other agents. By Sens account, my isolated system would, in this case, lead to serious constraints on my freedom. Perhaps this is the type of line that must be accepted, then, in order to make this theory work. True, it is committal to a type of freedom which is not negative in the strictest sense, but perhaps this a something we
11 12

H. Steiner, How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, pg. 447. A. Sen, Food and Freedom, In: World Development, 6 (17) (1989), p. 80

0901598 must accept. Whether or not this is true, however, is beyond the scope of this paper; for now it is acceptable to conclude that there is a social aspect missing from the traditional freedom account.

Even if, in this lonely world, we were to somehow remain selfsufficient, I feel most would reject this way of life as opposed to our current existence, regardless of its so-called freedom. Our social relations are in some way valuable to us, and to our concept of freedom, in a way that neither anarchy nor isolation can satisfy. Steiner and Carters systems of calculating freedom, without taking into account this sort of value, must then fail to adequately calculate our freedom.

0901598 References Berlin, I., Two Concepts of Liberty in: Carter, I., Kramer, M., Steiner, H., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) Carter, I., A Measure of Freedom in: Carter, I., Kramer, M., Steiner, H., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) Garnett, M., 'Ignorance, Incompetence, and the Concept of Liberty', Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007) Hobbes, T., Leviathan, (Forgotten Books, 2008) Sen, A., Food and Freedom, In: World Development, 6 (17), 1989. Steiner, H., How Free: Computing Personal Liberty, in: Carter, I., Kramer, M., Steiner, H., Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (WileyBlackwell, 2007) Taylor, C., Whats Wrong with Negative Liberty in The Idea of Freedom, ed. A Ryan (Oxford, 1979)