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1
Preface
I
This document is the iniHal instal1.:ment in the cor.tinued History
of the Joint Strategic Target Pla::ming Staf.:'. It is concerned first
.rith the developnent of :problems in strategic target :pla.nning during
the 19505 and the evolution of :plans for the of the llctivl-
.ties of the various commands into one plan; second with t:1e organization
of: the Joint strategic Target P1a:l.D.ing Stat'=- at Reac.quarters SAC; and
with the pre:pa.I:a.tion of the first Single Integrated Operation&l
Plan. In the of this history the historian did research
in J8rFS files at Headquarters SAC and in tte files of the Joint
of Staff in Washington. Documents indicated as exhibits (Ex) are 0::1
file in the History & Research Div:.sicn, of lni'ormation,
Headquarters SAC.
11
TABI,E OF
:Ba.ckground.. . . " ... .. " . ,," 1
---r-----------'JJ::O,"'-U;.u;J;l,.,kJ..J.!LLo...----.>..-"-----''___-'- __,__, _
5
30
18
. 28
. .
. . .. ..
. . . .. . .
iii
.. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . ..
.. . . . .. .. . . " .. ... ..
. . . " .. . ., .. . . . .. . . ., .. .
Sumrna.!')"
Footnotes
The Search More Effective
Prep3.yation of SIOP-6z.
Secretary of Defense Gates I, decision of 16 August 1960 to ./
establish a joint staff .at Hea.dCJ.UBrters strategic Air Command (SAC)
under the direction of Commander in Chief} SAC} brought together for
the first time a.ll elements of the armed services 'W'ith a stra.tegic
lear capability into one integrated operational
....
......
considered the decision the most important .he had made in seven years
2
in the Pentagon. Perhaps the m.s.gnitude of this action can be better
BaCk&!0Llnd. ,I
.lJNCLASS1FIEO
appreciated after a ravia." of the history of planning and coordination
activities ;for the stra.tegic nuclear offensive between 1952 and 1960.
(u)
Between the end of World War II and. the ,-oeginning of the Korean
States Na.vy announced tn. 1952 tha.t all of its new
" .. ' ..
l UNCIJJSIF1Jji
eXisted in :Planning and executing the atomic offensive, but by the
SAC had a. virtual monopoly on. the mea.ns of delivering atomic wea-
pons. The Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) drew SAC fat'ces under its direct
'operational control in 1946' ana. strengthened theSE! bonds in sUDsequent
by u.eurp8.tion of control of SAC by theater COIll-
IllBLders.
3
Therefore, during these yea.rs no coordination problems
ea:rly 19505 the situa.tion 'Wa.s changing because of a ':prolifera;tion of
'Weapons and delivery vehicles. +st
tack :p1.anea 'WEl:re ca];ab1e of carrying tactical atQ'.lli.c bcsnbs, and that
1t bad on band capable of deliveripg Jarge 'Pmbs. Newly
activated tactical units in Europe and the Far East al.sobeclUUe able
to deliver small "lee.pons. Indeed, the Secretary of the Air Force.
Thamas K. Finletter, announced that "nearly all
l
' USAF ccnnbat aircraft
were being modified to carry them.
4
The time 'WB.S also rapidly
ing 'When the Sovi.et Union 'Would becone e. major atomic power. It e.x-
To meet this increa.sed. Soviet threat the JCB a.cted to gain more ,""-
direct control of the nation I s e:>..-pa.nding atm:l.c force. In March 1952
an ad hoc e-ommittee of t:!lat group examined existing P:r.ocl;l.dures for con-
.
i;rol and. coordination of: atonic operations and recQll!Ilended centraJ.iz.ing
them for maximum banbing effect and rri.ninrun: interference between forces.
The JOS agreed and established facilities for lateral coordinati.on of
planning called Jo:i.nt Coordination Centers (JCC) in Europe and the Far
East.* They vere war roam facilities for receipt, compilation, display)
reView; coordination, aDd relay of information concerning the :plans and
opera.tions ot a.tomic .forces fo'!' 'the benefit of the unified a.nd specified
c<XlJ.IDB.nders concerned and the JCS. **6 This was operational coordir.ation,
tha.t is, it took place after hostilities began. +&1
'* Buckinghamshire) United K:l.ngdQlj, and, Pershing Heights) '[!okyo,'
** In Europe, Cammander in Na.VIil Forces Eastern At1a.D.tic and Med.1--
terranean (CINCNErM), CCJllIllallder in Chief United States Farces Europe
(CINCEur). and CetrlllJ.!l.nder in Chief Strategic Air CcmmaIld (CIOOMe),
and tbe Far East, Ccmma.nd.er. in Chi ef Pa9rtfc (CI:troPac)J COOlI'l'J,EU)der
in AJaaka (CIM:A.l)'. and CINCSAC. uriCLASS1FJlfl
2
Early exercises of the Joint Coordination Centers disclosed B. re-
to act as host for a conference of appropriate cOlOl1lB.nders to
3
/
-
These fa.ctors were manage-
.:l
UNCLASSIFiED

Ho;.r successful. vas this InEl.chinery2 T::le magnitude of the :proolem
:periodic coord.ination of atomic war plans. With JCS approval these coo-
:mit an atcmic annex, Le., a target list, to his war plan and to coor-
conferences and a:pproved by the JOS were ':prepositioned with the Joint
claves became known. as World.-Wide Coordination. Conferences (wee). Tbey
,
quirert.ent for Jlre-hostili-ties coordination of ccmmanders I atomic pl8,ns.
Accordingly, in 1954, the,JCS asked each appropriate commander to 6ub-
dinate it with theater commanders and CINCSAC. In 1955 SAC wa.s directed
This coni'erence failed to agree on Ilriything except the requirement :for
a methodology or "modus operandiII for defeat of .cemnnmist air :power.
Coordir.lB:tion Centers for o:peratj.onal coordination required by an exer-
ciee 0::.- the initiation of hostilities. . The totcil coorc1ination activity
pre- and post-hostliity, ""as kr..ow.c. as the atomic coordination machinery.
7
'Were held. each upsequent year through 1958. Plans coordi,oatecl at these
probabJ,y can be awrecia;!:ed best by :recalling the caIlJ?lex problEillB of
generation} la.unch, mutue.l su:p.portJ a.nd bombing involved in
pre:P8:ring a single ccm:rnandls strike plan.
able because the ,",ork went OIl withih the tr8Illework of a ClEmon doctrine.
When coordination between canmands with different conceIlts) doctrines)
tr&llt1otLB, 'a.nct, techniques was attempted, the IJ1"obleIJ1B beca::ne formid-
a.ble. On the l'0sitive side" wo:r;j..d-wide conferences ens.ble camranders
TJ3P $ Re:;:.
UNCLASSIFiED
to a.ppreciate more i'u11y each others ca.IJ8.bilities} tasks, objectives,
and plans. Target lists} forces, and strike timing were discu.ssed and
compared. Scme conflicts were a.voided. Yet the defects of.' the program
were clearly more evident- than j.ts successes, at least to SAC. The con-
ferences did not solve targeting conflicts; for example) in the 1957
and 1958 meetings duplications triplications (two or more cammanQs
deli vering -weapons to the same ta.rget) '\,TeTe significa.ntly reduced.
Neither did they achieve mutual support cr ur.ity of effort.
among the JOS camnanders. At the JCCs, operationa.l coordination
dures de:pcnded upon a highly Bo];Jhisticated canmunications system. - Dx:--
ing }ieacetime exercises the ccnmnmications tine between sending and
receipt of messages tended to increase causing a backlog; under combat
conditi ODS the systemI B efficiency 'Would be greatly Teduced. In each
of the exercises of the .ICC machinery f'ran 1958 through 1960 over 200
tilne over target (Tar) conflicts hig:llightecl the degree of conflict, in
existing . In. wartilte} with ilisrupted CClI.llIl!llI'..i ca.tions 1
" : .... '.:
this could. in needless loss of aircraft ana. c:::ews. A cailpa:rison
of target lists and sane conflict resolution were the net gains in four
yea.:ta 01' coordination
8
N. T.rining, Gha.irman of the
JOS) believed. one fundamenta.l principle had evolved frm these coordi-
nation " atcmic operations Ill.UBt be pre-planned for
to the ma.ximum extent possible antl With minimum
re11aooe on :post..lI.Hour ,,9
.t' '.' .:
4
.J:..f:"e'-p rr-----....
llNCLASSJF1ED
The Search for More Effective Coordination
The, Defense Reorganization Act 1958 (Fublic taw 85-599), passed
b;y Congress on 23 July 1958" seemed to oj?en new vistas for better cocr-
dination of the strategic offensive. President Eisenhower, in GU-tlin-
ing his plan to the Congress, em.phasized n the vital necessity ot
complete unity in our strategic planning and basic direc-
tion. ,,10 It necessary that the Secreta..ry of Defense a.."ld the Join"i:i
Chiefs, have the authcri'ty to take action in these matters. The Air
Ferree, tradi.tionally in fa.vor of integration along l:i.nes,
2..1
sup:POrted the President's program" a."J did the A:rmy. 'l'he Navy was
less entbUSiastic.
12
{u)
.A.:rmed with increased authority over tbe deYelopnent and operati on
of new weapon systems given him by the reorgan1zation act,13 the Secre-
tary ot: Defense, then Neil McElro;jl"t examined :plans i'or the new Fleet
BalJ.istic Missile or Polaris;, then in developnent. In December 1958
he asked the Joint Chiefs :for their views on the future eI!!Ployment of
14
the system.
As spokesman for the Air Force, General 'l'hCXlJ88 D. White advocated f/
creation of a unified US Strategic Camnand) to encao.pass su-oordine.te
'UIlits from Force (heaVy and medium bombers and intermediate and.
.
intercantinental ba.11iatic lniasHes) and the Navy polaris. With sp-
:Pl'oval ot the .TOS.. the CINCSAD 'Wcu1d develop the orga.ni2a.tion .so it
could be tunational by the time Po1a.:ris became Strategic
li
B"!
tfj P .5'8: Sf 1'JVlASS1FlID
5
;--'l'i\.,
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,
lieved the entire investigation "as :PTema:cure. It WO'\.lld assign polaris
to the fleet and. its c'()lllr.aIld structure later when it had "becane
a. :proven system.
20
The }>1arine 0or:Ps favored 1D8kiug the JCS respOUflibl
e
tar t:lelection of uu-gets.. a.t'ter 'Which the unified would.
existed.. in the JCS to 1'l'e"Vent undesirable duplicatiOns in strategic tar-
geting, planning, and wea.:P
0nB
employlIlent and the CNO believe6. it should
remain tb$J::'e.l9 The llrmy genercl1Y agreed wi"th "the but it be
Burke smr little neeti for change: inhis opinion coordination had been
"Working 'Ilell since the 1958 A(;1; and integration of
into the fl.eet would pose no tSU"geting Assignment
all.wea)?o'n S)"S"Cema -(:;0 e. single ca:nna.na.,. on the other hand, II "rauld
disrupt and aJ:ter the 1J. S. defense organize-tior.. 1,18 Authori"'vy already
had earlier asked. -tha.t. Polaris be assigned to C<:Il1lll1d.nder in Chief, At-
lantic (CDIcIANT) and eventually ""to United states CO]llllB.nder in Chief,
(USCIlilCELcr) and COlII:llB.nder ill Chief, Fa-cHic (c:INCPac).17 ACbr.iral
'?, 0I' 9[ srJtJELASSIFJID
, The Navy, a.."1d Marine Corps were in 0PJ?osition to the
jected t.o integl"ating all strategic ve8.J?on systeI!lS into a single cam-
IlJEl,nd and recamnended rejection ct.' the. Air FOl'ce :Position.16 The NaVy
Air Force plan. Afuciral Arleigh :Burke, Chie::- of llava,j. OJ;leratio::lS, 00-
tu:re best suited for Ill8Y..im:um ei'fective atCtllic offensive
15 '
plans.
lieved a unified strategic command pro"vided tbe organizational stru.c-
ing services and assigned to the ne;; hcadq\1!l..---ters. General White "De-

UNCLASSIFIED
Air command would be integrated with those of the pariicipat-
In his reply, General Twining rev.i.wed. the history of coo:rdina:t.ion
As a result of this 6.isagreement, a split liecision paper was -p::-e- ./'-
sented to the BeeDei'. 22 flJ.i;hough General White reported l-lr- McElroy
.',
, '
f
!
\
(3) control o:f strike forces. '!legarQ.ing the first, he inclined toward
to date ana concluded fl. not mucro more progress can "be achieved
under the present arrangements tl
2
5 He rejected modifications
to the existing machinery.. e.dvacating instead "fundamen.tal che.nges"
to the system. , The J)roblem divided into three categories: (1) tar-
geting policy, (2) de'Telopnent of integrated operati.onal plans, and
the Air Force counter :force :philosophy.. believing the ta.rget s;ystem
shoulit. include (in o:rdeI' of :priority) long range nuc.lea:r Q.eUveTY caJ?8.-
bilitYJ and. milita.ry control centers, 'War JllS,.king resources)
anq popu.la.ti on centers. After ado:ption of a targeting policy1 in t::te
TQf' 5[fr 8Rii. UNClASSIFiED
ing at lteadquaTters SAC 'left the SecDef' and. members of the JCB, h@ rtJ-

quested. t.he Cha.irman present his views on this problem.
target coordination procedures. In late July" ;following an EWO brief-
did not believe a c.ecision on command arrangements was urgent becal:Se
tbe system vould not become oFel'at.iona,l until late in .1960,2
3
there
was nO doubt that the Secretary intended 1:.0 press or improvement of
land atJ.9. :'leet missiles vhich would hav-;a greatcoordiTlation l'rOb-
21
lems ana. be vu.J..nera'ble if c:ounnunications were destroyed.
carrJIllB.ndeJ:' 'Would. create a. "monolitbic" structure to control aircrai't
","" ...._ '"!'._..; ........
,.
,
,
:.,
..
d.L."
o-
j
in .the fOTlll 0'1: e conooand' d.ecision, and enforced, would there be progresS
in the &:rea of target coordina.tion.27
(SIC?) wouJ..d; in General Twining's wm-ds, " :pTovide a sonnd. oasis
for necesSa.ry coo:rdination of ollerationa.l pla.ns of. local cCiQ1liS.na.ers
iJ'ith '8 plen...26 OnJ.:y ai'ter d.ecisions on these issues were made,
sought the positiom; of 'the ser'Vice6 on the issues of targeting coor-
dine:tion "by :requestir..g answers to 16 Questions. 28 lui I an inter-
sem
ce
ad 'hoc camnittee prepared a. reply to the. CluestiorL!'l. 29 I.a.tcrJ
each service preIl8-red. "their answers. 30 .Jv!, in the issue
of' cOltllIll't-nd. aM of :PoJ.Ja.ris" a. wide d.ivergen
ce
ot opinion exiBted
between the eervices. :But no further a.ction taken on the matter
Jrt. the t:LIJ1e be presented h1s vi ew'S to the SecDef, the Chair.nan i.,.., ...
-'f 8 p_$ i: G-I-t .
UNCLASSIfIED
interle:r
ence
woul.d "be "simFJified.
ll
The promulgation of a. na.tiona.l
strategic target list (NSJ:L) and s. single integrated operation!lJ. IJlan
On the t'hi.:rd. issue, the Chairman :reasoned. -'l.hat if the a.bove actions
were taken "the qu estion of O',J;?era.tional control and problems of DlL:..tual
o:Pera.tiOnaJ. c6::P<LbiHty it "Would be 'brought into the :'ntegrai..ed. plan.
strategictargets, but polaris a
CINeSAC with its d.evelopnent. Na.val carrie:::'6 not be a.ssigned. any
an int.egrated o-perational :plan 'Was definitely needed. He W0\11d charge
sbould develop a. national, stra.tegic targeting system or list supject
to :review b;' J -2 (Intelligence). On t.p.e second. question) he believed.
Cha.irma
n1s
o:r:
inion
the cC!lIlIIlBJlder ):'esponsible for the strategic mission
dence that action 'Was neeo.ed. Re:presentatives to a coordination con-
T"ncmas S. Gates. The neT SeeDef gave early indications that he in-
=rol .5e6RE'"
in the a:ress. _::rget detection,
. . UNLU1SSlF!D
in the middle of June in. which the service :posi'tions were neelY dis-
cussed with the new Secretary,3
6
the Joint Statt prepared. a :ps-;per ex-
lI..eanwhile
J
the' issue remained, staJ.led at roadblock c:r conflict- ,..
ing service On 6 May General Twining adVised the Sec:retary
sources ", fer beyond the cspability of coo:r.'dination cOT'..1'er-
ences. ,,33 The senior repl'esentative of CINCEur and CINCMC stated in
of resolving the ta.rget .coordinatio:n problem fell to his successor,
Secretary McElroy alao left office in December 1959; and the task /.-.-
ference at Supreme Hea.dquarters Po;.rers , (SHAPE) agreed
that t.argeting of e. wide variet.y of wea':POl'lS ':rl.thout a 'lla.ste of re"
tended "to take action. On 20 January he told the Joint Chiefs that
he wished to discuss SM..17J.-59 (the split decision Polaris paper) at
convenience. 32 Events during early spring provided fresh evi-
that the Chiefs could not agree on a response to the 18 questions;
thei:&:' individual ....s were forwa::cded.
35
After a two-day discussion
diversified utilization} it that an efficient application of
the fore.e can only be accanplis:"led by a.uthority.3
4

their memo to the JCS: "With the increased number of ioTea.pons and thei:r
during 1959, awaiting the completion of Study 2009, an optimum target
system. for general war 'being preJ,?al"ed for Presidential awrova1 31
:panding on differences
;=t1p ;) C Iv i\ l.. I
UNClASSIFIED
';)'7
pl.a.nning and cOOl'dination. J i The Joint Chief's were in a.greement tha.t
a basic targeting policy was needed to translate contained in
Study 2009 and the President IS decision on the study ir:to workable in-
structions 1'01' unified -and specified carimande:rs, and t1l.a.t guidance WaB
needed f'or selection of in a national target list,3B but they
di.ffered on what that policy should be.3
9
General Twining felt the
elements of -this diversity a.rose, :r:artially at least, fran endemic
ce:ptual dif:f'erences. He urged -tha-t the JCS not wait .for . llperfec-::'
II To fit. action to the 'Word, he proposed a national. strategic
targeting ]?Olley.40 Service :positions went to the Sec:Def' as SM-696-60
on 20 Ju.ly 19)0.
On lo AU5'Ust 1960oJ after :wer a year of cOrJEidera:tion by the J"CS
e:nd. -two 5ecrete.:ries of Defense, the issues of command and of
strategic systems and stra.tegic targeting became the subject of a SecDef
decision. It was a clea.r coo:pranise.1 indorsing nej.the:t' the Air Force
position favoring a ur.d.fied canmand) nor the Navy position that exist-
ing .res machinery couJ.d do the werk. Recognized by secretary Gates
was CnrCSAC1s experience in strategic The individ-
. ua.l designated as CINCBAC, acting as the ager:t of the JCS, would col-
lect at SAC a team of f'.:x:perts f::::-aI'. all services to prepare
a. plan :for aU. U.8. forces canmd:t'ted to the imtial stra.tegic strike
effort.. CINCSACf S duiies as Director of stra.tegic Ta.rget Planning (nB:rp)
. . 41
were an add.itiona,l and. separate Op. 18 AuguBt Secre-
tary Ga.tes e,.Bsigned. 80S GepereJ. Power' a depaty :Rear Admiral (subse'luently
T)jWp
UNCLASSIFIED
p:'OIlloted to Vice Admiral) Edwa.rd N. ari expert ill nuclear wea-
42 ..Lm.a.L'
:pons and,former head of the Defense Atonic Support Age.ncy. ,-:=JT
Qrgal"-izn.tion
General. Pawer began immediateJ.:y to gather his inter-service staff ,!'
at Headqua..rters SAC. Actiol1E: to bring in new lJeoJ:lle and organize and
train them. in. SAC methods proceeded at a brisk pace and they constitl.:ted
the organizatioll
l
s lllain problems d:uxing the earlY,:forul""..llative months.
Time for :preparation of the first J:llan waG short; the SecDat rlanted it
done by ea.:rJ.:y December. 43 Cu)
The organiza.tion was kep't as BInall aa :possible, with l!ll:I...ximum
ticipation of the eXisting SAC s'1..;aff,J but all aerv"laes participa.ted in
all aspects of :planning. Ccmmands involVed (SACEUR. CDrCUJIT, CINCPac,
. ,
CINell, and CHWNEIM) 'Were requestee. to send to a 24
August :meeting a.t Offtttt .AF'B to discuss organization and. manning. 4.4
TbTee days later a. proposed orgal:d.zs.tional strllcture to :Perform the
:main 'Work i.e., pre:Paration o a. National strategic Target
List (Ns:rL) and a Single Integrated Opera-a'onal Plan (STOP), 'VraB pre..
and forwarded to the JCs.
45
(u)
The organizat:ron was divided into two general categories (see ...../
Chart next ;page). The first was the Office of the Direc-tcl'.
Pcr.re-r, in llls. OB.;pacity as' Director of Stra.tegic Target Pla.nni.ng.. ha.d.
. 46'
as his 1Z1iesion to: CU)
.LJ.
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. .
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i
JOINT srHATEGIC 'lIMGEl PLANNING STAFF
OFFt1lT AIR :FORCE BASE, .NEBRASKA
C I N C I S ~
SENIOR LIAISON
REPRESENTATIVES
SINGLE
INTEGRATED OPERATIONl>L
PLAN DIVISION
- - ~ . _ - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NA...'fTJ:ONAL
arRATEGIC 'r.AHGET
LIm' DIVISION
l"-
I
JCS Publication No.4) "Organiza.tion a.nd Ft.E'letions CIt' the .TeS}" 1 Dec 60.
.....
-.,-'--------- -----
-"----- .-.
llNCLASSJFIED
a. Organize a Joint Strategic Ta.rget Planning staff
consisting of personne:L. from the various services
:possessing the l"e@ired skills to' perform the
targeting and functions. Cu)
b. Develop and maintain the 1'TSTL and'"'c.he SIOP for
attack of the targets on the NSTL. (D)
c. Submit the NSPL and the SlOP to the Joint C"hie::'s
of Staft' f"or review and. apprmral; highlighting
I'0ints or difference wh:.ch be rea01ved duri:ng
the :preparation of the NS1L and the SIOP. (U)
...
Also assigned to this office 'Was a deputy; ;.rho assumed the res:ponsibili-
ties of the Director in his absence and acted as his :principal assistant
and aansor on J EIrFS activities, and oIle l"c]resentati ve each fram the
Army, ITavy, Marine Corps, and. Air These service :representatives
se:rved as a personal stafi' the o.:.rectcr a.l.d his d.eputy, represented.
their services in :policy :matters, and performed a liaison tanction.
They vere !lot in the canma.nd channel. Representatives frcrn u."lified
and speci:t"ied canme.nds supplying forces' to the SlOP and a JCB liaison
group were also attached 'to -the staff. T"lle CINC representatives (the
number assigned vas at -the discretion of their conrma.nder) Ftici})8,ted
in the llreps.ra.tion 6f the SlOP and. NEIrL. They were not integrated, into
the staff.. but 'Were directly responsible to their resJlective canmanders.
A JCS liaison group, an integre.J. part of the Joint Staff, JCS, assisted
the DSJ:P in interpreting .res guidance and informed the JOB end the Ber-
vices of in the J?repsration of the Nm'L and SlOP. The ClUe
and service representatives served as e. Policy CCJ:IJ11li ttee under the

che.irma.nshi:p of the de:puty director. This committee reviewed a.nd.

UNCLASSiFIED
.. -:-:.. -

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Quested the above orga.pization was divided as follOW's: SAC re-
sou1'ces.- 140 ofi'icers;. 57 a.irmen, and 22 Civilians; kr!rrY - 10 officers;
SubseQ.uently.. as a result of the survey made or the NSL Divisioo
l
g
intelligence structu:re and the intelligence sUPIJort agencies of SAC
14
......

a:r 50 military spa.ces to be a.Cided to the 197 SAC military :persorJlel

On 1 SeJ>ten:.ber 1.960 -the .res approved the proposed organization,
designating it the Joint St.rategic Target Planr.ing .Agency
(JSTPA), * and. the initial Joint Tab2.e of .Distribution (JTJ)) consisting
*' On 29 September 1960 the JCS redesignated the arga.m.:z;at1on as the
Joint Strategic mget Planning staff. (f:M-957-60.. lIstrategic
Target PJ.euming, II 29 SelJ 60.) .. .
The initial Joint Ta.ble 0: Distribution (JTD) of 269 spaces re-
wark:iJlg in related areas. In One change, the JCS .sti)?UJ..a.-ted. tbo."::. the
deputy chief of the SlOP Division be a Navy officer in the grade of
:rea:r a.dmi.ral or captain..
49
-f&f.
NavY - 29 officers; kir Force - 8 nr,d M3:r1ne CorDS 3 offi-
cers .48 -fe+
gory consisted of the tvo :Pl"oduction units of: the Target Stn.ff--the
strategic Target List Division and the Single Int.egrated Oper-
ational P1Em :Division--wbich tC::lk their names frem the "Work they per-
formed.
47
eU)
sible. for a.funinistration and J;l!l"sonnel supervision, The second cate-.
a:PJ.n'0ved policy; disagreements io1ent i.O the director fo'1: final decision.
Also:p
art
of the Office of the was Secretariat, respon-

Headquarters) at the Chief of Nava1. OperatioLIS request} the DeJ.)uty
;
Director of JSTPS req'l.:ested 69 adMtio;::;a.l1Dilitar,f spaces) '\-lhien ,,,itb
:tbe excelltion of 5 ai:rmen fran Air Force tone f\n'nished !Jy
the Navy and Arrrry. Forty of VE':re to be assigned to Readquarters
SAC Intelligence functions and 29 to the JS'.rPS.
50
A...4;er reviewJ the
JeS allIll'oved the interim augmentation of: 29 military IJersonnel and 3
civilian spaces) but iJ.isapproved the adCliticnal 40.
51

The organizati.on to prepaxe the first N5'TL and SIGP was assembled
in haste because the SeeDer had ordered the two dOCUlIlents cCl!!l.Jlleted by
J.4 Decembe:r 2960. Emllhasis had 'oeen :placed on aU9.u.iring the best
people f.:r-arn the services to do the job; not much a..""lSlysis had been
made of existing capability the SAC sta.:f'f. But .rith camplet:.on
ct.. imtia.1 l'rsn and SIOP* the ?:::ganization could. 'pe adapted. for the
:fUture, i.e.) the work of kee.ping the dOC"Jments c'lll':!'ent. General Power
recCIl!lIIlE!o.ded a reductionj the non-BAC authorization "woUld. be reduced
fram 83 to 75 s:Paces and SAC :personnel in a dual funC"tion status wau.1d
be cut. from 219 to lll. He also asked that the number of permanent
reNeserr-ua.tiYes of th.e CINes be held. to a mhimum. 52
The A:rmy and. Navy did not agree. T:'1.e Chief' of Ra.vel Opcr'<1tio:n.s ..
did not think it a.d.equa tely representea. all servi.ces at all levels, but
favored the ld:r Farce. Because the duties of the NSTL Division. concerned
intelligence and taxget selec"vion,l in the Na.vyT S opio1
o
n a.l1.
* The :preparation of these B.oc'\.llll.snts -.rill be treated in this
history.

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to provide the broadest a::1d nosi; eX}:'e:rt intelligence base whic"i
can be achieved to support tbe SlOP... 53 The krrny did net think the
hered to the composition of forces and weapons assigned to the plan.
as ArtIr'h Na.vy" Or Marine COl1?s (41 per cent). Although the D3J:P had
favor -the ItrOposal to reduc:e the number of the representatives,
The. DSTP argued that exist::'ng JCS guida.nce .for creation of joint J../
'-'t 5EC! &15 llNEfASSIFI[f)
ation of an intelligence paneJ., 'tfith representat.ives frau the CINes,
the services, the Joint Staff, and the Centra.:. Intelligence
the most efficient use of Sl?ace and technica.l eguipnent, and most ad-
He had not used forces submitted to the plan as a basis for represen-
tation; if' he had the Navy and. Marine Corps would :have been :red.uced by
one-ha..1.:f. In the docl.llll.ent 14 key positions out c 34 were id.ent:Lt'iec1
services should be e9.ually represented. Neither did Afunirel Eur:-{e
proposed manning. met the criteria. of a joi=rt staff, nor did it agree
sibilities to a specified. He defended the JTD as representing
.his interpretation 'of JCS guidance: it was the most econcmical, nade
with maintaining SAC officers Vith ttvo jO"DS in key positions, except
far the DSJ!P. It recommended equal representation s.m.ong services il}
the NSI'L Division and proJ;lortional representation (based on
forces) in the SIOP Division. 54-
:preferring instead to leave their appointment to the discretic:n of the
ccmmander Injecting a ne!' feature} the eND recanmended cre-
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the best qualified, would be chosen for these posts :rrespective of ser-
Vice.5
7
In the D$I'P's opinion, the guiding principle of the JSJ)PS or-
ganization "Was ".' that of service representation pro:portionel to
. ti:le serv:i.ce involved. ,,58 The organization as submitted was ap-
proved by the JCS O!l 14, June. 59 (e)01)
Preparation of SIop-62
General Power,. in his capacity as was guided by the Uational
Strategic Targeting and Attack Polley (NBr.A?)) a docUment 'Which .
formed the core of -this , t s stra.tegic strike
of tn1a policy were to destroy or SinowSov1ct
:Bloc strategic strike forces and major :rd.2itarJ and gove!'nment control!
and. to strike urban-ihdustrial to achieve the leve?- i
. .. indica.ted in study 200i] T:'1ese ves to'
accOl!lpl:ished by, integrating strategic .forces am directing them against
a lllin:imum. list of' targets. 60
The first the J SI'FS after its organization W'as to d.etermine .-
'What targets l.!:ere t,o 'be a.ttacked. On 18 August General Power directed
his Diz'ectorate of Intelligence to -prepa:re a. prelimi:n.a.ry target list.
At'the init:!.a.l meeting ot the Sta.:f:: six days later Intelligence pre"
sented a working list, l'Jatiom.l Strategic Target rata. :Base
(NS1lJll) of StelU'iJlg Committee headed by
* rFran this list a team of e:x::perts :fran NSTL Division' the
:prepaxed the final list&. -l
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deli vering a weapon to each bCJ:lio release li:le vere det,e:::nined, e.. process
of II OJ)tiJn1.n:n. targeting" was entJ>loyea. in selectlng nUGlber of' D3:Zs the:t
TOP SEG-R-E-+-
.:..:" M .,
to ea.ch DGZ. An IfO::Ptimum !nix
l
' roz list) the best caubir..ation of types
of taxgets (militB.l"y 1U'ban-iDtJ:U5triaJ..IJconsideri'.ng the m:cliber 0= 3:
should be attacked and tne des:i.:red assu...-a.nce of delivery to be a?:p1i.ed
TOP 5 E-b-R'-F-ET-I---
Afte::- the number of weapons available the degree of assurance of'
desired clegree of destruction. The .results were verif'ied manun.Jly.
comprised the After 8.Gsigning a relative 'Worth to the targets
:Basic to th.e pre:Pa'l."ation of the KSrL was the NSJ:DB) a cCR:lpilation
_gets o'i t:,. Call-
bined knOW'ledge of U.S. intelligence sources. 'By a process of refine-
ment the highest priority in this target data base eventually
*' Ii. process o:t d.etermining the relative worth of potential
military and urban-industrial'targets by of a point sys-
teIll. This:ran.k1ng vas 'the basis :rot" D:lZ developnent end DGZ ]1'1-
ority. Eldsting SAC milltary a.nd 'Weigbil:lg system
was lIlbdit'ied in coordinstioo 'With CINe representatives. (l-Ul.nual)
l'Target Weighing System, II 19 Dec 60, prepared by J'ffi:PS, J3-mSO;
:rOM" Col :J. M. Phil:pott, Ch,7 N9J!L Div, JS'EPS, to ncr, "JS1'PS
History:l 1J 9 Oct 6l, B-8060/.l..)
Erker insured. that the targeting needs of all the CINes wer'e satiGfiea.o
General Power wanted the final list to include only t.argets 'which had
been" -posi'tively and. located.
i.n the base -r>y means of a target weighing * the process of devel-
desired. ground zeros ;ere' gro1,J.ped . \
/ into target isla.nds or grou.;ps of :prox::.mate identii'ied as '
/ cCAnple:xes. C01llJlUter programming then s elected the optimumn1Wber and
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location of: DGZs Within the islands i-ihich when s-:ruC;lr. would. achieve the

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, B.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(5)
20
...... c-.... - ...
,fOP SECRET
In the middle of September 1960 ;.:ork began OIl applying weapon.
* CINCL.A..'NT
1
CINCPac, and C:NCSAC conmritted fcrces to the SIOP ar..d. they
were integra.ted directly ::nto the plan, llut BACh forces ere
eluded only on a coordinated basis. This came a1lout beca'l'-s.eof: the
special nature of the c:cmmalld, i.e." it contained foreign as 'Well as
U.S. :forces. '1'he SACEu:r f'orces are shcr.rn in the nIOI'; liaison be-
USC1NCEt.u- ant. Js.rPS prod"IJ.cen. mutually satisfactory target cover
a.ge a.nd support. (Memo 'for All Ooncerned" JSTPS "MitlUtes of the
Ninth Meeting of' -the.Policy COIllmi:t-tee.. 11 .2J. Oct 60; Intel'vie""'1 R.
Historian, with Lt Col F. N. Millen" Asst CINCSAC JSTPS,
21 Mar 62; lOM, Col P. J. loog, .SACEur Senior Rep, JgfPS
J
to :nx::m"
"Eeview of E1story of JgrPS,1t 15 }jar 62, :a..B256o) -fer'
POll system .Tere a.l.s<l determined.and submitted. to the POl:i.cY COllllllj:t..tee
. 64-
for ap:?roval.
COllcu:rrent 'With work on the target system, personnel of the ,srop L-"'"
Divis:i,.on and CINe l"cJ.lresentatives analyzed ca:Pabilities of forces sub..
mtted by the cINes 'pre:fl8,ratory to ap.pl-yi2J,g forces to the target
system.* Only capabilities in December' :960 were
considered in the 8101>-62. Rel1ab:'!..lity planning factors each weB.-
tems gathered by SlOP Division to -the DGZs prepared by l'iSl'L Division.
target system .diVided t"wO parts-those targets ea.st 0ill
TOP SECRET
wea:pons available., which would accC!J1:plish objectives set dmm in the
N'Sl'AP) .Tas -thus develo:Ped.
62
Upon cCOlpletion of the SIOP this list
. DGZs (706 in "the USSR,,_China., _.European
sateiJ->tes"

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iJmn.ed1ately, wel'e then targeted 'to take advantage of: the disTU.ption
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. E.O. 129.58, as amended

. Section 3.3(b)(5)
2l
RESTRl STED DATA,
TO? SECRET
The JCS consti:-a;i.nts pOlicy reqt;.ixcd that:
a. Surface bursts satellite areas be held to the mini:num
demanded by necessity. ffSil'Dr
b. In :Russia and. Ch.ina.
1
weaJ?OllS should be employed. to:
(1) Reduce civ.i1 and casualt:i.es to the m:tni-
IlIU!ll demanded by military neceSSity when :Pr:Lilal"Y und.ertakings apply.
Co. Surface burst weapons be liJIlited in critical areas to ins'
that the expected dose J...imits set "by the JCS a.:t'e not exceeded.
(Sec V to JS'J:PS Rpt 1, "JCS Constraintz{ II to Memo for JCS
t
"Fallout
ConstI'aim Polley," 1'ron Dill'P, B-78376.)
** This was a :t;ol'.ce of 874 d.el1vel'y systems (1447
15 lllimJtes it loca.ted bases, and 1d""0 hours if mobil
(carriers and Pola.r1s su.bmarines (E::.-1ef'ing, ltNSl'L and. SIOP P:t'e-
sente:tion to seeDef," 1 Dec 60, cl II, B--TT67J. .. )
*** Oonsisting or 1464. a1rcrett and missiles and 1976 weapons (Ibid'.).
-
..
a:9:9lication tea'lll.S were one :for each sector. {See Chart ne:>..-t
page) Theu work consiste:1 of studying air defenses.. selec.ting
-"'-":""''"---------:---._._-_ __ .. '
lor.gitude ana. those west of 100
0
,east longitude. Two force
.,
,...-
tics, .determining attrition probability.., and stt:.dying weapons effects
and policy.*' A d.efinite tYJ)e aircraft Dr missile was t::len
assigned to a definite ta;rget. Alert react:'ng to tactical
'tofere integrated fb'st agaiut the highest .priority targets.
6 .
__5 :Follow-on forces,. *** not maintained a condition to react
TOP SEGRE'F-
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ca.used by the alert strike, to increase :Probability of destruction of
I high }It'io:rity and. to exp,md. the >lS1L eoveragiJ
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Force Application/Target Selection
f Recording1
/ NSTL-Targets
Support
Functions
-
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TACItIeS FORCE CAPABILITY GAM I.I\UWCII DATA AIIfl.l.L!VTPN EFFECTS A'rrR
SAC PAC IANT SAC PAC LAlff' N9l'L-l4aterials NSTL-Targets N&TL
: .. - . _.-
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Portions denied are S-FRC
and thus outside of
ISCAP's jurisdiction
for aircraft to 2500 to
For forces consisted of such
and 'Wea.:pons targeted,
st:rikes vras difficult because of the g:::-eat variety of delive:ry syst:lI1S
yield; and CEPs ranged fram 300 to 3000 feet
-, }
12, 000 teet for missiles, i
,
[;he anne" three a=ndl.ees: s,""ike -t1mi"", aircrart ";0"--'1
and missile recapitulation by accountiDg line DUm; 1\
and .uore.i't and missile reoapitulation by targat =nber and. nc:zA :
,.
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unit" strike "timing foi' ind:!.v.i.duaJ. sarties was extracted from. the t,iming
sheets and integrated into ind.ividual combat lllissicn "folders. 67
-
After the 'Work of' appJ.ying cCllllm:.tted forces to targets was com-
pleted, dalIlage asseSsed, and neaessary refinements and adjustments made)
tOP SECRET
Detailed. sou.Tee data sheets were :prepared on each sortie. They
conte.ined information on by sortie, so....-tie entry pOiLt' on the
II-Hour Control Line (HHCL), tactics used, post-strike base or recovery
.area; ty:pe weapon delivered, and type Veh:f.Cl:] After f'urlher. d.ei;ailed.
flight :plarming, the cODl.:plete source data. program 'Was run tl-..rough SAC 's
704 com1JU,ter to,tsolve time CN'er target ccnfli Strike tinrl.ng sheets
eacJ1 of: 16 o:Pt:ions became Armex .F* to the 810P-62 and. were del:ive:l.'ed
to the and specified Task force commande;s received
only those sheets directly rela.ted to their mission. At the ta.ctical
1
!
! divergent systema as the .R-52, the F-100, and the ATLAS and the :Mace;
i
\ fa.ctors varied fram to .95 ller. cent :i.n aircl'afi to 38 to
\ . 75 per cent in missiles j YleaJlOns trCllIl. in
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These targets fell
intelligenceJ
Headquarters SAC for
operational cone epts j
attacked. in the SlOP.
of OP Sf:G REt-
It vas' a list of all Naticnal Stra:tegic Target
A minimum number of targets .rhose timely and
assured destruction will accc..'Uplish the s:pecific
objectives set forth in. the NBrXP (this was the
minimum NS'.rL).
Defensive targets necessarily struck in order to
strike the targets in (1) above. fB-t-
other targets Which the DSTP a."ld the CINes agree
sh:m1.d 'be taken under attack and those ather in-
stallations in the lmtional strategic Ta.rget llita
J
Ease d8:lllGoged because of co-location.
ts+ .
(l)
Data Base installations to be
r-;;; r8
intoCree ge neral grour;s. 0
the NBrL was prod.uced.
On 1 December 1960 the JCS.., of ULified and
tied commands ce:m:citting forces to -the BIOI'... and other high ranking mili-
enemy dei'elliJes; force application; assessment of s.ortie success, da:!lls.ge)
lUJ)U)
tary and ciy;i1ian 32 in all, gathered at
. 6 ....,.._.---"..._... .,. .
briefings on SIop-62. 9 were the NSTL;
and ca.sualties; and. dissents to the plan.7
..:r-oP Sf CRH--
The cClm}>lete SIop-62 was a deta.iled pla."'1 of 'What ",ere to
be attacked" by 'What and in 'What n:.anne:r during the initial stra-
te.gic attaefgainst the Sino-SoViet B.1.oQrt supersed.ed. any conflict-
ing guidance contained in the J"oint Stra.tegic Capabilities Plan. Eight
the key portions of the plan;
s,ponsib1llt1
e
fl and co:nmand .:relationships, a.tomic, Mncept of oJleration.s;

O,ption 1 "Was the alert option; only the aiert force could. be laimched.
under this oondition.. Options 2 through 15 'Were based on
ly 1
n
creasi:lg :preparation time frOll1 1 to 28 hO".n's. Option l6 was
predicated on a miniIlI'JIIl. o:f 28 hours :preparatio!l for all forces
(Appe:od:lx J. to Chall 10) Jffi:PS Planning Mazma1..1 1 61).
alert force could be launched under :positive control. FOllO'J-on forces
rese.rved the prerogative of :putting the plan into effect. Its mission
was to:
72

c culd be beld and redirected before the execution message vi'as received
j
coordinating strike timing) and adminis-
trative pr,ocedures.
71
f!he .res, acting under orders from. the President,
e. Destrooy or neutralize the Sino-Sovtet strategic
nuclear capfbility and :primary rilitary and
goverrnrlent controls of m,ijor importance.
based on the amount of warning available.* strategic.A:ir Comm.a.. ...ulls
plan, howevar. Sixteen options for executing the .plan 'Were aW,dlable
1
TOP
and menned. sy.stem.s in the follO"";- on force could be recalled. even "When
airborne; lI'.obile forces (aircraft ca.rriers ar..d missile submarines) caul
launch frcm alternate positions; and fiXed missiles had dual targets.

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with certain SIcp-62 planning factors were
I
at the c:riefing by CINCLant's semo::, representati-.re to the JCS, Rear
AdniraJ. J. J. ;ryland. Although they had earl':er been resolved qy the
n8rp,75 by .res c.irection tr.ey 1;ere as of the Secllif brief-

ing.
76
First, Admiral Hyland objected -Co :wha.t he called thets;rps :policy
of justii'ying a. m.axiJ:rll.:m rather than a tJir.imum target list. Forces were
rigidly cOllllllitted to the SIOP as first. priority, giving tl::.e cClln.l!lEll1der
little latitucle in hitting other targets important tp him. Because of
g..udance that only srop forces 'would st.rike targets, tlany -heater
targets were ,placed on. i<he Ij.st "to. nake s-.rre they were struck. This
eJo..'})anded the target list beyond what CDrCIEnt believed to be specific
objectives of the NsrAP. TI The DsrP's c..ecisi.on hOod bee:l that e."'<:cess
forces should be used to increase "the assure-nee of' of high
priority targets rather than :for attacking ac.o.:i.tional targets not part
of the mnimum. NSl'L.
78
Second.> -:he Senior Representative dis-
agreed w;Lth the weather factors developed for the SlOP. He believed
the plar.. to use visual delivery aircra:ft to attack at random ti::nes to
be erroneous. He also disagreed with 'the ,Process of ave:.r;aging the good
daylight capability of tbese Vith their poor night
i This resulted in a low assuraD.Ce factor which must then 'be raised by
"'----"
26
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,=t,
"
,
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--f-G-fL5-H-R-H-
27
Because of
A delay of launching d.ue
he agreed the specific
probability that a non-all-weather :nission wo,..ud be c8:P8.ble 0:: doing
ceniage figures vere promulgated which represented tbe
percentage to use was a matter 0:: judgment, in his opinion the effort
that 'Weather and 'visibility conditicns in each aNa would permit target
plished successfully, the mi.ssion not be completed. as
sized that. the weather factor 'Was an important one in dete....---m.ining the
caxrier mobili"ty, cOIlllnB.nders vere not required. to launch :iJmned:i.ately
upon receipt of tactical warniLg.
79
earlier em)ta-
to weather might not :p:revent t:"le missicn from eventual.1y 'oeing accom-
the }ob assigned at any time durillg thE: year.
assurance factor used in SIop-62.
ident1f1catioLI by non-all"i-reath.er aircraft. * The ':percentaga ra.nged fran
38 to 54 per cent.
80
General Povler decided that in e;x:ecuting srop-62
Po'!' plCUll'l.ing purposes in sIor-62) for e. strike selected at randC!ll) }ler-
but if' it vas 'L"'li'a.-vorable individual CINes wOi.tld use a.1"ternate lauuch
81
schedules. In his third dissent)' Admi=a1 Hyland disa,greed whh the
it: weather ravore.ble nun-all-i;eather aircraft would go a.s scheduJ.ed.,
eXlJense involved. in planni:r..g far highe:r than 90 pel' cent assurance
d gl t
.. ,t . . d. 82
of:. e1ivery 0::1 any sin e targe wa.s too great for the :::-esi.u. S ootaJ.r.e
..------.
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"* The equation vas -thus: the probability 0::. success is equal to the 1 i
reliability of' the weapon system times the enroute and. ta.;rget area ! i
suxvivability ot the weellon system times the probability at correct.JJ I
target identi:fication for all-weather ail"c::;-aft. ..;
. I
--. .., I
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f same as if' the oxd.er had. c orne in daylight and good weather.
no ur..anim:!. ty of opinion, 'the Cllail"Illan pro:pose'd. a national strategic tar- f
I
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The Single Integrate<1 Opel"atior.al Plan for 1962 :represented. a. unique
The was approved without major change by the JCB, SecDei',
ar.d the President on 2 December to be ef'fect.i ve 1 April 1961.
8
4. The
plan went :into ef'fect on that o.a.te.
85
+s1-
cf ::-ol"ce. .A:f.'ter lengthy tonsideration of the iss'J.e by the JCS pToul.:.cad
in war :pla.IlDing. to its develop.nent" atomic targeting
was coordinated after the fect; nandicaplling Ir.utual support and
-1'"-O-P- -5 EG-R-Ef.
geting :policy. The Secretary of Defense accepted this plan and. directed
i it be used a.s by CDJCSAO in his :lew capE.city as Director of
}
Strategic Target 'Plar.:ning. In h:i.s 6.ec.:ision of 16 AUg11St 196o} the Sec-
,
"
l'etary decided. a strat.egic ccmmand 'Wa.s not needed; "aui; nei1::';;:r did he
,
\ thil".k target p
1a
nrUI'.g cou1.i De done within existing JCS ca];abilities.
\ He crec:ted the Joint Strat
f
3gic Target Planning Staff" responsible to _,< _
1 the JCS" but located /;It SAC. The JffrPS reFlaced. the Wcrld-
I Wide Coordination C_eren"e method of :Planning COordinationJ:1U"",,"
I o:pera.tio!lS.1. coordination ;'cl5' s-:;ill l'equired in the J;'ost E:-lioill' Ilha.s;1'l
1
I
..
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.__ . .....--................
lear .strike coordination, but it was a beginning) a fO'l..'CldatioIJ. 'fo:: future
::
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SECREt --
See JCS 2056/251, "Coordina.tion of Atamic Operatior..e, II 11 }f2.y 61
[Decision on stud.y by J-3], .:B--79820. The total effect of SlOP on
the atanic cooJ:'dinat:ion system could not be accurately evaluated
until of the worla-Vide atomic exercise
f:or september 1961. -fsT
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development.
zationJ produ.ced the first trSl'L and SlOP in less tha.n i'o'Jr months. As
fran di:verse concepts
J
but they die: not interfere with .submis-
expected, the precess "las not completed without di:tl'erences arising
sian of the :final p4n to -the SecDel' on. 1 December and. its acceptance
at that til:J.e. The JSTPS was not a p3.:lC.cea :tor all 'the problems of nuc.-
;
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( nuclear we::J Working With a short deadline, nucleus at: SAC offi-
cers, assisted by officers 01' other services essig:led. to the new organi-
FOOTNOTES
7. 5:ist SAC} J,an-Sun 57, PP 50-52; Hist of SP.C, JIL'1 58-JuI 59,
P:P 33-47.
CM-3
8
0-59, Memo fer SeeDef, f:::"an Gen.N. 7. TvdniDg) Chairman) JCS)
IITarget and .Associa.ted P.roblems, It 17 Aug '59, enclo-
sure to JCS 2056/131, 20 Aug 59.
President t s message to the Congress (COF/), 3 Apr ::;8) :E:x 18, Cr.a;J
I. Hist of &-\C, Jun 58-Jul 59.
Hist of SAC, Sun 58-Jul 59} 'PI' Intervic::w (on -La.:l,jereco:rde::-),
Mr. S. R. Caywood, Historian, .,i-::;h Col E. C. Unger, Ch, Policy Br,
DPL; Hg, SAC, l2-14 JuJ. 61.
Heari!lgs Before th.e C01!IIllittee on A;nn.ed Services, Rouse of Repre-
senta-tives, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, "3eorganization of DOD,"
No. 83, Pl' 6427, 6279 (Testimony of Cen T. D. Whi"te) U3A.F, ar.ld
Gen 1-5axwell Taylor, CofS, USA).
W 6344-6391 (1'estimol".Y of Adm Arleigo. R. Burke, CNO, USN).
Public Law 85-599, 6 Aug 58.
1'-1e:mo for Chairm.e.n.. JCS, from Ron D. A. Quarles) Actg SeeDef, "Con-
cept of .Employment a.nd COl!I!Jland StructUl"e fo"i' :POLARIS Weapon System, II
24- Dec 58. This Cl.ooument became .res 1620/209, 5 Jan 59.
3. Robert D. Little) A of the .lir :force Atomic Energy Prog:ram,
III) :Part 2) 1> 333.
c:
"'.
Richard E. Stockwell, SoViet Ail" Power {Pageant Press, Inc.,
:p 1; Robert D., Little; History 9f "thl:! Air Force P:tomjc Enel't,'Y Pro-
gram, Vel III, Part 2, pp 299-300. ,
6. Tnid.,:p 335; History of' SAC} Jun 58-JuI 59, Vol. I} p 23.
1. JCS SM-810-60, '19 Aug 60 (B-76b4-3); T.IlE E} JCB SM-810-6o) 19 Aug
6o} :for Gen T. S. USAF, IlDirector of Strategic Target
Planning} 't to fM- 373-60.. 22 AU,g 60) Memo fc::: the SeeDef, "Target
Coordination ana Associated Problems, II (E-76643).
2. N.Y. Herald Tribune, 18 Aug 60.
4. Fred. B:a'll.1in: al.) Ed..s., The Aircraft Yearbook for 1952, (Lincoln
Press, Inc., Ma.shington, D. c.) PI' 194), 188.
8.
9.
10.
il.
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v18. J"es 1620/254, Memo" eNO, US!.".l, to JCS, "Concept of' JfuI:ployment and
Cominand. StTUc.ture for the Polaris 'vleaJ;lon System)" 20 Apr 59.
JCS J.620/250, Memo, Co;fS USAF to JCB, "Command and Control of
St.rategic If 28 Apr 59; .Memo for SecDsf
1
from CofS -JB..AY,
A.FM lB2-59
1
"Concept of Employrr.ent and Coomand st:::-u.cture fer
Polaris System, II 5 May 59
1
1& 12, Cha.p I, Hist of 8ll.O) Jul-Dec
59-
The positions of -the Navy, Z19.rine Corps, and Air FOl:'ce went
to the SeeDer as 8 May 59-
Ltr, Gen T. D. White) Cot'S USAF, to Gen T. S. Power, CI.UCl?A
C
, 8
Jul 59, Ex: lUst Of Jul-Dec 59, IV.
Appendix D to ,res 1620/257, 0:: the Marine Corps Views
on ConcEpts of Employment ar.d CamlllaIld BtructUl'e 1'or the Polaris
ivea.pon System)" 8 May 59.
Brig Gen C. A. Randall, Mil Ass"C to SeeDef, ::or Chairman,
JCS, "Concept of' ErnplO;Ylllent and. CCllllZland for the Polaris,"
30 JUJ. 59-
CM-380-59, Memo :fer SecD=;f f'::om Gen lil. F. Twining) Chairiuan) JCS"
Coordination and. Associated .Problems, II 17 Aug 59, Enclo-
sure to J"es 2056/131) 20 Aug 59.

.116.
22.
21.
23.
24.,
20. Apper..dix.A to 3es l620/257, llViC'p" of CafS, USA) on Concept of:
.!%:;Jloymerl't and Command Structure 'for the Polaris Weapon Sy.stem, ,e
8 ?-fay 59.
:res 1620/254, Memo, l1SN, to :res, nConcpt Employment and
Command Structure for the Polms Wea.pon System) II 20 Apr 59. The
Na.vy :position .,as sU:PJ:oxted. by Re,pl'esen:'ative Dar..iel Flood (Dem,
Fa.), in:fluential member of the Rouse Subcammi:ttee on OOD Ap::pro-
priations (See Hearings Before the Su.bcU'll'Zlittee on DOD Apprcll:l.'i-
atious", 86th 2nd Sess, .?art 2) pp 118-J25)
....-1.7. :res 1620/223, CNO, USN, to J"es" nConcept of :E'mplo:rment and
COll1'l!and for Polaris "Heallon ,system, \I 22 .ran 59.
27.
.28. CM-386-59, Memo for J'es; trom Gen N. F. :r-.tini..1g, Chail'ltlSn, JeS,
"Target Coordi:oa.tion an.d Associated Problems, II 24 Aug 59. Also ./
JCB
25.

/26.
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Memo for Gen }lowe::.", nom Col L. D. Clay, Ch, DPLB, SAC,
Command," 15 Jun 60.
Memo far the JCS, frOID. :Brig Gen C. H. Eisenhart.. CINCSAC Rep) and
Maj Gen R. T. Coiner, CINeEur Rep, "NATO Coordination Procedures.. 11
14 Apr 60, Ex 19, Chap r, Eist of Jan-Jun 60. .
JC5M 193-60) Mf;alO.. JaS (signee. by ChairIi'..an) to SeQ-Del', "Pa.rget Cocr-
dina:tion and. .Assoc:tatedlToblem.s, 11 6 May 6D.
usN Bureau of Pexsonnel Order 051664, 17 Aug 6D.
Nemo, Chair.ma.n... JCS for .res) "Target Ccordination and Associated
:Problems)" enclosure to SM-682-60, 15 Jul 60.
Memo f'qr ,qha1:rman
J
JCS, frcm SeeDef, lfTarget Ooordination end
Associated Problems" II 16 Aug 60 (1)...76590); SM-B09...60, Memo for Gen
T. S. l\::r..rer
J
USAF, f'rCll!l. JCS.) 1'Di:recto:r of Strategic Planning, II
19 Aug 60.
35
34.
42.
tJ'o.
33. Ltx) Cen T. S. Power} CINCS.t\.C, to Gen W. F. :;:'wining, Chairrnan, ,rGS,
1 Jun 6o, EY.: 21.. Chap I} JIist of SA:::) Jan-Jun. 60.
Enclosure) Memo for Jes} "Tare:;et. Coordination and Associe.ted ?rob-
II to 3GS .2056/137.. 3 Oct 59. Members of the ad hoc cOlc:mittee
were Maj Cen G. W. Martin, USAF; Brig Gen J. K. Woolnough, USAi
RAdIn C. V. Rickets, USNj e.nd Brig Qen vi. J. VanHyzin, USMC.
Note to Control Div, JeSs fro:n Brig Gen lL L. 1Iillyardj .Yes}
"JCSM-171-59} 8 M.ay 59} subject t CCllce:p:' of Employment and Command
St:ru.c.twe ::"or the POLARIS Wea.pon System.. I" 20 .ran 6c.
91-340-60) Memo for Dir) Joint staff) from. Brig Gen H. L.
Sec) JCS) "Target Coordination and Associated Pl'oblems)" II Apr 60.
JCS 2056/143, 22 Dec 59.
v-3T. JCB 2056/161, lIParget Coordi:uation and Associated Problem..<;, to 29
Jun 60, forwarded to as enclosure to Memo, Twining to SecDef,
same subject, as JCSb1 273"60.
..._----,.
f. 38. Ibid..

,
t c/39. 2Bo-6o
J
Memo, JCS(signed by Chairman) to SecDe.f} ":Target
;.Coordination and Associated Problems} II 7 Jul 60. The Air Force
i wou2d desienate CINCSAC as national strategic targetir.g authority;
but the Na\'Y and -che Marir.e Corps fa.vored <1esignating the Joint
\ 'to do the job assisted. by the unif'ied and specif'ied corema.l1ds
i a.nd ether a.gencies.
?
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Interview (te.:pe xecorued), Robert M.' KiP.'P, and E. R. Caywood, 3is-
tor-ians, With VAdIn E. N. Parker, IIDSl'P, 29 6l.
Memo for t,he Record, nStaff Meeting .18 Aug 60) II .Brig C'rn S. J.
McKee, Sec) JS'I'PS (n-78391j.
Msg" .res 9
8
93
4
2, .res to D8:rP... 26 Jan 61, Ex: 6; JCS 2056/223, Memo)
JCS to Sel:Ilef... 3 Mar 6J..... f01Wardcd as 3 Mar 6J... The
.A:t.r Force a.pproved of DSI:Pl s manning Without change.
Msg, ])S'.rP 0997, DIr? to .res, n.s., 8 Fen 61.1 ,enclosure to .res
20
56)219,. 9 Feb 61.
:Memo for "'.;he JCS, "Pr0Jlosed Orga.nization and Manning Requirements
for Strategic Target :Planning, Jr 27 Aug 60, from Gen T. S. Power,
D&:rP,
Tan A, "National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, II to
Thooas s. Gates, to Chai:r.man, JCS, :'Target Ooordir.ation
and Problems.. II 16.Aug 60 (B-y6590).
JCS SM. Memo 'for -tbe SecDaf fl"Oll1 Oen N. F'. Twining, Chair-
man, JCS, "Ta.rget Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60,
Tab A (B-y664-3); Nemo :for JGS frOln SecDef) "'rarge-;; Coordination
Associated Problems," 1.6 Aug 60 (:B-76590); Hemo :for the Record,
"Daily Progress Rpt on. Jf1J2r Activities, " Part I, :Brig GEm S. J.
McKee, Sec, 24 Aug 60 (:B-770l0); Memo for JC3) from Gan T. S. PcY"er,
DS'lP, "hoposed Orgnni zat1or..a.l Nanning Requirements . , Il 27 Aug
60" E.2:; He:no :for Jes, from Cen T. S. '.Pow'ex) DSEP, nS'tatement o:f
'Func'ti::lns ana JeiD 3,pecifications for Ke;>r Positions in J8rPS.. " 25
J'uJ. 61> JCs SM-.963-60, of Reference for J'CSLG) .. 27
Sep 60; Briefing.. 'NSJ:L and SIal' Briefing 'to Secref.. II "by JSTPS, 1
Dec 60 (B-7T659). ,
48. Memo far J'es, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Proposed Orgam.zational
.f;'J..9.l1r'..ing RequireJnents . ) II 27 Aug 60.. 1::::...1:-
49 Msg, 98
226
5, J'es to 1 Sep 60.
50. Msg, 2161) WSl'PA to J'CS, 27 Sep 60, Ex 3.
51. Mag; 9
8
4249, Jes to J)ffi'P, 13 Oct 60.
52. Ltr) Gen T. S. ::PO'wer, DSl'P, tD Jes) "JSTPS Ivfan:power Requirements
and Organization.. II 9 Ja.n 2 AtCh, .Ex 4; Merna for the.
Record, "Daily Progress Report on JSJ:p Activities, It P"<U't I
J
:Brig
Gen S. J. McKeel Secretary} DS.rP) 24. Aug 60 (B-7'70J.0).
53. Msg... .res 9
8
934.1, 26 Jan 61, Ex 2'
51;..
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68. JBJ:PS Planning Manual, l A.pr 61, :p ll.
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lisg) Jes 992409} JCS to DS.r.'?, n.s.; 22 lo-lar 61, Ex 7.
Ltr, Gen T. S. Power) nSl:p, to JOB, tlJSTPS Manpoy;er Requirements
and Organization,lI 27 Apr 61; wi"b 1 Atch,
Memo for Admiral :f'erker, frOll! Gn Power, "JBI'PS Crgani.zatior: and
Table at: Distribution BeC02lllIlendation to the Joint Chief's of Staff, II
10 Jan. 61,
SM-6511--61, Memo from JeS to DSTF, 'IJoint Strategic Targs::. Planni:og
Staff' .l>Ianpover Requirements ana Organization} to 14 Jun 61; See also
Memo i'o:r JOS frCfIll Gen T. s. PO'iler, DS1!:P, of Functions
and Job S:Pecifications :tc'ir Key PositiDns in JifrPS," 25 JuJ. 6J.,

:res SM-372-60, Memo .for the SecDai', from Gen N. F. T'vtining, Chai:t-
lllB.u, JCS, "Target Coordination a.nd Problems, It 22 Au.g
6o, Tab A (B-76643).
Memo" Vll.dm E. N. Parker, DDSJ:P, to IJSJ!P, nJSl:ps Report
Week Ending 2 Dec 60,'1 6 Dec 6o} Ex 11.
-
65. Manual, ".rSTPS Manual,:J 1 J):pr 61.. pp 77-91; Interview,
E. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, DSllP?MF) 6 Sep 6l
61. Memo :for the Recol'd, "Sta:f::" Meetir.:g of 18 Aug 61," Brig Gen S. J.
Y:eXee, Sec, JS1:PS, 18 A.ug 60 (13-78391); Melt!o :for the Record.. ":Daily
Progress Report on .joint St:l:'ategic Target :Plarmi:ng ft.c'civitieS
J
n
Part I, .'Brig Gar. S. J. McKee, &c} 24 Aug 60 (:B.... 77010).
62. i-fu.::lllal} ltJBJ:PS Planning Mar.ual.. I' 1 Apr 61, pp 8-18; Interview,
P.. Kip]?, Historian} 'With Cel W. A. Hussey.> USA, Dep Ch, NSJ:L Div,
11. Sep 61. .
6,3. Brie:t.'ing, h
NafL
and SlOP Presentation to Beenef. II 1 Dec 60, by
JSl:FS.. Vol r (13-7765.9). .
64. Erie:t'ing, l1NsTL and SlOP Presentation to SeeDef, n 1 .Dec 60, Vol.r ,"
(B-77659), and Vol IJ: (B-77671).

66. ltJBI'PS Planr.ir..g If 1 Apr 61.

67. Inte:r:view.. R. KiP1lJ Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, !k.:>'"'.r?BvIT',
6 Se]? 61; SIOP-62, A."1nex P (:a...n620) d.escriptioo. only.. not actUal
Annex F.
69. Records i'n nesen-tations and ProtOcol Sec, Off:ice Cots, SAC.
Bee :ex: 10 :!:o'J:.' a. cCtn'p1ete list of participants.
j--'
I 56.
!
{ 57.
..
58.
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73. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker. DD8r.P, to Ch, srop Div and erNe Reps,
"Integration of SACEUR Coordinated FOJ"ce.s in srOI'-63," 24 Ms.:!' 61)
w/l Atch.
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:Memo) VAazn E. N. .. DDSl'P, to DSl:F} nJsrps 1'rogl.eas ::te:port Week
Ending 2 Dec 60,11 6 .Dec 60, Ex .u.; Meno, Gen T. S. J'mter, DSl'.P
J
to
JaB, IlJCS NSJ:L/srOl'..63, n 16 Jan 61, E>c 12; Msg, JCS to JCS
et a1., 3CS 987018, 9 Dec 60 _ _
79- - -"WSTL aDd SIO.P Px-esentation to SeeDer," 1 Dec 60 (B-77
6
59).
80 Me!rLO, Gen T. s. FOITer, to OINCLs.nt Senior Representative to
,TSTPB, "Weathe.r Factor, z.:fethod cj:' A:p'p1:!.cation, \I 22 Oct 60; Manual,
ItJ:"STPS Planning Manual, II I .Apr 60, Appendi..'{ V to Chap 7, P.P 40-4-1.
81. Bri.efing, "NSl'L-SIO.P to SecDe::, " 2. .Dec 61, Vol II
(B-77671j.
82. Ibid., Vol I (B-77
6
59).
83. Atch 1, J"STPS Memo t:or Record, IIDisag:reements ResolVEa by Directorls
Decislon," 31 Dec 60, to JSE:PS Memo for All "Minutes ot:
Elev-enth Meet:Lng of Policy 1.Nov 60," 7 Nov 60.
84.
2 Dec 60' (B-77620).
72. -Change 1 -to SIOP-62) 7 Jun 61 (B-T7620-A). Cam]>lete SIOP .filed in
SlOP Div-"'sion} JS1'PS, R:'l SAc.
74. Msg, B-79315, Dffi'P to JCS, .., 31 Jun
75. JSTPS Meno for 1_11 Ooncerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Hec.tiI.lg of the
Policy Committee, 1 -Nov 60, II 7 Nov 60, Atch I, JS"l':PS MeIno for
Record, Resolved by Director 1 s -Decision, II 31 Oct 60.
76. SM-8lo-oa, A.ug 60, Tao Cto 8r.f-372-6o) Memo for SeeDer} fTClllJ.
Gen N. l?- -Xw-iJ;ling, Cha:i.:rznan> JCB, "Target ,:,nd Associ-
ated hoblems, \l 22 Aug 60.
IT. and SloP 1':cesenta-tion to -the SeeDet) 1 .Dec 60 (13-77659).
78. Memo :foT .DWP> .:'rO'..It 11Adlr. J. J. EyJ.e.nd., CINCla:ntjNED::
to J"&:rFS, "NSTL and 8IOP," 21 60 (B-77246); J"S'l'PS Hemo :tor All
Concerned, IIY..i.nu.tes ot:' .Eleventh Meeting of <;he l'o;:Licy Can:mittee, 1
Nov 60.. Atch 1, JSJ:PS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resol--lTd b;r
D-l-rector IS DeciSion," 31 Oct 60.
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{ 85. Memo} VAdm E. N, Parker, rmSl:?) to DS1P) 11.rSfPS P.r-ogres5 Report tOr
i Week .Ending 31 Mar 61} II .4 Apr 61. _
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lNSA49
--Document 2
[-_., 00_
HISTORY &RESEARCH'DIVISION
. H:EADQUJl.:gTERS srRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
JANUARY 1964.

I .1.------
Date --"2. "fV..J
h
j'f.'l.:'L _- _.-
Al!t.'-a1'Y DuD -:LW" I-f!.. ..-:-
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COpy
..:"-':-.-."\
o '1-' M ... 0 3 --1' t:; ...:'
. ,_ .
. .
PREPARATION OF' SIop-63
. "
}jISTOBY OF THE .JOINT' STRATEGIC TAR(iET PLANNING S'TA.FE':-.
roHNGRADED 'AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSrliTED. tOD DIR '5200.10
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS
PANEL, E.O.12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP NO. 2.007- 0 2.. S- Joe. 2.
This is a document and will be' bandled in
accordance with the provisions' of APR 205-1) as amended.
It contains the national defense of
the United' States and) accordingly, utmost secuTity:will
be,afforded and distritution and ,dissemination of its con-
';::ents viII 'oe on' a, II need to' know" basis ..
Reproduction of t1"!is' QOClllilent in'i,hole or in :Part is
protibitcd'exccpt with the of'the
Staff.
This is classified 9GD to conformto
the of .tte information in the source docu-
ii
PREFACE
This volume is'the second ?repaTed by the SAC History &Research
Divi$ion 'covering the acti ot the Joint., St.rategic Target PJ,anning
located SAC) J\FE) The historian
has development of and the actions taken
in preparing the plan. The main Porti.on of' the nq.rr?-ti 'Ie' is concerned
with appraisals of methodology-and rele'ffi.ncy to the next
ylan; gaming, the new guidance for SIop-63, and of the
. plan. Discussion of the mechanics of the SlOP and what it is j"merided
to' do has been kept a,s g.=;neral as possible.' The SlOP) itself a. perma-
. .
nent document; and exhibits narrative furnish greater
det2.il should. the reader ....rish it. Appe.ndix I is a ,short statement all
JSTPS organization, included '1'01' the of continuity, which did not
fit conveniently into the main narrative. Appendix II summarizes .for-
mal ax,-ose 1-!ithin the staff the
the plan' and "That ....'as dor,te 'to resolve them. An eXJ?lanation of. some
of the more esoteric terminology of nuclear targeting follows the ap-'
pendices. identified as.exhibits ) are on file in.the
History & Division.. In accordance' with paragraph 3b). JAr
210-1; this history contains no information categorized as extremely
sensitiv.e (ESr).
iii
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Re:?'oh.:.tion of .Disagreements JSTPS Concerning
?lanning Factors
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27
iv
<> Footnotes.
II
Appendix, I
Preparing the Plan
SIOp-63, GUiq.an,ce,
The J S'l'P8 Organization
Background
\v.s.r Gaming SIop-62
'Explanahon of TermS .'
..' _-_.._---------_....--_-
B:'1.ckground
s<,ances in whicn conflict could be ir..itiated. E::x:plaining the ger1ni.nat:-
the President pas been
11
,
'2':.'1:::' seriousness \'lith'Vnich the neil admin,istration regarded this
. . . flexibi+ity, a choice
as (u)
search f'or nore freedom"of action, vas nowhere more thatl in its.
retary.o: Defense, Robert McKamara. In ge:ieral, the administ.rat.iqn,
t"elt :past for general war 'geared to a
to surprise attack. It therefore sought means to expand
.SECRET
"
This vas bound. to have a direct iT:lIJact' on the pre'j;laration of the
nationts plan for strategic forces. The guid-
nuclear su?eriority ahd a .strategy of response gives. us hope
of minimizing daniage in the event ve have to fulfill ou.r ",; J
ance eventually received for SIOP-63, tltasks" and II options, II
ing strciegy of controlled to a 'NATO iri
Secret.ary McNa'1tara 8ai6.,. "We believe that the or' .oUr
. l"eapp:.:'e.:i.sal of defense polic:ies cO:'ldl.lctec. i::1 1961 ,t.he n-::,vr Sec-
.;
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for more' freedom of action'in response. to the posed by
Soviet Union: the United states"must be fr.ee to choose rather than tq
.. SECRET
ized "gran<t str?-tegy"' of t'he Kennedy Administ:ration as the' .search
One 'astute observer of the JlmeI'ican political scene has chat:'acter-'
have the choice foreordained by a 'rigid poli"cy. "What you need is
the latitude of pos'sible reactions to fi.t the wide range of 'circum- .'
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been' prepared \"i thin the, time (four months) I;vailable', But the
Planning staff constitutes the main- thread of this narrative.* f&1- .
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Assistant :for Science and Tedi':"1ology. , .Although he believed :i.t to be
faithful to directives and similar in outline to earlier SAC plans,
certain directives and for the
cifically questioned was the damage criteria
(-.Thieh he :fel.t might result in overkill and large force
. initial strike when damage levels from alert strikes alone
seemed so "extenSive. ..
SEC RET
*, The Jsrps organization remained unchanged dwing the peri ad under.
consideration; it is discussed in AppendiX I
SEC RET
first plan. was not yet in effect When iicame under tDe scrutiny and
c'riticism of G. B. Kistiako\/sky, President Eisenhower IS Special,
The SIGP-62j completed'in .December-1960.and put'
int
9 effect 1
April 1961, vas generally recognized as the best plan could have
f''
:] represented the adll1inistre:tionls, attem:pt to put its ph:i.los?phy into
) .
o} .
! Interpretation and application of this guiqance (markedly
changed from instructions for SrOp-62) by the Joint Strategic Target
: .
.J th.e essentiaily counterf'orc.e character of the targeting oath in pre-
ventive and retaliatoTY situations) of .the cqmputer
granuning, and "thE: corcmitment of alert and follo-l-on fo:r:ces to the
.(
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", Reappraisal of Strat'egy
!
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.S[CRET
this were done, weight pf effort applied against tareets could' be
fire .and radiaticn as vell 8."1;; blast, .Then as.;;essing damage . I:f'
3
?-1reaa.Ybe/iun to soliCit comments and recom-'
;1'00 the cINes 'aild' "the es.
6
'cst of
In Obe of hl"S
JTiem.o
9
to the
The Joint Chie:fs bad
SE
actions should be leading to of
tegic :he under
ditions His Secretary .McNamara, felt.
a rene", O"i:. ... procedures 'was i!l order" and in March 1.961 instructed, the
JC'S to the a.nd planning JSTPS. "f':'3)"':'
mendations for the f'u'ture
JOS) the. outgoi.ng Secretary. of' .

of EisenhOl:rel:" Admi' '. m; st.ratJ."0 . , ,

. , . / . n, Thomas Gates, .caut.i'oned:that.
the plan. should not be allowed to' stagna:te. He said: n further-
The National Strategic Attack Policy set. the.minimum.assuxance
of deli very at each bomb' release line a't 75 pe:r cent tfi? ach::t:eve the.
level . required on targets. A=lY') the'SIOP-62 had a
scal-.= 85 :per cent as.surance.J
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_,.
the.?eplies on' questions of damage of
delive"y, the target value "system; operational
flexibility in execution of 'The
and of
casualties prOYide;jfor. in They believed' that' a'
was c;;teria to 'overall
same four also believed that procedures for achieving"
- .
level of of of weapons. to .each
line result in targets being weapons.*
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more research .,as needed itl the of
otheTIfise'would have surface burst.
ing materials.
SECRET
operational factors --,probability of success of weapon systems and.
WI' SEC RET
of average' virids instead of an annu'al wind';' th,c' as
for computing would be .delivered
at each desired zero (DGZ);- and the considerati,on of only SlOP
",eapons 11he11' At "the root of t,hiS problem the
vf opinio'n among scientists regarding' criteria- to use in es-
tablis:ling and, the relative value 'of
:policy for Another !'ccornme.ndation, 'by the Navy:'
vias that Frget point 'system useC!-, "in SIDP-62 ,be more.
ceptive.to ihe needs of all commands rather than'just to SAC.
The three. es} CIN0PAC,' CINCL.l1.jllT) and DSl'P were in. agreement that
reore .research 'was . required hqi-l to corr:putefxpectea doses. of radi"a-..
.' . ..
tiOll on frier.dJ.y peoples from bomb bursts. 'The 'sIop-62 had, ..
withln .prescriDed radi'ation levels by aLr bursting' rnan;y. weq.:pons .which..'.
. .
base survivability factors -- were also recommended for
. . . .
during as TISTP} , agreed .need.for some
changes based on experience; he had earlier informed the,JCS
rung fac'tors in preparing the first plan would be revi'eYled and,
/' , '
modified as requir.ed pre,:pa.r:lng the
8
He did, hOHever; con-
sider the SIop-62 sutficient for use in preparing next
plan.
9

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No a:c?unt was i;'aken' of fallout
plos:l.OIlS.
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in the near and far term could be taken to the latitude of' our
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The first detailed exposi-
The essence of thls lengthy document
and to adjustments in i'oTce
A message it quoted a policy
out from tl:t ,JCS to ,the unified. and ccm.'nands for conUllent , in
But i\.:ndamental changes in nuclear targeting policy were
'Within the Department of Defense in early 1961 which "',-ould eventuall:.v
be'ref1ected in the guidance for
tion of the administration IS strategi'c thinking for general' war went
for the Chairman of' the JCS by 'Deputy Secret,ary of DefeBse Roswell
GilJ.?8tric and an attached 'draft of a proposed new basic, national se-'
curity in Secretary ,of' DefenSe'S'office.L:!he theme
bility in U.S.
1962.
v&.s thatU.S. plans and programs needed a ,-rider range of. ;:.lternatives
. .
br opi::ions. 'to meet the various forms a thermonuclear .could take.
T'ne CINes and. nsrp commented at length to the who in turn re-
plied to the Secretary of Defense. Their' responses mirrored the
SECRET
tudes of men who bore heavy responsibilities for direct command or
..
.followed.earlier administration statements calling for greater flexi-
.or Bloc 'nations;
readiness. /
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population, and government control centers; to avoid on one
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response. Of particular interest to Secretary McNamara and Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric to permit
forces from initial attack; to avoid on
The CINCs and the DSTP were asked for their opinions on.what actions
'''SECRET
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All agreed.
The capa-
Exemption one or m9re 'specific oT
areas from ,ini attack. E'f&).
Recall of manneqsystems after initial launch.
'. .
Redirection of follow-on forces'before the
to execute vas given.
Missiles .gene*ally had
.Alternate launch positions and timing.
(1)
(9)

already been taken, they also ca\ltion iest our str:at.egic
D8:r?) in the;Lr 'cite<:! the sizable. list of' opt.ions 8:ud pro-
12
plans:
for flexibility.alreadY existing .. i.n the SIOP' and ccrmnand win
'plans outstrip our capability to put them inti? .practice.
nuclear forces were .being "p.ursued v:i.gorously" as better command

bility .simply did npt: yet exis t to permit of enemy' nOJ;l- .

'ni1itary centers 'and population in an Both the JCS ahd the
wouldhaveto be judged accor.ding to military necessity.
. that force sur.vi:-:a1 .be enhanced by improvi.ng veapon. sYE?tems, but
.until lJeen by theldeterrelit
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forces to a second strike.rol, enemy targets
. The JCS assured the Secretary of'Defense that better means for
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,trategIc force, an4 who "ere .intimate "ith the va,t :camplexitiee of
qJ?erating' theseforces. agreed tl19.t nio.re work vas. needed to in-
. . I
I crease flexibility and options' to nuclear war) indeed same steps had
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A period of reappraisal of eXisting procedures 'and
7
".--.
Tlere
Botn. the
_ SECRET
procedures were developed. ,Everj effort would be made
flexibility and selecti.vity into SIOP_63.
l3
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In b,is study on in late General
The staff was directed to study methodology for development or SIOP-
damage criteria, assurance of delivery, criteria, improvements in
the target point value system, additional flexibility, and several
other areas (See Memo for DSTP from JCS, "Actions
Directed Ioward Improving the Next NSTL!srOP, II 1 Apr 61) E-78T44)'.
f&1-
and CINCPAC :tepresentai:.iyes believed that., in fact) .improved'
aSSUI'ed the Chiefs that additional "improvell!entG 'and :J;efinements
ll
had'
been and others contemplated' for SIOP-63.
15
was not unanimity Ylithin the JSTPS ,on this however.
. (rnd control
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the methods for 1963 'remained tho$e of 1962. The new
tain the old. Qhe
y
used SIOP:,,:
62 because it produced a plan Which contemplated attacks on, too large
a target system) which was too destructive) which underestimated weap-
0lL? e:t:fects, and which gave enemy forces a high probability of 'SUC,ces3
improvements in to be used in developing the next' depend-
. , 14
ing of cours'e on guidance fl.;rnislled by the JCS. (u)
soon. after acceptance.?! the first plan ip December 1960 and.continued
into the spring and of 1961. 'The studies represented proposed
.- 0"
methodology had not been and for all practical purposes
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of j-CS in on planning factors* began
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(1) a National Strategic 'Target
(NSJ:lL) of the mini,mum size required'to
mee,t the NSTAP. '
(2) 'Economy of ,forc;: application to this li1ini..lnum
strategic' target system. fs+
" (3) ,
More realistic of own and
capabilities. ,
(4) Emphasis on neutralization of enemy strengths
instead of tpeir,complete destructibn.
(5)" of all the effects of nuclear
weapons 'and of overlapping effects of weapons
programmed on adjacent,DGZs. /
(6) Establishment of a reserve force
operations ,reqUired immed.iately after the effecta-' ,i
o:f' the assa.ult have been evaluated.
Simila,rly, the CINCPAC :representative cJ:"i the method'-
while giving SlOP low probabi,lity' o.f
'"' Reiluirements
'for SIop-62 were 'ar-' .
- having been /I 1 .
unrea ist::ic" and' "far in excess" .
of what .{<las reQUired.
16

e CINCLA..NT1 s recomm.endat.ions for h '. 6

c apge .111 3 methodology
featur.ed /1" ..
him) in minoT instances, 'procedures' uncha.nged. The re-'
ology of SIop-62 and protested its continued in SIOP-65. 'To
sult ',.;ould be a c0l'l:servati ve plan which gave the enemy every advantage')
dd.,m'grading U.S; capabillties'. f!:..f the of SIop.62 c?n.:."
tinued; the next' plan would 'be, a capabilit,ies plan ifqich use :ror "
all forces and 'availaQle and
extension of the :plan beyond the' time when the',next plan should have , :t
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He had told the JCB in February 1961 that he
General Po0er held a different o]inion of the efficacy of SIop,"62
use in SIOP-63.
19
This, as has been
. "',' 20
mentioned, was reiterated in the 'methodology study of 23 June. And
in July' he told the 'JCS' that should new guidance not be forthcoming
b 1 A
.... ,. 10.' 0.' . t' 1;:' d" t . ,21' Th
"l, ]?.Lannrng COl:. procee .. ne 0 u. lrec lOns.', 'us,
,d.iverte::}, entirely from. the pr8V2.01:S' Illan. The SlOP vas c1yriami c' in :12.'"-,
Alihough when ,completed itrepresp.nted the accurate possible
become eff?,ctiv:e re,quired numerous alterations to annexes throughout
the life of the plan.
23
fsj
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, ,
CUT::re:'lt of targets and weapon' systems available to attack
ttJem, sUbse'quent ,changes in forc,e intelligence, and
in pr<?d:udng SIOP-62, many wou1d','have
to to ',continued. validity and to modif'oJ
'. " . 22
experience and f-ew

Alt.r..ough early in 1961 the JSTPS was ,at
its procedu.:ces and prepa:ring for- the next plan) could, not be
. "
it was clear that the Director saw,nb need
. ' ,
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strike P08SiblJ He called "a of method-

ology 'and philosoph:(" before, the nexf plan, was produced. ,'f.P&t
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Wai' Galiline. BlOP-62 .
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SlOP Division Chief) to direct
NOFORN.'
_ SECREt
Geperal C.M.
. .
Abruptly in early August, however, with the wai game :process well
, ,
against. each under the rule of a control group). and a '.
sp:ring and s-.muner of 1961: of 'on the numeroUs'
were to Work within the SlOP Division continued into the
-:;1" sircuJ.ation game (using a T!iathematical model suited for random :play)
a "\-ride variety of condi tioYls under i-rhfch it might "be On
5 December' 1960 General the war game of SlOP forces)
tl:.e work. The broad objectives were evaluate the effectiveness of
. 5.E GRET,
shape in- the JSTPS for analyzing it by a process of war garning"lt- using
. '.
Soon after Slop-62' .iYaS a.ccepted. by the JCS, plans began to take
and grbund rules' to be used in the game be ?es91ved
by the Policy Committee> In instances where memoers could not agret;)
.
the DSI:P decided.
along
7
.the picture entirely. The JSTPS received from the Chief
* War game is defined as' an'operational research employing a
representation of a military or politico-military opera-
tion) conducted according to preset rules of play, using plausible
plarilling'factors, for the purpose of a range' of possible
. outcomes to the conflict under study. Such g8.rn.es are analytical, as
field, fleet, or command post This
definition is from JCSM 1261-61, frcrn JCS to DSTF al.} "'Policy
on Tliar Gaming. of J oint Plans /' 22 Nov' 61. W .' .
. a basis for future SlOPs, and to educate
SIOP . pJ.anner's . A manual. or (pitting' opposing dec'ision
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Henceforth.. no civilian contractors }rould be per-
Category E -- Those of crisis situations which might
involve U.S. in limited war or eventually general
war .
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.Ca.icegory A Those of Joint war plans 'upon which
national depended.
of Naval Operati,ons of a war game the Navy bad:
("i\eport of Simulation Investigation SI.OP-?2
11
) . The of the'.'
study was not so much in. its conclusions) although/the DSTP believed
them. invalid be.cause of the 25 in .
i -::'s 'effect on other games. [2.... eneral. Power . had 'been
a possible comp!omise of war plan due to the participation
:.!he Navy"Tas confident that) in f<l:ct). .no M.d
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plac;e) c: but the affair resulted in the JC.S preparing c.etailed
SECRET
Category C Those.of global strategies (political)
economic) psychological} scientific} military
tne' CKb gaQe of organizations .not normally privY -to: such.
. SECRET.
'participate games of current Plans..
30
but the
sensitive informa.tion.as and weaknesses of u.s.. forces) t.aco-:
tiC', end penetration He Gonsequently stopped all JSTP3 hand
ga7.es. and had the He JCS to
. :-equesl; o"Cner commands to ceaS'e games involving SAC. tps+. ....
'.-,-ould 'not proni-oit commanders from evaluating parts of in which
. tney had direct ipte-;est. 31 of' the JCS arrived in .))70-
veober'as guidance on fUture war gaming
\fould henceforth be' diVined into fou.T categories :.3
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re.view
It was ,cQncluded
An 'the
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An increase in forces on alert in-
'.' SEGRFF
Those other than the three above.
T't-r.o postures, one-third and one-half'alert,
, .. SE,G RET,
D
levels, of ,da.'1lage' (destruction before launch or nSf,,)"
General conclusior$ indicated destruction bY,enemy
paramilitary) that affected the power positions in the
trEe World confrontation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
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of unified. and s:;;ecified c:;:orrunands and DSTP., The ga.'!les iolould be used
,,0 check, procedural plans and use of to dis,cover,weaknesses
rr.odest tnan early plans had called for.
on SIOP forces 1-ras late in 1961 and results' pubiished in two
degradation bfore launch.
creased ,the number of weapons ultimately delivered.
weapon deliveries'f.or a strate&ic situation 'in which the fore
"hat DEL factors should be used to achieve more accurate statistics on

W2G the most of all, those to ve-
,is eXpO?ed to 'attack before la1L.'1ch) although caution was in at-
tempting to'arrive at, specific DEL factors for use in future games.
factors were based on .broad assumptions dev,e,loped in varying
degrees) future analysis of DBL should) according to the study) cover
,'a iOide range of possible 34 t9:s+
,,-
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.:
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In April 1962 JCS DSrP'to conduct a
. . .., .
of the'63 plan.
35
JSTPS FUrthe; .
SIo?-62.
It appeared at the time vas completed onthis study that
'of SIop-63 Mould be complete and detaiied thap that 'of '
. . .' : . .'
, .
for review and. approval ,on ,1 February, JCS
'. SECRET
1960 the had that guidance reach them by
ditions caused by. the short of time producing
slop-62 to be repeated during preparation of the next pian. More time
. '.'. '.
was needed for study and interpretation Of, guiaance.
37
As' early as
. SECRET
slOP-63 Guidance
'tory of the staff covering preparation of SIOP-64.
will 'be thls ganle'and.its results in the next his-
1 fa:' SIQp-63 to be completed by: I ,July 1962. With the 1 "Augu.st
.date,' fo:'ce; o.:PPlicatiPn: could begin. Septem.ber, the p18.11 could' be sub-'
JUl, memoers of' the Target Staff agreed that they did not. want con::'
plan to unified ind 'specified and begin
ing.supportirrg plans 1 April, and Slop-63 would become effective'l
, ' . , .
July. 'Later) hOivev.e.r) with the I date apprOaching hayir..g
recej.ved no guidance, General PCMer wanted to continue with ,the' old
39 .but -the JCS said it Was preparing g1:1ida.nce arid'
wanted to get.it out that date) although might"'be one or two
'Weeks late."40 Thif;i proved to be a highly' 'optimistic estimate --'
'. 41 .
ance did not arrive until 30 October. \YT
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implemented} was to achiev.e
.. SECRET
To minimize damage to the U. S. and 'tts Allies,
and in all events to .limit such damage to a
level consisterrt with national' survival and
i ridependence.. .
To bring the war to an' end on the most adian-'
tageous terms fa:!" U. S. and its Allies',
To. destroy or neutralize' the military capabili-'
t:es of the enemy, while retaining.readYj effec-
.tive and controlled U.S. st::-ategic capabilities
to assure; to the ma.ximui'li. extent }1os-.
. sible... of U. S. military superiority.
tothe enemy.... or any potential enemies} at any
p.oint dUring or .after the :Vlar.
(1)
(2 )
nanifested'in three tasks to be by a choice of
62 . ' This time the JCS a capabilities plan} Le.} it wouid..
. . . .' .
controls were specifically excluded. Every w0uld be 'made in .
._SECRET
. It was apparent inunediately to planners as they:'studied the new
guidans: that it much more detailed than the 'SIOP-
. .
use forces at the time the plan was not thbse'pro- :
of delivery forces. National military
'l'he attainment of.more fl.exibility in operati0l"!-s'
"grcr:Jned' for. a' future..date. When
"'h J:' 11' t:' 42'
e ouJec \07
tack Tasle. I would 'accomplish the destru.ction or' neutra.liza-
. .
although the. plan did ev.entua.lly provide for them to a degree.' T'oese
withhold provisions remained "slid under all tasks. .In :Task II oth:::;
tb.is ta.sk. to minimize damage to 'people .and industry. It :included: the
ty to withhold atta.cks 'on 'and any or. all coinmunist satel-
lites. Previous 'slOP-62 guidance had mad'e no mention of Withholds} .
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Tas,k III executed
"S EC RET
SEC RET
I Execute .Task.I under conditions or u.s. pre-
emption, .but keeping back 'for possible subsequent
use forces for Tasks II and III.
II Execute Tasks I and II under .same IT. S. pre-
but withholding for possible
subsequent use programmed for Task III.
CSilST .
above three tasks Would be accomplished by a choice of one to
r
trols which \-loula most effectively reduce Sino-Soviet 'capabihty to
. ", 43 IJJ:I.CL)
cC:::'t::';'lUe 1;118 ,\-;ar. \-:i..:T
taken to minimize,the'eff:ct and'
deliberate attacks on military forces and'resources in urban and.
selected critic'al elements of industry, technology, and government con-
* The term'option) as it was used in'SIOP-63, had' an entirely dif-
ferent meaning in SIOP-62. In the :previous plan it was a factor
cf time, l6.options .(ere based on the amount of warning
. available. CRist of Jsrps, Preparation of SI.op-62, :p 25, B-82767)
,
** Although provisions were to be made for withholding attacks against
-China or any satellite under any attack option) was :made clear
1.n the guidance that should .any conflicts in force ./.
OCC\ll", they should: be resolved by emphasizing option V. '
:., J ....
,
. targets were out-slde major 'urban areas) and care. wouid continue to be .
. depending upon what conditions prevailed when
. .' .
host,:;'li'ties began.:**"
:. rF.
O
- SOYi:. forces and resources came under a.tack, e. g , ....
I air bases, controls, transportation, etc. These
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The allocation 'of forces :for the above work would -be done so as
SEC RET
Execute Task r under tactical warning but holding'
be.ell: fOT. subsequent .use forces prograrruned ..fqr Tasks
II .and IIi.x< E-:Ps-r.
stonl.g..:: p:,oductiOJ;l facilities.; and on control faciliti.0s .-ror
and launching subnarine bases;'. on primary nUl?lear. and chemical
primary st?ging and dispersal bases; on known missile'sit s
. .
to abO'legl'o:md and aireraf't on heavy and medium.oombe
The 90 per of severe
::-.1. :1ic;r,er expectanc:i:-es of damage against sould be
1'he guidance stated that; '.'Available forces wi;Ll.be to maxi-.
::;.ize achievement of the' oo'jectives 9fthe plan.".The JQS set'nei:-
Tasks I and II under tactical warning but
fo!ces'for: Task III.
'SECRET
.V Execute ail three tasks under

* It was that the' chances for using this option were remot
so forces were to be for it:as a last priority. Generai
Lyman lem.n.itzer, Chairman .or.the JCS, was reported as very critical
of this option and doubted it would. be executed.. (Memo for
.DillF, fran Brig Gen W. :R. :Peers, JCSlG, ".Questions and Oanments ."by
'JCS furing JCSLG FO'U1'tb Status. Brief{n.8 on SIOp-63, II 6 Jun 62.)
.
to permit the assignment of sufficient f'orces to Task III to
'nllclca:- .delivery forces known to and be active and which i-rere
45
out.sidB T:iajor urban areas. \ro;-
. ior' the strategic'miss+on could not achieve the
it could ?e . capabilities per
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SEC RT
"It wa,s clear to' JBrPS ,planners that to satisf
J
' of
Dr confidence of destruction on Task I and II targets,
(including suppression of defenses), to'destroy law
Although SAC and, Polaris forces would be colJlIJl.ltted:,to
--.
the SIOP as first priority, theater comnanders and specified
commanders) had the prerogative of deciding what other forces to
nut to the plan.*' They would be used in the STOP to increase ,the
estimates reckoned that it would take twice 'as long to' prepare, as its
of preparation was revised. NoW' force
the JCS guidance would mean pr.epariJ:'..g a more complex pla.r: with greater
'nexHiHity and dis criminati'on than was necessary in 48 ' Early
.
Cignificant to 70 per cent of the floor space in 'the lOO'lar-
gest cities the Soviet Union and Communist 9hina. Floor' space was
introduced only to\define the sIze' of the force to ,be' allciqated to'Ta.sk
III, not to define the targeting Objectives.
46

till July, when 'the vent into effect, taken up with preparation
application would begin 15 1962 and be cODpJ.,eted'2 A;priL The
JCS would be briefed on the plan 15 A:pril, wi ttl the remaining time UnN
.:'
.!. [ In SIOP-62 coDmdtment to the STOP was firat. priority for
ate CINe :f'orces. fs.t

.. _.:.
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SE'CRFf
discussion will in preparing the SIOP. It seemS appro-
The two months ,following receipt of'JCS were occupied
With agreements reached and differences resolved) ivork could begin
_st.cRET
Policy Committee, and in with planners from the commands
, 51'
concerned" agreements' on policies 'for Cleveloping the 1963plan. E-s:+
and 'distribution of the plan and annexes . However} by early Janu-
:i n earrlest on' the plan 'itself. '1'he' SIop-63} like its predecessor) had .
ary it was realized that 1 July vas too optimistic and theeffective
. 50
date was changed ',to I August. f;;t1-
\-lith detennining the exact 9f the 'general statements in the
guidance}' and based on this il'lterpretation} ha.:lnnerin& out thin' the
1?as"i(: elemen'Cs: . targets and forces to attack then1. The folJ..ovJing .
g'ets 'was the' Target Data Inventory (TDI), a list of some instal-
priate to begin with the target,list.*
, ,
ty' and force/we?-:pon availabni.:t'Y. But first a- process 'of .
refinement had to be completed. The basic source for selection of tar- .
lations the Sino-Soviet tactical or strategic
p preparing the St'rategic Target List (l'JSTL)
i-lould be the finalproduct of the targe't seH:ct'ion :process; all tar-
gets on this list would under attack in tne.:plan as a
..- - -
,"'---' " i'
l *' 'From' :proceaure it should not be concludea that the list was pre- 1
,\ pared before a.ny work" on force applicatipn began. Work on many as- j
. [:peets of these two principal portions of the' :plan went on simuitane-
': ously. (u)
.;.;...w._:_.__
J( (j\(:
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19
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Maintained on computer tapes)' .it wa,s a of informa-
Installations in :t;he Ds.ta :then submitted' t'? 'a process of
Division.
1"1'.00 these basic :a target' data 'base (NSTDB) ,was prepared .
of DGZs required to meet the, damage' criteria to
individual aiming points. From this a'group of
i:.o,get their relative: worth or Value within the
in ,After usi:n;g a to group contiguous'
, into tar/?iet,: islands, 'the installations list,'Yla's
'. ' into a Desired Ground Zero (DGZ) again using computers to locate
. .
,
:
OCZs emerged.. A weapon wa.s. tentatively applied' to each DGZ and an t.
ysis of its effects. Of courst:, many faCtcrs'::had tobe'considered
in process: i.e., cia..')1age to under
certain constraints, iinri.'t'ing radia'tion' dosage within sat-
,\ tion on ta:rgets 'Which ha<:i ptrategic significance and met the
set dcwr. in the NatioI;la.l Target<;l.nd A.ttack Policy .p6?-6l" ,27 .
OCi:.ober 1961).' fT3+
S[GRET
fj the USAF in collabcration with t be Army and llavy. or the 12,000,
.iI: less than 'Were of strategic si.gnifi.cance. Next,
-2
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eJ.l1te 'and friendly nations; vulnerability, of the .ta.rget and size
the' area; and, the type of weapons ava.ilable.
52
, fsj-
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Each DGZ 'Was assigned to a'task (I, II, or III).
the total number of DGZs against which forces were:to be
SECRET 'I
of .
E.O. 12958, as amended
. , Section 3.3(b)(5)
, I
, I
------------;--------;--------,-------_. '"
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20
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The. SlOP DiviGion planners" .
SECREi.
Thus" at this :point in the preparation of SIop-63 the target had
been identified and a tentative weapon applied. Now the .second major
get charts} and. probable areas.
'to plan. To 'facilita:te force application" the roz list was divided
as data on of forces
o::-ity 1151:.5, qy t;ask" preplanl1ed damage' for each' lX:?-". air tar-
il1:
to
a ,,-'estern easte;n sectionji.e.) those tar.gets west of
east those east of east conmutted
or Ylith SIOP,:,,63 consisted of the
- .
'lyzing t.he forces committed to the by unified a.nd commands.
This' of forces" which must be' completed before applying" them
the Policy Committee on -what -planning factors' to use. *
to targets, was itself an intricate process' requiring many decisiops by
To the force application the'NSTL Division provided DGZ .
. ,
had been preparing.the DGZ,list, SIOP Division had been. ana-
*.. These YTeapon. system reliability, accuracy; wea.pon relia-
bility" sortie \3eparation. criteria) surv:i..vabili:tY,.
traiion probabilities, and weather/darkness factors. See Appendix
I for 'qf fsi . :'"
** 'Heapon sysj;ems committed to or coordinated with sioP-63 were: 'Stra-
tegic Air Command, B-47, B-52" B-58" Atlas D, E, and.F, Titan I ahd
II, and Minuteman; Con:unander in Chief, Atlantic" A3D" A4D" AD" A3J .
(carrier attack. bambers):, and Polaris Ai and A2; Camma?;p'er in 'Chief,
Pacific, F-IOOD) F, F-105D" ]3-57" A3D" A4I;l" Mace B" Regulus; Supreme
Allied Commander) Europe;. F-84, B-66, F-IOOD" F, F-lOlC" F.-I05D" AD,
A3D" A4D, Valia.nt,. Canberra, Mace A, B" Jupiter (Jsi'J?S
Manual, i5 Mar 62" B-82430). tat- .
SECRET
. .
phase of SIOP began;' While NSTL
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December .196"2
Alert. Non-Alert

'. Alert. Non-Alert
. .
Deli very Vehicle summary
. rv
III
.-.--
.{. I .. SAC bomberiind missile
''''-1
Delivered by. Committed Forces
..
eniCSAC, l
.1661 1217 2878
. l869
;L267 3136
CINC1AJ.l"T
80 106 186 : 80 106 186

. 155 .
. 200
..J.2L .122...
230

.-.-
189? .',
1523
. 3419 2108 '.
1603

20'7 40 . 247 48
.'.
Ballistic'Missiles
277 325
...Cruj,se l1issi1es . 32
0 32 36 0 36
Aircraft 730 . '982
rtJ2 748. 1019 . 1767
Tot.a1
969 1033 1991 1061 .. 1067' 2128
FolIo-wing .is a sli.'Th."1larYof deli very 'vehi"c1ep and :....eapons committed
'toe pl?-n:r. The August figure shows capabi;J..ity when .
. e.:'fect, and the December 1962' figure shqws' gro\,tp. '. Com- .
. figures. out; by type of delivery .and
". 56 .
ftffit-.
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(5)
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turing 'the seg,uence. a..a.mage expectancy fran vreapons
on 'each DGZ y,ras afisessed. Also, car'e w/?-s taken t'o adhere to "
the pollcy on constraints as 'set dC1.?n in JCS guidance; thuS it wa.s sanetim s ':
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Phas,e
(1) damage or con
Enemy vere then analyzed a:t:ld: a
..' .
This'was Phase Oue portion of
Th"O consisted forces
'the 'roz Priority List.
gan. 57 fe+- .
able enemy nuclear forces soon after 'conflict be-
10 January 1962 with.SAC Ppla!is ttds-
targeting, foll.owed by' the reaction forces, SAC
SEGRFf-
overseas ?-ncf"ZI 'alert} and then non-alert missile and other ZI.forces.
. .
priority or .those to theater and (3). to en-
fidence of destrOying. (2) to destroy targets ?f relatively
of process of a 'sortie will
&;i v<? t:he reader an appreCiation for the comp;lexitya:nd m.agnitude of. SIO
force appl:i:ca.tion. A sortie "l:Tas' first choSE?Il: .and a DGZ selected
. .' .
re-examined to see it: any improvements -could 'be made . If the' s,?rtie. '
. " '. . . .
still failed, :selected. for' .and another tGZ' was
for failed if 513 -
. .,.... . . .,
was 'a law, pr-obability of the' sortie reaching target? the flight was
preli.minary r9ute established. A sortie was tentatively When
it 'meet the :requirements of .the. rou"te
J
penetration and
..delivery tactics. factors were Ifthe result
{ .
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Constraints) as we shall see pr?ved.an difficult
problem in SIOP-63. 59
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Thes,e sheets,
..
SEG-REt
.,SEGRE1'
The X date. on command and execution) vehiclej refuel-
ing} routing, weapon type} delivery.tactics, and targeting informa-,
tion", The Y cards included routing information} e.g." corridor and
time of arrival:, ,entry point, ear1y "warning line ta;ctics, maJ or .turn-
, ing ..1'01nts:, and post strike fs7 , ,
applic'ation wa:s complet'ed.' 19 , a.lt'hough'
to t,he' force application conti nued until late in May
because high priority installations were to the
. ".. .
lists. By this 'information ,on ea,ch sortie ',had been place,d
pr: !:lachine processed' (called X 'y simt to
CQ:;.-=-.itt.iruj forces to plan. Using these cards:.! the 'cqmmands pre-
;:,;,.'::-ed detailed flight plan's 'to :t:o ,post-strike' base.
to the in late May) the checked &ud
(;ra..":"J:led into a. c9U1';luier to resolve tiine, over (TOT) conflicts. '
for each sortie were then
, " ',,'60
,,'"ere eventually, distributed as Annex F, to the
While force' drew to a cios,e) steps being
taken to present the ,finished ;plan to 'the :JCS and the Secret.ary of De-
fense't:oi- approval. the of 5101'-63' the JCS
and 'other interested had been kept informed'of :progress by
,the Joint of Staff Liaison Group (JCSLG) to the Jerps. The '
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E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(5)
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. .
o'cjectives 9f the Guidance and is conformance 'With
the chief of the JCSLG wa's confident that the 'JCS was familiar
. :." '. : 62
t:;,;, ?lan and 'be "highly. receptiv:e" t9 J:STPS presentations ..
liaison group; headed by Brigadier General W. R. Peers (USA),* thus
fre'ed JSrPS. :planners .from..briefing responsib:i,litieswhic:h they' hac+ .'
four.d during of These ,
. '.' '. .
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. , .
r.::''; ::.:: is the opini.?n of the Liaison tj:lat SIop-63
:>.:<!.ici-, !lad toJ.,d thi? JCS: ".To :m.y mind, t.he JSJ:PS has made. a. great
' ..
were to time by
and then just qefpre review .the ccmJ!J,eted
. 'SIOP-63' sent to the.J.CS for By early
'* Brigadier Peers, formerly Chief of staff' :for ltrr:i:y InteJ,li-
genee,. succeeded Brigadier General E. E. Chief, cTCSLG
1
on
.5 1962. (MOO .313, 22 'Dec 61; see also his biogra.phy in
.
n O:w JCB guidanc'e which created a prqblem for
I-
f
i r. 0'... e.;cr, a:1d one 'Which they. were not able to conform to in al.1, cases, .
I: . .... . '.'
cOristra.:{nts .dr limiting on .
! .
!. 11tc areas on' the periphery of the. $oViet Union and Cornmunis't Chi.na.
t: .'. .
,. Tnere. r..adbeen agreement- that constrain.ts: policy use4. in SIOP"",62,
,
'based 'on detopa.tion of the. single
. needed 64. ' for SIOP-63 stipllJ.a.:ted 'WduJ.d.
. '.
be. deterrnineq. 65 thus ;roblem ..umulative.

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!/ created in,same' areas; ,.:)?lanne;cs' made m;:iny,qhanges in size of
--.-.
weapon, 'height of burst, and of delivery.vehtcle,66
bat in 'May JCS limits Of ,dosage exceeded at monitor
Gnd elevating burst to:the maximum'extent possible, additional with-
, '
holds and selective reduction 'of'effort,below planned w.ere in-
... Stili dos!'lge limits set, were ':lnder 'sme'
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(5)
"..
. ::
'

:....

Following th,: of SIop-'63 asked that nsrp con-
to to meet prescribed constraints by seeking alternative .pro-
:.,Thieh was 'not even taken into account, was detonation
, c;:',:,::::- wcapons i.ear' monitor 69 ,
j
T"ne Joint Chiefs t"!'o days of briefings a.t Offutt op.
19 June by approving SIOPN 63 to become' effective 1 August. ,.The plaD
presented in part to 'Secretary of Defense McNamara on '20
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<THeria.
70
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It .could.be. exec1,.1.ted using on;Ly 'SAC and
Polaris' forces}' although this would result
in lbss of strikes by theater.
rewer targets' attacked; and a resultant
frst
Same limii:-ed for a ::protected
reserve. Under conditionsi
and depending upon the success of
enemy p.uclear. capability., some'. alert sorties
.scheduled for Urban-industrial targets.would
be withheld and in that sense .became a pro- ..
tected reserve) as would
non-alert sorties. BecaUse of the small. number
of missiles' a.vailable for the plan, however,
and: the need to use them early the: enemy
nuclear threa.t) they could not be' used as a prq-
in.SIOP-63. ....
. SE'GRET
capabilH,y to execute the' alert. force' 0l1ly
any force gen(.:ration

. .
The launch' of the force positive
coritrol and the generation of aircraft .to take
its 'place or to back it up insured a c<;mtinu-
ously effecti veforce, even if the enemy. at-
tempted to' 6:PClOf the. initial alert force, ".
throughout the critical period between
of the posit1ve control.force ' .
. '. . .
. .
. '. ... .... i:
. The capability existed to' execute the plan by'
:tasks (I) II; or III) the rive ..
... '

(5)
(6)
ised to 'be more cCmIllex in execution.
of
. 71 . . '. ..
June. The' Secretary later praised General Power and his' staff. for
. . . 72
. their work. (U)
.....r..... The SIop-63 was a much flexible' plan than ito? ".
I bl.!-t was J:lore and
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.The mediUm, for(::e' dispersal plan also gave flexi-
bility to ,
, , ,
the briefing of JCS and the Secretary of TIefense on
i712 aircraft were cOmmitted to tne plan in August 1962, . see P. ,
" '" ,
ably a more pace. But
c:!.:-;,ce it "ras not) a.nd',since addi ti0nB:l increase' in :Perso!!J1el 'Was
" ,
:.:-.e, pla. ... '. Had more t:tme been available, prob,-
"The extra tine and' effort required to complete multiple' targeting
actions, thus ,satisfy the for five' attack
placed a heavi vorkload on the' staff., 'An' aircraft sortie, for exam-
ple) would be targets under different attack op-
this one ?y the hundreds Wh;Ch
be and of the labor can be, ima.g-'
'The was prepa'red'in about eight from !eceipt of
8urirrn.ary
" ,
time-honored military exvanding the
day became a necessa.rnJ and routine
The Slop-63 was, accepted without revision by the, JCB and :Sec-
ret.ary of 'thus tl;ley affirmed that it their wishes
as set guidance. and provisions for con-
trolled to general :'W8.r pTovidedf'or in the rep:r.esente'd
the Kennedy Administration1,8 most significant contribution to nuclear
J"
iWS'i1iitanf"'e""rcXf'AA9tm 7 .... . -
... "
,
....
28
. .
The Secretary of Defense rea.soned
... SEC REf
offered more choice of response.
slop-63 was a :pian whi.c:h offere9. as :many as 4,000 dj,"fferent : ..
. ,
cur more would give the Sov.ietUnion.incen-
between and military in their fitst .
No one, of course,. knew. w.hether 0:r: .n6:t w.Quld a.c-:.
cc;:.::. reasoning arid fashior,t. plans but.the
:-'::.q.:-;: it to do 80.7
5
.. . .
str;teE;Y to f=. earlier, 'sIop...62 had .certain, if lim-
.Hed, features of{flexibility, . but essentia,lly the.. plan was tailored
for reaction of t;- c0Il!plete force and 74 . Th.e ...
* Admiral Parker yes succeeded by Vice Admiral Roy Lee J ohIlson on lO
January 1962. Bef'ore his assignment to the Jsrps, Admiral Johns.on
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policies
. (BtJPERS Orders 113957, 27 Pee 61; See also biogr!?ophy in document ,.
volume). Adinira,l Parker, upon his transfer, became. A.qsista.nt Direc-
. W'ea.1?ons Evaluat10n and. Control Bureau, Untted States Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency. (u). .
;.:- .:.:::;i;.::; 0:' action; It was, J:l.oweveT, like every military plan ever de-
.""LG....:::.:.,. mi:f" capab1lity of U. forces to carry it. ...
r.:; :":::'s capability in tenUs of flexible .response yras still limited ..
cc:-,;;::a2.ized cor.t.::-ol so to selective response I:luclear
O:1S in all .probability, seriouslyAegraded it" not ...
exisiitng
.'Inc f:ci";-r.;e;: of the JSTPS, Vice AdIr2i.ral E.o
do.... i.:-lat they could -be relied -upon uncl,er nUclea:r:. at- .
tack, and preferred to put his trUst in the .operational ::!J.
.......-.
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centralized controland 'flexible nuclear strike,
. SEC RET
. .... 76
do his best with what he had. . His successor to the
nere vould give increased confidence.in
existi'ng to be a weakness) lie .
by, the to correct
by' hardeni.ng 77, ,Cle'ari
yJ
' much pe done in
l:",a,l".i:Dg the force a.nd its" comrna:nd and c entrel more' effec-
und,er the \;'arieus condit;ipns in which conflict cQuld be initil;l.ted.
. . . . . " ....
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AppendiX
. .
THE JSTPS .ORGANIzATION
':
. Brought together at 'Headquar,!<ers SAC late in the su.mriler- or' 196c)"
direction of Gene!al s. Pawer., the
. '.. .
.' .
..Target PlC!-nning Staff "ras an group of intelligence and
. operations. plaiming specLiIists .. From fts ca.re ':Tas faken.
'.' .
. . .
. keep the staff' with 'a 'nucleus of. perman.ently as'signed' offi-
. .-' '. '. .
ce,s and enlfsted men' 'suppo:i:t;a by' .SAC serving' in a duai -
. . 78 (u): ....:. . '.'
Ca.PS:C.lty. .
. '..lthough the sta:rr ipcreased scmewhat' during the hunied :pre:J?Ei.ra-.
.. ,'-.- .Lh, -"i";':"'t p;a.n {fro'm 269 ';'n , 96r.. 302'i-n "aU:u3.rv
.... :,;., '! .... ....:J. ...... ... . ..... U J:I .. u ._:.;...... v "'! u ." v
",., '.' ':' .'. .... "
19b 1r, When the :plan was comple,!<ed General Power acted to cut the. staff'
thus it to the conti of keeping the '.
and up to . with this'
. . . 80
. on '1
1
.;. June:: 15)61-. (U)
During the :prepa.ra.tion: .of there wa.s no change .in the.
staff's Joint Ta.ble of bist.ri?ution; it rema.ined IS?' officers .and .en- ....
listed men positions .. ...,ith 16 of.34 key positions in'NSTL
I '.
30
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. Deputy Director, the success:ful preJPElration of the plan terided to work
against consideration of increased strensth, since any addition would
.' . 82 ()
have to be' related t? ~ deficiency in the plan. U .
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-,.;: ).

At Policy'
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...
. Appendix II
REsOLUTION OF- JSrps
CONCER.N+l'p. ;PLA:NNING
. BQi!b Reliabilitt
it )(J,')
[r J-li';ile Dud J!actors "].: , :' (\;;{<,;
- ;".'c the 39th Poli.9Y Coimnittee ..25 AUgust 1961) the Weapon
:. .'
S':"'ste::"s Reliapillty .Committe'e coimnittee having
C:n;C?ep a.. ',' .
:.>.::-::etlc, dud' factor"of per cent, 'be'used in 'planning (a. mean of..
n:'i.j;,;.s dud fa.ctors ranging from' less' th.an 1 per"cent to 3.3 per.'
GI:;CSA.C desfring a 5 :Per:'cent dua
.:.. .=. tl.l2. At the 40th' Policy Carnmitt,ee' meeting' "the
decided of the committee 2.7 per
Co:mu:ttee all agreed wit.h the. exception of the CINCAL, , .
Ccmmitti7e meeting the.' CINCsAC 'agreed to the use <?f the 5 :per c.ent factor.
Air representatives., wh<? :Voted for 5 per qent.
reasonedthat Physicai actions by the,
creW: might cause' certain .errors in' procedu:re. .This 5 per cent 'factor
vas the same usediD
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'.f
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.-1'
Also presente'd at the 39th .Policy ,meeting by the Weapon, .' ( '.
Reliability 'C'a:nmittee, . . t, .
. The carm::dttee using a 2 per cent dud ':The 1
.
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CI!iCSAC representative advocated ,its use. Tt:te CINCLANT
n',:d CIHGPAC renresentati'ves did not believe it should be' used a.t all.
-. ," " . .
I , ". '
I I'" C::Y..nown I:efenses Factor' "-
. ..,--1
-(::f-;':,. Penetration Ccmmittee
""!'----- .
'III Aircraft Bombing ,Circular Error Probable (CEP) , 00
The Weapon Systems ReliabUft.y Committee aiso presented at, the
: '
, ,
A vote during.. the 39th Committee llleeting sho-w:ed ail but
nne. Air Force ;epresentatives in agreeme'nt no't During the :.
I .
38tb Polipy Committee meeting the unresolved issue of what'
to use for B:il weather: aixcraft;. E'SitiOnS of .thecommittee, .'
from 600 feet 3000 The CINCSAC representativ
believed 3000. feet was ,the minimum could realiptically be ap-
plied nSTP,.
Policy 'Committee meeting 'of 2 November, the'CEPs
by the using commands would be used.
I.i.nkno.;:l .defens'es,';,J In SIOp-62 a factor ofji....JfaT pet 100 nautical
'," '-- .' . '. "
cli!:s penetrating an of Unkriown defenses was, used. , The
. . .
l:l.eeting of 2 NoV:ember the D1rF decided an' attrition rate of 1 per cent
per 200 miles .or any ::port'ion thereof would "be applied 'When
penetrating an area of unknown -defeilS.es. A maximUm of 10' per cent
"auld he "pplied fQr any given sortie.'
Jsrps and the.CINCs) could not present a unanim01.i.sopirrton.on.
""0f.,.;... factors to. use in planning 1.'01' destruction',of weapon systems by
. . ." .-.
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*We
Factor.J
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Proposal 2 T.hat all factors be used including
'pre-launch sUrvivability. (Army anQ Air Force
,
Proposal 3.' That for SIOP-63 forces'. De .
applied. in the manner taking into
conSid.erationtheir various capaoiiities . Any
'-. constants should be 'a.pplied at this', time . ,
(rel1abilit,Y) dud' .factors) etc.).' .In the assess- 'J
ment :phase' the effects of varying fa.ctors such as ..
'Weather/darkness, attrition, DBL, .should be
-...:---
-N-&fflRit-...
.-a--t-eR"rT-
considered: "
_-.-.' '.
I 1 That rio. application'of
l
vivability factors be used.. (CINCSAC a.nd G.INCAL
.
of determining .an accurate :fac.tori 'it vlOuld 'not be used.
, .
pl.i.cation of destruction launch factors', . ..
Tactics Committee. as pnresolved.witlfin the Committee was
,hether or not a f"actor f"orEiritirJnto law
en.used by lli1k.:lOwn ha'zards)' clobber factor:;rThe CINCSAC
...._. __.- .'" ..... c:.
to use the. SIOP-62.method 1 per.cent attri-
:.io;; .ver individual.;ortie for e,yery100 illiles ot: lOW'
. All others believed' it 5 nat be used at 81{] The ll!'1rP;
,- :.:-,;; 41st Policy ,CClIllr.1itt ee meeting; 'decided that of .th'e c1if-
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i'ntegrated in'd3,. compUter' to det.ennine their effec'ts
more' accurately. (CINCLANT, CINCPAC" Marine Corps,
end Navy .
U.s!': 0:' the Weather Factor' i..:.
:-{. in' the calculation of success of deli yery at bomb release
bCE:'1. 'of a diss'ent by CrNCLANT .. .
to the' SecDei' :of 3IO;-62, ;"nd remained a source of. dis:"
on which it not been possible' to achieve:agree-'
;"(1:5. wl1c:.her or not SlOP'planners should.use a. weather/darkness."
. . .
"':ould all suppli-e'd, and wo,-:ld reviey them. ::j.n light
. w,.' :'CIi:, ono. modify them acCOrdinglY: . {!III;
J.
After discussion)' in. which the .wisdom of applying
old wes
, questioned) General that.heunderstood the JCS'
hini to' the' DEL .fa:ctC?r in"the SIOP-63)' deq1.ded that JSTPS ...
" 3-.j;::,cCl:len: during consideration of procedures for use in $Iop:..63 planiung .
. ' .. :i-l:t:'.h!'r 'the nor CINCPAC representative believed the f,'actor
. ,
, in SIqP-62 was' valid and argued, that it ,should useq in'the
. next Essentially, the. had been to a mathematical
. betweenthe probable assurance of deiive;y of a visual sortie
. c?nclitions :'were favorable (Le'i da.ylight and ,good. weather at 'ta:;'-
get) and the probable assurance of delivery when c'onditions were pro-
hibitIve (Le., at night and wit.h bad weather at the target) . CnCIANl' IS .
POSj,t1on, supported by CINCPAC, was cl'earlY,arid amply stated in the
cy' camnittee mee:tingS. of late' summer and e,,?-rly fall, ,and in
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It definitely stipulated that 'this i'actor'
PoWer hi-s decision until JCS' guidAnce'
Defini.ti6n Alert Force VIII
.in their defined alert 'forces as. portio
" '" .,
of the. unified. and specified commanders. coII!IIlitted :force,
vhich he designates as strike and constantly prePared .to "
lAunoh )mier conditiopsoftaetic81 ",rDing." P""era';"
cond:i, tions of :tactic?-l warning." The 'CINC;3AC} CINeAL, ..aJ?d Air Forc.e.
The Policy Committee, in its meeting:of 8 December; split on. the
der1r.ition One ciiNCIJOO, CINCC .
PAC-,- CINCEUR.1 Marine Corps, . and A:rmY representa.tives, .it f :.
.as . nthat .portion of th.e unifi'ed and specified 'c'cmilll1 or'
. . .' . ,
imp!:'o've the' "bookkeepingll. b; eliminating it.. He believed' {Ii bette'r to i
. '.- . .. . I
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r'e::-r on the side of,being pessimistic about. our :capability a.nd to .plan , '.}
; '. . .' J.

! ,accordiilgly.
. force which in his 'judgment 'Will be able .,
/' ." .
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; vas received.in October.
;.
I . .
.. ; \.'ould be ..used. A13 to the question of how it would be used.1 'General '
. . . .' . . .' .
j the' Policy 9 decided
\ '.,. . ... ' . , ,... '. '... .
['0'1.' factC?r, as SIOP-q2., '.
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"..,-- " .. : oj ....
! ..".. .--'- "' .. ". . ." '84 '. .
r rme'mos . for the Deputy..Director. This. :tQ
.f lthe in the Poiicy Canmittee meeting of 28 August.' He' recog-
" 'j ,I . .'. .....
"j' ,.'r nized prol)lemas a very difficult 'involviIig 'judgnlent fa:ctoTe;
.!. that could not be proved one way or the :other: He felt that. a. c'qm- : .. !.:\
!. was' b.ecause : .. J t
r :'.
; involved.1 put he also ,criticized the'CINOiA.NT:'s position: to' .r
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E.O. 12958, as amende
Section 3.3(b)(5)
..... _.:..... :
NOFORN

The D81P replied that .the use of pre-lajlnch survivability fact.ors
had by the' Jsrps: and had a..greed tha.t
. .
it vas the inteht of'the JCS that, .the DEL factor be. used.. Ill' early
January the 'JCS'had briefed on met.hodology" use of thiS' .
. '.: CINCPAC's but th.ere hed no direction t-o
, '
C.xmJ.ittee .meeting 9. he decided i;n>:favor .of the first pro-
p-osal abpve... Elf'S: '., 1/ 'f' .... ' :'. ":;- ..., '.. .... : .. "", .
:..J \<,. V) :i,.j;' -:'. <,:" . -,.!.'.', .,,,' i .'
--- . . .............--!.J . .. -./.
I r.<' viih DEL Faetors and For,,' 'Application i
1
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\', f::::::
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:::p::::Cj
said that JOS
I ::::':::: :::t
.L.; '.""e of' plenl1ing it should be apPlied'. Ee wished itt0 :be used in the
I u!;sessment phase and i'orce a;pplicatiqn. He also objeCted,
adefinition was really since it had been tbe staff '. .
l .popcy to' accept the .nwnber of aircraft on alert. fram the CINCs wi
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"heater f'orces"prefe:,rril'l-t?;. the' seq,uence
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Section 3.3(b)(5)
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. . if' ".
proceduxes. iThe .. D8;i.'P alSo believed. JC.S guJdance indicated.".
L., .
of SAC and.Polaris before theater forces in the 'He
. . .' . .'
said forces could.' not. be .caIlplet.eiy upon in ..
. ',' '.' .' '. . . .
planning, 1?'ecause they might expropriated 'by JCS'fGr . I
missions. Jfe added, hbvever, that' CINCPAC gi ' .
" .
'. \..,_.... ...-.
39.
, , ,
The probability of a delivery vehicle launching as
excluding e:ffects of offensive ac-
tion. fe-),
Time to positi.oning and of .all
:forces to war sorties. '(to, '
The reaction time available under of
surprise attack for of ,forces. (u)
That portion of the committed force not scheduled
for th,e at'tack option. (u)'
EXI:'LAN.ATION OF TERlIJS
FQTces' not aVailable for assignment to specified '
alert or mi,s siops, e,.. g. J' aircraft in
depots or' modification" w4ich 'can'be prepared in
a 'relati'Yely short 'time, ':plus any missiles, not on ,
launchers 'at time of execution, and possible Polaris, "
sUbmarines"and aircraft carri,ers either in U. S.'
ports or from laun9h areas.,
0])
Tnat portion of the SlOP force other than the alert
f'orce. (lJ) , ,', , ' , ,
T:pat pori;i'on of a Ultl,fied and specified
commit;ted or :coorcUnated force which 'in his' j,udg-,
ment will be aole 'to'launch unde'r ccnditions of
'tactical warning. (u)"" ' '
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The probability ,of a launched delivery vehicle reach- ,\. ,
ing the :Boob Release (:BRI,;), or, target ex- 'j'
clud,ing effects of enemj. defensive action.
., ,
The probability of a delivered weapon detonating; ,
includes release, arining, fuZing, 'du.ds, and hu:rna.n '
error"! ,.fs1- :..........:...j i
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..... , / ',;/ ;: .' =",..--.,...r\
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, ,
A missile or aircraft (or ccmbination of both), With
weapon(s) and all relatE;!d, equ,ipment, including sup-,
, porting ,:facilities 'Which contribute' directlr to the
launching, and.delivery a the
'target. .'.' , ,', ""-':":'
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Force:
Alert' Force,
vlarning,
Residual,Reserve
j' .
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I'. lAll..t"1C... .
( Reliability'
'/
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J .Reliability
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At.Ul..Ck.Option
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The probability of aircraft .
weapon to the BRL, . eX'eluding or enemy a.c-
tion. It is' the product of launch reliability' and
inflight reliability'which' include$ refuelillg
atili t:-, applica-ole. {-et .
. . .' .
Time from which airc'raft and/or. preJE.ration
is computed.' This time will be designated .by "the
JCS as a 'six d,igit d.ate/time g:;roup, Zulu time;' it
will be used as the base time for prepar.atiori of
. the force to a ready .status. . ..?a-)-' . . :
.... ' : .... ' ..: ..'.. _..
. The pro"Qability of '8. wea.pon the!' . \
SlOP.8:
1
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rea.cting to .an: \.' .I
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.to only). . .... . I' ]
. . . ": \ :,>-c:::::::J._--:
The 'probability of. 8. delivery a' . '.
wea.pon Which' detonates as excluding
of enemy action. (u) .
(1) Weapon reliabUity 1;; the product
of alert' readiness reliability times launch.relia-
bility times' inflight. reliability times'
ability '(applies .only). (U)' ..
(2) Alert: weapon system rel.iability is
product of alert reliability times 1apnch.
reliability times inflight reliability times weapop ..
reliability (appl;i.es to missiles OJ;lly). (U). .'
,.
{
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One o'f :rive. indiVidual .attack :plans included in . .
'JCS srop. '. Each. plan is designai;.ed to accompli.sha . J '.'
specific objective(s) ..7'hese f'ive pla.ns '. .
that range of selective responses.in Which the U.S. l
. would execute major nuclear attacks againstthe Sin . r.
Soviet Bloc ..The f.orces available in each Attac$.. . f
Opt:i,on vary to the'"condiiions of a,ttack as . t
. a function .of warning time fsf'"
:Tha"t tiDie 'by the JCS .for :th /'/
execution of the srop. It "Will serie as the'cc:rnmon .
reference time for all mop strike 'forces:: . This t Ji
will be designated in the Execution prder for the. : j ..
SlOP as a six digit date/time group, Zulu time.' . 1.
. \
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",rea:;;:<jn System

:, :f:eliability ..
. !
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The rate :'at' Which strike forces become availa.ble
for latulch afte;r receipt of. an A-hour..
The launching of strike forces in response to un-
. equivocal . wa;rning of impending major 'Sino-'
Sovie':t Bloc attack upon :the U.S. .orits allies.
....
l. . . i'. "'. ": . i
Probability..of achieving a given degree ofdfuna.ge, I' .)
aJ,.l operational factorsjincludiilg pre:- I .1
. launch survivability) .and.weapons effect!'' .It is. ./.;
the. average of fuuriage that would De achieved. if the ! .t
were .run 'many' times. * ... \
i
Sub-plans" of each attaGk' option which deal . j .\
timing problems inherent"in changing nU!!l.oers of ,.
generated aM' launchable del:tvery. vehicles. Force 1"
generation the JCS w.ith the capa- i
bility of launching. the' optimum strike force con- t-
. w.ith the p;r:eJQ.ration time. . .:-__,__\
The probability that a 'del{very will survive
an enemy attack under an established condition of
warning. (u)
Specific undertakings to achieve JCS d.esignated ...
objectives. 4}- .
A proc.edure under wh'ich cqrnmanders. of ).lI1.ified.
specified cummands'may launch 'alert force aircraft
,after deciaration ofadefense. emergency. This con-
cept provideq positive. assurance. of having a portion
of the force making
process but without risk of the U.S. initiating '.
generai war miscalculation. should' the alert
prove to be. false. Conside:r:ing initial -posi':'
.. tion, no aircraft will penetrate :the of '
the enemy early'warning radar net and under no cir-
cumstances penetrate enemy territory 'fUrther
positive instructions to proceed on 'strike..
..
i
Expectancy
?r.,- IAlUlCh .
3u:rvl van1ll ty :
. .. ._.."
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FoorNOTES:
)":'.::;') for' the Chairman;' JC$,' from SecDef Thomas .Gates,
t. n 20 Jan. En:::1s' to .res 2056/208, 27 Jar.. 91. ..
1\ ,,0 .jCS 2056/229, .13' M3.r 6i;; .Bee also 'Encl K, lI.B8.ckground"
. . , of Plamling Factors in Sl.OP,." to J: -.3 aPs 603/1, .8. Max 62,
"ikpc-rt ; , ; on Ar.eas '1;0 be Investigated ' . , ., II ]":78558.
. . . '. '. ."
9870i8" JeS to Cha;irman, .:res, et al., "Jes' NS:rL 'and
Approval, II 9 Dec 60. ' See Appendix B to 'JCS 2056/194
. ' . . . . .
Alsop, Grand II 8a.'turdat 'Post;
Vol'235, No. 13,' p 11, 14; See also 1.' 'Times',
Y.8:1 61. (Address 'by the President.. t? Congress); and :flreside.n:t1a1'.
Message to Congress on the Defense 23'Mai ql..
.' :.... J .,'
. '. .
Scc:Le/ls speech to 'the. Np.TO Ministeri<;il Meeting, 5'l1ay 62,' in..
JCS Hemo 2305/?59, 11 May 62; B-83265'" . .... . .'
3: AJ1.nex to'Appenrii'x to JCB 205'6/208, '27 from.Memo
fo:- .P1-esident .from -Special Assistant to President for SCience. and
... :cchnoloGY;" 2-5 Noy 60, Ccmmelfting at 'length on .the .....
the D$TP f.elt its c'onclusi(:Jns . .
. '. B lack of complete 'with 'procedures em-' .
bv J srps. r: . The CINCLANT representative to the J grPS was .
'. i:-: .agreement with the. report', . (Memo for. the JCS; fr9lJi:
. .T: S. PoWer, .DffrP, "-Methodology Study," 23 Jun 61, with 1
I. ..... '7018' ) .'. ','
", . C:l, jj- ... .... .., . '.' .
2.
C'.
; .
6.
...
7, to Report by the J-3 to the Jes, and Recomrnen.da- .
'as to Areas to be Investigated for Possible Change in
oping the I'iext NSl'LjSIOP,1I 8 Mar' 61.- These'cormnents and. :recoin.:. .
'mendations were solicited by 'JCS .2056/194.,' Array coinments '(Encl .
to JCS 2056/204), Navy Comments .(Enel to JCS 2056/1CfT aIfd to. JGS
2056/221), AF Ceirmnents (Encl to Jes l116/87), Marine Corps' com-
ments 20$6j220), CINCAL comments' see JCS'2056/210,
. sr
nC
LA.1'I"T comments (Encl to. JCS 2056!206), CINCPAC :cornments see
. JCS C;r:.NCNEIM see JCS 2056/209, CINCSAC' cdn-
.. see JGS 2056/214, DSTP canments (Enel to' JCS 2056/207),
i3-78558. . . '. " . .
. .
8. Memo for JCS, fran Gen T. S. '])6TP, :I1JCS NffilL/SIOP...63, \I
Jan Es2:.:
Msg, terP'l168" DSrP to. JCS,. 1.4 Feb 61.
l.fSg, JCS 995685" from JCB (Dir of Joint ,Starr) to Gn Pow'er et' a1., 9
Nay 61", Originally sent as No.te by Secretaries (5 May"
61) to JCS on '-'PoHcy ,Guidance on Plans for Central War, II referred.
to J-5' for comment and reconunendationS .as mati:;er of "priority, JCS '
2191/h27, 8 61, .,',
43
"]vlsg, DsrP )3-79315, ':frpm DSfP to JCS, 31, Jun ElJ,.;, !!3;, Msg,
:c B-79347,'SAC to JG.B, 5,Jun 61, Ex. '4; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS,
2 Jun 61, J3-79324; Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 5 Jun 61, B-79359;, JC$M .
406-61, 15 B-79491, Appendices A-G. ..
12.: .. 406-61, '15 Ju-ri 61, n-79491, forwarded. witn: A-G;
fv1sg, DillP, B,-7931S, from,Dm:P t.o JCS
3
31 Juil 61: Ex '3-'
. . . . . '.
13., JCSM 15 6i, for.'arded. with A-G.
1i;.. The fo11ow:j.ng documents re,t:lecting DSTP's position are enclosed
r.s'exh:5,bits: ,Memo for,the JCS, fr,an Gen T. S. fewer, DSl'P,
"Nethodology Study, I! w/l Ateh; 23,Jun 61, B-79It81, staff'
3tudy, Criteria," prepared by N5TL Div, '3 JUno1, B-79366,
nn,ci: Staff Study" "Assurance Criteria, II 3 Jun B-79365, both
in>1emo for JCS, from Gen T. S.'Povler; nSTP, "JSTPS,studies
3
'13
,'Jun 61} B-79367,' Ex. 6,; Ltr, Gen T. "s. DsrP, to ,
lI
Im_
})l'ovements of II w/l' Atch, 3 May 61, B-79107j 'Dffi'P
to JCS, ",Ex})ansion of Selected Response to 23' Aug
61, 'Ex 7. : These studies'were directed by SM-390-61,'
He.'1lo for DSTP :t:rom JGS" "Actions to be Taken .' Toward Thi.-
pr9ving, the Next NEJrL/SIOP, II 21 Ap'!' , , '
15 L.iemo for. JCS; frcm' Gen T. ,S. DSTP) Study, il
23 Jun ,61, w/1 ,Atch" B-79481, 'Ex: 5. ' ,
16. Appendix II" "Comments by cnWLANT Representative on Methodology-
Study," and Appendix III, "Comments by CINCPAC Representative on
Nethodology Study; ". to Me:w.o for the JCS;,' from. Gen ,T. ,S. 'Power; .
DSTP" study," ,,23 Jun' 61, Ex -5;.
17. Appendix II, II Comments, by CINCLANr Representative on Methodology;
to 'abqve Memo. '
18. Appendix III, llCormnents by CINCP;\C Representative on MethcdolofSY
Study," to above. Memo. '
, .
,19. DSJ:P ll68, DoorP to JOS, 14 Feb 61-
20. See 'above memo JCS of 23 Jun
,21. Memo for -the'Record, Maj Gen K. K. COllpton
J
,'DOO; SAP, IIDmp Pre-
sentation to tbe JCS ... ," 13 JUl "61.
.-..I;'"
"
22. for 'JCS", fran 'Gen i1. s. Power, nsrp, lIJGB
'16 Jan
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JSTPS Policy No.' 4, "Policj'Regarding'M8.intene.nc'e of the, Single
, Integrated Operational Planj!' 25 Hay 61;, Memo for DSn', II ' " " '
P:roc;ress Report " ") II 17 Jan 61;, ,Me!!1o for DPBrP, from'Maj Gen ,
c, X: ,Eisenhart
1
Ch, SIOP Diy', Amendment't,o SIop-62," , , ,
,30 Nar 61; ,.Msg, PsrP' personal Power to Adm 'Felt (CINCPAG) ,
and Adm Th:nnison, (CINC;LAN'.r)) ri'os., ,8 Apr 61; Msg" 61-25 JCSLG, to
JC.S) "Thirty-second Weekly ,Actfv;i.ty'Rep:ort, II 14 Apr" 61; "Memo for
Ad.r:l Parker from Capt S. E., Ruehlow", USN" I1SIOP Div Status Report'
, '.leek ,Ending 24 Jun 61" n' ,J1in 61; Memo ror .;rcs) ,from' Gen s,,' ':
DSTP, of Changes #3 and, #4 JCS SIOP-62, 2B ': '
olio\! 61, B-8094g; Memo for froni Gen T. S. Power, DSrP) "Sum_
::-''1.;''''/ cf Chaliges #3 and #4 tq JC's, SIop-62) II 28 Nov B-80942;
fo:' JCS) 'fr'om Gen T'. S. :Power, DSTP) , uSurinnfl-ry of Change '#5; ....
'] Eo"'.:; 62) B-82y88. '
"Status ,of War Game for , siop,,:, 62, II presented ,by OoLE.
I., SlOP Diy and Chief of War Game) ,5 Jan' 6lj Ninutes' "
..: -:'" :-.': 2'3rd Policy Committee 13 Mar, 6'1, 25 Var 61; '.
of 'PoJ,icy 'Committee Meeting, '20 Mar 61, 3.1 Mar
,:.,. 1,<' "'" I ,. ,.. o'f" 'ne 2t::th 'Pol"'''y Co"""''; "'tt:>e M"'e'" i ng ::>1, 61 and ')7 . __:.il ;....... ':..... ... .',;J.. .; .... ..t.... . '1.1'&':'1.1.". Y ....... __ ,V_.1. :- _-r" ,. ... c...
].I.ll r 61" 5 Ap:r 61; Minut,es of the 26th Policy COIi!mittee, Meeting, "
"j I\pr (1) J.8 Apr 61; Memo for from' Gan T. S. Ppwer, DSl'P,
,"lh:15 ion on Folic;y Committee Disagreement Regarding War ,Game
Red 'reM, A.o,'SUillptiOns with Respect to Play,' of Red, Versus Polaris "
Suol::n:fi'nes," 7 Apr 6i-;Miilutes ,of 36th Policy CCIrnirlttee'Meet1ng,
6" Jul til. 7 Jul 61. ' ,
". ,
"
21;.,
G' reI" G'.:=n PCMer; from Cbl W" J, Crumm, ',USAF
..e, Sln CNor s War Game of SIop-62, ", 3b,Aug B-8oo46;
,)l..sg) DSrp B-80120, D3rF to "Concl,usions 0P' Study of ,ONO
i{eport,O' ,7 Sep 61, B-8OJ.,02. ' '
,'26. ,..ag) DSrP B-79834) D8I'P to JCS, n,s., 7 Aug 6l.
27. 'pIzg) B-798
8
7/ DsrI' JCS, lIHand War G8llles> ,12),ug 61.," When in
Hoy the ne>J1y .formed Joint War Games 'Control Group (JCB) sought'
mAterial relating'to 'the SIOP-62 war game, :ror use in ,an evatua:tion
of poSt-attack ,capabilities of the U'.S. and the Sino-Soviet 'Bloc, '
it vas told that' e.ll material relating to' "Red" ,(Soviet) and ":Blue".
(U.S.) SIOPShad,been destroyed. (Memo Chie:r., 'JCSLG, fram :
Brig Gen W. R. CaJ.houn, nir JWGCG, "JWGcG P05t-At:tack Capablliti,es "
Study," 6 Nov 61" :8-80875,; rOM, DsrP to Ch) JCSW." IIJ\{GCG Post-
Attack Csplbilities ,study, II 28 Nov 61'. ) " , "
28; MsgJ OR dNa to JarES, "Simulation' Investigation srop..62, n
,9 Aug 61.
, 23-
, 'I
...:'......._....
,.,:. K to J-3 'Ops' 603/1) 8 Mar 61, "Report by J-3 to JCS on A:rea.s
(: .Inve.st.1ga.ted .'. . : ,II B-:-78558..
r; 2:::',\ ':-:."il4::, Capt R. F. Fuller" USH, HConsider.a:'cio:ns Rel8,t1veto' the
llSTL Mn.intenarice Procedures, II Atch 3 to Minutes of P9
11c
y
t Heeting 2<, 6 61.. .' ..
I
I
. I
JST:PS Technical 'Me"morandu'l1 62, HAn Inve'stigation of the
rn"f'luence of.' D3.111age Before Launch Factors .Upon. BIOP .;E:ffectiveness, II
JSTPS 62-4, tlCont1nuat1on 'of Damage.
::J::'crc Ls:unl;h Btuqy, ". 31' :62,:B-82064.. .
. . . .
:';'C:;2'1 1261-61,: on War Gaming of Joint NOv61.
JCS 4233, JCS to DSTP, Wa.r CarDing of Joint. Plans,"' .
62, B:-82972
. J D 018a, JSTPS to "Policy.?Ii War Gam:i:ng: of Joint P:laps,"
",= Y 62. . .
JCS fll-'\. 99945.7) JCS to 25 61.
61-'60, .JCSlG to JCBj' "61st W.eekl:y Activity Report, II. Nov .61.
U62-61; "Guidance Preparation' of 11 27 Oct
B-00720. . . .
Teo.in ..
Ibid
'for -the Record, Maj Gen' K. Com.:pton, Dep 1X), sAc, "DsrP
to the JCS . , . ) II 13Ju1 61.
Ibid. :
-.'
Ibid.
.-

-_.
: !.;
29. 'Hsg, JCS 1118, from (Chairmim JCS) to. Gen "12
Aug 61, .]-798.94; Msg, JCS 1317
J
.JOS to cnWSAC, 30 Aug 61,
30. Hsg; JCS 1318, JCS to CINeSAC, 30 Aug 61, B-80032.
3:i.. l'.f!,-g, JCB 1317, JOS to CINeSAC, 30 Aug' 61, .B-80033.

......' ..
40.
. 4.2.
43.
".
.
.... :.:.
. 57. JSTPS Planning Manual; '15' Mar 62, B-82430} pp 24-?7,: 13-'14:.1 .?2;
. Memo, . VA-dm R. L. Johnson, .. DDSTP to..DSTP, ". ' Report
, 12 .Jan 62, IT 18 Jan .62; Memo: for DSl'P; from VAdm R. L. John-
son,. DDSl'P, 'IlForce A:pplicatj,on for SIop-63; II 2.2' Jan. 62; :B-81942, .
. Ex 11; Briefing, Force Structure, ". Col E... A. McDonald,
.D8rPRti) 18 Jun 92, B-836.68, Ex IG. . . . . '. . .
5$. JSTPS Planning Manual, 15 'Mar 'pp 98-100.
59, pp 10,).-102,
60.. Ibid., pp loB, 109, 110,. 'Ulj Briefing, IfTbird.. stat;;s .Bri.e:fiDg, "
JCSLG to JCS, :2 May 62; Memo for DSTP, f!a:rJ. DDSTP, .'
Repo:r:t- 25. May 62, .If. 31 May 62... . . '.'
61.' Memo :for,JD 'et a1.; VAdm R. L. Jolmson,' DDSI'P, Brief-
ings During the-Iaydown .of SIop-63, 11 . J,l. Jan' 62.'
,
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I
46 .
Briet:fng, .."Na.tional strategic' Target List"i by Col J.M.
Ch,. -NsTL Div, to .JCS; J:un B-83834, '.'
J$IPS Pl.aniring Manual,.15l-!a.r 62,
Brienni, "SIOp-63 Force .Structure,!) 'Col E. McDonald; JCS, .
18 Jun 62, ],;,83668, Ex 10; .
. -.'
'Ibid,
.-- .
53
56,
54.
55.
Atch, 'l"Principle Differences Betlieen .JCB Guidance for SIOP-63
and SIOp-.62, II' for from DDill'P, ,rVisit by Gen Dean's
[Dir J':'3 .Staff, 'JCS] PartY'2-3 Apr 62,.1l 6' Apr 62, 13-82754.
49. Briefing}, l"srop-63 St'a.tus 1I"to jcs 1i; JCSLG,' 5 Jan 62.'
This estimate proved. correct: 4. months.for Brop..62,8 months .
. for SIOp-63.
50. Msg)' DS':!'P- .337
2
,. JSTPS to JCS., "JCS SlOP .DeveiQPnient Schedule/'. 3
Nov for DD8rP, i'rem 'Capt S. E; De}) Ch; SIOP... .
Div, .' Report. " 5 Jan 62, II 8 Jen' 62. '. ..'
51. 6l-6b, JCSLG't9 Jes) :3 Nov 61;
Memo,. 'nDWP to nsr.p; ". ,:; Progress' Report'. , . 10 Nov 6lj II 15
Nov 61; Memo tor.Ch} Nm'L. a.nd SlOp Divs, 'fram Vice Admiral E. N.
Parker, DDSTP, lIPre:paration for the Develo];ment of Slop-63} II: 17
Nov 61j Final Report, . "Conference' on -rrocedures for .
.SIop-
6
3, Offutt Att....-.B,. 11-15 Dec 61, II preI> by Col ;r. M, Pht1pott,
Ch, NSTL Div}.B-82077;Seea1soAppendix II of this historY for'.
a discussion.bf General Power's resolution of disagreements
arising in the Policy Coimnittee. .A resUme -of di:fterenc.es. .
sent to' the JOB. on 9 Jun 62) seeEx 8.
. -

'06. BriefiIJg, JCSIIJ,to JCS" nSecond Status ,Briefing,' ,16 Mar ,62.'
j .'
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VAdin R" L.. Johnson" DllBrP, 'to'DSI'P, II. Report
22 Jup. 62, II 27 Jun 62; 'Official appxo:v:a.l c8JIle by ',JCS,
to CofS USA'et al., 21 Jun 62, :B-83629. ,
--... .
, , ,
Briefing, "Fallout' Constra..ints, ", Col C. E. Becker" Ch, Tactics Br',
Div, to JCS, 19 Jun' 62, B-83661,: Ex 12.', An analysis ,of casu-
, aities and 'r.esnlting fran implementation of
(blast; terminal" ini.tiaJ. nuclear ra.diation, and fallout 'effects),
, Is contained as Elc 14;, ' ,,': ' '" " ,
Memo for nBrP,."from Brig ,Gen W. 'R. Peers, 'Ch, JCSLG,' "QuestionB
a.nd Comments by Chieff,!o of Staff ',' ,II 6,Jun 62, ':B-83460.
63. JCSW (Brig Peers X, JC$, "Third Status B:riefing, II
2 M9.y ,62. , . I
62.

.,'" .

....
(J'
, ,
Briefing; "Fourth Status Report;" JCSLG (Brig Gen Peer.s) to
JCS, 62. '
3rt efing, JCEr.LG to JCB, 31 ,May 62.'
, ,
65,. ' JCsM ,"Guidance for 'pt.epe,ration' of, srop-63," 27, Oct 61"
, ,,' " ,
64., see p 4.
l1riefing:, :"F1exibility 'Achieved,," by Col E. A. McDonald) Ch"
DSl'PF.'l4, 19 JU)1' 62, 'B-83668, Ex 10. '
' ..
See 'p 6; 'Aiso, Msg; DSrP JSTPS to JCS, 3i. May 61, B,..79315,
Ex J; ,Hsg, DsrP 1?-19966, JSl'PS t6,JCs., 23/1530Z,Aug 61" Ex 8; Memo
for Ge'n Power, from VAdm. R. L,. Johnson, 'DDSEP, I1Visit by, '
Dean and' Party, 2-3 Apr, II 6 !tpr' 62).; B-82754; ',Ex, 13', ' ,
'75. Statement bY' Robert McNa.mara ]ef'ore House Armed' Services'
Camnittee on ;IT 64-68 Program,and 1964: Defense, Budget, 39
' ,
. 72. ].It::ino for Cha:irman:, JCS, from SecDef R., S. tI
, , , 13 ,Jul 62}, JCS, 2056/335, B:-8391? ;'
":;:,<,,76., Intex:vi
ew
, , KiW, Historian, with'VAdm E. N. Parker" DDsrP,
";.: ", 29, Dec 61,' on tape.
I.trtervie'r1" Robert ICiW,: Historian, with VAdm B. L. Johnson, JDD,
4. AJ!r 63, ta.pe. . ,
.
......
.

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Toici.'
!:;7.q,'.;i,"..t}:,Robert Kipp, Historian, With VAdm R. L.. Johnson, JDD"
:. "Ap" 63, on " , "
lCipp; Capt J. J. Reicb;el,
:.cc, JS" 28- Mar 63j JarFS Joint Table of Distril;>ution, ,lb,
, 11;: .Iun 61,' ,1T,l "JSTPS Manpower Program"IT 64 thru' FY 69/' n. do.J ,,:
b:t: JS; JSTPS, '15j ,See also' of
.:..ndl With JSTPS; Ex ,16. ': ' ,
, --'. ."
. ' ..
35,' cnfcPAc DSTP,' IlSIOP 3!2317,z Nov ,62.,
eo" ,[.l.sg, JDD ClJ:O-S, Js:rPS to Jan' 62.'
. for 'DDSJ:P). 'from FAdm Paul Masterson, CrrrCPACR.epJ. rrSIOP Fac- .
!,I)!"r. .l ,. 4 Aug 61., Atch 2 to Minutes of: Policy Committee',Meeting,
i. :Aug 61j Hemo for ':DDffrP, from. RAdIn "J9hn Hylan4; CINC1J\l.'lTRep, ,', '
'{.)"lplication of Weatherjfurkness :F:actor" for SIop-63, II 4 Aug 61;
. '3 to Minutes' of 38th Policy Ccinmittee Meeting, ,4, Aug 61; ,
',', for DDsrP, from ':RAClm',John J. Ryland" CINCLANTRep, lICINCIANT
i'OGi t.iqn, 6:n Application, of Weatherjrarkness in, SlOP P;tan':',
fl.l!"... :;, II' 8 Aug' 61,.. Atch 10 to Minutes cif Policy'Comm.;l.ttee Meeting,
:l:q. 61. . . . ". .
" ,
.::: .';1"
I ... :.
-::
""{6, Hist of. JsrPS}, Backgr6und.and Preparati0!1'of SIOP-62} pp14;
15, B-827.07. . .
.
::.,"
I.
* .
R-1754-PR '
October 1975
The U. S. ICBM Force:
Current Issues and Future Options (U)
C. H. Builder,' D. C. Kephart, A. Laupa
A Report prepared for
- UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND
1 Rand 1
SANTAMONICA.CA90406
--
1
-iii-
PREFACE
Thi s i s a summary per specti ve of the U.S. ICBM force. The purpose
i s t o provi de deci si onmakers at al l l evel s wi th a short but comprehen-
sive background appreci ati on of the key i ssues and opti ons that have
become associ ated wi th land-based ICBMs. The material should be use-
f ul i n hel pi ng to suppor t a wide range of deci si ons af f ecti ng the
future composi ti on of the U.S. ICBM f or ce. While the i ndi vi dual topi cs
are not devel oped i n detai l suf f i ci ent f or speci f i c deci si on si tuati ons,
they do cover a span of concerns and al ternati ves goi ng beyond what i s
usual l y found i n any si ngl e r epor t or bri ef i ng on the f or ce.
Provi di ng a short yet comprehensi ve review has enforced some econ-
omies i n the sel ecti on of material. Si nce the i ntended readers are
l i k el y t o have more than a pedestri an knowledge of ICBMs, the aim i s
t o remind rather than to educate. The tutor i al s are l i mi ted to those
i ssues and opti ons that seem to pi vot on detai l s not wi del y di scussed
i n the open l i ter atur e. The di scussi ons do not go very much beyond the
U.S. ICBM f or ce, even though many of the subj ecks i nvi te, if not demand,
broader consi derati on'of rel ated topi cs such as the Sovi et ICBM f or ce,
al ter nati ve str ategi c f or ces, and nati onal securi ty obj ecti ves. These
r el ated topi cs are omi tted unl ess they seem pecul i arl y rel evant to the
U.S. ICBM force. It i s presumed that the audi ence i s familiar wi th
these broader questi ons.
The report was prepared as a task on the conti nui ng Project RAND
' study enti tl ed "Future Strategi c Aerospace Force Requi rements."
UNCLASSIFIED ...
-V-
SUMMARY
Thi s report presents a broad review of i ssues and alternatives
beari ng on the future o f the U.S. ICBM f orce. The purpose is to pro-
vi de a background understanding and a perspecti ve to hel p support de-
ci si ons on f or ce str uctur e and deployment. The hi stori cal evol uti on,
cur r ent status, and ongoi ng pl ans for the force are bri ef l y summarized,
servi ng as a compact ref erence source and i ntroducti on to the U.S.
ICBMs. I ssues associ ated wi th ICBMs i n the publ i c debates are developed,
together wi th outl i nes of the pr i nci pal opposi ng arguments. Future
opti ons, beyond those now programmed f or the f or ce, are i denti f i ed and
di scussed.
-
A t the end the authors present thei r own subjecti ve assessment of
the key i ssues and opti ons. They hol d that the unresol ved pi votal i ssue
beari ng on the future of the ICBM force i s whether or not it will evol ve
to pl ay any unique r ol es i n our str ategi c postur e. The future does not
l ook promising i f ICBMs are viewed simply as antarm of the Triad--one of
thr ee ways o f doing the same j ob. The authors believe however that ICBMs
could emerge preeminent f or speci al roles i n at l east four areas. These
i ncl ude ICBMs f i tted for l i mi ted str ategi c oper ati ons, ICBMs as a cost-
effecti ve str ategi c reserve, ICBMs f or counter f or ce, and ICBMs f or "f orce
equi val ence."
UNCLASSIFTED
- i x-
CONTENTS
PREFACE ........................ .............................
i i i
~UMMARY ............. ........................................
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................... V
.......................
vi i
I .
I 1 .
I 11 .
1
2
6
6
11
11
22
12
26
23
27
28
31
34
34
38
35
40
40
41
47
48
48
54
56
58
57
60
65
61
70
77
72
79
80
80
Several Promising Futures ...........................
Limited Strategic Operations ......................
Assured Reserve Capabilities ......................
Counterforce
Equivalence ......................................
.......................................
The Outlook
.........................................
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82
82
84
85
87
88
...
V
(U) Launch on Attack Assessment. Even i f a l l o f the technical
uncer tai nti es attendi ng pr el aunch sur vi vabi l i ty were resol ved, other
i nher ent uncer tai nti es i n mi l i tar y and pol i t i cal planning for l ar ge-
scal e counter for ce attacks ar eki kel y to r e g i n an issue. In addi ti on
to the techni cal uncer tai nti es, the attacker 's r i sks of bei ng preempted
(or havi ng the I CBM for ce launched befor e the attack i s complered) are
unquanti fi abl e. One view i s t h at such r i sk s make a del i berate, care-
f u l l y pl anned attack i ncredi bl e; an opposing view hol ds that such r i sks
ar e i r r el evant i n cl assi cal deter r ence cal cul ati ons, which ar e concerned
wi t h possi bi l i t i es more than pr obabi l i t i es.
~- ~rrl -
-21-
,-
(U) The mere possi bi l i t y of the U.S. ICBMs' bei ng launched upon
confi r mati on of a Sovi et ICBM attack, even i f launch-on-attack assess-
ment i s not expl i ci t l y adopted as pol i cy, i s hel d by some t o pose an
i nt ol er abl e r i sk i n any Soviet contempl ati on of an effecti ve sur pr i se
attack upon the U.S. ICBM for ce. Even if the Sovi ets had hi gh confi -
dence i n t h e s i l o k i l l capabi l i t i es of t h ei r ICBM for ce, i t i s argued
that they coul d not be sure that thei r attack would be successful be-
cause "the Russians would have to consi der that Minuteman might be
l aunched agai nst Russian t ar get s i n t he 30-min warning time between the
launch of t he Russian ICBMs and t hei r ar r i val at t he Minuternan si l os. "
*
(U) There are two important aspects to t he cr edi bi l i t y of t hi s
potenti al capabi l i ty as a deter r ent to the Sovi ets. One i s how the
Sovi ets mi ght j udge prospecti ve U.S. act i ons i n t he l i ght of our pol i cy
statements. The Presi dent has r ej ect ed "sol e r el i ance on a ',launch-
on-warning' strategy'' because i t "would f or ce us t o l i ve at the edge of
a pr eci pi ce and deny us the f l ex i b i l i t y we wish t o preserve."' Whether
the Sovi ets mi ght i nter pr et such pol i cy statements as defi ni ng our in-
tenti ons or not i s uncl ear and can be argued ei ther way.
Y
(U) Launch on Attack Assessment. A cr edi bl e capabi l i ty to launch
the ICBM f or ce on attack assessment requi res systems f or assessi ng the
.. attack and then implementing appropriate launch command and targeti ng
procedures. The main obj ecti ves of attack assessment are: to determi ne
wi th hi gh confi dence that Hn attack i s in pr ogr ess, to assess the nature
and i ntent of the attack, and t o provi de deci si onmakers that i nformati on
i n time to act. An attack assessment system would consi st of surveil-
l ance sensors, communication networks, capabi l i ti es for near-real -ti me
data processi ng and di spl ay, and capabi l i ti es f or data i ntegrati on and
anal ysi s. With current sensors, the potenti al l y avai l abl e i nformati on
times for attack assessment are shown i n Tabl e 4 .
. _.
x:
_. 'i
(U) At t ack assessment i nf or mat i on pr ovi des but one i nput t o t he
ICBM l aunch deci si on pr ocess. Ot her i nput s may be t he pr evai l i ng wor l d
si t uat i on and i nf or mat i on avai l abl e f r om i nt el l i gence sour ces. As an
. at t ack devel ops over t i me, assessment i nf or mat i on can assume t wo as-
pect s: Fi r st , t he st r at egi c nat ur e and pur por t of t he at t ack ( how
many at t acker s, f r om wher e; goi ng wher e, and when?) and, second, t he
t act i cal par t i cul ar s of t he at t ack ( whi ch, dependi ng on t he qual i t y
of t he at t ack assessment syst em, may i ncl ude t he i dent i t y of t he spe-
ci f i c t ar get , at t acker t ype, and t i me of i mpact).
(U) Because of t he rel at i vel y short t i mes avai l abl e, a credi bl e
deci si on pr ocess must i ncl ude a pr epl anned set of deci si on cr i t er i a,
i nvol vi ng at l east t wo consi der at i ons: (1) t he at t ack assessment
t hr eshol ds for consi der i ng l aunch commi t ment , and (2) t he level of
conf i dence i n assessment i nf or mat i on f or l aunch deci si on. The f i r st
may wei gh t he consequences of l aunchi ng versus not l aunchi ng; t he
second may r equi r e, f or exampl e, conf i r med r epor t s f r om sever al i nf or -
mat i on sour ces of numer ous Sovi et war head det onat i ons i n t he U.S.
hear t l and bef or e t he deci si on t o l aunch i s made.
I V. AN ASSESSMENT
The for egoi ng per specti ve of cur r ent i ssues and future opti ons f or
the U.S. I CBM for ce i s i ntended as an obj ect i ve background f or decision-
making. How that background i s assessed as foreshadowi ng the future of
the for ce depends upon some fur ther , subj ecti ve consi der ati ons:
What are the crucial i ssues?
What vi ews are taken on those i ssues?
-Which of the avai l abl e opti ons ar e r esponsi ve t o those views?
Answers to these questi ons ar e not necessar i l y si ngul ar ; they may vary
wi th peopl e and time. While prepari ng thi s perspecti ve,' the authors .
have formed thei r own judgments on t he answers. I n thi s fi nal secti on,
we depart from the summary per spect i ve and present our vi ews and judg-
ments on what al l of t hi s i mpl i es for the'futur e of the U.S. I CBM for ce.
Thus, t hi s f i nal assessment forms a separate, more subj ecti ve par t of
the r epor t, r ather than pr esenti ng the concl usi ons of a quanti tati ve
anal ysi s. Our readers may r epr esent a var i ety of vi ewpoi nts; they ar e
encouraged t o draw t hei r own concl usi ons.
We see the most important and pervasi ve concern to be the preser-
vat i on of t he long-term capabi l i t y of U.S. ICBMs to deter a preempti ve
nucl ear attack, both i n fact and i n appearance, i n t he f ace of the fore-
seeabl e devel opi ng threat. The pr i nci pal sour ce of t hi s concern i s the
l ar ge- scal e Sovi et deployment of accur ate MIRVed mi ssi l es that coul d
thr eaten the sur vi val of U.S. s i l os .
Aver t i ng t hat possi bi l i t y by negot i at ed l i mi t at i ons on MIRVs or
throw wei ghts i s t o suggest that SALT determi nes the future of the U.S.
I CBM force. Avoi di ng the consequences of the thr eat ei ther by abandon-
i ng the si l os or r ebasi ng the ICBMs, i mpl i es that a si l o- based mi ssi l e
f or ce i s one the U.S. can or should do wi thout. To i gnore the concern
i s t o deny both the s'cenario and r at i onal e for str ategi c nucl ear for ces.
Whi l e these futures are extremes whi ch may bound t he future of U.S.
I CBMs, we f i n d them nei t her at t r act i ve nor r eal i st i c as sol uti ons.
UNCLASSIFIED
--L
-80-
THE PIVOTAL I SSUE
I nstead of boundary sol uti ons, we have sought the pi votal i ssue
that, more than any other, mi ght be a watershed f or the future of the
for ce. We submit that such a pi vot al i s s u e i s whether each of the
str ategi c offensi ve forces--ICBbfs, bombers, or SLBMs--has some uni que
rol e wi thi n the U.S. str ategi c postur e. If the I CBMs are considered
si mpl y as one of three di f f er ent ways of doi ng the same j ob, then we
ar e not sanguine about thei r prospects as key el ements of the future
U.S. str ategi c postur e. However, i f the ICBMs ar e seen to have a
speci al r ol e in the posture because of thei r unique capabi l i ti es and
char acter i sti cs, then sever al i nter esti ng - al ter nati ve futur es are
evi dent t o US.
Resol uti on of t hi s pi vot al i ssue hi nges not onl y on the actuaZ
char acter i sti cs and capabi l i t i es of ICBMs and on t hei r actual r ol e i n
the str ategi c postur e but al so i n l ar ge measure on publ i c perceptions
of t he j ob t hat ICBMs ar e supposed t o do.
To suggest how deci si ve t hi s issue may be, we of f er below two very
di ffer ent pr ospects for .the future of t he for ce, depending upon how the
questi on i s resol ved.
A FUTURE WITHOUT MUCH PROMISE
I f the U.S. ICBM f or ce i s vi ewed as just one of thr ee str ategi c
offensi ve for ces whose pr i nci pal and common r ol e i s t o det er a nuclear
attack through assured r etal i ati on, then the over r i di ng concern will
. ' conti nue to be the sur vi val of ICBMs i n a preempti ve attack. Compar-
i sons among the thr ee for ces on t he basi s of su r vi vabi l i t y are i nvi ted
simply because i t i s the basi c common denominator of r et al i at or y capa-
bi l i t i es . Other qual i ti es, admi r abl e or not, ar e l i kel y t o be di s-
counted as not essenti al or centr al to the pr i nci pal r ol e of str ategi c
for ces.
The most responsi ve opti ons f or s i gni f i cant l y improving the sur-
vi vabi l i t y of the I CBM f or ce t o a di sarmi ng attack are (1) t o launch
t he for ce on attack assessment, or (2) to rebase the force. Whi l e
ther e ar e other al ter nati ves, they appear less ef f ect i ve or pr act i cal .
F or example, proposals t o make the sur vi vor s more capable, such as
UNCLASSIFIED
:.;s., ...., :*.;,
depl oyi ng l arger mi ssi l es or more RVs per missile, will general l y not
be recogni zed as sol uti ons, because the dominant perceived concern i s
force survi vabi l i ty--not the abi l i ty to execute some wel l -defi ned task
requi ri ng so much throw weight or so many RVs.
Further hardeni ng of si l os l ooks l i ke a l osi ng game i n the f ace
of i ncreased mi ssi l e accuraci es. A cti ve ABM defense may be a techni-
cal l y ef f ecti ve way to improve the prel aunch survi vabi l i ty of the ICBM
f or ce, but i ts acceptance i s impeded by the r estr ai nts of the ABM Treaty
and the emoti onal l egacy of the ABM debates.
Launching the ICBM f or ce on attack assessment i s probably the
si mpi est and most cost-effective way to f r ustr ate a counterforce attack.
But as a declared pol i cy, we bel i eve it would be vi gorousl y opposed as
both dangerous and unstabl e (an acci dent coul d theoreti cal l y precipitate
a nucl ear war).
Neverthel ess, we bel i eve that the technicaZ capabilities to launch
ICBMs on attack assessment shoul d be devel oped for thei r deterrence
value--so that no adver sa9 would dare assume that the U.S. coul d not
l aunch the force out from under any attempted'hi sadng attack. They
shoul d not be costl y. We al so see such techni cal capabi l i ti es as pro-
vi di ng addi ti onal f l exi bi l i ty in crises, where the decl arati on of an
emergency readi ness to l aunch the force on attack assessment coul d
serve as an addi ti onal rung i n an escal ati on l adder. But we do not go
so far as t o urge that the "survi vabi l i ty" of ICBMs be predicated on
pol i cy of l aunchi ng the force on attack assessment; the assurance of
- ' ICBM r etal i ator y capabi l i ti es shoul d not rest upon such an awesome
commitment.
The possi bi l i ti es for i mprovi ng the prel aunch survi vabi l i ty of
ICBMs through rebasi ng are numerous, but we have seen none that l ook
a
promising as a sol uti on f or the enti re f or ce. Our appreci ati on of the
rebasi ng concepts now bei ng consi dered for the U.S. ICBM force l eads
us to bel i eve that if appl i ed to the enti re f orce, they would be very
costl y, of debatabl e ef f ecti veness, and l i kel y to sacr i f i ce some i m-
por tant attr i butes (e.g., accuracy and securi ty) of the present f orce.
O f course, the search for rebasi ng concepts conti nues, but a good si ngl e
sol uti on i s not yet i n si ght.
UNCLASSIFIED
-82-
. Di versi fi ed basi ng of the I CBM f or ce has been proposed as a means
t o di ver si f y vul ner abi l i t i es, but i t will impose most of the same draw-
backs as a si ngl e r ebasi ng sol uti on: i t will be costl y, ther e will be
arguments over the r el ati ve effecti veness of. the sever al basi ng schemes,
and some of the better char acter i sti cs of the pr esent si l o basi ng ar e
l i k el y t o be l ost. Di ver si fi ed basi ng concepts will r esul t i n a frag-
mented I CBM for ce; and i f adopted pr i mar i l y t o improve the overall for ce
sur vi vabi l i t y, each f r act i on will i nevi t abl y be subj ect t o sur vi vabi l i t y
comparisons with SLBMs. The fai l ure of some por ti ons of the I CBM for ce
t o measure up to the per cei ved sur vi val standar ds of SLBMs would r esul t
i n pkessures to el i mi nate mar gi nal or i nfer i or . fragments. Hence, pi ece-
meal dismemberment of t he I CBM f or ce might be faci l i t at ed.
I n sum, i f the ICBMs have no unique r ol e wi t hi n t he U.S. st r at egi c
postur e, we do not see a promising future f or them. Thei r evol uti on .
would then hinge upon over al l f or ce su r vi vabi l i t y, i wd we have not been
abl e t o i dent i f y any good force- wi de opti ons f o r ' r d i ev h g present con-
cer ns over I CBM sur vi vabi l i t y agai nst a preempti ve counterforce attack.
.k,
x
SEVERAL PROMISING mTTURES
I f i t i s accepted that each of t he st r at egi c of f ensi ve f or ce ele-
ments coul d have a speci al role or r ol es wi t hi n. t he U.S. st r at egi c
posture, then we see sever al i nter esti ng al ter nati ves for the I CBM
for ce. We can t hi nk of at l east four speci al r ol es for ICBMs; perhaps
ther e ar e more.
Li mi ted Str ategi c Oper ati ons
Whi l e provi di ng LSO capabi l i t i es cannot 'be claimed as the excl usi ve
domain of I CBMs, we bel i eve t hat ICBMs possess and promise more of the
desi r ed at t r i but es for LSOs than any ot her st r at egi c for ce element. I f
LSOs ar e a s peci al r ol e f or I CBMs, t he pr i nci pal concerns will be t o
ensur e effecti ve and f l exi bl e t ar get i ng wi t h minimum col l at er al damage.
*
Even though these concerns seem exagger ated to us. Ne bel i eve
they refl ect a preoccupati on wi th a narrow def i ni t i on of t he purpose
of str ategi c for ces, wi th extr eme thr eats, and wi th simple anal yti cs.
' I
UNCLASSIFIED
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t
. ::r . >'.:
._ . '.
'- .I'
The prospects f or cont r ol l i ng unwanted col l at er al damage whi l e
achi evi ng. t he desi r ed l evel of t ar get damage are dominated by del i ver y
accuracy. There i s l i t t l e doubt that the accuracy of bal l i s t i c mis-
si l es can be improved markedly wi th the techni cal means avai l abl e; the
questi ons have to do wi th whether we should improve I CBM accuraci es
(because of thei r counter for ce i mpl i cati ons), by how much, and by what
means.
The hi ghest possi bl e weapon del i ver y pr eci si on should be sought
for LSO capabi l i ti es. For some LSO tasks, zero-CEP vi a ter mi nal homing
i s desi r abl e SO that the smal l est possi bl e yi el d, or even conventi onal
expl osi ves, can be employed where condi ti ons di ctate or permi t. Whi l e
r el i ance on termi nal or external navi gat i on ai ds for assured r et al i at or y
capabi l i t i es might be eschewed, we see no reason why thei r benefi ts
f or lesser conti ngenci es shoul d be forsworn. For LSOs, we bel i eve that
I CBMs shoul d not be r estr i cted to al l - i ner ti al guidance. Thi s imposes
an unnecessary limit on del i ver y accur acy and, hence, upon the requi red
weapon s i ze and consequent col l at er al damage.
Options f or i mpr ovi ng t he t ar get i ng fl exi bi l i t y of ICBMs f or LSOs
i ncl ude addi ti onal C funct i ons, expl i ci t t ar get i ng, var i abl e yi el d,
sel ectabl e fuzi ng, ear th- penetr ati ng weapons, et c. Al l seem worth-
whi l e- - at l east i n smal l quanti ti es. None seem ver y costl y compared t o
a new mi ssi l e or rebasi ng the I CBM f or ce, Perhaps the greatest impedi-
ment t o t hei r development is that they ar e not l arge- scal e, force- wi de
program options.
3
Large numbers of ICBMs ar e not r equi r ed f or LSOs, nor ar e l ar ger
missiles wi th heavi er throw wei ghts. I n some cases, MIRVs are l i abi l -
i t i es r at h er than assets. I n the pr esent U.S. I CBM for ce, our most
accur ate mi ssi l es ar e MIRVed, and that coul d be awkward f or some LSOs.
A few very accurate single-RV missiles shoul d be avai l abl e.
Si nce l ar ge numbers o f missiles ar e not r equi r ed for LSOs, we be-
l i eve that eZi t e force concepts ar e attr acti ve. Some of the featur es
desi r ed f or LSOs coul d detr act fr om the per for mance of other str ategi c
tasks i f implemented throughout t he I CBM force. Moreover, high-
confi dence hard- target k i l l capabi l i t i es (f or LSOs agai nst sel ected
hardened f aci l i t i es ) would not engender as much concern about t hei r
UNCLASSIF'IED . -
counter for ce potenti al i f -they were acqui r ed onl y i n l i mi ted numbers
f or an el i t e f or ce.
An el i t e I CBM f or ce f or LSOs mi ght consi st of a squadron (50) or
a'wing (150) of Minuteman mi ssi l es. If t he el i t e for ce were seen as
presenti ng a pr ef er ent i al t ar get f or a Sovi et LSO, i t might be deployed
i n Wing V I at Grand Forks, under the Safeguard ABM umbrella. That
arrangement might al so be seen as advantageous i n the r ati onal e for
mai ntai ni ng a si ngl e Safeguard si te: i t coul d shi ft the pr i nci pal
threat scenari o from an al l - out attack to LSOs, a threat that may be
techni cal l y l ess demanding (or overwhelming).
I f we have any r eser vati on about the . potenti al futur e of the I CBMs
f or a speci al r ol e i n pr ovi di ng LSO capabi l i t i es wi t hi n t he U.S. stra-
t egi c posture, i t i s not wi t h t he qual i t i es of ICBMs, but wi th the con-
cept of LSOs. It remains t o be shown whether LSOs ar e a durable and
useful concept contri buti ng to deterrence. I f they are, we think ICBMs
will evol ve as a pri nci pal i nstrument of that concept.
Assured Reserve Capabi l i ti es
Another speci al rol e i s t hat of pr ovi di ng a r eser ve of str ategi c
nucl ear weapons that can be hel d i nvi ol abl e and avai l abl e for a
l ong ti me i n general nucl ear war. Whi l e t he abi l i t i es of U.S. stra-
t egi c offensi ve for ces t o survive i n the tr ansattack per i od have been
wi del y anal yzed and discussed, f ar l ess at t ent i on has been gi ven to
the l ong- ter m sur vi val of str ategi c for ces i n a ser i ousl y degraded
postattack environment. Because of t h ei r rel ati ve autonomy during ex-
tended patrol operati ons, nucl ear- powered submarines of f er at t r act i ve
sur vi val char acter i sti cs (wi th the possi bl e excepti on of assured two-
way command communications) f or per i ods of sever al months i nto a post-
attack peri od. Beyond that time, the breakdown of l ogi s t i c support
would probably limit t he avai l abi l i t y of SLBMs.
We bel i eve that the U.S. I CBM f or ce has sever al shortcomings f or
both immediate and l ong- ter m postattack sur vi vabi l i ty. The immediate
sur vi vabi l i t y problem (past the fi r st day) i s t i ed up wi th provi di ng
el ect r i cal power, whi l e the l ong- term probl em i n the fol l owi ng weeks
i s the same as for t he SLBMs: l ogi s t i c support. Both of these
UNCLASSIFIED
probl ems coul d be favorabl y affected by making the mi ssi l es dormant.
We bel i eve that dormant oper ati on of a por ti on of the Minuteman ICBMs
woul d provi de a l ow- cost reserve force wi th l ong- term survi vabi l i ty,
at l eas t u n t i l a si gni fi cant Sovi et counter for ce capabi l i ty emerges.
I n t he more remote future, i f Sovi et counter for ce capabi l i ti es
domi nate the questi on of I CBM survi val i nto the postattack per i od,
r ebasi ng of ICBMs f or an assured reserve f or ce may.be an at t r act i ve
opti on. One concept worth expl or i ng i s the basi ng of dormant mi ssi l es
i n secure underground bases.
The needed s i ze of such a reserve i s probabl y no more than a
hundred megatons del i ver abl e t o several hundred separate aimpoints.
The use of MIRVed missiles would reduce the requi red number of del i ver y
vehi cl es, but they mi ght be l ess manageable than a l ar ger number of
smal l mi ssi l es wi th si ngl e warheads. In any event, we do not see why
reserve force mi ssi l es shoul d be burdened wi th the features and costs
f or qui ck reacti on, hi gh accuracy, or sophi sti cated defense penetrati on.
SLBMs are cer tai nl y candi dates for an assured reserve for ce. I n
a competi ti on, land-based ICBMs may have two advantages: Fi rst and
perhaps most.important, I CBMs i n underground bases are l i kel y to be
cheaper to stor e secur el y out of harm's way than SLBMs continuously
at sea. Second, ICBMs can probabl y be stor ed (and control l ed) consi der-
abl y l onger than the oper ati onal l i f e o f SLBMs wi thout land-based
l ogi s t i c support.
Counterforce
I f a speci al r ol e f or I CB Ms is to pr ovi de counter for ce capabi l i ti es,
we see an i nter esti ng, but very cont r over si al , future. Any investment
of counter for ce capabi l i ti es i n the ICBMs will be seen by many as de-
st abi l i zi ng, unl ess they are rebased t o bet t er s u r vi ve any for eseeabl e
Sovi et attack. On the other hand, even i f the ICBMs were more securel y
based, some would chal l enge the need for substanti al counterforce capa-
b i l i t i es unless the U.S. had aspi rati ons toward a di sarmi ng fi rst- stri ke
posture. Ei ther way, any attempt to devel op a si gni fi cant counter for ce
capabi l i t y i n the U.S. str ategi c postur e i s a j ourney on a bumpy road.
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We ar e aware of some sophi sti cated arguments for acqui r i ng (or threaten-
i ng to acqui r e) counter for ce capabi l i ti es, but we do not thi nk they
would car r y the day i n the pr esent publ i c debate.
The techni cal r outes to substanti al counter for ce capabi l i ti es in-
cl ude improvements i n hard-target k i l l capabi l i t i es through increased
accuraci es and yi el ds, or through a l ar ger missile wi th gr eater throw
wei ght. There i s l i t t l e doubt of the techni cal feasi bi l i ty of ei ther
approach. I f constr ai ned to the pr esent mi ssi l e, the most expedi ti ous
route mi ght be to augment the i ner ti al gui dance wi th r adi o ai ds. With
a l ar ger mi ssi l e, l ar ger yi el ds and gr eater numbers of RVs could com-
pensate for the accur acy l i mi tati ons of al l - i ner ti al guidance.
I f ICBMs are rebased to make them r el at i vel y immune t o attack,
then the need for counter for ce improvements beyond those needed f or
LSOs i s hard to j usti fy. Mor eover , i f the requi rements for counter-
force hard- target k i l l capabi l i t i es do not exceed those needed f or LSOs,
t he qual i t i es of t he pr esent fi xed si l o basi ng for LSOs seem pr efer abl e
t o t hose of most rebasing concepts. I f counter for ce capabi l i ti es wel l
beyond those r equi r ed for LSOs ar e somehow j u s t i f i ed, then f or a cr i si s-
stabl e posture, the adopted basi ng scheme would have t o enorce an un-
favor abl e exchange upon the attacker i n terms of counterforce capabi l -
i t i es expended versus those destroyed. Some of t he basi ng opti ons for
a new I CBM now bei ng studi ed by the Air For ce meet that cr i ter i on, but
so do sea basi ng opti ons.
The possi bi l i t y of i nvest i ng any counter for ce capabi l i ti es i n
SLBMs r ather than i n land-based ICBMs cannot be di scounted if the de-
velopment of substanti al hard- target k i l l capabi l i t i es i s del i ber at el y
undertaken by the U.S. With external gui dance ai ds, we bel i eve that
the accuracy of SLBMs can be adequate f or hard- target k i l l capabi l i t i es
wi thi n the Tr i dent missile throw weights. Thus, ICBMs might have t o
compete wi th SLBMs f or any speci al count er for ce r ol e i n t he U.S. stra- .
tegi c postur e.
We are not sanguine about the competi ti veness of the avai l abl e re-
basi ng opti ons for ICBMs. They ar e not cl ear l y super i or to the SLBMs
i n su r vi vabi l i t y, even though t hey ar e di ffer ent i n t hei r vul ner abi l -
i ti es. The new basi ng opti ons ar e l i kel y to be much more costl y than
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the pr esent si l o basi ng, possi bl y as costl y as submarine basing. HOW-
ever, i f the desi r ed or r equi r ed counter for ce capabi l i ti es coul d be
ef f i ci en t l y packaged i n a r el at i vel y s mal l number of missiles--say one
or two hundred--then the cost of the r ebased for ce would be bounded i n
proporti on. A numer i cal l y smal l for ce woul d l i kel y r equi r e a l ar ge
mi ssi l e wi t h many accurate MIRVs, and such a mi ssi l e may not be com-
pati bl e wi th mobi l e basi ng concepts that have been proposed.
Equi val ence
The concept.and precepts of strategi c equi val ence presentl y re-
fl ect some concerns about str ategi c postuze asyrmnetries and thi rd- party
percepti ons. These i ndi cate a s peci al r ol e f or ICBMs i n the U.S. stra-
tegi c postur e because ICBMs are an i mportant part of the Sovi et posture.
I f the U.S. wants ICBMs i n i t s st r at egi c force posture so as t o
look equi val ent to the Sovi ets, then r etenti on of the exi sti ng for ce,
which i s pai d for and r el at i vel y i nexpensi ve t o maintain, i s an attrac-
ti ve opti on. Given onl y t he pol i t i cal i mper at i ves of matching the
Sovi ets i n possessi on of ICBMs and i n aggr egat e numbers of st r at egi c
del i ver y vehi cl es, t her e i s no more cost- effecti ve choi ce than the
pr esent Minuteman for ce.
I
If the measures of equi val ence become more sophi sti cated and in-
cl ude comparisons of I CBM throw weight, numbers of RVs, accuracy, etc.,
s i l o basi ng will continue t o offer cost- effecti ve opti ons for maintain-
i ng equi val ence. Refi tti ng the pr esent si l os wi th a l ar ger mi ssi l e,
whi l e not cheap, w i l l almost cer tai nl y be cheaper than most other means
f or i ncr eas i ng bal l i s t i c missile throw weight.
Thus, the present si l o- based I CBM for ce coul d conti nue to be an
i nexpensi ve way to mai ntai n equi val ence wi th the Sovi et str ategi c pos-
ture. Whether t he r at i onal e for equi val ence . i s suffi ci ent l y devel oped
and accepted to secure a s peci al r ol e f or ICBMs i s probl emati cal . I f
the concer ns for the sur vi vabi l i ty and s t abi l i t y of ICBMs l ead to re-.
basi ng, then we doubt that the I CBM will conti nue to enj oy i t s present
substanti al cost advantage over other str ategi c offensi ve for ces. In
any event, we bel i eve t hat t he pol i t i cal cl i mat e will favor equi val ence
over s t abi l i t y, and that the economi c cl i mate will continue to favor
the present si l o- based ICBMs over mi ssi l es other wi se based.
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THE OUTLOOK
We bel i eve t here are at l east f our i nt erest i ng and uni que rol es
f or I CBMs wi t hi n t he U.S. st rat egi c f orce post ure. The f i rst and
cl ear est i s speci al i zed capabi l i t i es f or LSOs pr ovi ded by i mpr ovement s
i n a por t i on of t he pr esent I CBM f or ce. The second i s a cost - ef f ect i ve
st r at egi c r eser ve f or ce achi eved by dor mancy of a port i on of t he pres-
ent mi ssi l es. Thi s shoul d suf f i ce at l east unt i l t he Sovi et s possess
a, Bf gni f i cant har d- t ar get ki l l capabi l i t y; af t er t hat , any st r at egi c
r eser ve f or ce wi l l r equi r e mor e secur e basi ng t han wi l l be af f orded
by our present I CBM si l os.
. ' 4 : ' . , , &
The t hi rd rol e f or I CBMs i s t hat of .a l i mi t ed f orce wi t h durabl e
hi gh- qual i t y count erf orce capabi l i t y. Thi s rol e i s cl ouded by l ast i ng
concerns about st abi l i t y and di sarmi ng f i rst - st ri ke post ures, and by
pot ent i al compet i t i on Fr om SLBMs. Ef f ect i veness i n t hi s r ol e does not
depend on hard- t arget ki l l capabi l i t y; r at her ; i t depends on a cost -
ef f ect i ve and compet i t i ve basi ng scheme t hat is rel at i vel y i mmune t o
at t ack. We have not r ecogni zed such a scheme yet .
The f our t h r ol e is t hat of providiqg.ICBM'equivalence at l ow cost .
The key her e i s to ret ai n as much as possi bl e of t he present si l o bas-
i ng; ot her basi ng schemes sur r ender . t he subst ant i al cost advant ages of
I CBMs over SLBMs and bombers.
We bel i eve t hat t hese speci al rol es f or I CBMs pose i nt erest i ng and
at t r act i ve f ut ur e al t er nat i ves f or t he U.S. I CBM f orce, especi al l y when
cont rast ed wi t h t he f ut ure we see i f t he I CBMs ar e deni ed any speci al
r ol e wi t hi n t he U.S. st r at egi c post ur e. We have seen a0 new basi ng
opt i on f or I CBMs t hat woul d cur e t hei r shor t comi ngs wi t hout al so sacr i -
f i ci ng some of t hei r best char act er i st i cs. Whi l e t he sear ch f or bas-
i ng opt i ons shoul d pr oceed, of cour se, we are persuaded t hat t he f ut ure
of t he U.S. I CBM f or ce shoul d not be predi cat ed- - i nadvert ent l y or i n-
t ent i onal l y- - on f i ndi ng a single new basi ng scheme. I t mi ght j ust cost
us t he ent i re f orce, and we t hi nk t he U.S. st rat egi c post ure woul d be
much t he wor se f or t he loss.
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