Accountability Corpus v Tanodbayan The complaint for electioneering against the Director of Trade et. al.

, filed before the Comelec was withdrawn and later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelec Legal Assistance Office moved to enter its appearance for the complainants. The Tanodbayan denied the motion on the ground that it has exclusive authority to prosecute the election offenses of public officials. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TANODBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES? HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either explicitly or implicitly, authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. Instead the constitution granted such power exclusively to the Comelec in order to insure a free, orderly and honest elections. It is the nature of the offense that determines the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec regardless of who the offender is, whether a private individual or a public officer. Nuez v Sandiganbayan The constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan was questioned as being violative of (a) due process and equal protection (since private persons charged with estafa or malversation are guaranteed the right to appeal first to the CA and thereafter to the SC, while private persons charged with public officers before the SB are allowed only one appeal, and that is, to the SC), and (b) no ex post facto rule (since before the promulgation of PD 1606, the right to appeal to the CA and then to the SC was already secured by Secs. 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948). HELD: (1) The claim that PD 1606 deprives petitioner of the equal protection of the law is hardly co nvincing considering that the Decree is based on a valid classification. The Consti. provides for the creation of a special court, known as Sandiganbayan (SB), and the rule is settled that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, among w/c are the due process and equal protection clauses, must give way to specific provisions, such as the provision on the creation of the SB. (2) It hardly can be argued that a particular mode of procedure provided in a statute can become the vested right of any person. An accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Consti., as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and w/c he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him. Would the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal, deprive those, like the petitioner, who are charged in the SB, of a right that is vital to the protection of their liberty? Its answer must be in t he negative. The innocence of guilt of the accused is passed upon by a 3-judge division of the SB. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, otherwise, the Presiding Justice designates two other Justices from among the members of the SB to sit temporarily in a division of 5 until a decision is rendered w/ the concurrence of 3 Justices. If convicted, the accused can seek a review in the SC on

a question of law or the substantiality of the evidence. Petitioner makes much of the facts that there is no review by the SC of facts. What cannot be too strongly emphasized is that the SC, in determining whether to give due course to a petition for review of a decision of the SB, must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for conviction in criminal cases have been satisfied. Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan Petitioner, governor of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to restrain the Sandiganbayan & Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution & hearing of criminal cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan w/o legal & constitutional authority since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. HELD: (1) We find the petitions impressed w/ merit. Under Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. 1 of the Consti., the Ombudsman (as distinguished w/ the incumbent TB) is charged w/ the duty to: "Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, em ployee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." On the other hand, Art. XI, Sec. 7 of the Consti. provides that "The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." Now, then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent TB (now called Sp. Pros.) is clearly without authority to conduct prel. investigations and to direct the fili ng of crim. cases, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective Feb. 2, 1987 Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, May 19, 1988 (1) The power of investigation conferred on the Ombudsman covers both administrative and crim. offenses. Accordingly, the Sp Pros. cannot claim that he retains the specific power of prel. investigation while conceding the general power of investigation to the Ombudsman. The greater power embraces the lesser. (2) The fact that the informations filed by the resp. from Feb. 2, 1987, were invalid bec. they were not authorized by the Ombudsman, is not a jurisdictional defect. The Informations could have been challenged in a motion to quash under R 117, ROC on the ground of lack of authority on the part of the officer filing the same. If this ground was not invoked, it is deemed waived under Sec. 8 of the same Rule. Xxx At any rate, to settle this question, we hereby rule that the decision of this Court in this case shall be given prospective application only from April 27, 1988. xxx

To recapitulate, the Court holds that, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply prospectively to cases filed in Court prior to said resolution and pending trial nor to convictions or acquittals pronounced therein. The exception is where there has been a timely objection and a spec ific challenge, as in this case, where the Court ordered the nullification of the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp. Gonzales. Amendment to the Constitution Santiago v COMELEC, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this proposition to the peopleDo you approve the lifting of the term limits of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution? The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya- Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors- oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfins Petition to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments: 1. The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. 2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not after publication. 3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. 4. The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the peoples initiative. 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose. The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco. ISSUES: 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision? 2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision? 3.

Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid? 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution? HELD: NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. 1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing Constitutional changes. 2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin maxim Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid. 3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. PIRMA v COMELEC, GR No. 129745, Sept. 23, 1997

Lambino v COMELEC, GR No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006 On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed

an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative. HELD: NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. For

sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are: 1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely; 2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.