In Thw Imue

*Thailand

Insurgency *

S A&M UNIVERSITY

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH,NANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. Davison ACTING ASSISTANT COMMANDANT colonel Benjamn D. Cap8haw

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Showof Forcein ForeignPolicy . Defensein India . . . . . COL Drew J. Barrett,Jr.,USMC 3
9
16
24
32
. . . WG CDR M. K. Chopra,IndianAir Force,Ret . . . . LTC JamesW. Barnett,Jr.,USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Earl B. Shaw . Dennis Menos

WhatPrice ChinasBomb? .

EarlyAmericanExplorationof Lop Nor . ThailaridInsurgency:A New Cause? . MilitaryTechnologyin West Germany . Army Nationbuilders . Afro-AsianCountries . . . . . .

. TheodorBenecke 41
47
54

. LTC John J. Saalberg,USA

. GEN Nguyen Bao Tri, South VietnameseArmy . . . . LTC JohnW. Baker,USA

LTC Lee C. Dickson,USA . . . . . . . John Erickson . . C. C. Too

ArmyForcesin RiverineOperations .

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75
82

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The VIEWS expressed in this ms azine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the f Staff College. US Army or the Command and Genera

Editor in Chief COL Oonald J. Delaney Associate Editor COL George S. Pappas Army War College Assistant E$tor LTC A. Leroy Covey Featuras Editor LTC Charles A. Gatzka Production Editor Helen M. Hall Spanish-American Editor MAJ Juan Horta-Merly Brasilian Editors LTC Paulo A. F. Viana LTC Samuel T. T. Primo Pubffcation Officer LTC Edward A Purcell Art and Oesign Charles A. Moore
Oonald L. Thomas

MILITARY REVIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Arm Commsnd snd General $teff College, Fort Leaw enworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Porfu/u ese.i se of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Department o the Army, 28 May 1955. second-class postage rid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subacriptioo rates $4.00 (US currency) a year m the Unltad States, nited Statea military peat offices, and those sountries which ara mambars of tha Parr-Amer/can Postal Un!on Gncluding Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countriaq single copy prica 50 canta, Addraaa subscwptlon mail to tha Book Daparfment, U. S. Amry Command and Ganeral Staff Collaga, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

The Military

Review

announces

the selection REVIEW

of the following AWARD

afilcle

horn the June 1967 issue as a MILITARY Clausewitz on Limited War

ARTICLE:

WiUtim D. Franklin

Iheauthor
:onflict from

writes simple,

that

Karl

von Clausewitz belligerence

visualized through total

a! spectrum war.

of

~narmed

He con

:Iudesthat Clausewit%did not look on completely unrestrained violence w tbe only method of/conflict, but offered another alternative-that of Imited war, The conflict in Vietnam is particularly suited to conditions )f limited war in the light of a neo-Clausewitzian strategy.

COMING:
hneral Bruce C. Clark&, Retired, in G2: Member of the Operation Team, writes of the tendency to consider intelligence personnel as technician, thue lowering the influence of the G2 below that of the G3 on the operations team: Ke suggests that, if both do their jobs well and effectively, each will be a coordinate member of the operations team in a tactical unit. Lieutenant Colonel George S. Jones III, in Strategic Planning: discusees the ro]e of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the development of national security Micy. They annually prepare a Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) which is increasingly important as it is an initial point in the development ofthe annual militsry budget. He euggests that the Joint Chiefs be designated M the principal military advisors to the Congress.

SHOW OF

FORCE

Colonel Drew J. Barrett, Jr., United .Statee Marine Corps

IN POLIC FOREIGN

WO basic requirements for the successful employment of a show of force are a clearly defined political purpose or objective for the operation, and credibility for the chow of force that ie being undertaken. There also are other considerations, which either have been pertinent to some past situ ations or appear likely to be important in the future. Theee are timing, a rec ognition of the poeeibility of failure and the consequences thereof, the im. pact or acceptability of a show of force before world opinion, and the require ment for close coordination of military and political activities in the conduct of show of force actions. A study of several successful exam ples of the uee of the show of force indicatee a politiecl reaeon for eaeh of them, The purpose of the expedi tions againet the pirate rulers of Tan: gier and Algiers was to insure /ecu rity of commerce on the high seae. When the US Navy wae ueed to deter 3

Panama Canal. In the Lebanon opera tion, the purpose was to inhibit exColonel D~ew J. Barrett, Jr., US Marine Corpe, ie with the 8d Marine Divieion in Vietnam. He eerved with the let Marine Division in the Pwfic during Werld War II, in China, and in Korea, Other aeeignmante include dut~ with Marine Cerps Headquarter in Washington, aud en the etaffe of the Marine Corpe Schools in Quantico, ~Virgittia, and the 6th Fleet Cem i mmder in tti Mediterranean. He ; holds a B.S. in Ecouomice from iUar ~ahd Couege, Huntington, Weet Vir ~ginia, and is a 1986 .gradwate of the US Army War College.

it muet be credible. If any circums tance Ieade the intended object of the show of force to believe that the ini tiator of the action will not or cannot employ the force in queetion succees fnlly, the intended chow of force can not be successful. A neeeeeary condition to eetablish the credibility of an intended show of force is an adequate and properly positioned force in relation to the etrength that the intended victim can bring to bear. The adversary rnuet also . be convinced that the intent and the will to employ the force portrayed are preeent. In addition, timing and sui priee may be important. Miliiq Review

:.-.

. s.

SHOW OF FORCE There are several examples which illnetrate credibility. President Theo dore Roosevelts actions in deterring Colombias expected opposition to the Panamanian revolution in 1903 was certainly credible to the Colombians. The US desire for a transisthmian route for the Panama Canal was well known; US naval units were known to be in the area; and the Colombians knew the limitation of their own forces in seeking to counter those of the United States. When US ships arrived on the scene, followed a few days later hy official US recognition and a promise to pro tect the new Panamanian Government, no practical choice was left to the Colombians. The show of force was adequate and credible, and the polit ical objective of access to the isthmus for construction of the interocean ca nal was a reality. Lebanon Operation In the Lebanon action of 1958, Pres ident Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic was well aware that the United States had indicated an intention to aid the government of Lebanon., He did not take any steps, however, to reduce the pressures on Lebanon until he was actually pre sented with evidence of that intent. Perhaps, the US intent to provide as sistance to Lebanon was not yet cred ible to him. President Nasser may have been surprieed at the speed of the US re sponse to the request of Lebanons President Camille Chamoun for assist. ante on 14 July. Nasser undoubtedly knew that 6th Fleet amphibious forces were in the Mediterranean since that was their habitual location. He may have been misled, however, by news paper accounts that the 6th F1eet was largely deployed along tbe coast of
August le67

Spain at the time. However, Nasser may not have been aware that there were three US amphibious squadrons in the Mediterranean at the tilme, rather than the ueual one; and he may not have known of the speed with which Army elements could be placed in Lebanon. A force of 2,000 Marines landed at Beirut the day following the Lebanese

Commodore Matthew C. Perry request, and a similar force landed the next day. Two days later, another such force arrived by sea, plus additional Marines by air from the United States. The following day an Army battle group arrived. By D-day plus 12, over 14,000 US troopsincluding 6,000 Ma rines and 8,000 soldiersand 72 tanks were on tbe scene. An impressive force, adequate to provide the assist ance which had been requested, had been placed in Lebanon in a very short time. The intent and will of the United States had been convincingly demon strated by the very fact of the troop deployment. There is no incontrovertible proof that the US actions in Lebanon caused 5

SHOW OF FORCE imnortant. There was no reason for ha~te in the actkme against the Bar bary Statee by Commodore Edward Preble in 1803 and Stephen Decatur in 1815. Their actione could have been conducted either earlier or later with equal etTect. The came could be said for Com modore Matthew C. Perrys conduct in opening Japan to intercourse with the United States. Perry initially ar rived in Japan in July 1858, delivered hie meseages for the Emperor, and stated that he would return the next spring with a larger force. On his re turn the following March, he was suc ceeeful in negotiating a treaty which met US objectives. While there may have been some applied psychology in Perrye method of operation, there is no indication that any preciee degree of timing wae involved in hle success. Timing More l!IIIMWd In more recent examplee, timing has aseumed greater importance. Even a weak state can marehal world opinion and, perhaps, outside aesietance if given time. During the Panama inci dent, timing was important becauee US recognition of the new Panama nian Government had to be accom plished before Colombia could garner eupport. Since it is eaeier to extinguish a emall fire than a large one, timing will be even more important in future shows of force. Timing waa crucial to the Cuban miesile crieie eince US actions had to succeed before the So viet missiles became operational. It wee critical in the Lebanon crisie to prevent the overthrow of the govern ment before corrective measures could be taken. Any nation employing a show of force runs the risk of embroiling it eelf in hostilities. Should the adverMiiiiry Review

E-the cessation

of both the rebe}licm against the Lebanese Government and of the external support to that rebel lion. The facts are, however, that both did stop. The US Ambassador to Leb anon at the time stated that withont the: . . . presence of American forces in Lebanon, the cnei-cwould have con tinued, and the conetrwctive elemente in the countm, whicle ultimately were able to carrg ont pree$dential electione and to fimt a eoktivn to the crieic, could not have achieved their parpoee. Both baeic ingredient to credibility were demopatrated in the Lebanon op eration. The force involved wae ade quate and present, and the will to em ploy it had been made believable by the epeed, scope, and decieivenese with which it had been deployed. National Character There is one other aepect of credi bility which is important, especially in modern timee. Starting from the baeic premise that the primary purpose of any show of force ie political in na ture, it follows that euch an operation has to be consistent with national character. The customary behavior of the n@ion initiating the action, and ita actione just preceding a period of teneion, can eerve as a valid indica tion of its resolution and intent. Thue, it ie more likely that a nation which hae established a pattern of aggres sive actilon in its foreign policies will be believed, if it should undertake a show of force, rather than one whoee behavior has bordered on the timid. Another factor affecting a chow of force is one of timing although there are occaeione when it may be rela tively unimportant. when the objec tive state is powerleee to oppose the intervening power aid lacke the meane of acquiring help, timing may not be 8

..

..

SHOW OF FORCEc sary choose to reeiet rather than to accede to pressure, the choice then muet be made by the initiator whether
to continue to preee the matter to

poesible hostilities or to desiet and accept the consequences of having failed. In effect, by resisting, the pro spective advereary has undertaken a show of force of hia own. President Woodrow Wilson under took a chow of force in 1919 by intro-

intended to imprees Spanish officials and provide a meane to evacuate Amer ican nationals if necessary. This mie eion initially was aucceesful, but the JWne was left in Havana unneces sarily long. when the ship was de etroyed at ite mooring, the public out cry was such that the iesue of war or peace was removed from the Presi dente hands. It is apparent that fhe possible consequence of the dispatch

ducing US forces into Siberia in an effort to dilute Japanese influence, hoping to induce the Japanese to with draw when US forcee did. Tbe Presi dent did not expect his ploy to work. He had foreseen the possibility of fail ure, and, when it occurred, he with drew without further involvement. The introduction of the USS Main~ into the Cuban revolutionary situa tion in 1898, on the other hand, wae different. The presence of the ship was August 1967

of the Maine to Havana were not ade quately considered in advance of the action. Consideration of the possible con sequences of chow of force actions, therefore, must occur during the de liberation which precede their under taking. These are basically political queetions, tempered by military ad vice as to capabilities and possible mil itary consequences. Until recent years, concern about 7

SHOW OF FORCE world reaction to shows of force did not particularly apply. The use of force in international relations was more or less accepted, and communica tions were such that the matter prob ably was ended before it became gen erally known. Today, the use of force in interna tional relations is not condoned, and rapid, worldwide communications and press networks immediately focus world attention on hostilities or the threat of them. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy took immediate steps to inform both the public and international organisations of actions taken and contemplated, to gether, with the reasons for them in both the Lebanon and Cuban missile crisee. It can be expected that any future shows of force by the United States will be subject to the same condition and, therefore, must be designed to meet at least some degree of world approval. Coordination of political and mili tary actions ie essential to a success ful show of force. Even in the histor ical examples cited earlier, coordina tion was recognized as important although the actual mechanics may have amounted to little more than in suring that the mission given to peo ple such as Commodores Decatur and Perry on their departure wae coneiet ent with the national aims which their actione were to eupport. The instruc tions and premission coordination pro vided Commodore Perry, in which Perry himself assisted in the drafting of his own instructions, typify the na of the coordination employed. Under current conditions, the need for coordination assumee greater im portance because a close relationship exists between crises, even though the areas of crises may be separated by thousands of miles. The means with .which to achieve coordination are available and efficient. The Cuban mis. sile crisie provides an example of close coordination. The bridge of the USS Piercethe destroyer which inter. cepted and inspected the only Cubabound ship that was stopped during that emergencywas in direct voice contact with the White Houee during the actual interception. On the other hand, close coordina tion during the early etages of the Lebanon action was surprisingly de ficient. The American Ambassador knew that the landing would occur, and when, but he had no direct com munication with the amphibians task force which would execute it, nor with the landing force commander ashore after the landing had been made. This situation wae remedied quickly after the landing, and botb communications and liaieon were established. The ab sence of such a mechaniem at the out set, however, invites trouble. The requirement for coordination hetween military and political eche lons at all levels, from decision through planning to execution, is critical. The requirement for close coordination car ries with it the parallel need for ade quate communications throughout and for close understanding of all partici pants of the importance of the polit ical nature of the entire undertaking.
ture

DEMOCRAC
DEFENSE in INDIA
Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Indiaa Air Force, Retired

ESPITE the passage of time, the definition of democracy, a form of government of the people, hy the people, and for the people, is still the best. It is certainly the most suit able definition of Indian democracy which ie dietinguiehable from at leaet two other forms of government prev alent today. One is the government of the class, ae in Communiet countriee, which is aleo sometimes described as democratic. lhe other is dictator ship in wh]ch an individual or a cau cus dominates. There are many features which distinguish the liberal democracy of India from the latter two, but, pre eminently, one is inspired by consent and the others are inspired by force, Therefore, if India is to retain one of her principal impulses of govern ance, the control of military power, which represents the moat organized form of force, is of crucial importance. The Constitution of the Republic of India provides the mainsprings of Policy and the framework and guide hgott 1967

u
9

INDIAN DEFENSE lines of government. Unlike the US Constitution, the Indian Constitution ie a massive document of about 100, 000 worde dealing with diverse sub jects in great detail. Four of ite pro visions are pertinent. It provides for a Parliament at the center and an Assembly for each of the 17 states of India. The Parlia ment consists of a President and two Houses of the Legislature. Of the two, the House of the People is the meet powerful and is directly elected on a country-wide basis by the vote of the adult population. The House of Assembly is similarly elected. The Parliament and the Aeeembliee then elect the President who becomes the chief executive of the state. The President cane upon the leader of the largest party in Parliament to form a Council of Ministers with the leader ae the Prime Minister, Thue, a Cabinet form of government comes into being, and is responsible to the Parliament, and, ultimately, to the people. A similar arrangement aleo comes into being in the statee. The Constitution providee that all citizens of India, irrespective of religion, caste, or color, but subject to the prescribed age limits, are en titled to vote. Elections to the Parlia ment and the Assemblies are, there fore, by all the people. In order that theee electione be scrupulously fair, the Constitution also laye down the machinery for elections which operWing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Iudtan Air Force, Retired, is military cerreepoudent for the Emg lbh-language Indian newspaper, The Indian Express. A freqctent contrib utor to the MILrrmY REVIEW, he & the author of Indi& en the Nuclear Path which appeared in the Janumw 1967 issue. In k&__-., _ ates throughout the country under a Chief Election Commissioner. The position and statue of this officer are carefully guaranteed and guarded in the Constitution itself. Each citizen of India hae been granted the right of freedom which is one of the seven fundamental righti guaranteed in the Constitution, By this right, which even the Parliament cannot abrogate, he has the freedom of epeech, expression, and association which are at the heart of the process of chooeing representatives. The Constitution provides for the establishment of a judiciary with detailed eafeguarde for ite independ ent, impartial functioning. One of its duties ie to safeguard the citizens fundamental rights. Thrust et Democracy According to the Constitution, In dia must hold elections every five years. These have, in fact, been held regularly since the Constitution was inaugurated in 1950. The latest elec tion, which was the fourth of its kind, was held in February 1967. There were 20 main patiles, a few miscel laneous organizations, and a large number of independence who took the field. The Congress Party won abso lute majoriti in the national Parlia ment but with numbers .gm@ly re duced. Only seven of the 17 states returned the Congrees Party to pbwer. One state returned Communists, another a purely regional party, a thi~d a rightist party, and seven statee were forced into coalition governments, with the Congress Party having the largest number eleeted ~n each ease but lacking an absolute majority. Wldle this fourth election has underlined the prevalence and thrust of liberal democracy, it has also
Military Revise ..&i

INDIAN DEFENSE
brought into relief the role of mili There can now tary power in India.

be two lines of future development. Even though there are governments of varying political complexions at the national level and in the states, they could function together smoothly as in the United States. In that event, 3ni&ar?? PQV?a P2r&Wtm ita E4xm&

democracy are the reservoir of power are important factors in determin ing political trende. In present-day India, the soldier is a popular figure. He symholizea order and efficiency, in contrast to the riots and the rough and tumble of political life. He also evokes sympathy for a Yar$%$y& zmw& SC haa m%?akm+

United Nation.

The Indian sokfisr symbolizes order and etliciency and hae contributed much to United Nations peace-keeping forces main functilon of security against external dangers. But they may be at loggerheads, in which case military power will be involved in internal threats as well as external dangers, and will become a key factor in the stability and integrity of the state. One may ask how the armed forces have figured in the preeent election, remembering that the attitudes and responses of the peopl~who in a Mfl$t 1967 of hie life since independence in dif ficult border areas, defending the country against China or Pakietan. If he met reverses at the hands of the Chinese, the fault, it is considered, wae the politicians, not his. Most families have sent their sons to the armed forces which have ex panded rapidly during the last five yeare. Expansion coupled with con flicts with the two neighbore have
11

INDIAN DEFENSE engendered countrywide military con sciouaneak+ and, therefore, have accen tuated appreciation of the role of military power in national life. Consequently, all national parties sought to project their military pro-, grams to the public in their mani. festos. True to form, these programs ~ made a variety of approaches to the 1 defense problems. The Congress Party stayed with its policy of nonalign ment dnd cautious arms buildup. The rightists were in favor of a military alliance with Western Powers. The Pore extreme among the rightists also advocated such an alliance, hut, i addition, wanted massive militari z tion bf, the people and the producI tion of nuclear weapons. Adequate Military Strength There was a universal consensus on one matter: There should be ade quate military strength to ward off aggression and to counter threats. Any government of tomorrow which is incapable of this will have trouble with the people. Although wanting strength, the people were not worried about how this was to be achieved, but left the matter to those who were at the helm of government. Military power, as such, was, theref&-e, not an election issue. More intimate and immediate problems swayed the minds of the voters. These problems included ris ing prices, unemployment, religious safeguards, municipal facilities, edu cation, standards of morality in public life, and general performance of the ruling par~les. Besides, neither the parties nor the people at any time supported any method other than the constitutional democratic prncess for goed government. The Indian Constitution Iiste two eeparate sets of responsibilities, one 12 for the Union and the other for the states, with the proviso that, in an emergency, the Union can also take over the subjects of tbe states. De fense falls in the Union list, and the armed forces, militia, and their in frastructure are built, controlled, and administered by the Central Govern ment. The states have nothing to do with them, although they can always ask for their assistance. A recalcitrant state must, therefore, face the fact that it has no military power of its own, and that the troops stationed within its territory owe their alle giance to the Central authority. Article 53 The crncial provision of the Con stitution in this connection lies in Article 53 which says that, The supreme command of the Defenss Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and the exercise thereof shall be regulated by law. The President is tbe chief executive of the state. Since he holds the supreme command, this signifies that military authority is subservient to civil authority. But the command can. not be exercised by the President on his own in an autocratic manner; it has to be exercised in accordance with the law framed by the Parliament. Insofar as military power is vested in civil authority and the civil author ity has been forbidden ita untram meled use, this provision forms the cornerstone of government under liberal democracy. Preoccupied with a host of issues and being a large body, the Parliament is concerned with defense only at the highest level. Of three principal facets of power-control, strategy, and commandParliament is interested mainly with control, seldom with strat egy, and never with command.
Military Revi@

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INDIAN DEFENSE Three forms of parliamentary con trol are prevalent at preeent. By pass ing the Indian Army, Navy; and Air Force Acts, the Parliament has con stituted the three arme of service and given a three-pronged structure to the defense services. Only Parlia ment can alter this structure. The defense budget has to be presented yearly to the Parliament which thus exercises financial control over de fense. The Parliament has also estab lished Estimates Committees which review periodically the functioning of the defense machinery in its various aspects. Chain of Command The President holds the levere of command and operation. His role is nominal; the real power lies in the hands of the Council of Minieters which ie the Cabinet under the Prime Minister. From the Cabinet, authority is further channeled to the Defense Minieter who is equivalent to the US Secretary of Defenee, his various committees and aeeisting councils, and the headquarters of the three services. The Defense Minister is normally a senior member of the Cabinet and has a nnmber of com mittees. The most powerful is one which he heads himself and includes two Deputy Defense Ministers, the Defense Secretary, the three Chiefs of Staff, the Scientific Advisor, and the Financial Advisor. All major decisions of interministerial and interservice character are made here. The Chiefs of Staff have a dual position. As a committee, they are the expert military advisors to the Defense Minister. As individuals, they are the heads of their respective services, and are responsible for the recruiting, training, eqnipping, and administration of each of their serv ices. Along with their headquarters, they provide a demarcation line be tween high defense policy on one side and administration and operation of the service on the other. The fulcrum of this system lies in the Ministry of Defense headed by the Defense Secretary. This Ministry plays three rolee. It is the Secretariat

.. .

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. ..

, .,,. ...,.! .... ,t, Inform. t;..

s
6. .... . of India

Govev>,me,zt

Shri Swaran Singh, Defense Minister of

India to the Defense Minister, collecting and feeding him information and provid ing him with assistance. Aided by this Secretariat, be discharges his responsibilities as the ministerial executive of defense, as advisor to the Cabinet, and as the governments spokesman on defense in the House of the People. It ie also the body which controls and supervises the functioning of the army, navy, and air force. Finally, it controls and 13

A#gust 1967

INDIAN DEFENSE administers a large number of ordnance factories, defense undertakhgs, : and military institutions. There are certain features of this mechanism of defense control which are not obvious but are noteworthy. The higher levels of tbe hzgh command, where policy is made and principal direetilvee are iseued, are preinserted into this machinery and yet having a highly distinctive indi viduality is the figure of the Financial Advisor. He is not a defense official, but is the representative of the Min istry of Finance, an entirely separate civilian body headed by another bigh ranking Cabinet Minister. He not only has the final say in the alloca-

\,

INDIAN HIGH
COMMAND
WFlm COMWDER
I I CASINET I
I 1 DEFENSE MINISTER I

) DEFENSE MINISlfRS COMMITFEES I

I DEFENSE SfCREFARY MINISTRY OFOEFENSE I 1

1111
CHIEFS OF STAFF 1 CHIEFOF AIR STAFF

sccftlltll~s

I CHIEFOF ARMYSTAFF

NkvrilSTAFF

CHEFOF

111 AMY HL400UARTEFIS

HFADOWITERS

NAVAL

HFAD%RTERS

dominantly civilian. Apart from the Supreme Commander, who is a civilian, the Cabinet is composed of civilian Mhisters responsible to the Parliament where military elemente are negligible. In the echelon below the Defense Minister, all officers are civilian except the three Chiefs of Staff. The Ministry of Defense, composed of many hrmdrede of officials, is completely civilian.
14

tion of defense funds, but also supervises their disbursement at all levels of the military complex from the headquarters to the lowest formation. In theory, as well as in practice, the purse strings of defense are in the bands of officials outside defense. As far as status goes, the Chief of Staff is high in the Indian hierarchy. He is number 22, if he holds the rank of full general, in the Warrant
Military R8view

INDIAN DEFENSE of Precedence in which the Preeident is number one. In the body of the Idgb command, however, he ie one among many outstanding oIR+sIs. As a body, the Chiefs of Staff have direct accese to the Defense Minieter, but as individual heads of their respective service, they must approach him only through the Defense Secretary. They have no direct access either to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. Thus, in military mattere, the Chiefe of Staff make recommenda tions with regard to the eize, organi zation, weapons and equipment, and infrestructure of the armed f orcee. But the ultimate decisions are in the hands of the Cabinet and are imple mented by the chiefs only after the Cabinet has iesued directives. Reeourcee for the maintenance of the armed forces are produced by organization which are controlled and administered by the Minietry of Defense. Theee resources include weapons and equipment of all types, military cantonment installations, areae, and etrategic roads, railways, and airfielde. Scientific reeearch into weapons systeme and allied mattere is aleo controlled by the Minietry. Tbe armed forces have no authority and no resourcee of their own to manufacture arms, but they make recommendation, provide specifica tions and technical advice and some times make their own experts avail able to institutions producing weapons or doing reeearch. Tbe value of the Indian defense control system, which hae been in operation for only 17 years, cannot be fully determined. Certain gape in it are, in fact, already being pointed out. It ie said that the Parlia ment as a whole has been rather indifferent, leaving matters too much to ite executive wing which has allowed defenee to deteriorate. It ie aleo eaid that tbe military control is not only under civil authority, which is justifiable, but also too much under the civil servant; which ie not justi fiable. The higher echelons are considered topheavy and complicated with far too rhan y committee and procedural tangles to be efficient enough for quick decisions. The Indian syetem ie based upon the old pre-1963 British model which hae eince heen reformed by the creation of a unified inter aervice etaff for higher defense plan ning and strategy. Some such reform, which ie in conformity with the present-day requirement of war, should also be introduced in India. There are critics who say that the Indian debacle against the Chinese in 1962 was due, at least partially, to deficiencies in the Indian K]gh Com mand. But these are mattere which relate to a few parts of the system and their functioning, and not to the eystem ae a whole with its characteristic inspiration, character, and mold. Th]s system, conforming to the highest tradition of liberal democracy an! rooted in the Constitution and built on the principles of civil-military rela tionship, has so far enabled India to pass with reasonable success through the streseee and etorms of the post war period. It bodee well for the future.

iqmt 1967

15

WHAT
PRICE
CHINAS

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Barnett, Jr., United State8 Armg HE successful explosion of Communist Chinas first nuclear device in October 1964 was a dramatic event. It brought an automatic membership for Communist China in the nuclear club, and produced a radical change in foreign relations between China and her neighbors. The explosion demonstrated vividly the Communist Chinese ability to make it on their own without Soviet assistance, and proved conclusive] y that there had been a revival of science and technology in China. It served as an example of the ability of a highly disciplined Communist state to focus national energies on a difficult undertaking. There is a strong possibility that the event signified for Mao Tse-tung, and other high part y officials, an accomplishment that is equivalent to the btirning 18 . Militery Review
k%

CHINAS BOMB of the mortgage by the average home buyer. Certainly, there must have been a tremendous sense of relief when the successful test explosion at last prO vided a return on several years of con siderable investment. Magnitude of Task When the original decision was made in Peking to embark on a nuclear weapons development program, it is not certain that the Chinese decisionmakers had any real estimate of the magnitude of the undertaking. It also is doubtf u] that they had any accurate understanding of what their true costs had been, even after their first detona tion was a success. This is not to say that they were unable to recount their annual operating expenses or to inven. tory the new facilities that had been created ( Figure I). Undoubtedly, they could identify such costs as the bills that had been presented by the Soviets for goods and services furnished prior to their ideo logical clash, and they could reca pitulate other out-of -pocket expenses. There is a sharp distinction, however, between a mathematical summation of the costs of labor and material and a calculated understanding on the part of the Chinese Communist leadership of what they have denied their coun try. By their decision they have di verted a significant fraction of their strained economy toward an undertakLieu fenant Colonel James W. Bar-. nett, Jr., is with Headquarter-s, 7th Engineer Battalion, 5th Infantry DiVkion (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado. He holds an M.S. degree from the Military Ir&titute of Tech nology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and, pmov to his present assignment, wea graduated from the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn sylvania.
laaust 1967 ing which can contribute little to the economic well being of their nation. Except for satief ying a normal cu riosit y, there is little value for West erners, or even the Chinese themselves, to know the monetary amount of the Chinese investment in nuclear devel opment. On the other hand, it might help Western observera to understand the Chinese better if they recognize the degree of importance that has been placed upon their nuclear program by the Chinese Commnnist leaders. It is useful to such an termine how much Peking has been willing to sacrifice to obtain the weapon. Itemized Requirements In my analysis, the requirement for conducting a nuclear development program have been itemized with their valne estimated in US dollars. The US dollar value was converted into a meas ure of Chinese value by determining the value of complete indnatrial plants which could be purchased by Commu nist China on the international mar ket. A purchase of industrial plants on tbe international market requires the completion of a hard money transac tion which not only is identifiable, but also ie translatable into US dollars. Also, such purchases would represent a true outlay by Chinaa diversion of money or goods from internal con sumption. By converting estimated outlays fo; nuclear development into productive capacity equivalents, one can better understand what the Chinese have de nied themselves in future production of consumer and producer goods by electing to expend their resources for an economically nonproductive pro gram. The requirements for producing a nuclear device include a supply of fie 17

under.qtandi tO de.

CHINAS BOMB sionable material of adequate mass to sustain a chain reaction, a meana with which to assemble the material rapidly into ita critical geometry, and a mech anism which triggere the entire proc eee. These requirements imply a need for materials, personnel, and facilities to work the materials, and a technol ogy that PrOvidea the proper scientific and engineering disciplines necessary to create the desired end products. Major Operations Figure 2 identifies the major opera tions which must be performed to cre ate a nuclear device, and allocates fa cilities and personnel resources to each operation. It estimates the time neces. aary to conduct the operationa prior to the first test firing, and then cal culates the cost of operationa in terms of capital investment and operating expenses of corresponding US opera tions. The individual values may not be accurate enough to satisfy a good accountant, but they permit an ap proximation of tbe total cost to be made. The Chinese nuclear program from 1957 through the first exploeion in
1964 cost an estimated 2.5 billion US dollars. The current annual cost is 47o

million US drdlara, not including any costs associated with the development of delivery means for nuclear war heads. Several other cost estimates have been made public. The wide range of difference should be an adequate caution to use them more for their qualitative rather than their quantitative value. In any event, the point iq not that a determinable amount of money was spent for the first Chinese bomb, but that Pekirrge decision to spend scarce resources for this purpose had a significantly detri mental effect on an already strained economy.
18
L&..+ ,

As a first comparison, the cost of Chinese bomb can be contrasted with the benefit to agriculture of a major capital investment in chemical fertilizer plants. Nothing is more im portant to the Chinese people than ag. riculture, and more of the Chineee pee. ple are directly affected by agriculture than any other sector of the economy. It is a land of 600 million peasants out of a total population of over 700 mil lion. Agriculture probably accounts for roughly one-half of Chinas gross na. tional product. A new fertilizer plant was pur chased by India on the world market in 1965 at a cost of 65 million dohars and it produces 375,000 tons of chem ical fertilizer yearly. Tbe total Chi nese production of chemical fertilizer in 1964 was estimated to be approxi mately 3.25 million tone. Estimates for Communist Chinaa actual require ments for chemical fertilizer vary from 14 million to 40 million tons. In the most extreme caae, therefore, 100 new fertilizer plants at a total cost of 6.5 billion dollars would be required to meet the demand for 40 million tons. In the moat conservative estimate, 38 new plante, costing 2.4 billion dollars, would provide all of the fertilizer needed. Other Factors Unquestionably, there are other fac tors which muet be added to convert available fertilizer into harvested grainproper application, favorable weather, and even the transportation necessary to distribute additional ton nage. Confronted with an absolute rra cessity for expanded food grain pro duction and a practical limit to the amount of arable land that can be made available, Chinas onlf apparent solution to her dilemma is to increase the yield per unit of area farmed.
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CHINAS BOMB

20

Military RwioW

CHINAS BOMB Chemical fertilizer, therefore, ap peais to be Chinas best hope. for solv ing her acute food shortage problem. Furthermore, until sbe can feed her self, only a small fraction of her for eign exchange can he directed toward the purchase of the capital goods that are so desperately needed for her in dustrial growth. ExpansionIs Slow In spite of the neceeeity to expand her fertilizer industry, China baa tsken only modest steps to do so. A new chemical fertilizer plant has been constructed in Shanghai at a cost of 25 million dollars and it produces 100, 000 tons of fertilizer per year. In ad dition, China has recently purchased two complete plants from an Italian manufacturer for the equivalent of 14 million dollars. The capacity of these two plants is estimated to be about 50,000 tons per year combined. Pekings decision to invest 2.5 bil lion dollars in a nuclear device instead of in fertilizer plants may have doomed millione of Chinese to death by starva tion at worst, or to chronic malnutri tion, at best. Its society desperately needs increased food production. The prospect of an exploding population makes it necessary to feed the equiva lent of a new Canada each year. Pe kings economy perennially produces shortfalls in farm outputshortfalls which have an almost immediate im pact on industrial production as well and there is an urgent need to improve yield per acre as the only apparent means by which to increase the na tional production of food grains. The cost of Chinas nuclear program may also be thought of in terms of steel production had an additional 2.5 billion dollars been invested in new steel plants. ,. In 1963, the US Government inves tigated the inclueion of a large steel mill as a part of its economic aid to India. Estimatee priced the proposed miil, with an annual capacity of 2,600, 000 ingot tons, at 1.8 billion dollars, or 408 dollars per ingot ton. By extrapolation, if the Chinese Communists had elected to invest 2.5 billion dollars in new steel capacit~, they could have added approximately 3.5 million tons to their annual pro duction. An incremental addition of that magnitude is equal to half of what they were able to achieve during their First Five-Year Plan. It would be equivalent to a 25 percent increase in their present national capacity. What effect this would have had on other industry can only be inferred, but tbe successful expaneion of a basic induetry such as steel could not fail to stimulate growth in construction and manufacturing. Energy Resources As a third alternative, Communist China might have invested 2.5 billion dollars in ite capability to generate tbe energy required for industrializa tion. Energy resources are a useful in dex of tbe modernity of a nations so ciety because the replacement of hu man and animal effort by machines is characteristic of all the truly advanced nationa of the world. China habitually is regarded as a land where ant-like hordes of coolies toil at tasks that could be performed more efficiently by powered machinery. That image will persist, moreover, un til the kilowatt-hour and the British thermal unit replace tbe arms, Iega, and backs that deliver the bulk of Chinas energy today. Production fig ures for electricity y, petroleum, and coal are pitifully low for a nation of 700 million people. An installed kilowatt of thermal 21

~ August 1967

CHINAS BOMB - electric generating capacity costs ap proximately 250 dollars. Hydroelectric plants cost slightly more than therrnal electric, plants in capital investment, but they operate for Mss. An invest ment of 2.5 billion dollars in new elec tric generating atationa would add 10 could also be compared to an equiva lent investment in petroleum. Based on reasonable cost comparison yard sticks, an investment of 2.5 bfllion dol lars in the Chinese petroleum industry potentially would have added 16.8 miilion tons per yearmore than twice the total production in 1963. It is possible that China nray not possess the reserves of crude petro. leum neceseary to develop a 24-million. ton-per-year petroleum industry. But if China doea have substantial un tapped reserves in petroleum, aa recent reports indicate, a large investment in its development would result in the growth of an industry of great value, both for internal consumption and for uae in the world market. Petroleum in Foreign Exchange The Cbineee must buy the means with which to produce manufactured products until their own industry de velops to the extent that it can build its own new plants, and there ia no doubt as to the value of petroleum in foreign exchange. Petroleum is one of the products for which the worlds de mand is expanding rapidly, and the best customers for petroleum products also are the beat eourcee from which to purchase industrial equipment. A fourth Cbineee alternative could have been the development of a paper industry. The estimated cost of a l,OOO-ton-per-day paperboard mill is approximately 60 million dollars. An investment of 2.5 billion doliars in papermills, therefore, could have pro vided the Chinese with a produtilve capacity of approximately 41,500 tons of paperboard per day. At current prices, this level of production would create an export potential of approxi mately 2.5 billion dollara per year. Compared to Chinaa recent foreign Militery Review

The cost of the Chinese bomb could heve provided over 100 milfion barrels of petrOIeum annually

If an average plant efficiency fac tor of 80 percent is assumed, this new generating capacity would add 70 bil lion kilowatt-hours to Chinas annual production of electric power. This in creaae ia more than hvice the electrical energy produced by China in 1963. Such relatively abundant power could be used for many industrial purposes, as welI as for the sorely needed ex pansion of irrigation in support of agriculture. The coet of Chinas nuclear program ,22
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CHINAS BOMB trade volume history of three to four billion dollars per year, the addition of 2.5 billion dollars in paperboard ex. ports would be of major significance. A paper industry would be an impor tant complement to Chinas highly agrarian economy. Two distinct advantages would ac crue from a decieion to turn marginal land to the raising of pulpwood trees and, concurrently, to employ large numbers of the rural population in their planting, care, and harvesting. Pulpwood ie one of the few money crops which not only grows on mar ginal land, but also serves as a con servation measure. There would be rel. atively little retraining necessary for the people involved in raising and har vesting the trees. It ie one way that China could extend her total arable land, and probably turn to a more profitable pureuit some marginal land that ie presently yielding small returns of other crops. A final comparison concerns the value of improvements in transporta tion to a country the size of China. The 2.5 billion dollare spent on the Chinese bomb could buy the following representative mix of transportation: 40 airfields at five million dollars. 400 short-range jetliners at 2.75 million dollara. 100,000 trucke (2 ?&on) at 4,000 dollars. o 4,000 miles of two-lane, allweather road at 200,000 dollars. This probably is a poor mix for China today. She needs more railroade and rolling stock, more roade and auto motive equipment, and relatively few jet passenger aircraft. Nevertheless, it is indicative of tbe tremi?ndoue in crease in the ability to move people and things that could have been ob tained with an investment equivalent to that made in nuclear weapon devel opment. These examplee of productive facili tieswhich could have been obtained for the cost of the first Chinese nu clear device-are not suggested as al ternative solutions to Chinas economic dilemma. On the contrary, the adop tion of any one area to receive the sole benefit of the investment would be as unwise as the decision to ignore them all. Each separate example does, how ever, dramatize the impact of divert ing large amounts of scarce resources to a nonproductive undertaking. In terms of real value, it might be said that their first nuclear explosion has cost the Chinese 14.4 million tons of chemical fertilizer per year, and that the lack of 14.4 million tons of fertilizer has coat them 36 million tons of food grains per year. Alternatively, the cost might be viewed as a Ioet opportunity to triple their national production of electric power or petroleum or to increase their annual production of steel by 25 per cent. Stated another way, the cost could be considered as 2.5 billion dol lars per year of Iost paper exports that might have been realized under other circumstances. It appears, however, that the priori ties established by the Chinese Com munist leadership place political gain ahead of economic development, and that possession of nuclear weapons is regarded as a substantial political as set by Peking. It is difficult to foresee circumstance in which Chinas Pos eeesion of the nuclear weapon will be worth the price the people have paid for its development.

Mlgsst1967

23

Early American of Lop Nor

ROBABLY few Communist Chi nese are aware that an American geographer, Elkiworth Huntington, was the first Westerner to explore in the vicinity of Lop Nor, a salt lake which lies near their nuclear test site. He ie better known for his many publi cations about the influence of climate upon the progress of civilization than for hie explorations in central Asia. In fact, he was pursuing information on thie climatic philosophy when he traveled to Lop Nor during the winter of 1905-6. He emphasizes this reason for the trip when he states that he went: . . . not onlg for the purpoee of learniwg what ie really there, but also to ascertain whether the lake of LoPNort now merely a reedy ewamp, hm been ewbject to great fluctatimw in eize dunng the gladal epoch, amt even during the era of tecorded history. Itis true that another Weetern ex24

Exploration
Earl B. Shaw

plorer, ah Italian, Marco Polo, trav eled the caravan route to Cathay, which led just south of Lop Nor, more than eix centuriee before Huntingtons exploration, and that Marco Polo is well known to the Chinese of today. But the Italian never explored the Lop Nor Lake; in fact, he had no reasou for exploring it becauee his main miss ion was to stndy Chinese life and customs in Peking. Moreover, he may have been fearful of leaving the known caravan route for a look at the ealt lake. Marco Polo considered his paesage through the desert south of Lop Nor as one of the worst parts of his en tire journey from Italy to China. He describes it as a desert of sandy plains, eterile mountains, and evil spirits which were said to lure travelers to destruction with extraordinary illu sions. Lop Nor is located at 40 degrees 30

Review Military

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LOP NOR minutes north and 90 degrees 30 min utes east. However, it is not its lat itudinal location that made. traveling in the area so difficult for Marco Polo and Huntington arid which makes it a useful nuclear testing site for the Chinese Reds. Rather, it is its location within an area surrounded by moun tain barriers and hundreds of miles from the sea that creates the desert environment which is so difficult for surface travel and human occupation, and consequently suitable for nuclear tests. location The lake lies 1,200 miles north of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and north of the lofty Tibetan Plateau and the high Himalaya Moun tains. The Pacific Ocean, also partly cut off by high mountains and pla teaus, is even farther away from Chi nas nuclear site. The closest portion of the Arctic Ocean is about 2,000 miles to the north and separated from the nuclear blasts by a mountain bar rier along the Siberian frontier. The Mediterranean Sea is as distant as the Arctic, and theAtlantic Ocean is twice as far away. Due to these great distances, mois ture-laden air moving toward the con tinental interior drops most of its pre cipitation before reaching Lop Nor. It is forced to give up moisture on the windward sides of surrounding mountains and warms as it descends the lee ward slopes facing the desert, thus greatly hindering condensation. The difficult terrain between north ern India and the Tarim Basin, and the primitive means of travel at the beginning of the 20th century, made Huntingtons journey toWard central Asia extremely difficult. He started from Kashmir in April 1905, crossed both the Himalaya and Kunlun Moun tains, and did not reach Charkhlik, on the southern edge of the Lop Nor Desert, until December of that same year. Similar travel time was required for journeys between Peking and the Tarim Basin. Prior to the 1940s, the main movement on the Imperial high way between Peking and Sinkiang Province, which inchrdes the Lop Nor and Takla Makan Deserts, was by stringless, two-wheeled carts, pulled by horses or mules. The long journey took at least 120 days of actual travel, allowing for the usual rest stops. To day, the traveler may fly to Chinas northwest province in a few hours, or make the trip by automobile or rail in a few days.

! ~ !. ~ \

Earl B. Shaw is Professor of Geog raphy at Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts. He r-sceived his Masters degree from Washington 1 University, Saint Louis, Missouri, and ; his Ph. D. franc Clark Unhjers$ty in Worcester. The author of several books and a frequent contributor to prof es skmal geographic magazines, hie artt cle, The McMahon Line, appeared in the July 1966 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW. 5 iugust1967

Tarim Oasin The Tarim Basin, Asias driest area, includes approximately 215,000 square miles, a region about the size of Colo rado and New Mexico combined. It lies between the Tien Shari Mountains on the north and the Astin Tagh to the couth. These encircling ranges are responsible for a pattern of interior drainage, and no river, not even the Tarim, reaches the sea. Wind-eroded sediments also are deposited within the lowlands because of the high ele vations on all sides. Huntington describes the Tarim Basin as follows: On every eide except the northeast

25

,....
LOP NOR it ia surrounded by lofty anew.dad mountairw. At their ba80 a barren belt of typical piedmant gravel, like a vest beach .of shingle from ten to forty milee wide, eucks into its poroue depthe all but the Zargeet of streams from the anowg mountains. At the lower edge of the sloping gravel plain, pebbles give place to fine coil and clay, and more or leee of the water either., reappeare in qwinge which irrigatd oaees of vegetation, chiejly gnarled poplars, tamariske, and reeds. On the southern side of the basin, between Kashgar and iIhotan, the zone has a width of ten to twent~ milee, but far ther east it diminished to almost aoth ing near Lop-Nor, a thaueand miles from Kashgar. All the chief oases are eitcmted in this zone. Farther from the m.onntaine vegetation di8aMSar8; and the center of the bath is occupied by two great deeert areas. One of the8e, toward the weet, called Takle-Makun, hae been $hown bg fSven A.1 Hedin to be compo8ed almoet wholly of huge 8arui dunce ranging up to two or three hundred feet in height; the other the Lop deeert at the eaetern end, was u+ known eoxept on the edgee until the jourtwy described in these pages, proved it to be in large part a vaet salt plain. Lop Nor Eaplored After eecuring equipment, supplies, and helpers at Charkhlik, Huntington began hie journey through the LoP Nor region on 23 December 1905. He probably choee to explore the region in winter rather than summer because summer temperatures are extremely high, with July averages of 92.7 de grees Fahrenheit and a record maxi mum of 118 degrees Fahrenheit. Also, he had heard Chinese descriptions of a part ef the Lap Nor indicating that it coneisted of muck which could swal 2e low men and animals, and, if there was any truth to this tale, the muck should be frozen during the winter period. Huntington traveled eastward along Marco Poloe route with four men, five camels, and 45 days provisions. Theee consisted of mutton, rice, bread, on. ions, dried apricots, and tea for the men, and two pounds of linseed cake per camel per day, Huntington arrived at Miran on Christmas Day. Here, he discovered the ruins of an ancient Buddhiet town wh@h wae, perhaps, 1,600 years old. He spent four days at Mlran and at Abdal, a few miles away, probably to estimate their ancient population and study the culture briefly. The data he collected was ueed to support hie the ory of a eeries of long-term climatic changes. Uninhabited Region On 29 December, the party con tinued eaetward, and Huntington made the following comments about tbie part of hbJ reeearch: We entered what ie probablg the greateet uninhabited continental re gion in the world, outeide the polar regious. In an area equal to thti of Great Britain and ITetand, where the popnkztion number8 40 ?dtion, there is not a eingle inhabitant. Much of it has neser been vieited by any explorer,.. or even by the native8 of nearbg areae. After daye of 8teady travel, we eaw absolutely no sign of living man. Ex cept in rare cazee, there wae no vege tation which even camele could eat, awd no water 8ave bitter poota. BW travel ing in the dead of winter when the temperature fell to zero F. eve~ night, and by carefcdlg cho~ng out aad melting chunks of hard white ice ffom the mictkt of the gettowish maehy ma terial covering meet of the pools, we . MiUtery RWi8W

LOP NOR managed to get water, which in that part of the world is called dmnkable. We were troubled with thirst meet of the time, and the indigestion caused bg the 8alt water laeted a month or two after we ceased ushzg it. When Huntington left Abdal, he continued east along a former shore line of LoP Nor: To the south barren gravek stretched interminably toward the make preparation for a plzmge into the utterly unknown region to the north. We estimated that, barrtng ac cidents, we ought to reach the 8att 8pring at Altmieh Bulak in aiz days. The 8prang.@ 90 milee away in an air line di8tance, at the foot of the Kuruk Tagh, qr DrII Mountains. There was no kuowing, however, what delays we t ,might encounter or how leng we might have to hunt for the spring. In euch

mountains: to the north the brownieh white ezpknee of the old lake-bed stretched eullen and unexplored to a sea-like horizon, or faded away in a dusty haze. Nothing relieved the mo notony except a sharp lacwtrine bluff, sixty feet high ri8ing 8uddenly from the insignificant zone of vegetation. The zone was a mere .stmp of brown reeds, dotted with bvight blue pools of brine, unfrozen becauee so saline. When he reached a section: . . . where the water was not quite 80 eaZty ae eleewhere, we halted to klgust1967

cold weather the camels could water, or, at a pinch, twelve. Accordingly, we cut tWelVe da!188upp111of ice, @Uf tati riek faggote enough to last eight daye if u8ed very spamngly. Thie, with thirty days provisions which still re mained, twenty days linseed cake, and the camp equipment, made the camele loads 80 heavy that it was impossible fer any ene to ride. . . . For four weary day8 we 8tumbled northward acrose the interminable ealt pfain of the old lake bed. Rough!
go ten days without 27

bitterly

LOP NOR An ordirwrv frozen ploughed field would seem like a macadam road in comparison. imagine the choppiest sort of a eea foith white-cape a foot or two high, and freeze it solid. When we camped in what we hoped tWe a soft epot, and tvied to drive in the iron tent pegs, most of them bent double. We had to uee an axe to hew down kummocke of rock ealt a foot high be fove we could get places emooth enough for sleeWug. Each night, when we pulled off our eoft-soled boots, the onlg kind in which we could keep warm, we realized how the bastiwado must feel. The elownese of our stumbling progrese, ,the boundlese-ness of the eea-like h,orizon, the hittev morning wind, and the uncertainty as to ?ohen we ehocdd find something diferent made ue feel that the old lake muet have been endless. Following the above description of the rough terrain encountered during four days on the unknown northern route, Huntington gives his theory for the origin of the irregular surface features: ZMrittg the ancient lakee long con tinued procees of dryi%g up, there was a deposit of unknown thickneee of al most pare rock salt. When the ealt finallg became dry, it eplit into penta gom from five to twelve feet in diam eter; the procese being similar to that which givee rise to mud-cracke when a mud-puddle dmeeup, or to basaltic columns when lava coole. The wind, or come other agency, apparently depos ited dust in the eracke; when rain Or enow fell, the .moieture browght n.v rww salt from below; and thzw the cracke were solidl~ fil!ed. When aext the plain became dry, the pentagons appeared aga$n. Tl@ time the amount of ma terial was larger, and the pentagone buckled upon the edges, and became 28 ......

saucer-ehaped. By comstle.re repeti tiocte of th$e procees, or of eomething amdogous to it, the entire lake-bed be came a mass of pentagone with ragged blistered edges. Twice zoe encountered faiut hollows where for a mile or two the plain was damp and comparatively smooth. Tra veling in euch placee was much eaeier than elselohere; bnt we did our best. to avoid them, for we remembered the r Chineee tales of muck which swallowed horse and rider. 13egond the main bodg of the lake our worst fears were al moet reattzed. The salt aeewmed a whiter fresher appearance, and ~egan to look slightly damp. I toae riding ths bigge.it of the camele whose load of wood and ice had now been partlg used. Suddenly, I found myself turn in9 a summersault backward of the camel. His hind lege had broken through the saline cruet and plunged a yard deep into soft, oozg muck. As he strnggled ponderously to extricate himeelf, his front legs sank in; and water came bubbliwg UP in muddy poole about the proetrate creaturee etomach. Two other camets fell into the mire at the came time. In the haste with which we began to tear off. the loads, I forgot to investigate whether I was eemouel~hurt. Relieved of their burden the two emaller camels extri cated themselves. My big, heavg ani mal, however, was eo completely mired that we had to pat ropee around his legs and pult them out on to felts which we epread on the soft mud to keep him from sinking into it again, It was a grim jeet on the part of Na tm-e to lead ue into an rmfrozen watem bog in zero weather in a region eo cold and dvy that we, were carrying ten or twelve dage eupply of ice for drinking water. If the mud had been a little softer we ehould have lost the

MilitaryRSVitM

LOP NOR camels, and might never have r-e tww,ed to corroborate the Chinese tales of bottomless muck. . . . On the f ourth morning of our wearg nzarch, we were cheered bg encounter inga shore lke, marked by a steep bluff thirty feet high. On climbing to its top we supposed that we had left the old lake bed behind. After walking glittered with innumerable gypsum crystale, or was spar8ely studded with aeolian mesas, made of pink and green ish clag, and from thirty to sixty feet high. On the sixth day, the red plain gave place to a maze of mesas. As we were traveling at rrght angles to their long axes we were obliged to make countless huge zig-zags in order to

~-----

.-_.

.. /

The camels loads were so heavy that no one could ride

a quarter of a mile among aeolian mesas of clay, however, we dropped d~n another bluff, and were in the adt plain again. We had crossed a fnger-shaped peninsula, ten or twenty times as long as it was wide. All that day and until noon of the fifth dag we mcountered similar peninsula or elon gated islands, separated by bays and aoands of similar dimensions. The szes were all dir%cted northeast and 80uthwest. . . . Shortly after noon of the fifth day we found easy traveling for a time. A fantastic red plain, the soft dry bed of an older ezpansion of the lake, @t 1967

find breaks through which camels could pass. Nevertheleee we made four teen miles that day, and by sunset were close to the mountains of Kuruk Tagh, and only eight miles from Alt mish Bulak. Before camping for the night we found driftwood buned in a long dry flood channel. It was the first sign of life, or of the work of running water that we had seen for six days. By noon of the seventh day, the Huntington party reached one of their main objectives, the spring at Altmish Bulak. Here was water for both man and beast. 29

LOP NOR At AItmish Bulak, the party rested a day, chopped new ice, cut fagots, and got ready for a start the next morn ing toward the ruins of Lulan, 30 miles to the southwest. Drrring the stop, however, all the camels but one small animal, attracted by a herd of wild tensive salt plains now surrounding the water body were covered with water during the wet phase of the same cycle. Here, he disagrees with other sci entist who believe that the ealt plains near the present lake are merely dry

It was so cold plates had to he put en the fire to keep the food from freezing

camels, etrayed away. The party, how Yr, fOund the animals and returned them to camp. The remainder of the Huntington stndy of Lap Nor deals largely with his theory that the lakes small size is the result of a dry phase of a longterm climatic cycIe, and that the ex-

playas abandoned by the Tarim River. They reason that, when water evapo rates, the salty silt remains, and, as salt and silt accumulate, the lakebed rises. When the river fills one terminal lake with silt and ealt, the stream shifts to another which has been low ered by the wind while dry.

LOP NOR Huntington took careful notice of all features of the geographic emvironment, both cultural and physical. He commented on the climate, topography, vegetation, soiis, and geology all along the way. He conducted this examina tion on foot or on the backs of slowly plodding animals-the best methods of travel if one wishes to get the feel of a region.

.:..

CONSOLNIATED INDEX
The Military Review announcea publication of the MILITARY REVIEW CONSOLIDATEDINDEX 1922.1965. The index, compiled by the Kansas State University, contains 30,000 subject entries and 10,000 anthers. This valuable research tool will be available 1 July 1967 from the Book Department, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. Price $2.00 postpaid.

ORDER YOUR COPY NOW

hgllst 1s67

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32

THAILAND INSURGENCY since 1961 primarily on domestic is sues, has achieved to date only mar ginal success. Strategy Shift The chief adversary of the insur gency has heen the national govern ment at Bangkoka dictatorial re gime, in the eyea of the Communists, completely indifferent to the economic plight of the countryside. With the buildup of US forces, however, a ma jor shift of emphasis has occurred. Domestic issues are no longer empha sized. The prime opponent haa become the United States and, to a lesser ex tent only, the government at Bangkok. Daily, from across the Mekong River in Laos, the clandestine Free Thailand Radio ie calling upon the people to drive out the US imperialists and to deetroy their bases in Thailand. Only time will tell whether this shift in Communist etrategy will suc ceed. No nation wishes foreign troops on its soil, and the Thais, despite their pro-American feelings, may not be an exception. Of significance ie the fact that Thai land, in her long history, has never been colonized hy a Western Power. The Communists know this too well and understand also the Thai nation alist sentiments, their love for inde pendence, and their devotion to the royal family. Thus, while holding the national government at Bangkok re sponsible for allowing the Americans tO colonize their country and sup pressing the countryside, the Commu nists have skillfully ahstained from Dennis Menos has been a Depart ment of Def enss employee since 19.47. He holds an M.A. in International Re lations fvom the Georgetown Univer eit~ Gm.duate School in Washington. D. C., and is a June 1967 graduate of. the US Army War College.
@f 1967

making any attacks on the person of the King or on the Queen. The Communist attacks on the US presence in Thailand have become es pecially severe since November 1966 when US helicopter units were com mitted to a modest counterinsurgency role in northeastern Thailand. The United States was accused not only of occupying Thailand and maintain ing 60,000 troops in the country (the actual figure wae 35,000), but of ter rorizing and massacring people as well. Again and again, Peking and the Free Thailand Radio have urged the people to rice up againet the Americans before they make Thai land a eecond Vietnam and a baee of W3eSSiOII against all Of Asia. Vulnerable Pesition The United States may be in a vul nerable position in Thailand from a propaganda standpoint becauee of her strong presence there and of certain parallels between Thailand today and South Vietnam five or six years ago. Obviously, Thailand is far from being a US colony. She ie a staunch US ally whose troops fought alongside the US forces in Korea and are fighting now in Vietnam. Her government is one of the original signatories of the South east Asia Treaty Organization (SE ATO) and a strong supporter of the alliance. In 1962, the United States confirmed her SEATO commitment to Thailand and pledged to defend he$ against Communist subversion as well as external aggression. US forces were first stationed on Thai coil in 1962 when Preeident John F. Kennedy sent 5,000 troops to that country at the height of the Laotian crisie. The big US buildup in Thai land, however, did not occur until late in 1966. There were 13,000 US troops in Thailand in March of that year. By 33

,
THAILAND liWR6ENCY the end of the year, there were ap proximately 35,000 men, mostly air men belonging to the 13th US Air Force. The US buildup in Thailand has been accompanied by the improvement and construction of an entire network of airbases, naval facilities, pipelines, roads, supply bases, and Army Iogie tic installations. Communist propa ganda refers to these facilities as pro viding the base for future US aggres sion in Asia. Facilities The most important of these facili. ties is the Sattabip base, on the Gulf of Siau twhose navaI and air facili ties, when completed, could rival Cam Ranh Bay in strategic importance. The U Tapbao airfield at Sattabip, for ex ample, has a runway of 11,500 feet and accommodates B-52 bombers. An other important facility is the US logistic center at Hborat, operated by the 9th US Army Logistical Command: A multimillion-dollar strategic high way, built with US aid, now links Bangkok with Udon Thani, near the Laotian border. A huge radio commu nications network is under construc tion. The United States has given or loaned Thailand, since World War II, approximately half a billion dollars in economic aid alone. The amount of military aid furnished far exceeds th]s figure when one considers direct aid, training assistance to the Thai armed forces, and the costs incurred in the construction and maintenance of air, ground, and naval bases. During the last few years, aid under the Military Assistance Program has been mostly in the form of materiel and equipment needed in counterinsurgency opera tions. Military aid for Fiscal Year 1967 amounts to 60 million dollare, a 34 50-percent increase over the Fk.cal Year 1966 program. Communist propaganda has linked the US counterinsurgency aid pro. tided Thailand with the so-called op pression of peasante in tbe northeast. It is true that US aid has been gen erously given the Thai Army and pnIice in the form of helicopters, river. boats with which to check infiltration of guerrillas across the Mekong River, trucks, rifles, and artillery. However, until November 1966, US forces had never been engaged, even indirectly, in counterinsurgency operations in Thailand. Furthermore, US military advisors assigned to the Thai Army have ~been kept at regimental levels and have not been allowed to accom pany their units in tbe field. Tanrporary Arrangamanta The US poIicy has been, and still is, that the insurgency in Thailand, bs ing rather small, can be met effectively by the Thais, without the active par ticipation of US forces. Consistent with this policy, and until such time as Thai pilots could be trained to op erate the belicoptere being fnrnished Thailand, Washington agreed in the summer of 1966 to provide the rreces sary pilots to ferry Thai troops from their assembly areas to the edge of counterinsurgency operational zones. The Washh@on announcement which detailed the action was careful to stress that this would be a temporary arrangement and that the US helicop ters and crews involved would be unarmed. There seems little doubt that the leadership of the Thai insurgent mov~ ment is aware that domestic issues alone cannot bring success. Thailand is actually a poor prospect for a war of national liberation. The country has no colonial history and enjoys a
Military
REViVV ,*A

centuries-old tradition of independ ence: Economically, it is prosperous, there is adequate land in relationship to the total population, and the stand ards of living are comparatively high. The people of Thailand are united by a common religion, and, despite the existence of minority groups, the population is ethnically homogeneous. The King and Queen ,are honored

active membership is probably less than 1,000, and the party could not claim more than 10,000 sympathizers. The present government came to power without elections in 1963 after the death of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. But tbe vast majority of Thais do not really seem to he con cerned about the legitimacy of their government. They give this govern

throughout the nation and symbols, garded as national

are

re

the most remote villages country. Although the government, for all practical purposes, ia authoritarian, it ie run by an elite of patriotic men, both civilian and miIitary. These men are supported by an efficient civil serv ice whose top administrators have nearly all been trained in the West. The Communist Party of Thailand has practically no following. Its present iegust 1967 I

even in of the

ment their full loyalty and support, as the Thais always do with the govern , ment in power. The principal figures of the preeent government are Field Marshal Tha nom Kittikachorn, the Prime Minister, and General Praphat Charusathien, the Deputy Premier, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Minister of the Inte rior. Both men are committsd to re turn the nation to constitutional gov ernment through the adoption of a new constitution, the reestablishment 35

THA1l.AtItOINSURGENCY of political parties, and subsequent na tional eiections. Success in this area would deprive the Cornmuniats of one of their principal propaganda themes. Although Thailand has certain re: gional economic vtdnerabiiities; on a national basis, the country enjoys a healthy economy with rising standards of living. Its land has rich agricul tural, mining, fishing, and forest re sources, and it is not extremely over populated. Most Thai farmers own their own land, a fact which has made land reform a minor propaganda theme. Furthermore, there is marked eco nomic stability, the currency is firm, and there is little, or no irrtlation. De spite an annual population increase of three percent, the economy of Thai land has been growing at the rate of Six percent, with industrialization making substantial gains. This, then, is the environment the Communists have selected for their next war of national liberation in Asia. To date, the dynamics of their movement have followed closely the pattern employed in Cuba, South Viet nam, and China herself. There is a political front; the insurgent forces; the establishment of rural bases; and, more recently, the underground in the urban areas. Political Leadership , The political leadership of the move ment is provided from Pekhrg and Hanoi through the United Patriotic Front of Thailand which was created in January 1965. The front includes the Thailand Independence Movement and numerous other Communist front organizations such as labor unions, youth federations, religious groups, and peasant and workers associations. Tbe leadership of the front ia obscure, and several Tbais in exile, including 36 a former Prime Minister, have been mentioned as its leaders. Officially, the United Patriotic Front has a six-point program. It includes: . The removal of the present gov ernment and establishment of a gov ernment of patriots and democrats. . Tbe withdrawal of Thailand from SEATO. The expulsion of aIl US forces from Thailand. The establishment of an inde pendent national ecormmy. The redistribution of land and the improvement of standards of living. . The development of educational, health, and sanitation facilities for all. Two Areas Selected From an analysis of insurgent ac tivity to date, it appears that two areas of Thailand have heen seIected by the United Patriotic Front for initial es. tablishment of rural bases and insur. gent warfare. These are the areas in the country of greatest economic, po litical, geographic, and sociological vulnerability to insurgency. One of these areae is in the northeast, the other in the southernmost part of the Isthmus of Kra near the Thai-Malay sian border. Northeastern Thailand is a large area, tbe size of West Virginia, and has a population of approximately four million. Geographically, the area is a plateau, bounded to tbe north and east by the Mekong River and on the west and south by mountains. Its most im portant rivers, both for transporta tion and irrigation, have eaeterly flows and drain into Laos and Cambodia. These facts have made communica. tions with the rest of the country very difficult and largely account for the isolation of the area from Bangkok. . MilitaryReview

The northeast has few towns, and its road network is very poor. More sig nificantly, however, the area adjoins Laos, across the Mekong River, and offers an excellent sanctuary to the United Patriotic Front. Economically, the northeast is the least developed part of Thailand and, until recently, her most neglected. The

siderable political vacuum in the area. Resentment and distrust toward the government are strong, a normal aftereffect of centurtes of political iso lation of the area from Bangkok when highhanded policemen and tax collec tors were the only visible organs of the government. The area is inhabited by Thai-Lao

A,?Iw New.

F..t~,.8

The US buiIdup in Thailand has been accompanied by tbe improvement and construction of many roads and bridges

area has no wealth-giving resources, its soils are poor, and it euffers regu larly from seasonal water shortages. The annual income of the peasants in the area is one-half that of the rest of the country. The northeast also has political and sociological vulnerabilities. Despite re cent efforts on the part of the govern ment to close the gap between iteelf and the people, there still exists a conAmaf 1967

who, although ethnically a branch pf the Thai people, are related culturally and maintain close family ties with the inhabitants of western Laos. The Thai-Lao speak a different dialect from the one spoken in central Thai land. Although the basic loyalties of these people should not be questioned, many of them are known to be sympa thetic to the Pathet Lao Communists. There is in northeastern Thailand, 31

THAlfANil INSURGENCY however, a second popubition group which is clearly Communiet oriented and sympathetic to Hanoi. These are the 35,oOO or so Vietnamese refugees whohave heen living in the area eince 1947 when they left North Vietnam to avoid being caught in tbe fighting between the French and Vietminh forces. The Vietnamese are devoted followers of Ho Chi-minb and appear to be responding to the direction and leadership of Hanoi and Peking. The Communiet stronghold in the northeast is in the area between the Phu-Pan Highlande and the Laotian border. This is ideal ambush eountry, reminiscent of the CentraI Highlands of Vietnam. The area is thinly poPu lated, its jungles, caves, and forests offering abundant hideouts to a guer rilla force. It is not the first time in Thai history that this area is being used as abase for insurgency. During World War II, the so-called Free Thais operated out of here against the Jap anese occupation forces. Impact of Insurgency It is extremely difficult to establish a clear estimate of the insurgency in the Phu-Pan area and of its potential threat to tbe northeaet. Alarming re ports have heen received, however, from many reporters in the area. Their alarm is not so much of the military threat posed by the 1,500 or so armed insurgents of the Peoples Armed Forces (PAF), but of the apparent effects that the insurgency is having on the peasants of the area. From all indications, theee peasants have re ceived a good dose of terror, and many appear to be makinga cboicein favor of the insurgence based on fear alone. Prior to 1966, the PAF seldom ven tured outside its hideout except when fully unopposed and for purposes of recruiting new members and obtah . Mlliiary Review

,..>..-~L,

CHINA

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THAILAND INSURGENCY ing food supplies. The year 1966, how ever, witnessed open militancy on the part of the organization. There were aPPrOxlmately 100 incidents of insur. gency during that year, ranging from ; assassinations of local officials to hitand-run raids on small, isolated Thai police units. The raids are of special concern be cause they tend to undermine the con fidence of the peasants in the ability of the government to defend them. Further, they offer the insurgents a source for acqniring much-needed weapons and supplies. According to the clandestine Free Thailand Radio, the PAF engaged the police and army during 1966 in 120 battles, killing and wounding 300 enemy troops. Winning Minds The greatest success of the PAF to date has been in winning the minds of men in the countryside through the adoption of the terror tactics employed by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The PAFs chief adversaries are the policeman, the tax collector, the vil lage headman, and the teacher. Its weapons are political indoctrination, extortion, and murder. A common tactic of the PAF is to enter a village, when the poIice are ab sent, and to address the peasants in emotional terms. Then, the audience ie requested to respond with rice, clothing, or other supplies required by the insurgents. Those peasants not able to provide material goods are asked to join the movement, either as active members of the PAF or as in formers in the intelligence appara tus. Peasants not choosing to cooper ate are characterized as police in formers or collaborators of the Americans. By all indications, the daily incursions by PAF insurgents into the villages are gradually bring ing some of the peasants of the north east into submission. The majority of the PAF insurgents are apparently being trained in North Vietnam and infiltrate into Thailand across Laos and the Mekong River. They are organized and opsrate in small bands perhaps no more than 20 men each. While food and clothing are obtained locally, the insurgents rely on weapons and medicines from Hanoi. Their weapons are of great varietysome are Red Chinese, others of Eastern European origin, and even some US weapons have been reported. The latter were probably captured from Vietnamese forces in Vietnam or were obtained in Laos. In the northeast, the leader of the insurgence is Yot T Sawat, a 50-year-old former manager of a sugarcane cooperate. Minority Groups The second area of insurgency is in the southernmost part of tbe Isthmus of Kra near tbe Thai-Malaysian bor. der. This is a much smaller area than tbe northeast, but equally isolated politically and geographically from Bangkok. Here, the United Patriotic Front is exploiting the strong discon tent of a minority group and tbe rem nants of the Malaya guerrilla move ment of the 1950s. The threat in this area, however, is much smaller than in the northeast. The area lacks a suitable sanctuary where the Commu nists can raise, train, and equip ,a large insurgent force. The dissident minority group con sists of the one-million-strong Thai Moslems who harbor separatist senti ments and feel etrong affinity for Ma laysia. The Thai Moslems do not mix with the Buddhists and consider them selves an underprivileged majority governed by a privileged few. They receive substantial support from the 39

Ii

AIISSSS 1967

THAILAND INSURGENCY C)verseas Chinese of Thailand who, al though inhabiting areas farther to the north, are likewise Malaysian oriented. The second minority group in the area consiata of the remnants of the guerrilla force (500 to1,000 strong) which was defeated in 1959 by the British in Malaya. Led by the Chinese Communist, Chin Peng, this force ia operating out of the jungles and sandy lowlands of the Isthmus of Kra. Until 1965, the counterinsurgency efforts of the goverriment were con ducted mainly by the Thai police. In November 1965, however, Thai Army units of battalion strength were as signed to reinforce the police. The Thai armed forces consist of aPPrOximateb 125,000 men with 84, 000 army, 18,000 navy, 20,000 air force, and 3,000 marines. With US aid, the national counter insurgency apparatus is being sub stantially strengthened, and the gov ernment is optimistic about the final outcome. The border police and provin cial police forces have recently been strengthened by a Village Defense Corps of 25,000 to act as a militia and to provide backup for the poIiee. Army counterinsurgency unita, sim ilar to the US Special Forces, have been trained and are being assigned to sensitive areas to seek out the in surgents before they can become es tablished. Finally, the intelligence and counterintelligence organizations have been strengthened. The government of Thailand is not relying on military action alone. With support and encouragement from tbe United States, it has initiated a civic action program to eliminate the vul nerabilities of the northeast throngh early development of the political in. frastructure and aggressive economic and skial reform. 40 To date, the efforts to close the po litical gap between government and peasant have been less successful than
the economic development Irrigation networks and of the area. roads have

been built, school buildings have been constructed, and medical aid has been dispensed at a rate never known heretofore. A program of rural electri. fication bas begun, and water is being pumped for the first time in many homes of the northeast. The civic action program is being conducted by Accelerated Rural Devel opment Teams which are continuing tbe efforts begun in 1960 by the Mo bile Development Units. While the units were mobile troops of specialists whose task was to survey the needs of an ares and to encourage rural communities to start the programs, the development teams are being per manently assigned to areas to keep the momentum of development going. As worthy ae these efforts are, the northeast cannot be made secure from Communist infiltration within a mat ter of months or even of years. Worse yet, some peasants in the area appear to be reacting unfavorably to civic ac tion. They are bewildered at the ,sud den interest displayed for them by the central government, and their dissatis faction has even been heightened as a result of tbe introduction of reforms, There is no consensus among Thai land watchers on the extent of tbe threat to the security of Thailand on the part of the insurgent activities of the United Patriotic Front. There is agreement, however, that the outcome in Vietnam will have a profound effect on the Thailand insurgency. The Com munists may use the expanded US presence in Thailand as the canse to expand the insurgency in that coun try concurrently with Vietnam.
Military Review

... .

..4

?$# LB I: v~From [West Germany)

Yearbook of Militarg

Technology 1966

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
IN WEST GERMANY

Theodor Benecke

ETTING up of the armed forces in the Federal Republic of Ger many in 1955 led to the task of pro moting military technology to serve the military system. Since neither armed forces nor military technology existed in West Germany at the time, military engineers were able to take advantage of starting from scratch. Drawing upon their experience and kaowledge of conditions in other countries, the engineers established

two basic principles. Military tech nology encompassing research, devel opment, production, and maintenance of armament materiel was to be es tablished on an interservice basis. No separate tasks would be performed for tbe army, navy, or air force, and each special branch would work to satisfy the requirements of all three services. The second principle dealt with the organization from the Ministry of

Aspuf 1967

MILITARY TSCHNOL06Y Defense down to the test centers. A vertical organization was selected. The organizational pattern of military teeimology in the Ministry, providing for subdivisions for different types of weapons and equipment, was appliiid from the Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement (BWB) down to the teet centers. In reviewing the brief history of military technology since 1955, another factor should be noted government sponsorship of scientific and technical projects for the purpose of furthering defense objectives served to fill a vacuum existing in many areas of the natural sciences and technology. Oual Significance Thue, the establishment of the armed forces and the attendant ad vance in military technology assume a dual significance, not only in the limited sense of the existence of a defense establishment with all its politico-military implications, but also in regard to the promotion of natural sciences and technology through ear marked government funds. Since the purpose of military tech nology is to supply soldiers the best and most modern equipment, military This article was digested from an Englieh translation of the original which appsared in the YEARBOOKOF MILITARY TECH NOLOGY 1966, published b~ Wehr und Wiesen Ver2agsgeseUschaft, Darm8tadt (Federal Repwblic of Germang), under the title, Wehr technik % der Bunde8 wehr. Copyrighted @ 1966 by Wehr und Wti8en VerlagsgeseUechuft. Dr. Benecke L? Preeidcnt of the Federal O@ce for Mi&arsi Technology awd Procurement in Koblenz.
42 .. . technology exploree the frontiers of technical feasibility. It is one of the most satisfactory aspects of the mili tary engineers activities, leading not only to progress in many areas of re search and technology, but also to an advance in the state of the art. This, in turn, substantially strengthens the national economy.

Military Technology Tasks The tasks entrusted to technical personnel working in the field of miSi tary technology include advising lead ing officials of the Ministry and armed forces on: Initiation and direction of ap plied research. Evaluation of research results. Planning and direction of new developments and teeting of materiel. Support of service trials. . Agency-wide tasks, standardize. tion, technical specifications, and training aids. Preparation of technical docu. mentation for regular production. Cooperation with industry in the fields of development, production, and repair of equipment. Supervision of production. Performance of inspection and acceptance. . Supervision of modification serv ice. Q Teaching activities within the training and education program. The military engineer often is caught in a conflict between I@ de sire to carry out what he recognizes as necessary, and his responsihilib for properly employing the funds prm vialed. The approach used by militars engineers and their colleagues in con tracting cannot be compared to the methods employed in free enterpriec. Competitive businesses can take rieke to achieve special gains in time and Mlltars Revise -..4A

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

bst 1967

43

money. The government official may not do so; he is obliged to adhere to established procedures. The impetus for developing new materials may originate from various sources: research results, a combina tion of technical discoveries, sugges tions and experience gained by the services, industrial firme, and the ne ceesity of finding a counterweight against new equipment of an adver sary. Technical Requirements The technical requirements for new equipment are established through co operation between the armed forces staffs, the Military Technology Divi sion, and North Atlantic Treaty Ch- ganization allies. These military re quirements are then converted into a development concept. As soon as the decision to start a development pro gram has been made by the Ministry, implementation is delegated to the BWB. It is the BWBS task to elabo rate on the development concept in order to prepare the way for award ing a contract, to map out a develop ment program, and to obtain appro priations. Concurrently, detailed lo gistic requirements are prepared, the standardization aspect is examined, and coordination with other develop ment projects is started. Once the Military Technology Divi sion approves a concept, a develop ment contract is placed. Even in this early phase there is continuous co operation with the command agencies of the services aud the Armed Forces Materiel Command. As soon as the contractor-conducted trials have been completed and the development model is sufficiently per fected for testing, the appropriate testing establishment undertakes the test pr@ram. As a rule, the tes~ cen 44 .....

ter first supports the contractor by making its facilities available. Later on, after the responsibility has heen transferred, the contractors team as sists the test center staff for a speci. fied period of time. As soon as a sufficient number of models have been teeted satisfactorily and an independent report has been approved, the equipment or weapon will be presented to the service and troop commands concerned. After a joint discussion, a proposal for the temporary introduction of the mate rial will be submitted. Next, the equipment will be evaluated in ths field in service trials which may be supprirted by the appropriate test es tablishment. If service trials yield positive results, the cervices will sub mit an application for adoption of ths equipment. Concurrently, military en. gineers will complete preparations for procurement action.

QuantitiesEstablished
In the meantime, the Ministry of Defense incorporate the equipment or weapon in the defense plan and establishes quantity requirements. This enables the Minietrys Defense Production and Procurement Division to authorize the B WB to take procure ment action. Subsequent steps are ths conclusion of contracts with industry, production supervision, inspection, and delivery of the material, weapons, or equipment. When equipment is pur chased abroad, the procedure is simi lar except that there is no initial or development phase. When eauisrment and weapons are released to the service support units or the depot, responsibility is also transferred. However, the agencies of the military technology sector which were instrumental in the initiation process will observe further develop . Military ISevimr . A.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ments. This applies especially to large equipment and weapon systems. In the case of tanks or aircraft, for in stance, modifications may become nec essary due to $eld experience or new requirements. Modifications are kept to a mini mum, but cannot be entirely elimistoring supplies, especially spare parts. It should be kept in mind that after building up the armed forces, during which the initial procurement of weapons and equipment was the dom inant factor, the maintenance of equipment assumes increasing impOr

Co,t.ul of Test model of a 36-tube rocket launcher nated. When a modification to an ex ieting weapon system or piece of equipment is deemed necessary, the stages described must be repeated on a limited scale. The organizational structure of mil itary technology represents a decided advantage over organizational pat terns based on the needs of individual service branches and specific tasks. This system insures a clearly defined authority, the use of identical eqnip ment in the services, the efficient em ployment of specialists, early stand ardization, and uniform methods in
iugust 1967 under development

.utrLLm

in West Germany

tance and requires a growing share of available funds. The executive functions in all areas of the armed forces are vested in the Minister of Defense. Thus, the Mili-, tary Technology Division of the Min istry of Defense is the highest office in its field. This division is entrusted with drawing up plans for projects in the fields of natural science research and technology. The division is sub divided into one branch dealing with general technical problems, one re search kk-anch, and five materiel branches. On the same organizational 45

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY level, the Defense Production and Procurement Division formulates the procurement programs. Th& two divi s~ons are headed by the Main Divi mon Armament. AS a semiautono mous federal agency answerable to the Ministry, the BWB is charged with the task of supplying all arma ment, from the most simple piece of equipment to large weapon systems. It may be of interest that the BWB not only concentrates on tacks of mil itary technology in a narrow senee, but aleo develops and procures the soldiere personal equipment. The BWB consiste of six materiel divisione covering all equipment, weapon systems, and defenee instal lations, and of one division dealing with pereonal equipment, food pro visions, post and camp material, and medical equipment, In addition, there are a general technology division which ie responsible for technical co ordination, materials, and documen tation; an inspection service division; and two general administrative di visions. One ie the central divieion for administration, personnel, and budg etary affaire, and the eecond a policy diviei~n for contracting and pricing. A 13WB representative is responsi ble for the test eetabliehmente and naval arsenals. On the branch level, tbe technical side of development proj ecte ie eloeely tied in with advanced production engineering and produc tion aspects. The contract specialist ie in immediate contact with his tech nical colleague, One of the most important fields where military technology acts as an intermediary between industry and the service branches ie technical proving and testing. The armed forces test estabiiehments, which ard also organized on the intereervicej and hardware pattern, are subordinate to the BWB. The number of test establishments ia larger than the number of BWB equipment divisions. This is because specific tasks and fielde require special teet eetabliehments such as a moun tain proving ground for teeting win ter and mountahr equipment; a test center for chemical, biological, and radiological defense; a degaueeing range; and a materials testing center for all special fields. The uniform etructure of military technology and armament, which backe up all efforts of the armed forces, has proved encceesful. Weet Germanys NATO allies, who strive for a similar simplification, consider this organizational structure to be the most modern of its kind.

. .,,

MilitaryitwkI ~ . .... ... .

ARMY
NATIONBUILDERS

Lieutenant

Colonel John J. Saalberg, United States .-trm#

MERGENCE of military men during the past two decades as a decisive political force in many of the developing nations haa been a highly un expected and perplexing phenomenon to most Western intellectual and politkal, leadera. Since the majority of these new nations were formerly colonies of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, Weetern leaders had assumed that these statee would develop governmental institutions patterned largely after those of their former European masters. The future of these new na tions, therefore, would be determined primarily by their Western trained in tellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalistic political patilee, and their small menacing Communist Parties and organizations. Military ascendancy was almost entirely unforeseen, and the magnitude of this development has shaken the beliefs of many Western leaders that democ rocy has a bright future in the majority of these states. Of 12 modernizing states outside of Latin America that were independent prior to World War II,
@wt 1967 47

NATIONBUILUENS eleven have experienced military cows detat or attempted coups since 1945. Of 20 states which became independ ent between World War II and 1959, there were 14 which had coupe or coup attempts by 1963. Of 24 states which gained independence between 1960 and in the 20 Latin-American
45 percent of the time. Ghana,

military

Reuuhlics More recent coqps or attempted seizures

Indonesia, Syria,

in Gambia,

and South Vietnam indicate that the trend continues. For the most Dart. these militarv

United P..?sn J.t.rnatiowd

Achmed Sukarno was deposed by the army in tbe continuing trend of military COUPS in developing countries

zures of power or attempted seizures before the end of 1963. During, the decade from 1947 to 1,957, military officers were Presidents Lieutenant Colonel John J. Saalberg is assigned to Headquavtev8, Ist Ar mored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in His tory and Government and Interna tional Relatious from Coruell Univer sity, Ithaca, New York, and is a 1967 graduate of thi US Armg War College, Cavlisle Barracks, Pwme@ania. Hie service includes duty with the 6th Ar mored Cavalry in Germany; as Assist ant Professor at the US Army Mili tary Academy; with 8th US Army, Korea; and with Headquarters, US Armg, Europe, in Germany.
40

the tensions produced by political, eco nomic, and social change. Usually, the army has been the acti~e agent. Mili been violent, tary action has normally

although often relatively bloodless. Once having seized power, the army has rarely continued direct military rule for any great length of time, and military leaders have usually retired as quickly as possible behinti some quasi-civilian facade of government. This does not mean that the military forces actually surrender power, how- . ever. Often, they have merely substi tuted a cabinet which they can con trol for the one they oueted. Fre quently, they have chosen to remain in the background and influence ths
Milifsry Rsvim

2.

NATIONBUILDERS
existing government. Although the military leaders in these states have hastily engaged in politics, they have disengaged with the greatest reluc tance, if at all, Western democratic political leaders need not have been surprised at the role that military leaders have come to play in many of the developing na tions. There was no tradition of ci vilian control of military forces in the developing states. The army, if there had been one at all, had until quite re cently owed its allegiance to a foreign sovereign. Further, since these new nations were marked by a virtual ab sence of social and economic institu tions, the military forces enjoyed un usual advantage vis-a-vis the civilian government and other political and social groups. .

Superior Organization In most of these nations, the organi zation of the army, although rudimen tary, was superior to that of the government. The armed forces also enjoyed an emotionalized symbolic sta tus; and, most important of all, they possessed a monopoly of arms. In ret rospect, it is amazing not that the military forces have frequently en gaged in the politics of these nations, but that they have ever done other wise. The leaders of these military upris. ings comprise a small and elite group. They mainly have been officers, al though occasionally a noncommis sioned officer has sparked a coup. They have come largely from the lower mid dle classes for whom a career in the military service, like a career in the civil service, is a means of attaining a higher status within their social or der. Surprisingly, they have little in common with tbe majority of the men they command. They are relatively
August1967

young and remarkably progressive. Often, they have spent most of their adult life in military service, fre quently in association with fairly welleducated foreign officers from their former colonial power. A few have attended foreign mili tary academies; more have received technical military training in advanced countries. As a result, most of these military leaders have a keen aware ness of the difference in status be. tween their own country and other more advanced nations. They possess distinctive values and attitudes, among which is an extreme consciousness of the concepts of nationalism and of po litical unity. They are strong supporters of the national interest, andalthough often spiritually in tune with students, in tellectuals, and other elements within their society anxious to become part of the modern worldthey are highly critical of the factional interests which they attribute to such groups. They are rebels who have already found a cause. Economic Development A serious problem facing any leader of a developing nation is economic tte velopment. The path to the modern world is different for each developing nation, and the development process is marked as much by the unique ex periences of each country as by any uniformity. The ultimate goal is tbe same, however. Each developing na tion seeks to lift the pressures of scar city from the mass of its people. To achieve this, the existing economic system must initially be modified in such a way as to increase output. This should produce capital for the con tinued expansion of production and provide an increased income for a large number of people. 49

N4TIONBUILOERS The process continues through a series of vaguely identifiable steps un til the society reaches a stage where the most advanced modern techniques can be applied over a wide range of resources, and where most of the cit izens enjoy the benefits of the eco nomic system. At that point, the so ciety has developed the technological and entrepreneurial skills to enable the group to ~roduce the products it desires. Throughout the precese, the nations political and social institut ions are constantly modified.

.
serving law and order, provide inter. nal and external security, furnieh Iim. ited communications, assist in simple economic management, assist in trans. porting crops or materials to market, direct or conduct public education, and inetitute small-scale social improve ments. In addition, they can provide limited engineering and public health services. Other Qualities The peculiar features of a central ized command, a hierarchical struc ture of control, the persuasive use of discipline, a self-cent.shed communi . cations system, and a corporate esprit de corpswhich the army requires to accomplish its primary function of fighting wars-are also qualities that make the military organisation a highly effective administrative agency, The controlled military environment itself facilitates modification of the primitive cultural attitudes held hy military personnel of the developing countries. When a recruit enters the military service, he physically departs from the familiar traditional environ. ment and severs many ties with the civilian community, pati]cularly if he comes from a village or tribal habitat, The new soldier enters an orderly environment in which he can antici pate what is likely to happen in train ing and in which he can, to a degree, predict his future. Thus, despite the fact that the process of cultural change is accelerated in the army, the direc tion of change is so preordained and the opportunity for personal initiative is so small that the emotional and psy chological strains imposed upon the individual by the unknown and the new are markedly reduced. This per mits a more rapid change in personal attitudes and standards than in a lees controlled environment.
MmtafyMew

HumanCapital
Successful economic development of a nation depende upon a multitude of elements including the supply of in vestment capital, the availability of resources, and the attitude of the peo ple. The latter is particularly impor tant. Ihdese a government can develop the spirit and the human potentialities of its people, it can develop little else economically, materially, ctdturally, or politically. One of the first tasks is to develop human capital, to overcome the poverty of human reeources. At first gfznce, the army appears to bean ideal instrument both to de velop human capital and to modify social and potitical institutions. The modern army is a microcosm of a state. R possesses its own separate and self-contained systeme of provisioning, supply, medical supPort, engineering, communications, and even education. The larger and more complicated the military establishment, the more tech nicians and specialist it will contain. In a primitiye society, the army is probably better equipped technically than the civilian sector. During the early stages of development, the army can perform a multitude of functions * assist a civil government. Military personnel can help in pre
,50

.,

NATIONBUILOERS The purpose and the nature of a military establishment also tend to make it a forceful instrument to promote modernization. BY nature, national military establiahmenta are competitive institution that have the ultimate aim of testing their own strength against that of another military organization. Although nonmilitary agencontingencies, which in many underdeveloped countries may never be met, armies are relatively immune to prag matic tests of efficiency on a day-to day basis. Just as Weetern armies have lived in a dreamworld planning for wars that never occur, armiee in the newly emerging countriee fre quently devote their efforts to the task

us ties may draw inspiration from abroad, they operate mainly within tbe context of their own society and their focus is on internal development. The soldier, bowever, constantly looks outside his own nation to compare his organization to those of other countries. As a result, he readily gains an awareness of international standards and a keen appreciation of the weakneesee of hia own society. Since military organs are created for future hlgest 1967 ..

Army

Many foreign officers have received advanced military education at US Army schools

of becoming more modern and more efticient with little regard for realit y~ The simplistic nature of military activity often encourages army leaders to oversimplify the complexities involved in modernizing a society. Standing some dietance from their own civilian community, with attitudes and standarde of their own, they are relatively divorced from the daily eco nomic realities of development. This makes them advocatee of change. 51

NATIONBVILOERS Advantages wkich the army initially peasesses as a nationhuiklfng agency diminish as the country begine to de velop. As the economy expands and as the social structure becomes more complex, a society develops require ments for trained technicians and 1a bor organizers which tbe miIitary tions effectively, it was necessary to reinforce mifitsry personnel with skilled civifian administrators, The US. Army still recruits civilian technicians to supplement the fimited supply of mifitsry specialists in di verse fields. These include administra tion, law, finance, economics, public

MUitary officers who zeize control of government need the administrative businessmen and civil servante

advice of

force cannot satisfy from its own reeources alone. There is no concrete reason why a military establishment could not de velop these skills except that the army normally finds it economically unprof itable to do so. Even US experiences with the post-World War II military occupations of G6rmany and Japan indicate thk. To conduct the occupa S2

works, public health, public relations, safety, welfare, transportation, com munications, and research and development. Even if military organiza. tions could obtain the economic resources necessary to train or develdp such specialists, it is unlikely that most armies would be willing to absorb directly so many activities pe ripheral to their chief military func , MllitaIy Mm a ~,., _.,.A

:..

NATIONBUILOERS tions which could, if they became dominant, change the nature of the military establishment itself. Many of these attitudes and fea tures which make the army invaluable as a modernizing force unfortunately lead the military group to view the development procees myopically. For the military officer, proper perform ance results from mechanically learn ing skille that require little, if any, understanding. Equipment procured from the more developed nations is usually designed with this thought in mind. Tactical doctrine is relatively simple and rigid. Within the frar-ae work of this experience, all problems can be overcome if someone will only give the correct order. Basically, the taak facing the gov ernment in an emergent nation is that of creating political, eocial, and eco nomic institutions that will facilitate ~ change of the traditional order. Where military agencies have gained control, the conflict between the impulses of the military to modernize and the needs Iof institution buildine-. noses a distinct set of problems. The military I officers who seize power in an emerg ing state frequently do so in response to the chaos, corruption, or reaction ary character of the civilian regimes that preceded them. Although the otti cers are modernizers, they are nor mally indifferent or hostile to the needs of political institution making. The officers are not businessmen or civil servants. If they encourage either or both of these groups, they weaken their own power hy promoting com petitive independent centers of power and decision. If they do not encourage or tolerate independent activity, the economy will tend to stagnate. A lack of progress may be acceptable during that period of initial public enthusi asm after the military leaders take control. After a time, however, the deeply rooted demands for change will reassert themselves and these leaders will be placed on the defensive. Ulti mately, if military leaders retain po litical Dower indefinitely, they must create some type of authoritative po litical organ to legitimize and institu tionalize their own power. The problem of promoting an effec tive relationship in developing coun tries between the military adminis trator and the nascent politician is still unsolved. Although the United States has enjoyed great success in aiding military leaders in the perf orm ance of administrative functions, we have had little success in encouraging these military leaders to train their people to undertake the role of demo cratic citizenry. Nor have we been par ticularly successful in encouraging greater tolerance and understanding within the military forces of tbe poli ticians function. In dealing with these new nations, US policymakers must understand that both administrators and politicians are needed. In cooperating with a mili tary faction that may he in control, we must realize that the military lead ers can contribute only a limited amount to national development. In assisting these military leaders in raising their own standards of public administration, US military and eco nomic aid must be tendered in such a way as not to stifle the basic aspect of political developmentthe growth of representative political institutions.

kq!usf

1967

53

The views eXpre88edin this article are the authors and aTe not nec essarily those of the Department of the Army, the Department of De fense, or the US ArmII Command and General Staff College.Editor. N Afro-Asian country is a new nation in the proeees of mod ernization. New nation and 1mod are two factors whkh ernization make the background of an AfroAsian cauntry different from that of

a Western country. Theee two f actore confer on the army a unique statue in Afro-Asian countriee, a etatus which is entirely different from that which it holde in Western countries. As a newly estabtiehed nation, an Afro-Asian country 1ack8 cohesion. The national senee which ie most strongly manifested during the etrug- gle for independence eventually weekens when independence is at tained. The centrifugal and divergent forces are numerous and etrong. Dif

MilihryR8VIEW . . ! ... . . ,.-. .,.- >.., ....X .-b.. .+#t!&

ferences exist between cities and rural areas, between the intelligentsia and the masses, and between various religious, linguistic, racial, and local communities. Factional jealousy and conflict thrive, while the unifying and centripetal forces are practically non existent. To avoid this disintegration and to continue to exist, a new Afro-Asian nation must depend on such centrip etaI forces as do existthe nation alist forces. The history of Afro lugust 1967

Asian countries in tbe last 10 years shows that in each one of them the political front in power and the aryy are the two strongeat national forces. When the political front in power is defeatedthe Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League in Burma, the Mos lem Front in Pakietan or the Libera tion Front in Algeriathe army be comes the sole national force capable of keeping a new nation from disin tegrating and helping it continue to exist. 5s

AFRO-ASIAN $OUNTRY An Afro-Asian country is also a country on the way to modernization. Modernization is a task which re quires leaders with the professional know-how of a technician, the capa bility of a political commissar to or ganize the masses, and the dedication of a missionary. Moreover, to modernize does not mean to sever all ties with the past, thus creating a vacuum to be filled with an imported foreign civilization. Afro-Asian peoples object to modern ization by divorce. They reject com munism which advocates revolution hy complete divorce from national traditions and all human values of the past. Historical Traditions Afro-Asian peoples demand mod ernization within the continuity of historical traditions. That is why modernization in Afro-Asian coun tries means a change as well as a renaissance-changing the patterns of life, thought, and reaction, the means of cultivation, production, and cooperation; restoring the eternal values of traditional cultures, values which were threatened by a foreign civilization thrust upon them against their will. In Afro-Asian countries, the army is the agency able to train cadres not only to undertake modernization pro grams, but to undertake them within the historical continuity. This is the aspiration of Afro-Asian countries during the remaining 30 odd years of this century. The army is a national force in its fullest sense: The word nation Gensral Nguyen Bao Tri, a grad uate of the US Army Command and Gensral Stafl College, is Minister of Inforneatime and Omm Arms, Govern ment of Vistmzm, in Saigen. aa covers three different meanings: nationalism, national unity, and conti nuity of the national community. The national character of the army in. Afrn-Asian countries fully covers these three meanings. Nationalism Objectives Nationalism is the most important factor since it determines the right eousness of any political body. Since the end of World War II, the peoples of Asia and Africa hav~ unanimously fought for the two objectives of nationalism: independence and prog ress in freedomindependence in or der to liberate their nations, progress in freedom to liberate men. This great and hietoric move in Afro-Asian countries is a wave of nationalism. The army was born in this great and historic move. Local condition might differ from country to country, but the army of the new nations was generally tbe armed force which fought for independence, the first ob jective of nationalism. The situation in Vietnam was quite a special one. History has brought our people to the f rent rank of pio neers of the Afro-Asian historic move. We were the first to begin the strug gle for independence against the colo nialists. We were also the first to fight communism in order to achieve progress in freedom. While other Afro-Asian countries waged two separate and successive wars-first against the enemy of inde pendence, then against the enemy of progress in freedomthe Vietnam people had to fight fw the two objec tives of nationalism, against colonial. ism and communism, at the same time. Due to this dual war, the his toric drive in Vietnam seemed at times to offer the image of contra dictory struggles. Consequently, our

Review MIlitsry

,..

AFRO-ASIANCOUNTRY countrys situation may appear eOm plex or even chaotic. However complex and chaotic the situation may be, it cannot hold back basic facts. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam is a national one which was born and grew up in the struggle for independence. Its birth began with the unification of the armed forces fought communism to help our people achieve progress in freedom, the second objective of nationalism. The army in Afro-Asian countries draws its members from every reli gion, race, language, and region. Its composition is national in nature and, therefore, exemplifies national unity. The army not only hss a national

which fought for the two objectives of nationalism. Thanks to the staunch national spirit of the national army, our country succeeded in driving out the French Expeditionary Corps to begin an era of independence. The armed forces of the Republic of Viet nam have attained maturity with na tional independence. In spite of untold hardships, they have relentlessly ~wuat1967

composition, but also a national spirit: The longer and harder it fights for the two objectives of nationalism, the stronger its national spirit becomes. In the hard and dangeroua fight, no soldier cares to find out to which re ligion, region, race, or class his fel low combatant may belong. Even in Vietnam, where the political scene is rife with factional division and ha 57

AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRY tred, no source of social disintegra tion can exert much influence in the army. Despite so many upheavals, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces etill succeed in safeguarding the character of a national force and in typifying national unity within their ranks. Continuity A nation is a community consisting o? the living as well ae the dead and the unborn. It is an animate entity whose very lifeblood is historical con tinuity. No nation can survive if its bloodstream is cut off, its past sev ered and its future dimmed as it sees only the present. The national spirit is, therefore, the realization of the continuity of the national community. In Afro-Asian countries, tbe army is the living image of this continuity. The esprit de corps applies not only to those who are fighting at the pres ent, but also to those who have laid down their lives, and even those who have not yet joined. The army is ever rejuvenating itself as it replenishes its ranks with young people. Deeprooted in the past, it fights at the present with its eyes on tomorrow. Unlike other national forces, such as revolutionary or political parties, tbe army in Afro-Asian countries is not a closed community with a tend ency to look back at its past or, more accurately, at its past record. It ie a force capable of sustaining the unin terrupted bloodstream of the national community. In Western countries, the army, or more accurately its officer corps, is usually regarded as a conservative force, if not a reactionary one. West ern armies owe this characteristic to historical circumstances which also account for the fact that the army and the intelligentsia are oppoeed by 58 theit very nature. The armys nature is conservative, while the intelligen tsias is progressive. In the Afro-Asian countries the situation ie different.f Here, the army is a progressive for e. Moreover, it ie the sole national orce which suc ceeds in living up tq/ its ideal within its ranks: modernization in the con tinuity of history. / Modernization in the continuity of history is both a renovation and a restoration. It not only means to bring technical knowledge and enlighten ment to rural areas, but also to bring the spirit of humanist communities back to the cities. The Afro-Asian army, has succeeded in building a twoway road linking tbe rural areas to the cities. Brosdminded Philosophy The majority of the people of an Afro-Asian country are farmers and most of the servicemen, therefore, come from rural areas. How has mili tary life changed these peasants? First, it has encouraged broader views and strengthened national spirit. A farmer is a man who has a regional and narrow viewwhich does not befit tbe citizens of an independent nation in this new era. Military life has changed the AfreAsian farmers views. Military life has opened up new vistas for the farmer-soldier and strengthened hie national conscience, especially in a country waging a war, such as ours, and where servicemen move from area to area all over the country. To help make the farmer cross tbe bamboo screen surrounding hie hamlet is to open up new vistas for hlm; this is the first step in modernization. The world today needs a broad -minded philosophy of life. When man can reach the moon and outer space, Miiitsty Iteviee

AFRO.ASIANCOUNTRY !ations no longer have frontiers, nuch less localities or villages. Mili sry life is modernizing the farmer oldiers soul. His philosophy of life s being broadened as he travels over Iifferent geographical areas, as he ives in communities made up of felDW soldiers from all regions and clas es, and, in the case of Vietnam, as Ie is in contact with allied troops. low Way of life Second, the army teaches the peasInta new way of life. Todays modern lumy is scientifically organized and ~pplies up-to-date techniques. There ore, military life changes completely he way of life of the farmer-soldier. Phe army also gives him a chance to ret acquainted with mechanical engi wering. He gradually absorbs one of he most important elements of ra ,ional civilizations: precisionpre :ieion in time, in organization, and n action. Thus, military life provides !hefarmer-soldier with a new way of ife which meets the requirements )f the modern world. This plays an important role. Modernization is not confined to industrialization or to technological revolution. Modernization also aims at changing the way of life and pat terns of thought of the people. A new nation will lack the basic conditions b enjoy a technological revolution if its way of life is not changed. As far aethe farmer-soldier is concerned, the mmyhas actually succeeded in achiev ing this modernization. The majority of the officers by con trast are intellectuals coming from well-to-do families in the cities. The tity intellectuals are trained by a modern civilization characterized by rational and selfish individualism. That civilization lacks the spirit of collective humanisma characteristic
bst 1967

of traditional culture. Consequently, in addition to bringing technical knowledge to rural areas, moderniza tion must also develop a synthetic culture consisting of all values of the two civilizationsmodern and tradi tional which are in conflict in an AfroAsian society. Traditional Culture How has military life changed a city intellectual officer ? Becauze of their everyday contact. with fellow officers from various social classes, and especially with and due to their farmer-soldiers, assignment in rural areas, the intel lectual city officers have rediscovered the values of traditional culture. Further, the values of collective hu manism are gradually brought to bear on the officers way of life. In addi tion, the espmt de corQs and discipline in the army have replaced selfish individualism by a firm community spirit. This community spirit is also part and parcel of the national spirit. The national spirit is not fathered by reason alone-rational civilization but is also shaped and sharpened by the sacrifices of their fellow combat ants as well as their own. As in the case of the farmer-soldier, army life turns the city intellectual officer into a new man in the fullest sense of the term. He has succeeded in the revolution of his own selfthe of modernization * prime condition which other social classes can hardly accomplish. He has succeeded in achieving a synthesis of the values of modern and traditional cultures, and is thus a progressive man. It is not a one-way progressintroduction of the rational, mechanical civiliza tion to enlighten farmersbut a twoway progress: modernization and res toration of traditional values. 59

AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRY The historic mission of the army in Afro-Asian countries is determined by the Afro-Asian background and by the nature of the army itselfa na tional force as well as a force of mod ernization in the historical continuity. . There is no denying that in one coun try after another, the army hae set foot on the political scene in the new Arthur M. Schlesinger calls it a heroic leadership. His phrase aptly describes the leadership of the nation. buildere. They were the leaders who struggled against the colonialist for tbe independence of their country, and wbo took over the leadership of the nation once independence was recov ered. Conditions might differ from

US ArmY

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam is a national one which was born and grew UP in the struggle for independence

nationa of the Asian and African Con tinents. This is a general phenomenon and not limited to just any one case. Its cause cannot be special, individual, or accidental events which are valid only for the history of each country. It must be common to all Afro-Asian countries. In order to understand clearly and objectively the mission of the army, we have to asseee this his torical evolution. Discussing the leadership problem, especially in the riew nations which have just achieved independence, 60

country to country, but, generally speaking, the republic which foliowed the days after tbe attainment of in dependence wae a republic of nationbuilding. In the years of fighting for inde pendence againet the colonialists, as in the early daye of the nationbuilding republic, national unity waa very strong. But when it came to carrying out tbe second objeetiveprogrecs in freedom-disintegrating and diver gent factors gathered strength and factional differences appeared, thus threatening to weaken national unity.
MiiiiIY RE#iW .

AFRO-ASIANCOUNTRY In Vietnam, as history compelled our peo~le to fight at the same time for both objective of nationalism, the disintegration of our society broke out early in the first period of that historic campaign. Communism gath ered strength from such a disintegra tion. The heroic leadership phase did not end at the same time for all AfroAsian countries. The common denom inator in the last years of this period was their extreme social disintegra tion as differences and divergences threatened to disrupt their political atmosphere. Politicsl Scene It was at a fime of such extreme disintegration that the army stepped onto the political scene in Afro-Asian countries. When all sources of conflict, and division and factional jealousies, threatened to break down the already fragile national unity, the army was the only force capable of saving the new nations from complete disinte gration. Thus, after tbe heroic leadership period, the new Afro-Asian nations entered the military leadership era. The prime mission of the army today is determined by its very natur+a national force. Against such a dis integrating background, its mission is to achieve national union in order to strengthen national unity. Only if it succeeds in strengthening national unity and in mustering pop ular good will can the army reestab lish the political unity which was shattered when the heyoic leadership period came to an end. The national army of the Afro-Asian countries de veloped and grew up or, in other words, military unity was achieved in the period of nationbuilding. The nationbuilding republican regime k!gust19s7 moved from political unit y to military unity. The birth of the second repub licanism in Asia and Africa is achieved when military unity evolves into polit ical unity. The second historic mission of the Afro-Asian army is one which results from the armys nature as a force of modernization in the continuity of history. That mission is to set down basic principles for the crisisthe judicial as well as the leadership crisisco as to enable the new na tions, once political unity is recovered, to achieve progress in freedom by way
of modernization tinuity. in the historical con

Instrument of Unification Both of theee missions clearly indi cate that the army plays an important

role in the future of democracy in the new nations. This prospect of democ racy, as well as the armys nature, explain why tbe Afro-Asian army can not become a political party without betraying its own mission. The nature of a party is division. Yet the army, a national and also a modernizing force in the historical continuity, is an instrument of unification and not of division. If its historic mission is to be accomplished, the Afro-Asian army must be a force safeguarding the nation, the task of modernization, and the future of democracy. It is only natural that the intelli gentsia forms the leadership class ih an Afro-Asian country. This is true for all countries and still more so in tbe case of our country where Con fucianism has enjoyed a wide influ ence for thousands of yeare. The officers are an element of the intelligentsia. They are the intelli gentsia-in-uniform. It is only when the nature of their group is so deter mined that it becomes possible to 61

AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRY understand the future countries. their historic mission in of the new Afro-Asian new nation, The nature of the remain. ing 30 years of this century will be that of collective emancipation or col lective doom. A common destiny is binding together ali components of the leading class. No group can eman cipate itself singly or it will perish alone. The leading class ie a commu nity, a community with a common destiny and aspiration, Community Spirit Since the Communist are trying to create a gap in the leading class by any means so as to step in and fdl it, a strong community spirit is a ques tion of life and death with the lead ing class of the new nations. If they are blihd to the danger or too short sighted to see it and let the enemy capitalize on division and jealousy bs tween various groups, or between those who are in uniform and those who are not, their behavior amounts to digging their own graves. Thue, the community epirit, or in other words, the sense of khship be tween the officers and the intelligen tsia, will have a decisive influence on the destiny of the new nations and on the future of democracy in the
two continent.

Role of Uniform The only difference betweeu the offi cers and the othere is their uniform. Hence, in order to understand the mis sion of the officer, it is neceeeary to find out the role of the uniform in the Afre-Asian political world. The uni form first symbolizes the spirit of na tional discipline. The uniform itself is not neceesary for the Afro-Asian po litical world. Ite necessity results from the lack of national discipline among the intelligentsia in these countries. Second, the uniform symbolizes a collective community. Llkewiae, its necessity results from the lack of com munity spirit among the intelligentsia which is molded by modern culture, the nature of which is selfish indi vidualism. Finally, the uniform symbolizes ,,engagement~, and eacrifice for the just cause (independence and prog ress in freedom). This engagement spirit is neceseary on the Afro-Asian political scene, for the intelligentsia in theee countries are following a wait and eee course. The wait and see attitude meane that the latter refuse to become involved, and con tribute nothing to the national his torical movement by protesting the murky state of the political scene. The officers can accomplish their mission only if they realize that they are a part of the intelligentsia class in general. Nothing is more harmful to the future of an Afro-Asian coun try, as well as to the future of democ racy, than a divorce between officers and rntelligentsi,a. In fact, such a divorce amounts to a complete rupture between the two components of the leading class of a *

The sense of kbw,hip between the uniformed and the nonuniformed of the intelligentsia is an age-old tradi tion of the Vietnamese people which may be called Nguyen Cong Trus tradition. Itisa tradition of acoun try whose culture does not separate the academic from the military. Ac complishments in both academic and military subjects were looked upon as an ideal scholarly training. On the battlefield, Nguyen Cvng Trus uni fo~ far from concealing hia intel lectual nature, helped make it atand out more clearly. Dynasty after dy nasty, Vietnamese history could boast
Uilitary Review

AFRO.ASIANCOUNTRY of many talented mandarins who built UP this tradition of kinship. In the old days, Vietnam also pro duced a tradition of intelligentsia tradition in-uniform, a distktive rarely seen in the history of the West or the East. If modernization in the historical continuity is both a new procees and a revival, then this tradi tion is one of the values of the tradi tional culture which must be restored to meet the demands of the modern age. Once the intelligentsia-in-uniform tradition is restored, the officers will be free from all types of complexes sad will be able to play their part in public affairs-the part of one of the component groups of the leading class in a new nation. That tradition also helps the officers I to understand the sense of k]nship among the two component groups of the intelligentsia class. This sense of kinship will sweep away any complex or jealousy on the part of the officers, as well as the intelligentsia, and will build up a strong community sense that will tie all parts of the intelli gentsia together. Thanks to that strong comntunity sense, the intelli gentsia-in-uniform will be able to lead the army in attaining the first objective of its miesionachieving national union as a starting point to recover political unity. Finally, the intelligentsia-in-uni form tradition will bring out the intellectual nature in the person of the officer. It is because of this nature that the officers join the political scene in a new nation. The intellectual nature helps make the political role of the officer legitimate. L]ke physical strength, the uniform itself cannot make such a role legitimate. As in the old days, the warriors garb did not conceal, but set off the nature of the scholar. Today, the uniform is a means which helps the intelligentsia to perform its duty toward the people and the nation. The uniform will disappear from the political scene the day the AfroAsian countries have achieved politi cal unity thus safeguarding national existence and progress. The most noble mission of the intelligentsia-in-uni form is to help usher in that day as soon as possible. Therefore, the intel ligentsia-in-uniform tradition may eventually transform ths officers into builders of democracy on the two con tinents.

ARMY FORCES

IN RIVERINE OPERATIONS
Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel John W. Baker, UrutedState8 ..trmp
Colonel Lee C. Dickson, ffrated States Arm#

HE movement of combat battalions and support units of the US 9th Infantry Division into the Mekong Delta hae brought to the US Army a new challenge even for Vietnam. It marks the opening of a new phase in the wara concentrated effort to defeat the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta by riverine warfare. The Viet Cong threat to the rice bowl of South Vietnam has been readily apparent for eeveral yeare. Until January 1967, fighting the Vlet Cong in
Title photo courtesy

US Navy.
MilitaryRevieW

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RIVERINE OPERATIONS the water and mud of the delta wae largely the responsibility of South Vietnams own armed forces, aided by US advisors and Army aviation and Navy river patrol units. The major problem with stationing addi tional, large-size US unite in the delta wae the lack of unpopulated tracts of solid, dry ground large enough for military base camp facilities. One action taken to overcome this problem was to dredge a site for a reinforced brigade-size baee camp out of the Mekong River mud at Dong Thanh, about 50 miles southwest of Saigon. The Mekong River Delta is typical of many areaa in the world where overland movement is severely limited by lack of roada and inadequate bridging or ferries to cross the nu meroue rivera and canals. Of even more concern to the man on the ground is the fact that much of the area that looks like dry land on a map ia actually under water a large part of the year. Then, the foot soldier can, for the moat part, travel on the surface in only two ways. He can wade through the water and mire or he can move by boat.

Heavy Population Conducting military operations un der these terrain restrictions ia often further complicated by a heavy pop ulation deneity. The Mekong Delta .is the home of some five million people, which ia more than ane-third of South Vietnams total population. This is a type of environment that is now being defined ae a riverine area: An inland area with an extensive network of nvere, can-ala, str-came, irngation ditches, paddies or s wampe extending over a broad, level terrain, parte of which rmzu be inundated periodically or permanently. It may include sparselv-p&pulated swampe or Lieutenant Colonel John W. Baker foreste, places where eivere and is on the staf and faculty of the etreame have steep banks densely US Armg Command and General Staff covered with trWical treee or bamboo, College. Hie aasignmente include duty and locations where the terrain ie with the 7th Infantry Division in Ke-rea, the l?d Arwcared Division in relatively flat and open. A large agrar ian population may be concentrated Germany and the United Statea, and along the wat eru,ays. Riverine areas as an advekor with the Republic of near the ocean, or far inland, may be Vietnams 7th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. He l@de a B.A. affected bg tidee. from Saint Benedicte College in Riverine warfare is not a new type Atchison, Kansas. of military operation. The US Marine Corps conducted riverine operations Lieutenant Colonel Lee C. Dickeon in the Florida Everglades from 183T is with the US Army Combat Develep to 1842 and in Nicaragua in the later mente Command Institute of Com bined Arms and Support at Fort 1920e. The US Navy conducted river Leavenworth. He ie a graduate of the ine operations along the Yangtze Naval Command and Staff School of River in China from 1927 to 1932. the Naval War College, and holds an The US Army and Navy conducted M.B.A. from the Babeon Institute of riverine operations along the James Bezeinees Administration in Babeon and Mississippi Rivers and in south Park, Massachusetts. He has served ern swamps during the Civil War, three yeare in Germany and was with and in Mindanao in the Philippines in the US Military Ass{stance Command World War II. in Vietnam. iugust le67 65

itlVERINE OPtSAliONS The Britiih fought along the ZWle R&er in 1S9S and in the Euphrates River Delta in World War I. The Japanese conducted extensive opera tions along the Yrmgtze from 1937 to 1945. More recently, the French naval assatdt division {Dinaa8at&) fought against the Vietminh in the Tonkin and Mekong Deltas from 1946 to 1954. Since then, Republie of Vietnam Army are hseed on adapting todays tactical dectrine and equipment to the special operational requirements of a riverine environment, while benefiting both from the lessons learned from bis torieel examples of riverine warfare and the exploitation of new organisa tional, operational, and materiel ideas. In areas with limited overland transportation capabilities and abun

units and Navy River Assault Groups have conducted riverine operations against Viet Cong insurgents along the extensive waterways of the Me kong Delta. Wltb US -Army and Navy unita beginning operations in the Mekong Delta, it might be helpful to examine some of the tactical concepts for riverine operations. These concepts
1 Major Rkba?d M. Mwer. United States *my. -~= (jwmd4Jes Team in 14iv.r w= fm% Milituw Review, S@tember 1$66, w 64-61.

dant surface water, inland waterways provide natural routes for transpor tation and communications. These water routes have strategic and tac tical importance to an insurgent or hostile force, particularly in situations where insurgency is supported and directed by an external aggressor. Where navigable waterways exist and roads do not, or when roada are interdicted and the hostile forces use navigable waterways to supplement . MllltaIY Revbn .,

aa

RIVERINE OPERATIONS or replace road movement, a doctrine and strategy to interdict and control the waterwaye become decisive. Oper ations involving this doctrine are be ing referred to as riverine operations. lines of Communication In many ways, inland waterways resemble roads or railways and can be considered simply as lines of com munication. The tactical principles which govern their control and use for military operations are essentially the same as those that apply to land lines of communication. Equipment for military operations from the water looks different, but serves the same purpose as equipment for land opera tions. Ships and watercraft are sub stituted for wheeled and tracked ve hicles to meet armor, armament, and transport requirements. Ground forces must think of water waye as somethhg other than obsta cles to be crossed. Naval forces oper ating inland must understand the principles of ground combat because these will determine the character istics of the watercraft required and how they will be employed. Riverine operations include all mili tary activities designed to achieve and maintain control of a riverine area by destroying hostile forces and restricting or eliminating hostile ac tivities. Operations are characterized by the uee of water transport to move military forces and equipment. Riverine operations fall into two general categories. One involves mov ing and landing waterborne ground zesault forcee for eustained opera tions ashore. This may be an inde pendent action. More frequently, the waterborne forces are landed for coor dinated operations with other ground forces deployed by air over land. The second type of operation is temporary. Aegost 1987 It ie characterized by a swift landing, rapid action ashore, and a planned withdrawal. This is the normal pat tern of action for a eearch-and-destroy miesion or a raid. Riverine warfare is not just another aspect of amphibious operations, al thongh some principle and techniques of amphibious operations can be readily adapted to riverine operations. Riverine warfare is distinct, however, in that it continually uses specialized craft, equipment, and techniques, and is usually carried out where amphib ious operations are not practicable. Total Employment The significant operational concept of riverine warfare concerns the total employment of available forces, one element of which is the force oper ating on the waterways. Military forces equipped and trained to oper ate on rivers and canals in conjunc tion with airmobile and overland forces can add a new dimension to mobility and firepower. They can suc cessfully dominate the over-all envi ronment and control the routes of communication and populated areae. The nature of riverine operations necessitates integrating the opera tions of ground forces, naval units, rind supporting air forces. Tbe high est degree of coordination and coop eration between these forces is man datory. Their operations are interde pendent and must be considered as a single, tactical entity. A Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) infantry division suitably organized for combat is well suited to oper@ing in a riverine en vironment. Maneuver battalions should include both infantry and mechanized infantry; tank battalions will often be deleted. The Honest John artillery battalion may also be deleted. 67

RIVERINE OPERAltONS Tids division can operate in difficult weather and terrain, with austere logistic support. Its units can use water transport as an addkional means of mobility, Nondivisional ar tillery, armored cavalry, aviation, engineer, intelligence, and combat service snpport units can support combined-arms teams as required. River Flotilla Naval forces in a riverine envi ronment may be organized into a river flotilla to give ground units an afloat base facility, furnish combat and combat service support, and patroI waterways. A typical naval river flotilla may consist of a river support squadron and from two to five river assault squadrons. Tbe river support squadron is com posed of barracks, repair, salvage, and supply ships to support Army and Navy units operating from an afloat base. Such a base, located near tbe area of operations (AO), provides a suitable launching point for water borne operations and minimizez the impact on civilians. Ships of the support squadron in clude: APBsbarracks ships, eelf propeiled, or Af?Ls-barracks craft, nonself-propelled, to provide billets for ground force and naval personnel, and command and control facilities for flotilla, brigade, and battalion commanders and staffs; AR.Ls-land ing craft repair ships to provide maintenance facilities for naval and ground units; LJWs-landing ships, tank, for supply support; and various smaller craft for security, salvage, and tug services. Anchoring these ships adjacent to airfields, and being able te move them as required, con siderably increases tactical flexibility. The tactical element of the naval river flotilla is the river aseault sqnadron. A squadron is composed of enough troop carriers, command craft gunboats, escort boats, and refuelers to support a reinforced infantry bat talion conducting offensive tactical operations in a riverine area. Watercraft of a typical river assault squadron include: armored troop car riers (A TCS) for transporting troops and equipment; command and com munications boats (CCBS) to provide command and control facilities for embarked forces; Monitors (gun boats) to provide fire support during water movements and ground oper ations; assault support patrol boats (ASPB.Q) for fire support, minesweeping, and patrolling; and a re fueler which is an ATC with portable fuel tanks installed in the cargo well. Tbe A TC can also be used for com bat resupply and as a floating medical aid station. All these watercraft, except the ASPBS, are converted landing craft mechanized (LCMS ). Each river as sault squadron is organized into two river assault divisions. Each division supports one or two reinforced com panies the same way the squadron supports a battalion. Other Types Other types of naval forces also may be operating in the riverine area. An inland waterway patrol force, with fast, lightly armored, heavily armed watercraft, can interdict hostile lines of communication along and across the major waterways. An inland wa terway mine-clearance force may be assigned to operate various typeq. of sweep gear in major deepwater chan nels. Task organicstion for riverine operations is based on mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available. In gen eral, Army requirements for accom-

Review Mititary

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RIVERINE OPERATIONS plishing the mission will be the de ciding factor in determining the strength and organization of Navy and other supporting forces. Afloat-based. maneuver battalions me used primarily as waterborne forces moving on watercraft of the naval river assault squadron. How ever, land-baaed battalions can have and coordinate their movements and firepower quickly and with decisive results. Highly mobile maneuver. ele ments and continuous, flexible fire support are indispensable in riverine areas. All means of mobility are some what restricted during riverine opera. tions. Foot movement is least desir

the same capability by using river assault squadron watercraft for trans port and fire support. Ground forces also may have a water mobile element that rises plastic aesault boata with outboard motors. Offensive operations in a riverine environment are conducted under many different terrain conditions and against hostile forces with widely differing capabilities. Successful op erations normally depend on the ability of friendly forces to control blgust1967

able for maneuvering forces; it ex hausts troops and severely limits their rate of movement. Movemen$ and maneuver normally require a combination of all available means of mobilityfoot, wheeled or tracked vehicles, boats, helicopters, and fixedwing aircraft. Exploiting the move ment, fire support, and logistic assets of supporting Navy elements signifi cantly enhances Army firepower and maneuver capabilities. Because most riverine operations 69

RIVEIIINE OPERATIONS involve at least two military services PIUShost country forces, parallel plan ning is required at aIl echelons. Oper ations are normally phased to differ entiate between planning, loading and staging, movement to the AO, tactical operations in the AO, and withdrawal and return movemente. The ground tactical plan for the AO also may be phased by time, geographic limits, or type of operation. Timely and detailed planning and coordination between Army and Navy commanders and - staffs at the brigade-flotilla and bat talion-river assault squadron levele are particularly important. Waterborne Operations Riverine operations make extensive use of water transport to move troops and equipment. Waterborne opera tion are normally mounted from areas where ground forces and naval watercraft can be marehaled and loaded, and operation can be coordi nated. This may be at a land base ad jacent to a navigable waterway, at an afloat base on a navigable water way, or in an existing AO. Once they are loaded, the watercraft proceed to designated landing sites within an aesigned AO where offeneive striketype operations are conducted. Water movements normally are divided into three elemente: an ad vance guard, flank and rear guard, and a main body. Formations are similar to those used in ground move ments to ccmt@. They facilitate Navy control of ivatercraft movements while maintaining ground force tac tical integrity. The objective in move ment organisation is to provide secu rity for the entire force. Security meaeures during the move ment phase include proper water craft formations, Constant water pa trolling, land patrols as necessary 70 the route, air observation, and armed helicopter escort. Close air sup. port on station or strip alert, artillery, aud available naval gunfire support muet be preplanned. River assault squadron fires are primarily provided I by the Morzttom and ASPBS which have El-millimeter mortars, 40-milli meter guns, 20-millimeter cannon, .50 and .30-caliber machineguns, and :, M79 grenade launchers.
along

Tactical Moves All water movements outside the base area are conducted as tactical moves. Hoetile forces frequently have well-developed infiltration and ambush ~ capabilities, as well as techniques for expkiiting water mobility. Their eepa. bility to fight on the water, however, is usually limited. The primary threat to the waterborne force is from mince and from undiscovered hostile ambush forces on the flanks rather than to the front. They may strike at any point in the column. The ground maneuver units and the naval river asaault elements must be prepared to carry out counterambush attack plans at any time during the movement. Control meaaures, such @e phase lines and checkpoints, are used. Com munication are maintained with higher headquarters controlling tbe water movement. The Army and Navy commanders control the movement from a CCB within the movement formation or from an airborne com mand post. Landing areas normally are selected to avoid prepared defended positions. Unite must be prepared to accept bat tle at any stage of the landing, how ever. Assault landing formations are habitually adopted and supporting fires planned either aa preparatory fires or on call. Assault landing for mation provide for rapid, orderly . Mniiry Rwiw

RIVERINE OPERATIONS movement of units ashore and an immediate advance to secure initilal objectives in the vicinity of the land ing area. River assault squadron boats are stationed to provide sup porting fires to the flanks and rear, as well as to the front of the landing force. Use of predesignated initial objecforce. When the landing is unopposed, the forces move speedily through the initial objectives to launch tactical ground operation. The ground tactical operation is initiated when the commander is eatisfied that the assault landing, re organization, and seizure of initial objectives have progressed to the de

tives i/nsures that a combat posture is maintained during tbe landing and provides assembly areas for reorgani zation. Assembly and reorganization of units are simplified because each rifle platoon is normally landed intact by one A TC. If troops are attacked by a hostile force during landing, the initial objectives provide a defensive area for protecting the rest of the &ust 1967

sired degree. Encirclement, surprise, and firepower are used to fix the hos tile force and to prevent its with drawal. Naval watercraft and Army assault boats support the operation by making maximum use of available waterways. Ground troops normally can operate continuously in shallow water areas for only two to four days. Prolonged 71

RIVERINE OPERATIONS exposure of troops in water and inproper foot care result in cases of immersion foot. Individual morale and alertness decrease markedly after about 48 hours of continuous operations in subordinate elements may use many forma of maneuver to accomplish their mission. In addition to the ground forces moving to the AO by Navy watercraft and Army assanlt boats. other unite mev move overland

wade thr@gb knee-deep mud and waist-to-chest-high water. When OP eratione in an inundated area continue for an extended period of tilme, con sideration must be given to rotating/ ~ ground units by rifle company within the battalion, or replacing a commit ted battalion with an uncommitted battalion from the afloat or land base. In riverine operations at divieion and brigade level, the baeic forms of offensive maneuverpenetration and envelopment-evolve into an encircle ment or a series of encirclements. 12 *,<,. . .... . . e

The fleeting nature of hostile targets makes rapid response by reaction forces essential. Foot marches may be necessary when other transportation is not avail able or feasible. Normally, foot move ment is restricted to short marches and followe initial deployment by other means. Movement by truck mey be practicable along the major roads in a riverine area. Ferrying operations are frequently required for trucks and troops. If it is not possible to ferry the vehicles,
Military
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RIVERINE OPERATIONS additional trucks may be required on the far side of the waterway. Thor ough route reconnaissance is a neces sity. This must include checking for mines and ambush sites, ae well as the condition of the roads, bridges, and ferries. APCS can traverae most of the riverine area with considerable free dom over carefully selected routes. They can move -fast and still retain unit integrity. Movement may com mence from a land base, an existing AO,-or may follow preliminary posi tioning by naval watercraft. APCS can be transported on waterways hy the landing craft, utility (LC7J), the LCM, or the LST. Primary Olsataclas The primary obstacles to APC trafficability are the numerous irriga tion canals which vary in width from three to five yards. With few excep tions, the smaller canals present ae difficult a barrier as the large ones because of the steep mudbanks along each side. Trafficability and crosscountry movement for APCS may be better during the monsoon season than in the dry season. Rice paddies with two to four feet of water are trafficable for the APC. Uncultivated ground usually poses some problems in offroad mobility. Helicopters offer a rapid and flexi ble means of movement into an AO. Many staging areas and landing zones are available throughout a riverine area. Airmobile operations are used te commit blocking forces, reserves, and reaction forces, and for combat reconnaissance. During the wet season, riverine areas may be widely inundated. Heli copters can still land, but care must he taken to prevent off-loading troops into canals hidden under the water.
h!gsst 1967

The first man off-loaded should check the water depth in the immediate area before the rest leave the helicop ter. Airmobile operations in swamp areas with heavy vegetation are limited to employment of troops trained in rappelling, or use of land ing zones adjacent to the forested area. The ready availability of helicopter landing zones makes it advantageous to move the airmoblle force to a pre selected loading zone by boats, trucks, or transport aircraft. This shortens the distance troops have to be moved by helicopters, saves time, and injects more troopa into the objective area without refueling. Airborne forces can be employed year-round with few terrain restric tions on the size of the force dropped. During the wet season, water depth must be considered when selecting drop zones. Inundated areas present the added danger of a parachutist becoming entangled in the water eoaked parachute canopy and drown ing. The air drop of small boats along with the supplies facilitates movement and supply support. Air transport also can be used to move ground forces between base areae and for ,ward staging areas. Future Trends Present concepts for riverine Oper ations have adapted existing doctrine and equipment to fit the operational requirements of a particular riverine environmentthe Mekong River Delta. Future concepts will be modi fied based on combat experience in Vietnam and by the introduction of new mobility equipment. Air boats and air-cushion vehicles are being used successfully in Vietnam. Hydro foil watercraft also have a potential application. New amphibian vehicles 13

RPKRIHE OPERATIONS with lower ground preesures are be ing developed, There is an urgent need for a sim plified, mobile eurfaee vehicle that can readily traverse all types of mar ginal terrain in riverine areas, such as rice paddiee, marshes and swmnpe, weed-clogged waterways, mudbenke, hard surfaces. earthworks, and The development of a family of Marsh Screw Amphibian.% which use the principle of the Archimedes screw for buoyancy and propulsion in water and soft soil, may be one way to meet this requirement. Improvement in the availability of artillery fire support for riverine operations also is required. A tech nique for firing the 105-millimeter howitzer from a beached LCM has been developed and is being ueed in Vietnam. The one drawback to this procedure is that the Z.CM must bs beached before firing can begin. Some means of firing the 105-millimeter howitcer from a floating watercraft is needed to provide readily available fire support during the waterborne movement phaee. The successful employment of Army, Navy, and other forces in coor dinated or joint riverine{ operation will have a significant impact on the outcome of the struggle for control of the waterways, the land, and the people in riverine areas.
* Militam NrJte Htw.blmuer I. Mil&mI Re.iem,

March

1967. P 102.

WE READ THEM ALL but . . .

When submitting the original side of paper the ideae) and always manuscripts one carbon, enhance for consideration, typed charts, or illustrations please send on one (or just of double-spaced,

only. Pictures,

the attractiveness

and clarity

a manuscript. The Military Review accorde manuscripts normal care, courteous consideration, and a prompt reply to the author.

74

Military
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From The World Todag (Great Britain)

~he Fly in Outer Space

John Erickson

OR some, the Soviet commitment to the antiballistic missile (ABM) is merely the well-known syndrome of Soviet strategy, defenee-mindedness. Although a factor in the Soviet outlook, eo simple an explanation hardl~ corresponds to all the nuances and implications of tbe post-Khrushchev reconstructioniet military policies. Not that the fundamental frame of reference for Soviet strategy has been recast. It remaine what it was, a concept of war waging based on a combination of offensive and defeneive capabilities in contrast to the US strategy of war deterrence based on an overwhelming offensive capability. There have been, however, ehifts in some direction involving modifications in doctrine and differentiation in capabilities. By attacking what was called one-variant warv and by improving both the qualitative and quantitative aspecte of the Soviet strategic missile arsenal, the Soviet command has

hgllst 1967

75

OUTER SPASE moved away from total deterrence. and the minimum deterrence. This might have satisfied Mr. Nikita S. Khrushchev as he cnt the corners of cost, hnt it failed ,to convince the military that it would work. Flexible Response Credibility, therefore, was and is a major issue. In this connection, a review of the escalation factor is important. No longer is there rigid insistence that escalation wOuld he automatic. There is, instead, recog nition that the use of nuclear weap ons might be conditional, that limited war might develop, and the Soviet Union should prepare for such com mitment. Thus, the Soviet command disengages iteelf deliberately from commitment to one-variant war; moves toward flexible response of a Kind; and, therefore, reinforces cred ibility by giving notice of commit ment not merely at the topmost rung of war waging, but also at interme diate levels. By moving toward a form of flex ible reeponse, the Soviet command is extricating itself from the amhigui-. ties and the damaging inconsistencies of a deterrence position whose credi bility was eroding. Total deterrence was, in a number of senses, obsolete; This article was digested from the original, published in THE WORLDTODAY,the monthlv jour nal of the RWa[ Institute of International Afiatrs, London (Great Britain) Marc+ 196T, un der the title, The Fly in Outer Space: The Soviet Union and the Anti-Ballistic Miesile. CopII nghted @ 1967 by THE WORLD TODAY. Mr. Erickson is with the Dep artment of Gqvernrnent, Uni versity of Manchester, England. minimum deterrence was, at best, unsatisf actoryat woret, dangerous. This abandonment of ideas of autc matic escalation has been accompa. nied by a recognition of the potential importance of new areas of conflkt, such as struggles for national libera. tion. The doctrine of automatic es. calation hae also been revised in rela tion to such national Iiheration struggles. r Of equal importance is the intensi fied effort of the Soviets to improve their capability for theater warfare the reappearance of Soviet Marines, the discussion of long-range tram portation facilities, and amphibious landing operation. This type of flexi bility, the kind sh & n by the United States in Vietnam} is a matter of ~ great interest to the Soviet command. Counterdeterrence ~ The implication of all this go rather deep, affecting not only ideas of deterrence, but also counterdeter. rence-the two ways of exploiting military power short of actual war. Obviously, the Soviet command would wish to stretch its counterdeterrence as far as possible. Mr. Khrushchev stretched it repeatedly until it virtu ally snapped, the most spectacular debacle being the Coban miseile crisis. But these counterdeterrent threats ~ enjoyed diminishing credibility all the way from the Quemoy-Matsu crisis in 1958 to North Vietnam. Clearly, the reconstitution of the credibility of Soviet counterdeter rence ie urgent although this confllcts with adjustments made in the doc trine of automatic escalation which simultaneously augmented and dimin ished credibility. From this point of view, the ambiguities of the later Khrushchev period have been replaced by yet another set. MilitaryReviem

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OUTER SPACE The effect of the reconstruction policies on the Soviet strategic arsenal has been both quantitative and quali tative. The two significant changes underlined by Mr. Robert S. McNa mara for the past year are the in creaaed rate of hardening of inter continental ballistic miesile (ICBM) launching installations and the deploy ment of an ABM system. Tbie cor responds generally to an outlook (forming the bulk of present strength ) have storable liquid fuele and thne lend themselves more eaeily to protection through hardened sites. In addition to these qualitative improvement, the reconstruction pe riod can point to the virtual doubling of Soviet land-based ICBM strength (from 150 in 1964 to well over 300 now ). Thie signifies steady progress rather than any drastic crash proUnited States 934 624

Miasiles and Aircraft

USSR

Intercontinental

ballistic

missiles

340 130

Submarine-launched Intermediate Long-range

missiles ballistic missiles

and midrange bombere bombers

750
up to 200 1,200

Over 600

Medium-range

which caets the Soviete war-waging strategy in terms of offensive capa bility and active defense. The Soviet armed forces, organized along the lines of their miesions or specific functions, fall into four main groupings: the strategic deterrence force (ICBMe and tleet ballistic mis silee ), the strategic offensive force (the long-range air force and strate gic airborne or amphibious forcee), the strategic defense forces (ABM defense and the air defense com mand), and theater forcee (ground troops, air, and naval support). Nu merically, this presente the appear ance as shown on the chart. Thie represents some shaving down of the US four to one numerical supe rioritya superiority which ia two to one in terms of megatonnage, with Soviet warheade running higher up the scale, from 10 to 30 megatone. The eecond-generation Soviet ICBMS klgmt 1967

gram, a policy which might be as eumed to apply also to the ABM sys tem. The reeults derived from this re construction period, the background against which the ABM partial de ployment has been introduced, must aPPear from the Soviet side as by no means unsatisfactory. The move to ward a flexible responee, with the attendant augmentation of and im provement in the ICBM arsenal, aims to enhance the credibility of the Soviet deterrent; an active defense is pm-. sued through the ABM syetem; and there is the aspect of stretching the Soviet counterdeterrence, with urgent attention being given to theater forces. A decision for a partial deployment of an ABM system would make sense witbin all three of these contexts within the Soviet deterrent posture as a whole, within an active defense,

11

kR

SPACE

the Soviet equivalent of the US Nike Zeus (Spartan), a two.swge missile with a jettisonable tandem booster (NATO code-named Grifion). In Novemhpr 1964, the Red ,]are parade bronght forth the 6w0sh, pnblicly described as an ABM, a 50-foot missile concealed in its envi ronmental container with the four nozzles of its first stage showing at the open base, and the head of the 18

although the latters effective altitnde zone was claimed to be between 20 to 200 miles. By its configuration, how. ever, Western opinion was inclined to set its main preomupation with targets at an altitude of 20 miles. The Galosh must have a very fast response time; it muet have an equally impres sive thrnst in order to leap to its target. The sustained thrust for the GrifMilitaryRwiw

OUTER SPACE fort has heen mentioned as 500,000 pounds. If the Griflon had a warhead in the high-kiloton range, then the Galosh may pack more than one mega ton. The Soviet choice hae evidently been for a nuclear warhead, the alter native being a conventional explosive which does not interfere with radar doee to the area to he defended. A Soviet city defense, if it proceeds along the lines of a systematic ABM deployment, could be directed toward complicating the targeting choicee of a Potential attacker. The attacker would be forced to choose-knowing that some targets were defended

X.te..w{a
The reappearance of the Soviet Marines is psrt of the effort of the Soviets ,improve their capabltit y for theater-type warfare to

when detonated as a nuclear explosion does at high altitude. In this partial deployment, the Soviets have apparently opted for city defense, beginning with their key cities, much after the pattern of their installation of the earlier air defense system against manned bombers. It is rational also that they should de ploy to cover the main missile ap proaches. A city, however, is a rela tively large area to defend. The defensive installations, the target acquisition and discrimination radar, the whole ground guidance, together with the interceptor are all located klgutt 1967

between large defended targets and ,small undefended targets, but with no assurance that limitless or fatal dam age could be done by going for un defended targets. This may have real meaning for the Soviets in terms of damage limitation and survivahilit~. But just how much survivability do the Soviets believe they are buy ing ? The defens+in view of the minute margins for error, the fan tastically complicated problems of intercepting reentry vehicles, and discriminating between live warheads and decoysis apparently faced with odds heavily weighted against it. The 79

OUTER SPACE Soviets have evaluated and tested their own system, tests which report edly included fhe destruction of two incoming missiles by one interceptor. What this destruction entails is itself a technological profundity, but it focuses attention on the nature of tbe warhead carried by tbe Soviet ABM. Since the ban on nuclear tests within the atmosphere precludes air borne tests, warhead development must be based on what the Soviets learned both in their final pretest-ban testing and on subsequer$ under ground tests. Identifiable Gains The 1961-62 tests produced certain identifiable gainsan increase in warhead yield and a reduction in the size of the fission &iggers. In these tests, Soviet ABM techniques were explored and certainly investigated. The Soviets would also have learned of the effects of nuclear explosions on radar through ionization. Under those nuclear effects may come the secret of the Soviet ABM warbead, the 1961-62 high-altitude tests having contributed to solving the penetration of the ablative ma terial on an enemy warhead with strength sufficient to impair the war head firing circuit, or penetration of tbe warhead shielding to a degree which unhinges the guidance system (or both), thus sending an enemy vehicle crazy. One might, therefore, have an ABM designed to intercept at an altitude of over 100 miles, with an extensive slant range and with a warhead with properties capable of crippling through emission. A. planned ABM defense, based initiaIly on what might be a consider able technological breakthrough and conceived as a city defense, seems to be a cogent Soviet design. It is, there 80 fore, possible to guess that the Soviet command has an estimate of how much defense it is buying, or more particularly, what it wants to buy. The other Soviet defensive system, Blue Strip or Blue Belt, which may involve missile-firing submarines, is separate from this ABM system. Both for Soviet intentions and capa bilities, an indicator of obvious im. portance is the civil defense program,~ particularly the mass shelter effort. What is, perhaps, more important as an indicator is the recent revelation about new organs to run tbe coun try in the event of nuclear war, pos sibly indicating a newly revised approach to survivability and what to make of it. It might be less popula tion protection and more administra tive-political protection, safeguarding the nucleus of the state. Pig in a Nuclear Poke With the budgetary bulge which the ABM has already produced, the Soviets, or at least an important section of the leadership, must be convinced that they are buying more than just a pig in a nuclear poke. Exactly what they are buying re mains, of necessity, somewhat unclear. Apparently, Soviet opinion do~s not hold the introduction of the ABM to be an act of destabilization. On the contrary, it is intended to even up the balance vis-a-vis the vast stock pile held on the other side. It could be a very promising combination of weapon systems, from which the Soviets would take some dissuading. It could be an extremely promising military technology. This seems to be tbe present value placed upon it; exploitation could hoist the Soviet forces on the way to that superiority, strategic superiority, which military doctrine makes mandatory. Miliiry Review
..

OUTER SPACE On the other hand, there is much ground to cover. This can scarcely be the closing stage of the divergence between military and po litical views,, between minimum de. terrence and war-fighting capabilities. Certainly, the gap has closed a little, but it is too early to conclude that Soviet strategy as a whole is being militarized. The present militarization may be due predominantly to the present cir cumstances of the leadership, where military counsel carries greater weight than was the case under Mr. Khru shchev. There has been a movement from minimum deterrence although no radical shift. There is no evidence that this is tbe prelude to some inor dinately ambitious political strategy. It could reflect a more somber view of goodwill, but, above all, it appears as a much introverted Soviet decision, deeply embedded in caution, even pes simism, and constructed as ah elabo rate compromise.

August1967

81

DEFEATINGCOMMUNISM IN MALAYA
C. C. Too MAJOR characteristic of the Communist national liberation struggle in mounting insurgency in the developing countries is the extensive ex ploitation of the local civil population, particularly those in the rural areas, to eupport and sustain the Communist organization. This was no exception with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP ) when it broke out into ita militant cam paign of vioience and terrorism making it necessary for the government to pro mulgate a state of emergency during the period of June 1948 to July 1960. ~ When the Japanese ArmY occupied Malaya in early 1942, tbe secial-economic conditions of the country suffered a total collapse. This was especially true in the urban areas where trade and industry were obliterated by Jauanese occuTitle phota C..IWY Information Service. Federationof MaleY& 82
Militety Review

MALAYA pstion, and unemployment became rampant. Trade with the surrounding countriesparticularly Thailand and Burma which supplied a high propor tion of MaIayas staple food, rice-was practically nonexistent. Under the cir cumstances of a food crieie, there waa a natural tendency for the people liv ing in urban areas to migrate to the rural areaa to engage in food produc tion, mainly by squatting upon any suitable land and setting up their emall vegetable gardens there. Squatter Area Faced with the food crisis, the Jap snese occupation authorities aleo took active and even drastic measures to drive the people out of towna and cities to the suburbs to engage in food pro duction. The number of squatters increased enormously. The net result waa to turn the entire countryside into an extensive squatter area most] y beyond the control of the Japaneee oc cupation authorities. The majority of the urban popula tion in the Malay Peninsula was, and still is, of Chhrese origin. While most of thie Chinese population were not politically minded, nevertheless, the C. C. Too has been head of the Psy chological Warfare Section of the Ma kryeian Government since 1956. He was born in Malaysia of Chinese par entage, and graduated from Raf7tes College in Singapore. Mr. Too has been associated in combating communism in his country eince 1946, and, when M& laya became independent in 1957, he was decorated for his contribution in pe~ehological warfare againat the Communist terrorist. In 1962, he toured the United States on a State Department leaderehi grant and lec tured at the US Arm 3~Command and General Staff College ,on his ezperi enees during the Mala~an emergency of 1948-60.
August1967

MCP, composed mainly of Chinese membership, existed in the country. Clandestine cells were active in ex ploiting the anti-Japanese sentiments of the local Chineee population in fur therance of Communist purposes. Com munist activities were, therefore, hid den under the cloak of anti-Japanese activities. When the Malay Peninsula fell un der the Japanese invasion army in early 1942; the MCP took over the re sistance movement, and the vaet squat ter areas in the country became their operational basee. Communism became synonymous with the desire to fight against the Japaneae invaders. Hand in hand with the so-called Ma. layan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the MCP organized an an cillary supply, intelligence, and re cruiting organization nnder the name of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japaneee Union ae part and parcel of its Popu lar Movement (Min Yuen). These or ganization had their members in the squatter areas which they used as their baaee. Mass Trials During the period of the Japanese surrender, the Communists carried out mass triale before the return of the Allied forces to the Malay Peninsula. Many alleged collaborators were exe cuted during the mass trials which the local population was forced to attend. During a period of three to aix months, the Communists were in complete con trol in the smaller towns and remote villages before tbe Allied forcee com pleted the process of taking over. The MPAJA officially diebanded on 1 December 1945, but its cadres were retained aa functionaries of the MP AJA Ex-Comrades Association and they were soon active in organizing various labor unions and popular or 83

MALAYA ganizatiorrs to carry on the Commu nist struggle. With the rapid progress of rehabil itation, government machinery was soon restored in the ,major towns in the country. It took much longer, how ever, for the civil administration to might eject them from the land upon which they were illegaljy squatting. One of the most attractive propa ganda lines of the Communist was land reform which had already proved ex tremely effective to the landless peas ants in China, and the MCP was not slow in exploiting this line. In the var ious political programs issued by the MCP from time to time, there has al ways been the policy of giving land to . the landless. No new land policy was forthcoming from the government and the MCP made capital of this to rally the squatters. In addition, it exerted an effective atmosphere of intimida tion and extensive propaganda among the rural population. Political Factors To the hitherto nonpolitical rural population, the MCP carried out an extensive propaganda campaign ex plaining that the difficult social-eco nomic conditions encountered by the squatters were attributable to their lack of political enfranchisement un der a colonial regime. The MCP pregram called for the establishment of a Peoples Republic of Malaya with universal enfranchisement and all the democratic rights. It particularly. em phasized safeguarding and improving the living standards of the peasants and workers. The MCP, with its nu merous, front organizations, was the only body in the entire country which was putting forth what appeared to be a positive and dynamic program. This was being done during a time when the colonial government was trying to reestablish its prewar organization and functions. While the MCP was already in the process of going underground to launch the highest form of strugglw the Armed Struggle? government action took them by surprise in a seMllitary Ifwimt

Crown CODYright Iberved (Great Britain)

Rubber was tbe major industry in Malaya and tbe government sought to protect it and tbe workers from tbe Communists

lages. Furthermore, the large number of squatter areas which did not exist before the war were provided no ad ministrative machinery whatever. Malaysia, like the majority of Asian nations, is basically an agricultural country. To the landless squatters, the greateet and most pressing need is land. The gradual return of civil ad ministration to the villages brought in a new concern: the government

MALAYA

I
Iries Of raids in late June 1948. As a result, eeveral of their leaders were mrested and later deported to China. sporadic Communist attacks took place in rural areas, hut it was not until De rember 1948 that the MCP issued its first campaign directive. This direc tive, entitled Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War; was m adaptation of Mao Tse-tungn thesis entitled Strategic Problems of the 1Chinese Revolutionary War written in 1936. ~llCP Strategy Tbe contents of this MCP directive ~followed closely Mao Tse-tungs the ; sis in an attempt to ascribe an identi fication of Malayan conditions in late 1948with conditions in China in 1936. Two major phases were envisaged by this directive. The first phase had the enemy on the offensive and the MCP on the defensive dnring the early stages when the enemy is strong and we are weak. During this phase, guerrilla warfare of attrition would be carried out by the MCP in order to wear down the enemy and, at the ssme time, to build up its own forces. The main tactics were to be a series of sudden attacks upon enemy weak points with a maximum concentration of local MCP forces which would re treat upon encountering superior en emy strength. The capture of weap ons and ammunition from the enemy was of great importance. MCP armed units would normally remain small in size to insure maximum mobility. Ordy temporary bases would be set up, usn allywithin the squatter areas, with the sqnatters themselves providing a pro tective screen. Phase two would be reached when the MCPS armed units reached a suf 6cient size and strength to monnt a strategic counteroffensive. At this Argust lee7 early date, the MCP did not talk about the third and final phase of Mao Tse tunge strategy of positional warfare with permanent bases in the form of liberated areas. The complete emphasis upon mili tant action which characterized this 1948 directive sowed the seed for the MCPS future defeat. It was a depar ture from Mao Tse-tungs later more balancsd strategy of waging a doublepronged strnggle simultaneously.: the armed struggle in remote areas out side, the sphere of government influ ence and control, hand in hand with a peaceful legal strnggle largely by means of the Communist nnited front in urban areas under government con troL In actual fact, even during the first phase, the MCP was upset by un planned, haphazard, government de fensive military action which soon caused considerable demoralization and casualties among the ranks of the MCPS armed units. fiQVem81e17t Reaction The government reacted by making great efforts to increase its military and police strength. On the whole, it was thrown on the defensive, rnshing troops to reinforce remote places when these came under Communist attack and being ambushed by the Commu nists while on the way. The military situation was highly similar to that in South Vietnam until 1965. When on rare occasions the government man: aged to go on the offensive, the Com munists disappeared melting into the nearby squatter population. The civil population was under com plete influence of the Communists, either in sympathy or in fear of be ing intimidated. Many had relatives or friends among the Communists as a result of the MCP policy of incrimi 85

fAAbWA nathg all former members of the un derground resistance movement, the MPAJA, whether or not they were sympathetic to the Communists. The colonial government, in a mo ment of panic, fell into the Commu nist trap. They treated practically all former resistance members as Com munists and suspeeted almost every them, and they realized that during this presess they would be drawn be. - tween the two fires. Even those who were initially attracted by the MCPS program of land for the landless and political enfranchisement for their own peoples government had now to be intimidated and terrorized into activsly helping the Communists in :

crow.

Copyright Reservf.i (Great Britain)

Identity cards of plantation workers are checked as they report for work

member of the local Chinese popula tion as a Communist on the argument that tbe absolute majority of the mem bership of the MCP and its front or ganizations were Chinese. The squat ters came in for patilcular suspicion on this score and were treated by the colonial government accordingly. The squatters saw the MCP fight ing against the British Colonial Gov ernment for the power to rule over 66 b:--.-. -.

this crossfire. Rampant terrorism with brutal atrucitiea was committed by the Communists during this period to sub jugate the rural Chinese population which consequently suffered the high est casualties during the entire cam paign. On the whole, the squatters reverted to the traditional attitude of the pws anta in China who were drawn be. tween the government forces on one Military Iteeiee

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MALAYA side and the Communist forces or the bandits on the other. Both sides repre sented oppressive authority which tried to subjugate them and extort taxes and other payments from them. They would rather stay as far away as possible from the crossfire and hope each side would eliminate the other, thus leaving them free from bother by government and antigovernment forces alike. Importance of Protection It took the British authorities a pe riod of time to realize the futility of blaming the defenseless rural popula tion for noncooperation and fencesitting. It required a drastic reorien. tation of official thinking to wake up to the fact that such a policy had the effect of playing into the hands of the Communists by driving the people to the Communist side. The obvious answer to this problem was to give the aquattera reasonable protection from Communist intimida tion and terrorism. This was physically impossible since most of the rural pop ulation were scattered over a wide area and a high proportion of them had their farms in remote places. Also, tens of thousands of rubber-tappers who supported the major industry of the countryworked, and still work, in the extensive rubber estates stretch ing miles away from civilization. One of the principal aims of the Communist terrorists was to destroy tbe major industries in order to plunge the entire country into an economic crisie, thus making it impossible for the government to pureue the antiCommunist campaign. Since rubber was, and still is, the major industry in Malaya, every effort had to be made to keep this industry going. Because it was impossible to bring protection to individual rubber-tappers, squatters, and other members of the civil population, and since without protection the public could not be ex pected to resist the Communist ter rorists even with the best of will, the idea was soon conceived by the British planning experts that individual mem bers of the rural population could be brought to places where protection could be given. By doing so, the Com muniet terrorists could be jsolated from the rural population from whom they drew their sustenance. The result of thie came out in the form of com pulsory resettlement of squatters into new villages. National Registration On 1 March 1949, the government introduced the strict enforcement of national registration throughout Ma laya. Under this mezsure, every adult had to register with the authorities and was issued an identity card bear ing his photograph, finger prints, and his personal particulars, including tbe address of WISresidence. On the whole, the Communists and their supporters dared not present themselves for reg istration. This, therefore, had the ef fect of separating tbe goats from tbe sheep. In addition, useful information on the distribution of the squatters was provided by this measure as a baeie for planning their resettlement. On 28 May 1949, a regulation was promulgated providing the authorities the power to resettle the squatters and to clean up the squatter areas. This was quickly followed by the resettle ment of equatters in sensitive areas as a purely military necessity. Owing to lack of experience and an inade quate staff, considerable difficulty was encountered in these early efforts at resettlement. Meanwhile, the MCP saw the writ ing on the wall when the newspaper 87

hguse 1881

MALAYA carried reports of the resettlement, and it lost no time in mounting an ex tensive propaganda campaign among the squattera encouraging them to re sist resettlement. The squatters were told that they were being sent to con centration camps with resultant dire consequences, that they should not budge, and that the authorities could not move them. Actually, those squatters who bcwas not enough. IWore comprehensive and long-term planning was, therefore, introduced. This new planning was launched by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs when he arrived in Ma laya te take over the post of director of operations in ApriI 1950. As a re. suit, the pIan is commonly known as the Briggs plan. This plan called for a general re. view of the current operational situa

Iieved this propaganda and refused to move were removed physically from their huts, placed in military trucks, and taken to the new resettlement areas. There, because of their late ar rival, they had te be satisfied with the last choice of sites for their houses. This had a salutary effect upen the squatters who now began to blame the MCP for the wrong advice given them. As a result of experiences gained during the balance of 1949, it became obvious that haphazard, short-term planning, while essential in coping with the immediate military situation, w

tion in conjunction with the squatter areas. Suitable sites were studied and investigated for the resettlement areas. These were intended to grow into normal villages and townships upon the conclusion of the campaigo, in addition to serving the immediate operational requirement of cutting the Communist terrorists off from the lo cal population. Priorities were alle cated, staffs were recruited, and build ings and other material procured. The resettlements were renamed new villages carrying the implica tion of a new and better life for the MilitlIy Rlwiw ,>=

MALAYA squatters. In these new villages, the squatters were given, among other things, these facilities for the first time in their life: e Adequate protection from Com mnnist terrorism. .Land on which to build their housea. Free material and assistance in building their houses. Government subsidy for the ini. tial period of resettlement for approx imately three to six months until they could find employment in the new area or reap the first harvest of their ehort term food crop. Free medical and health services. Free schooling for their children. Standpipee for their water sup. ply. Good roads inside the new vil lages and to the nearest township. Population Control On the other hand, each pereon in every family was carefully registered by the resettlement officer who kept a complete roll of the population in the new village with a photograph of each person. Each visitor to the new village was registered as was any member of the new village going out to visit rel atives or frienda elsewhere. In short, complete control of the population was achieved. The amenities provided in the new villages contributed greatly toward refutation of Communist propaganda against resettlement. While an appre ciable amount of hardship and worry were no donbt encountered when the squatters were forced into leaving their old homes in the squatter areas, they coon realized the advantages pro vided in the new villagee. In Augnet 1950, the MCP felt the effect so badly that it issued a direc. tive entitled Guide to the Anti-Reset hlgsst 1967 tlement Struggle ordering that the squatters should be forced to resist re settlement to the bitter end. However, this failed to check the mounting mo mentum of the campaign. Village Llefense The new villages were sited in such a way that, apart from the availabil ity of suitable land and all the normal considerations of maintaining a viable economy for the villagere under the circumstances, they were within easy distance of quick reinforcements should their military or police garri sons need help to defend the new vil lages againat Communist attack. This wae of utmost importance not only from the military point of view, but also from the viewpoint of the morale of the villagers which could affect the success of the entire campaign. Each new village wae surrounded by a double barbed wire fence approxi. mately seven to eight feet high which was lighted at night. Gates were manned and everyone was searched when going through the gates, Hence, the functions of the new vil lages were almost entirely on the tac tical level in terms of local military operations, although the underlying principle of cutting the Communists off from the local population upon whom they drew the auetenance may be given strategic connotations. Since the defense of the new villages de pended on their proximity to nearby military centers, this made them satel lites of expanding government control radiating from the military centers. Conetant perimeter patrolling and patrolling in depth in the nearby jun gles aleo turned the new villages into satellite operational bases. This was coordinated with similar patrolling from the nearby military centers, thus making it difficult and eventually im e9

MALAYA possible for the Communists to make use of the terrain in between. The net effect was that government control ex panded from such bases to link up with similarly expanding bases nearby. The Communists were either driven away or cut off into small isolated groups to be eventually eliminated piecemeal. In a sense, it was Mao Tse-tungs basic tactics of mobile warfare operating from permanent bases in rural areaa being adopted by the government which was defeating .tbe Communists. The Malayan jungle is so neutral that even experienced Communist ter rorists could not exist in groupa larger than four or five persons. Even so, there was practically a full-time need to forage food in tie form of scanty jungle vegetables and fruits and small animals such as rats and frogs. This left hardly any time to engage in Com munist activities. Thus, even after re settlement, the Communist terrorists in the area had to remain near the new villages to obtain food and med ical supplies from the residents when they came out to work in the rubber estates or tin mines. Infiltration Although the majority of the Com munist terrorists and supporters took to the jungle upon the implementation of national registration and the reset tlement scheme, nevertheless, a few of them were bold enough, or were aur- prised into being resettled. These Com munist elements lost no time in Or ganizing themselves and making con tact with the Communist terrorists in the nearby jungle. They became massea organisations ineide the new villages under the direction of the Communist branch committee or armed work cell hiding in the nearby jungle, and were charged with the task of sm~ggling food, medicine, and other essential suppliee to the Com munist terrorist groups. In June 1951, the government coun teracted by imposing strict food con trol measures and stringent gate chccke in the new villages, with the purpose of stopping food, medicine, and other commodities essential to the Communist groups in the jungle. Searching booths were erected at the gates, and communal cooking of rice was introduced in some areas to prevent any private ownership of uncooked rice inside the new villages. Cooked rice, being bulky and perish able, could not be kept and smuggled out to the Communists. Curfews were imposed on a 24-hour basisoutside the new villages and dur ing the hours of darkness withh most new villages. All travel on the public roads had to be made under convoy and no stop was allowed between con trolled areas. By the end of 1952, there were 509 new villages set up with a total pepu ,lation of 461,822, mostly Chinese. Psychological Operations The inability of the Communist Ter rorist Organization (CTO ) to stop the resettlement plan and the subsequent food control measures presented a tell ing setback upon the prestige of the CTO among the rural population. With protection and administration, public confidence in government was rapidly restored. There was a correspondhg deterioration in Communist morale, especially when government military pressure was mounting at the same time. A surrender policy was offered ts the Communists by the government under which an increasing number of Communist terrorists gave themselves up for the hope of a new life, The sur rendered Communists provided invaiu

1 , I 1

MALAYA able intelligence on their ex-comrades in the jungle and on the masses orga nizations within the new villages. Suitable surrendered Communists were selected ,to tour the new villages to tell the people of the unhappy con ditions in the jungle and of rapidly dwindling Communist strength and morale. WRb success begetting more These disagreements led to the execu tion of one senior leader and the sur render of two other senior leaders. If government intelligence at that time had been as good as it became later, the entire antiterrorist campaign couId have been successfully concluded in 1963. In April 1954, the second conference

success, tbe entire process snowballed toward eventual defeat of the Commu nist terrorist campaign of violence in the armed struggle. The collapse had begun, and even the Communiete rec ognized it. Although the number of terrorist attacks and military and civilian cas ualties actually mounted in 1960 and
continued to increase major disagreements until 1962, three

1950 within hugust 1967

the ranks

took place in of the CTO.

of Communist and Workers Parties within the British Commonwealth wqs held in London. A representative of the MCP submitted a report to this conference which resulted in a resolu tion calling for peace negotiations with the government. On 1 May 1955, an announcement from the Malayan Na tional Llheration ArmY General Head quarters called for peace negotiations and offered to send representatives to Kuala Lumpur to make arrangements 91

.
for peace talks between MCP leaders and the government. Meanwhile, development and prog ress in the new villages continued. In August 1950, announcement was made of the formation of the Home Guard on a voluntary and part-time basis. ThkI group was to take over etatic de fense and free highly trained troops and the paramilitary Police Field Forces to pursue tbe Communist ter rorists deeper into the jungle. The re sult of this policy was that, for the first time, the suspected Chinese exsquatters were seen given training and arms to take part in their own defense. In June 1951, elections for village committees, to be known as iocal coun cils later, were first held in the south ern state of Johore. This had been a difficult area before and wae, conse quently, one of the four priority areas for resettlement. This was followed by similar elections in the states of Selangor, Negri Sambilan, and Perak. In view of the frequent Communist propaganda calling for democracy, and the fact that there had not been any election with]n the Malayan Commu nist Party eince World War II, tbie move was of particular significance. Although initially advieory in nature, the freely elected village committees were coon given increasing responsi bilities. Citizenship, and, therefore, political rights, became available to the Cbi neze in Malaya, and many Malayan citizens of Chineee origin voted in the first general elections in August 1955. This returned the Alliance Party to power to forma government under tbe principle of internal self-government promised by the Britieh Government. Two yeare later, on 31 August 1957, the independent and sovereign Feder ation of Malaya came into being. 92 The tempo of the mopping up opera tion increased in consequence even after several attempts by the MCP to offer to talk peace. The atate of emer gency was officiaUy ended on 31 July 1960, thus putting an end to the 12 year campaign. At present, practically all the new villages set up during the Malayan anti-Communiet campaign of June 194$ to July 1960 have become thriv ing villages or townships. All of the villagers have their own houses on land for which they are issued titles or leaees by the government. Most villages have piped in water, electric lights, schools, and clinics. The new villages have proved to be more important as a long-term silent social rural revolution in Malaya than merely a temporary meaeure to fight Communist insurgency. The most important lesson learned during the 12-year anti-Communist campaign in Malaya was that of win ning the civil population, patilcularly the rural population and the under privileged, to the side of the govern ment. This involves increasing gov ernment activities, coverage, and ad ministrative facilities, and eventually changing the government itself when thie became necessary. Military meas ures were essential, but had to be co ordinated with civil government mess. ures and took second place to admin istrative measures without which the military could not operate effectively in the long campaign. More than anything else is the need for reasonably effective local govern ment administration. This calls for the rapid recruitment and training of jun: ior administrative officers. The impor. tance of this in the developing coun tries anywhere in the world cannot be overemphasized.
MilitaryRDViOW

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nl:v~

From The Znfantrtt

Journal

(India)

The Victorious Will

Lieutenant General Harbakhsb Singh, Indian Armg

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N WAR, he who plays safe: lies low, and awaits developments usually comes off second best. The commander who alwaye tries to dominate a situation, is eager to seize fleeting opportunities, and is prepared to pounce upon them with inspired audacity usually carriee the day, however adveree the circumstances of battle. There are always a number of ways of fighting battles successfully, but few of winning them cheaply. While the rigid, slow plodder, the stickler for text book conventions, also reachee hie goal, his route to success is often littered by prohibitive coste in men and materiel. Quick, spectacular achievements at com paratively low cost usually come to the audacious, the bold, and the enterprising.

August 1987

93

THE VICTORIOUS WILL

The instinct of the opportunist in action is somstimae inborn, but can also be cultivated through proper training and psychological develop ment. It is a a+ commentary on train. ing technique+both during tactjcd exercises with and without troopsthat the rigid application of accepted tactical doctrine is often unimagina tively insisted upon. The unconven tional is usually frowned upon what ever the justification of the action. The inevitable Well, it is not ueually done dampens the spirit of the average officer during training and curbs his initiative in war. Attitudes and Methods WhHe teaching correct preeedures, drills, and precepts of war are necesUW, it must be appreciated that theee are all means to an end and not the end themselves. Once mastered, the average officer must retain an elasticity of mind to vary, violate, or depart from them to take advantage of favorable situation. To do this, he must be encouraged to develop a mental attitude which, while reelect ing the establiebsd convention of war, is, nevertheless, prepared to break away from them should the oceaeion ariee. There is, therefore, a definite re quirement for a reorientation in atti tude and metbode of training. The army shou~d aim at cultivating in its commanders a spirit and mental atti tude which would welcome chances of bold action inetead of indecisive wavering when faced with a situ ation. while in the initial stages the cor reet application of established prin ciplsa should be taught and practiced, once a sound foundation is laid, var iations from accepted norms should be permitted and even encouraged within appropriate circnmetances. In exercises, suitable situations should be created involving tbe taking of calculated risks and the uee of bold and audacious action, even at the rick of deviating from normal procedures and established principle of warfare. The average officer should be in stilled with the conviction that, if a gamble is justified, he must not hesi tate to stake hie all. The ideal would be achieved when an officer ie so psy chologically attuned to offensive spirit that, not only ie he on the lookout for the opportune moment in battle, but is eager to create for himself favor able situations for audacioue action. Passive versus Active Training In tactical exercieee where eand tables are ueed, even at lower levels most of the time ie devoted to etereo. typed-hypothetical problems repeated with monotonous regularity. The action requirement is pushed to the background and sometimes even ig nored. It muet be remembered that, in battle, it is more often the cumu lative effect of a series of actions that carry the day and not the best laid plane on paper. Planning is important, but a dis propo~lonate share of the time should not be devoted to paeeive training ae oppoeed te active probleme which are associated with the conduct of individuals on the battlefield. Prob-. lema requiring qttick decieions and involving aggressive action ehould be liberally introduced in exercises. It is a matter of appropriately emphasiz ing a particular aspect of training. 4Militarv nOVieW

..

.,

THE VICTORIOUSWILL Problems requiring committee solutions should be reduced to the minimum and be generously interspersed with individual requirements. While committee planning ie inevitable in the complexity of modern warfare, the ability to make individual, on-thespot decisions is vital on the battlefield. An officer loses his capacity for confused, is better than listless wait. ing and hoping for the best. The indi vidual who is inclined to look over his shoulder for orders or requires continual prodding from the rear must either change hie attitude or not accept command. In exercises, some commanders tend to take for manted the smooth func

ArnwNetm Featu,m
Problems requiring quick decisions and involving aggressive introduced in exercises action should be liberally

independent thought and action if he is accustomed exclusively to committee work. Nothing is more demoralizing in war than inaction. The hesitant, the wary, and the cautious usually induce despair and despondency in subordinates. It must be impreseed on all that any action, especially when the circumstances are grim and the eituation
August

tioning of supply lines, reliable com munications, the faultless transmis sion of orders, and flawless execution of plans, not realizing that, in war, faulty functioning of these agencies is the rnle rather than the exception. During training, prohleme should be posed to depict the unexpected in war so that commanders are mentally con ditioned to take such situations in 95

1967

THE VICTOR1OUSWILL their stride rather than being para lyzed into inaction. No impcmder able should retard a commanders pace or tempo of action in battle. The fog of war should be treated as a normal phenomemm. The practice of basing plans and actions on detailed information about the enemy, glibly provided by obliging umpires during exercises, must be discouraged. Such unrealistic training will accustom the average officer to expect similar detailed enemy information during battle. While intelligence about the enemy ie important, waiting for complete details is fatal, especially where time favors the opponent. One must be trained to accept that, more often than not, only scanty information about the enemy will be available and the gaps in the jigsaw puzzle will have to be filled in by intelligent deduction and even through sheer guesswork. The tendency to hold back because adequate information is not readily forthcoming ie the favorite refuge of the type who likes to play safe-and eafety on the battlefield is synony mous to cowardice. There comes a time in most battlee when opposing eides are evenly matched, and vital issues hang in the balance. It is at this juncture, when the original plans and orders have gone haywire, that the commander with greater stamina, grit, and deter mination will rally his troops for one final desperate effort and tip the scales in his favor. The will to outlast the OppOnent, the ability to draw on ones last ounce of strength for a final audacious fling at the enemy is the hallmark of a great field commander. This must be emphasized in all train ~ ing. The need for injecting a bold, dar ing, and audacioue attitude in our commanders is vital, for, in war, the timing of an action and spesd are all-important. The officer who acts and makes mistakes must be pre. ferred to the one who is never wrong by playing safe. One word of warninga misplaced interpretation of these ideas may, if applied unimaginatively, produce the type who breaks conventions merely because he thinks it is fashionable to do so or who, under the mistaken guise of audacity, tries to play rashly with the lives of men. This must be guarded againet. The aim of training is to forge a commander who blends a cool and calm mind with the swift and sure intuition of spotting and grasping the transitory chances in war and then, acting on them with paralyzing speed, delivers to the enemy the coup de grace.

Military Review ,.. ....444

UNITED STATES
ArmyROTC Expansion The Army plana to increase the number of college-level Reserve Of ficers Training Corps (ROTC) units during Fiscal Years 1968 and 1969. Up to 15 new units may be estab lished during each year. These are the firet units to be added to the col lege-level program since 1952. At present, the Army ROTC pro gram is conducted on 247 college and university campuses in all 50 statea, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. More than 150 degree-granting institutions have made application to join the program. Applications will be accepted from interested institutions which meet the established criteria. The basic criteria for selection are: The institution must be an accredited four-year, degree.gra~ting college or university, and institutions must agree to. establish a Department of Military Science as an integral part of the institution, and to provide ade quate clasaroom, office, storage space, and other required facilities. These factors-considered with the institu tions potential to produce officers both qualitatively and quantitatively, and the need to achieve geographic distri bution of unitewill form the basis for selection.DOD release. U-21A Aircraft Oelivered Delivery of the first twin-engine, turbine-powered U-21A utility air craft has been made to the Army. Acceptance of the initial produc tion model signaled a delivery sched ule extending through spring 1968, and which includes 129 U-21AS, The U-21A is capable of accommo dating up to 10 combat troops or six to eight command personnel in var

B..ah

Ai.wafe

llwpomti.m

U-,21A ied interior arrangements plus a crew of two. Other interior config urations make it available as an airevacuation ambulance or cargo car rier. With a maximum gross weight ~f 9,650 pounds, the U-21A can carry up to 2,000 pounds of useful load at cruising speeda in excess of 170 knots over a 345-mile radius of action. The aircrafts range is nearly 1,250 miles plus a 30-minute fuel reserve, and its maximum flight endurance is approximately eight and one-half hours.News release. el

iugllst 1967

MILITARY NOTES Shsmltaneous launch of Perahings

US Amw Two Army Per8hhzg missiles roar skyward in a simultaneous launch con ducted from a firing point near Blanding, Utah. The 34-foot missiles, 100 yards apart, flew a flawless pattern and impacted on target at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, nearly 400 miles away. This was the first attempt of eimulteneous launchings for Perehing. Perehinga two-stage, eolid propellant system which carriee a nuclear warhead-is currently deployed with United States and West German units in Europe.News release. Joint Ammunition Board The military servicee have eetabliehed a hoard to allocate and control on a worldwide basic the distributilofl of selected items of ground ammunition common to two or more cervices. The board, called the Military Services Ammunition Allocation Board, was created by mutual agreement of the aervicee: The board will he composed of a representative from each service. The Army member will be the chairman of the board and will be responsible for providing tbe secretariat.-Army News ~eaturee. 3s Low-Altitude Cargo Delivery The Nlr F~rce has successfully dropped a 50,000-pound package from a C-1.?OHsroulss using a Low-Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAP ES) . With LAPES, a cargo plane pasees over a drop aone at an altitude of about 10 feet, releasing a 15-foot ringslot parachute attached to four 28-foot parachutes. The development of LAPES allows air delivery of heavy cargoes to un prepared sites with a high degree of accuracy and without Iandhg the aircraft.DOD releaee. Mllitefy RWIEII
..3

MILITARY NOTES Mallard A tactical communications system liti]ng field armies of the United States, Australia, and Canada will undergo cooperative development by the three countries. The Malhzrd Project will use all kinds of message and data transmission from simple written messages to digital systems, and could possibly involve communications satellites. The initial development phase will Project solicit competitive system design studies from US industry. Threecountry industry participation will he encouraged for certain supporting technique efforts. Scheduling calls for a five to sevenyear research and development program and a follow-on phase for equipment production. This would provide the system between 1975-77. DOD release.

Jet-Propelled Gunboat

US NGW
The USS Gallup (PGM 85) is the second of the A8heuiUe CISSS gunboats to be built

The Navy has a revolutionary new class of motor gunboat which is pro pelled by jet engines at speeds of al most 40 knots. The first boat is the USS Asheville (PGM 84) which is designed to punch fast and hard in coastal and river op erations such as those now being con ducted in Vietnam. The main powerplant contains twin 875-horsepower diesels and a sec ondary J79 jet aircraft engine. These engines can accelerate the ship from a dead atop to 40 knots in slightly more than one minute. The variable pitch hqsst 1967

propellers can bring the Asheville to a full stop from that speed in under 60 seconde. So powerful is the thrust from tbe ships jet engines that highspeed maneuvering calls for fastened seat belts. , Armament on the 165-foot ship in cludes one 3-inch rapid fire gun in an enclosed mount; one 40-millimeter automatic cannon; two twin, 50 caliber machinegnns; and miscellane ous small arms. The crew consists of three officers and 21 enlisted men.US Navy re leaee, 99

MILITARY Jt07ES CH.47B Delivered to Army

The first CH-47B Chinook helicopter has been delivered to the Army. The advanced Chinook has uprated engines, cambered rotor bladee, a blunted aft pylon, and atrakes along the rear ramp and fuselage for improved frying qualities. The CH-47B, operating at sea level condition with a full fuel load, is able to transport 15,800 pour.ds on a 115-mile radiue mission. This represents a S4-per,cent increaee over the payload capability of earlier Chinooks. Cruise epeed for the new helicopter ie increased by 41 percent to 155 knots. News release. SeIectatda Range Rocket Army scientists have controlled ventibnal rockete normally remain solid fuel and a liquid oxidizer in a airborne until the solid fuel is com pletely expended. selectable range rocket. The eys A eolid propellant first stage is tern, employing a propulsion concept used to boost the new rocket. A holding promise for future miesile and space application, has been suc second eolid fuel and liquid oxidizer cessfully tested at Redstone Arsenal, stage ignites and keeps the rocket airborne. At a determined time, the AIabam& oxidizer is ehut off, extinguishing the The selected range eyetem has not fuel. The rocket impacts in the d~eired been used before. because of problems target area.DOD releaee. in controlling the burning fuel. Con

lW

Miliiary RwiOe

i Rough-Water loading Four crates are beiug lowered into a lighter amphibious resupply cargo (.LAfZC-5) by a portable lighterloader. The portable device stabilizes the smaller vehicle with the ship, mak ing the transferal of cargo easier in rough seas. The lighter-loader is being kievel oped hy the US Army Mohilit y Equip ment Commands Engineer Research

MILITARY NOTES

Polar-is At3 and 13 carry the 1,725 mile Folams A.% Each Polaris sub marine is armed with 16 missiles. DOD releaae. Battlefield Burglar Alarm A battlefield burglar alarm to warn of the approach of enemy troops is being tested at the US Army Elec tronic Proving Ground in Fort Hui chuca, Arizona. The eight-ounce device contains a flashlight battery, buzzer, signal light, and a spool of thin wire. The soldier surrounds his position with nearly invisible wire and puts

AnnII

Nevm

Features

and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Scientists are studying ways to speed up the trana fer of military cargo from merchant ships to shore.Army News Fea tures. Polaris Submarine Force The Navys Fleet Ballistic Sub marine Force completed its 400th successful patrol in May following 60 days of operation by the USS Lafay ette. There are 41 fleet ballistic sub marines in commission. Twenty-eight are equipped with the 2,875-mile August 1967

Alarm being deveroped for use in Vietnsm o the alarm nearby or on his belt. If an enemy breaks the wire, the alarm sounds or the light flashea. Each set has three spools of wire, 9,600 feet per spool. Breaking with only three and one-half to aix ounces of pressure, the wire can be repaired by melting strands together with a match.Army News Features.

101

MILITARY NOTES C5A Jet Tranaport

Lo.klmed-Oecwgin Ccawmv
The Air Forces Military Airlift Command (MAC) is scheduled to receive 11S C-5A jet transports, nicknamed the Gakzzy. The first flight of the aircraft is scheduled for June 1968, and the firet delivery to MAC a year later. The first two 16-aircraft equadrons are expected to be operational by 1970. Capable of flying at 435 knote, the 728,000-pound aircraft measures 245 feet long, is 65 feet high, and has a wingspan of 22S feet. The GakMw will fly for 3,5oo miles with a 110-ton payload and for 6,335 miles carrying 56 tons. The aircrafte four fan jet enginen will be able to produce some 41,000 pounds of thrnst, enough power to operate 800 personal-size automobiles. An American car could make 31 trip# around the world using the fuel carried by the aircraft. A major asset will be the Ga&xus ability to transport the Armys largeet pieee of equipment, a 74-ton mobils scissors bridge. In addition to a cargo load, the aircraft will aleo carry 97 troops. A commercial version of the GaZuaII will eerry more than 700 paesengera US Air Force release.

Hew Army Boot The boot, which will eventually reThe recently adopted standard Army leather boot has no stitches or place the current stendard leather nails in the eole and heel. combat beet, baa a chevron-type sole and heel for traction on snow and on The new boot-developed by the US ice. Army Natick Laboratories at Natick, Designed so the sole and upper part Massachusetts-has a vulcanized sole will wear out at the same time, tbe and heel molded directly to the leather boot is replaced when worn out, elimi upper boot. It is the counterpart of nating the need for repairs.Army the tropical boot now being used by News Features. US forces in Vietnam. 102 Militwy RWbW

MILITARY NOTES Portable Generator A new portable generatorweigh ing only 35 pounds with fuelbaa been developed which can be easily carried about by a eoldier to provide silent, immediate, and long-term power for military field equipment. The compact thermoelectric gener ator ie designed to deliver 300 watts of electrical power, has an eight-hour

Moreover, since the generator is silent, unlike engine-powered gener ators, it also can be used to charge batteries quietly in the field without fear of alerting the enemy.News release. Jet-Flap Rotor Principle An agreement to investigate the design and development of a jet-flap rotor for vertical lift systems wae recently announced by a United States and a French manufacturer. The team effort of the two companies is directed toward future development of vetilcal lift syeteme employing the jet-flap rotor principle in vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft. a technical break Considered through and a significant contribu tion to rotary-wing technology for extra large or high-speed helicopters, the jet-flap rotor is propelled by ex hausting a sheet of high-pressure gas along the trailing edge of each rotor blade. The magnitude of the lift on the rotor blade ia varied or controlled by the angle between the plane of the jet sheet and the rotor blades. Engineere believe this method of control may replace the blade-cycling system now used in conventional heli copters. Propulsion of the rotor by gas emiesion eliminates the driving transmission and the need for an afiti torque tail rotor. The jet-flap rotor system has the potential advantages over conventional rotor systems of increased operating reliability and lowered maintenance costs. The system has the further advantage of a low-vibration level eince the rotor itself ia rigid and fixed in pitch.News release. Ioa

US N.VLJ

Thermoelectric

generator

fuel supply, and can operate on kero sene, jet fuel, or diesel fuel. The generator is expected to re place battery power for certain mili tary applications and soon may take the place of engine generators in for ward battle areas. It is currently be ing evaluated for Marine Corps field use in powering communications and other field equipmetit. The manpack generatora rug ged, solid-state power unitmeasures 11 by 17 by 18 inches. It can be trans ported on a Marine Corps packboard, strapped to the back of the soldier, and can be rapidly and easily con trolled and put into operation. klguat1987

MILITARY NOTES WAC to Be Espanded The Army hae embarked upon a campaign to increaee the enlieted strength of the Womens Army Corps (WAC ) by 3,282 and the officer strength by 314 during the 24-month period beginning 1 July 1967. There are now approximately 10, 000 WACs, both Regular and Re. serve, on active duty serving in the United States and overseas. The enlisted women perform duties in approximately 150 different occu-

years of college or its equivalent may apply for Oficer candidate training. The Army recently established the WAC Student Officer Program de signed for qualified young women who are interested in a commission. Col lege women who have successfully completed the WAC College Junior Course may apply for additional ac tive duty in the Army Reserve in the grade of corporal E-4 during their senior year of college. While in school, they pay their own tuition and expenses, but, as members of the Reserve on active duty, they receive the pay and allowances of corporal grade E-4. Upon graduation, they are commissioned second lieutenants and are called to active duty to serve for two yeare from date of commission. DOD release. Composite Aircraft The Army hes selected two corn. panics to develop a composite air craft that combhea the hovering capa bility of a helicopter with the range and efficiency of a fixed-wing airpline. A contract for 1.9 million dollars was awarded to each company after the Army evaluated various concepts for the aircraft. The concept of one of the manufac turers is a tilting rotor technique, in which blades mounted on the wingtips will be used both ae roters for vertical lift and propellers for horizontal flight by tilting the blades up to 90 degrees. The other manufacturer is using a stopped stowed rotor approach, in which a rotor is used for vertical lift, and, upon reaching a certain speed, propellers take over to p~ovide cruis ing thrust. The rotor@ then stopped, folded, and stowed.A!rmy News Fea tures. Militafy Review

Amw

New.

Feat.ra

A WAC physical therapy assistant ranging from administrative and clerieal positions to communications, data proeeesing, and medical positions. Qualified enlisted women who have attained s@icient experience may aPP~ for a warrant if available in their particular career fields. Direct commissioning of qualified college graduates ie the major source of WAC otlicer procurement; however, qualified enlisted women with two

MILITARY NOTES

WEST GERMANY
BO 105 Helicopter After three years of development, the BO 105 helicopter has successfully completed its maiden flight. This is the first helicopter in the two-ton . .,

CANADA
New Armored Veldcle The Canadian Army has received aPPrOval to buy 174 new command and reconnaissance vehicles from a US manufacturer. Replacing the Ferret scout car, the new vehicle will be used by reconnaissance, armored, and field engineer units in Europe and Canada. It ie a highly agile, Iigbtweight, full-tracked armored vehicle ~capable of amphibious and rough crosscountry operations, and may be used at high speed on highways. Operated by a three-man crew, it bas a length of 15 feet, a combat

Sol&t

und

Technik

BO 105
class which has two powerplants. Be cause of the fixed rotor, its flight characteristics are comparable to those of fixed-wing aircraft.News item. Army Trade Union The West German trade union which was given permission in 1966 to recruit in the armed forces has signed Up 4,000 persons, including three generals. The Union for Public Servants and Traffic and Transport Workers (oTV) has been recruiting in the armed forces for about six months. The oZV may not order its members to strike in case of an international emergency. However, it may bargain #for a wide range of benefits from improved career opportunities to higher pay. The Defense Ministry ruled that the right of soldiers to join a union fits the governments conception of civil ians in uniform.News item.
hgusf 1967
CWULCX.. Militzvu

Journa

weight of 18,500 pounds, and a cruis ing range of 325 miles. The principal suspension and powertrain components are interchange able with those of the MI 19 armored personnel carrier. Production is scheduled for comple tion in December 1967.News iterp.

ITALY
Air Defense Missile A new surface-to-air missile, the Indigo, has been developed by an Italian manufacturer. The missile is estimated to have a ceiling of about S0,000 feet, It is suitable for use by ground forces and on ships.News item. 105

MILITARY NOTES

PORTUGAL MilitaryService
The term of compulsory military service hag been extended from 18 months to a maximum, of four years. The number of women serving in the armed forces is to be increased to make more male personnel available for troop duty.-News item.

AUSTRALIA
Defense Aid te Malaysia Australian defense aid to Malaysia will continue untill 1970, according to a recent announcement from Can berra. An Australian technical mis sion will visit Malaysia coon to study futnre defense requirements.News release. Mirage Squadren in Malaysia A squadron of Mirage tighter air. craft of the Royal Australian Air Force is now in Malaysia to form part of the Australian contribution to the British Commonwealth etrate gic reserve, The unit replaces a squad ron of Sabre fighter aircraft which was withdrawn earlier this year. News release.

SOUTH KOREA
Aviation Cempany Slaterl fer Vietnam The Republic of Koreas first heli copter and fixed-wing aviation com pany will be organized in Vietnam by 15 Republic of Korea officers when they complete training at two US Army posts in the United States. The training includes a special rotary-wing qualification course at the Army Primary Helicopter School, Fort Woltere, Texas, and a special transition course in the UH-lD, Fort Rucker, Alabama. Each officer had logged at least 300 hours in fixed-wing aircraft. They began the current helicopter training early this year.DOD release.

SWEOEN
100 Viggerr-37 Aircraft Ordered Swedens Air Force has placed an initial order for 100 ViggerM7 air craft with a Swedish aircraft manu facturer. The contract, amounting to ./. . .,. ... ~., -., *.; ,.

NORWAY
Patrol Boat Oefivered One of the two patrol boats included in Norways 1960 fleet renewal pro. gram, the KNM Aeger, was recently delivered to the navy. Equipped with the Norwegian-developed Terne 111 electronic antisubmarine syetem, the 730-ton craft was constructed in Nor. way.News item. Sterd Delivered to Navy The Norwegian Navy has taken de livery of the Stord, the 14th of 15 Kobben cla& submarines being con structed for Norway in West Germany. A coastal submarine, the Stord dis places 350 tons standard and 472 tone submerged. It carries a crew of 18. News item. 1(R Viggen-37 about 297 million dollars, is for 83 AJ-W attack aircraft and 17 Sk-87 trainers. The Mach 2 aircraft can carry Sirle wiruler and Falcon air-to-air missiles and the air-to-surface Soub-805 missile.News item.
Mliitwry
ROVitW

T.ehdwu

W,ek

MILITARY
BOOKS

T. E. LAWRENCE:ArI Arab View. By Srdeiman Mmwa. Translated by Albert Brrrtor. 301 Pages. Osfard University Press, New York, 1666.$6.50. BY MAJ DONALDS. MAHLBERG,USA The legend of Lawrence of Arabia is well known in the West through the biographies and autobiographies published in the past three decades. These hooks and papers generally emphasize the contributions made by T. E. Lawrence toward Arab inde pendence and surround him with an aura of glamour. But was he really a larger than life hero, and were his endeavors really a prime factor in achieving independence for the Arabs ? The author says no. Using British Army reports, per sonal interviews, and historical Arab documents, Mr. Mousa preeents a wsll-erganized and logical argument designed to refute specific statements made in pro-Lawrence publications. His favorite targets are Lawrences own recollections contained in PiUar of Fire and other autobiographical writings. The author haa provided an opportunity for Lawrence fans to make a counterargument by including comments on the Arab View ex pressed by Lawrences brother. The author sketches the early mili tary activities of the Arab fight for independence. He touches on such items as desert tactics, the develop ment of Arab military leaders, guer rilla warfare, and logistic problems involved in the conduct of a rebellion. Snpwr13s7 THE CHINESE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY. By Brigadier General Samuel B. 6rifAth 11, US Marine Corps, Retired. 39o Pages. Mc6raw-Hill Book Co.r New York, 1967. $10.95. BY COL DONALOJ. DELANEY, USA
General Griffith traces the history and development of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from its organization in Klangsi Province in

1927, through the Long Marchfl World War II, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War to the present. He feels that the opponents of the PLA consistently underrated its abili ties and, thereby, suffered. In fact, United Nations forces in Korea in 1950 came very close to disaster by first discounting the likelihood of Chinese intervention and, later, by underestimating PLA capabilities. The Korean War conclusively de stroyed the myth that the Chinese were deficient in the martial qualities deemed virtuee in the West. Truly current information is scarce, but General Griffith believes Mao Tse tung and his group have firm con trol of the military forcee. Efforts are being made to overcome obvious im balances in tbe defense structure by giving priority to the aircraft and air defense industries, production of jet fuel, building missile submarines, and a limited program to equip some divisions with modern armor. This book ia an important con tribution to understanding the mili tary power of Communist China. 107

MILITARY BOOKS THE POLITICS OF ISCAf.ATION IN VIETNAM. By FrenzSchurmann, Peter Dale Scott, and Reginald Zebrik. Foreword by Arthur Schl* singer, Jr. 160 Pages. The Beacon Press, Inc., Boston, Mass., 1966.$3.95. BYLTC ANTHONY P. DE LucA, USA Prepared by a working group or ganized by echolars at the University of California, at Berkeley, and Wash ington University, in Saint Louis, Miesouri, this is an analysis of the critical stages in the development of US policy toward Vietnam. Its pur pose is to point out the relationship between peace efforte, both at home and abroad, and US acts of escalation. Through an examination of nine critical periods beginning with the fall of Ngo-dinh-Diem in November 1963, the authors conclude that a pat tern exists in which moves toward political settlement of tke Vietnam war are terminated by an intensifica tionof the war by the United States; and that the pattern is one not of progress toward negotiation, but of graded escalation. With the documentation preeented in this volume, the conclusions would appear valid. However, these conclu sions must be evaluated with a realiza tion that they are not based on all of the facts which are available to US decieion makers. Without understanding the limita tions within which the study was con ducted, the reader could easily be con vinced that the United Statee does not want a political solution to the war in Vietnam and is following a policy of deepening military cOmmi~ ment. The reader is cautioned that the study, as recognized in the fore word, does not give due weight to the military neceeaities that may at times have rendered an enlarged American role imperative. CORRE(JIOOR:The Saga of a Fortress. By James H. andwilliam M. Belote. Foraword by Robert Leckie. 273 Pages. Harper& Row, Inc., New York, 1967.$6.95. BY LTC JOaEPH D. HYNES, USA In thie, the first full story of the 10SSof Corregidor in 1942 and its re capture in 1945, the Belote brothers have produced an authentic and in spiring account of an epic chapter in . our military history. Tbe authors, both historiana, spent seven yeare in the preparation of this well-written book. It ie recommended for the military reader. NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE. 6y Yehoshafat Narkabi. Translated From He. brew. 301 Pages. Daniel Davey & Co., Inc., New York, 196B. $7.50. BY JOHN R. CAMERON A brigadier general in the Israeli Areny, the author is currently in charge of strategic reeearch in Israels Ministry of Defense. This book was written as a basic introductory text, and as required reading for college students in international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The scope is wide, but well met. Mr. Harkabl covers both definitions and implications. The material in cludes the writings by authorities commonly associated with nuclear strategy: Kahn, Aron, Henry A. Kiss inger, and others. Their theses are well stated. The content of their the ses is equally well set, for the author takes care to note the changes in the world environment and international system brought about by nuclear weapons and the questione poeed .by them. But more than that, the book opens up avenues of thought on some of the most pressing, long-term prohIems confronting the military thinker. Military Review~

106

MILITARY BOOKS HISTORYOF THE SECOND WOR1O WAR: The Mediterranean and Middle East. The De struction of the Axis Forces in Africa. V!lyme IV. BY Major General L S. O. Play fau and Brigadier C. J. C. Molony With CaptainF. C. Flynn and Group Captain T. P. 61eave.556 Pages. Ner Majestys Stationery Office,London (British Information Service, New York), 1966.$16.00. BY COL JULIAN P. FANE, British
Army
The fourth volume of the official British hietory of World War II is a readable. and well-documented ac count of the North African campaign. The book starts with the extensive preparation for the Battle of Alamein the turning point in British for tunes during the warand closes with the defeat of the Axis armies with a quarter of a m,illion troops cornered with their backs to the sea in Tunisia. The action and interplay of all three services of. the A1lied forces are well described, particularly the details of the destruction wrought on the ene mies sea communications by the Al lied air forces and British Navy. The authors have managed to as. semble a massive array of facts in a readablqform with excellent mapa and detailed appendixes. TEN VIETNAMESE. BY Susan Sheehan. 204 Pages. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, f967. $4.95. BY LTC JOHN R. VILAS, USA Based upon interviews with 10 Vietnamese, this volume provides an interesting and informative insight , into their Iivee. The subjects include ~{a Peasant, a politician, a South Viet ~ namese aoldi&, and a Viet Cong prie oner. Their remarks provide a vivid, enlightening, and often critical view of the struggle in Vietnam. i
kg5se

THE ORIGINAL JOURNALSOF HENRY SMITH TURNER. With Stephen Watts Kearny to New Mexico and California 1646.1847. EdNed and with an introduction by Dwight L. Clarke. 173 Pages. Tha University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1966.$5.00. By LTC GLEN D. THOMPSON, USA This volume is an account of the hardships encountered by General Philip Kearnys force during its journey from Fort Leavenworth, Kan sas, to California in 1846, and the problems involved in settling the West, It furnishee a look at uncon ventional warfare in its rawest terms. THE SANDINO AFFAIR. BY Neill Macaulay. 319 Pages. Quadrangle Bhks, Inc., Chicago, Ill., 1967.$6.95. BY LTC CARL F. BASWELL, USA When the US Government landed Marines in Nicaragua in 1926, after a conservative military coup Over threw a popularly elected Iiheral gov ernment, the stage was aet for the emergence of one of Latin Americas favorite anti-Yankee heroes, a peasant soldier, General Augusto C. Sandi no. This is a vivid and factual account of General Sandinos six years of guer rilla warfare from 1927 to 1933, against the government troops of Nic aragua and the US Marines. The guerrilla tactics developed by General Sandino were later used by Fidel Castro in Cuba and the Vietminh and Viet Cong in Vietnam. Generals Lewis B. Chesty PulIer and Matthew B. Ridgway received their basic train ing in guerrilla warfare against San dino in Nicaragua. This is a valuable book on guerrilla warfare and the politico-military as pects of pacification. The author points out our mistakes in Nicaragua, and that we are still making some of them today. 109

19e7

MILITARY BOOKS NEITHER LfBEffTY NOR SAFETY:A Hard Look at U. S.. Military policy and Stratagy. By Ganaral Nathan F. Twining, United States Air Forca, Ratirad. chairman, Joint Chiafs of Staff 1957-30.330 Pagas. HoIt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., Naw Vork, 1336.$5.95. BY LTC DCINALU K. MACGREGOR, USAF General Twining presents a hardhitting eseay on the degeneration of I-W defenses. He develope his thesis by covering the background for the development of a strategic force, the US policy of containment during the periods 1950. 60 and 1961-64, the current US for eign policy, and problem areas that must be solved if this country is to remain free of possible world Commu nist domination. In this thought-pro voking work, the author offers signifi cant observations on US defenses. THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTNEAST ASIA. Sy Arnry Vandanbosch and Richard Butwell. 433 Pages. University of Kentucky Prass, Lexington, Ky., 1S3S. $7.S0. BY MAJ BARTONM. HAYWARD,USA This ia a revision of Southeaat Asia Among the World Powers published 10 years ago. However, the authors heve produced a volume that for all intents and purposes is a completely new work. Fosusing on Indonesia, Ma laysia, the Philippines, Vktnam, Lees, Cambodia, Burma, and Tbaibmd, they have included chapters on the politics, foreign relations, and the US policy in southeast Asia. Any book.such as this is bound to suffer from trying to cover so much in eo few pages. However, it is an excellent source of information on the current situation in southeast Asia and how it came about. The work ie well written and easy to read. 110
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MARCH TO THE SOUND OF THE DRUMS. By Harold 1. Oppenheimer. 333 Pages, Wabask Press, Wabash, Ill., ICBB. $5.95. ,This volume containe a number of interesting stories about Samoa prior to and during World War II, and a collection of articles on miiitary sub. jects by the author which have ap. ~ peared in military journals. The i articles cover such subjeete as auto. 1 matic data proseesing, how to be a ! success as the chief of staff of a major { command, and arctic operations. A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED ; STATES ARMY. In War and Peace, From Colonial Times to Viatnam. By Gana Gurney. Foreword by 6anersl Harold K. Johnsorr, ~hiaf of Staff, United States Army. 815 Psgas. Crown Publishers, Inc., New Yom 1CS6. $15.60. This is a photo album of the Army which wili appeal to old soldiers and young students alike. Most of the pho tographs and drawings have been seen before, but, perhaps, not in one vol ume. Attractively displayed with enough text to tell the story, it is a useful addition to any military library. A GUIDE TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM. S3 Anthony Harrigan. 134 Pages. Panther Pub Iications, Inc., Boulder, Colo., 19SS. $4.5C. BY MAJ FRANCIS A. IANNI, USA Tbe author, a noted newspaper ed itor and military writer, presents, in a series of vignettes, a survey of some of the military problems in South Vietnam and the methods developd as soiutions. The ati]cles, reprints of dispatches written while Mr. Har. rigan was reporting from Vietnam, range from an analyeis of the wark progress to an evaluation of the effec tivemms of the B-52 bombers. The booiG although it suffers from careless editing, is informative. Revks Militery
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MILITARY BOOKS DISCIPLINE AND BAYONETS. The Armies and Leaders in the War of the American Rrwolution. 6Y lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Mitchell. 223 Pages. G. P. Putnams Sons, New York, 1967.$4.95. BY LTC RALPH PUCKETT, JR., USA Colonel Mitchell traces General George Washingtons efforts to de velop and train the continental army by describing battles and analyzing the reasons forsuccese or failure. At tention is focueed on leaders as the author measures them against thecri terion of how well they made use of the resources at hand. Because of the number of person alities presented, thk analysis is somewhat limited in depth. Conse quently, the book may not satisfy the serious student. On the other hand, the breadth of coverage and the some times fascinating accounts of battles will prove of interest to the reader. HARIILUCK IRONCLAD. The Sinking and Salvage of the Caire. Edwin C. Bearsa. 208 Pagea. Leuisiana State Universi~ Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1966.$5.95. BY COL OLIN E. SMITH, USA The atory of the sinking and sal vage of the Cairo, a Union gunboat,
is presented by historian Edwin C. Beerss. He also provides a brief HIe tory of tbe western flotilla that tried to gain control of the Mississippi from the Confederacy.

VIET CON6. The Organization and Tech. niques of the National Liberation Frent of South Vietnam. By Douglas Pika. 490 Pagea. The Massachusetts krstituteef Technelegy Press, Cambridge, Masa., f 966.$6.65. BY COL DOUGLAS P. HASPSR, USA This book provides a comprehensive look at the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam. It ie devoted, primarily, to an examination of the insurgent communication media and matrix, the organization of the NLF, and the ideas communicated. In the course of this analysis, the author nees shout half tbe book to describe tbe evolution of the NLF to 1965. The vokrme contains valuable back ground information for those wbo are scheduled for a tour in Vietnam. RENDEZVOUSAT MIDWAY. U.S.S. Yerktown and the Japanese Carrier Fleet. By Pat Frank and Joseph 0. Narringten. Ferewerda by Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, United States Navy, Retired, and Yahachi Tanabe, Former Commander, Imperial Japanese Navy. 252 Pagea. The John Day Co., New York, 1667.$5.65. 13Y LTC JOHN R. VXLAS,USA This fascinating book traces tbe his tory of the aircraft carrier USS Yor7c town from its christening to its watery grave. Based upon letters, interviews, and historical records, the story in cludes information releaeed after 20 years of security restrictions. , Highlighted by 16 pages of photo graphs and several sketch maps, the book centers on the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The authors discussions of Japanese and American equipment, tactics, and commanders are informative. The volume is well indexed and is recommended for the general reader as well as for those interested in naval tactica. 111

The ill-fated attempts to salvage the gunboat andtheir final succees in 1964 should be of special interest to Civil War buffs. This narrative of the courage and determination of the people who worked so diligently to salvage the 500-ton ironclad is so cleverly written that the reader feels he is an eyewitness to the sinking in 1862 andan active participant in the salvage more than 100 years later. Asglwr 1s67

MILITARY BOOKS 71kEARMY MEOICAt SERVICES CAMPA16NS: Burma. Volume V. By F. A. E. Crow. 754 Pa@s. Her Majestys Stationeq OfRce, Lon don (British Information Service, New York), 1966. $30.iJo. . BY LTC GSORGEW. Fosn, USA This work is a detailed history of the Burma campaigns with particular emphasis on medicai support. Each chapter deals with the tactical situa tion followed by closing paragraphs outlining the medical support. The last chapter is a summation of the medical activities for the entire Burma campaign with detailed sta tistics revealing the fantastic job ac complished by the medical services. CHINA, VIETNAM, ANO THE UNITED STATES. Highlights of the Haarings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 2t 8 Pages. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C, $4.50 clothbound. $2.95 paperbocnrd. BY COL THOMASH. REESE, USA In February and March 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from distinguished Americans regarding China, Vietnam, and the nature of US foreign policy regarding these nations. In this vol ume, 18 of the most significant state ments are preeented in the hope that they will contribute to better understanding of our problems and prospects in Southeast Asia. While the authors of the statements agree that Communist China is a major threat te the security of the United States, they disagree on the most euitahle manner of meeting this challenge. The highlights of the hearings reflect a responsible and searching concern over foreign policy problems created by Communist China and Vietnam as far as the national security of the United States is con cerned. 112 THE SMOKE SCREEN OF JUTLAND. BY corn. mander John Irving, Royal Navy, Retired. 256 Pagas. Oavid McKay CO., Inc., New York, 1986.$7.95. BY LTC GLEN D. THOMPSON, USA Commander Irving presents a thor ough account of one of the most sig. nificant naval battles of, World War L Much has been written abeut the Bah tle of Jutland, hut a cloud of mystery has surrounded certain pertinent facts P regarding the failure of the British Fleet to destroy completely the encir cled German Fleet. The man meet mentioned as the one responsible for this tactical blunder is Ad,miral Sir John R. Jellicoe, com mander of the Britieh naval forces at Jutland. Through investigation of German and British documents, per sonal knowledge, and interviews with persons who were involved in the bat tle, the author concludes that the blame has been falsely placed on Ad mird Jellicoe. He offers evidence that the Admiralty and certain subordinate commanders should share in the re sponsibllit y for the failure. THE BUFFALOSOLOIERS.A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West. By William H. Leckie. 290 Pagea. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1967.$5.95. This is a story of the 9th and 10th US Cavalry. Beginning with their formation in 1866, and for 25 years, the reader rides with the buffalo soldiers while they battle hostile In dians, keep the peace on Indian reser vations, and track down cattle thieves and illegal traders. Well indexed and coritaining 21 pages of photographs, drawings, and maps, The Ih@zlo Sokfiers is recoin. mended to the general reader as well as to the military historian. Militaw RevierI