Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

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FORTY-SIX YEARS OF MILITARY i&iV& ~ ~~

ArmY of Israel

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BG S. L. A. Marshall,USAR, Ret COL Gerald L. Overstreet,USA . . . . . . . . .

SkillShortage Delpipn or Dilemma?

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Psychological Warfare Key to Successin Vietnam Searchfor Equilibriumin the Middle East State-Defense Officer ExchangeProgram Roleof Nuclear Weaponsfor the West Scandinavia and Future of NATO . . . . . . . . .

ReubenS. Nathan - 19
Howard C. Reese 29
41
46
54
63
73
80
85
90
97

LTC Billy W. Byrd, USA . Robert E. Walters

COL John E. Dwan 11, USA . . . Lewis H. Gann

From Ox Wagon to Armored Car in Rhodesia TargetAcquisition Vietnam Style . . . . . . . . . . . .

LTC David H. Hackworth,USA . . . . . . .

BurmasChina Crisi~ The ChoicesAhead TheBattalionand Zero Defects SovietMititaryPenal Units MilitaryNotes. Milijary Books. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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John H. Badgley

MAJGene T. Sherron,USA Vyacheslati P. Artemiev . . . . . . . . . . .

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The VIEWS expressedin this magazineARETHEAUTHORS and not necessarilythose of the USArmy or the Command and General StaffCollege.

Editor in Chief COL Donald J. Delaney Associate Editor COL Thomas J. Cleary, Jr. Army War College Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey Faatures Editor

LTC Charles A. Gatzka Production Editor Helen M. Hall Spanish.American Editor MAJ Juan Horta-Merly Brasilian Editors LTC Samuel T, T. Primo LTC Romero Lepesqueur Publication Officer LTC Edward A. Purcell Art and Oasign Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege,Fortleav enworth, Kansas,in English, Spaniah, and Portuguese. Use of fundsfor printing of this publication has been approvedby Headquarters, Oapartment of the Army,28 May 1965. Second-class postagepaid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.Subscription rate%$4.00 (UScurrency) a yaarin the Unitad States,United Statesmilitary post offices,andthosecountries whichare members of the Pan-American PostalUnion(including Spain);$5.00 a year in all othercountrie% singleCOPY Price 50 cents. Addresssubscription mail to the Book Department, U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

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ISRAEL
Brigadier GeneraI S. L. A. Marshall, United States Armu Re8erue, Retired This, however, is one of those glit tering generalizations that, in itself, is of small value to military men un less there is an accompanying ex planation of what thinking simply means when applied to strategy, tac tics, weapons usage, and all other aspects of fighting operations. I would say that Israels general staff, planners, and operators stake their faith in these principles: Surprise. 3

ANY bouquets, possibly more than the facts warrant, have been tossed to the army of Israel in recent months. No soIdiery has been so lionized since the drop of the first atom bomb made war the dirtiest of three-letter words. It has been said over and again that Israel succeeds dramatically with arms because her fighters and theorists believe in the fundamentals and keep the design simple.

hpril1968

ISRAELI ARMY Mobility. Flexibility. Concentration. They are rated and exercised in about that order. Had Israel trjed escalation, which is not a principle but a modern gimmick that forfeits eurprise, she still might be fighting. Simplicity shines in Israels stra tegic appreciations. Here, is a small state surrounded by sworn enemies, yet its military men are not confused by the fact.

Main Enemy Egypt is tbe main enemy. If Egypt can be beaten, then the others must yield. On that fact, tbe Sinai Penin. su]a must be the decisive batt]e. ground. Sinai ie good tank country, despite its rough wadis, impassable dunes, and mountain barriers. Egypt and Suez lie to the west; main lines of communication, therefore, rtrn east to west. Thus in June 1967, armored col umns bad to be the chief means of overrunning and destroying the Egyp. tian Army based on the peninsula. It had to be done swiftly lest tbe United Nations or the great powers inter. vene. Four to five days was reckoned as the maximum time allowable for a total conquest of Sinai. Without this, possession of. the base overlook ing Tiran Strait could not be aesured. Brigadier General S. L. A. Mar shall, Un{ted States Arrrru Reserve, Retired, served in World Wars I and II and in Korea. A columnist and war eorreepondent, he has served for many gears as an editorial writer and mili tary critic for the Detroit News. His most recent book is Swift Sword: The Historical Record of Israels Victory, June, 1967, a review of which appears in the Book Review eection of this issue. 4

Yet every practical avenue into Sinai was blocked by heavily fortified worke, frontally mined, and fixed with manned trench systems running three to five miles in depth. The area was strong in antitank guns and bunkered armor and enclosed five io seven bat talions of field artillery so based that they could barrage the approaches. The main hedgebogs had been built under the supervision of Soviet miii tary engineers. They were designed to repel armor, and no reasonable person would say they were proper targete for direct assault by armor, Actually, they were broken by direct assault in very few instances. The manner of attack was ae varied as were the conditions of the ground. It suffices to add that the impression in the United States is decidedly wrong that great armored sweeps, maneuver ing ever for the rear, collapaed the Egyptian Army. They bad decisive effect here and there after the front was smashed, but they did not break it. Akpower What the armored columns wrought, however, cannot be considered wholly apart from what tbe air force bad already achieved before ita planes were hitting in combination with tbe tanks. Brigadier General Mordechai Hod, Chief of tbe Air Force, is one of the simple-thinking Israelie. He felt cer tain he could throw everything at Egypt and gamble that Jordan, Iraq, and Syria would not attack bis bases while he did so. Why? Because Egypt would not tell her allies the truth of what was happening. He felt it safe to concentrate his strike against 11 Egyptian bases, ignoring the other 14. Why ? The 11 would include all bomber and MiG-21 Military Rsview

ISRAELI ARMY bases, the real threat to -Israels in terior. Further, the shock to the 11 bsses would probably paralyze the enemy air force as a whole. Eight ocIock in the morning seemed an hour when surprise would not he possible. only a madman would think of going head-on at a time when the other camp was certain to be wide shifting to fly cover for the armored column striking into Sinai. In 492 sorties, they destroyed 402 enemy planes on the ground, no doubt an all-time record. They did it pri marily by eoncentrrking on perfection in gunnerynigh infallible marks manship with the 30--millimeter can non, a tactic lightly regarded else-

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This scene at the Mitla Pass attests to the accuracy of Israeli gunnery awake. By inverse reasoning, General Hod concluded that 0800 was the per fect hour for surprise. By the end of 80 minutes, General Hods planes had stricken Egypt be yond any likelihood of recovery. It should be called the 80-minute war; it was effectively over approximately two houre before anyone in the United Statee knew it had begun. After Hod had crushed the Egyptian Air Force, giving Israel9 field army an overwhelming advantage, his fighter bombers before noon of 5 June began ADril 1S8S where. It is one of General Hods simple ideas, so simple that corre: spondents credited him with harbor ing a secret weapon. How did the armored column shat ter and destroy Egypts far heavier array of tank power, superior in num bers, modernization, and weight of cannon ? Mobility was one answer, although deployed forceswith allaround protection, self-propelled ar and abundant armor--can tillery, never be wiped out by movement alone. Israels tankers and gunners, 5

ISRAELI ARMY like Hods flyers, did it through WI. perior marksmanship. They are better gunners; they are trained to fire ac curately hy day and night, and under any condition. Superior Gunnery There are a few examplee of suc cess through armored shock in this campaign where tanks charged in and routed a larger force by velocity and the threat of violence. They are the exception. Also, there are numerous melees where forces either got mixed or were shooting it ont at close range with each other. And there were epi sodes toward the end where the Egyp. tian tanke, guns, and vehiclee were in panic flight and the soldiers would not turn to fight; so Israels armor en gaged in, without enjoying, a carnival of destructiveness. However, these are merely the un. dertones and asides of a campaign won hy better shooting at fairly long range by Israels tankers and gunners in the first stage when Egypts op. posing array did try to stand and fight backmore stoutly than bas been reported. The battle was not a pushover at the start. However, after the first 24 hours, it was made a debacle through superior gunnery. In spite of this, Israeli tanks were getting knocked off by tank fire on the third day. The average tank-against-tank en gagement in the early and decisive phase was fought out at between 900 and 1,300 yards, with the armor on both sides holding still. The armor. piercing round of a Centurion, Sher man, Patton, or, for that matter, the 75-millimeter round of the AMX, will go through the frontal armor of a X%, T54, or T55 at these ranges. The battlefield proved this point Or, the other way around, the 100-millimeter 6 of the T5.4 or the 122-millimeter of the JSS are equally killing at these ranges when the shooting is accurate. One shell seems to be as effective as the other although the J.l? round is cumbersome and may only be fired at the rate of two to three per minute.

Figure 1. The T54 can fire seven to eight rounds in the same time. Usually, Israeli tankers got off two or more rounds before the Egyptian tanks fired at all, and, within that bracket, they were already on target. Once the Egyptians began taking losses, their tanks almost invariably stopped and stalled on the line where the attacking armor already had the range. In one night fight on 5 June, six Israeli Centurions engaged the front of an Egyptian armored brigade mov ing in line across the El Arish wadi at a range of 800 yards. Th first 2 ary Review

ISRAELI ARMY salvo from the six blew up one T54 and set afire six soft-skirined vehicles. This fully illuminated the deployment in the wadi. Tbe Egyptians remained where they were and fought back throughout the night.. Morning light, revealed 26 Egyptian tanks destroyed within the wadi. The Israelis lost not one tank. Massed artillery from behind the Egyptian armor, and from positions south of the El Arish airport, ranged in on the Israeli tanks throughout this action. It, too, was highly inac. curatsf Two Israeli batteries of artil lery, however, were enough to hold off the Egyptian armor when tbe Csn turiorz.r ran out of ammunition and had to be pulled back. Frontal Attack In the frontal attack, as the bat tle against the Sinai fortifications opened, Israels armor did not try to breach the line bead-on at any point. Where any opportunity for an out flanking movement existed, it was seized. If tbe ground permitted, it was done by armor supported by halftracked armored infantryusually converted paratroopers. The armor charged on deeper to hit the tanks and artillery positions while the in fantry turned back to attack the en trenched line. Where they could not be used in combination, the infantry did the outflanking on foot through tbe dunes. Later, they would reverse and open a lane through the mine field for tbe tanks or to admit an engineer party that would do the work. Israels tank commanders have a saying: Then I called on my snipers, meaning special gunners who are so expert that they will not miss at any reasonable range. Yet Israels four generals of armor who figured con #pril 1968 spicuously in Sinai are not tankers from their early service. Brigadier General Israel Tal has been at it longest, having converted from infan try less than 10 years ago. Brigadier General Avraham Yoffe and Brigadier General Ariel (Arik) Sharon are in fantrymen; neither had previously led a division. Brigadier General Ye. shayahou Gavisb, the field army com mander, another infantryman, and a specialist on training, was exercising his first field command in 15 years. It is hardly remarkable that improvising on the field of action comes easy to Israelis when such improvisations in assignment are thought right and reasonable. Crash Basis No full-blown plan was pulled from a secret tile toward implementing this last Sinai campaign. The details were worked UP on a crash basis at South ern Command Headquarters in Beer sheba as tbe crisis thickened after mid-May. General Tal, on the last night, devised the expedient of throw ing a flying column flankward against Khan Yunis early in the morning be fore launching his main attack on the solid Egyptian front held by the 7th Division south of Rahfa, It paid off handsomely. The diversion worked; the force, getting to Khan Yunis unscathed, threw a shudder into the, Egyptians that shook everything to the westward. With tbe taking of the Rahfa line and the crashing that night of the fortress of Umm G@af by Sharons division, in what is usually called the Battle of Abu Agueila, the Iinchpin dropped from the Egyptian defensive front, Everything that followed was by nature anticlimactic. Although more than a mopup remained, the destruction of the Egyptian Army had 7

ISRAELI ARMY become predetermined. These two maneuvers, therefore, have particular interest. General Tals was much the simpler opening maneuver. At the same time, his over-all problem was more com plex since enemy fortified ground lay beyond the 7th Division front for more than 30 miles, blocking the main road. Cracking the front, he would have to overcome the Sheikh Zuwedi the enemy flank. That done, the armor would strike the heavy weapons to the west, and the infantry would attack the entrenched line to the east. The maneuver almost failed since the half-tracked infantry was not able to keep up with the armor in the heavy going. So out of disarrangement came a daylong battle (Figure 1.). The armored infantry battalion of paratroops were cut off and sur1

BRIGADIERGENERALARIEL

SHARONS MANEUVER

Figure 2.

and Jerardi hedgehogs, the defenses of El Arish, and the hedgehog of Bir Lafham to the south of it. Three Egyptian brigades were in line, each within a fortified box, the whole extending north and south six miles, from Rahfa to the sand dunes. Supporting the boxes were seven bat talions of artillery and at least three battalions of armor. General Tals solution was to feel his way southward for the limits of the mined front and take the chance that he could put two battalions of armor and one of half-tracked infan try through the deep sand to breach 8

rounded between the two lower bri gade boxes. Ultimately, one tank bat talion reversed, attacked eas~ and freed it. In contrast to General Tals assault on the Egyptian main poeitions south of Rahfa, all of which was carried out during the daylight hours of 5 June, General Sharone attack on the for tress on Umm Gataf, a more formi dable position, was done by night. This need not have been. The division started off from the neighborhood of Nitzana. The desert to the west of there is not too difficult, and the early hours produced little fighting. By midMilitary Review

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ISRAELI ARMY afternoon, the main body of tbe divi sion waa conf rOnting tbe Egyptian hedgehog, and Ieraeli tanks had it onder fire. Still, Sharon held off. That is the surprising thing. His plan was extraordinarily elaborate, involving about five main and three secondary movemente which had to be coordi nated and roughly synchronized if he was to succeed without paying too much in men and tanka. Yet he gam bled that he would have a better chance of doing it after dark because the Egyptian fire would be less, and his men would get some rest; and he won. Umm. Gataf, the hedgehog, lies about six miles east of the village of Abu Agueila. It is solidly fortified for four and one-half miles in depth, the works being about two miles in breadth. The flanks rest on two bar riers, high dunes to the north and a solid line of ridges to the south, The tanks had to come through Umm Gataf by the main road or not at all. Tbe plan was as follows: One ar mored battalion would strike parallel to the main body, moviug north of the dunes, and go at Abu Agueila from the back door. One task force would swing southwest and form a block to bold back the Egyptian armor basing on Queisima. One infantry brigade would advance afoot along the shoul ders of the dunes and enter upon the enemy position from the northern flauk. A paratroop battalion would be landed from choppers atop the dunes and attack directly the six artillery battalions within the hedgehog. The infantry brigade that had slogged along the dunes was to de scend, mop up the Egyptian frontline, then open a gate for an engineer party to come through. The engineers would clear the mines from at least two April 1968 lanes so that the tanks could advance. The paratroops, having finished the artillery, would clear away with their casualties and return to the dunes. That done, so that the field of fire could be used witbout danger to friendly troops, the tanke would ad. vance via the main road and engage the Egyptian armor. This was an elaborate plan. It seemed so involved that, just hefore the attack went on, the Chief of Staff, Major General Itzhak Rabin, called in and said he would be happy enough if the op eration wae postponed until morning. Sharon was indignant. Schematically, the plan went as shown in Figure 2. As diagramed, this looks like a dream by Rube Goldberg. The amaz ing sequel is that every bit of it worked, approximately as planned, al most exactly according to the time schedule. The hardest blows were taken by the column of outflanking armor north of the dunes. The main body attacking the strongest Egyp~ tian position in Sinai took far lighter losses than did Tals division at Rahfa. It would be too much to extract from this campaign the lesson that audacity always pays off. It is enough to say, rather, that Israels army be lieves that it does, most of the time. That it paid off handsomely in June 1967 is beyond diepute. But audacity is of the will and spirit, and is not to be praised above extraordinary painstaking and endless practice in what is often considered a smaller and more technical sort of thingprecision in marksmanship. Israels military leaders say audacity should come naturally to free men, but those who are soldiers still have to work for tbe skills and strength to endure battlefield stress that validate the proposition. 9

...

Delusion or Dilemma?
Colonel Gerald L. Overstreet, United States Armu

The views expressed-in this art icle are the authors and are not necesearilv those of the Department of the A rvny, Department of Defense, or the US Armv Command and General Staff Colleoe.Editor. RMIES historically have had difficulty in obtaining and retaining highly skilled personnel. Although it is not recorded in history, 10

Hannibal, undoubtedly, had no small specialist problem in taking his 40 ele phants across the Alps. General George Washington had great difficulty in retaining the most critical skill of his Armythe trained rifleman. A personnel report submitted to General John J. Pershing on 1 May 1918, outlined the acute shortage of skilled manpower in the American Expeditionary Forces ( AEF). This reMOitary Review

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port reflected a shnrtage of 99 percent of the authorized airplane mechanics, 84 percent of the gas engine repair men, 86 percent of the horseshoers, and 98 percent of the wireless opera tors. Yet less than 40 days later, units of the AE F received their baptism of tire and were successful in ctimpaigns at Cantigny, Chiiteau-Thierry, and Bellwau Wood. significant Factors These examples pnint out two sig ,. mticant factors: clussificatinn of highly The skilled personnel is constantly chm]g ing and is geared to the tecbnulogy of the day. The mission can be, and consist ently has been, accomplished despite apparent shortages and the use of per. sonnel not completely trnined in their duties. Highly skilled personnel are consid ered to be those en] isted personnel whose qualification in a specialty has resulted from long and costly training to meet the established job descrip tion. The shortage or retention of these personnel can be made exactly what our personnel policies make it Colonel Gerald L. (hxrsfrect is witk Ist Field Force, in Headquarters, Vietuam. He received ki~ R. S, in Mil itary Science from tke f.lniversit~ of Marvland, C%llege Park; attended tile Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia; and iR a 1!267 graduate of the US Arntv War Colle.qe, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, He served in Europe daring Worid War II, and ka8 been assigned ax Adjutant General tuitk tke Militar~ .t.9si8tance Advisory Group in Japan; with Headquarters, 82d Airborne Divi$ion, Fort 13ragg, Wd Headquarters, Nortk Carolina; US Strike Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. ipril me

sKILL SHORTAGE a continuing problem, a challenge of changing times, or even a routine personnel management action. Devel oping a stopgap solution for todays special skills will not solve this prob lem in the future. The approach to personnel management must keep pace with tbe advances in technologysi multweouely. The post-Korean War years ushered in a new era of personnel manage ment. Rapid technological changee and improvements created a totally new and unfamiliar environment for per sonnel management, mushrooming into a complete maze of square holes to be filled rather than a relatively small number of round holes. Missiles, elec tronics, automation, and air mobility were suddenly upon us, with no ade quate personnel policies to follow. Monetary Enticements Tbe seemingly logical course to fol low to retain these highly skilled per, wmnel, who had been trained at Gov ernment expense, was more money. A series nf monetary enticements fOl lowedexpanding the grade structure to provide for nine enlisted grades, proficiency pay, and reenlistment bo nuses. To these were added the Vsri able Reenlistment Bonus (VRB ) to selected categories of specialists, and the designation of proficiency pay to these same categories of specialists. A lesser superior performance pay was authorized for personnel not otherwise receiving proficiency pay. What has been the effect of these enticements ? In the first instance, they have not accomplished the desired re sult, since the shortage and retention problem is still with us. Second, while the specialist benefits, the combat sol dier ia relegated to a secondary posi tion. 11

SKILL SHORTA6E Past personnel policies have, per haps, considered, but certainly have not provided for, the solution of the fundamental problems of require ments, utilization, and perishability of skills. Actual Requirements There is a strong and almost ha bitual tendency to overstate actual re quirements, not so much in quantity as in the degree of proficiency actually required. The title of the position rather than the level of skill actually required is often used as the measure of the number and type of qualifica tion required. Automation and com puterization have seemingly obscured our perspective. While 100 percent utilization of highly skilled specialists ie desirable, in reality, this is seldom achieved. After 29 weeks of formal training in electronic maintenance, the automatic data processing equipment repairman, for example, often performs only mi nor or preventive unit maintenance. This is because contract maintenance is frequently used in higher echelons in the United States and in many over seas areas. The special skills of the specialist thus tend to become lost through lack of use. Specialized skills are perishable with changes in technology, and the tech; nicians must constantly be retrained and updated to keep pace with the equipment. With rapidly advancing technology, loss of skill level can oc cur rapid] y. This problem is especially serious with highly skilled specialists who can only be utilized overseas, or those for whom more positions are es tablished overseas than in the United States. Regulations authorize the assign ment of a specialist out of his specialty 12 when he rotates to the continental United States (CONUS), with the pro viso that he will be sent back overseas after the minimum period in CONUS. Having just returned from overseas duty, the specialist is normally ap proaching the end of his enlistment. The prospect of a year or less in CONUS, outeide of bis specialty, and then another overseas tour is often not an inviting one compared with civilian life, particularly with the many enticing job offers available to highly skilled technicians. Even if the man decides to reenlist, the Army has lost almo@ a year of productive out put from his epecial talent with a re lated diminution of his skill. Reality In seeking a eolution to the problem of retention, we must recognize that the military grade and pay structure rule out effective competition with in dustry. The military pay eystem pre supposes only 23 levels of responsibil ity ynine enlisted, four warrant offi cer, and 10 officer grades; however, this further narrows to only nine lev els in the principal area of concern the enlisted grades. Large and diversified corporations, such as General Motors or General DY namics have hundreds of wage Ievele, each geared to a special type and level of work. In the military syetem, a highly skilIed individual such as an avionics repairman can obtain grade E-4 and, perhape, E-5 after three years, and then must struggle upward against the time in grade and promo tion quota restrictions. At the end of the same three years, a mail clerk, a truck driver, or an or derly can beat the same level and pay. The VRB is a one-time inducement: and proficiency pay may, or may not, Military Ravlew

SKILL SHORTAGE

be authorized for a specialists mili tary occupational specialty (MOS) throughout his career. Reenlistment bonuses also decrease with each sub sequent enlistment. The Armys poli cies are geared to the negative phi losophy of a careerist reenlisting re

working among civilians and in a semicivilian environment, The challenge ie not great. The training which he received at a spe cialist school is not always fully uti lized. New equipment is often accom. panied by technical repreaentatives

US Arm The Ameriezn Expeditionary Forces in World War I had an scrrte shortsge of ekilkd manpower cause he cant afford to throw away the years he has inveeted, The Army is competing, not on a dollar basis, but for a way of life the man wishes to follow. The young man wants money, adventure, challenge, and responsibility. What does the Army offer ? . The pay he receives is essentially the same as any other soldier, and less than his civilian counterparts. . There ie little adventure for the skilled specialist. He is normally lo cated in a rear area or in CONUS

who assume the more interesting and challenging tasks. He often has little responsibility entrueted to him. Ae equipment be comee more complex, the greater is the echelonment of supervisors. It may be true that an absence of challenge and responsibility is found by the newcomer in civilian industry, but the young eoldier doee not per sonally know this since he probably entered the ArmY directly from school. Proficiency pay and the VRB are measures which entice only the fence

SKILL SHORTAGE straddlers when the time comes the decision to reenlist. for
The highly technical equipment that the military services possess, and. for which these specialists are rs quired, is developed by civilian indus. try. It is to the advantage of the mili. tary services that civilians developing this equipment have experience of its military use. Personnel who do not continue in the service beyond their initial corn. mitment are placed in the Army Re serve and are thus available in the event, of emergent y to provide a res ervoir of highly skilled specialists.

Another facet in the problem of pro curing and training skilled specialists is the tendency to overstate the actual technical requirement. The complexity of modern equipment is relative to the degree of familiarity with the equip ment. The automobile, when first de veloped, was considered extremely complex since new terms and princi. ,ples were involved. W]thin a few years, teenagers were tearing down and rebuilding cars. The present world of automation and sophisticated elec tronic and mechanical devices should not produce a continued outcry over the shortage of specialists. American ingenuity is etill here, but we are rapidly burying it by convincing our men that only a highly trained and epecial type of man can possibly under. stand or operate the new complex equipment. Indirect Benefits We fail to realize that the high school graduate of today actually pos sesses a broad base of knowledge and familiarity with complex equipment. We overemphasize our own systems since there is a prevalent feeling in the services that every man who pushes a button must know the theory and intricacies of the machine which he sets in motion. This is, perhaps, tbe ideal, but it ie not a necessity. The loss of highly skilled personnel to civilian industry should not be viewed as an all-bad situation because indirect benefits accrue to tbe military services and to our country. Many of the men who are trained in highly skilled jobs would not other wise receive the training and would remain a part of the lower skilled labor force. 14

The Approach A new approach toward solving the retention problem can be taken along five lines: Identification of reqnirements.
. Retention policies.
. Training and contribution of in.
dustry. Utilization policies.
. Incentive policies.
Every position now requiring long.
term formal schooling should be closely evaluated to determine the de gree of skill which is actually re quired. There are two ways to obtain a fair return on our investment either reduce the amount of invest ment or obtain a longer amortization. Both of these methods should be used, with requirements considering botb short-term and long-term training. The more detailed and technical maintenance, particularly in nontac tical units in CONUS, ehould be per formed by contract maintenance or by permanently assigned civilian person nel with the required technical train ing. As an individual progresses in rank to a position of leadership, the require ment for detailed, specialized skill di minishes, and the requirement for

Militsry Ileview

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1 ,. general application gains in impor tence. The retention of a large percentage of specialists for an indefinite period should not be our goal. Concen tration efiould be on a selective reten. tion of those individuals with potential for leadership of other skilled spe cialists. A 10 percent retention rate of first

SKILL SHORTAGE exceed the current actual grade break down in each grade from E-5 to E-9 *by 15 to 50 percent. Does 10 years seem too long? The equipment now creatilng critical per sonnel shortages was either in exist ence or in development 10 years ago. These suggested ratee of 10 percent and 60 percent are now essentially be-

US Amy

Assembly and much of the technical maintenance on complex equipment can be, and is, performed by contract or permanently assigned civilian personnel termers and a 60 percent retention rate of careeriete will provide ade quate manning of a given specialty. In 10 years, asauming absolutely no ini tial input of skilled personnel, these rates would provide the epecialty with 59.2 percent first termers (E-2 to E-4), 19.2 percent of second termers (E-5), 14.4 percent third termers (E-6), and 7.2 percent fourth termers (E-7 to E-9). All of theee percentages ing met in the critical areas; howe ,er, the men being retained are not alwaye those with future leadership potential. Our reeearch and development per sonnel should work closely with in dustry in developing eimplitied in structions for field operation of new equipment. In 20 years, and, perhaps, even five years from now, todays equipment will seem relatively simple, but why wait until some future date

SKILL SHORTAGE

talents of highly skilled specialists, it is obvious that there is a great degree of similarity in the functions to be performed. Manufacturers producing complex items of equipment for the Army should be required to assist in training military operators to the de gree of technical proficiency required. Special programs should be estab lished to assist in meeting specialized skill requirements, thus amending the 16

highly specialized duties. They should be given a modified basic training of relatively short duration and sent to echoole or to specialized advanced indi vidual training to learn the minimum essentials of the military application of the duty they will be performing. On-the-job and onsite training for technical personnel should be con ducted by technical representativee of the civilian manufacturer as a part MilitaIy Review

y
SKILL SHORTAGE of the contract price~- The longer, formal training should be restricted to careerists with potential for future leadership. Personnel poaeeseing a critical epe cialty should be centrally monitored and assigned to assure effective utili zation. The number of personnel in these highly ekilled specialties ie rel control atively small, and tighter should not be impossible. Utilization Policies Personnel possessing skills which sre only utilized overseas, or for whom inefficient vacancies exist withh the CONUS, should be authorized a special bonus for reenlisting and remaining in an overseas command. The amount of the bonus should be related to the undesirability of the particular over seas area. Periodic CONUS leaves shonld be authorized for men in this category. Skilled and dedicated leadership is required for the management special ists to provide challenge and responsi bility. These specialist often have no military binding force, and they are msde to feel like civiliana in uniform rather than dedicated soldiers. Incentives alone do not retain per sonnel in the eervice. A man remaine in the service for the advantages and intangible rewards of the Army way of life and not necessarily for the monetary rewards. He expects, and is entitled to, adequate pay to maintain a decent etandard of living; however, he does not expect to become wealthy. incentives should be used to retain dedicated men to train and lead to morrowe soldiers rather than as a meane of buyidg talent which may become obsolete in a few years. To eingle out certain specialists for either proficiency pay or the VRB may, April 19%s in the long rnn, be of more harm than it ie of value. Both of these incen tives are pointed toward a ehortage in particular fields. What happens when the specialty is no longer re quired or there ie an overage in the field ? These are short-term incentives of morale value to only a few indi viduals, and are detrimental to the morale of the vast majority of eoldiere. Combat arms personnel are not au thorized proficiency paythe most they can quaIify for is 30 dollare a month euperior performance pay. There are no combat arms pereonnel in the two highest brackets for the VRB. Amount of Proficiency Since the military pay scale cannot compete with industry, no attempt ehould be made to differentiate be tween highly skilled specialists and other men whose service is equally es sential. Incentives should be based on service, dedication, and proficiency and not on the attainment of a highly spe cialized skill financed by the Army. The amount of proficiency pay should increase with eervice rather than spe cialty. Men in grades E-4 and E-5 should be eligible for P-1, grades E-6 and E-7 for P-2, and gradee E-8 and E-9 for P-3. One of the factors in qualifying a man ~ proficiency pay ebould be ef fectiveness in convincing good men under hie supervision to reenlist. This would place more personal emphasis on the reenlistment effort, and also provide additional incentive to the sen ior dedicated eoldiere who are in a position to make the greatest impact. There can, perhaps, never be an incen tive to appeal to the young soldier that will match the example of the dedi cated soldier with a personal intereet in his men. 17

SKILL SHORTA6E The VRB should be discontinued in favor of a bonus which applies equally to all personnel. Prior service personnel who possess shortage specialties should be per mitted to reenlist from civilian life in the grade they formerly held, pro vided they can pass an MOS test ap. plicable to their grade. If their score qualities, they should immediately upon enlistment be authorized pro ficiency pay applicable to their grade. Much of the present problem, of course, is due to the expansion occa sioned by the Vietnam buildup. The current use of short-range incentives will leave the Army with a surplus when the strength is again reduced, requiring another change in policy on incentives. Greater use of inductees in highly specialized fields will bolster the capability of the Reserves. The Reserve should be the source of tech. nicians during a buildup situation, and the obligation of every reservist is to be prepared to serve when called. Hopefully, this new approach can re lieve the dilemma.

The objectives of our enlisted promotion system are first: to fill the au thorized enlisted spaces with qualified men wbo have demonstrated poten tial for increased responsibility; second: to provide each man with career progression and rank which is commensurate with his abiiitiea and potential, and finally: to attract and retain the hrgh cafiher individual for a lifetime career in the Army. Lieutenant General Albert O. Connor

18

Military Review

From Orbis

Ke toSuccess in ieham
Reuben S. Nathan HE ideological theses the Viet Cong purvey have never caught fire. There has never been a popular movement in support of the Viet Cong as there was of the Vietminh. Any demonstrations in South Vietnam have been carefully contrived by individ uals concerned with their own little games and ambiguous ambitions, and form a part of the natural turmoil of a people groping for self-rule after decades of stultifying colonialism. It ia not easy to understand why some of these demonstrations should have so misled the American public because television, ditferent from the, press, presented it with tbe incon trovertible truth. Few of the alleged parties which make up the Lao Dongs (North Vietnamese Commu nist Party) front organization, the socalled NationaI Liberation Front, ever existed; those which are more than tic tion ad~ up to nothing. Tbe absence of a genuine Commu nist movement conforms to the general pattern. Tbe Communists discovered long ago that Communist doctrine April 1988 19

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE holds little attraction for people. All Communist tid~tmces have been mwom plished by force, threat of force, con spiracies, coups, and terror. No na tion, with the exception of the Repub lic of San Marine, ever freely elected a Communist government, and that government did not last long. In North Vietnam, more than one million people fled from communism 12 years ago; in South Vietnam, an other million, having escaped from Viet Crmg-dominated areas, prefer the unenviable life of refugees to life un der Communist pale. All muss migra tions since 1!)45 have been away from communism. A Substitute Instead of propagating communism, therefore, the Communists, being real ists, long ago switched to a substitute: they identify themselves with the as piration of the people whatever they are, even though these may be in con flict with fundamental Communist ten ets. Ho Chi-minh, for instance, promThis article was condensed from the original, published in ORBIS, No. 1 Spring 1967, b~ tlte Foreign Policg Research Insti tute of the University of Penn aglvania. Copyrighted @ 1967 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Nathan is Director of the Fairfield Institute for Political Psvchologv and lnternatiOnal Communication, an association of consultants. A retired colonel in the US Armv Reserve, he has been recalled to active duty twice during the Vietnamese con ffict to direct the Planning Staff of the Joint US Political Affairs Once and to develop a National Psycho logical Operations Plan for Viet-. nam. ised land reform with private owner. ship before he gained control of the north and started collectivizing. Some object that today there might be a genuine Communist revolution in Vietnam were it not for the brutal methods of oppression employed by government and police. Tbe plain fact is that none of the governments SUC. ceeding Ngo-dinb-Diems ever hdd that much power or were that etficient. Vietnam may not be a democracy by US standardsstandards it took two centuries to developbut she is n cu riously free country. Not only is criti cism of the government her favorite sport, hut the hamlets rule themselves. Rural chiefs who do not enjoy the con fidence of the people will not be chiefs for long, and, if thousands of them were murdered by the Viet Cong, it was because they reflected, as they must, the views of their constituents. Revolutionary Warfare Revolutionuy warfare is the most highly organized type of warfare. Al though it can be and usually is con ducted by a small minority, it is total war in its truest sense-political, psy chological, social, economic, and only secondarily military. It does not aim at such conventional military objec tives as defeating armies or taking ground as such; it aims at the cre ation of a political and psychological vacuum that only the insurgents can fill. A Viet Cong detachment does not normally cut a road to hamper troop movements or tbe flow of military sup plies. If it cuts the road from Dalat to Saigon, it aims at increasing the price of vegetables in Saigon, at con tributing to inflation, and at proving that the government cannot protect the people against rising prices. If it Military Review

.~
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE cuts the road from the coast, the pur pose may be taxation, for trucks carry ing seafood will EO through at a price. Yet even the toll charge-no matter how important the funds derived /nay be to financing the insurgencyis primarily designed to demonstrate the governments inability to keep the road open. The physical act of throw ing up a roadblock aims at making a psychological point. Terrerism terrorism, Similarly, the Viet Congs main weapon, is less concerned with its immediate victims than with inspiring fear in the survivors, par alyzirig people, and stifling resistance to Viet Cong policies. It follows that the Viet Cong want maximum public ity for their acts of terrorism. As long as they achieve their objective of fear and paralyeis, they are perfectly will ing to pay the price in terms of pop ular and international revulsion. It is the measure of our inability to grasp the nature of revolutionary war fare that we tend to advance this ob jective by widely publicizing incidents of terror. Each outrage unfailingly produces US pamphlets featuring pho. tographs of Viet Cong victims, usually women and children. These are sup posed to demonstrate-as, of course, they do-the contempt in which the Viet Cong hold Vietnamese lives. Yet North Vietnamese publications cele brate these massacres us victories and often prove the victorys extent by featuring the same photographs on which we rested our case. Not all tbe targets of revolutionary warfare are in Vietnam. One of the most important is US public opinion which, Hanoi hopes, will ultimately compel Washington to withdraw from the War. Many attacks on US units loril 19S2 have not only been in contradiction to General Vo Nguyen Giaps basic concept never to engage the enemy un less he is relatively weak or demor alized, but had no conceivable stra tegic or tactical purpose other than to inflict casualties. The over-all purpose has been to persuade the American

Ho Chi-minh public that its leaders pointlessly rifice American youth. sac

Tbe Communists tend to overrate the significance of this domestic crit icism just as Adolf Hitler overrated the influence of the America First Committee and Fritz Kuhns GermanAmerican Bund. It is one of the tragic paradoxes of history that there might no longer be a war in Vietnam if jt were not for those at home who 5p pose the US role. If much of the confueion to which 21

..

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE the critics admit is caused by the com pJex nature of revolutionary warfare, not all of it is. China and - North Vietnam have stated their objectives as clearly as did Hitler in Meirr Karnpf; they have done so time and again, and they began to do so long before the United States introduced combat troops into South Vietnam. One of the first of these statements appeared five years ago in Pekings Peoptes Daily, the official voice of the Chinese Communist Party: Defeats of the tactics used b~ the U.S. advisors in South Vietnam prove that revolutionary forces can over come the superior militarg strength of the United States. The reverses sus tained by tfie US. in Vietnam will en courage revolutionary action in other countries of Asia, in Africa, and in Latin Am&ica. A Test Case From this, one can draw several con clusions. The war in Vietnam is a test case. Its primary objective is to demonstrate the !superiority of revo lutionary warfare techniques over the conventional power of the United States. The reduction of South Viet nam is secondary. Success is meant to serve as a mes sage to hard-line Communists all over the world that the United States is a paper tiger, unable to protect her friends, and that revolutionary plan ning may safely disregard US poli cies. The objective is not so much the immediate expansion of Chinas zone of influence as the gradual isolation of ber most powerful antagonist. At stake in Vietnam is not merely the right of 15 million people to live as they please, but the security of the United States, the ultimate target. If the Viet Cong succeed in prov ing the case of revolutionary warfare veraus US power, the already tenuous situation in Laos will in all likelihood deteriorate and Thailand will face se. rious problems. Neither the Pathet Lao nor the insurgents in northeast Thailand need much encouragement to intensify their operations. The psycho. logical effect of these developments on the rest of southeast Asia and newly emerging nations elsewhere would cer. tainly be considerable. Major Factor The image of US power is a major factor in world affairs. What if this power would seem to have lost its cut ting edge ? What if a Viet Cong vie. tory, by arms or negotiationthe vic tory of a small revolutionary minOr ity over 15 million South Vietnamese and 200 million Americanswere to unleash simultaneous Communist ac tion in several Latin-American coun. tries or other areas of the globe? China would not have to push buttons for scores of little red Fith rers to get the point that the American giant has an Achilles heel. In August 1966, in an editorial in the Peoples Daily, Pekings leaders updated Lin Piaos doctrinal state ment on peoples wars. The key sen tence reads: The day when the maiti militarg forces of the United States are wiped out zuill mark the outbreak of revolu tion in all countries of the world, and that means the utter collapse of US imperialism. Not only is the success of revolu tionary warfare over the conventional power of tbe United States seen as a signal to Communist leaders &d movements urging them to rise and to begin the encirclement, it is also meant increasingly to suck US power Military Review

-T~

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE into the Vietnamese conflict in order to paralyze the United States else where and, of course, eventually to destroy her. The wise course is to prevent peo plez wars from breaking out across the globe. The first step is to stop the Viet Cong. This cannot be accom plished solely by conventional means. fare lies in the integration of all means of struggle within the framework of a single and single-minded psycholog ical operations plan designed to de prive the Viet Cong of the one factor on which the success of revolutionary warfare depends: popular support. The emphasis is on integration and the primacy of psychological consid-

Amw

New

Feat.re.

Intelligence comes primarily from informers While military strength is indispen sable, US conservative approaches to military strategy and the primacy granted to purely military considera tions reveal that she still lacks the modest sophistication which, in 1945, would have suggested the wisdom of tsking Prague and Berlin. Nor do es sentially traditional aid, information, and pacification programs promise much by themselves. Tlie answer to revolutionary war fipril1968 erations. Unless the United States subordinates all conventional instru ments of warfare and statecraftand the thinking that goes into the em ployment of each of themto psycho logical planning, she has little chance to prevail over enemies who think, live, and tight in terms of psychological warfare. She cannot do so while her faith in hardware exceeds her belief in ideas. It is unrealistic to try guarding 23

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE every square foot of the jungles and mountains of Vietnam. Millions of men would he needed to defend every one of the thousands of hamlets against attacks by concentrated forces which can choose at will their targets for tbe day. It takes only three men to lug a fairly heavy mortar from its hiding place up a wooded hill in the dark of night and 10b a dozen rounds at the most heavily guarded base. But it would take an army to prevent those three from causing a great deal of damage, for it iz not easy to police vast areas of jungle and keep them policed. There are thousands of miles of vital roads which can be cut by a hand ful of guerrillas. How many men it would require to keep the roads open is impossible to know, but it is safe to say that there are not enough available. Intelligence The only thing that can prevent small, highly trained units from car rying out ambushes successfully is in telligence, information on where they are and what they plan to do. Intelli gence comes primarily from informers. But anyone who remembers the Chi cago of the 1920s will also recall how difficult it is to find witnesses ready to testify against terrorists. Normal people do not like to take chances with their lives. To the ex tent, therefore, that checkmating the Viet Cong depends on information, it is necessary to persuade the people that it is in their interest to act as informers. The Vietnamese peasant is an extremely sophisticated speciee; he has to be to stay alive in a country that has been torn by war for 25 years. As any realist, he prefers to be on the side of the stronger battalions. He knows that the Viet Cong in his midst represent an immediate threat to his survival, and so he hae tried tO accom modate them. But he has begun to sense that the US buildup has turned the tide against the insurgents. If he can be made to believe that the Republic, supported by the re sources of the United States, will in. evitably prevail, he may conclude that it is wiser not to take a chance of be ing identified with the ultimate loser. He is shrewd enough to realize thst he and his family are fairly safe un less the Viet Cong use his village as a hideout or a strongpoint. When he is told of instances where information from villagers on the whereabouts of Viet Cong in their vicinity led to the destruction of these units before they managed to infiltrate the villages, he sees tbe point quickly. Enlisting the peoples help, even though it has been done neither sys tematically nor consistently, has be gun to produce results. The resnlts could be much greater if the United States understood and exploited the full potential of psychological opera tions. Security The prevention of terrorism, assas sination, and ambushes cannot by it self win the war although the increas ing sense of security following from it wonld be of incalculable value. US military strategy, therefore, apart from the essential routine of securing the perimeters of our bases, aime at eearching out and destroying tbe en emys main strength units and logistic centers. The trouble ie that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars, except when Giaps conditions are metthat is, when they have a chance to hit at Military Raviaw

Sense of

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE numerically inferior or demoralized units-do all they can to avoid con tact. Their purpose is not to stand and fight and take the heavy losses which superior firepower can inflict; it is to remain in being, capable of hitting at will with locallY superior numbers, and so tO tie dOwn many times their strength all over the country. Viet Gong Tiring The question is whether it might be possible to break the enemys will to fight at a smaller price in terms of manpower, time, sweat, and blood. Since the US buildup began in the summer of 1965, the presence of US combat troops, tbe constant threat of their mobility and firepower, and the domination of the skies have kept the Vlet Cong on the move. They are get. ting tired. The more tired they get, the easier they-especially the great numbers of conscripts they are now forced to employsuccumb to psycho logical operations. They are probably more vulnerable to propaganda than they are to bullets. Thousands of in terrogations of prisoners and defec tors, many of them in depth, bear this out. There was a time when the Viet Cong felt fairly safe staying in vil lages, indoctrinating the villagers (which is not a hard job if one car ries automatic weapons), and growing rice with them and taking their share. Since the US buildup, they can no longer afford to stay put. They must grab what they need. They extort four times the amount of taxes the govern ment imposes. They seize rice they did not help to grow. And in lieu of re cruiting volunteers, they must draft every likely young man. The draft, more Often than not, takes the form S@! Wee of kidnapping at the point of a gun. The reason why the Viet Cong have trouble enlisting volunteer is, in part, universally human and, in part, pe culiarly Vietnamese. As long as the insurgents seemed to have a chance of winning, many Vietnamese thought it prudent to have one son serve with the Viet Cong and another with the Vietnamese armed forces. Today, most of them no longer consider it neces sary to play botb sides. The other reason stems from the belief that the dead who are not ritu ally buried in marked graves will turn into errant soulsa fate worse than death. Now that the Viet Cong are hard pressed, they must often leave the bodies of the dead on the battlefield to rot, uncared for, in the jungle. It is hard enough to lose a son, but it is harder to know that his soul may never find rest. This is why few par ents today want their children to be come Viet Cong. Peasants Resistance No peasant likes people who take his money, his harvest, and his sons. If these same people endanger the rest of his family simply by infiltrating his village and exposing it to hostile fire, he likes them less. There have been instances of resistance, rare be cause it is dangerous; but grudging reluctance to part with money, food, and sons has become quite general. The Viet Cong know it. They ascribe the situation not only to military pres sure, but to a miscalculation. They had thought in the summer of 1965 that they were winning. Therefore, they emphasized military over psychological considerationsthe unforgivable ein. Now, they admit, it is. hard to revert to fundamentals. To overcome the peasants resist 25

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ante under the pressure of time, the Viet Cong had little alternative but to increase terror. In doing so, they took on another formidable enemy: the Vietnamese commitment to nhan doa which means not only dignity and humanity, but absence of oppression. The inescapable result was a process leaders know that they have lost be. cause their own book tells them so, The US Army announced in January 1967 that the number of Viet Cong who bad defected in 1966 by volun. tarily coming over to the govern. ments side and registering in C1/ieu Hoi (open arms) centers totaled 20..

US Ar%w

Interrogation

of a Viet Cong prisoner of war 242. The figure for 1965 had been only 11,124; that for the preceding two years combined less than 9,000. It is generally believed that the elimination of four Viet Cong costs the life of one Vietnamese, American, Koresn, Filipino, or Australian. This means that 5,000 allied soldiers were spared in 1966. That is ahout 10 battalions, and it is not the whole story, for many defectors join the Vietnamese Army. Instead of losing men, the allies gain men. The psychological outlook favors tbe allies. The US military buildup and US policy as stated by President LynMilitary Review

of ever-widening alienation of the peo ple from the Viet Cong. Alienation of the people, to the highly indoctrinated hard-core Viet Cong, spells defeat. All Communist doctrine unequivocally states that suc cessful revolutionary warfare depends on securing voluntary popular support. The insurgent must be able to trust the people on whom he must rely for shelter, food, and information. If POP ular support is no longer voluntary, the trained Communist knows that his efforts are doomed. He need not be told. But we can tell the rank and file, the soft-core Viet Cong, that their 26

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE don B. Johnsonas much as it takes for as long as it takesproject power and determination sufficient to demon strate that free Vietnam must inevi tably prevail, and this encourages the people to hasten the arrival of peace and security by supporting the uki mate victor. The Communists own doctrine proves that they have lost. Increasing emphasie on the revolu tionary nature of development in free V]etnam suggests. that the country may be on its way to finding its true identity, and that Vietnamese solu tions to Vietnamese probleme offer greater hope than the stitting, reac tionary, alien teachings which the Viet Cong import and try to impose. For what Americans are apt to consider Vietnams chronic instability is, in fact, merely the normal social, ideo logical, and political ferment of a new nation in the process of trying to find itself, of a society seeking to fill the emptiness created by the death of an old order. US Identification Faith must he instilled in the cer tainty of victory and peace and the emergence of a just society. The ob jective is not the mere creation of good will, the goal of so many US aid and information programs, nor is it the appeasement of expediency. It is identification-the US identification with the peoples aspirations and theirs with the US purpose. It should be made clear that the United States continues to represent that permanent revolution of mankind which the American Revolution advanced; that only the principles of that revolution can ultimately produce the results for which man Ionge; and, most impor tantly, that we will produce them. This general objective must, of course, be translated into terms which are directly meaningful to the Viet namese. It must not be confused with selling the American way of life, so meaningless to people whose history and environment differ from ours. Three Conditions There are, however! conditioris. One is that effective psychological opera tions projecting the US message must not only be planned and carried out systematically, hut radiate burning, passionate faith. They cannot be left to either amateurs or bureaucrats; they require professionals, and they require, believers. Second, the propagandist must be permitted to saturate tbe atmosphere with tbe smalleat possible number of the simplest possible themes, taking the offensive and forcing the opponent on the defensive, for defensive prop aganda is ineffective. This requires strict central control and unity ,of command to make certain that the same themes are used everywhere and at all times, without departures that would weaken their thrust. It requires, furthermore, that the United States rid herself of all intellectual preju dices against repetition. There are many ways to make the same point without boring and ultimately antag onizing ones audience. The third condition is a drastic change in political and military think ing and planning. It is time tbe United States recognized that onventional warfare may be as ohsol J cent as traditional diplomacy and that, barring nuclear dieaster, international con frontation are likely to pit spiritual values and material resourcesin that orderagainst the techniques of rev olutionary warfare. To he ready for this probability, the 27

ipril19aa

present order of priorities must be reversed. It must be recognized that propaganda and psychological warfare are the primary weapon systems of the era and that tbe function of mili tary operations is, in substance, lim ited to supporting them, principally by providing them with that indispen sable ingredient, the image of physical power. Political and psychological warfare have been the stepchild of US state craft for too many years. The United States has yet to realize that informa tion is, at best, a weak substitute for them. The information policy on which the strategic propaganda effort is founded is based on a plethora of trite fallacies and disregards the fact that the meaning of news depends on the perspective in which one views it. Fortunately, the effort in Vietnam demonstrates that the United States is changing her attitude. This is not a reference to the bombing of North Vietnam which clearly had first been conceived as a psychological opera tion, a message advising Hanoi that tbe price of directing and reinforcing the Viet Cong was increasing and might, in the end, be prohibitively high. It disregarded a large number of pertinent facts and lessons, including that bombing tend6 to raise morale and unite people behind their govern ments as it did in England, Germany, and Japan; that Asian stoicism and Communist fanaticism combine to re verse the messages intent; and that people get used to almost anything that lasts long enoughone fears un certainties. The intended message turned into a conventional military operation. The fact is that the United States

has, in Vietnam, at last begun to ap. preciate the usefulness of tactical psy chological operations, but has not as yet recognized their correct place and their true potential. Psychological warfare is not just a matter of broadcasting and of drop. ping leaflets, of brainstorms and gimmicks. It is tbe systematic pur suit of psychological objectives to achieve political ends. Even though words are still the most powerful in strument in the human arsenal, it does not rely on words alone. Correctly employed to exhaust its full potential, psychological warfare bends all actionmilitary, political, economic, and socialto its purpose. This requires recognition on the part of all authorities that the goal of all action is tbe achievement of a psycho logical objective. Every action must be planned and conducted with the psy chological objective in mind. In other words, instead of looking at war merely as an encounter between two parties intent on destroying each other, it must be viewed as an effort to make people switch allegiance from one set of opinions and values to an other. The full meaning must be grasped of the fact that the primary target in Vietnam is not the death of the, enemy, but tbe trust of the people, without whose acquiescence, voluntary or involuntary, revolutionary warfare cannot be sustained. Psychological warfare must cease to be an appendix to action and become tbe reason for action. The United States must prove that her vaiues are closer to tbe hopes of man than are those of the enemy. US values are the ultimate weaponthe only weapon ca pable of paralyzing revolutionary war fare. Milifs@Review

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-.

THE SEARCH FOR EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Howard C. Reese >

?
N THE light of Israels victory in June 1967 and the strategic changes that it introduces in the Middle East, the United States and the USSR face an identical question: How can the two principal powers adapt these changes for their respective interests ?

What the United States does to take advantage of new opportunities depends, in large part, on what the USSR makes of the same circumAvtil1968

stances. The Soviets have reportedly replaced about 80 percent of the equip. ment lost by Egypt, thereb~ starting a regional arms race again. T~e United States would seem to have l~ttle choice but to balance such a move with com parable aid to Ierael or, perhaps, give consideration to the eetting up of a regional alliance. The Middle East is too important a region for US policy to develop solely 29

MIDDLE EAST in response to Soviet policy. It is use ful, therefore, to examine the points of agreement and difference that the United States and the USSR have in the area, in particular regarding Is rael and the Arab States. This is a necessary first step in making US pol icy for the poetwar period. limited Accord As for Israel, the only agreement between the United States and the USSR is recognition of that countrys right to exist. Although limited, this accord is significant in itself. The im plication arises that, if it is convenient for the two major powers to recognize Israel, it could be appropriate for the Arab States to do the same. Beyond recognition of Israel, US and Soviet attitudes diverge. Toward Israel the United Statee is friendly, the USSR hoetile. It should be noted, however, that this unfriendly Soviet outlook to ward Israel could change as it suits Soviet interest. It is with respect to the Arabs, however, that both powers markedly differ. In the dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis, the United States has tried to be neutral. That war has erupted three times does not necessar ily condemn the theory underlying US Howard C. Reese is an Operations Research Analyst with the Research Analfisis Corporation and a member of the facedtfi of the School of Interna tional Service, American University, Washington, D. C. He received his Ph. D. from New York University. A US Armfi Reserve oficer, he zoas with Su preme Headquarters, Allied Expedi tionary Forces, during World War II, and served with the Par East Cosn mand in the Korean conflict. His arti cle, The Arab-Israeli Dispate and the Major Powers, appeared in the April 1966 iesue of the MILITARY REVIEW. policyfriendship to both sides. Un. der the best of circumstances, neutral. ity is not an easy course. Yet it is fair to say that given the emotional, cultural, political, and economic fat. tors hearing on US policy in the Mid. dle East, the United States baa, in the main, conducted that policy with rea. sonable skill. In the early years after World War II, it was US policy to keep the USSR out of the Middle East. With that end in view, the United States forced the USSR to evacuate Azerbaijan, Irana north&nmost province, in February 1946. In 1954, eight years later, the United States took the initiative in putting together the Baghdad Pact now the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)to shield the Middle East from possible Soviet aggression. For the moment, the best criterion for the success of the pact is that no war has broken out in the region with Soviet participation. Hazardous Alliance A regional alliance, however, espe cially one that is drawn together by an outside power, is sometimes risky. Three factors suggest that such alli ances can be hazardous: Geographic closenessin this case between Turkey, Iran, and tire USSR on one hand, and between Pak istan and Communist China on the other. This closeness induces relations that the alliance, at least in its early stages, sought to prevent. For Iran, this relation takes the form of Soviet economic and military assistance; for Pakietan, it is Communist Chinese economic and military assistance. Members have a habit of derogat ing common goals in f aver of paro chial, national aims. With respect to Kashmir, Pakietan promotes her ob M6itary Ileview

r
,

-q

MIDDLE EAST two alliances achieved a balance in centrat Europe that was acceptable to both sides. In the Middle Eaet, however, the status quo was acceptable to the Soviets. They did not, therefore, answer the Baghdad Pact with a grouping of statee sympathetic to Soviet objectives; moreover, there were 1954-66

jectives at US and CENTO expense. Vis-a-vis India, pakistan enjoys Pekings SWPOrt in thwarting the United States and CENTO. Time ueually brings into play new factors that Can raise doubt about the alliances reason for being. CertainIY, the alliance did not reCommunist

Economic Aid and Grants to the Middle East (In millions of US dollars) le54.6e

19S6 Only Donor Totsl 190 363 1,636 149 376 294 218 3,226 Figure 1. Esstern Coy:::ist Europe -_ 29 -1 .--30 ___ ----..---------- -- -- 169 Total 6 162 -- 1,

Recipient USSR Irsq Syria 190 233

Donor Eastern Colnniat Europe --114 540 17 46 56 8 781 --16 85 40 ___ 60 --201

USSR 6 133 ----------139

United Arab Republit 1,011 Yemen Iran Pakistan Turkey Total 92 330 178 210 2,244

...

duce tension in the Middle East or reduce Soviet influence. Indeed, there are grounds for believing that the Baghdad Pact accelerated the building of a substantial Soviet position in the area. A contrast between Soviet response to CENT() and Soviet response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offers an interesting comparison in the flexibility of Soviet strategy. In Europe, the USSR countered NATO with the Warsaw Pact. Together, the April 1968

hardly any candidate. In ehort, an alliance did not suit Soviet purposes. True enough, the Soviets might have pressured Iran into leaving the Un inspired pact and joining the Soviete in a bilateraI or even a multilateral organization with, perhaps, Afghan. istan. Having failed to gain the upper hand in Azerbaijan some years before, however, the Soviete poesibly thought it prudent to avoid another cleavage involving Iran. The Soviets reply to the Baghdad Pact was more 31

MIDDLE EAST subtle: They outflanked the alliance by economic and military assistance. Through economic assistance, the in ties with Western financial and technological sources. Beginning in 1955, the USSR ex. tended to countries of the Middle East approximately 41 Percent, Or about

Soviets widen the nationalized sector of a countrys economy, allowing the

US Economic and Military Assistance to the Middle East, 1946-660 (In millions of US dollars) Recipient Iraq Syria Jordan Israel Lebanon Yemen Saudi
Arabia United Arab
Republic Pakistan Iran Turkey Total Economic 56.1 73.2 517.2 1,076.9 79.2 41.8 _, ,. MISitary 46.6 0.1 55.6 20.0 8.7 Totsl 102.7 73.3 572.8 1,096.9 87.9 41.8 209.1
1,133.3
3,072.0 1,752.0 4,846.8 12,988.6

47.4

161.7

1,133.3 3,072.0 856.8 2,277.7 9,231.6

--n$ 895.2 2,569.1 3,757.0

.CENTO economic aid t. the MiddleEast during this Deriod amounted to 62.8 rndlion dollam. This sum postdates most US .S$istance, coming into effect after the %ghd.d Pact was formed. The money hae been used b build msds and improve the general mmtnu.icsti.ms network with,. the CENTO mea. ,Less tba n $50,000. CNOdata.

Figure 2. recipient to eliminate or reduce Western influence which usually entails comparable cooperation with private industry. This is precisely what Gamal Abdel Nasser allowed to happen in Egypt. Soviet loans and credits became a substitute for US and Western investment, resulting in a reduction two billion dollare of a total of five billion dollars in foreign aid. Besides Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen, the Soviets and their Eastern European allies did not overlook the three regional membefs of CENTO: Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey; Communist China was also a donor [Figure 1). military Review

MIDDLE EAST In 1965, Soviet aid commitments of 540 million dollars, or 80 percent, went to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. For the same year, US aid to these same countries came to 600 million dollars, or about 14 percent of the total US assistance to less-developed countries. Whereas US aid to the three CENTO countries exceeded the Soviet equiv alent, this assistance represented a smaller share of total US aid to lessdeveloped countries. Economic and Military Assistance It is hard to make an exact com piwison between Soviet and US foreign aid to the Middle East for at least three reasons: First, US foreign as sistance has gone on for 20 years, as opposed to 13 for its counterpart; second, US aid has been distributed more widely within the area, to 10 countries as against seven; and third, since 1946, US aid to the region has constituted about 10 percent of all US assistance to less-developed countries compared to 41 percent for Soviet aid over a significantly shorter period. For the period 1946-66, US eco nomic and military assistance to the Middle East amounted to 12,988.6 mil lion dollars and was distributed as shown in Figure 2. Turning to military aid, it is pos sible to document US assistance in this category, with the exception of Pakistan. However, the same cannot be done for the Soviets for two ren sons: First, reliable figures are usu ally classified; and, second, assigning dollar values to Soviet equipment is not a simple matter in the context of world market prices. The best that can be done is to cite published sources that have general accuracy, more par ticularly in such categories as aircraft, tanks, and trucks. April1968 Cloaked in a Czech-Egyptian arms agreement, Soviet military aid became a fact in the Middle Eaat in Septem-; ber 1955. The Western Powers-the United States, Britain, and Franc% had hitherto enjoyed a virtual monop oly in supplying weapons to the region. At the Bandung Conference in the summer of 1955, Chou En-lai, then Premier and Foreign. Minist& of Com munist China, indicated the availabil ity of Communist arms to President Nasser of Egypt. To obtain q nonWestern source of arms fitted in well with Nassers policy of independence from the three Western countries. By 1964, Egypt had acquired 750 million dollars in Soviet military credits, and by mid-1967 this figure was well over two billion dollars. Similar Agreements The Soviets entered into similar agreements with Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. The Soviets also began to supply the Arab States of the Mag~reb in west North Africa, sometimes con sidered within the Middle East. Al geria became a recipient of growing amounts of Soviet arms. With the de feat of the Egyption forces, Algeria now has the second-largest army in Africa, about 60,000 troops; only the army of South Africa is larger. The influx of 72 Soviet MiG fighter aircraft, 200 tanks, radar systems, and naval patrol craft to the Algerian ar senal worries Morocco and makes her dependent on the United States for the restoration of an arms balance. In the Horn of Africa, the Soviets have been liberal with Somalia, reportedly send ing 150 MiG fighter bombers, 20 heli copters, and enough armored equip ment for a brigade., It can be seen, therefore, that thd Soviets have a sizable economic and

33

MIDDLE EAST military. investment in the Middle East, from Algeria in the west to ~omalia and Iraq in the southeast and northeast, respectively. The extent of this aid is an example of Soviet in terest in the Middle East. This in terest must be considered in examin ing Israeli and Arab aims. To give political meaning to mi]i. tary victory, the Israelis reporte .

Future of tbe Gaza Strip. Disposition of the Sinai Penin.

Sula.
Future of the Sharmel-Sheik. . Neutralization of tbe Golan Heights in Syria. Problem of the West Bank of the Jordan River.

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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

~ve an agenda of six items for nego tiation. Ineesence, theitems are based on territorial adjustments with secu rity in mind. Victory has also moti vated Israel to think about the problem of Arab refugees, a question the Arab States have chosen not to disassociate from a general settlement. The six points cover the: . Question of the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. 34

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11

ISSAEL

SINAI

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Apart from these six points, the elusive question of Israels recogni. tion by the Arabs has an intrinsic im portance for the Israeli Government. Should such an event come to pass, perhaps as a result of the interim non. belligerency, the Israelis would, un doubtedly, regard such a development as second in significance only to the establishment of tbe Jewish state. If the Arabs should find it possible to put aside their feelings with respect to Israels quarantine, their own posi tion might be strengthened inanyfu ture negotiations. The problem of Jerusalem would seem to be virtually settled.

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Compromise Solution Israel annexed or, to use the Is raeli term, administratively unified the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem on 23 June. It would appear that this sensitive question regarding the ad ministration of holy places sacred to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam will find a compromise solution. Each re ligion will have supervision over its buildings, and Israel will have polit ical control of the city. Notwithstand ingpossible effectson Israels security, the question qf the Gaza Strip might also be open fo compromise. In early July, Major General Moshe Dayan, Israels Defense Minister, said that tbe Gaza Strip should be incor porated into Israel. It was from this area that Egyptian commandos raided Israels southwest horder in 1955-56, Mititary Review


MIDDLE EAST prompting Israels entry into the sec ond Arab-Israeli war. After that con flict, Israel unsuccessfully proposed that the strip be placed under the United NatiOns, with Israeli troops providing security. General Dayans Israel now favors a opinion aside, plebiscite to decide the future of the Gaza Strip. Sharm el$heik The Israelis, on the other hand, seem to have no interest in holding the Sinai Peninsula. Present indica tions are that Israel would be satis fied with demilitarization of the pen insula so that Israeli forces can be withdrawn. More critical, however, is the eituation in Sharm cl-Sheik. This piece of land on the tip of the Sinai Peninsula commands the ap proach to the Gulf of Aqaba and Is raels port of Eilat. Egypts blockage of the gulf, in Israels view, consti tuted a reason for war. To make cer tain that such a blockage cannot be reimposed, Israel would either gar rison the Sharm cl-Sheik herself, or accept the presence of a neutral power to preside over the gulf. The Israeli purpose is to keep this sealane open to ships of all flags at all times. With regard to the Golan Heights in Syria, Israel is no less adamant in a matter she considers equally vital to her security. Prior to tbe June war, Syrian artillery fired on Israeli farm communities from the Golan Heights. The Israeli General Staff is deter mined that this will not be repeated. It is likely that only a demilitarized zone could satisfy the Israelis. The West Bank of tbe Jordan is an even more complicated problem. In creasingly, the Israelis view this area as an autonomous region. Although the precise distribution of responsihilities must await a final settlement between Israel and Jordan, the present plan has the area attached to Israels economy. If Jordan signed a peace treaty, the territory would be jointly administered. Defense, however, would be Israels responsibility. The question of the West Bank of the Jordan en compasses the Arab refugee problem. Those problems, the recognition of Is rael, and the improvement of and un restricted access to regional waters constitute the critical issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arab refugee problem has lin gered for 19 years. For encouraging the Arab residents of Palestine to flee when Israel came into being, Arab leaders must be censured. Tbe Arab leaders undertook this move in the belief that victorious Arab armies would soon take over the former Brit ish mandate in its entirety. The Is raelis, on the other hand, at least in the early stages of the 194S war, asked the Palestine Arabs to stay where they were. Positions Reversed When the war was over, the Arabs and the Israelis reversed their posi tions. The Arabs insisted that the 1s. raelis readmit the Arabs who had left, while the Israelis refused on seturity grounds. As a result of the 1967 war, the Israelis found it expedient to re examine the problem. The wars out come had brought increased numbers of Arabs under Israeli military juris diction. Israel was aware of the psycholog ical ramifications of the problem. Aware that she enjoys the advantage over the Arabs in public opinion in the Americas, Europe, and southeast Asia, Israel could not risk this incal culabl y vital asset. The statement of

MIDDLE EAST the Israeli Government on 29 June had that in mind: . . . that with the creation of new conditions in the re gion, there now exist conditions en abling a general immediate solution to the refugee problem. The Israelis are realistic. enough to know that they cannot gain on all six points. Delay in moving to the con ference table will obviously make ul timate negotiations more difficult. For the moment, however, the Israelis can afford to be generous, especially in view of a lack of unity among the Arabs. Position From the end of hostilities until now, the Arabs have been groping for solidarity. Four meetings have taken place: two of Arab Foreign Ministers in Kuwait in July, and in Khartoum a month later, a meeting of five Heads of State in Cairo in July, and a second Arab summit conference in Khartoum No unusual results, in September. however, have been achieved thus far. That there sh@d be differences among these countries, seven in Asia and seven in Africa, with significant geographic, economic, social, and po litical contrasts should not be surpris ing. Five examplesEgypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia point up these differences. For most countries, military defeat means political change. At least, such is the Western experience. Thus far, Egypt seems to be an exception, for President Nasser continues to hold his position as tightly as before. Not even the poor performance of his ar miea has diminished his ability to at tract the loyalty of the Arab masses from Tunisia to Kuwait. It seems probable, nevertheless, that distasteful decisions may be unavoid able for him in the postwar period. As the deepening distress of the Egyptian economy shows, adventures abroad and progress at home cannot go on at the same time. Nasser will have to choose between emphasis on domestic goals and extension of Arab revolutionary activities. The question is whether he could survive such a reversal of priorities. Whether Soviet support continues to be as generons in the future as in the past, it is clear that Egypt, under Nassers leadership or not, must have time to recover and rethink her future. As the most popu lous and strategically situated Arab state, Egypt has a crucial role in the Arab East. Egyptian Attitudes In evaluating Egyptian attitudes vis-a-vie Israel, it is ironic that there should be considerable agreement be tween their social and economic out looks in this essentially backward re gion. The leadership of Egypt and Israel is forward looking. From a so cial and economic point of view, there fore, it is probably true to say that Cairo has more in common with Tel Aviv than with Riyadh. As their cleavage over the Yemen shows, Egypt and Saudi Arabia seem to agree on Iittl*even politically, apart from a mutual desire to see Is rael eliminated. The gulf that sepa rates these two key Arab states is nearly as difficult to bridge as the chasm between Egypt and Israel. In light of the grave emotional differ ences between Cairo and Tel Aviv, the similarities are, at best, superficial. If any improvement can take place, however, these likenesses must be em phasized. In some Egyptian quarters, there appears to be evidence of this. At least, in the rethinking of Egyp-

TheArab

Mtlitary Review

MIDDLE EAS tian-Israeli problems that now is go ing on in Cairo, the factors held in common are receiving some attention. Of significance is a statement by Dr. Mahmud Fawzy, formerly Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic and now special advisor to President Nasser. He is reported to have said that, if only Israel paid an honorable compensation to the Palestinian refu gees, everything else would be nego tiable. Even. Nasser himself at one time proposed negotiations with Is rael prior to the recent conflict. Nsssers Stsnd It is in this light that President Nassers intransigent 23 July address, calling for a continuation of the war against Israel, should, perhaps, be viewed. His remarks, delivered on the 15tb anniversary of the overthrow of Khrg Farouk, celebrated a patriotic event, the start of Egypts eocial and economic revolution. Given the compet ing and recalcitrant attitudes of Pres idents Houari Bomn6dienne of AI geria, Nur al-Din of Syria, and Abdul Rahman Arif of Iraq, a moderate stand by Nasser would have been dif ficult on such an occasion. Changes in Egyptian attitudes must evolve slowly and subtly. Theeesential political pre. scription for the Arabs is solidarity. Of necessity, however, each Arab state must speak for itself. One of these is Saudi Arabia. In the recent conflict, Saudi Arabia was only a Passive participant. There were Saudi troop movements, more sym bolic, perhaps, than determined. The Saudi Arabian Government could not completely avoid some display of in terest in the crisis. Besides moving troops, Saudi Arabia cut off oil pro duction. on the other hand, King Fais@, the capable ruler of the coun April1968

try, wae aware of where his best in tereste lay. They were not with Egypt

In Riyadh, the capital, there wa relief that tbe war was short. A drawn out struggle would have required a active commitmentwhich the Saudi wanted to avoid. Oil production woul

The Arab refugee problem bas lingere for 19 years

have been shut down fortbe duration thereby curtailing the income tha King Faisal needs to modernize h country. Relatively unpublicized, th process is making strides that reflec the capable royal hand. In itself, th task is enough to preoccupy the King Egyptian efforts in the Yemen, how ever, to destroy the Royalist Govern ment there force King Faisal to su port the forces of Saif al-Islam al-Bad with money and weapons. It should n be surprising that His Majeaty did n attend the Cairo meeting.

MIDDLE EAST There were other reasons. Saudi Arabia was no$ directly involved and the meeting was held under the aus pices of President Nasser, whom King Faisal does not trust. Also, there are few close ties between the King and the radical leaders of Algeria, Sudan, and Syria. Absence of the Head of State from a major Arab country tesSudan or Morocco. BY creative diplo macy, the Jordanian Government must end this occupation or come to terms with it. For this reason, Jordan may be forgiven should she find it neces sary to alter her previous policy of no relations with Israel in f aver of some. thing more in accord with reality. In contrast to Jordan, who suffered

b-
tifies to the absence of unity in the Arab East. Tbe consequence of the lack of unity is a strengthening of Nassers posi tion. It might be expected that the popularity of King Faisal among the Arab masses would rise at this mo ment. The institution of monarchy fails to draw the response it once did from Arabs, particularly from the youth. The services that King Faisal might be able to offer the Arab cause must, therefore, be confined to the strengthening of his own country. Jordan, her richest soil under Is raeli occupation, is obviously in a po sition much different from that of the 38

Lm!iz
Intern.,.

The USSR reportedly has replaced about 80 percent of tbe equipment lost by Egypt so heavily in the war, neither Lebanon nor Saudi Arabia involved herself ac tively. Neither took part in the Cairo meeting. Lebanon is a typical Arab state with half the population Christian, half Moslem. That Lebanon did not become engaged in the conflict could be as cribed to this distribution. The army commander, a Christian, refused to obey the order of the Prime Minister, a Moslem, to open a front on Lebanons border with Israel. Although this de cision was, undoubtedly, reached on military grounds, it is conceivable that Lebanons evenly divided demographic profile was acontribnting factor. Any

Military Review

r i

_.,
Lebanese policy toward Israel would probably devolve from this internal heterogeneity. Tunisia might be mentioned as a further example of Arab diversity, al though she is only a small state and only peripheral to the heart of the Arab East. Like Lebanon, Tunisia is a former French colony and a Mediter ranean country. Her Chief of State, President Habib Bourguiba, reflects tbe possible advantages that remote ness gives to objectivity. ModerateView In Pronouncements concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute, President Bour guiba has taken a moderate and orig inal view. For example, over a year ago, he criticized tbe stand of the Arab leadership on the Arab refugees as sterile and unproductive. Calling for an end to hatred, the Tunisian leader emphasized the need for a construc tive solution of the problem under UN auspices. More than once, he disagreed with Nasser, a notable example being his refusal to follow Nassers demand that the Arab States break relations with Bonn over a reported shipment of arms to Israel. In the aftermath of tbe third Arab-Israeli war, Bour guiba continues his temperate point of view, advieing means other than war to resolve continuing Arab differ ences with Israel. Given Arab differences and the re sultant delay in reaching a settlement, reference can be made to the earlier question of how can the United States and the Soviet Union adapt the stra tegic changes in the Middle East to their respective interests. First, it should be decided what these interests are. Does this mutual interest Iie in the promotion of parochial aims or the April 19a8

--- ----%
MIDDLE EAST advancement of United States-Soviet and intraregional relations to stimu late political and economic equilibrium in the Middle East in place of tension? It ie idle, to be sure, to dismiss the importance of United States and So viet objectives. For the United States these are, first, the territorial integ rity of the countries in the areas and their freedom from Communist or other subversion. Second, the United States must as sure herself of continuing access to the oil of the Persian Gulf. However, Arab oil is not quite so necessary as before because of increasing availabil ity of oilfields in west Africa and Ven ezuela and the natural gas deposits of Holland PIUS eventual use of nuclear fuels. Third, awkward as it may be, the United States must strive for friendship with the Arabs, but not at Israels expense. Soviet Aims Soviet aims, on the other band, are not fixed so easiFy. Geographic con tiguity with the Middle East under lies Soviet interest in regional devel opments. Understandably, the USSR does not wish to feel a threat to her southern flank. Undoubtedly, however, Soviet military leaders must know that the dormancy of CENTO constitutes no real danger. Conceivably, then; there is some hope of realizing a set tled state in the area. The question is whether the Soviets are willing to accept the present equi librium in the Middle East in the same way that they seem to have made a favorable response to a similar situa tion in central Europe. The Soviete have not yet indicated that they are willing to do so, as the renewal of. their arms shipments in reportedly large quantities to Egypt suggests.

WIOLE

EAST it takes for Israel and the Arab States to negotiate an adjustment of their outstanding differences, the more it becomes an obligation of the United States and the Soviet Union to bring the disputants to the conference table. Under ideai conditions, it would be better for the antagonists to settle their own problems. In the absence of their willingness to do so, the major powers, preferably in concert with the United Nations, have little option but to take the lead. Three Arab-Israeli wars should be enough. The Israelis have shown convincingly that they can fight. Neither they nor tbe Arabs have proved that they can make peace. The failure to do so is an opportunity for the major powers to improve the situation in good faith. It should be the objective of the United States and the USSR to promote the coexistence of Israel and the Arab States. Achievement of this goal could contribute to a ditente be tween the United States and the Soviet Union which the leaders of the two powers say they desire. The Middle East, because of its strategic impor tance, is a convenient area for the two principal powers to direct their poli cies to this end.

Nor have the Soviets agreed to a US proposal to file notices of all arms shipments with the United Nations, an item of the agenda between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Premier Alek sei N. Kosygin during their discus sions at Glassboro, New Jersey. A factor of continuing uncertainty is the presence of a Soviet fleet in the Med iterranean, now consisting of 30 ships, cruisers, submarines, and amphibious craft. In the summer of 1967, the num ber of. ships reached 46. The political purposes of Soviet eco nomic assistance do constitute a chal lenge to the United States. Since tbe economies of most Middle Eastern countries do not lend themselves read ily to a duplication of US or Western economic organization, the question ariees whether there could be some cooperation in economic aid, however modest, between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this way, an open ing could be made for eventual, more substantive joint enterprises such as arms control. Meanwhile, it would seem to be in the interest of the two principal pow ers to restore peace to the area and to make certain that the rights of each state are respected. The longer

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40

Military Review

Lieutenant

Colonel Billy W. Byrd, Urn-tedStotea Armu

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\

The views expressed in this arti cleare the autho+s and are rwt nec essarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Army Command and Gen eral Staff College.Editor. N THE spring of 1966, official talks were held in London between rep resentatives of the United States and British Governments. The ~Iks ~en. tired on a politico-military subject having important foreign policy impli cations for both governments. This petilcular meeting was unusual be cause the US State Department was represented by a Navy captain, and the Departrn&t of Defenee (DOD) repWil Iw

resentative was a Foreign Service officer. There wae no mixup, the officers were representing tbe right depart ments. In fact, the Department of State-Department of Defense Officer Exchange Program celebrated ite fifth birthday that yaar. The exchange program ie a natural outgrowth of efforte by officiale of the State Department and DOD to im prove mutual understanding of for eign and military policy. The concept for the program evolved from a grow ing recognition since World War II of the close relationship bet,ween foreign policy and military policy. At the na tional level, there is no pure foreign

policy nor pure military policy. This does not discount the role of political primacy in the conduct of foreign af fairs, but it does highlight the fact that 20th-century diplomats and sol diers must know and understand the workings of the other. Primary Purpose The exchange program has as its primary purpose the cross-training of selected military, civilian, and For. eign Service personnel in pOliticO-mil itary affairs, and the promotion of better understanding and cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense. It is aimed at creating for the future a small corps of experi enced personnel capable of assisting and advising in the formulation of na tional security policy. The program was officially inaugu rated 9 January 1961, and included the initial assignment of 10 officers, five from each department. It has grown S1OWIYand today numbers 15 Foreign Service officers from the De partment of State, and 13 military and two civilian officers from DOD. Assignments are generally for two years. Various suggestions have been ex-

amined for expanding the program Because of the requirements for highly competent officere and exchange positions euited to their talents, the two department for the present re. gard 15 officers from each side as the optimum number. The exchange officers are not liaison officers, although they do perform lia. ison tasks. They serve as fully inte. grated staff officers in their host agency and have the came responai bilitiea and authority as their col leagues. Their efficiency reports are made by their immediate supervisor and endorsed by tbe next higher oRi cial in the chain of command. FSO Ranka The ranks of Foreign Service offi cers ( FSOa) on duty in the Pentagon range from FSO-2 through FSO-4. The middle-grade ranks of FSO-3 snd FSO-4 are assigned to the service staffs, while senior rank FSO-2e are detaiIed to the Office of the Secretary of Defenee-International Security Af. fairs (OSD-ISA) and the Joint Staff. Military officere serving in the State Department are usually in the ranka of coIoneI-captain and Lieutenant colo nel-commander. There are no fixed rnles regarding the assignment by rank, but it has been the practice to put the higher rankhg officers on the Policy Plan ning Staff and in the Office of PoliticoMilitary Affairs. There are no set criteria for select ing pereonneI for the exchange pregram. However, both department seek individuals having a broad profes sional background, a high level of mo tivation, and a good degree of adapb ability. It is also desirable that the individual have an interest and back ground in foreign affaire. This may MilifsIy rmdw

Lieutenant Colonel BiUU W. Byrd is with the 1st Battalion, T2d Armor-, in Korea. He was graduated from Okla homa State flnivemit~, Stttbmter; re ceived hie M.A. degree in International Relations from the American fJniver sitrr, Washington, D. C.; and is a grad uate of the US Artrw War College. A vet et-an of World War II, he hae served with Headquarters, US Army, Eu rope; Strategic Pfanx and Policfl Di rectorate, O&e, DeputV Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington; and with Political Military Affairs, Bureau of Near Ea8term and South Asian Affairs, Department of State. 42

--,~

..7

EXCHANGE be in the form of practical experience in field or staff positions, or formal education in the field of international relations or foreign affaire. Exchange officers are more effective and contribute to their joh sooner when they have come from a preceding tour in tbe Pentagon or the State De-

PROGRAM

examples. of typical action papere which flow across their desks during any particular day are:
In the Department of State, the exchange officer in the Otlice of Po litico-Military Affairs, a Navy cap tain, drafts a paper expressing State views on the proposed schedule of 6th

US State

Department

Building, Fleet

Washington,

D. C.

partment. It is aseumed that each ex change officer has a good knowledge of the functions, organization, and re spofisibiiities of his own department before going to the host agency. This does not preclude the assignment of officers from the field, but a split tour in Washington between the Depart ment of State and Defense has been the rule. ~ What do exchange officers do in daytoday operations ? Some illustrative April 1936

visits to Mediterranean ports. The Army officer 1% the Bureau of Near Eaetern and South Asian Affairs develops political rationale in support of Military Assistance Pro grams for the countries in his region.
An Air Force officer in the Bu reau of African Affairs prepares a study aimed .at highlighting the im pact on US foreign policy caused by Communiet military assistance to hewly emerging African states.

43

EXCHANGE

PROGRAM departments. This channel of comrnu. nication can be particularly helpful to Washington staff officers dealing with interdepartmental matters. The exchange program has achieved meaningful results. The basic purpose of the program ia being met in the cross-training of a small group of of. ficers in politico-military affairs at the national level. It is the consensus of officials in both the State Department and DOD that tbe program has pre moted better understanding and co operation between the departments. Utiliition Positions However, there appears to be room for improvement in the utilization of exchange officers after they return to their parent department. Of the two departments, State has made the bet ter and more immediate use of its officers. Within DOD, only about onehalf of the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers have received subsequent po litico-military assignments. All of the OSD civilians, however, have been w signed to utilization positions. Despite over-all service require ments and alternating demands for command and staff duty, the military departments should be able to improve the utilization rate of ita officers, par ticularly since the numbers are small. An officer should not be nominated for the program if he will not be available for a suitable follow-on assignment. The Army and Air Force have no specific method for identifying an ex change officer once he has finished the program. The Navy and the Depart ment of State use, respectively, a mil itary occupational specialty number and position titles for politico.military affairs officers. The Army and Alr Force could adopt similar procedure for identifying their officers. military Review

Across the river in the Pentagon, a Foreign Service officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Mil itary Operations, staffs a Joint Staff paper in which the Army recommends that certain actions be taken concern ing third country aasiatance to South Vietnam. In ISA, a State Department ex change officer is in the midst of writ ing a DOD policy paper dealing with the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These items would be accomplished regardless of the exchange program. Because of their prior training and experience, however, the exchange of ficers are able to contribute expert political and military advice at the working level which otherwise might not be available to the immediate pol icy and decision makers.

Transfer of Knowledge Another benefit of the exchange pro gram is the transfer of knowledge. After serving two years in another department, the officers have a fair knowledge of how the host agency op erates, how it acts and thinks, and how it arrives at policy decisions. Upon returning to their respective de partments, they are better equipped to deal with politico-military problems within their own offices, and they have a better understanding of how each department formulates national secu rity poIicy. Moreover, the mere fact that there are 15 exchange officers on each side of the Potomac has expanded the ex isting channels of informal commnni catilons between State and Defense De partments. This has proved to be val uable, particularly in the coordination of joint State-DOD papers, and in the exchange of information between the

--EXCHANfiE PROGRAM

Apother possible area for improve ment concerns exchange officer quali~ fications and position requirements. Presently, officer procurement ie han dled informally, and no fixed, rules applY in thie respect. Perhape each office supervisor in the Departments of State and Defense having an ex change position could draw up a list of personal and professional qualities the exchange officer should have for ,the particular job. These liste could then be exchanged and provided to fhe appropriate personnel officee in the twO departments. Something of this tyqe would be more meaningful than a rou tine job description. Moreover, the im

mediate. supervisor would have more say in the selection of exchange offi cere they receive for training. The formal exchange of officers be tween the military and foreign policy makhrg institutions of government is uniquely American. No other govern ment in the world has a comparable effort. Ite future succees will depend on periodic reviewe to insure the con tinued selection of high-quality per sonnel, the assignment of these per sonnel to appropriate exchange posi tions, and subsequent assignment of these experienced officers to utiliza tion assignments within their own de partments.

The threads of foreign policy extend throughout the fabric of our na. tional life. You cannot find the significance of any one thread without seeing its relationship to the whole. It is not always easy to keep that in mind in the echo of gunfire. Prs8ident Lwzdon B. Johnson

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The Rok of

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
for the West
Robert E Walters NE of the obvious facts of life today for any Minister, or Secretary, of Defense is that weapons are enormously expensive. This has always been true, but probably never has it been so necessary to spend money simultaneously on research and development efforts and also upon production for peacetime forces. Even the United States and the Soviet Union have found that decisions must be, or

should be, taken intelligently upon the choice of arms and weapon systems. Prior to World War II, development seemed to go at a more leisurely pace, and frequently change was reeisted by those in power. However, change juet for the sole sake of change, or bs cause other nations are switching to new weapon systems, is not necessarily wholly correct either. There seeme to be reaeon to suspect that, at times,

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS weapons become like fads. One reaeon which many nations gave for building battleships was that the leading mari time powers were doing so. While development of new weapona should he encouraged, it appears that things have been turned around. Pol icy and military doctrine should, as far as possible, dictate arms research and development. This has not been true. For example, nuclear arms, both strategic and tactical, were developed and then only later was a doctrine con cerning their use evolved. It seems muchmore reasonable, therefore, that, as long as technical change has been accepted as a must, then it should be guided by doctrine. Western Policy By doctrine is meant the needs of the over-alI policy of a state, or in the ease of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, their joint aims in Europe, and the principles of war. The policy of the West has been to resist any attack which might come from Eastern Europe. This fear bas subsided with the belief by many that This article was condensed from the original, publiehed in the JOURNAL OF TEE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION (Great Britain) -&nkt 1967. CoWrighted @ 1967 by the JOUR NAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SEavICE INSTITUTION. Mr. Walters is a student of mit itaW and naval strateg~ and eerved in the US Marine COWS. He has bsen an irrstrmctor of mathematics at the University of LouieviUe in Kentucky; the US Naval Academy in Anrmpolia, Mar@wni; th~ Johnx Hopkiwe Univereitp in Baltimore, Marg km.d; and the Un$vereity of Bvrdg@ort in Connecticut. the Soviet military system was more interested in forming a defensive bul wark than an offensive aword. Since Western policy was a defen sive concept, it has tended to falter on the choice of terrifying weapons which probably, while being respected by the Soviets, have been as much feared by the peoples of central and Western Europe. It has undoubtedly been this factor which mad? theee peoples so reluctant to contribute en thusiastically to their defense since obviously the tools of defenee seemed to form their own cotlins. Nature of War Perhaps, then, a reflection upon what the late Major General J. F. C. Fuller had to SSY about the nature of war in The Reformation of War might provide a guide: The security of peaceful prosperity ie the object of war, not slaughter. It would appear much more desir able to try to guide technical develop ment along the lines of the needs of doctrine. We have, unfortunately, put the cart before the horse by letting technology dictate the choice of weap one. Sometimee this must be so; one cannot always have tbe kind of weap ons which are needed, and thus a com promise must be made. The trouble is that, all too frequently, technology tends to dictate doctrine and even pol icy. This seems to have been the case with nuclear arme. There has been a tendenqy in the United States, less ao in EngIand and Europe, to consider nuclear arms as our best weapons and not merely as a deterrent but as a full-fledged in strument of policy. Thps, the West has been impaIed upon the horns of this thorny dilemma. While the West, and the United States, cannot afford

April
1968

41

NUCLEAR WEAPONS to give up nuclear arms unilaterally, nonetheless, it is important to place them in their proper perspective. There has heen often heard the remark that nuclear arms are just a natural development in the history of weaponry. Nuclear advocates point, rather superficially, to the fact that, in the past, with each new weapons development, the cry of alarm went ,, , i b valid. The whole history of warfare shows that, in spite of the constsnt improvement in weaponry throughout the ages, the percentage of casualties in relation to the population, and even the forces employed, hae been rela. tively low and has tended to rernsin about the same.
There have been exceptions to this,
and usually it has been whenever the

Even though the US Civil War produced large numbers of casualties, figures of the other great powers were higher up that this meant the end of civilization. This is quite true, but, because people were wrong in crying wolf in the past, does not preclude the possibility of a real wolf appearing in the future. It might mean that, when a real wolf does appear, we will not be able to recognize him. This historical development ment, when examined closely, 4a arguis not

the World War I

policy was one of genocide. The most recent example at hand concerns the enormoue Soviet casualties of World War 11. Varioue figures are given for these casualties which run from 20 million to as high as 40 million people many of whom were civilians. It is interesting to note that this policy may have been one of the prime factors in defeating the Germans. Military Revhw

p-?
NUCLEAR WEAPONS If one accepts the lower figure, then this is about 15 percent of the popu lation which is a fantastic figure. It is no accident, then, that nuclear ad vocates such aS Mr. Herman Kahn use the Soviet UniOn as an example to ahow how a country might survive a nuclear strike. Unfortunately, they forget to mentiOn that genocide was the admitted policy of the Hitler gov ernment. In other words, historic par allels must he picked from cases where genecide was employed, which under lines the fact that nuclear arms are not a natural development in weap onry. Caaualty Figwres Professor Quincy Wright, in- his book A Study of War, provides a num ber of useful casualty tables. These figures might be subject to question and interpretation at many points, and one must use them with care. One table shows the number of sol diers engaged in battles, the number of casualties, and the percentage of casualties, both with respect to popu lation and the number of troops em ployed, for France by decades from 1630 to 1919. It is interesting to see that tbe greatest percentage of the population either killed or wounded occurred in the 1910-19 period when it was 5.63 percent. This is far from the 15 percent of the recent Soviet experience which is the nuclear war parallel. Still, the French toll produced a great effect upon the nation. The per centage killed and wounded in this same period, with respect to those en gaged, was S.70 percent. A similar table is given for Great Britain, and again the greateet per centages of casualties out of the total population and out of those employed was in the 1910.19 period. These perApril 1968 centages were 2.61, measured against the total population, and 7.47 percent of those employed in fighting. In all of the previous decades, the percentage of casualties out of the total population never rose to two percentnor more than 30 percent for those employed. Interestingly enough, the highest percentages for casualties measured against those employed in battle frequently occurred during times of comparative peace when a relatively small engagement of, say, 2,200 casualties ont of 8,000 employed produced inflated percentages. US Table The table for the United States is, of course, different from the tahlea for France and Great Britain. Since we did not get into World War I un til 1917, American casualty percent ages are much lower. These figurea were .14 and 2.40 percent for casual ties measured against the total Popu lation and the number of troops em: ployed, respectively. Our Civil War period, while producing large numbers of casualties, did not approach the World War I figures of the other great powers. It is instructive now to compare these figures with even the most con servative estimates of the probable casualties resulting from a nuclear strike. Fritz Sternberg estimated sev eral years ago that a 30-hour attack upon the United States could result in casualties of 30 percent of the Popu lation. A recent naval war game demon strated that eight Polans submarines on battle etations could kill 35 million Soviets. The figure of eight Polaris submarines representsorrly one-fifth of the Fokwis force and to this mnst be added the Strategic Air Command 49 ,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS missiles and aircraft. It is true also that, with the unforeseen possibilities of an enemy first strike, part of this might be destroyed. However, the pro visions for a second-strike capability seem to cover this contingency. It is obvious that, in the projected casualties for any nuclear war, bar ring extensive civil defense efforts which themselves might be considered provocative, the rate would far exceed those of any prior war. While they may be acceptable to some, it seems clear that these rates would tran scend the historic rate of casualties which seldom rises above two percent for the total population. It is, there fore, inconceivable to consider it as juet another weapons development much like gunpowder and machineguns. It simply is not true. A Mirage The second most frequent argument used by nuclear advocates is that the superior manpower and conventional force capability of the Soviet bloc has forced the West to rely upon nuclear arms. This gives rise to a problem in semantics which seemingly has stumped a number of people. The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never had vast military manpower superiority over the West. This has been largely a mirage. It used to be that statistics were used to hoodwink the unsuspecting, and, after a while, one had the impres sion that even the person who origi nated the hoax had begun to believe in it. For example, tbe number of Soviet divisions was compared with the number of Western divisions which gave an unbalanced appearance because the manpower in Soviet di vieions was much lese than that in Western divisions. This was a manpower hoax that nuclear advocates were fond of using in the 1950s. It ended in the 1960s. Guerrilla Warfare Today, the Soviet Union occupies a position similar to one held for so long by Germany of having strong en. emies on opposite bo~ders. It is, there. fore, not straoge 16 \learn that the Soviets have d&cided t? build another Trans-Siberian Railr~d farther north and away from the Chinese border. However, while there is the Chinese threat to the West, the threat is an indirect one of fostering guerrillatype wars. The West has not always been too successful in guerrilla war fare largely because we fail to see the intrinsic relationship between politics and force. This failure, however, is certainly not one of men or of equip. ment. The point is that, in guerrilla war, numbers alone are not the real decid. ing factor, nor is it necessarily so in terms of orthodox modern warfare. In the years after World War II, mil itary and political leaders tended to look upon the Soviets with horror at the prospect of the Asiatic hordes sweeping across Europe. This was not quite accurate. It would now appear that the Iron Curtain which Stalin lowered was more of a defensive na ture than offensive. Nor, seemingly, did the Soviets have any illusions that sweeping to the Eng lish Channel would be an eaey matter, contrary to what many in the West thought possible. Whenever Western leaders thought about this possibility. their minds invariably went back to the blitzkriegs which produced such earth-shaking victories over Poland and France. But what happened in 1939, and Military Raviow

NUCLEAR WEAPONS even in 1941, was not possible against a determined opponent in 1945. The difference was not in terms of equip meut, but in terms of ideae. In 1945, and even earlier, both sides had ]earned to use modern mobile weapons bssed upon the internal combustion engine. This knowledge made it pos sible for the defense to be stronger than the attack. of nuclear arme, then these are neces sarily our heat weapons. It would seem that adopting this reasoning would be alIowing the opposing side to do our thinking for us. Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that nuclear arms are the very worst weapons for the West, and this is particularly true

The Defense Field Marshal Erich von Manstein noted almost casually in his postwar memoirs, LOSt v~cto~~es, that it was accepted that the defense was the stronger of the two forms of fighting. In The Other Side of the Hilt, B. H. Liddell Hart relates that, after the war, General Heinrich told him: In the light of mw experience, I consider that IIOUTconclusion that the attacker needs a three to one euperi oeitg de tinder the mark, rather than over it. I woald eag that, for succees, the attacker needs eix to one or seven to one agairwt a wsll-knit defense that has a reasonable front to cover. Thers were timw when my troops held th r US Amw Photos owm against odds of 12 to 1 or Pven Pield Marehal Erich von Manstein 18 to 1. It seems obvious that the NATO of the cweanic parts such as the United forces had it within their grasp, there States and the British Isles. fore, to establishan adequate and solid It must be remembered that the defense against any poss,ible Soviet Englieh Channel was enough to stop move to the west. It is true that the Hitler jiust as it had been enough to island of West Berlin has always etop Napoleon Bonaparte. Thie is not besn a dangerous and peculiar salient to imply that the United States and which has alwaye been tempting to the Soviets. But there ie no reason to I. Great Britain, because they are rela tively secure, ehould be indiff~rent to believe that the Soviets wquld have oms power controlling Western Eu been any more aggressive if the A1 rope. Inde&l! fa~ from ~ but the point lies had been forced to rely entirely of the argument remains that, with upon conventional forces. nuclear arms, we find ourselves in an T1rerehas z&p been the naive belief untenable position. in the United States that,> since the Nuclear arms are the only mean$, . Soviet Union apparently fears the use APril 19S8 51

NUCLEAR WEAPONS as far as one knows, by which the Communist bloc powers could strike directly at the United States or Great Britain. In terms of conventional weapons, there is no question that they can be held at bay without any dan ger of them being able to strike di rectly at their homelands. Then what logic is it that maintains that nuclear arms are our best weapons ? Contrasting Position One might contrast this position with the one taken by the Admiralty when Robert Fulton, the American in ventor, approached tbe Royal Navy with tbe idea for a submarine. Ful tons idea was rejected, but he was, nonetheless, paid off to the tune of 15,000 pounds. Admiral Lord Saint Vincent remarked: Pitt would be the greatest fool that ever existed to e?weurage a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want and which, if successful, wwuld dewve them of it. It is true that you cannot block progress, but the guide for progress should be your own aims and not those of your opponent. In terms of nuclear arms, it is patently ridiculous for us to consider them as our best weap ons, as many in the West are wont to do since they exist as the ordy means whereby the United States and Great Britain can be hit. It is, of course, quite another matter to re nounce nuclear arms, and the West should be prepared to do this ordy if they could win suitable gains from the Soviet Union. Indeed, this might well be one hopeful line of approach. There is no question but that nu clear arms are weapons of genocide. They can be little elee. There have been attempts to build elaborate theo ries in the United States to try to 52 limit the effect of nuclear arms and control their use. No one, outside of tbe particular proponents of these ideas, seems to have a great deal of faith in them. In epite of the exten. eive etudies which have been made, there ie etill great uncertainty as to what a nuclear war would entail. War is, after all, a contest of wills, and predicting exactly how people will re. act is a difficult matter. It could be that a nonnuclear na. tion, fearing the power of a neighbor. ing nuclear nation, might feel that it would be in ite interest to develop biv. logical weapone. Tbe great advantsge with biological arms would be that they would not destroy property and, hence, would not hinder the advance of ones own forces. In addition, any political leader must look beyond the war to the ensuing peace which must follow. This implies that he must al ways be aware of the effects which the war, and tbe weapons of war, will produce. Research end Oevelepment In the recent past, it eeems that military research and development have gone on almost independent of doctrine. Nuclear arms were devel. oped; subsequently, the strategy was developed to use theee weapons. The same was true of tactical nuclear weapons. They were developed, and then a rationale, tactically and stra tegically, for ueing these arms was devised. This, unfortunately, hae been the way Western strategy has been preceding for the past 20 years. While research and development should be encouraged, nevertheless, it should he directed, first, by needs of policy of a nation and, second, by the military doctrine which must evolve from thie policy. Scientific discovery Miiitery Review

r....

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NUCLEAR and development cannot be turned on and off like a water tap, but this is not the point. Tbe problem is that research and development should be directed toward those ends which are likely to be tbe most valuable. The accent upon weapons, seemingly independent of policy and doctrine, has produced an absurd state of affaire. War is, after all, a, means of settling disputes. between nationeit ie fibe last court of appeal. Now, nations are tending *toward a peculiar position. WEAPONS

There are disputes between nation% and we are, given the choice of extremes-either settle all differences peacefully or bIow up tbe world. Strange as it may seem, it would appear that the world should be made safe for war. Force and Right, eaid Joubert, are tbe governors. of this world, Force till Right is ready. In. deed, this ie true! The danger is tbatj in trying to throw war into the ash can, we might throw the world in with it.

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Scandinavia

and the

Future of NATO

Colonel John E. Dwan 11, United States Armu

The views expressed in this article are the authors and are not necessarily thoee of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Army Command and General Stu# College.Editor. HE future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance ie a major iseue despite the war in VietS4

nam, turmoil in Communist China, the disaffection of France from the West ern alliance, the dilemmas of the un derdeveloped world, and the crisis in the Middle East. When we think of NATO in this country, we tend to focus primarily on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It is a fact, however, that the Scandinavian coun tries comprise one-fifth of the memMilitary ltevio~

SCANDINAVIA

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bership of the alliance, and they OC. mp~ NATOs strategic northern flank which we may have heen takhsg too much for granted. Since, under the terms Of the N Y h Atlantic Treaty, members may WI dmw from the alliance after 1969 with one years advance notice-a date that is fast approachingit ie important to know what these northern partners are thinking, and what they will do. How do the Scandinavians, from their rather remote northern perspective out of the mainstream of events, look at what is happening to NATO and at their own security in a changing world? New Perspective The Scandinavians are unquestion ably viewing their secnrity position today in a new perspective . The out look has changed fro at of 1949 aa formedwhen the year NATO each country made the decision whether or t to join. This changing outloo / w a combination of old and elements. The old elements are sach countrys fixed geographic loca tion on the globe and its history; and the new are each countrys interpreta tion of events taking place beyond ite Colonel John E. Dwad II is with the PolicII Planning C&tcil, Depart niont of State, Washin ton, D. C. He receivsd his M.A. awd $3h. D. degrees in Zntermatiowal Relations from Yale Univer.ritg. He attended the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina and the Southeast Asia Treaty Or ganisation Conference in 1954 m a member of the US Delegations. Colo nel Dwan served in Korea with the 7th Infantry Divieiop; was on the faculty of the US Army War College, Carlfele Barracks, Pennsylvania; and has been aseigned to the Oflice of the Chief of Staff, in Washington. April Ieso borders and ~he manner in which theeq event$ impinge on its own interests. The old geography, of course, re mains. Scandinavia is set apart from the centraI landmase of Europe. Den mark alcine ia attached as a small ap pendage. Although remote and with relatively modest resources, Scandi navian geography is important. Geographical Realities Norway ehares a 122-mile border with the Soviet Union cloee to the im portant Soviet naval bases at Pechenga and Murmansk. Her ice-free coastline. confronts the accese routes to and from the North Atlantic in the far north and extends south along the flank of that strategic area. Denmark atande astride the routea connecting the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic. Swe den flanks the Baltic approaches to the east, and, especially in the north, eeparates. areae of traditional eastern and weetern influence. Iceland occu pies a strategic position athwart the eea routee into and out of the North Atlantic. These old geographic realities are, perhaps, even more important today in the era of wide-ranging missiles and naval craft than before, not only ,for the strategic warning and eurveilIance they afford, hut also becauee use of these areas must be denied to a possible enemy. From an objective strategic point of view, a case could be made that geography is what really makes the Scandinavian countries im portant to the Western alliance eince their human and material resources are relatively modest. The historical past also remains. Al though neutral in conflicts among the larger European powers for many years, Norway and Denmark were in vaded and occupied by Germany in

World War H. Iceland was used as a base of operation by British and then by US forces. All three opted for NATO in 1949, having experienced the results of going it alone. Sweden, not a participant in World War II, continued to remain unaligned, and re tained a policy that had kept her out of war for 150 years. New Elements Together with these geographical and historical realities, Scandinavian attitudes are also affected by new ele ments on the world scene. The future course of the Scandinavian countries will doubtless be determined from an evaluation within each country of how these old and new elements, including recent events beyond their hordere, affect their own security interests as they see them. There are six attitudes which seem to be widely held throughout the area. These are represented by the follow ing statements with a brief discussion following each: The cold war is over, amd the threat of Soviet military action against Western Europe hae been neutralized by the deterrent effect of US strategic nuclear forces. There appears to be general agree ment that the Soviet Union has ceased to he a threat to European security. A frequent opinion is that this ie a different and less dangerous world from that of Joseph Stalins or even Nikita S. Khrushchevs day. Points often cited to support this view are: Europe has recovered from the military, economic, and political weak ness of the postwar period when it was no match for, and, therefore, a temptation to, Soviet military aggres sion. This fact, coupled with the US strategic deterrent, has made it far 56

too risky for the Soviet Union to at. tempt to extend her influence in Eu. rope by military means. Fundamental changes have taken place within the Communist world. It is no longer monolithic and run from Moscow, but has fragmented among a number of centers of nationally oriented communism. Divided within its own camp, communism as a weapon in the Soviet arsenal is less dangerous. The Soviet Union increasingly is concerned over the future development of Chinese Communist power, and is less likely to take risks in the West with an unfriendly China at her back. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are devoting more and more reeources to Asia, particularly in connection with the Vietnam war. This tends to reduce the likelihood that Europe will be the scene of pos sible conflict.
The eastern European countries are anxious to seek new forms of ac commodation with the West economi cally and culturally. These same prac tical and even emotional impulses also are affecting the Soviet Union.

Soviet Intentions To Scandinavian eyes, the facts of history confronting the Soviet Union have brought about a change in So viet intentions toward Europe. The leaders no longer consider feasible the possibility of extending Soviet influ ence in Europe by military means. They are sincerely seeking further dtitente with the West to preserve hard-won domestic gains under the pragmatic leadership of a managerial class. These men are quite different from tbe tyrannical Stalin or the mer curial Khrushchev, and will subordi nate Marxist doctrine to the practical needs of economic growth and more Military Iteview

SCANDINAVIA traditional Soviet security interests. While military leaders remain con cerned over Soviet capabilities, they agree that real progress is being mad~ toward East-West d.%ente, and that the Weetern Powers should not con tinue to view the military threat in the same terms as in 1949. This atti%andinavian thinking about NATO

aPPears to tie that the allia,nce aho~d be maintained, but that its functions should be expanded to make it more than the vehicle for a hostile military confrontation with the Warsaw Pact powers. it has Been suggested that NATO could serve the allies as a

Scandinavian

geography

is a key to the control of the Baltic area forum for the discuaeion of political and economic matters, and, thereby, facilitate coordination of actions that the members wonld take individually in their relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The thought here eeems to be that, with the diminished military threat, some further justification is needed for NATO if public eupport is to be main tained for a political commitment that, after all, rune counter to long-standing neutralist tendencies in the area. There seems to be no official doubt that the three Scandinavian members of NATO will remain, in the alliance. There hae been some discussion about what form the commitment. would take after the 20-year obligation expired in

tude naturally affects the security pol iciesand the budgets-of the Scan dinavian countries. The NATO alliance in its pres ent form is outdated, and should be modified to fit the new circum etances. There is general agreement that NATO hae been essential to the de feqse and stability of Europe. Only the extreme leftwing partiee have con sistently opposed it. NATO ie credited with having provided the essential shield behind which Europe recovered from the war and reassumed its role on the world scene. Having accepted thie, many Scandinavians believe that NATO as a strictly military alliance has outli~ed its usefulness. April1968

adherence to NATO is the youth in each country. Without exception, the countries are feeling the attitudes of the growing youthful eIement in the electorate. This is the segment of so ciety that did not experience World War II-one-third of the population generally. Old attitudes, emotional bi ases, and traditional patterns are be ing questioned. 58

Iidity of policies that have existed dur ing the postwar years, including the NATO commitment. Among these latter groups, various questions are being asked. In the global contest among the great powers, would not the Scandinavian countries be as well protected by the United States whether or not they were mem bers of the alliance? In other words, Military Review

SCANDINAVIA coti~dthe United States afford not to protect even a neutral Scandinavia, perhaps handed together in a Nordic pact, armed, and resolved to stay out of a war between the larger powers? Why shOuld even the present levels of defense expenditures ~.e supported since, as the British and some Amer icnns say, there would be a period of political warning preceding any Soviet military move in Europe which would give the West adequate time to pre pare? Whether such questions are serious or serve merely to rationalize declin ing defense budgets is open to debate. The fact remains that these points of view are being expressed, and they contribute to the uncertainties that lie ahead for the northern members of NATO. Concern about the future course of German nationalism cor&i tutes the single strongest reason for preserving NATO. 6ermanys Future Course In all the countries except Iceland, there is definite anxiety about the course Germany would take in the fu ture. Perhape thie underlying attitude wss brought closer to the eurface by statements and positions taken by the Bonn government on subjects such as the nonproliferation treaty. Yet the reasons for the anxiety are often ad mitted to be more emotional than based on any objective evidence of a change in Germanys political direc tion. Irrespective of the reasons, there is broad agreement that the integration of Germanys arme~ forcee into the NATO military structure and into a European security system generally is highly desirable. This means of keep ing Germany in hand might be, for the Scandinavians, the principal rea son for perpetuating the alliance. The Scandinavian contnbution to world stability and peace con siete chiefl~ of maintaining a baf ance of power in the Nordic area between the Soviet Union and the Weetern allies. Nordic Balance Scandinavians seem to assume as an article of faith that they are the guardians of a delicate equilibrium in the balance of power in northern Eu rope. According to this concept, re ferred to as the Nordic balance, sta bility and peace have prevailed in the area because Finlands treaty arrange ments with the USSR in the east bal ance those of Norway and Denmark with NATO in the west while Sweden, in between, is aligned with neither side. The concept further holds that greater Soviet influence over Finland is held in check by the prospect that Norway and Denmark might reverse their self-imposed limitations on the stationing of NATO forces and of nu clear weapons on their soil, and that Sweden might develop closer relations with the West. Although a number of knowledge able persons, especially those in gov ernment, doubt that this concept of a Nordic balance has any practical value as a political instrument in spe cific policy situation, a segment of the academic community believes it did operate ae a check on the USSR in 1961 when, at the time of the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev asked Finland for consultations under the terms of the Ruese-Finnieh Treaty. President Urho Kekkonen demurred, strengthened in his stand by a timely statement from the Norwegian Foreign Minister to the effect that Norway might have to

SCANDINAVIA reconsider her han on NATO bases and nuclear weapons. The base-and-ban policy and Swedish nonalignment seem to be gen erally accepted as responsible for the preservation of Finnish independence and general stability in the area. One suspects, however, that an even deeper underlying attitude is that, in the laet analyeis, the Scandinavian countries can do little to control their own destiniesthat in the course of the contest between the great powers, what happens in Europe as a whole will determine their fate no matter what they do. Therefore, the Scandi navian states must at least try to stabilize their portion of the world and remove one additional area as a point of hostile confrontation between East and West. It is with this goal in mind that Sweden has contributed enthueiasti cally to various United Nations peace keeping efforts around the world. For similar reasons, Norway doee not per mit NATO military exercises in the Finnmark area adjacent to the USSR. Reductions in national re eources devoted to military secu rit~ are acceptable in view of the diminished threat aud the impor tance of encouraging further Eaet-Weet d6tente. Defense Expenditures Throughout the Scandinavian area, the trend in defense expenditures is down. Domestic social programs, al ways competitors of defenee for f uncle, appear to he winning. The prevailing mood is not one of optimism for a reversal of a downward trend. Underlying this lack of enthueiaem for greater defenee efforts seems to be the conviction that the security of the Scandinavian countries lies in 60 hands other than their own. In Nor. way and Denmark, there is explicit reference made to external forces meaning primarily those from the United States-coming to their aid if they are attacked, and that the role of local national forces is to execute whatever delaying act ions they can until such help arrives. Special Units In this context, they are interested in the existence of the Allied Com mand Europe Mobile Force eince these relatively emall unite composed of other NATO forces have been created for the express purpose of deployment to the flanks where in peacetime no other NATO forcee are stationed. These special unite are intended pri marily to serve in a deterrent role by demonstrating allied solidarity and commitment in a time of teneion. Norway and Denmark are aleo in terested in a concept for e quick-reac tion mobile force suggested at the meeting of Defense Ministers in July 1966. This concept envieions more eiz. able units drawn from reeources out side NATOe central region and dis patched to a threatened flank with the capability of substantial combat ef fectiveness. Even Sweden, resolved to fight to defend her neutrality if attacked, does not rule out the option of appealing to the Western Powers for help if that alternative is neceseary. Here, again, US etrategic power is implicity ac cepted as the foundation of Scandi navian security. It appears that the three countries concerned conceive of their own mili tary defenses as, at best, marginal to their ultimate eecurity neede. They aspire, at most, to put up enough of a fight, if attacked, to prevent a cheap M6itary Review

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SCANDINAVIA , mcmv . ... victbry and buy enourrh time for outside help to arrive. H-owever, underlying this concept is a gnawing uncertainty about what might be hap. pening on more vital fronts, whether sufficient military resources from the outside would, in fact, be availabie, and whether those in charge would de cide that such resources could be most profitably employed in coming to tbe Scandinavians aid. AvoidingHostilities All of this leads the Scandinavians, finally, to the conviction that their se curity can best be enhanced by avoid ing hostilities in the first place. This translates into a primary concern with deterrence, meaning the US strategic posture, and the avoidance of desta bilizing actions in the Nordic area. As fsr as the Scandinavians own con tribution to the military equation is concerned, it is difficult for them to argue in their own domestic political arenas that a little more in tbe way of already inconclusive resources is important one way or the other. Sweden has the additional problem of being able to develop a nuclear ca pabilitya choice Norway and Den mark do not have. It seems that Swe den currently deems it neither neces sary nor desirable to take the nuclear route. ~he atmosphere of ddtents, and the ( hopes that a continuation of thie trend raises for normalizing the political eit uation and easing the tensions of Eu rope, also plays ite part in dampening enthusiasm for greater defense ex penditure. The prospect of additiorrd US troop withdraws from Europe and cctrrent US policies toward Vietnam are unsettling faetore that strengthen domeetic political April 1SSS ~ forcee teudintio queetimt the fu . ture uti~ity of NATO. A final Scandinavian attitude about which a generalization can be made concerns two current US lines of pOl icy: the prospect of additional US troop witbdrawal~ from Europe and the Vietnam tions to both to a further need for or war. Scandinavian reac of these iseues contribute questioning of the future survivability of NATO.

Policy Inconsistent To the Scandinavians, the continued maintenance of US forcee in Europe represents an eeeential part of the over-all deterrent to Soviet military action. Without them, the Soviete could reasonably wonder whether the United Statee would commit her stra. tegic nuclear power to repel an attack on Europe. Symbolic US f orcee would not suffice. Similarly, the increasing US in volvement in Vietnam ie read by the Scandinavians ps. representing greater US concern w;th Aeia than Europe. The commitm M to Asia of resources not available 1,for Europe implies to them that ,the! United States sees the dangere to Eu\ope ae less great. Even the Soviet Union, concerned with the problem of Communist China and also involved in Vietnam, is pushing dt? tente in Europe-again lowering the risks of conflict there. Beyond thie, US conduct of the war in Vietnam is unpopular in Scandi navia, although more on moral and emotional grounds than on the basis ~ of logical analysis. But the result is the growth of anti-American eenti ment which makes the relationehlp more difficult between the United Statee and her alliance partners. It appears that Scandinavian are beginning to conclude that two basic 61

lines of US policy are inconsistent and self-defeating: On one hand, they con tend, the United States insists that NATO must continue as essentially a military alliance, thereby perpetuat ing the cold war. On the other hand, the United States is trying to bring about further ditente with the Soviet Union, and move toward an easing of the hostile confrontation that has characterized East-West relations in the postwar years. The Scandinavians are clearly on the side of ditente, and if they see NATO as a barrier to progress in this direction, it may be only a matter of time, they say, until the anti-NATO trend will be irresistible, and the linch pin in Western solidarity will be swept away. The problem for the United States is how to keep the Scandinavians, and the European allies generally, from perceiving the choice in either-or termsNATO or ditente. The solidarity of the Western Pow ers over the years, as represented by NATO, has created conditions in Eu rope which the Soviet Union has had to take into account in assessing the means she would adopt for pursuing her goals. Because of NATO, one of those means has not been the uee of military force in Europe. Over time, other realities on the world scene, in cluding the defection of Communiet China, have confronted the Soviets with facts to which they have had to adjuet and react in terms of their

own self-interest. The current East. West relationship, characterized by s meaeure of ddtente, is a product of thie confrontation with the realities of the world as it is. The United States probably ie en couraging the trend on the premise that the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries will ultimately find it to be in their own intereste to work toward greater economic inter course and a Ieesening of the danger of wars over which they might have no control. However, one need not conclude that the disbandment of the Western alli ance muet logicalIy follow. The Soviet objective surely remaine the f ragmen tation of Europe and the extension of Soviet influence, politically and eco nomically, over the area. With mili tary meane having been determined impractical to date, other means will be tried. While Soviet means have changed, no evidence euggeste that their goals have changed. The task ahead for the United States ie how to ~anage the alliance so as to accommodate greater EastWeet contact in a way that will en hance European strength and inde pendence rather than fragment it and render it more susceptible to Soviet influence. Reluctance to examine how NATO might be adapted to tbe new environment will make tbe choice be tween NATO and d6te?zte appear to our alIies even more stark than they may now conceive it to be.

Military Review

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Lewis H. Gann

N 15 June 1890, a strangely as sorted force assembled in the sun-drenehed bush country of north ern Bsshuanaland. It consisted of approximately 500 British mounted police and about 200 armed settlers under military discipline. These also included some Americans such as Maurice B. Heaney, a prominent fron tiersman. The expedition had been as~embled by Cecil John Rhodes, one of the most successful of 19th-century em pire builders, a great South African mining magnate, and the most in fluential British politician in South , Africa at the time. Rhodesbacked April1968

by a chartered company known as the British South Africa Company which enjoyed British imperial sanction meant to occupy South Africas hin terland in what is now Rhodesia. He also wished to craate a new British community in the distant veld, exploit the gold of the reputed El Dorado in the interior, and, ultimately, to strengthen thw British hold over South Africa. His force was a peculiar military phenomenon. It was, perhaps, the last army raised by private contractors on a cash basis. Its leaderFrank John son, a tough, able man, half soldier, . half entrepreneurwas the kind of 63

adventurer more familiar to the Eu rope of the condottieri than of Queen Victoria. However, he proved to he an excellent organizer. Pioneer Organization His column was well equipped, and combined the military technology of the South African backwoods with that of the industrial revolution. There were 84 great lumbering ox wagons to carry the pioneers and their belongings. Their crews were carefully trained to maneuver with military precision and form mobile pivote to support mounted riflemen in the event of attacks by African war riors. There was aleo a traction engine, a steam-driven generator to operate an electric searchlight, ma chineguns, and light artillery. Hence, Lobengula, the ruler of the great Matabele warrior kingdom in what is now Rhodesia, hesitated to assault the column. On 12 September, the pioneers reached their destination without mishap. They built a small fort where Salisbury, the present Rhodesian cap ital, now stands; then they dispersed to look for the promised Ophir. The pioneers failed to find the riches of their dreams although there was gold in the country. Mining began on a small scale, and more Lswis H. Gann is Senior Staff Mem ber at the Hoover In@itution, Stan ford. Uni~ersit% California. He aaw servwe wzth the British Army (Ro~al Frwiliers) during World War II. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University at Oxford, awd hm written numerous books and arti cles on Africa. Dr. Gann is the author of GuerreUas and Insurgency: An Interpretive Survey which appeared in the March 1966 issue of the MILI TARY REVIEW. S4

white men arrived, mostly from Great Britain and South Africa. The Euro peans industrial economy based on wage labor, however, proved incom patible with the Matabele tribal econ. omy founded upon pastoralism and armed raiding. In 1893, war broke out between the settlers and the Matabele whose spearmen had hitherto commanded an unchallenged ascendancy over most of the indigenous African community of the region. The Matabele had evolved a way of fighting that utilized the military potentialities of an early iron age economy to their limit. Theirs was a nation in arms led by a warrior aristocracy. They relied on well-drilled formation of footmen, armed with spears, oxhide shields, and some firearms, trained to charge in flexible crescent formations. Mounted Volunteers The whites were relatively few in number. Their regular military es tablishment was small. Instead, they depended on mounted volunteers who were excellent shots and much more mobile than their opponents fighting on foot. The settlers had ox wagone. They, moreover, successfully employed the Maxim gun, a weapon that con ventional British officers still under estimated. The colonists combination of mobility and firepower proved ir resistible. The Matabele were crush ingly defeated in a few great battles, and their Kingdoma Black Sparta overspecialized in an archaic form of warfare-disappeared from history. Three years later, in 1896, the Matabele once again took to arme. This time, they were joined by many of the smaller Mashona tribes to the eaat of them. The insurgents organi zation apparently hinged on the rem nants of the Matsbele state machinery MtlitaryReview

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RHODESIA Mounted riflemen broke up the Afri can bands and kept them ceaselessly on the move. The white forces seized natjve crops and cattle, thereby im posing an economic blockade against their opbonents who-for their part were gnf+ble to work out a concerted strategy. By 1897, the rising had coI-

and abo on an extensive network of spirit mediums who claimed to speak for the tribal deities and tbe tribal ancsstors. They promised that war wordd bring freedom from tbe white mens exactions. The Africans, having profited from ths lessons of the Matabele war,

Cecil J. Rhodez pioneer force crossing the Lundi River in lS90 . lapsed, and the country was per avoided pitched ba+Ales and stuck to guerrilla tactics. The insurgents en- , manently pacified. joyed an enormous numerical supe The Europeans, thereafter, relied ~iority. Also, many of them post+essed on a small, but capable, mounted po firearms, and some had received mili lice force which served as the coun tary training from the British. trys first line of offense. The police, About one-tenth of the colonists a highly professional body, built up were massacred in the lonely bush, an efficient intelligence network. The countryside was effectively controlled and for a time, the settlers position by posts and patrols, and the police appeared desperate. However, alI the relied on the principle of prevention major centers heId out, and after a in%tead of repression. At the same short time, the Europeans succeeded time, the chartered company insti in seizing the strategic initiative. . .. April lW 65

RHOOESIA tuted many administrative and eco nomic reforms. These were so effec tive that there were no further armed risings. This enabled the Europeans to send the bulk of their fighting men out of the colony to fight on the Brit ish side during the South African War of 1899-1902 and the First and Second World Wars. At the time of the Boer War, for instance, Rhodesia, with her large percentage of young, unmarried men, was able to put approximately 15 per cent of her white population in uni form. In the First World War, the country was abIe to make a military effort of simiIar magnitude in rela tion to its ecanty white population. Social Structure The social structure of white Rho desia in many ways resembled that of early Australia or the United States rather than that of Great Britain. There was a feeling of innate social equality among the Europeans, and there was no special respect for of ficers ae a social caste. Professional officers were looked upon in much the same way as senior technician or civil servants. The countrys small permanent establiehment was supple mented by a volunteer militia officered by leading citizens with experience in spare-time soldiering. During World War I, however, Rhodesia was still a backward country relying on the export of primary prod ucts such ae tobacco and minerals. The Rhodesians could not manufac ture a bulletmuch less a bomb. The simple nature of the countrys back woods economy was reflected in the organization of its armed forces. Rho desian whites, supplemented by some units of professional black soldiers, mainly served as infantrythe most specialized although the most harshly 66 tested form of military labor in existence. At the came time, a high propor. tion of white settlers gained commis sions in other British units. The selfreliance and ability to command, which the colonists had acquired on lonely farms and in isolated gold mines, stood them in good stead in wartime. Temporary Prosperity After World War I, Rhodesia ex. perienced temporary prosperity conse quent upon the high prices paid for a time for her raw materials minerals, tobacco, and maize-on the world markets. More immigrants, white and black, entered the country, and government by a chartered com pany became an anachronism, espe cially as the company iteelf was steadily losing money due to its grow ing administrative commitments. Tbe Britieh Government, fearing the expense involved, would not take over the colony. The coloniets were thus permitted to choose by means of a referendum whether they wished to join the neighboring Union of South Africa as a fifth province, or whether their territory should become what was technically known as a self-gov within the British erning colony Empire. The majority of the electorate, drawn from the propertied and mainly white strata of the community, opted for the second course, a decision warmly supported at the time by So cialist, missionary, and humanitarian opinion in Great Britain. In 1923, Rhodesia, or Southern Rhodesia as she was known at the time, thus at tained what amounted to internaI autonomy. The imperial government in London retained the right to run the countrys external relatione and a Military Review

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RHODESIA limited veto over certain types legislation dealing with Africans. of talions and supporting services. If such a force were wiped out in one massive battle, the colony would suf fer irreparable damage and its mili tary contribution would cease. In peacetime, white Rhodesiane supplied moat of the countrye skilled and supervisory labor. White Rho desian youths were comparatively

Rhodesia, however, controlled her own state machinery, including her armed forces which subsequently came to include a small air fOrce. Dnring the interwar periOd, the cOuntry made considerable progress. There was some degree of economic diversifica-

Raising the flag at Fort Salisbury tion, and, when the Second World War broke out in 1939, the country was once again able to make a consider able effort in felation to its limited resources. Rhodesias military contribution closely corresponded to her changing social structure as well as the close political partnership which existed at the time between London and Salis bury. Rhodesia, with her small white population, would never be able to put into the field much more than a British brigade group of three bat April1s68

well educated. The colony was begin ning to develop secondary industries of its own; hence, it attracted a con siderable proportion of men with a technical or mechanical background. Rhodesia could, therefore, concentrate on leader training and the production of specialist units, including armored car formations, scoute, and air squad rons. The imperial government in = London thoroughly agreed with this assessment, and Rhodesia, therefore, followed what might be called a policy of personnel dispersion.

RHOOESIA About 15 percent of the white pop ulation volunteered or were con scripted for military service. A high percentage of these men gained com missions and servbd as field officers in units raised in the British Colonies of central, west, and east Africa. Rhodesians also fought in various specialist units in the air. In addition, the colony once again organized its own African formation, the Rhodesian African Rifles. Indirect Consequences World War II had far-reaching, indirect consequences for Rhodesia. Great Britain could no longer ade quately supply the country with manufactured products. Rhodesians, therefore, were forced to build fac tories and steel mills on a considerable scale. They made good use of their inexhaustible coal resources. After the war, the territory emerged as the most highly industrialized state of sub-Saharan Africa, outeide the Union of South Africa. It had iron and steel as well as light industries. The European population, swelled by numerous immigrants, now con sisted mainly of townsmen employed as skilled workers, technicians, or in business and the administration. Farming completely changed its char acter. The typical white farmer was now more likely to be a skilled spe cialist with a diploma in agricultural science or even an engineering degree rather than a pioneering backwoodsman. Industrialization also affected the African social structure. The country began to develop a number of semi skilled black workers as well as .a middle class of trained peasant farm bus owners, and ers, contractors, teaehers. The new men beg~ tO lean to African nationalism, as oP 68 posed to the Europeane Rhodesisn protonationaliemj and the country faced a new type of political conflict, At the same time, the white man. ufacturers faced an economic chsl lenge. They began to look for pro tected markets outside the borders of their own country. In 1953, the Rho desians succeeded in joining their ter ritory with what wae then the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a loose political as sociation. This association was based on an ill-defined partnership between blacks and whites with the whites ss the senior partners. British Bloc The new Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, designed as a British bloc between Afrikaner-ruled South Africa and the emergent black states of the north, controlled her own mili tary establishment. She closely co operated with Great Britain in the military sphere, and made arrange ments with the imperial government to assist the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Middle Eaet in the event of another great war. The federal government was unable to surmount African political opposi tion in the two northern territories where there were comparatively few whitee. The British Government, now convinced of the merits of decoloniza tion, lost faith in the experiment, and, in 1963, the Federation broke UP. Rhodesia reverted to her original status ae a self-governing colony, albeit with a somewhat liberalized constitution, that now givee eomewhat larger representation to African elec tore. In 1964, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent Afri can Republics known respectively as Zambia and Malawi. Rhodesia, there-

Military Revlsw

RHODESIA fore, began to look toward South Africa, taking up an option that the Federation had expressly been de signed to prevent. Political power within the still dominant white com munity shifted, broadly speaking, from the more liberal manu$actur era and professional men to the farm ers, the miners, and the white arti sans. New Governing Party The Rhodesian Front, the coun trys new governing party, feared that tbe imperial power might use its vestigial powers to impose yet another constitution on the country, thereby radically improving the Africans position at the Europeans expense. In addition, independence had become a matter of pride, and, on 11 Novem ber 1965, after abortive negotiations with Great Britain, Rhodesia issued a unilateral declaration of independ ence (UDI). There were many critics of the Rhodesian Government who were quick to point out that Rhodesias white population numbered lees than a quarter of a million people as against approximate y four million Africans. They asserted that the mi nority would not be able to subjugate the majority even by using the most brutal police state methods. Ae Rhodesia faced the wider world of independent Africa, it was felt the countrys weak military forces would not be able to stop the black tide on the Zambezi River, the countrys northern frontier. The critics further assumed that Britain might intervene and smash the rebellious regime by armed force. In any case, the territory was dependent on foreign trade, and would be at the mercy of a worldwide boycott: The critics, however, had given April 196E

inadequate attention to the countrys military and economic structure. UDI was not a pw%ch in the central Eu ropean sense because the Rhodesian Government already effectively con trolled b@h the state machinery and the military establishment. By world standards, the countrys armed forces were small. But within the context of

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Partisan gusrrilla squada have been un able to cope with helicopter-transported police units with tracker-dogs independent Africa, they were formi dable, corresponding, as they did, to the military potential of a relatively highly industrialized ,community. According to a summary com piled by The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the army corn. prised two regular infantry battal ions: one of white professional sol diers, the other of African volunteers commanded by European officers. Both had attained a high standard of efficiency. There was no problem of

RHOOESIA loyalty. The regular forces also in cluded a special air service unit of 150 paratroopers who could be rapidly deployed for action as a Yire-fight ing squad. In case of war, the army could be expanded into two brigades with ex tensive supporting services, including Ferret armored cars. The reserve es tablishment provided for specialist units and eight territorial battalions mainly composed of white conscripts obliged to do nine months full-time military training and subsequent re fresher courses over three years. Antibandit Operations The Rhodesian Army, unlike the professional forces of the other newly independent African countriee, could not, therefore, think in terms of stag ing a coup detat. It was primarily, so to speak, the mainly white electorate in arms, and its political loyalty to the existing parliamentary regime could not be questioned. It possessed a thorough knowledge of its own coun tryside having been well trained in what were euphemistically referred to as antibandit operation in the bush. It could, therefore, compete with guerrillas on their own ground. The army was supported by a wellbalanced force of five air squadrons comprising fighter and ground-attack planes, bombers, helicopters, and transport planesdesigned to facili tate rapid troop movements and give support in ground operations. The countrys first line of defense against internal unrest consisted of a professional and highly proficient po lice force. This force amounted to some 2,000 white and 4,000 black sup ported by volunteers wbo could be called out from their ordinary civilian occupations. These forces as a whole depended mainly on British equipment 70 except for items such as French-made helicopters. After the UDI, the sup ply of new weapons and spare parts from Britain was cut off. It appears, however, that the Rhodesians have been able to get suppliee to some ex. tent through clandestine channels. Additional machines also appear to have been imported from Italy. If British military intervention in Rhodesia was never a serious threat, military intervention by black African states was even more unlikely. The various independent African states suffered from numerous internal dis. agreements. They faced serious finan cial problems and lacked sophisticated equipment, air transport, and tactical air support. There was no common command structure, no common tacti cal doctrine, and a general lack of well-trained staff officers and military technicians. Operation far from home might, moreover, occasion serions disciplinary problems. Political Effects From the long-term point of view, military expansion was apt to have serious political ae well as financial consequences. Professional soldiers form a potentially volatile element in a developing country lacking a welldefined national consciousness and a parliamentary tradition. Army expan sion, however desirable from the standpoint of foreign politics, might, therefore, present an African civilian government with a military coup detat headed by dissatisfied officers in command of relatively large forces. The leaders of the radical African opposition, as opposed to the African moderates represented in the coun trye official legislature and tbe tribal chiefs, put their trust in guerrilla warfare. They argued that the white economy would be vulnerable to an hWitsry Rsview

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international boycott. The Europeans should be further softened up by sporadic acts of sabotage and assas sinations executed by well-trained squads with an invulnerable sanctuary outside the country, but enjoying popular support among the maw of Rhodesias black population. The combination of economic and military pressure would lead to a steady exodus Of whites that would pick up momentum m the cuuntrys economic situation deteriorated. In the end, the Europeans would be forced to make political concessions leading to the installation of an Afri can Government and a long overdue social revolution. The bulk of white farm properties would then be dis tributed among Africans, and the economy as well as the administration of the country would be Africanized. PartisanEffoft Weak The nationalists, however, were unable to build their operations into a sustained campaign. BY the end of 1966, the Rhodesian Government forces had accounted for several scores of guerrillas. Despite optimis tic estimates from African nationalist sources, the partisan effort had more or less exhausted its impetus, and the countrys economy remained unaf fected. Small partisan squads so far have not been able to cope with shock units with dogs that can be trans ported by helicopter to wry part of the country on short notice. The Rhodesian military authorities have now evolved a plan whereby members of the Territorial force, mainly in the rural areas, can be mobilized quickly on a zone system and go into action in their own arexs. This will provide for rapid assembly and deployment of reserves if the need should arise. April 1988

RHOOESIA The nationalist military planning was apparently based on a series of grave miscalculations. The Rhodeaian countryside is topographically not well suited to partisan activities under modern conditions. To the east and south, the territory bordera on Portu guese East Africa and the Republic Of SOuth Africa with which Rhodesia has both official and unofficial military and economic arrangements. Terrain and Towns Most of the country consists of bush and savanna land which is gen erally open to observation from the air. There are pecketa of difficult ter rain such as the eastern highlands and the hilly, broken bushland near Sipolilo. But these pockets are rela tively dispersed; they do not between them make up a contiguous base. The Rhodesian towns are well laid out; they do not resemble the great of Algerian cities. urban jungles Access by road to the African town ships, as well as their electricity and water supplies, can be regulated with out difficulty; hence, they can be con trolled with ease. The local adminis trationunlike that of many southeast Asian countriesis highly erlicient. The active internal European op position to the present regime is small in Rhodesia. It derives its strength mainly from academics, clergymen, and a handful of profes sional people and businessmen. The whites are willing to tax themselves in return for their privileges. In fact, they pay for the bulk of the countrys revenue. The white farmers are not, for the most part, absentee landlords. The Europeans do not, therefore, suf fer from the deficiencies in morale that beset a furrctionless aristocracy. While the Europeans are fairly united, the African opposition re 71

RHOOESIA mains split. There are two factions ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union ) and ZANU (Zimbabwe Afri can National Union) which are bit. terly divided over questions of tactics, personalities, and other matters. Both are illegal in Rhodesia, and their cad. resnever very efficient-appear to have been fairly effectively disrupted. The Rhodesian intelligence network seems to be e~treme]y effieient. The indications are that it extends into Zambia, Great Britain, and, perhaps, even to some Communigt countries. This appears to be a plausible ex planation for the rapidity with which the government forces were able to act in the past, often apparently with considerable foreknowledge. Tbe Rhodesian authorities have ap parently obtained much information from Africans who voluntarily mw rendered after having been trained abroad. In addition, the Rhodesian security forces recently have collabo rated with South African police offi cers on Rhodesian soiI; they have also been able to draw on South African and Portuguese intelligence sources. The international economic boy cott remains. The advocates of the boycott appear to have disregarded the Iessons of World War II, when the Rhodesians were able to mobilize about 15 percent of their white pop ulation, while at the came time greatly expanding their economic potential and paying for tbe bulk of their war expenditure from current income. The bnycott can, to snme extent, be circumvented through middlemen in South Africa and Portuguese East Africa. Zambia and other countries, both African and nnn-African, con tinue to trade with Rhodesia sub rosa, Zambia, for the time being, still re mains somewhat dependent on Rho 72 desian railway communications and on electricity from the great Kariba installations. An economic blnckade is not likely to be effective, unless aimed at the whole of snuthern Africa, in. eluding Rhodesia, the Portuguese col onies, and South Africa. But even then, it is probably now too late for such a policy to be effective. South Africas industrial potential is large enough to assure the survival of what is now a new white-ruled southern bloc in Africa. Rhodesia has, undoubtedly, suffered from the dis ruption of accustomed trade channels akhough the extent of her losses has been concealed by contradictory sta tistics and by the concealment of relevant data. There is at Iesst one litmus paper test wich can easily he applied. Sta tistics can be falsified, but not the value of real estate offered to pm - chasers on the open market. Even a cursory examination of advertise ments in the Rhodesian press over the last years indicates a slight rise in real estate values rather than a drop. This may serve as an indication of the resilience of an economy backed, in the last instance, by the resources of South Africa, the most highly developed country in Africa. Apparently, Rhodesias resources remain considerable. The country has a relatively balanced economy with developed industrial, mining, and agricultural sectors. The territory can feed itself, and it continues to trade with the outeide world despite numerous difficulties. Its military Po tential remains considerable within an African context. Hopes for a speedy Rhndesian collapse are, there fore, illusory and should be dismissed from the minds of political, military, and economic planners alike. Military Review

Lieutcmmt Colonel David H. liackworth, United Stute8 Armu

OMMANDERS in Vietnam have uniformly agreed that a bigger problem than killing the enemy is finding and fixing him. The enemy tries to fight on his cnvn terms. Hc selects the exact battlefield and seeks to lure us in by feinting at a lonely outpost, After \ve deploy into his care. fully prepared battlefield, he wiil not fight until everything is to his advan tage, General Nguyen Van Vinh, Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), describes the tactics Ml 196s

being followed by his frontline com manders in Vietnam m: A1oid decisive contact \vith US forces except when victory is xssured. Exploit the guerrillas t~vo main tactical gambits: the ambush and the attack on a fixed installation; strike hard nnd \\,ithdra!v swiftly before US firepower can make the operation too costly. (onduct a mobile defense-type operation which includes small units \videly dispersed over a large battle field; smal company-size units wov / 73

TARGET ACQUISITION ing frequently from one redoubt to the next to avoid B-52 strikes; large units, battalion and regiment, assigned specific killing zones and prepared to execute a variety of contingency plans for each killing zone. These tactics closely follow the US concept for a mobile defense on a nu clear battlefield, and for the same rea. sonto avoid massive and hard-hit ting airpower. They capitalize on the guerrilla strongpointsthe ability to move and mass units quickly in the jungle, a detailed knowledge of the battlefield, and ease in hiding forces to avoid contact. Contingency Plan A typical North Vietnamese contin gency plan is shown in the sketch. An NVA battalion is located at its perma. nent base. This unit has prepared a number of plans based on the assump. tion that US forces will land at either one or all three landing zones ( LZS). One plan assumes that US forces will land at LZS Red and Blue. Upon report of a US unit entering the bat tle area, the battalion moves from its permanent base camp, using a hidden trail that cannot be seen by aerial obLieratenan t Colonel David H. Hack wortlt is assignsd to the Armys Di rectorate of Training, Ofice of the Depnt~ Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D. C. He received his B.S. degree from Austin Peay State Col lege, Clarksville, Tennessee. He was the operations oficer and a battalion commander with the 10lst Air-borne Brigade in Vietnam, and early last gear, returned for three months to study small-unit combat artirm with Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall. From this study, they coauthored a Department of the Army Pamphlet, Vietnatrr Primer, which is an analysis of infantry cornbat actions. 74 servers, and occupies a striking po~i. tion. Once in the strike position, the battalion readies for combat while re. connaissance elements are sent to oh. serve the enemy at LZS Red and Blue. Based upon the strength of the air assault force, the enemy commander will decide whether to attiack at the LZ or to ambush at prepared sites as his opponent deploys from the LZ. These well-camouflaged ambush posi. tions are located along natural routes that tbe enemy commander expects the US force to use. Scout Element If the air assault force appears too strong to attack at the LZ or is too wise to move along likely routes, then the enemy will assign a scout element to shadow the US unit. Every move ment will be watched. Soldiers and weapons will be counted, alert pro. cedures and tactics will be recorded, and every detail of operations will be noted. When the enemy finds a weak spot and thinks he can win without getting bruised too badly, he will at tack. If his US target is too alert and its n(imbers too strong, the enemy will avoid contact, but will harass. Contingency plans are prepared for all other LZS and probable ground approaches in the battle area. All plans are prepared in great detail. Mortars are laid and ready to fire, troops rehearse each plan until it is executed flawlessly, leaders record time and distances from all points, and soldiers memorize rally points. But even after all this preparation, if the enemy commander thinks the risks are too high for the probable gain, his force will avoid contact and melt into the jungle and become vir tually impossible to find. As General Vinh has said, his army

Military Review

TAR6ET ACQUISITION will not fight a positional war. When the US unit launches a massive opera tion, the enemy will nOt stand and fight for a jungle base camp or any other piece Of reaI estate. The enemy will move swiftly to a secret, wellcamouflaged defensive position. Bid ing his time, he waits for his chanw to attack a small exposed US unit. The enemy believes that, once the command and control centers, uncover and smash his logistic apparatus, and tn keep him off balance thus spoiling his planned operations. But the big sweep should be just one of several tactical concepts of the commander. It is ditlcult to maneuver an in fantry force effectively in the thick, knotted underbrush of Vietnam. In m attsck situation, a rifle company will

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1 \
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I CONTINGENCY
PLAN

~A.R[D SITfS lSM rlvw[ mm M) MM (w Vls!slo

US soldier is on the ground und is separated from his helicopter znd other sophisticated equipment, he is at a disadvantage. The enerhy has oc cupied the area of operati&s (AO) and knows it well which enables him to fight only when it is to his advan tage and to break contact quickly and escape a purau ing force. An occasional sweep by US troops into the enemys safe areas is militar ily necessary to disrupt the enemys @il 196.9

do well to be able to maneuver effec tively more thrm two squads on line. The obstacles to movement posed by thick, jungle vegetation negate classic infantry maneuver. The enemy con cluded long ago that infantry maneu. ver was not profitable in the jungle. He gave it up. That is why he em ploys only the ambuah and the attack on fixed installations. To beat the en emy in jungle warfare, we must adopt his methods of fighting in the jungle. 75

TARGET ACllUISITION Major General (then Brigadier Gen. era] ) Willard Pearson, as commander of the 10lst Airborne Brigade in Viet nam, employed a new brand of infan try tactics called the semiguerrilla concept and achieved resounding re sults. This concept is designed around the principles of stealth, deception, surprise, and-ence the enemy is the most important collection source, and he is trained and motivated to produce. Prisoners of war are sought, and the capturers receive appropriate recognition. Another technique is careful entry into the battlefield. Every effort is made to deceive the enemy when in. troducing units into an AO. Measures

foundmass. These principles are forged into hard-hitting weapons by several techniques. One of these is the formation of a streamlined intelligence gathering system. First priority is given to co] letting intelligence and getting it to the commander as it comes in. Liaison is established with all friendly activi ties in the proposed AO. The individ ual soldier is made aware that he is 76

such as dummy airmobile aesaults, clandestine entry by overland intikra tion, use of local native forces to act as guides and scouts, night helicopter landings into previously secured LZS, and placing preparatory air and artil lery strikes on an area as a diversion without following up with troop land ings are all used. A third technique is the effective use of the long-range reconnaissance Military Revhw

TARGET ACQUISITION

,
patrol (LRRP). Small teams of spe cially trained vO1unteers are located about the battlefield. Ihey are inserted by a variety of techniques: over}and infiltration, day-and-night helicopter infiltration, rappel and parachute in sertion, and dropped off as stay-behind forces while operating with a larger unit that moves out of the area. These teams move by stealth to a designated location and establish surveillance over likely enemy routes. All sightings are repro-ted,and lucrative targets are hit by air and artillery. They tight only to avoid capture. Nlgbt Operation The lOlst made effective use of night operations. Troops were spe cially trained in these operations and sobn began to dominate the battlefield at night. Units moved routine] y at night, ambushing, patrolling, and mov ing company-size units into blocking pesitions deep into enemy-controlled territory. Ambush patrols, spread across the battlefield, were especially successful. During the daytime, they melted into the jungle and stayed in active. Silence on the battlefield is also an important technique. After the bri gades units were introduced into the operational area, every effort was made to deceive the enemy as to their deployment. Harassing and interdic tion fires were stopped. Airstrikes were not called for unless a worth while target was found. Helicopters were not allowed in the AO, and aII other aircraft were tightly controlled by brigade. To reduce the need for resupply, air craft units entered the operational area with three to five days modified operational rations such as a mixture of rice tmd powdered soup. During the Apn1 1s38 clandestine phase of the operation, units were resupplied at night by hel icopter. KIeception Plan A detailed deception plan was pre pared for each operation. If the bri gade was to conduct operations to the north, a detailed cover and deception plan would be prepared to conduct operations to the south. It was well known that the Viet Cong (VC) kept every possible staging field under sur veillance by scout teams and agents. As soon as a US unit starts to mar shal soldiers, helicopters, and tons of supplies at an isolated airstrip, all NVA and VC main forces units within a 50-mile area would be warned. As part of the deception, detailed extensive reconnaissance would be con. ducted in the south, liaison established with local indigenous forces in the dummy AO, maps distributed, aerial photographs taken and distributed, briefings conducted, and orders is. sued. Simultaneously, the actual plan for the north was quietly being put together. Then, on D-day, H-hour, just as the deception plan called for, artil lery would hit possible LZS, and airstrikes would be made on possible en emy positions in the dummy AC). Meanwhile, troop helicopters headed south would drop down to treetop level rmd head due north, flying nap of the earth to the real. battlefield. Surprise, stealth, and deception fre quently enabled units of the 10lst Air. borne Brigade to slip undetected into guerrilla territory. After fixing the enemy, the forces would operate con ventionally using all available fire power. mobility, and reserves in an effective employment of mass. Reaction forces were flown into LZS selected and secured by LRRPs. These 17

forces would move quickly to previ ously selected blocking positions and establish ambushes along enemy routes of withdrawal. Other maneuver forces positioned near tbe enemy, and sup ported by air and artillery, acted as beaters to drive him into the fire of the ambush force. Once contact was made, all combat means were used. Tactical air, artil lery, and armed helicopters struck po sitions and routes of withdrawal. Psy chological warfare qircraft orbited the battlefield broadcasting a message from a recently captured soldier of that unit. The guerrillas then realized that their supposedly impenetrable re doubt had been penetrated and that they had been outguerrillaed. The semiguerrilla concept is a sec ondary, but, nonetheless, real bonus of battlefield economy. The 10lst Air borne Brigade required less than 100 tone of supply a day, half the usual requirement of a brigade. Austere uee. of vehicles and silencing of the battle field by rednction in helicopter lift and artillery fires were responsible. Checkerboard Technique A final technique has been referred to ae the checkerboard. This is tbe updated version of Rogers Ranger tactics with sharp attention given to finding the enemy. Under this concept, tbe battIet3e1d was closely studied and battalion-size AOS selected. A plan was then developed caOing for a sys tematic search of each area. A battal ion could be assigned five or more AOS to be entered in the priority of where the enemy was most likely to be. Small search units, normally platoon size, infiltrated the selected areas. Each was assigned a part of the over all checkerboard. Once on the ground, these elements melted into the jungle.

They traveled hght ana searcnea !or such signs as broken twigs, warm coala in a epent fire, fresh tracka on a trail, freshly dug holes, and the unmistsk. able odor of the VC. Each unit set up a well-hidden base, cached supplies and equipment, and established communications. Small pa. trols searched for trails and streams, Experience bad proved that the guer. rilla was addicted to both. Once the landscape was studied, ambushes were set with the purpose of capturing ~ prisoner of war. Maximum Latitude The commander of the unit was given maximum latitude to engage or not to engage. In his judgment, if he thought he could destroy the enemy force, or could strike a large fleeting target with tactical air without undue risk to his force, he acted, If the en emy waa too strong and the time not right, he hugged his opponent and re ported his movements to battaliou. Meanwhile, battalion plotted each checkerboarding unit and sifted through the intelligence. LRRPs lo cated in fixed positions reported enemy activity. Reaction forces were poised and ready. Once the checkerboarding units found the enemy iu size, the battle then changed from a decentralized semiguerrilla operation to a hard-hit ting centralized conventional attack. In an analyeis of over 20 brigade or larger size operations, it appeared that the use of large-scale operations to find the enemy was extravagant, unproductive, and militarily unsound. Moving just one brigade to a new AO requires vast resou rceshundreds of sorties of C-lSO aircraft, tons of sup plies, and extensive repairs by engi neer troops. Military Review

18

r. f

TARGETACQUISITION The big problem of the war is to findthe enemy, and this must be done es economically as possible. Forces must be carefully Organized. A swift, lightly equipped hunter force must firstfind the enemy, and a much larger, heavily suppOrted killer force should be held in readiness to pounce on and destroy him. To win in Vietnam without paying an excessive price in lives and war costs, we must use the soldier in the jungle who has learned how to beat the enemy at his own game.

We went to Vietnam to help stop the terror, to help stop the chaos, to help restore the country to the people who me its rightfuI owners, and to begin the slow process of building toward order, security, and freedom. For tunately today we are making strides toward that end and the Army and Air Force as a professional body have never looked better. They are well trained nnd superbly led, capabIe of innovation and fresh ideas. Our forces are en gaged in a new type of war, where the enemy is at once everywhere and no where in a battle zone that knows no frontlines mrd no rear areas. Lieutenant General Harry J. Lcmleu, Jr.

lpril1968

Ah

M:2+4C
Surveg

From Asian

.,3.

. .

fwMA~iti#llvA CRISIS
The Choices Ahead
John H. Badgley

HE middle ground has eroded in Asia. As the cold war fever has declined, neutralism has become meaningless foreign policy. In the past four years, the Asian international scene has changed as though it had passed through a cataclysmic war. Ttie Bandung spirit of Afro-Asian amit~ died with the Sine-Indian bor der conflict in October 1962. Tbe tran sition to a new power arrangement was symbolized in June 1967 as the 80

Burmese and Cambodian Govern ments, the last of Asias important neutrals, joined India and Indonesia, as well as those states aligned with the United States, in being denounced by China. Burmas two-decade-old friend ship policy toward China appeared to be bankrupt. The process of forming a new China policy is not yet completed for Asias ex-neutrals, but there can be no doubt as to the d]rection in which Burmas MilitaryRevie

 -q

BURMAS BogYoke Ne Win and his Revolution ary Council is. being pressed. China Afaoists have utilized their last levers of domestic influence in Burmaan Party and the insurgent cOImmmiSt Chinese studentsto force the i~~ue+ Not since the insurrection began in May 1948 has any Burmese Govern ment been so challenged domestically and abroad. foreignPolicy Shift The need for a major ally to counter the Chinese pressure may become es sential, yet it is a traumatic choice, for never in Burmas 900-year history has a free government aligned itself with a foreign power oukide the Irra waddy-Salween region. For Burma to enter into such an alliance against China would, therefore, be a major policy shift; yet already Ne Win is modifying the isolationist policy, a policy tliat weakened Burma econom ically to the point that Peking could hope to overthrow the government with a rejuvenated insurrection. The principle around which Burmas foreign policy considerations always clustered was the relationship with China. In the two decades since inde pendence, every Rangoon government has worried over its long frontier with China, which is indefensible without maior militarv aid. Postcolonial_ leaders reached the This article was condensed from the orrginal, published in ASIAN SURVEY, November 1967. ASIAN SURVEY is published monthlg bll the Institute of Inter national Studies, University of Cafifomia. Mr. Badgley is an Associate Professor in the School of Ad vanced International Studies at Johns Hopkin8 Urriversity, Balti mo!e, Maryland. ApdllW

CRISIS

same conclusion as did all but the most bellicose of the precolonial monarchs. That conclusion was that Chinese he gemny sbordd be acknowledged so that China would leave Burma alone. By the 17th century, tribute missions were traveling frequently enough to Peking, usually every 10 years, to in stitute the relationship as a tradition, and, with only a few dramatic excep tions, the system worked until the British came on the scene. Domestic Strife The relationship since 1!348 has functioned in rather the same fashion for the came reasons. The analogy with Finland ia often made, for there Soviet dominance is axiomatic. Like Finland, Burmq had no concrete evi dence that any neighboring power could oppose ber dominant neighbor in a real confrontation. After the Korean War, the only potential non-Asian power with that capability, the United States, seemed to have little taste for land fighting in Asia. Finally, and more importrmt, the Burmese Govern ment had so much domestic strife that any significant great power involve ment threatened to lead to another Korea and, later, another Vietnam. Now Burma is faced with an im placable China with an expanding nu clear capability. The Maoista are de livering their worst propaganda at tacks and may already be promieing substantial aid to the insurgenta. The insurgents control perhaps a tenth of the population and nearly two-fifths of Burma. Should Chinas belligerency increase, the Ne Win government now would have no choice but to seek out side aid or risk a coup led by more militant anti-Chinese or anti-Commu nists from either within or outside tbe military services.

erable fortune. and blood in defense of Asian allies, but uncertainty, given the unpopularity of the Vietnam war, about taking on new commitments. If Burma chooses, she can seek as sociation with the Southeast Treaty Organization or that cluster of states that already has nuclear defense ar rangements with the United States: Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and PakL stan. Another choice would be to strike 82

alliance of potential use against both China and the US cluster. A fourth possib~lity WOUMbe a mu tual defense pact with the ex-neutrals, Indonesia and Japan. These four choices are alternatives that Burma never felt free te make before. Should she choose, in the face of a Chinese threat which could become quite con crete, Burma could select one of these four alternatives and establish a his toric precedent. Military Review

BURMAS CRISIS From the Burmese perspective, all of these policy choicee have disadvan tages. To align with the United States and her allies would directly contra dict previOua POlicY. It would encour age the same US cultural subversion that General Suharto has labeled as Indonesias second most dangerous threat. It wOuld mean inviting Chinas most powerful enemy to a position di rectly on her border, a border that is os much a threat for China as for Burma. It would risk severe domestic disturbance, for an entire generation of Burmese have been reared on an ideology that labels the United States se a colonial power. For many, US presence would be as distasteful as a Chinese occupation. The loose nuclear umbrella arrange ment would suffer the same disadvan tage pe$ceived by India: ardent na tionalist regard joint Soviet-United States aid ae unreliable and too dis tant in the event of attack from China. Fu~~rmore, the nationalists see both powers as bent on interfering in In dias d stic affairs-the United States k thro h her economic aid and Central Intelligence Agency activi ties and the Soviet Union through her Communist Party ties and military aid. Technical Problems The technical problems posed by parallel commitments from the Soviet Union and the United States would be considerable, requiring the Burmese military to learn the use of both types of weapons. Lastly, it would mean ask ing the two superpowers to cooperate more closely than may be politically possible for either one, given the ten sion arising from Vietnam and the Middle, East wars. The third choicer inviting a uniMl lateral Soviet preeence, would be as great a strategic threat to China as would US presence, given the Maoist perspective of the world. Furthermore, it would mean intimate cooperation with a Communist state that has cov ertly aided the insurgents within the past decade. The Burmese Army would have to be retooled and retrained in tbe uae of Soviet weapons (they now have mostly United States and British arms). Finally, as both the Vietnamese and Middle East crises demonstrate, the Soviet Union may not be willing to commit her troops in the event of a major war. limited Capability The fourth alternative, while po litically the most inviting of any new policy to tbe Burmese public, offers only limited military capability. Neither India nor Indonesia will be able to afford the export of substmr tial numbers of troops for many years to come. It is questionable how capable their brigades would be when fighting on foreign soil. To a~k for only weap ons and communications aid from either power again would be politically acceptable to many Burmese, but scar cely adequate to meet any serious Chi nese invasion or insurgent buildup. A modification of the fourth alter native, aid from Japan or Pakistan, might serve some short-term advan. tsge in alerting the world to Bu rmas defense needs, but, again, with a seri ous Chinese confrontation, such aid would be puny. Other possible allies, Great Britain or the European pow ers, are less promising than the United States in terms of their defense in terests. Militarily, Europe has for gotten about Asia, leaving security problems there to be solved by the su~erpowers and the Asians. 83

was

The military confrontation between Burma and the Maoist regime is still unlikely, despite the heated exchange of mid-1967. But the sudden buildup of tension confirms the views of apolo gists for US Vietnam policy and sug gests that leaving Asian problems for Asians to solve may not be in the best interests of many Asians or of the sfutrM quo industrial powers either. As one goes over Burmas alterna tives in this current crisis, it is ap parent that the Soviet and United States presences in Asia offer impor tant new possibilities. Without either power, Burma would be forced to kow tow to China in the current crisis just as other weak powers throughout the world have done in the face of over whelming pressure. Or Burma could fight as Finland did in 1939, or Po land in 1940, and suffer the same grievous losses, Some have argued that China would not challenge the legitimacy of a neu tral government that refused alliance with the United States or the Soviet Union. Such a view may have been correct once, but the crisis that Burma is now facing in her relations with China sustains the oppoeite position. Burma has pursued a foreign and domestic policy that was as correct as possible without being subservient to China; tragically, its reward is a foundering economy and a weakened bureaucracy that makes the country

unusually vulnerable. In the face of the same unreasonable Chinese hosti] it y that encouraged Peking to support the Indonesian Communist insurrec. tion, Ne Win now must seek an alter. native course. Should Burma turn to the United States for some form of renewed as. eistance, it would be doubly tragic if her request was ignored. Undoubtedly, the most acceptable form of support on both sides would be through inter national or regional agencies. In this sense, the Burmese case is not unlike that of Indonesia, MaIaysia, India, and the other non-Socialist states on Chi nas border. Consequently, it would be. hoove Congress to reconsider its cur rent determination to cut back for. eign aid at any cost. In a real sense, the reward for Vietnam casualties is already forth. coming in the Burma crisis. The ex tremists in Peking have overplayed their hand, and, as never before, the most neutral of Asias states is free to modify its opposition to the West and pursue a more liberal and outward-looking policy. Such a policy which would invite outside assistance, as well as a return to a mixed domestic economy, could return Burma to the condition of rapid development char acteristic of the mid-1950s. To ignore the Burmese plight wonld save money in the short run, but would serve up far greater long-run costs if the Mao ists prevail in China.

84

Militsty Rov]6W

The Battalion and

.-+:, ~,

, ,,, !:.:-,

----. Major Gene T. Sherron, United States Army

OMMANDERS often find it dif ficult to get a unit up and keep it there. One possible solution is Zero Defects (ZD) . The ZD program originated in 1962 in the defense industry during the development of the Pershing missile system. From there, it was adopted by the entire US Army Missile Command, followed by the Defense Supply Agency. By late 1965, the Army Chief of Staff directed that the program be launched Army-wide covering all com mands and headquarters. A persistent brigade commander of I#il 1W8

the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Ca nal Zone demonstrated how ZD could work in an infantry troop unit. Colo nel Adelbert D. Boggs pointed out that, by definition, ZD was an individ- ; , ual program designed to get people to do their jobs right the first time, and he urged his commanders to conceive ways of implementing this materieltype program in a troop-leading sit uation. It was soon apparent that ZD is nothing more or less than a motiva tional approach to the elimination of defects attributable to human error. 85

ZERO OEFECT5 However, a person must be motivated before rendering wholehearted support to an idea. This is especially true of a pride of workmanship and self-inter est program such as ZD. Strong com mitment, direction, and support by commanders is essential to a success ful ZD program. To Err Is Human? Throughout our lives, we are con ditioned to accept tbe fact that we are not perfect and will make mistakes. However, we do not always allow tbe same privilege of imperfection for others. How many errors do you allow the pay clerk when it comes to your personal pay ? When the military wife uses the car, would it be acceptable if she wrecks it only one out of 10 trips to the Post Exchange? If these situations are unacceptable, then we can say that errors are a func tion of the importance that is placed on specific matters. In some areas, im perfections are acceptable; in others, the amount of defects must be zero. Through ZD, the attempt is made to motivate the individual to assign the same importance to his military activ ities as he does to his personal affairs. As a reaIistic approach to carry out the basic goals and intent of the ZD program, the 193d Brigade developed a means of measuring the efforts of the units in ZD, and this system be came known as the Unit ReliabiIity Profile. It was the leaders job to mo tivate and keep the goal of do it right Major Gene T. Sherrow ie cmrrently completing work on a Master of Buei nese A dmeltistration degree at George Waehin@On University, Waehi32gt0n, D. C. He is a grodunte of the US Army Command and General Staff College, awd served with the .tth Battalion, 10th Infantrp, Fort Davis, Canal Zone. 86 the first time in the mind of the sol. dier as he performed his duties whether they were in the field, at the motor pool, or behind a typewriter. In. dividual unit slogans are important also, and the 4th Battalion came np with, Why do it twice-when once can suffice ! With this profile concept, ZD was worked into everyday happening and activiKles. In most cases, it actually became the basis for areas of corn. mand emphasis on the regular monthly battalion inspection and the quarterly brigade inspection. The meaaurers used to check or evaluate the units progress toward the ZD goal were placed iu the two categories of man. power reliability and materiel reli ability. This gave a natural tie-in to unit readiness reporting as well as the materiel readiness program. Ory Run Basis The scoring system, perhape the most complex feature of the program, was firet checked out on a dry rnn basis to insure that the goals and standards were realistic to the units and uot self-defeatiug. The ecoring on the Unit Reliability Profile (see chart) emphasized the goal of WY as perfect. Scoring to the right was undesirable, and reaching 100 was regarded as un satisfactory. Additional bar lines ap pearing on a units chart indicated they were further away from ZD. Some categories provided for scores in increments of 10, othere were by thirds, and some were such that one defect rendered the category ae un satisfactory. Standard checklists such as local di rectives, Army regulations, and De partment of the Army pamphlets were used to score the different catego ries whenever possible. The command Militafy Review

.= .
ZERO OEFECTS

l$ril 1888

81

ZERO DEFECTS maintenance management inspection (CMMI) checklist was used for the weapons and vehicle categories. Where necessary, items were added to and deleied from the categories as experience was developed in the vari ous areas. Deleted from the list was The adjutant became the real expert on funds administration because it was he who checked them on the bat. talion inspections. The battalion aur. geon was able to get better results from his aidmen who were assigned to the comnanies when he held them r..

Collrt.a of .Uthov Wide publicity was given to individuals, such as Private First Class L. J. Cumbie, 518th
Engineer Company, whu personally were responsible for Zero Defects in their duties
the entry on pay vouchers when the battalion pay clerks were consolidated at brigade. Also, the injury and acci dent rate bad to be moved to brigade for scoring since the safety recording at Army Headquarters was not geared to the company level. The officers and men of the S3 and S4 sections took special pride in their respective forms with full credit go ing to them if, the errors were zero. 88 sponsible for keeping the soldiers im munization records up to date. This led to competition between company aidmen. The eurgeon, as a member of the inspection party, was able to praise the work of the aidmen in the presence of their fellow soldiers. One company of the battalion won tbe US Army Forces Southern Command Best Mess Award as a result of the emphasis created through ZD. Military RevlGw

,.=
ZERO DEFECTS Drivers took great pride in both log books and maintenance when they knew that good work was going to be publicized. Whenever an individual ac complished a ZD in a category for which he was personally responsible, his name would be on every bulletin board in the brigade. In the area of weapons, the cOmpany armorers were able to develop an unusual proficiency in small arms repair through the rap nort .-. . thev .. develoned with the direct support ordnance unit on the post. The S4 worked out a special, in formal arrangement that caused the ordnance repairmen to make visits to the arms rooms and thus check the weapons and records. Concurrently, they were training the armorers as to their responsibilities in the differ ent echelons of maintenance. By using CMMI stmrdards and checklists, the individuals were confident when the day came for annual general inspec tions (AGIs) and CMMIS, for these were the standards to which they had now become accustomed. Although the scoresheet conveys the idea that the compmries were rated individually and, in turn, a composite score resulted in the battalion rating, I the program was not used as a report card for the company or battalion commander of the unit concerned. If it had been treated as an evaluation technique for commanders or a cen suring device for soldiers, the program surely would have failed. It was for this reason that the completed scoring sheets had limited distribution, but honor was given to those soIdiers who were responsible for ZD in their cat egory. On a monthly basis, the brigade pub. lished a ZD bulletin which showed the individuals, by name, who had person ally been responsible for achieving ZD in vehicle technical inspections, morn ing reports, and equipment log books. Also, the companies with ZD in cer tain categories were recognized. The success of the ZD program within the brigade was easily measur. able by comparing the scores over any six-month period. During the first check, every company in the battalion showed improvement and the average was a 50 percent improvement by cat egory. Yet tbe fringe benefits of this type of program often overshadow the planned objectives. The care, atten tion, and interest demonstrated by the doers tended to keep their activities almost constantly ready for unmr nounced CMMIS and AGIs. ZD is not n cure for all the ills of a command, but it is a leadership tool. It is a continuing program and nccrls a new start from time to time. It is an excellent device to focus attention on the individual and the little items that go to make an effective unit. The success in Zero Defects will be in pro portion to the amount of interest and enthusiasm displayed on the part of the leaders in the chain of command.

19ss April

89

SOVIET
MILITARY
PENAL UNITS

Vyacheslav P. Artemiev

ENAL units in the Soviet Army include disciplinary battalions which exist in peace time, and assault battalions which are created in time of war. These battalions are designed for offend ers whose sentences are commuted by the courts for assignment to penal units. The Soviet Gcwern ment justifies the existence of pe nal units with the argument that a soldier who has committed a crime ie not necessarily unfit for military service, and that the im mediate carrying out of sentences in wartime would contradict the defense interests of the country. During peacetime, an enlisted man on his first tour of duty wbo is sentenced by a military tribu nal to imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than

90

Military ReYi@W

.T
PENAL UNITS fractions. They exist in all military

two years may be assigned to a dis ciplinary battalion inetead of being imprisoned in a general penal insti tution. Tbe convicted serviceman is still considered on active duty, but is a convict-soldier. He continues to re ceive military training and political education, but is under severe condi tions of extreme discipline and heavy of the punishment for infractions rules. Assault Battalions During wartime, courts may sen tence servicemen to assault battalions regardless of rank. This also appliea to civilians who are fit for military duty, but WHO have not been drafted into the armed forces. All court sentences, in cluding capital punishment, may be commuted to assignment to assault battalions. According to the law, crim inals sentenced to 9erve in a penal bat talion must eraee their guilt before the Fatherland with their own blood. After serving the terme designated by the courts, or after parole from pe nal units, those convict-soldiers who have redeemed themselves by exem plary service in disciplinary battal ions, or by heroic action in the frontlines, may be restored to duty in regu lar military units. Disciplinary battalions are special military units with eemipenal regimes and severe punishment for rules in VuaciLe81avP. Artcrnieu i8 a former oficer in the Soviet Armg and a grad uate of the Soviet War College (Frcmze MilitaW Academ~). He is occapied in research of the Soviet 8ff8tem and has uktten eztengively on the Soviet armed forces. This article was translated from the Russian by Jirome S. Maw. Mr. Artemiev is the author of soviet Mobilization Doctnne which appeared in the June 1966 igmte of the MILITARY REVIEW. aprilIaaa

districts and are isolated from other military units. Contact between the convict-soldiers and any outsiders ia prohibited. These battalions have the status of separate, units. Battalion and smaller unit c&rrmanders exercise authority and are accorded privileges normally reserved for comn,andera of the next higher echelon, In view of the fact that service in disciplinary battalions is extremely taxing for officers and ca reer noncommissioned officers, tbe time served is doubled for tbe purpose of determining length of service. Time served by ,convict-soldiers is not cred ited toward length of service, although the men are considered to be service men during this period. Planned Activities Officially, a nine-hour working day is established in disciplinary battal ionsthree hours are set aside for military mrd political training and six hours for physical labor. However, this is merely a formality. In addition, there are regular evening politicalorientation> ograms, meetings deal ing with drill and labor activities, briefings, and political information hours. The six hours set aside for physical labor is usually stretched to 10 to include the time epent in travel ing to and from work, eating lunch, and the assignment of jobs at the work projects. In this way, the planned ac tivities of the convict-soldiers are stretched to 16 to 16 hours per day. Days off and holidays are not always observed. The men live in typical military bar racks, but tbe windows are barred and the barracks are surrounded by a fence topped with barbed wire. Periodic searches are carried out, correapond

91

PENAL UNITS ence is not alloyed, and the receipt of packages or any type of information is forbidden. Convict-soldiers receive standard rations, clothing issue, and medical treatment. Hospitalization is provided either in prison hospitals or guarded medical wards in local jails. Convict-soldiers receive no financial compensation nor do they have tbe right to possese money or personaI ar role. If the soldier commits a serious offense within a certain period of time, he is returned to the penal bat talion without trial to serve the re. mainder of his sentence. If this new offense is serious enough to require legal proceedings, the remainder of the old sentence is added to the new one. Upon release from the disciplinary

Convict-soldiers

were used in breakthrough and assaults the most vulnerable positions

and were to be located in

titles except those specified in the reg ulations. Convict-soldiers and their depend ents are deprived of all servicemens benefite and privileges during the term of confinement in disciplinary battalions. Punitive measures are se vere even for minor infractions. A convict-soldier who displays ex emplary behavior and a conscientious attitude toward his work, his combat, and his political training may be des ignated a reformed offender by the battalion commander after one-third of the sentence ie served. If the in dividual continues to display a re. formed attitude through the first half of his original sentence, the battalion commander may nominate bim to a military tribunal for conditional pa92

battalion, whether through serving the entire term or on parole, the sol dier returns to his former military unit to complete whatever period of service remained hefore his transfer to the penal battalion. Full rights as a serviceman are restored including all privileges and benefits for his depend ents. If subsequent eervice is outstand ing, the unit commander may request that the time spent in a disciplinary battalion be credited toward length of service. At the beginning of World War H, disciplinary battalions were disbanded. Convict-soldiers were conditionally pa roled and assigned to military units in the active army where they were expected to rehabilitate themselves. During the war, crimes committed by Wtlitsfy Review

~-. [

I PENAL UNITS servicemen and other individuals fit for military service, for which the penelty W= lese than two years im prisonment, were invariably punished by aesigning the offenders to the army in the field. Offenders who received more severe sentencesincluding the death penalty-+ould, if the court con. sidered it expedient, be assigned to the assault battalions formed during wartime. legal Statutes In the Soviet legal statutes it is stated: Court decisions, wILich impow var iona aentenees on servicemen dur@ time of war, mqr, upon the judgment of the-court, be deferred until the con clusion of hostilities, so tkat the of fenders maII be ass<gned to the army in the field. If the militarv o~erider proue8 to be a resolute defender of the Fatherland, his se?ztence may be saspeaded. The Supreme Court of the USSR gave the following explanation: [n grantinu u deferment in carry irtfl out a deatk sentence or a prison sentence in time of war, the court must take the interests of the cmmt 7V into account. Deferred senteuew ekould not be granted to: individuals who act agaimet the State or Party, disorganiz ers of rear- areas, traitore or bandits, apie8 and similar agents of the cnemg, malicious deeertere and perpetrators of self-inflicted wounds, comards, bc travers and panicmongcrs, and to ail others who have been recruited to dis rupt order and break down resistance against the ertent~. It wae prescribed hy law that such individuals be executed. Individuals with draft deferments because of their civilian jobs were also governkdby the law. Inthe event they April 19W were convicted of a crime, they re ceived a deferred sentence and were drafted into the active army. Separate army penal companies were created in 1942 for certain servicemen in the army in the field sentenced to death or long terme. Hardened civilian crim inals were sometimes drafted and sent to these penal unite in commutation of various sentences. There was, how ever, no firm legal basis for this ac tion. The penal companies were attached to army headquarters, but were usu ally operationally subordinate to divi sions. These companies were later re organized into separate army penal battalions, soon renamedaesault bat talione. Their tables of organization and equipment were distinguished by considerable variations. These varia tions depended upon local conditions, the number of offendere, the intensity of combat, and the number of assault battalions in the army in question. Organization and Strength
The full strength of the companies
attached to the 6th Army on the 3d Ukrainian Front in 1944 wmied from 600 to 1,500 men in each. Platoons, at various times, consisted of 150, 300, and 500 men, and squads conLzined from 30 to 50 men. The number of squads varied as wfel] and was based only on the actual number of convictsoldiers. Each penal company had a permanent party of five or six officers and about 25 noncommissioned ot?i cers. Squad leaders and deputy platoon leaders were selected from among the convict-soldiers. Commanders of separate penal com panies and their political officers held the ranks of captain or major, but poseessed the disciplinary authority of regimental commanders and deputy 93

PENAL UNITS commanders. Other officers and ser geants had privilege of individuals of the next higher echelon. They re ceived double pay, and each months service in an assault unit was corn. puted as six calendar months for length of service in the army. For convict-soldiers, the computation was on a one-for-one basis, although in played cowardice or panic, refused to obey orders, or retreated under enemy fire without orders, the commander had the right to execute them on the spot. Punishment for even minor in. fractions was often brutal. ~. The losses of convict-sol lers in bat tle were usually extremqly high. A hero in battle might be transferred to

Photm muvtesv of autho Intensified combat training is conducted in penal units during lulls in fighting

regular units of the active army, time on the front was computed for all on the basis of one to three. According to the Regulations of Penal Units, these units could not be used in defensive deployment, but only in breakthroughs and assaults, and were to be located in the most vulnerable positions on the bounda ries of divisions, corps, armies, and army groups. Permanent party officers and sergeants were instructed to po sition themselves behind the battle for mations. If the convict-soldiers dis 94

a regular unit to continue fighting. A man killed in battle might be re habilitated and a black mark removed from his relatives and loved ones. The covvict-soldiers reaction to tbe stern laws and the inhuman treatment was frequently reflected in the murder of the most hated and vicious officers. Suicides and self-inflicted wounds ec curred frequently. Tbe simulation of serious illness was widespread even though the penalty, if caught, was the firing squad. Defection to the enemy was frequent despite the fact that Military Rsviaw

PENAL UNITS those attempting to defect on by their own comrades rewarded for such ac ion. were who fired were manded to be returned to the USSR. He was returned and tried by a mili tary tribunal. For treason, desertion, and revealing military secrets, he re ceived the death sentence which was commuted to assignment in a penal unit at the front.
Five students on pass from a military school committed a robbery in town. They were tried, and three were sentenced to death and two to 10 years imprisonment. The leader of the band and his two closest associates were shot; the others were assigned to a frontline penal unit. A drunken soldier returned to his rear area barracks, created a disturb ance, disobeyed the duty officer, and then beat him. He was sentenced to serve in a penal unit. A drunken driver responsible for an accident in which several people died was sentenced to 10 years im prisonment, but then commuted to as signment to a penal unit. During an enemy counterattack, a master sergeant on the front, dis played fierce resietsnce in hand-to hand combat. Nevertheless, hc was captured. In the prisoner-of-war camp, he agreed to perform certain house hold chores to alleviate his hunger und the severe conditions. The camp was near the frontlines and was captured by Soviet forces during a Soviet of fensive. For aiding the enemy, the sergeant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and commuted to as signment in a penal unit. A company commander and his political officer, for unsuccessful ac tion in combat ~vbich resulted in heavy casualties, were reduced in rank and assigned to a penal unit as privates. A regiment commanded by a COIG nel made several unsuccessful attempts

An intensified eomba training pro \ en penal units gram was conducted w were not in combat because of a lull in the fighting or in order to pick up replacements. In spite of the prohibi tion on using penal units in defensive operations, division commanders fre quently utilized them in the de$ense when there was no other feasible way they could be employed. However, the very fact that they were later desig nated as assault units defined their basic mission and limited their use in other types of combat. In providing replacements to penal units, the new men were brought up to the front under heavy guard. Trxins tilled with these doomed men were al most always the scene of tragic inci dents between the guards and the con vict-soldiers. The offenders intention ally provoked these incidents. They would organize mase riots and disobey the orders of their escort, thus forcing the guard to fire at them. TypicalCrimes Convict-soldiers, by virtue of their former situations, the seriousness of their crimes, and the magnitude of the court sentences they received, rep resented a most diversified group of individuals. Some typical crimes ~vhicb brought their perpetrators into perml units are: . A soldier in a unit near the Af ghanistan border lost his way in the hills and accidentally crossed the bor der. He was taken into custody, inter rogated, and offered political asylum. At the interrogation, the soldier re vealed information which he did not consider violated his oath. But he cate gorically refused asylum and de April 196s

9s

PENAL liNITS to take a hill. Heavy losses were sustained, and he received orders to SUSpend the offensive and await the arrival of replacements and an investigation. One night, under the influence of alcohol and fearful of punishment for failure, he ordered one more assault of the enemys positions. It was a failure. The colonel was demoted and sentenced to death. The death penalty was commuted to assignment in a penal unit as a private. A major general in the quartermaster service was the chief of rear services of an army. He was accused of failing to supply sufficient ammunition thereby causing the failure Of combat operations. He was sentenced to be demoted and shot. The death penalty was commuted to assignment in a penal unit as a private. The commutation of punitive meas ures into assignment to penal assault unite amounted to a thinly veiled death sentence which was carried out in the great majority of cases. On the front, a soldiers saying was wide. spread: What can he worse than war, and in the war a penal unit? In the penal unit, a mans past ended, and his future was won with blood.

LESSONS LEARNED
,The MILITARY REVIEW is particularly ing manuscripts Problems tactics, covering lessons interested by US in receiv units in learned

Vietnam. equipment, sion. After authors accepted.

of organization, and fire support with manuscripts the necessary

command merit local

and control, discus regulations, on thoee

informed

complying

appropriate direct security

may submit

to the MILITARY RE review

VIEW. We will obtain

MilitaryReview

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MILITARY NOTES
UNITED STATES
Miny R.?S.2Ne Commands The US Army Reserve (USAR) has established 18 new commands to round out its structure. Designated Commands (AR Army Reserve COMS), each headquarters will be headed by an Army Reserve general officer, with a staff Of approximately 100 ArmY Reserve officers and men, and nine full-time civilian techni cians who also will be Army Reserve membes. f
The ARCOMS wiIl provide general officer direction to all USAR units not assigned to one of the 45 USAR gen eral officer commands presently in the force structure. Organizations which will come under ARCOMS su pervision are troop units, reinforce ment training units, and mobiliza tion training detachments. The newly organized ARCOMS will be responsible for mobilization readinesa of all aasigned units, and will command USAR schools within their respective geographical areas. The ARCOMS will be directly un der the five continental armies.DOD release. Information Officer Shortage Tbe expanded requirements in Viet nam and an increased retirement rate of World War II veterans have created a shortage of trained Army informa tion ofiera. It has become necessary to till many information positions with officers one or two grades lower than required.DOD release. April 19S8 Modern Sandbag Sought Despite all its highly sophisticated computers, weapona, and material, to days modern Army still works to im prove a basic, if unglamorous, com modity: the sandbag. At the US Tropic Test Center in the Canal Zone, hundreds of sandbags are being tested to determine which type can best withstand the rigors of the tropical environment yet still be economical. The Army hopes to find among 12 different kinds of test aandbsgs one to replace the standard cotton bag which is not very satisfactory for field uae in the humid tropics. The sandbagsmade from plastic, fiberglass, and other treated and un treated materialsare being exposed under varying conditions to determine their resistance to the elements, fun gus growth, and attack by insects and rodents. Testers report no best bag has been selected. Some of the bags wear well in the jungle but fail in the sun light. Some split their seams, and others last better by the eeean than in open fields. Still others, tbe testers say, sprout plants.Army Newa Fea tures.

I 97

MILITARY NOTES TerraStar Test Bed excess of 30 miles per hour during An advanced marginal terrain re cross-country runs. search vehicle-designed to perform The key to !fenw,Shzrs triple. equally well on a hard surface, in threat capability is an advanced loco. soft soil, and in wateris being motion concept. The running gear tested by the Army. consists of four wheel assemblies The test bed, called TerraStar, was called major wheels. Each major accepted for testing following trial wheel consists of three minor wheels runa through swamps and rice pad mounted on secondary axles which dies; over rough, broken ground; and are located radially on large spokes in water. Existing special purpose

Lockheed

Airc.aft

.%rvice

Cmwtw

vehicles are generally limited to oP eration in only one or two of these three environments. Water tests established the vehicle as the worlds fastest wheeled am phibian not using an auxiliary pro pulsion system. Zerrtita.r demon strated an ability during water egress tests to emerge from water cwer nearly vertiqal banks. The vehicle consistently demonstrated speeds in

about the major wheel main axle. The minor wheel carries wide-base, lowpressure tires. The major wheels propel the vehicle in water and in severe e.oft-soil condi tions where conventional wheeled or tracked vehicles would be immobi lized. TerraStar operates on its minor wheek. as a conventional vehicle on roads and other hard su rfaces.News release. Military Review

sentinel Training Facility The Sentinel Central Training Fa cility has been established at the US ArrpY Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Tease, tO train personnel for tbe first planned deployment of the Sentinel antiballistic missile (ABM) system. Officers, warrant officers, and en listed men will be trained in artillery, ordnance, and engineer skills neces sary to operate tbe system. In addi tion to individual job training, the agency will monitor ABM research and development efforts.-DOD release. SupplyClassification An Army survey of supply manage ment problems has resulted in a new supPlY classification for the Depart ment of Defense. A 10-category classification system has replaced the five-category system to provide common terminology for all elements of the Def enee Department. Full implementation of the system is expected to take a year. The new unified system, a result of six years of Army studies, will solve problems such ae grouping of unre lated items, dual classification of iden. tical items, and misinterpretation among and within the services. The new classifications are: Class I-Subsistence. Class IIClothing, individual equipment, ten~age, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, and admin istrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment. Class IIIPetroleum, oils, and lubricants. Class IVConstruction mate rials. Class VAmmunition of all types. Class VIPersonal demand items. Aprillees

CIass VIIMajor end items such as tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles. Class VIIIMedical materiel, ineluding medical repair parta. Class IXRepair parte required for maintenance support. Class XMateriel to support nonmilitary programs such asagricul tural and economic development. Army News Features.

Navy Selects letRanger Helicopter The Navy has selected the Model 206A JetRanger as its new primary light turbine training helicopter. A contract for 40 JetRangers haa been signed with the manufacturer with deliveries to he made this year. The new Navy .retlfmzger primary trainers will be used by tbe Naval

Armed

Forca

.Wan.wcnIet

Model 26SA JetRanger Air Training Command at Pensacola, Florida, where they will replace a fleet of 36 TH-lsMs which have served in thie role for the pact 12 years. The JetRanger carries a 1,600 pound load and has a cruise speed of 120 knots and a top speed of 130 knote. It has a range of 400 miles. Powering the Jetl%zger is a 136 pound, 317-horsepower engine. The five-seat helicopter places two persons UP front and three in tbe rear.News release. , 99

MILITARY NOTES USS Dubuque Commissioned The USS Dubuque (LPD4 ), a new for an amphibious commander and an type of amphibiou~ warftwe ship, was assault treop commander. commissioned recently. It is the eighth The Dubuque is not specifically de. in a series of amphibious transports, signed for helicopter transportation, but its flight deck is large enough to dock ( L}Ds) designed to add a new permit simultaneous operation of two dimensinn to the Navys troop and ve hicle lift capability. medium-sized helicopters. The ship is a direct descendant of The vessel is 569 feet long, has a

US

NWW

the landing ship, dock (LSD) of World War II. It also incorporates features of the uttack transport (A PA ), the attack cargo (AKA ), and the assault helicopter ship (Z,~H ). These features include the flight deck and well deck of the LSD, the troop-ctirrying ability of the APA, and the cargo-handling and stowage capa bility of the AKA. It provides spaces

maximum beam of 105 feet, and a navigational draft of 21 feet, six inches. Full load displacement is 16,600 tons. The ship is armed with four twin, 3-inch, rapid tire gun mounts con trolled by three file control systems. In addition to the 426-mrm crew, the vessel carries 850 combat troops and 118 ofiicers in the assault and flag force.US Navy release.

An increase in the number of ap. pointments allocated to the Regular Army and Enlisted Reservefrom 27 to 85 eachis provided for in the current expansion of the Corps of Cadets at the US Military Academy. No tests are required of academy apsrlicants. Applicants must have had an interview with commanding officers and have the latters endorsement. 100

Military Acadamy Allocations Only an individuals record is used as a basis for his selection for attending preparatory school. In order to till all appointments allocated, commanders at all echelons are urged to encourage qualified en listed men to apply for the prepara tory school at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In the 1967-68 class, 662 applied, and 148 were accepted.DOD release. Milltary Rwlw

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.
MILITARY NOTES Riot&@ol Chemical Launcher The ES Expendable Launcher for riot-control chqmical agents developed recently by Jldgewood Arsenal, Mary land, is versatile, accurate, light weight, and easily man portable. Engineered to strap on an infantryrrmne back, the 34-prmnd E8 can be firedmanually or electrically controlled to launch 64 cartridges to set up a large riot-control agent cloud in ap proximately 30 seconds. A simple inclinometer sets the launcher at the deeired elevation, ranging from an almost tfat trajectory to an angle of 90 degrees. The firing platform coneists of three metal plates Antanna System Tests Air Force EC-195 aircraft are being used to test a new, single-wire an tenna that trails behind an aircraft more than five miles. The flight tests are being conducted at March Air Force Baee, California. Engineere are attempting to per fect the trailing-wire antenna system to provide low frequency radio trans mission capability from a jet aircraft. Coiled on a spool, the transmitting antenna is lodged under the fueelage of the aircraft. When ready for opera tion, the spool is unwoundmuch ae a fishing reelto the proper length for the frequency being ueed. Attached to the end of the wire is a conical, fiberglass drogtie that eup plies drag to uncoil the wire and pro vides aerodynamic stability .DOD re leaee. Sprint Completes Flight lest Sprint, one of two interceptor mis siles in the Chinese Communist-ori ented rmtiballistic miesile defense sys tem, has successfully completed a flight test at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. During the test, the missile wae subjected to sharp maneuvers and high therrnul effects. One purpose of the flight was to demonstrate the ability of the .Sprint to execute theee maneuvers and withstand the high temperature involved. The 27-foot, high-acceleration mis sile is designed as a short-range in terceptor to engage attacking inter continental ballistic missiles or other long-range missiles after they have re entered the earths atmosphere. Powered by two solid propellant rocket engines, the Spmnt is guided during flight by system radars. A Y Newe Features. Y \ 10I

USArmv E8 Expendable Launcher which are fanned out on the ground, with spikes to hold them in position. Munitions experts report that when all cartridge have burst on the tai get, the intense cloud generated would incapacitate unmasked temporarily pereonnel in the target area. Its ver satility makes the E8 effective for defensive or offensive operations, par ticularly in Vietnam.News item. April 1933 i

MILITARY NOTES Se~f-Propelled HAWS mounted system equipment, make up Engineering design tests of the the SP HAWK firing section. The self -propelled ( SP ) HA WKthe new towed equipment consists of the est version of the HA J?Vf solid-pro standard HAWK continuous-wave ac pellant, surface-to-air defense missile systemhave heen completed. quisition and continuous-wave i]lumi. nator radars, and a new platoon corn. The SP HAWK will provide addi

.,

USAmw tional mobility and ease o} emplace ment for the HAWK system currently deployed with Army and Marine Corps units in the United States and over seas. The heart of the SP HAWK bat talion is the independent firing section of the SP platoon. The key to this mobile tiring section is the new selfpropelled launcher ( SPL ), basically a tracked vehicle with a HAWK launcher mounted on its bed. Three SPLS, each carrying three ready missiles and towing trailer 102 mand post which provides fire con trol functions. The independent firing sections and associated eupport sections make up the SP platoons. Two SP platoons and a towed platoon, which has all stand ard HAWK equipment, along with the support and administrative organiza tions, constitute the SP HAWK bat tery. There are three batteries and a mo bile and versatile@rect eupport or ganization in an SP HA Wff battalion. DOD release. Military Review

MILITARY NOTES Underwater POL Storage Feasible Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) can be securely and economi cally stored under water in flexible containers in a combat theater or in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States. In addition to concealment and ef fective protection from thermal radia tion and blast, underwater containers can withstand the shock of largescale TNT underwater explosions, and would preclude the neceeeity of large, underground construction efforts. Studies and tests of underwater POL storage have been conducted by the Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mis sissippi. The most recent tests were made at Mono Lake, California, us ing a submersible fuel storage en velope developed by a commercial rubber company for the Office of Naval Research in 1959. Scale mod els of a 50,000-gallon container came through the explosion tests undam aged. Preliminary tests at Mono Lake and at Lake Ouachita in Arkan sas, ueing smaller chargee and com mercially available models, were also successful and led to the use of multi ton TNT explosions. The Navy had previously tested the underwater containers capability to withstand natural sea environment in the Gulf of Mexico during seasonal storms. The storms produced no sig nificant damage to the container which was 69 feet long, 22 feet wide, and five and a half feet high. Knowing that such storage systems were able to withstand the natural sea environment, the Waterways Ex periment Station aimed its tests at evaluating the containers response to underwater explosion shnck waves. DOD release. April 19S8 6unslrips for Vietrram The Air Force plans to use C-119 and C-lSO transport aircraft as gnn ships in Vietnam. The addition of these aircraft will increase the Air

~.130 ffer~~es

At+Fow/Sp.aca Digest transpOrt new C-47 The role

Forces firepower capability. The aircraft will replace the smaller that has won fame as Puff, Magic Dragon, for its gunship in Vietnam.DOD release.

Tests of Nuclear Fallout Oetector The Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is testing and evaluating a prototype nuclear fallout detection system which can monitor radiation levels in an area as large as 300 miles. Comprised of eight detesters, the system radios radiation measurements to a central monitoring station auto matically. The detectors can operate from batteries in case of a power fail ure and can transmit radio signals up to 10 milee, according to nuclear en gineere at the laboratory. Officials at the weap+ms laboratory said the new eystem makes it possible for an airbase to receive accurate, immediate information in case of nu clear attack, and to identify those lo cations on the baee where radiation ie most intense. The system will detect and indicate dose rates from 10 miRi roentgens to 5,000 roentgens per hour, officials said.DOD rebmae. 103

MILITARY NOTES

New Hamlet Evaluation System A new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), designed to obtain a more accurate determination than hereto fore o: the status of the pacification program in Vietnam, was recently an nounced. The new program, using computers in Saigon fed with data collected each month by more than 1,000 US district advisors in the field, is designed to cover the 12,650 hamlets in the Re public of Vietnam as they are cleared of Viet Cong (VC). The hamlets rated thus far are all exposed to some degree of government presence and are rated on a scale from A (secure with bigb development) to E (insecure with no develop ment). A sixth category is the hamlet controlled by the Viet Cong. The E category hamlet skews a government of Vietnam presence, usu ally military, but the Viet Cong are active there too. Other characteristics of the E category are that there is VC political and subversive activity; their infrastructure is operating; friendly security is inadequate; gov ernment of Vietnam officials are pres ent only in daytime; and health, edu cation, and welfare programs are non existent. A D hamlet isa little better. Viet Cong military activities have been re duced, and external VC forcee have been cut back by approximately 25 percent. Local participation in hamlet man agement has begun, the medical teams are vieiting periodically, and there is a beginning of education and welfare activity. In addition, there is a certain amount of economic development tak ing place. However, there is still VC 104

activity in the hamlet at night, and there is VC terrorism and taxation. The C category hamlet is classed as being relatively secure with VC military control broken, most of the hamlets infrastructure identified, and no overt VC incidents noted although continuing VC taxation is suspected. Here, government officials remain in the hamlet overnight, full-time med ical facilities are available, and pri mary education is being conducted in . permanent classrooms. The B hamlet is still more secure, and in the A hamlet everything is going right. The HES is only used to measure government of Vietnam control in the countryside.State Department re lease. Chieu Hoi Program The open arms (Chieu Hoi) pro gram of the government of the Repub. Iic of Vietnam completed its fifth year with a record total of 27,178 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops chooeing freedom during 1967. This number represents a 34-percent increase over the 1966 total of 20,242. Included among tbe returnees were 7,886 political ralliere, 4,731 of whom were Viet Cong infrastructure cadre or National Liberation Front organi zation workers, and 17,671 military menthe equivalent of two enemy di visions. Since it began in 1963, the Chieu Hoi program has proceesed a total of 75,209 Hoi Chanh, as the returnees are called. The government of Vietnam has continued to increase the services through which the Hoi Charzh are helped to become self-supporting, useMilitary Review

;
ful, and accepted citizens of the Re public. Under construction in Gia Dinh, where high-level Viet Cong cadre are received at the National Chieu Hoe Center, is a 17-milliOn piaster (more than $44,000) buildlrrg which will pro vide offices, classrooms, a dispensary, and other facilities for as many as 400 Hoi Ckarzh at a time. In 1967, an active construction pro gram more than doubled the capacity of the four regional and 47 provincial and city Chieu Hoi centers and brought the number of completed Ckieu Hoi hamlets to 17, with five more under construction. The 1,356 Hoi Charzlz and their 5,345 dependents who reside in the centers have taken advantage of the govern ments offer of a plot of land on which to resettle, 12,000 piasters for the purchaee of construction materials and furniehlnge, and a six-month family rice subsistence allowance. Although they are automatically exempt from military draft for one year, a large number of returnees have voluntarily entered military and paramilitary , units. Armed propaganda teams, made up of Hoi Chanh wbo volunteer to visit disputed areas to talk with Viet Cong and their famiIies to persuade more of them to defect, increased from 1,324 to 2,664 in 1967.State Depart ment release.

MILITARY NOTE3

WEST GERMANY
uH-ID Helicopters. A coproduction contract between tbe US manufacturer and the ,Federal Republic of Germany is designed to provide more than 380 UH-ZD heli copters to West+, Germanys armed forces by the end of 1970. Tbe program has three overlapping phases. The first phase called for 10 helicopters to be built in the United States. They were completely assem bled and test flown in the United States, then disassembled and shipped to the prime contractor in West Ger many. The second phase called for the US manufacturer to fabricate 40 heli-

Bdl HdicoPter News tiff-11)

States

helicopter fabricated in the United and aasembled in West Germany

POLAND
New Military Law A new defense law has been passed by the Sejm. The law makes it com pulsory for men and women between 18 and 60 who have not been selected for military duties to serve in self defenae forrnations.-Eaet Europe, January 1968, @ 1968. ipril IN

copters which were sent to Germany for final assembly and acceptance flights. Phase 111 calls for UH-IDS to be built in Germany. Only certain dy namic cnmponerrts will be made in the United States.-Z?ell Helicopter News.

YUGOSLAVIA
Submarine The first submarine of domestic pro duction was launched in Yugoslavia this past summer. The vessel has the latest in equipment and arms. The new submarine is the Heroi, meaning hero. News item. 105

MILITARY NOTES

,
SWEDEN
The aircraft will be designed to ewry 45 fully outfitted combat troops, At least 40 of the aircraft are ex. petted to be operational by the 1973. 74 period.Defeme Transportation Journal.

155.MiNimeter Gun The weight of the production model uf the Swedish self-propelled, ar mured, 155-millimeter gun has been reduced from 50 to 48 tons. The gun fires 14 rounds a minute and has a

PORTUGAL
Submarine Delivered The Albacora, the first of four sub. marines being built for tbe Portuguese Navy by a French shiphu ilder has been delivered at Lorient. The second of these bigb-performance subma rines, the Barracuda, will be delivered early this summer.fkfmse Trans. prwtation Journal.

FRANCE
SOldu 1 wd T<.!,.,/<

range of more than 27,000 yards. The crew compartments feature a chemical, biological, and radiological ventilation system. The chassis is practically iden tical with that of the S tank.News item.

Transall Transports The Air Transport (kjmmand of the French Air Force has received its first !l%-ansall transport aircraft. The air craft can carry either 16 tons of cargo, , . . .-,,, .. ,.
%,!.

THE NETHERLANDS

Military Service Terms

As uf 1 January 1968, the term of militury service in the Netherlands Air Force was reduced three months. Spe cialists will be drafted for 21 instead of 24 months and others for 18 instead of 21 months.News item.

Intw., a

Trcmmll transport 66 fully equipped paratroopers, or 62 wounded. The Trarzsatl has a range of about 2,800 miles and a speed of approximately 270 knots. France bas ordered 50 of these large transport aircraft. By 1970, three squadrons of 15 Tr-an+d aircraft each are to be operationaL-News item.

JAPAN

Fan Jet Transport Planned

The .Japanese Defense Agency has announced plans to develop :L new, medium-range, fan jet transport to replace its present fleet of C-46S. Four of the W-ton. Mach .7 aircraft will be built for experimental use.

106

Military Rev16H

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MILITARY

BEHIND THE LINES-HANOI. December 23, 196B-JamrarY7, 1967. BY Harrison E. Salis. bury. 243 Pag8S. Harper & Row, Inc., New York, Evanston, and London, Eng., 1967. $4.95. BY COL G~ORGE R. STEVENS III, USA This is an uccount of the experience md impressions gained by Htirrison Salisbury, a widely traveled editor of The New Yorlc Times, in a two-week trip to North Vietnam in late Decem. ber 1966 and early Janoary 1367. The author was given the opportu nity to talk with North Vietnamese otlicids-most nnti~bly, Premier Pham Van Dong. The impressions wbicb he obtained are not particu Iarly comforting. He portrays a united people who are pas sionately devoted to the defense nf their country agnirmt the attacks by US aircraft. He also makes a case for the logic of the propaganda which has csptured the minds of the North Vietnamese people and caused them to view US actions as a mere continuation of the colonialism of France. Mr. Salisbu rys firsthand impres sions convey to the reader the magni tude of the differences in perceptions of the conflict between US leaders and the North Vietnamese leaders and people. The book is interesting and worth while for those who are seeking a broad understanding of the Vietnam ese conhict. April 1968

THE HOUSE OF KRUPP. By Peter Batty. 333 Pages. Stein & Day, New York, 1967.$7.95. BY LTC GEORGE D. EIXtiRS, JR., USA In a fateful way, wrote the Pres ident of the Federal Republic of Ger many to Alfried Krupp von Bcihlen und Hulbach in 1961, t the history of your firm reflects the heights and depths of our people. Peter Batty has put together an absorbing chronicle of the Krupp family and their indus trial empire. Mr. Batty considers the most in credible achievements of the Krupp dynasty to have been the seemingly miraculous recoveries w,hich followed the two World Wars. The bulk of the brink is devoted to the story of how the Krupp colossus arose from the w+hes of World War II. From its founding in 1811 to mid 1967, control of the Krupp establish ment was vested in a single member of the family. This unique feature, ssya the author, made it R relatively simple matter for the rulers of Ger many to negotiate for the armaments that they needed to sustain their war math ines. He otfera the provocative hypothesis that the course of recent Eo ropean history would have been al tered had the firm been operated un der corporate ownership. For the most part, this is a re freshingly objective treatment of a highly controversial subject. It is an informative book shout one of the po litical and economic phenomena of our time. 107

MILITARY BOOKS THE MINUTE MEN. A Compact Nistory of the Defenders of the American Colonies 1645-1775. Major John R. tlal~in, United States Army. 266 Pages. Hawthorn 6ooks, km., New York, 1967.$6.95. J3Y LTC FRANCIS A. IANNL USA Ralph Waldo Emersons tribute to the minutemen of 1775 permanently enshrined the myth of the embattled farmer rushing to Lexington and Concord to defend against the intru sion of the redcoats. Emersons choice of words to describe the men who fought in the series of skirmishes which precipitated the American Rev olution, as Major Galvin shows, left much unsaid. The minutemen were much more than a group of enthusiastic patriots who left their plows, picked up their muskets, and set off to register their protest against British rule. They were part of a vast colonial army with long traditions of organization and training. The book thoroughly devel ops the thesis that the minuteman idea was a century and a half old at the beginning of the Revolution, rind traces the development of the concept from the early colonial preparations for defense against the Indian attacks , to the fateful spring day in which was fired the shot heard round the world. Major Galvin, who completed the book while a student in the graduate program at the US Army Command and General Staff College, uses his military background to weave an in teresting analysis of the development of the colonial defense system with an exciting and inspiring account of the Battle of Lexington and Concord. His account of the battIe, written against the background of the organization and policy which made it possible to 10s set in motion a plan in which 47 ments containing over 14,000 marched against the fast-moving ish COIU mn, makes fascinating ing. regi. men Brit. read.

Of particular value is the account of the place of the minutemen in the Massachusetts militia, the reconstruct. tion of the 47 regiments of militia and minutemen, and the examination of the experience and organization of the British Regular regiments compared to the provincial units. The book is an interesting account of an impor. tant episode in our military heritage, THE MARCN TO TUNIS. Tha North Africm War, 10IW19A3. Mediterranean Front, 1,k Year of Battle, Il. The End in Africa, Ill, 6y Alan Moorehead. 592 Pages. Harper& Row, Inc., New York and Evanston, 1965.$8,50, 13Y LTC JOSEPH D. HYNES, USA As a reporter for a London news paper during World War 1I, Mr. Moorehead wrote three books on the war in AfricaMediterranean Front, A Year of Battle, and The End in Africa. Published here in one volume, these books provide a clear, interest ing, and accurate account of the Brit ish campaigns in Africa and the Mid. dle East. The authors talent for describing events, tactics, terrain, and personali ties gives this work permanent value. Incisive portrayal of such Ieadere ae Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Field Marahal Bernard L. Montgom ery, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel are as fascinating today as when first pub lished more than 20 years ago. An important contribution to the literature of World War 11, this book is of value both to the historian aod to the professional soldier. Military Rwlw

, ..
MILITARY BOOKS cON6RESS AND THE CITIZEN.SOLOIER. Leg islativePol!cy-Makmg for the Federal Armed ForcesRaaerve. BY William F. Levarrtrosser. 267 Pages. Ohio State University Press, Columbus,Ohio, 1967.$6.00. BY LTC RALPH G. HENLEY, USA The authors scholarly approach has produced a hook useful to persons in terested in Reserve affairs, congres sional interest groups, or the congres sional battles of the former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Mr. Levantrosser favors executive-branch civilian control of the Military Es tablishment, and concludes that, even though congressional interest in Re serve affairs fragments civilian cOn trol, the results have, been beneficial. THE 6DTHIC LINE. The Italian Campaign, Autumn, 1644. By Douglas Orgill. 257 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1967. $5.95. BY LTC CARL F. BASW~LL, USA In the eummer of 1944, the Allies in Italy stood before the laet great military obstacle between them and the Alps, the Gothic Line. The Allied armies in Italy, weakened by a higher priority for men and materiel for the invasion of France, were a modest force for the task ahead. Their mis sion wae to attack and to advance over the Apenuines into the Po Valley, and be prepared to continue on through the Ljubljana Gap to Vienna. The German commander in chief, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, did bis job well. The hopeful Allied ven ture, beginning 25 August 1944, cost the Allies thousande of lives in ex change for only a few muddy milee. The offeneive wae abandoned in late October 1944. . This book is a well-documented and vivid military hietory of one of the fiercest campaigne of World War II. Aoril 19SS JU6GERNAUT. A History of the Soviet Armed Forces. By Malcolm Mackintosh. 320 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1667. $S.65. BY MAJ FREDERICG. AGATHER, USA Without adulation, and without delv ing deeply into political polemics, Mr. Mackintosh has written an accurate and interesting history of the Soviet military forces. The author describes the birth of the Workere and peas ants Red Army and portrays botb its brilliance and growing pains in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The author chows the disasters of the purge years, the Winter War with Finland, and the firet two years of World War IL The difficulties, changes, and technical innovations faced by the Soviet Army in the post war years are covered. The maps in the book are emall and difficult to follow. Perhaps if they were in the back of the book and larger, the reader would find them more useful. Nevertheless, this is an excellent book. MORALE. A Study of Men and Courage. The Second Scottish Rifles at the 6attle of Neuve Chapelle, 1915. 6y John Baynes. 266 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York and Washington, 1967.$8.50. BY MAJ CHARLES M. HANSEN, USA In March 1915, the Second Scottish Rifles, 700 etrong, went over the top at Neuve-Chapelle. A week later, re duced to 150 men and commanded by a second lieutenant, it was still a fighting unit. Morale is cited as the factor that enabled the unit to retain its effectiveness. Fierce loyalty wae primarily responsible for thie morale. The reader of this book will be re warded not only with a detailed analy sis of morale, but also with a brilliant portrait of a British regular army unit at the start of World War I. 109/

MILITARY BOOKS 1942: The Year That Ooomed the Asis. By Henry H. Adams. 522 Pages. David McKay Co., Inc., New York, 1967.$8.95. BY LTC CHARLES L. MCNEILL, USA The author, a Professor of History at the US Naval Academy, has written a vivid and impressive portrait of that year of decision1942. It was a year which began with the Axis Powers gaining tremendous victories and ter ritorial expansion, and ended with the Allies on the road to ultimate victory. Namee and places that will live in history are discussed in Professor Adams bookWinston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Ei senhower, William F. Halsey, W. Averell Harriman, and Erwin Rommel. Places such as Guadalcanal, Stalin grad, Midway, Casablanca, El Ala mein, and Bataan are brought into bright focus. THE CONQUEST OF APACHERIA. By Oan L. Thrapp. 405 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1967,$6.95. BY MAJ MILTON B. HALSEY, JR., USA Through the use of anecdotes and accounts of fights and battles, the au thor traces the history of tbe relent less conquest of the Apaches from in significant incidents to the great bat tles. He relates the heroism and the tragedy, the misunderstanding and the trickery, and the pathos and suffering that accompanied this conquest. The campaigns of General George Crook and General Nelson A. Miles are dis cussed, along with the stories of other less well-known Indian fighters. This book points out the problems and covers the techniques used by a relatively modern, well-supplied Army to defeat a small, disorganized, poorly equipped, but elusive and dedicated enemy. 110 BRASSEYS ANNUAL: 1967. The Armed Forces Year-Book. Edited by Major General J. L. Moulton, Brigadier C. N. Barclay, and Air Vice Marshal W. M. YooI. 406 Pagee, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York and Washington, 1667.$16.50. The 78th volume of Brasseys An. nual contains 32 articles covering a wide range of subjects, a list of works of service interest published in 1966. 67, and extracts of the 1967 British Statement on the Defense Estimates, VIETNAM: Crisis of Conscience. BY Robert McAfee Brown, Abraham J. Heschel, and Michael Novak. 127 Pages. Association Press, New York, 1967.$0.95 paperbound. BY LTC FRANCIS A. IANN1, USA This hook was prepared by three professors, a Protestant, a Jew, and a Catholic, teachers in the fields of religion, ethics, and the humanities, Their purpose is to ,present tbe polit ical and moral dimensions of the Viet nam issue to gain public support for a change in Government policy. Dr. Novak sketches the historical development of tbe present US involve ment in Vietnam, characterizing it as stumbling into war. Rabbi Heschel condemns the ill of militarism which led to the decision to use military force. This decision, he says, was a failure of statesmanship, a failure of nerve, and a moral retreat. Dr. Brown urges churches and syn agogues to apply spiritual and polit ical pressure to bring about changes in US policy. The central thrust of the book is the assertion that the war is immoral. Included are proposala for unilateral reescalation, inclusion of the Viet Cong in negotiations, adoption of the enclave concept, and unconditional ces sation of the bombing of North Viet nam. Miiitsry Review

-- .
MILITARY BOOKS sWIFT SWORD. The Historical Record of Israels VictoW, June, 1967. By Brigadier iieneral S. L. A. !rfarshall, United States lmny Reserve,<Retwed, and the Editors of American Hewtage Magasirr# and United press International. With Pictures by 15 Combat Photographers Including Special Coverage From Umted Press International and Magnum Photos, Inc. 144 Pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1967.$3.95. BY MAJ CHARLES M. HANSEN, USA General Marshall and members of the press have joined ogether to pro ~ duce a journal of Isr1,els victory in June 1967. Relying on firsthand inter views and pereonaI reconnaissance of the battle areas, General Marshall cov ers the over-all operation as well as key small-unit combat actions. Well illustrated with color photo graphs and sketch maps, Swift .SWord provides an interesting and readable account of the Israeli actions during this brief conflict. HISTORY OF THE UNITEO STATES ARMY. BY Russell F. Weigley. 688 Pages. The Mac millan Co., New York, f967. $12.95. BY LTC DONALD S. MAHLBERG, USA This volume is a well-organized and easily read chronicle of the most sig nificant events in US Army history. Obviously, it would be impossible to cover every aspect of the Armys growth since 1775 in a single volume of this length. However, hy carefully culling source material, using many footnotes, and confining himself to the essentials, Professor Weigley has been able to produce a fairly comprehensive his tory emphasizing the internal devel opment of the Army and the polit ico-social aspect of the Military Es tsblisbment as an instrument of the Government. April 196e THE POLARIS MISSILE STRIKE. A fieneral Economic Systems Analysis. By Robert E. Kuenne. 434 Pages. Ohio State Universi9 Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1966.$8.00. BY CAPT THOMAS H. WILLIAMS, USN This study uses mathematical mod els systematically to analyze the prob lems involved in design, employment, and protection of a submarine ballis tic missile system. It is an interesting approach to determine the optimum allocation of ballistic miesile subma rines and attack submarines in order to maximize the destruction of targets with Polaris missiles. The main conclusion is that the United States has more Polaris sub marines than are needed to deter at tack and that, on the other hand, we are not planning to build a sufficient number of the nuclear attack class submarines. CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA. BY A. Doak Barnett. 563 Pages. Columbia University Press, New York and London, Eng,, 1967. $12.00. BY MAJ RICHARDO. BoRGsTi+o!+f, USA % Mr. Barnetts latest contribution to material on Communist China is based on his interviews with Chinese emi grants during 1964-65. This analyti cal work provides a detailed study of the organization and operation of the political system in Communist China by using three case studies dealing with a ministry, a country, and a commune. The studies provide an in. sight into the growing dominance of ideology at all levels of government. Part II was written with Professor Ezra Vogel, and is hased, in part, on interviews with emigrem from Com munist China conducted by Professor Vogel in Hong Kong. 111

MILITARY BOOKS OTHER BOOKS BITTER GREETINGS. The Scandal of the Military Draft. By Jean Carper. 205 Pages. Grossman Publishers, Inc., New York, 1967.$5.00. LEADERS HANDBOOK. Fourth Edition. 160 Pages. Infantry, Fort Benning, Ga. $0.50 paperbound. GOVERNMENT AT WORK. BY Re becca Schull. 144 Pages. Sterling Pub lishing Co., Inc., New York, Reviaed 1967.$3.95. THE LETTERS OF PFC RICHARD E. MARKS, USMC. By Richard E. Marks. 190 Pages. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa., and New York, 1967. $3.95. MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE SIKHS. BY Lieutenant Colonel B. N. Majumdar. 235 Pages. Army Educa tional Stores, New Delhi, India. $10.50. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IN DIAN ARMY SERVICES. Volume II. By Lieutenant Colonel B. N. Majum dar. 212 Pages. Army Educational Stores, New Delhi, India. $7.75. A STUDY OF INDIAN MILITARY HISTORY. By Lieutenant Colonel B. N. Majumdar. 179 Pages. Army Edu cational Stores, New Delhi, India. $7.50. THE STATESMANS YEAR-BOOK. Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1967-1968. Edited by S. H. Steinberg, Ph. D. 1,736 Pages. St. Martins Press, Inc., New York, 1967:$12.50. THE UNITED ST TES MARINE CORPS. By Colonel , ,ames A. Dono ? van, Jr., United State@ Marine Corps, Re~ired. 246 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967. $5.95.. 112

RECEIVEO THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, By Brigadier General Monro MacClos. key, United States Air Force, Retired, 244 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967.$5.95.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY. By Lieutenant Colonel Vernon F. Pizer, United States Army, Retired. 213 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967.$5.95.

CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE. His. tory of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War IL Volume 111. By Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh. 685 Pages. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Washington, D. C. $7.25.

THE SOVIETS. A Pictorial History of Communist Russia. BY Robert Goldston. 255 Pages. Bantam Books, Inc., New York, 1967. $1.00 paper bound.

THE CHACO DISPUTE. A Study of Prestige Diplomacy. By William R. Garner. 151 Pages. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1966.$4.50.

IN DEFENSE OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS. The United States Navy and tbe Wars of Independence in Chile and Peru. By Edward Baxter Billing. sley. 266 Pages. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1967.$6.00.

VICTORIAN MILITARY CAM. PAIGNS. Edited by Brian Bond. 328 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York and Washington, 1967 $7.95.

NEGRO MEDAL OF HONOR MEN. By Irvin H. Lee. 139 Pages. Doddj . Mead & Co., New York, 1967. $4.00

Military Rerien