National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Minutes of February 12, 2003 Meeting

Chairman Kean convened the meeting at 9:40 AM. All Commissioners were in
attendance.

The Commission took the following actions:

~ Decided that meeting minutes would include all decisions of the Commission;

~ Decided that Commissioners would follow a policy of full disclosure of

professional financial activities and relationships;

— Decided on actions to facilitate early release of Joint Inquiry Committee documents

to the Commission, and to seek additional Commission office space;

~ Decided that Task Forces / Teams of the Commission would address areas of
investigation required by Statute, and additional areas as agreed by the Commission;

- Decided that Commissioners would submit recommendations on Task Forces /

Teams, to be assembled by staff and circulated for review and decision;

~ Decided that Commissioners would participate actively in Task Forces / Teams,

preferably by a process of self-selection, and possibly by a process of designation, to
be determined later;

— Decided that the Commission would hold public hearings in New York City in late
March / early April 2003 at 9:30 AM; and

-- Decided that the next meeting of the Commission would be held on Thursday,
February 27, 2003 at 9:30 AM.

In addition, Commissioner Ben-Vemste asked for inclusion in the record his statement,
that in the process of negotiation with the White House, the Commission should not take
off the table any of the statutory powers of the Commission. The Commission expressed
agreement with Commissioner Ben-Veniste's statement.
MEMORANDUM

To: Fellow Commissioners

From: Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton

Subj: Our Meeting on February 12

We look forward to seeing you on Wednesday, in our new offices at 2100 K Street. We
are in an anonymous looking building that also houses the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. The guards in the lobby will have your names and staff will make
sure you find us on the 3rd floor.

We are planning to begin at 9:30 a.m. and conclude at noon. Our agenda will be:

I. Scope of the Commission's Work

We provide a suggestive outline below, following up on our discussion on January 27.

II. Initial Schedule for Commission Activities

We are looking ahead to an initial set of public hearings in New York City, hopefully in
late March, followed by a series of initial background briefings in D.C.

III. Commission Process

Many of you have voiced individual suggestions about the way the Commission should
do its work and gather information. We want to take the time to share and discuss these
ideas.

IV. Commission Organization and Administrative Issues

In the last two weeks we have been rapidly working through a blizzard of details to
address space, staff, and budgets. We have already begun to hire some additional staff,
including a Deputy Director (Chris Kojm), and hope to offer employment to a major
portion of the staff by the end of this month.

V. Press

After the meeting we will make ourselves available to the press to comment on the status
of our work. As we speak for the Commission, we want to share thoughts on how to
present our progress to date.
SCOPE OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK

As we reflecting on the law that created the Commission, input we have received from
many sources, and the discussion at our last meeting, we might think of our work
addressing six major themes:

1) The "Base" [Al Qaeda]

A section on the enemy could review the origins and varieties of Muslim terrorism as it
emerged in new forms during the 1990s. It would describe "the other side of the hill" -
how they see the world, their leadership and organization, strategy and plans, recruitment
and training, and their assessments of us -- as best we understand it today. It would carry
the story forward to our reconstruction of their operational planning up to the eve of the
9/11 attacks. Thus the key analytic efforts would focus on:

A. The Development of Islamic Transnational Terrorism

B. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Leadership, Institutional Capabilities, Strategy,

and Operational Style

C. The Attack on America: People, Plans, and Preparations

D. U.S. Comprehension of the Enemy: Intelligence Collection and Analysis

(including executive management and congressional oversight and
resource choices)

2) The International Counter-Terrorism Strategies of the United States

A section on America's international strategies could include an appraisal of the overall

character of America's counterterrorism strategy as it evolved through 2001, especially
after the East African bombings in 1998. This would include the capabilities available to
different agencies and the work of American diplomacy. Particular attention would have
to be given to U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and interactions with crucial friends such
as Saudi Arabia. The pre-9/11 behavior of German agencies, and their interactions with
the U.S., will also be important. The mix of continuity and change after the Bush
administration took office would be considered, along with an analysis of that
administration's growing unease about the danger during 2001. Key analytic efforts:

A. General Strategies (to 1998, and 1998-2001)

B. Special Institutional Capabilities

1. Military
2. Covert action
3. Interdicting flow of assets to terrorists
 C. States Implicated in Terrorism: U.S. CT Policy and Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon,
Iran, and Syria

D. The Base for Al Qaeda: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan

E. International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (including law enforcement)

1. Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia

2. Europe (e.g., Germany - Hamburg cell, also UK, France, Spain,
Italy)
3. Asia (e.g., Malaysia, Philippines)

3) Defending America at Home

A section on America's defenses at home could start with the protection of borders and
handling of foreign immigrants and visitors. It would include an assessment of the
readiness of American law enforcement agencies and the state of their intelligence work
against terrorism within the United States. It would analyze the preparedness of
commercial aviation and the FAA. The section would also consider the preparedness of
public and private authorities for site protection and emergency response. Throughout
the report would connect these abstract points to the particular behavior of the attackers,
and how they exploited weaknesses in the system.

A. Borders

1. Passports and Visas

2. Watch Lists
3. Border control
4. Immigration enforcement

B. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Work Inside the United States

1. Domestic Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism, 1976-2001

2. Justice and the FBI (including Phoenix and Minneapolis warnings)
3. State and local law enforcement and intelligence work

C. Information Sharing: Law, Policy, and Technology

D. Aviation Security

4) 9/11

A section on 9/11 could offer a narrative of the attacks themselves, starting with the final
moves of the attackers and the four flights. It would examine the devastation, the
emergency responses, and crisis management in both New York City and at the
Pentagon. This section would also examine the immediate response to the attacks of the
U.S. government and its crisis management efforts, also analyzing related issues of
continuity of government.

A. The Four Flights, including ATC and NORAD issues

B. Devastation

For this portion of the report, and as a lasting memorial and evocation of
what these attacks meant, the Commission could work with survivors and
victims' families to prepare a validated, edited compendium of testimonies
- written or verbal - from those who experienced the attacks first-hand.1

C. The Immediate Response: New York City and Virginia

1. The World Trade Center

2. Emergency Response and Crisis Management: New York City
3. Emergency Response and Crisis Management: The Pentagon and
Virginia
4. Recovery Efforts and Site Control Issues

D. The Immediate Response: The Nation's Leaders

5) Lessons Learned So Far: The Global War on Terrorism Today

Carrying forward the research and investigative work done for the first four themes, this
section could take stock of what has happened and what has already been digested by
public and private agencies, acknowledging the results of two years of mobilized effort.
This section would also offer a general assessment of the current condition of the enemy
and American international and homeland security strategy.

A. International Strategy

1. The war in Afghanistan

2. The international coalition

B. Islamic Transnational Terrorism Today

C. Homeland Security

1 One Navy officer who barely survived the attacks, and was medically discharged because of his injuries,
has pleaded for a chance to work with the Commission. He has written an account of his experiences that
is a model of the testimonies the Commission can help compile, working with others involved in similar
efforts.
6) Recommendations and Reflections

The section could follow with further policy recommendations that go beyond the lessons
already learned, along with careful analysis of the reasoning behind them. In other
words, rather than just state a problem and then offer a set of conclusory
recommendations, the recommendations themselves would be treated as policy ideas that
deserve separate analysis. But the report could also offer some broader thoughts - not
tightly linked to policy - about the terrorist danger, the relationship between that danger
and other aspects of American policy, and the difficulties that are characteristically
encountered in preparing for surprise attacks or catastrophic events.

A. The Danger

B. Past and Future

1. International strategy
2. Institutional capabilities - intelligence, military, covert action,
financial, multilateral opportunities
3. Homeland security, including executive management and
congressional oversight

C. Reflections

1. A new era in world politics and its implications

2. America, terrorism, and the Muslim world
3. Surprise attacks
4. Coping with catastrophes
5. Opportunities
MEMORANDUM

To: Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton

From: Philip Zelikow

Subj: Commission Meeting on February 12

A possible agenda for the meeting might have the following five parts:

I. Scope of the Commission's Work

I can circulate a narrative outline following up on the Commission's discussion at
our first meeting. That outline is previewed in the staffing outline I've attached in
the memo on commission organization.

We would get commissioners' reactions and comments. We could also use that
outline in explaining our plans in our congressional meetings, where we will also
hear reactions and suggestions for the direction of our work.

II. Initial Schedule for Commission Activities

You may wish to consider whether you want to establish a regular schedule for
commission meetings. My suggestion is yes, but limit it to once a month for March and
April. If you schedule more such meetings, with the attendant work in lining up
participants and preparing briefing materials, it will eat up the time of your still
embryonic staff. But that tempo of full commission activity may be able to quicken as
the staff starts hitting its stride.

March session.
• Public hearing in New York City, extending over period of two days.
• Theme: Commission goals.
• Witness groups: (1) Victims/families; (2) State and local leaders; (3) Key
congressional sponsors; (4) President's representative; (5) Briefing on
ASCE/FEMA report; (6) Briefing on McKinsey/FDNY report; (7) ????

April session.
• Private briefings in Washington, covering one or one and a half days.
• Theme: Background information.
• Sessions: (1) Historical overview of US counterterrorism policy and landmark
events, especially since the 80s; (2) Overview of Islamic transnational terrorism;
(3) Counter-terrorism policy community, institutions and players - international
and domestic; (4) Intelligence community; (5) Joint Inquiry findings
III. Commission Process
This is the time for the discussion folks want to have about how tough and rigorous our
investigation should be. This discussion tends to be abstract and philosophical - 'we
want to make a record.' Quite right. But this easily produces a dynamic that tempts
everyone to thump their chest.

Perhaps excepting Lee, I don't think that anyone on the Commission has ever really
conducted an investigation quite like this one — an independent Commission tackling a
volatile subject that is more about policy and history than about crimes or other unlawful
behavior.
• The closest analogies may be the two major Pearl Harbor inquiries (1942, 1945-
46); the 'who lost China' hearings (1949-50); the Brownell committee on
intelligence and the 1950 invasion of South Korea (1951); the special
congressional hearings on US strategy in the Far East and the firing of MacArthur
(1951); the internal presidential investigation into the Bay of Pigs led by Maxwell
Taylor (1961); the Church committee and Rockefeller Commission work on
covert action abuses (1975-76); and the Long Commission on the Beirut bombing
(1984).
• But our effort is different in important ways from all of these precedents.

For the meeting next week, my only big suggestion is this: Avoid getting tied down to
any particular recipe of procedures - yet.

• We will be starting some intricate and sensitive negotiations with the White
House. I'll want to talk to both of you about this soon, and in detail. In these
negotiations, every little detail about modalities will be critical. You'll want to
retain the freedom to negotiate so that we can get the outcomes I think everyone
on the Commission should want.
• The Commission staff will also want the space to work up very specific
procedural suggestions to go with particular kinds of questions, certain kinds of
documents, and varied kinds of people.

IV. Commission Organization and Administrative Issues

These are discussed in the other memo.

V. Press
Timing and location of press availability
Materials to distribute to them
Tom and Lee to speak for the Commission
Preparation for Tom and Lee