The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946

The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946 Author(s): Gi-Wook Shin Source: American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6 (May, 1994), pp. 1596-1624 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782585 . Accessed: 08/10/2013 05:03
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The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946'
Gi-WookShin University ofIowa
This articlepresents a historical view of collective actionwithspeto the role of protest cial attention It arguesthatprior experience. actiondevelops a consciousness thatbecomesa resourcein future action. However, this enhanced consciousnessmust be mobilized through a protest organization foraction to occur. Data on 123 countiesin South Korea show that peasant uprisings in 1946 were functions of the degree of peasant experiencein protestparticularly tenancydisputesin the 1930s-and the effectiveness ofmobilization These findings demonstrate by people'scommittees. in an authoritarian the relevanceof resourcemobilization theory Third World context. In FromMobilizationtoRevolution, CharlesTillyproposesthatthenext agenda fortheories ofcollective actionand social movement, particularly resource mobilization theory, is to build a historical model.According to Tilly, the agenda should show "how a contender's collectiveaction at one pointin timechangesthe conditions whichare relevantto the next round of action," or more specifically, "how the form,intensity, and outcomeof the actionaffect the contender's interests, and organization, mobilization"(1978, pp. 229-30). Scholars of social movements have since respondedto his call: his own (1979) conceptof "repertoires of Tarrow's (1988, 1989) "cyclesof protest," Golden's (1988) contention," role of "historicalmemory," for "social and Taylor's (1989) argument movement efforts continuity" exemplify to providea historical perspective on collective actionand social movement.
l Earlierversions ofthisarticle werepresented at theannualmeeting oftheAmerican Association and at thesemiannual of Sociological (August 1992,Pittsburgh) meeting theKoreanSociological Association (June1993,Ch'unch'6n, Korea).I am very gratefulto Daniel Chirot, BruceCumings, Herbert L. Costner, Jae-OnKim,CharlesW. Mueller, Stephen G. Wieting, ScottEliason,EdwardLawler,and theAJSreviewers fortheir I also thankKo Jong-Wook helpful comments on earlier versions. forhis A professional assistance. development fundfrom the Center forAsian and Pacific Studiesat the University of Iowa aided thisproject.Directall correspondence to Gi-Wook Shin,Department ofSociology, ofIowa, W140SSH, Iowa City, University IA 52242.
1.50 0002-9602/94/9906-0006$0
? 1994byThe University ofChicago.All rights reserved.
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AJS Volume 99 Number6 (May 1994): 1596-1624
of 1946 Uprisings This articlefurther elaboratesthe role of priorprotest experience in lateraction. While generally agreeing withresource mobilization theory that protestmovementsrequire organizationand mobilizationof resources,I emphasize how priorcollectiveaction contributes to movementsby developingconsciousness (whetherclass, political,or collective). Legitimatecritiquescharge the theory"went too far in nearly abandoning the social-psychological analyses" (Klandermans 1984, p. 584) and thatit tendsto confine the rangeof resources to external ones such as "money,access to themedia, and support from powerful organizations" (Turnerand Killian 1987, p. 235). Emphasizingthe historical processof developingconsciousness and the key role this consciousness plays in collectiveaction mitigates such weaknesseswithoutretreating intoearlierpsychological approachessuch as mass-society theory (Arendt 1951; Kornhauser1959), collective behaviortheory (Smelser1963), and relativedeprivation theory (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). The recently published book Frontiersin Social MovementTheory(Morrisand Mueller in future 1992) strongly suggests a similardirection studiesof collective actionand social movement. I use county-level data on the 1946Koreanpeasantuprisings to empirically testthis historical view. Statistical analysisshows that outbreaks acrosstheregionwereindeedfunctions of peasants'degreeof experience in protestand resistancemovements duringthe colonial period, sugin peasantactivism.Yet peasantconsciousness gesting a greatcontinuity raisedthrough colonialprotest experience stillneededto be mobilizedby a protestorganization to inflameuprisings, bearingout the usefulness to liberal of resourcemobilization theory-heretofore "largelyconfined democratic regimes" (Jenkins1983, p. 549)-in a Third Worldauthoritarianpolity.My studydemonstrates thatany comprehensive analytical framework of collectiveaction and social movement mustincludeboth thehistorical formation and itsorganization and mobiliofconsciousness zationforprotest action.
THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Resourcemobilization theory has been criticized forpositing thatdiscontentand collective interests holdfairly constant overtime(McAdam 1982; Mueller 1987; Jenkins1983). McCarthyand Zald state that resource in mobilization theorists "assume thatthereis always enoughdiscontent any societyto supplythe grass-roots supportfora movement" (1977, p. or outsidehelp to of resources 1215) and thenfocuson the importance fordevelopment of collectiveaction. For instance, organizediscontent and Perrowclaim that "discontent is ever-present fordeprived Jenkins groups,but ... collective actionis rarely a viable optionbecause oflack
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American Journal of Sociology of resources.. . . When deprivedgroupsdo mobilize,it is due to the interjection ofexternal resources" (1977, p. 251). Because resource mobilizationtheorists take collective interests and discontent forgranted, the processby which collectiveinterests and discontent are defined or constructed appears nonproblematic and thusgoes unexamined. The theory helps correct earliertheories' (e.g., Davies 1962; Smelser1963) overemphasis on psychological motivations but failsto recognize thatcollective interests are defined collectively and thatthesubjectivemeanings people attachto theirsituations can vary.As McAdam pointsout, "The problem would seem to stemfromthe failureto distinguish objectivesocial conditionsfromtheirsubjectiveperception.. . . Segmentsof society may verywell submitto oppressive conditions unlessthatoppression is collectively defined as bothunjustand subjectto change.In the absence of thesenecessary attributions, oppressiveconditions are likely,even in the face of increasedresources, to go unchallenged" (1982, p. 34; McAdam's emphasis).Marx called thetransformation ofobjectiveto subjective interests the process of becominga real class or "class-for-itself" mustpredateany collective (Balbus 1971);thistransformation action.In Klandermans's(1984) words, "consensusmobilization" should precede "action mobilization"(p. 586). Piven and Cloward's (1977) study of United States, Mc"poor people's movements"in the 20th-century Adam's (1982) of black insurgency from1930 to 1970, Klein's (1984, 1987) of U.S. and West European women's movements, and Hirsch's (1990) ofthe 1985ColumbiaUniversity protest fordivestment from South Africaall show theimportance of consciousness in fomenting social protestmovements. The crucial question,then,is What set of conditions best facilitates of consciousness? the development this does not requirereAnswering course to earliertheories(e.g., Smelser 1963) that focus on irrational, magical beliefsto studythe roleof consciousness. Instead, the historical thatshape consciousness are critical. E. P. Thompson,a British processes as a keyfactor: social historian, citespast political experience "People ... .. . . . . identify interest, experience exploitation, pointsof antagonistic around theseissues. . . . In theprocessof [and] commenceto struggle as classes, theycome to know this struggling theydiscoverthemselves Class and class-consciousness are aldiscoveryas class-consciousness. ways the last, not thefirst, stagein the real historical process"(1978, p. is notstructur149; emphasisadded). For Thompson,class consciousness as structural suchas Althusser Marxists allydetermined byclass position, argue, or to be raised by the elite, as Leninistsclaim, but historically and collectively constructed Sewell's (1980) through politicalexperience. consciousnessand study of the emergenceof a French working-class Bonnell's(1983) comparablestudyof the Russian working class support 1598
of 1946 Uprisings Thompson'sconception of class and class consciousness. Morris(1992), in America as being criticizing previousstudiesof class consciousness "ahistorical and divorcedfrom real groupstruggle," urgesus to examine it as emerging as a social historical processin thecontext ofclass confrontations. Golden (1988) similarly have been able to arguesthatItalian workers mobilizecontinually on the basis of a radical socialisttradition over a of protest periodof time,as "historical memory" keptradicalaims alive. Drawing on an analysisof various formsof protestin Owens Valley, when it California, Walton says that"historical experience, particularly mobilizing participation" (1992, p. 326). Mueller'sanalysisof women's rise to public office also shows thatprevioussocial movements provide resourcesforfuture mobilization, one of the most important resources of collectiveconsciousness" being "development (1987, p. 90). Taylor (1989) says thatan important consequence ofpostwarwomen'sactivism, notthensuccessful due to "nonreceptive though politicalenvironments," was to providethe contemporary women'smovement witha resource of movement "collective McAdam's examcontinuity, identity." Similarly, inationof the "biographical consequences" of the 1964 MississippiFreein it "initiated dom Summer an important Projectrevealsthatexperience that"in turnis processof personalchange and politicalresocialization" a strongpredictor of the subject's activismbetween 1964 and 1970" (1989, pp. 753-54). AlthoughGurr's (1968) now classic cross-national it too is largely based on relative studyof civil strife deprivation theory, in subsequentpolitithatresult facilitates attitudes agreesthatpast strife cal conflict. formation As thesestudiesevince,attention to thehistorical of consciousness to correct a weakthrough protest experience promises ness ofresource oftheroleofconsciousmobilization theory (i.e., neglect behavior.2 ness) without retreating intoclassicaltheories of collective This historically constructed consciousnesscan help a subordinate to the group defineits situationas unjust or oppressive.Yet attention historical ofconsciousness butsupplements formation does notcontradict thecentral ofresource mobilization As discussedabove, argument theory. of disconthekeyexplanatory is theorganization variableforthetheory
2 I am not claiming that development of consciousness is the only possible outcome of previous political action. Such experiencemay influence futurecollectiveaction by changing political opportunitystructures(McAdam 1982) or by providing "activist networks" (McAdam 1989; Taylor 1989) or "repertoiresof collective action" (Tilly 1979). Some scholars conceptualize the relationshipof past protestto futureaction as "cycles of protest"(Tarrow 1988, 1989). Also, experiencesin the workplace and familycan raise the (gender) consciousnessneeded formobilization(Buechler 1990).
is about previous struggles, . . . is elaborated in legend and historical memory . . . and can become an important resource in its own right for
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American Journal of Sociology tent,thatis, the extent to whicha subordinate groupis able to develop protest organization (Gamson 1975;McAdam 1982; McCarthyand Zald ifnoteffec1977;Tilly 1978).Accordingly, evenenhancedconsciousness, tivelyorganizedand mobilized,does not necessarily lead to collective action.Studiesofpeasantprotest and rebellion also provetheimportance of organization and mobilization of peasant consciousness (Paige 1975; Popkin 1979). Klandermans pointsout that"consensus mobilization does not necessarily go together withactionmobilization, . . . [though] action mobilization cannotdo withoutconsensusmobilization" (1984, p. 586). At issue is not whichis morerelevantbut how historically constructed consciousness combines withmobilization efforts of social movement organizations to producecollective action.Neitherconsciousness nororganization alone suffices for collectiveaction, rathertheircombination. What earliercross-national studiesof politicalviolence(e.g., Gurr1968, 1970; Gurrand Duvall 1973) failedto specify is the way consciousness and organization interact action.As Morrisargues, to producecollective is necessary consideration of bothfactors for"a comprehensive explanatoryframework of collectiveaction"(1992, p. 372). In summary, I propose that protestexperiencecan facilitate future collectiveaction by providing a crucial resource,raised consciousness, be it class, political,or collective.Yet raised consciousness alone does notsuffice foractual action;it mustbe mobilized through protest organization. Beforeempirically thisproposition withtheKorean data, testing I will briefly discussKorean peasantactivism in thefirst halfof the 20th century. PEASANT PROTEST AND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL KOREA notrarein Koreanhistory, and uprisings were Although peasantprotests in traditional Korea (see Song et al. [1988] for sporadicand short-lived the 1862 peasant rebellions and Lew [1990] forthe 1894 peasant wars). However, the first half of the 20th century, especiallyafter1920, witnessed more frequent and sustainedrural conflict and protestthat affectedmore of the rural population,peasants and landlordsalike. Of weretenancy between1920and 1939,the particular importance disputes 1930s red peasant union movement, and "everdayforms of resistance" duringthe war years, 1940-44.3 First, tenantprotests against landlordsin the 1920s and 1930s prevailed in southern commercialized areas, becoming"constantphenomin the wordsof the colonialgovernment. ena" in ruralsociety, Colonial
I confine mydiscussion ofcolonial and resistance to theSouth. peasantprotest
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of 1946 Uprisings 397,281 involving government records report a totalof 140,969disputes, in tenantsand landlordsfrom1920 to 1939, more than 85% occurring the South (Ch6sen sotokufu1934, 1940a). Rent reductionand secure tenancyrightswere the major tenantdemands. Forms of disputation varied fromsimpleverbal arguments to individuallaw suits to radical Whilethecharacter ofthedisputes protests involving violenceand arrest. in the early1920s and afterthe changedover time(e.g., moreoffensive in theintervening depression years;see Shin early1930s,moredefensive tenants'growing consciousness 1990, 1993), theyprimarily sprangfrom of theirinterests, 1940a, pp. especiallyafter1933 (see Chosen sotokufu A colorights. 6-7), and often loweredrentalratesand securedtenancy nial government surveyshows that from1933 to 1938 rentalrates decreasedan averageof 2% in the South,withthedisputesa major impea change in authority relationsin rural Korea (Chosen tus, signifying s6tokufu as Mueller(1987) argues,pro1940b;Shin 1993). Furthermore, testmovement outcomesshould be evaluatedin termsof theirrelationin thatsense, as is now well recognized, one ship to future movements; was movements important outcomeof 1920s and 1930s tenantprotest thedevelopment political consciousness (Kang 1989;Shin ofparticipants' movement from1930 to 1939 differed The red peasant union protest regionaland class base, and demands: from tenantprotests in character, it involvedsmall landowners withtaxes and public so heavilyburdened dues thattheywereon thevergeofbecoming especially landlesstenants, local duringthe depressionyears of the early 1930s. They confronted demanding changesin tax policyand progovernment officials directly, in villageaffairs, schools such as raidson night testing policeinterference organizedby red peasant unions were (Shin 1991; Yoo 1974). Protests more radical, oftenentailingviolence and arrest.For instance,when in March 1932 about 300 union members in Yangsan countyof South was killedand 200 attackedthe police station,one member Ky6ngsang invited severerepresarrested. Radicalization oftheredunionmovement ofunionsin southern comsion by thecolonialgovernment, particularly thought" by mercializedareas, considered the "front line of communist the government destroyed (Yoo 1974, p. 270). Unions were commonly Amongthe 123 southern by the police in an early stage of formation. redunions.Whilemostredunions counties considered here,32 organized met colonial police repression and theirprotest movements were forced underground duringthe war years,manyunion leaders came to figure in theorganization ofpostwarpeasantunions(nongmin choprominently (inminwiwonhoeor PCs; see An 1990; hap) and people's committees
Ch6ng 1988; Cumings 1981). 1993).
During the war years (1940-44) overtand collectiveprotestbecame 1601
American Journalof Sociology In efforts difficult. to mobilizeresources (humanand material) for"total war," the colonialgovernment adoptedveryrepressive policiesand outlawed collectiveprotest (Eckert 1994). It also attempted to exact crops fromthe peasantsto supplement the armyfoodsupply.Faced withthe militarist colonial regime,Korean peasants resorted to "everdayforms of resistance," to use Scott's(1985) term,such as hidingcrops,changing crops into nonextractable theirdiscontent ones, or expressing through folksongs.In 1944,forinstance,70% of households in a villageof Haenam county of South Ch6lla province successfully hid halfof theircrops in collection avoidance (Kim 1981). Although thesekindsof covertand in written noncollective resistance went largelyunrecorded documents, a 1942 reportby the U.S. consul generalin Seoul supportsclaims that rice collection resistance was widespreadin the country (Quarton 1942). The reportalso indicatesthese everydayformsof resistancenurtured Korean peasants' "spiritof resistance."Furthermore, peasants' experience of landlord collaborationwith Japanese war mobilization efforts provokedstrong nationalist feeling, whichemerged as a primefactor in postwarradicalism.Thus, peasantresistance thewar yearsoffers during a criticalbridgebetweencolonial activismand postwarradicalism.In Taylor'susage, thewar yearswerea periodof "abeyance,. . . a holding in nonreceptive processby whichmovements sustainthemselves political environments and providecontinuity fromone stage of mobilization to another"(1989, p. 761). in variousforms Peasants' experience of protest and resistance during the colonial period influenced the course of peasant organization and subsequentmobilizationinto postwar uprisings.In particular,tenant protestsand the red peasant union movementin the 1930s increased participants' politicalconsciousness, whichwas kept alive through passive formsof resistance to duringthe war years and then contributed thatissues and targets of colonial postwaractivism.It is no coincidence period protestand resistancereemerged, thoughin more radical and in postwarpeasant uprisings. violentforms, DECOLONIZATION AND KOREAN PEASANTSIN POLITICS WiththeJapanesedefeatin August1945,Koreanpeasants,likepeasants in most otherpostcolonialsocieties(e.g., Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991), a new social and politicalorder.Theyorganized soughta partin forming and district the county levels down to the peasant unionsand PCs from village level and dominatedlocal politicsin many regions.One report countspeasant unions in 188 counties,1,745 districts, and 25,288 vilof 3,322,937 by November 1945, less lages, with a total membership thanthreemonths after liberation (Pak 1987,p. 382). Although perhaps 1602
of 1946 Uprisings exaggerated,these figures suggestthat an average of one person per peasant householdjoined the unions. Yet no nationalorganization fomented thisrapidgrowth; peasantunionswerelocalizedand their organizational strength and radicalismvaried greatly. Radical unionsquickly triedto dispossessJapaneseand Korean landlords.Some members even beat and thenjailed landlords,former policemen, and government officials who had collaborated withtheJapanese.Moderatesworkedto reform tenancy relations, rents,and thelike. Peasantsalso became activein PCs, a major grass-roots politicalorganizationin liberated Korea. Immediately after liberation, nationalist and Y6 communist leaders headed by Unhy6ngorganizedthe Committee for the Preparationof Korean Independence(Chos6n k6n'guk chunbi wiw6nhoe) to preserve"peace and order" and "prepare for independence" (Cumings 1981, chap. 3). In Septemberthe committee transformed intothe Korean People's Republic(Chos6ninminkongwhaguk), withPCs an important local politicsin suborganization thatdominated in the fallof 1945. PC class composition manypartsof the country was were peasants,workers and even a few eclectic;thoughmostmembers landlordsbelonged(An 1990). PCs and peasant unionscollaborated, ofin common.Most PC leaders were ten sharingmembers or even offices of local origin,with colonial period experiences in social and political movements such as the March FirstIndependencemovement, peasant protestmovements, labor movements, studentand youthmovements, and the Sin'ganhoe(An 1990, pp. 102-5; Ch6ng 1988, pp. 37-44). Autumn 1945 saw PCs organizedin all but seven countiesin the South. Yet, as withunions,organizational strength variedgreatly, whichclosely relatedto outbreaks ofuprisings a yearlater,as shownbelow. According to Cumings(1981), among the 123 countiesconsidered here,seven had one no PC, 55 a nongoverning committee (NGPC), and 61 a governing a PC or witha NGPC, former (GPC).4 In countieswithout government officials and landed elitesstillstrongly influenced local policies. For inof North Ch6lla provinceand Miryangof South stance, in Chong-up Ky6ngsangprovince"landed elements"remainedpowerfulenough to prevent the emergence of strong GPCs (see Cumings[1981],chap. 9 for detailson the committees). In sharp contrast, in countieswith a GPC, the PC functioned as a de factogovernment taxes and maintaining social order.For collecting at the instance,a South Ch6lla provincepeasant union representative oftheNational League ofPeasantUnions(Ch6n'guk openingconvention
in whichPCs assumedgovernmental 4 Figure5 in Cumings (1981)liststhecounties thefateofPCs in theSouth(see chap. 9). Regarding functions. Cumings also details in theNorth, see Kim (1989). suchcommittees 1603
American Journal of Sociology in Seoul, December8, 1945,reported nongmin chohapch'ongy6nmaeng) that provincepeasants refused district officials' ordersand obeyedonly the PC's (Kim 1974, 2:158-59). He also said peasants controlled most An American official in theprovince policestations. military government agreed that "all governmental agencies became powerless,"and that PCs "preservedthe peace and collectednecessarytaxes," preventing "looting,bloodshed,and rioting" (Meade 1951, pp. 56-71). Some PCs even "took a census,""assembledothervital statistics," and had armed defense units, posing a "threatto military government" (U.S. Army [1948] 1988,3:250). These observations oflocal politics in liberated Korea limn Charles Tilly's conceptionof a "revolutionary situation":"previofthatpopulation find themselves confronted ouslyacquiescent members with strictly demands fromthe government and forman incompatible alternative body claimingcontrolover . . . or . . . to be the government. . . . Those previouslyacquiescentpeople obey the alternative well thepoliticalscene of the body"(1978, p. 192). Again, thisdescribes areas PCs governed. But upon American local politicschanged.The American occupation, in Korea suppressed military government thesepoliticalgroups,accusing It declaredall politithemof Soviet-backed NorthKoreanmanipulation. cal organizations, including PCs, dissolvedand requiredthemto obtain new legal permission from themilitary government. OftenPC members werefired from and even arrested; forinstance, on government positions November 15, 1945, in Namw6n countyof NorthCh6lla provincefive PC leaders were arrested, and in March 1946, the countyexecutiveof in SouthCh6lla province, Haenam county a PC member, was fired bythe Such suppression military government. provokedstrongreactionfrom committee as in Namw6n where14-15 thousandpeople demmembers, onstrated againstthe arrestof theirleaders,withthreekilledby police fire.Yet such protest was just a foretaste of cominguprisings. such as PCs, the military While suppressing popular organizations and even reframework government kept the Japanese governmental storedgovernment officials who had served under the Japanese. The Japanese economic agencies the OrientalDevelopmentCompany and Chosen Food Distributing Company were revived as the New Korea Company(NKC) and Korean Commodity Company,respectively (U.S. Army1988, 3:142-43). About 85% of the notorious Korean policemen who had "recordsof brutality in arresting and torturing theirfellow were retainedand continuedto abuse theirpower under countrymen" Americanauspices (Henderson1968,p. 85). Korean peasants,of course, restoration ofthecolonialsystem ofcollaboregarded and reappointment rators as unjustand illegitimate. to keypositions By thefallof 1946,just before the Octoberuprisings, the Southalone saw 81 police stations and 1604
Uprisings of 1946 23 government agenciesraided. These werealso themain targets during the uprisings. Furthermore, the military government ignoredpeasant demands for land reform and insteadreestablished the hatedJapaneserice collection policy, supposedly to support theurbanpopulation. This collection policy deepened peasant grievances.As a peasant in Kangw6n provincesaid, "Since we wentthrough theterrible yearsundertheJaps,we have been to be patient withthecurrent trying situation.... But how long should we stand this poverty?" (Hansong ilbo, June 24, 1946). Police involvementin rice collection further exacerbatedpeasant discontent, as peasants complainedricewas exacted"muchin the same [way]as underthe Japanese,"but "treatment receivedwas much worse." Many peasants believed that theirrice quota was unfairand that rice collectionwas controlled and manipulatedby reactionary landlordsand collaborators with police support.Peasants oftenrefusedto yield rice to collection officials and police:in 1946only12.6% ofthescheduled ricewas collected (Hwang 1987). had muchabout ClearlyKoreansin generaland peasantsin particular whichto complain:reestablishment of theold Japanesesystem, delay in social and land reform, continued abuse of police power,ricecollection, ricerationing, and so on. Peasantsexpressed theirdiscontent and grievances in disputeswithlandlords,opposition to rice collection, and raids the on government forms of contention agencies,all familiar throughout colonial period. Then in the fall of 1946 theyexplodedinto the major Korea. uprisings of 20th-century
THE 1946 UPRISINGS
The uprisings began on October1, 1946,whenabout 300 railroadworkers in Taegu, a major cityin centralSouth Korea, went on strike,deSometimethat day the police killed a mandingincreasedrice rations.5 striker. ofOctober2, a crowdofmorethan1,000carried On themorning the cityand raided the citypolice the body of the slain striker through had 50 policemen.By October6, 38 Taegu policemen station,capturing been killed;martiallaw was declaredand Americantankspatrolledthe streets. in thecountryThe sparksfrom Taegu ignited elsewhere, particularly nearTaegu, for an estimated side. In Y6ngch'6ncounty, instance, 10,000 thecounty executive attackedthecounty protesters policestation, killing
in thespring strike foodprotests and summer and a general 5Although sporadic by
in Pusan, convention railroad workers at the end of September erupted places the here. at Taegu in October as described onsetofuprisings
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American Journalof Sociology and manyotherofficials and policemen who had servedunderJapanese rule but retainedtheirpositions due to the Americans.They also killed some 20 "reactionaries and evil landlords"(Cumings1981, p. 358). As discussedabove, mostKoreansdeemedtheseformer and collaboofficials rativelandlordsunjust and illegitimate. Accordingly, the major targets of attack were big landlords,police stations,local government offices, and rice collectionagencies such as the NKC. About 5,000 protesters seized countygovernment controlat Uis6ng; another2,000 raided the thepolicechiefand wrecking Waegwan police station, killing thehomes of 50 police and county at Hwanjung overofficials. Also, 400 protesters ran theNKC warehouse, burning all records ofriceand graincollections. The protesters were primarily local peasants,mostof themaffiliated withpeasant unionsand PCs. For instance,the Uisong police chiefreportedthatof thenineleadersin the Uis6ng protest, fivebelongedto the local PC, two to the People's Partybranch,one to the countypeasant school teacher(Cumings 1981, p. union, and one was an unaffiliated 358). Peasants oftenbrandished and clubs, sticks,farming implements, as well as rifles and pistolsconfiscated from raided police stations (U.S. Army1988, 3:347-64). theurbanstrike in Taegu initiated theaction,peasantstransAlthough thestrike formed intoa major uprising.6 Revoltspreadintothecountryside in NorthKy6ngsang thenin SouthKy6ngsang, province, Southand NorthCh'ungch'6ng, and South and NorthCh6lla provinces. Ky6nggi, By the end of 1946 some 40 counties,or about 30% of South Korean There was littleindication of nacounties,witnessed peasant uprisings. tionalorganization behindthe disturbances, exceptperhapsin the early stages of the Taegu outbreak(Ch6ng 1988; Cumings 1981). Major demandsand issuesstressed local problems, such as "theauthority of colonial police,brutalgraincollection ofgrainbylandlords policies,hoarding and rich peasants, and the systematic of the local people's suppression committee structure" (Cumings1981,p. 367). No accuratecountof paror casualtiesexists, ticipants butestimates about2.3 million suggest (most of thempeasants)engagedin the uprisings, and about 1,000 protesters 200 policemen were killed,and another were arrested. 30,000 protesters The 1946 uprisings were the largestand mostsignificant moveprotest ment of Korean peasants since the 1894 Tonghak peasant wars; they need forsocial and politicalreform, clearlyshowedtheurgent especially land reform.
6
To be sure,the uprising in a general involveda mass of workers and students in postcolonial revolt forces Korea. However, population against procolonial thriving of protesters becausethemajority werepeasantsand becausemuchof thedata for citiesare unavailable or incompatible withrural data, thisstudy analyzes onlyrural uprisings.
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Uprisings of 1946 How can we explainsuch massiveand violentmobilization of Korean How were theirdiscontent peasants into the uprisings? and grievances In line with organizedand mobilizedinto politicalprotest movements? thehistorical view ofcollective actionadvancedabove, I hypothesize that theaforementioned in protest colonialexperience and resistance provided postwar activisma crucial resource,that is, enhanced consciousness, which PCs thenmobilizedforthe uprisings To by organizing protests. be sure, some previousworks on postwarKorean peasant radicalism (e.g., Ch6ng 1988; Cumings1981; Kang 1989) make similarpoints,but no rigorous empirical testhas been done. For instance,Cumings(1981), stillthe best work on thisissue, simplypresents a bivariatecorrelation between red peasant union presence in the 1930s and postwar PC strength, with some supporting instances.Such a crude methodis not onlyliable to producea spuriousrelationship but omitsanothercrucial protest experience: tenancy disputes.In the restof thisarticleI employ a multivariate statistical analysisofcounty-level data on peasantactivism and relatedsocioeconomic variables in colonial and postwar Korea to testthe historical proposition detailedabove.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT
The analysis draws upon county-level data collectedby the Japanese colonial government and Americanmilitary intelli(Chosen sotokufu) data is siggence(primarily compiledby Cumings[1981]). County-level nificant because thecounty (kun)in Korea has historically been an important administrativeunit and even today remains an "economic, and politicalunit" (Kim 1990, p. 63). Also, red peasant socio-cultural, unionsof the 1930sand peasantunionsand PCs in thepostwarera were level. Furthermore, the county is a muchmore organizedat the county homogeneousunit (with an average populationof 138,000 people per in 1945,excluding a unitfrequently county Seoul) thanthenation-state, used in comparative studiesof rebellions and revolutions (Boswell and Dixon 1990; Gurr 1968; Muller 1985; Russet 1964; Walton and Ragin 1990),and thusmitigates a common withaggregate data: spuriproblem ous ecologicalcorrelation. I analyze 123 countiesin the South,omitting relevant data available; citiesare also excludedsince onlya fewwithout to rural uprisings my analysisis confined (the appendix lists included counties). DependentVariable The dependentvariable, UPRISE, measureswhethera countyhad a 1946 peasant uprising.Cumingsassesses peasant radicalismby giving
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American Journal of Sociology people's committee, 3 for a red peasant "2 units for a non-governing in theautumn unionin the 1930s,6 fora GPC, 8 forevidenceofuprising rebellious" uprisingsin 1946, and 10 for countiesjudged particularly and subjectivescale forparticular (1981, p. 453). Besides its arbitrary foroccurrence politicalactivities (e.g., Whysixunitsfora GPC and eight of uprising?), existence of a red peasant unionin the 1930s and a PC in in uprisings and empirically separatedfrom 1945 shouldbe conceptually I treat red union experienceas a 1946 (see also n. 13). Accordingly, and a PC as a variable affecting the impactof past separate predictor political experience(in eithertenancydisputes or red peasant union movements) on uprising.I decomposeCumings'sradicalismindex and assign values to the variable UPRISE by giving"1" forevidenceof a since no other in a givencounty, 1946 uprising and "O" forno uprising of on theuprisings, such as thenumber precisecounty-level information casualties,is available. Independent Variables (1) DISin protest: Two indicators measurethedegreeofpast experience disputesfrom1933 to 1939 recordedby PUTE, the numberof tenancy theJapanesecolonialgovernment (Ch6sensotokufu 1940a)and (2) RADICAL, a radicalismindex of red peasant unionsin the 1930s.7 Since no data existto measurethescale of red peasantunionprotest quantitative (e.g., numberof casualties),I createdthe radicalismindexby assigning "1" formere existenceof a red a value of "O" forno union existence, peasant union, "2" for evidence of protest,and "3" for protestwith This information comesfrom violence.8 Japanesecourtand police docu(forthe ments(such as Shis6 ih6 and Shiso geppo)as well as newspapers index see Shin [1991], app. 1). A large numberof disputesand a high indexindicatea highproportion ofpeasantswith value on theradicalism coeffiprotestexperience duringthe colonial period. A low correlation cientbetweenthetwo measures(r = -.01, NS) indicates theyrepresent of Koreanpeasants.Due two distinct experience typesof colonialprotest
7 Tenancy disputes occurred from 1920to 1939,butdata on thenumber prior to 1933 existonlyat theprovincial of tenancy level. Sincea similar geographic distribution disputes appeared the1920sand 1930s, shouldnot throughout however, mymeasure distort theoverallpattern ofthedisputes, (Shin1990).Other measures suchas scale or intensity, are also unavailable at thecounty level.In addition, becausefewwritten records depictthe degreeof "everyday of resistance" the war years, forms during doesnotseemto distort the these yearsmustbe omitted from This omission analysis. findings presented below. 8 An analysis notreported herethatused an indexbased solely on theexistence ofa redpeasantunionin the 1930syielded similar results.
1608
of 1946 Uprisings to its nonlinear relationship withthedependent variable,I convert DISPUTE intoa logarithmic scale. Intervening Variable As thePC was themainform ofprotest organization to mobilizepeasants I use itsstrength forthe 1946uprisings, as a variableaffecting theimpact of dispute and protestexperienceon uprisings.9 As discussed above, countiesfall into threecategories:those with no PC (N = 7), with a NGPC (N = 55), and witha GPC (N = 61). In counties witha NGPC, landed elitesstrongly influenced local politics,rendering the PC powerless as a protest organization. Onlyin counties witha GPC could thePC in theuprisings. be a force difference Also, no significant obtainsbetween the first two typesin termsof othervariablesincludedin this analysis. For these reasons,I collapse the first two categories, separatingthem from the third."0 Thus, thevariableGPC has thevalue "1" fora county witha GPC and "0" otherwise (forthedata on PCs as well as population see Cumings[1981, app. D]). change,tenancy rates,and paddy fields, ControlVariables I introduce postwar era population change as a control variable (POPCHG), since some claim its positiveeffect on the 1946 uprisings. of social mobilization, forinstance, Using Karl Deutsch's (1961) theory Cumings (1981) argues that Korean peasants who migratedto Japan, ideoloManchuria,and northern industrial areas wereexposedto "leftist gies" and experienceda process of "social mobilization."These mito homevillagesafter grants, upon return liberation, agitatedthe uprisings. RevisingCumings'smeasure(i.e., populationchangefrom1944 to 1946),I assesstheimpactofsocial mobilization bysubtracting population changein the 1930-40 periodfrom population changein thepostwarera (1944-46). Populationchangeseems a good measureof social mobilization since the nearly20% increasein populationwithinone year after liberation is well above a naturalincrease. Tenancy rate (TENANCY) is controlled since it allegedlyinfluences
9 To includepeasantunionstrength in the analysis would be interesting. Unfortudetailed information on county-level nately, peasant unions is lacking, though we can safely assume, as discussed above,that PC strength in general reflected peasant union powerin a givencounty (see Cumings 1981). 10Werethere sufficient a PC, comparison tocounties counties without withan NGPC and witha GPC wouldbe useful. The smallnumber of cases (N = 7) makessuch comparison oflittle meaning. 1609
American Journal of Sociology peasantactivism.Some arguethata tenancy system provokes revolutionary peasant movements (Paige 1975; Stinchcombe 1961; Zagoria 1974). According to Paige (1975),thesharecropper ortenant possessescharacteristicsconduciveto class conflict thatare similarto thoseof the working class: weak ties to theland, occupationalhomogeneity, and workgroup interdependence. In contrast, Alavi (1965), Wolf (1969), and Hofheinz (1977) view middlepeasantsas revolutionary, because theexistence of a tenancysystemindicatesa strong landed power that mighthinderthe organization and mobilization of the tenantclass into a protestmovement.The extentof the tenancysystem is measuredby the percentage of arable land leased in bothpaddy and dryfields in 1945. Market incursion into peasant villagesis also oftenconsideredto be partlyresponsible forpeasant uprisings (Hobsbawm 1959; Migdal 1974; Scott 1976; Wolf 1969). Thus, I include in my analysis the spread of capitalist market forces intoagriculture, as denotedby thepercentage of totalarable land used in 1945as paddyfields (PADDY)-site ofthemain commercial cropin colonialKorea, rice(from1931 to 1940,37.2% of its yieldwas exported to Japan); mostsubsistence cropssuch as beans and wheat were cultivated in dryfields(Suh 1978).1" Modernizationtheorists argue that risingliteracypromotespolitical participation by breakingdown traditionalworldviews(Levy 1966), whereas Scott (1976) and Wolf (1969) claim that peasants with such "entrenched values" (i.e., low literacy) precapitalist become rebellious. Chirotand Ragin (1975) arguethatneither low literacy nor commercialization but theircombinedeffect fosters rebellion:only where market forcesare strongbut peasants remaintraditional is rural unresthigh. The literacy rate(LITERACY) is measuredby thepercentage ofpeasant householdmemberswho can read Korean. Since no literacy rate data are available for1945,Japanesecolonialgovernment 1938 data are used (Chosen sotokufu1940b);I assume no significant change from1938 to 1945. The dichotomous natureof the dependentvariable (uprisingvs. no of ordinary least squares regression, uprising)violates the assumptions thusrequiring use of logistic regression analysis(Hanushekand Jackson 1977). Table 1 presents the variables'means and standarddeviations. ANALYSIS RESULTS Table 2 presents oflogistic theresults of thevariables.Model regression 1 shows the logisticregression coefficients of UPRISE on the structural
1" Sincefewcrops in 1945and 1946,thismeasure werecommercialized better reflects thedegree in theprewar ofcommercialization period.
1610
Uprisings of 1946
TABLE 1
MEANS Variable AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS Definition OF VARIABLES Mean SD
DISPUTE ................ POPCHG (%) ........... TENANCY .............. PADDY ................ LITERACY (%) ........ RADICAL ............... GPC ................ UPRISE ................
NOTE.-N = 123.
Numberof tenancy disputes,1933-39 Populationchange 1944-46 - population change 1930-40 Percentage of arable land leased, 1945 Percentage of arable land used as paddy fields,1945 Literacyrate, 1938 Index of red unionmovement in 1930s in 1945 Governing people's committee in 1946 Peasant uprising
864 15.5 68.5 59.3 30.9 .37 .50 .33
714 8.8 9.6 11.5 10.8 .72 .50 .47
variables (i.e., POPCHG, TENANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY) without thetwo earlierexperience measures(i.e., DISPUTE and RADIare CAL). This step shows whether the variablesmeasuring experience independent of the conditions in othertheories identified of peasant protestand rebellion. Model 1 showsthatTENANCY has a highly negative on UPRISE, being statistically effect at cx = .01, and the significant alone seem to supportthe middlepeasant thesisand commercialization of theory: the existenceof a strong landed class hinderedmobilization it. whereascommercialization peasantsforuprising promoted Model 2 introduces two major independent variables,DISPUTE and of these two RADICAL, into model 1. This model shows the effects for POPCHG, TENexperiencemeasures on UPRISE, controlling ANCY, PADDY, and LITERACY. Both measures, DISPUTE and on UPRISE; the former RADICAL, have weak positiveeffects impact significantly improvesafteradding these two experience measures;the in modelchi-squareis 5.4 (df = 2) and statistically difference significant tive in model 2 but the commercialization effect becomes statistically nonsignificant. To see whether the strength of a protest as measuredby organization ofpast experience on uprising, a GPC mediates any,evenifweak, effects model.If therelationship between thisfactor is introduced intothethird is entirely mediatedthrough exismeasuresand uprising past experience tence of a GPC, logisticcoefficients of both measureswould reduce to variable. nearlyzero afterintroducing GPC as an additionalpredictor 1611
at cx = . 10. The effectof TENANCY on UPRISE remains highly negais significantat cx = . 10, the latter at cx = .15. Also, model chi-square effectof PADDY is positive and significantat cx = . 10. These findings
American Journal of Sociology Also, coefficients ofpast experience measures on GPC would be expected to be significant and thecoefficient ofGPC on UPRISE to be significantly positive.Model 3 and table 3 present the results. Existenceofa GPC does notseemto mediatetheeffects ofpast experience measureson uprising.First,logisticcoefficients of both measures (DISPUTE and RADICAL) become statistically nonsignificant at cx = .10 and cx = .20, respectively, afterintroducing the organization variable. As expected,GPC also shows a significant on UPpositiveeffect RISE. However, measuresof past protest experience have no significant effects on GPC, as table 3 shows. These findings suggestthateffects of on uprisingare at best accountedforbut not past politicalexperience mediatedby a GPC.
TABLE
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS DESCRIBING
2
EFFECTS ON UPRISE
PREDICTORS'
Model 1 Constant .......................... DISPUTE

RADICAL
Model 2 .704 (2.192) 1.371* (.804)

.446
Model 3 .838 (2.249) 1.322 (.840) .383 (.307) .019 (.015) -. 100*** (.036)
.019
Model 4 6.103 (5.052) -.471 (1.328) .024 (.737) .077*** (.029)

-.124
(log) .................
......................
3.668 (1.667) . . .
. . .
POPCHG
TENANCY PADDY LITERACY GPC
.........................
...................... ....................... ......................
.013 (.013)
-.097***
(.032)
.042*
(.294) .014 (.014) -.099*** (.034)

.027
(.040)
.016
(.023)
-.020
(.025)
-.024
(.027)
-.024
(.071)
-.041
(.021)
.......................... (log) X GPC .......... ............. ...... ....... ... ... ...
...
(.022)
... ... ...
...
(.022)
.972**
(.133)
- 7.801
(.473)
DISPUTE RADICAL POPCHG PADDY 2 ... ...
.. .
(4.759)
3.720*
(1.703)
x GPC x GPC .586
(.832)
-.093*
(.034)
x LITERACY ... ... ... .001
(.002) ........................... 24.3*** 29.7*** 34.1*** 48.6***
NOTE -SEs in parentheses; N = 123 * P < .10. ** P < .05.

***
P <
01-all
one-tailed
1612
of 1946 Uprisings My foregoing theoretical reasoning holdsthatalthough protest experiencesraiseparticipants' consciousness, suchconsciousness alone maynot foment uprising. The contribution of consciousness turnsupon whether it is effectively organizedand mobilized by a protest organization. Thus, we should findeffects of interaction betweenpast experience measures and the existence of a GPC; onlywhen protest experience is mobilized through a protest organization would it contribute to collectiveaction. Model 4 in table 2 presents the resultsof a logisticregression of UPI includefourinteraction RISE withpossibleinteraction terms. termsin the equation: DISPUTE x GPC, RADICAL x GPC, POPCHG x GPC, and PADDY x LITERACY.12 This nonadditivemodel offers in betterspecification than the additive one (model 3); the difference model chi-squareis statistically significant at cx= .01 (X2 = 14.5, df = 4). Also, if we examine individualinteraction terms(model 4), of the two protest experience measures, DISPUTE has a statistically significant of 3.72, P positiveinteraction effect with GPC on UPRISE (coefficient < .05) but RADICAL does not. Also, POPCHG has a statistically significant interaction effect withGPC, thoughit is negative(coefficient of effect obtains betweenPADDY and -.093, P < .01). No interaction LITERACY. These resultssupportthe claim that tenancydispute experiencein the 1930s contributed to the 1946 uprising when mobilizedby a protest does not a GPC. Red peasantunionmovement organization, experience show the same result.Such an insignificant effect of red peasant union movement is nottoo surprising, however,giventhatthismovement prevailed in the North(see Yoo 1974). It is also perhapsrelatedto the fact suffered severecolonial government thatred peasant union movements of repression repression; thischillymemory may have impededpostwar As Scott'sstudyofpeasantrebelpeasantorganization and mobilization. lion in SoutheastAsia of the 1930spointsout: "The tangibleand painful memories of repression musthave a chilling effect on peasantswho coneven minor It maywell be thattheexperience template acts ofresistance. of defeatforone generation ofpeasantsprecludes until another rebellion of the principalexplanationsforthe absence of resistanceand revolt" (1976,pp. 226-27). Similarmemories ofsuppression amongKoreanpeasants may be responsible forthe insignificant effect of the red peasant unionmovement on theuprisings (see Muller[1985],Mullerand Seligson of repression's inhib[1987], and Gurr [1968] fora generalexplanation itingeffect on politicalviolence).
12
a new generation has replaced it.
. .
. The memory of repression is one
The rationale to include POPCHG x GPC is discussed below. 1613
American Journal of Sociology

TABLE
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS EFFECTS
3
DESCRIBING ON GPC
PREDICTORS'
Variable Constant ................. DISPUTE (log) .......... RADICAL ................ ................. POPCHG TENANCY .............. PADDY .................. LITERACY .............. 2x...............
= 123. NOTE.-N * P < .10.
Coefficient SE -2 .622 .887 .297 -.014 -.025 .037* -.009 1.951 .637 .2 76 .012 .02 7 .022 .019
9.0
ofthefindings relateto previousstudies.First,populaOtherfeatures on eitheruprisings tion change exertsno significant effect (see models 1-3 in table 2) or PC strength (see table 3), contradicting Cumings's Yet it has a strongnegativeinteraction effect with (1981) argument.13 GPC on uprisings (see model 4 in table 2): thisindicatesthatthe effect witha GPC thanforcounties ofpopulation changeis weakerforcounties ofthePOPCHG coefficients forsepawithout.Specifically, examination rate subsamplesof countieswith and withouta GPC shows that the ofpopulation and significant forcounties without effect changeis positive forcountieswitha GPC (this a GPC but is negativeand nonsignificant is also seen by deviatingthe interaction coefficient fromthe POPCHG in table 4). coefficient A basic assumption of social mobilization theory suggests why thisis so: social mobilization can influence thepoliticalbehaviorofpeople"who live in areas in whichthe mass of populationare largelyexcludedfrom withit "an expansionof the politipoliticalparticipation," by bringing strataof thepopulation"(Deutsch 1961,p. 499). The data callyrelevant confirm thiseffect. witha GPC in 1945 had peasObservethatcounties ants much moreactive in politicsin the 1930s than thosewithout.For instance, countieswitha GPC averaged960 tenancy disputesper county from1933 to 1939, whereascountieswithout averaged770 disputes;the difference is statistically the significant (t = 1.48, P < . 10). Similarly,
13 This is not surprising, as almost all PCs were organizedbeforemostmigrantsbegan to return to their home villages (Trewartha and Zelinsky 1955). Cumings (1981), combiningPC strength with the occurrenceof rebellionto create an index of peasant radicalism, cannot separate the effectof population change on each. This flaw also recommendsmy dependent variable measure above Cumings's.
1614
Uprisings of 1946
TABLE 4
COMPARISON BETWEEN KY6NGSANG AND CHULLA PROVINCES Tenancy Rate (%) 57.9 61.8 72.2 81.1 68.5 Counties withUprising (%) 82 35 30 15 33
Province North Ky6ngsang ............... South Ky6ngsang ............... South Ch6lla ..................... North Ch6lla ..................... All counties analyzed ..........
N 22 17 20 13 123
Uprising Started Early October Mid-October Late October Mid-December
NOTE.-N indicatesnumberof countiesanalyzed; bottomrow includesdata not just forKy6ngsang and Ch6lla provinces but forall countiesincludedin thisstudy(see appendixforlist).
in theradicalism difference indexof thered peasantunionmovement of the 1930s betweencountieswithand without a GPC is statistically sigthat,in countieswithout a GPC and wherepeasantshad relatively little politicalexperience duringthe colonial period,returning who migrants had experienced"social mobilization"provided "politicallyrelevant" stratafortheuprisings. In thismanner theexistence ofa significant effect of social mobilization (measuredby relativepopulationchange)onlyin counties without a GPC makessense. (Model 4 in table 2 showsa logistic regression coefficient of .077 [P < .01] forcounties without a GPC [i.e., GPC = Q].)14 In a secondfinding thatbearson previousstudies, tenancy rateconsistently exertsa highly on uprising, negativeeffect statistically significant in both additiveand nonadditive models(see table 2). This finding contradicts the class conflict modelprediction is more thata tenancy system likelyto provoke revolutionary movements (Paige 1975; Stinchcombe 1961) and insteadsupportsthe middlepeasant thesis(Alavi 1965; Wolf 1969). Given thatin Korea the tenancy rate was highin areas withbig landlords who controlled a substantial amountofland, a highrateprobably indicatesa strong landed class. One can suppose thatin such areas the landed class could hinderthe organization of peasand mobilization ants foruprisings (Cumings1981). Yet the persistence of a highly of tenancyrate on upnegativeeffect risingcannot merelybe attributed to stronglanded power. For, if so, it should have wielded a similarlysignificant negative effecton PC That is, existence of strong strength. landed class shouldhave hindered
14 This also illuminates Cumings's insufficiently explained findingthat population change is responsibleforrebellionsonly in 41 counties. See Cumings (1981), table 12.
nificantat cx = .10 (t = 1.43). Going one step further, it seems plausible
1615
American Journalof Sociology PCs fromobtaining governing positions; althoughnegative,its effect is not statistically significant (see table 3). The highlynegativeeffect of tenancyrate on uprising but not on PC strength thatthe effect suggests on uprising maysimply indicatea regional difference between theKy6ngsang and the Ch6lla provinces.15 Uprisingsdid not erupt nationwide in Taegu in North Ky6ngsangprovince,they simultaneously; igniting spreadintootherareas such as the Ch6lla provinces over approximately in Taegu, theyspread threemonths.Because the 1946 uprisings started mostwidelyin NorthKy6ngsang and onlyweaklyin Ch6lla. To examinethe effect of thisdifferential spread,I comparethe extent of uprising participation and tenancy rateamongKy6ngsang and Ch6lla (bothNorthand South)provinces. As table 4 shows,as uprisings spread fromNorth Ky6ngsangin early October to South Ky6ngsangin midto NorthCh6lla in October,to South Ch6lla in late October,and finally mid-December, uprising participation substantially declined(from82% to 35% to 30% to 15%). Tenancy was historically much higherin the Ch6lla provinces thanin theKy6ngsang provinces. Thus, thedecreasing uprising participation mayhave coincidentally joined withan increasing tenancyrate to producea highly negativecorrelation betweenthe two (see table 4). The present data cannotdetermine whether thepersistently of tenancy of strong negativeeffect rateon uprising reflects theexistence a strong a differential landed class or simply spread effect; findings presentedabove indicatethatperhapsbothfactors operate. nor literacy Finally,neither commercialization, rate,nor any interactioneffect of the two shows a significant effect on uprising (see table 2). This result is notunexpected, however, sincepenetration ofmarket forces into the villages was not a major issue in the 1946 peasant uprisings. Were the uprisings a response to market forces thatundermined peasant interests, we would expecta significant commercialization effect. They local were, rather,politicalprotestsagainst the military government, officials who also servedduring government Japaneserule,and collaborativelocal elitessuch as landlords.That thecommercialization measure had no direct on uprising, significant effect however, shouldnotbe interpretedas invalidating the commercialization thesisaltogether. Commeron uprising in model 1 before cializationhad a significant positiveeffect introducing protestexperience measures(see table 2) and a significant on thestrength effect of PCs (see table 3), and thushad an indirect effect on uprising through GPC. There are a number ofreasonsforthisindirect effect. First,disappearof PADDY on UPRISE in the second model ance of a significant effect
I am grateful to an AJS reviewer forsuggesting thispossibility.
15
1616
of 1946 Uprisings in table 2 seems due to its high correlation with DISPUTE (r = .37). Although no causal claim about the effect of commercialization on tenancy disputescan be made since the former is a postwarmeasureand the lattera prewarone, ifwe assumethatthe percentage of arable land used forpaddy fieldsreflects in the prethe extent of commercialization war period, especiallythe 1930s, we can state that commercialization was relatedto tenantactivism.In fact,previousstudiesshow thatcommercialization was highly responsible fortenancydisputesin the 1920s and 1930s (see Shin 1990, 1993). Accordingly, thetenancy disputenumber perhapsmediatesthe commercialization effect. Also, theindirect effect ofcommercialization on uprising through GPC suggestsits effect on peasant activismis morecomplexthan argued in previoustheories ofpeasantprotest and rebellion. Most previoustheories tend to targetthe disruptive (Scott 1976; Wolf 1969) or opportunistic (Popkin 1979) effect of commercialization on the peasant economyas provoking protest action.Yet in Koreanuprisings, as shownabove, marketforces werenota major issue. Nevertheless, market forces mayhave influenced uprisings by changing the ruraloccupationalstructure, espein theruraleconomy ciallyafter theybecame a major factor and society (in Korea theywerein fullforce bythe 1920sand 1930s).In other words, increasing commercialization could increasedifferentiation amongpeasantsthatwould in turn"breaktheir tiesto tradition and to longstanding workpatterns ofactivity, includand makethemavailable fornew forms ing politicalparticipation" (Cumings1981, p. 347; see also Paige 1975). In fact,Cumings's (1981) analysisof 15 counties withrelevant data shows a significant between PC strength and a moredifferpositive relationship in counties entiatedoccupationaldistribution. That is, PCs were strong with"a low percentage in agriculture in skilledand and highpercentage unskilled and professionals, and schoolgraduates" students occupations, (p. 348). Also, of the 14 counties(excludingPuk Cheju with no data differentiation showedhigher available),thesevenwithhighoccupational vs. commercialization thanthesevenothers (64% ofland in paddyfields contributed to uprising 52%). These data suggestcommercialization by producing a differentiated occupational structure withworkers, students, and intellectuals like who would play a keyrole in protest organizations had no GPCs in postwarKorea. Also, thatpeasants'protest experience of a GPC (see table 3) but neededto be on theexistence significant effect mobilized foruprising thata substantial bytheGPC suggests partofGPC leadership perhapscame from otherthanthepeasantry, as is thecase in mostother and revolutions peasantuprisings (Migdal 1974;Wolf1969).16
16
includenonagrarian theroleof workers, variablesin themodelto reflect students, and intellectuals in organizing and mobilizing intoan uprising. peasants 1617
in table Overall model ofPC strength 3 alsosuggests a needto poor specification
American Journal of Sociology DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Analysisof peasant protest movements in the first half of 20th-century in the 1946 uprisings Korea thatculminated shows the importance of a in explaining historical perspective social protest movements. The widespread peasant radicalismin liberatedKorea did not flareup overnight simplyupon removalof Japaneserule. Nor was it eitherthe resultof agitation by the NorthKorean communists as the official accountof the uprisings claims(see U.S. Army1988,3:365-71), or as Hendersonargues (1968), merelyan "anomic" and "pathological" expression of the "rootless" mass. It had much deeper historical origins.Postwar radicalism in colonial builton peasantconsciousness enhancedthrough participation protest and resistance. Particularly, politicaland nationalconsciousness in tenancydisputesin the 1930s and nurraised through participation of resistance turedduringthe war yearsthrough passive forms provided of colonial a crucial resourcefor postwaractivism.While destruction power no doubt provided structural conditionsfor the uprisings(see Skocpol 1979), that Korean peasants could have been mobilizedinto in the same way without is doubtful. uprisings such politicalexperience A protest"frame"(to use Snow and Benford's[1988] term)createdby of the 1946 colonialprotest and resistance shaped the issues and targets for uprisings, and theseexperienced peasantsprovideda crucialresource the uprisings, thatis, a potentially mobilizablebodyof participants. Yet, while one cannot deny the role of some key leaders of colonial in postwaractivism,at the aggregate periodred union movement level red unionexperience did not prove as cruciala resource as tenancy disThis insignificance to resultfrom the pute experience. appears primarily factthatthe movements invitedseveregovernment thatmay repression of peasants. also have impededpostwarorganization and mobilization no direct testcan be done withtheKorean case, it would seem Although or the presenceof repression that a chillymemory of repression would inhibit action(see Muller 1985; Mullerand Seligson1987). protest of different Such varyingeffects colonial protestexperiences compel to colonial rethinking previousstudiesthatlinkpostwarpeasantactivism protest experiences withoutspecifying the kind of experience. As mentionedabove, mostpreviousstudieslink postwaractivismto red union isolatedcases (An 1990; Ch6ng 1988; Cumings experience by examining 1981). Unfortunately theydo not considertenantprotest experience or mount any rigorousempiricaltest. The statistical analysis of colonial and postwarpeasant activismadvanced hereclearlyshows thatdispute was morecrucialto the occurrence of the 1946 uprisings. experience in tenancy to the 1946 While colonialexperience disputescontributed turnedupon uprisings,this analysis also shows that this contribution 1618
of 1946 Uprisings enhancedthrough mobilization by GPCs. That is, peasantconsciousness of uprisingonly proved crucial to the occurrence protestparticipation The detectionof this when mobilizedthrougha protestorganization. variableis a substantial withan organization interaction of past protest studies(e.g., Gurr1968) thatlargely advance over earliercross-national on present Furtherthe impactof past conflict conflict. failedto specify such as the power of the local structure more,the politicalopportunity These rate,was crucialforoutbreaks. landed class, measuredbytenancy in extheory of resourcemobilization findings attestto the usefulness ThirdWorld movements even in an authoritarian plainingsocial protest country and suggestthatwe shouldview withcautionworksthatstress characterof uprising(see Cumings 1981). They also the spolntaneous ofsocial disorganiwerenotanomicsymptoms uprisings strongly suggest zationproducedby decolonization (Henderson1968,pp. 136-47) or simNorthKorea (U.S. Army1988,3:347-98). plyagitatedby Soviet-backed analysissupportsCumings's(1981) claim that uprisRather,statistical with of peasantsaffiliated mobilization ings were the resultof effective showsthatboththehistorical local GPCs. Thus, the Koreancase clearly of consciousness experience and its organizathrough protest formation in any comforprotest actionmustbe considered tionand mobilization of collectiveaction and social protest prehensiveanalyticaltreatment movements. should focuson the interaction Futureresearchon social movements in explaining Neither protests. and externalresources betweeninternal nor collectiveinterests should be assumed to be constant consciousness proover time;analysesof collective actionsmustincludethe historical and reformulated. Also to be further cesses in whichtheyare formulated influences subsequentactionother experience specified is how historical networks" "activist consciousness, such as by developing thanby raising of collective "repertoires (McAdam 1989; Taylor 1989) or by producing otherthanpolitical,such as action"(Tilly 1978). In addition,experience in the workplaceor the family, as a means of raisneeds consideration ing collective consciousnessor developing such networksor reperis not to be toires(Bourdieu 1985; Buechler 1990). In any case, history forbut as an integral part of collective taken simplyas a background action.
1619

APPENDIX TABLE Al
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS ANALYZED
Province NorthCh6lla .................. South Ch6lla ..................
Counties Chin'an, Kuimsan, Muju, Changsu,Imsil, Namw6n, Sunch'ang,Ch6ng'fip, Koch'ang, Puan, Kimje, Okku, Iksan Kwangsan,Tamyang,Koks6ng,Kurye,Kwangyang, Y6su, Sunch'6n,Kohfing, Pos6ng,Hwasun, Changhulng, Kangjin, Haenam, Yong'am, Muan, Naju, Hamp'y6ng,Changs6ng,Wando, Chindo Tals6ng, Kunwhi,Uis6ng,Andong,Ch'6ngsong, Y6ngyang, Y6ngd6k, Y6ng'il, Ky6ngju,Y6ngch'6n, Ky6ngsan,Ch'6ngdo,Kory6ng,S6ngju, Ch'ilgok, Kfimch'6n, S6nsan, Sangju, Mun'gy6ng, Yech'6n, Y6ngju, Ponghwa Uiry6ng, Ham'an, Ch'angny6ng, Miryang,Yangsan, Ulsan, Tongnae, Kimhae, T'ongy6ng,Kos6ng, Sach'6n, Namhae, Hadong, Sanch'6ng,Hamyang,K6ch'ang, Hy6pch'6n Koyang, Yangju, P'och'6n, Kap'y6ng,Yangp'y6ng, Y6ju, Ich'6n, Yong'in, Ans6ng,P'y6ngt'aek, Suw6n, Sihfing, Puch'6n, Kimp'o, Kangwha, P'aju, Changdan, Kaep'ung Ch'6ngju, Pofin,Okch'6n, Y6ngdong,Chinch'6n,Koesan, Ums6ng,Ch'ungju, Chech'6n,Tanyang Taed6k, Yon'gi, Kongju, Nonsan, Puy6, S6ch'6n, Pory6ng,Ch'6ngyang, Hongs6ng,Yesan, S6san, Tangjin, Asan, Ch'6nan Samch'6k,Uljin, Ch6ngs6n,P'y6ngch'ang, Kangnfing, Y6ngw6l, W6nju, Hoengs6ng,Hongch'6n
NorthKy6ngsang............
South Ky6ngsang ............
Kyonggi ....................
NorthCh'ungch'6ng ........ South Ch'ungch'6ng ........ Kangw6n ....................
NOTE.-N
= 123.
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The Historical Making of Collective Action: The Korean Peasant Uprisings of 1946 Author(s): Gi-Wook Shin Source: American

? 1994byThe University ofChicago.All rights reserved.

AJS Volume 99 Number6 (May 1994): 1596-1624

During the war years (1940-44) overtand collectiveprotestbecame 1601

864 15.5 68.5 59.3 30.9 .37 .50 .33

714 8.8 9.6 11.5 10.8 .72 .50 .47

Model 1 Constant .......................... DISPUTE

Model 2 .704 (2.192) 1.371* (.804)

Model 4 6.103 (5.052) -.471 (1.328) .024 (.737) .077*** (.029)

(.294) .014 (.014) -.099*** (.034)

(.002) ........................... 24.3*** 29.7*** 34.1*** 48.6***

NOTE -SEs in parentheses; N = 123 * P < .10. ** P < .05.

a new generation has replaced it.

. The memory of repression is one

The rationale to include POPCHG x GPC is discussed below. 1613

American Journal of Sociology

Uprising Started Early October Mid-October Late October Mid-December

nificantat cx = .10 (t = 1.43). Going one step further, it seems plausible

in table Overall model ofPC strength 3 alsosuggests a needto poor specification

American Journal of Sociology

Province NorthCh6lla .................. South Ch6lla ..................

South Ky6ngsang ............

NorthCh'ungch'6ng ........ South Ch'ungch'6ng ........ Kangw6n ....................

NationalAnalysis." American Sociological Review55:540-59.

American Journal of Sociology

Statesand Western Movements Europe,edited byMaryKatzenstein oftheUnited

KoreanPeople."RecordsoftheDepartment ofStateRelating to Internal Affairs of

in ColonialKorea. Ph.D. disserta. 1991.Social Change and PeasantProtest

and Structural Suh, Sang-Chul.1978. Growth Changesin the Korean Economy,

American Journal of Sociology

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(.002) ........................... 24.3* 29.7* 34.1* 48.6*