Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON
Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.Alejandrino. Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered. Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments. In view of the propriety of mandamus Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. In view of effects of punishment Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. In view of no remedy Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.
Page 3 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two -thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
Page 5 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor: ____________________________ "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 "ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. "WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people; "WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary; "WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues; "WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? "WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; "WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the KatipunanngMga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. "Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary" _________________________________ The Ratification Case On January 20, 1973, JosueJavellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by JosueJavellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." The Issue: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.) 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The Resolution: Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution. Details: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
Page 6 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)heeffectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91 Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.
Summary of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Facts On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. Issues 1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission? 2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? 3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? 4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdicti on beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? 5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? Holding and Rule (Marshall) 1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams. 2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. 3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judic ial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. 5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction. Disposition Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission. See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction.
Summary of Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911). Facts Congress passed an act that conferred original jurisdiction the Court of Claims and appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to determine the validity of certain acts of Congress (i.e. to issue advisory opinions). The Congressional acts related to the distribution and allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee Indian tribe. Muskrat and the other plaintiffs in this case brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking a declaration that Congressional acts of 1904 and 1906 were unconstitutional, and that an earlier (and more favorable) act of July 1902 was controlling. The Court of Claims sustained the validity of the acts of 1904 and 1906 and dismissed the petitions and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issues 1. What is the scope of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution upon the Supreme Court? 2. May Congress expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts by empowering them to issue advisory opinions? Holding and Rule (Day) 1. The judicial power is limited to cases and controversies, i.e. the claims of litigants brought before the courts for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. 2. No. Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the judiciary by empowering it to issue advisory opinions. As per Marbury v. Madison, neither the legislative nor the executive branch can assign to the judicial branch any duties other than those that are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner. Under the Constitution, judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. A case or controversy implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication. Congress does not have the power to provide for a suit of this nature to be brought in federal court to test the constitutionality of prior acts of Congress because such a suit is not a case or controversy. This court has no veto power over legislation enacted by Congress, and its right to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional can only be exercised when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for determination. Disposition Reversed and remanded with orders to dismiss to lack of jurisdiction. Notes: Nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits state courts from issuing advisory opinions and some states engage in the practice. A fair amount of Supreme Court jurisprudence has arguably been unkind to the indigenous peoples within United States territory.
Page 9 of 11 (POLITICAL QUESTION CASE DIGESTS) National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx. [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC vs.SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 FACTS:The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that ActsNo. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of privateschools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and wasamended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutionalon the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well asteachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will alsodeprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civicefficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimitedpowers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawfuldelegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all privateschools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, inaccordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? RATIO DECIDENTI: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.
Tan v. Macapagal
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." Issues: WON the petitioners has locus standi WON the court has jurisdiction over the case Held: 1. NO. J justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute Must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain , direct injury as a result of its enforcement.Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: Validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement .Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 2. NO. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties; judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes
Issue: Under constitutional law, may the President of the United States, upon his non-indictment but association with a conspiracy which violates federal law, invoke executive immunity to interpose a District Court order which directs him to produce certain documents and recordings of meeting associated with this conspiracy? Holding: No. When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Courts Rationale/Reasoning: The Court has at the very best before this case interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, an express power. Thus, if the Court were to construe and delineate claims under express powers, then the Court should have the authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers. President claims (1) valid need for protection of higher authority and those who advise him; and (2) separation of powers insulates the President from judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal investigation. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the Court finds it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obligated to provide. As for separation of powers, they were not meant to stand by themselves, as there are cases in which the powers co-mingled with one another. Presidential communication is protected, however when the communication is not of a governmental nature, and there is a public interest in those communications, then the immunity granted by the Constitution does not exist. This is important to the adversarial system we have in this country. There must be a full disclosure of all of the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. This is essential to the carrying of justice. Both the 5th amendment (due process) and the 6th amendment (right to face adversaries is part of this carrying of justice. In applying the balance test, Presidential communications are indeed protected generally, but in the instance of a criminal case, the protection cannot remain, for it would cut deep into the guarantee of due process law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. Rule: Balancing test weighs the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the Presidents responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. Important Dicta: No court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically related to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution.