Ladera, et. al. vs. Hodges, et. al. , O.G No.

8027-R, September 23, 1952 Facts: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N Hodges, whereby the latter promised to sell a parced of land to the former subject to the stipulation of the contract saying that the failure of the purchaser to pay within sixty days after it fell due would render the contract annulled or rescinded. Furthermore, it is likewise stipulated that the sums of money paid under the contract would be considered rentals and the owner would be at liberty to dispose of the said lands with all its improvements to other persons as if this contract had never been made. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built a house on the lot. Upon her failure to pay, Hodges filed an action for ejectment. The court decided that Ladera is to vacate and surrender possession of the lot. Also, on that day, Ladera paid Hodges P188.50 which the latter recorded as rental payment. A writ of execution was then issued and the City Sheriff levied upon all rights, interest and participation over the house. The Sheriff then sold the house to Avelina A. Magno who in turn sold the house to Manuela Villa. But this transaction was not recorded. Upon knowledge of this, Ladera went to see the Sheriff and paid him to redeem the property but was received as rental payment. This amount, however, was not turned over to Hodges. Issue: Whether or not the house built on a land owned by another person, should be regarded in law as movable or personal property. Held: No. The sale of the land was not made without the proper publication required by law of the sale of immovable property. In this instance, the determination of whether or not the house in dispute is an immovable or movable property is vital. The undisputed rule is whether it is immovable by destination (place by the owner of the tenement), an immovable by incorporation (attachment not necessarily made by the owner of the tenement) or an accession. A true building is an immovable or real property whether the owner of the land is a usufructuary or lessee erects it. Moreover, when Ladera built the house in question, she was not a mere lessee but occupied the land under a valid contract with Hodges to sell it to her. Thus, the object of the levy and the sale was real property. The publication in a newspaper in a general circulation was made making the execution sale void and conferred no title to the purchaser. Furthermore, there was a valid exercise of redemption. So, at the time Magno sold the property to Villa, Magno no longer had title over the property strengthening the fact that since there was no title, the subsequent sale was null and void. PROPERTY - Gavino A. Tumalad and Generosa R. Tumalad, vs. Alberta Vicencio and Eliliano Simeon G.R. No. L-30173, - September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 143

Facts: The defendants, Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon, executed a Chattel Mortgage of their house of strong materials in favor to plaintiff, Gavino A. Tumalad and Generosa R. Tumalad. Defendants house was erected on the land of Madrigal and Company, Inc. It was agreed that in default of payment of any amortizations, shall cause the entire debt become immediately due and demandable. Upon default, the mortgage was extra judicially foreclosed in favor of the plaintiff as the highest bidder. As such, plaintiffs commenced a civil actions praying that the house be vacated and for the possession of the property. Obtaining a favorable judgment thereto, they moved for its execution. However, the judgment of possession cannot be executed for reason that the house was already torn down. Issue: Whether or not, the subject matter of the mortgage, a house of strong materials, be the

object of a chattel mortgage?

Ruling: Held that even though the inclusion in the Article 415, par. 1 of the Civil Code, of a building separate and distinct from land, means that the building is by itself an immovable, however it admits an exceptions. As in the case at bar, though there was no express provision referring to the house as immovable, nevertheless, by selling or transferring a house by way of chattel mortgage, the house is treated as a chattel. Moreover, the house stood on a rented land giving the defendant a temporary right as lessee. As such, it did not form part of the land. Though this distinction alone, cannot per se determine the nature of the property, it does when so combined with other factors, as when the parties intended to treat the house as personal property.

PROPERTY - Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Jaranillo, G.R. No. 20329 - March 16, 1923, 44 Phil. 630 Facts: Gervasia dela Rosa, Vda, de Vera, was the lessee of a piece of land located in Manila. A house of strong materials was erected thereon. On November 27, 1922 she executed a document in the form of a chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to the petitioner, Standard Oil Company of New York, by way of mortgage, both the leasehold interest to the land and the building which stands thereon. However, upon presentation of the document to respondent, Juaquin Jaranillo, as Register of Deeds of Manila, refused to register the chattel mortgage, contending that the nature of the property is not a personal property, but a real property. Issue: Whether or Not, the Register of Deeds, Jaranillo, has the authority to deny the registration of the document purporting to be a chattel mortgage executed in the manner and form prescribed by the chattel Mortgage law?

Ruling: Held that, the duties of the Register of deeds are of purely ministerial in character. There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial authority to determine the nature of the document presented to him for record. The said property may be considered as personal property by agreement of the parties, though it may be well considered as real property. Moreover, the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as long as no third person would be prejudiced thereby. Jaranillo should therefore accept the legal fees being tendered and place the document on record.

G.R. No. L -11658 (February 15, 1918) LEUNG YEE vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J.G. WILLIAMSON Facts: The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) bought rice-cleaning machines from Strong MachineryCompany (SMC). These machines were installed in one of the CAFs buildings, which was madeout of strong materials. A c h a t t e l m o r t g a g e w a s e x e c u t e d t o s e c u r e p a y m e n t o f t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e . T h e c h a t t e l mortgage included the building and the machines; the land on which it stood was not included.When CAF failed to pay their debt, the property was sold by the sheriff and the same was boughtb y S M C . T h e m o r t g a g e w a s r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e c h a t t e l m o r t g a g e r e g i s t r y a n d t h e s a l e o f t h e property to SMC was annotated on the same registry on December 29, 1913. On January 14, 1913, CAF executed a deed of sale of the land, where the building stood, to SMC. The sale was in the form of a public instrument, but the same was not registered. SMC went intopossession of the building at or about the same time when the sale took place.A t o r a b o u t t h e s a m e t i m e w h e n t h e c h a t t e l

m o r t g a g e w a s e x e c u t e d i n f a v o r o f S M C , C A F executed another mortgage to herein plaintiff (Leung Yee) upon the building to secure paymentof the balance of its indebtedness. Upon CAFs failure to pay, Leung Yee secured judgment forthe amount and levied execution upon the building, bought it at the sheriffs sale on or about D e c 1 8 , 1 9 1 4 a n d h a d t h e s h e r i f f s c e r t i f i c a t e o f s a l e d u l y r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e l a n d r e g i s t r y o f Cavite. A t the time of the execution, SMC, who was in possession, filed with t h e s h e r i f f a s w o r n statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy.Accordingly, an action to recover possession of the building was filed by Leung Yee. RTC ruled infavor of SMC on the ground that the company had its title to the building registered prior to thedate of the registry of Leung Yees certificate. Thus, this appeal. Issue: Who has a better right to the property? Ruling: RTC ruling in favor of SMC is affirmed; ground modified. Ratio Decidendi: The building made out of strong materials is real property. The mere fact that the parties dealt w i t h i t a s s e p a r a t e a n d a p a r t f r o m t h e l a n d ( o r a s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y ) d o e s n o t c h a n g e i t s character as real property. In this case, it follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in the registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any legal effect. However, since the facts disclose that the purchase by Leung Yee and the inscription on the sheriffs certificate of sale were not made in good faith, it must be held that SMC is the owner of the property pursuant to the third (3rd) paragraph of Article 1473 of the NCC, should there be no entry, the property shall belong to the person who first took possession of it in good faith, andin the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.