GUEVARA v GUEVARA December 29, 1943 Justice OZAETA FACTS In 1931, Victorino L.

Guevara executed a will with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made bequests to his legitimate son, natural daughter and stepchildren and wife of 2nd marriage. On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Rosario Guevara, who had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testator's demise, she commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory. ISSUE WON the procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara is sanctioned by law HELD No. The Court cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Court holds that if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others. DE BORJA v VDA. DE DE BORJA August 18, 1972 Justice REYES

FACTS Tasiana, as surviving spouse of Francisco, instituted probate proceedings upon his death. Children of the 1 st marriage questioned the validity nd of 2 marriage. Relationship between 2nd wife and kids of 1st marriage since then had been plagued with many suits (18 pending). To put and end to the numerous litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into, between Jose personally and as administrator of the estate of Josefa, and Tasiana, as the surviving spouse and administratrix of the estate of Francisco. It provided that with the mutual desire to terminate and settle the various court litigations, Jose will pay Tasiana P800,000 (P200,000 for each child) which amount shall be considered as the complete and full payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco. The compromise also served as quit claim. The compromise agreement was presented for approval to the courts where the probate proceedings of the estates of Josefa and Francisco were pending. However, Tasiana, apparently having had changed her mind about the compromise, opposed such submission for approval. She claims that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) it involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco and Tasiana; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect ISSUE 1. WON the compromise agreement was valid and binding HELD YES that probate is first required before any agreement may be entered: Tasiana relies on the ruling in Guevara v. Guevara, wherein the court said that the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of the estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against law and public policy. Thus, Tasiana mainatains that since Francisco left a will, the same must be probated and any agreement to the contrary is invalid. However, SC ruled in this case that Guevara is not applicable since what is involved is not the distribution or settlement of the entire estate, but the sale of the share of Tasiana in favor of the other heirs. Being the surviving spouse of the decedent, Tasiana need not await the outcome of the probate proceedings since she was considered by law as a compulsory heir. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in Guevara can not apply to the case of Tasiana GALLANOSA v ARCANGEL June 21, 1978 Justice AQUINO FACTS Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was 81 yo. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he was survived by his brother, Leon. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in CFI Sorsogon. Florentino bequeathed his share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino: he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise

bequeathed his separate properties to his protege Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely, Leon and his nephews and nieces. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis and nephews and nieces instituted an action in CFI Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said 61 parcels of land. They alleged that they had been in continuous possession of those lands en concepto de dueo and that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 and asserted ownership over the lands. CFI: Dismissed their opposition and Ordered the probate of his will because the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly thereof, so that the said decision had become final and it now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of seeking a redetermination of their right to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis. Fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 and twenty-eight years after the probate of the will, another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the recovery of the same 61 parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver. [1967 COMPLAINT] ISSUE WON allowance of will (prayed for in 1967 complaint) is valid given the 1939 decree of probate and the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 HELD NO After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura). The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190; sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan).

Dela Cerna v. Potot December 23, 1964 Justice Reyes Facts The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid Held The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.) The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. MANINANG v CA (PRONOVE) June 19, 1982 Justice MELENCIO-HERRERA FACTS Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with. Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI. Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. The two cases were ordered consolidated. Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. MR denied. Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before CA. ISSUE WON the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. HELD YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order

of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable. PASTOR v CA (QUEMADA) June 24, 1983 Justice PLANA FACTS Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.) died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966. He was survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child Lewellyn Barlito QUEMADA. QUEMADA filed with the CFI a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will left by PASTOR, SR. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu. The probate court appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR. to which Pastor Jr. And his sister Sofia opposed. QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate subject of the legacy which were in the names of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.The probate court then issued an order allowing the holographic will to probate. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground that there is still a reconveyance suit pending with another branch of CFI. The PROBATE COURT then set a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but no hearing was held because of the opposition of Pastor Jr. and Sofia again on the same ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum which in effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. QUEMADA also submitted his Position paper. So while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the PROBATE COURT issued an Order of Execution and Garnishment resolving the question of ownership of the royalties from ATLAS and ruling that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. ISSUES WON the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will. HELD No. Contrary to the position taken by the probate court, these two issued have not yet been resolved. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the question of ownership is

an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. ROBERTS v LEONIDAS April 27, 1984 Justice AQUINO FACTS Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died.He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce .He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. Ethel filed in the CFI an intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.Maxine, filed an opposition and MTD the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. For a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. Then Juanita Grimm Morris, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion. ISSUE
WON THE TESTATE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR PROBATE

HELD No. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's MTD. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, CC). The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case. NEPOMUCENO v CA (GOMEZ) October 9, 1985 Justice GUTIERREZ

FACTS Martin Jugo died with last Will and Testament with all the formalities required by law. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The case reached the CA and the respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The CA declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 7391 in relation with Article 10282. ISSUE WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. HELD NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. (Note: The defense of Nepomuceno that she was not aware that Jugo was married was not believed by the court.)

MERCADO v SANTOS September 22, 1938 Justice LAUREL FACTS In May 1931, the petitioner Atilano Mercado filed in the CFI of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. The probate court, in June 1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost 3 years later, 5 intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings, which motion was denied. It appears that 16 months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor de Leon filed 3 complaints against Mercado for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated. The 1st 2 cases were dismissed at the instance of the complainant, while last case was dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing thereon. Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the case. The petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The motion was overruled. ISSUE WON the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to the petitioners criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will HELD YES - Sec.306 of our Code of CivPro: " Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands may be as follows: Xxx in respect to the probate of a will the judgment or order is conclusive upon the will or administration Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. - SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the CFI, or by appeal to the SC; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." - Manahan vs. Manahan: ". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. " The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.Therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this

jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioner is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed. PASCUAL V DELA CRUZ May 30, 1969 Justice REYES FACTS Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died. A petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent. Pedro dela Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud. Probate court upheld the due execution of the will and appointed Andres Pascual as executor and administrator of the estate, as provided in the will, without bond. Oppositors appealed to SC directly (value of properties involved more than P300k). ISSUES 1. WON the contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by Dela Cruz were substantial as to discredit the entire testimony of the subscribing witnesses 2. WON the execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence HELD 1. NO. For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the document by the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they wanted to do so. [Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana] The contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositors-appellants (such as the weather condition at the time the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length of time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will 2.NO. To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own; that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised; that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that

it was actually exercised; that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution; that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will; nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the testator; or omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence REYES-BARRETTO v BARRETTO-DATU January 25, 1967 Justice REYES FACTS Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project of partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own name. CFI then declared the project of partition to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs, was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano and Maria. This was based on Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void. ISSUE 1. WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano (duly approved by CFI Manila) is void 2. WON there was preterition HELD 1. NO At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled, and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Reasoning The agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. In fact, even without the project of partition, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano, against the provisions whereof no objection had been made. 2. NO

The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime does not invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. There was no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage. AJERO v CA (SAND) September 15, 1994 Justice PUNO FACTS The holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, was submitted for probate by the petitioners Ajero -Named as devisees, were the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. TC admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, said decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 8133 and 8144 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. ISSUE WON the holographic will should be disallowed HELD No. Sec 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, and Article 839 of the New Civil Code are the applicable provisions with regard to disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.