Hagad vs Gozo-Dadole (1995) Vitug Facts Note: The Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) was promulgated on 7 Dec 1989;

The Local Government Code (RA 7610) was promulgated on 10 Oct 1991. Councilors Dionson and Bercede filed criminal and administrative complaints with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas filed against resps Mayor Ouano, Vice-Mayor Caete and City Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. - They were charged with violations of: (1) RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (2) Arts. 170-171 RPC falsification of legislative documents and falsification by a public officer, employee or notary, or ecclesiastic minister; and (3) RA 6713 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees. - It was averred that resp officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, resp officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint bec.: - under Secs 61 and 63 of the LGC, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments Dionson and Bercede argued the LGC could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the LGC. Deputy Ombudsman Hagad denied the MTD and recommended the preventive suspension of resp officials, except City Budget Officer Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. A pet. for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO was filed by resp officials with the RTC - Resp Judge issued a restraining order directed at Hagad, enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension issued in the administrative case filed in his Office Issue WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case - YES Rationale Sec 13(1), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the general investigatory power of the Ombudsman: - Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Sec 19, RA 6770: - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: 1. Are contrary to law or regulation; 2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; 3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law; 4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; 5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or 6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Sec 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman: - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Taken in conjunction with Sec 24 of the same statute, Hagad contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. On the other hand, resp officials argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the LGC which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Sec 60 thereof, on various offices, specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities. Thus, they insist, conformably with Sec 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . ." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The 2 statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, or irreconcilable, as to compel striking down one and uphold just the other. Repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." Secs 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old LGC. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of RA 6770, specifically under Secs 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The new LGC in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the OP. Resp local officials contend that the 6-mos preventive suspension w/o pay under Sec 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Sec 63 of the LGC to maintain its application. This is untenable. - The 2 provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Sec 24 of RA6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-mos preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. - On the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of 60 days of preventive suspension prescribed in the LGC on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Hence, there is no repugnance. The records reveal that Hagad issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by resp officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of Hagad. Be that as it may, it had been held that not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. Moreover, resp officials were put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found that the evidence of guilt was strong. Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the SolGen that resp officials' petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of the Dep Ombudsman contained in his Order, should not have been entertained by the trial court in accordance with Sec 14 of RA 6770. The proper recourse on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman was to file a petition for certiorari, as provided by Sec 27 of RA 6770.