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Ramon Christopher R.

Nollora Election Laws Regular Class Tuesday 5:30pm 6:30pm Election Law Assigned Cases

LLB II

Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991 Facts: Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera. Issue: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion. Ruling: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case. Macalintal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 Facts:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention: That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the VicePresident, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Article IX-A, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Issues: 1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Held: 1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall

provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. 2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vicepresidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and VicePresident. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. 3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

Domino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 Facts: Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 1998 election.

Held: No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original domicile.

The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed but also personal presence in tha place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani. A persons domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Japzon vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the United States of America for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar

(Barangay 6), for one year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Local Government Code. Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at Barangay 6. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. However, he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following: a.) Community Tax Certificate from Barangay 6 (March 2006) b.) Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005) c.) Registered voter at Barangay 6 (July 2006) Pending this case, Ty won the elections. The COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Ty. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed. Issue: Whether or not Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local Government Code. Held: Yes. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a

naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct. ?????

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party GO! GO Phil., et al G.R. No. 147589. G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001 Facts: On the registration period, the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and organizations but denied those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Moreover, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from the Certified List of Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said certified list be accordingly amended. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some herein respondents. Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Also, Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution. Issues: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections

3. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors. Held: 1. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Basic rudiments of due process require that the organizations or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system. 2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. 3. No, the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style party-list system. Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.

Atienza vs COMELEC G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010 Facts:

Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew support for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza, LP Chairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party. Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a three-year term. Meaning, his term has not yet ended. However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers could be likened to people power removing Drilon as president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constituion providing the three-term had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Moreover, the COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-over capacity since his term has been ended already. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. The COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al.s petition. As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute. Held: The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. Moreover, the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus,

the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas election but refused to rule on the validity of Atienzas expulsion.

BANAT vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009 Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have announced in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall iomplement the Veterans Ruling, applying the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. NBC denied the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC resolution instead it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC resolution.

Moreover, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of R.A. No. 7941. On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. Issues: 1. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? 2. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? Held: 1. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: a.) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. b.)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

c.)Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. d.)Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. 2. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Lewis vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006 Facts: The petitioners who already acquired Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 prayed that they be allowed to vote as part of their right. When the petitioners sought registration and certification as Overseas Absentee Voters, they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that a COMELEC letter stated that the petitioners have yet no right to vote due to their lack of one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. A week before the May 10, 2004 elections, the COMELEC filed a comment. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation on May 20, 2004 stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so. However, the 2004 elections ended already, so the petition becomes moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189 Held:

Yes, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of RA 9189 become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 of Article V of the 1987 Constitution prescribes requirements as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 of Article V of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency proscription in the preceding Section, be allowed to vote. There is no provision in RA No. 9225 requiring dual citizens to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA No. 9225, in implicit acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents, grant under its Section 5 (1) the same right of suffrage as granted an absentee voter under RA No. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that RA No. 9189 aims, in essence to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipino who save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. With the passage of RA No. 9225 , the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of their countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme.

Tecson vs. COMELEC March 3, 2004

Facts: On December 31, 2003, Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). In his Certificate of Candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939. On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to Disqualify FPJ and to Deny Due Course or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen. According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American

and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American. FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Poe. No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Espaol father and to a mestiza Espaol mother. In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence: a.) Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ b.) Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish) English translation of (b) Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907 Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe On their part, FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others: Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe

Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Poe, Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Poe Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Poe Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II On January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004. On February 10, 2004 Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for Temporary Restraining Order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed. 2. Whether or not FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? Held: 1. The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following: A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78)

the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly and honest elections (Sec. 52, same) any interested party authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same) Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution). In Tecson petition and Velez petition: The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the COMELECs jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition because the Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. A contest refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state: Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to qualifications of the President or VicePresident of the Philippines. (Rule 12) An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President. (Rule 13) Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-Presidentby filing a verified petitionwithin 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. (Rule 14) The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President.

2. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 41 SCRA 292 Facts: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

IN RE: MALLARE Adm. Case No. 533, September 12, 1974 59 SCRA 45

Facts: Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962. Apparently, both his parents were Chinese. A complaint was filed by the then Acting Immigration Commissioner, the purpose of which is to determine whether Mallare should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines. Consequently, Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law and his admission to the bar was revoked. Mallare moved for reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the Court. Mallare then petitioned that the case be opened for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidences which would alter the decision previously promulgated by the Court. The evidence consisted of an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church purporting to show Esteban Mallare, the petitioner's father, to be the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and testimonies of certain persons who had known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime. In its resolution dated July 31, 1969, the Court resolved to set aside its previous decision and granted the new trial prayed for.

Issue: Whether or not Esteban Mallare, the petitioners father, is a Filipino, thus making petitioner Florencio Mallare also a Filipino citizen, and therefore should be included back in the Roll of Attorneys. Held: The Court found sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its previous decision, and a definite declaration that Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law. The petitioner's evidence shows that his father was born out of wedlock and that his grandmother is a Filipina who resided in Macalelon, Quezon, affirmed by the testimonies of the natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son, Esteban. Petitioner's father is therefore a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship; and even assuming that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he come of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Aznar vs. COMELEC and Osmea G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990 185 SCRA 1990 Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued

on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for

disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

Held: Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either express or implied.

Bengzon vs. Cruz GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: Respondent Cruz a natural born citizen of the Philippines, he was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States of America. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Section 1 (4) of commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Then on June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as US citizen, in connection with his service in the US Marine corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran against petitioner Bengzon III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a natural-born citizen. HRET dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Held: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1.) by birth, and (2.) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn thereof. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippine from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become a Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of

the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executor only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has, (1.) not left the Philippines; (2.) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3.) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4.) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63, enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1.) by naturalization, (2.) by repatriation, and (3.) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualification and none of the deisqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of CA No. 473. Repatriation, on the hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to; (1.) desertion of the armed forces; (2.) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3.) service in the armed forces of the United States at any other time; (4.) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5.) political and economic necessity. As distinguish from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Filipino citizenship, he will be restored his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruzs case, he lost Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Section 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perform his Philippine citizenship. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1.) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth, and (2.) he does not have to perform any act to obtain his Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1.) those who were naturalized and (2.) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those naturalized citizens were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considered those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as a natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1.) those who are natural-born and (2.) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce

a natural born Filipino. As such he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996 Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once

rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

Co vs. HRET and Jose Ong, Jr. G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991 Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's

citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: Section 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a naturalborn. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private

respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest.

Tabasa vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006 Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 (pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72). Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered deported to his country of origin. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa alleged, among others, that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. Issue: Whether or not Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171. Held:

He does not. Republic Act No. 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos, was enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz.: Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not one of those disqualified, as enumerated in the law: Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that, if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino, subsequently, had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.

Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 207 SCRA 630

Facts: Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the

Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position. The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issues: Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen. Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office. Held: To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our

Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, states. By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. Petitioners Election of Philippine Citizenship they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different

The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national of the United States, whether by

birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Jacot vs. Dal and COMELEC G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Facts: Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a naturalized citizen of the US on December 13, 1989. Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administrator of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of approval of Jacots request, and on the same day, he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. September 27, 2006, the Bureu of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines.

Six months after, Jacot filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. On May 2, 2007, respondent Roger T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against Jacot, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. In Jacots answer he countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In the meantime, the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Jacot garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC issued a Resolution disqualifying Jacot from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filling of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. Jacot filed a Motion for reconsideration but COMELEC en banc dismissed his Motion. Hence, he sought remedy from the Supreme Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not Nestor Jacot effectively renounced his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor. Held: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC (Aug. 1, 1989) Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.

1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? 2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?

HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a preproclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the

prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. - Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. - The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. - The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. *Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.

Caasi vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990 191 SCRA 229

Facts: Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of the United States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it for convenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. Issue: Whether or not a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident. Held: In Miguels Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning to the country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.

Loong vs. COMELEC and Abdusakur Tan G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999 Facts:

An Automated elections system was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the militarypolice officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri). Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code. Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998. Issues: 1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.

2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar) 2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count? 2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable? 2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count? 3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu. Held: The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted. 1. Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. 2. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata. The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum

in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes. Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end. 3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely offline. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz: Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondents election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes. The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

Codilla vs. De Venecia G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002 Facts: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition fordisqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation. Issues: 1. Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative. 2. Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative. Held: First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. xxx Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for

reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. xxx (a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin. xxx A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate. Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A

purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Three (3) Term Rule Socrates vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 391 SCRA 457

Facts: Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term. Issue: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

Held: YES. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election. Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor. In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because: 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001; 2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen; 3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and 4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.

Aldovino vs. COMELEC and Asilo

G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009 Facts: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)? The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. Issue: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 Held: The Supreme Court answered in a negative. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three

years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. (EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Adormeo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147927 376 SCRA 90 Facts:

Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. Held: No. In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress. Neither can Talagas victory in the said recall election can be deemed as a voluntary renunciation under the Constitution. It was only by virtue of the recall that he served Tagaraos unexpired term. This did not amount to a third full term.

Borja vs. COMELEC September 3, 1998 259 SCRA 157 Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Carpo won the election case against Borja. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Held: No. The Court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.

Ong vs. Alegre G.R. No. 16395, January 23, 2006 Facts: John Stanley Alegre and Francis Ong, then incumbent mayor were both running for the position of Mayor in the May 2004 elections in San Vicente Camarinas Norte. Ong was proclaimed mayor for the 1995, 1998, and 2001 elections. However in 1998 when Ong was proclaimed the winner, an election protest was filed against him by Alegre. However the decision annulling the proclamation of Ong as winner only came out in 2001. By this time Ong had already served his full term. It is because of this event that Alegre sought for the disqualification of Ong. According to him Ong is banned to run for the 2004 elections as Mayor since he has already reached his three term limit. For his defense petitioner cites Lozanida v COMELEC. COMELEC ruled in favor of Alegre. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Francis Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

Held: Petition dismissed. The assailed COMELEC resolutions are affirmed. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) That the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) That he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. Petitioner cannot rely on the case of Lozanida v COMELEC. In this case, the difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

Latasa vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53,

Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his answer, arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of citymayor. Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001. On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001,which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections. Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion which essentially sought the annulment of petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects. On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. Held: As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post as seen in the aforementioned provisions (Section 450 (Requisites for Creation), Sec 7 (Creation and Conversion) of the Local Government Code and Sections 2 and 53 of the Charter of the City of Digos), the Court noted that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. It is evident that in the cases of Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, Socrates vs COMELEC, Lonzanida vs COMELEC, and Adormeo vs. COMELEC, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local

elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

Mitra vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 191938 Facts: When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as

Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials. On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Held: Yes. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

Rivera III vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007

Facts: A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run. Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest. Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004. Hence, this petition. Issue:

Whether or not Morales had already served his three (3) consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position. Held: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely". With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

Nuisance Martinez III vs. HRET and Salimbangon G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010 Facts: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes. Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof. Issue: 1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections. 2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Held: The court finds the petition meritorious. 1. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.

The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. 2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Election Law Ballots; nuisance candidates. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes. Election protest; nuisance candidates. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them. In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Electoral tribunal; judicial review. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for Edilito C. Martinez who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment.

Reapportionment of Legislative District

Montejo vs. COMELEC 242 SCRA 415, March 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it

violates the principle of equality of representation. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte. Issue: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. Held: Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside. The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress. Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that: Section 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made. Section 3. Any province that may hereafter be created. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so

increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

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