EVIDENCE | B2015 CASE DIGESTS

Jison v. C.A.
February 24, 1998 Davide, Jr., J. Raeses, Roberto Miguel O. Apologies for the length. I have tried to shorten this as much as I could without sacrificing level of detail, biut I failed. Please refer to the original for the pieces of evidence involved.

FACTS: Complaint filed by Monina Jison with the RTC on 13 March 1985: 1. Monina Jison alleged that Francisco Jison has been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. 2. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, Francisco (Francis?) impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was employed as a nanny of Franciscos daughter, Lourdes). 3. As a result, Monina was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo and since childhood, had enjoyed continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. 4. Monina alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Masters degree, became a CPA and a Central Bank examiner. 5. In view of Franciscos refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Franciscos Answer: 1. He could not have had sexual relations with Amolar as the latter had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944 and that he had not been aware of her whereabouts since then; 2. He never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. Affirmative and Special Defenses in the Answer: 1. Monina had no right or cause of action; 2. Her action was barred by estopped, laches, and/or prescription. Franciscos Prayer: Dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to malicious filing of the complaint.

SUMMARY: This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. Monina alleged that she is the daughter of Francisco who impregnated her mother Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Franciscos daughter. She claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized her as such. The trial court categorized Moninas many pieces of evidence as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favour of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Moninas witnesses were sufficient to establish Moninas filiation. DOCTRINE: [T]he scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of [Sec. 40, Rule 130], in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates..

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After Monina filed her reply, pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the following issues: 1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Amolar about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946? 2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latters own acts and those of his family? 3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or prescription? 4. Damages. Monina presented eleven (11) witnesses: and testified, in their various capacities, how they were introduced to Mina and how they came to know that Monina was Franciscos illegitimate daughter. [As they would unduly lengthen the digest, the testimonies have been omitted. Please consult the original for the individual testimonies of the witnesses, along with the pertinent pieces of evidence. ] For the pieces of evidence relevant to the discussion of Sec. 40, Rule 130, they are as follows: 1. The letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) Monina procured from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of Franciscos elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (Franciscos elder brother), addressed to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio Jisons daughter), for Beth to assist Monina. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that Monina was Franciscos daughter. [These letters were procured in connection with Moninas trip abroad, which she eventually cancelled. ] 2. A letter of introduction from former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V). [This was procured for another trip abroad after she finished her graduate studies.]

3. A recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of Francisco. Franciscos Defense: Francisco offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the RTC of Manila, aside from presenting additional witnesses. Basically, he and his witnesses claim that there was no unusual relationship between Francisco and Pansay, and that Monina was not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. [Again, the testimonies were omitted. Please refer to the original. ] It must be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of Moninas witnesses and about half of Moninas testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest of Monina's testimony and those of Franciscos witnesses. Decision of the RTC: 1. DISMISSED the complaint, noting that the action was filed twenty years after the death of Esperanza Amolar (Moninas mother) and the fact that no action was instituted against defendant either by Monina, Esperanza, or the latters parents. 2. The TC then discussed the four issues raised in the pre-trial. a. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Amolar about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946? NO. i. It was improbable for Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in Nov. 1945 because Pansay would then only have been in the first mont of pregnancy. ii. No positive assertion of copulation between Pansay and Francisco. iii. Moninas attempt to show opportunities for copulation failed to

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consider that there was also an opportunity for copulation between Francisco and the other several domestic helpers living with them at that time. b. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latters own acts and those of his family? NO. i. Evidence thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." 1. To the first category belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of Moninas filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of defendants wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter, Alfredo's conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants daughter, from his personal observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he compared with that of defendants and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely observe them together. 2. To the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as [a]t each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and

allegedly on those occasions when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the paternity of the latters child. 3. To the second category belonged Moninas testimony, since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from Franciscos relatives (Exhs. S to V). c. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or prescription? Not by prescription, but by estoppel. i. it was of the perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there seems to be no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff. ii. Barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already twenty-

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five years, a professional and under the able guidance of counsel. d. Damages. No damages were due Francisco. Ruling of the CA: Ruled in favor of Monina. 1. As no vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code. 2. Rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as Francisco did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx. 3. There was overwhelming evidence on record to prove that Monina was Franciscos illegitimate daughter. a. Testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish Moninas filiation. b. Casabuena and Savariz testified on something that they personally observed or witnessed, which matters Francisco did not deny or refute. c. Moninas testimony was corroborated by Franciscos former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. 4. The positive testimonies of Monina and [her] witnesses xxx all bearing on Franciscos acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged Monina as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, Francisco himself, in his deposition, only

casually dismissed Moninas exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by [Moninas] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from their employment. a. The testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not have been true, for as pointed out by Monina, she signed the affidavit xxx almost five months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. b. It would have been absurd for Francisco or his lawyer to have secured Moninas sworn statement if the latter were not his illegitimate daughter. 5. It is true that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule has exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses testify. The other is where the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In the present case, both exceptions apply. All of Moninas witnesse whose testimonies were not given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment. 6. The Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as Moninas Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in evidence as part of [Moninas] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to further reinforce Moninas claim that she is Franciscos illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar. ISSUES: WON the CA erred in ruling that Monina was the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.

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RULING: NO. The CA was correct in ruling in favor of Monina given the evidence on record. RATIO: Franciscos Arguments: 1. it was physically impossible for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in Moninas birth. 2. His testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the time of or even after her employment by him. 3. Moninas testimonial evidence is shaky, contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, that: a. Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; b. Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting between Francisco, Pansay and Monina; c. Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive in testifying for Monina as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central Bank supervision and Monina was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and d. Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment Monina received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at Merchants Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play.

e. Moninas testimony that he answered fror her schooling was self-serving. f. Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; Monina resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong; and Moninas employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz, & Co. was attributable to her educational attainment. g. The Court of Appeals reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. i. Their genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify. ii. The contents of the baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. iii. In both both Exhibits E and F, the names of the childs parents were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not Amolar). Ruling of the Supreme Court: 1. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as Monina's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 1 thereof provides the

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

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various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established. a. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. 2. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. While Moninas mother could no longer testify, this does not mean that Monina could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. a. Since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of Francisco at the time Monina was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between Francisco and Moninas mother was not at all impossible, 3. There is some merit, however, argument against the probative value of some of Moninas documentary evidence. a. Moninas reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced.

i. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. ii. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. iii. However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of Moninas testimony to corroborate her claim that Francisco spent for her education. b. Since the certificates of the Local Registrar and he baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. c. As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to Moninas filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as Monina witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the

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contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and Monina shown by evidence other than the documents in question]. i. Sec. 40, Rule 130 may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits. ii. See doctrine iii. Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation2 iv. Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as Monina's school
2

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community

records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of Francisco recognized her as his daughter. 4. As regards Moninas affidavit which attests that Francisco is not her father, it would have been unnecessary for Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. 5. The burden of evidence then fully shifts to Francisco. a. Two (2) glaring points in Franciscos defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as That is not true, I do not believe that, or None that I know. i. it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I dont remember. b. Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence Franciscos attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in Moninas favor may not succeed. c. Nothing substantial could be obtained either from Franciscos witnesses either. 6. All told, Moninas evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover,

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Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. 7. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. The last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. a. As Francisco set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing Moninas delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.