International Negotiation 15 (2010) 5780

brill.nl/iner

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conict: Moving from Power Brokerage to Relationship Restructuring

Ruben Harutunian*, 1
10761 Mist Haven Terrace, Rockville, MD 20852, USA (E-mail: rubenchik@gmail.com) Received 6 August 2008: accepted 7 July 2009

Abstract The conict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents the failure of mediation eorts in the context of a prolonged and successful ceasere which has created disincentives for compromise. Todays dicult negotiation atmosphere originates from perceiving the conict as primarily an ethnic problem couched in the rhetoric of a territorial dispute. Further, a prolonged and successful ceasere has entrenched powerful economic and political interests on both sides which stand to gain from continued limbo. With this in mind, the Minsk Group should shift its focus to the implementation of condence-building measures between the authorities on both sides as well as the three societies involved. Secondly, the Minsk Group co-chairs can no longer just serve as peace brokers, but must be co-signers to the negotiated agreement, emphasizing their role as guarantors of a long-term peace between Armenians and Azeris. Finally, any long-term agreement will have to include aspects of mutual economic development, cross-cultural exchange, and socio-political understanding. Keywords restructuring; condence-building; guarantors; mutual development; ethnic conict; territorial dispute

The conict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents the failure of mediation eorts in the context of a prolonged and successful ceasere that has created disincentives for compromise. Relative stability in the region over the past decade-and-a-half has emboldened both sides to hold out for an imagined outcome of outright victory. Since the signing of a ceasere agreement in May 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh
*) Ruben Harutunian became Deputy Press Attach at the Oce of Public Aairs, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in August 2009. His previous position was as Vice Consul in the U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Consular Section. Prior to that, he served as a Thomas R. Pickering Fellow in the Oce of Public Aairs at the U.S. Consulate General St. Petersburg in 2006, as well as a Bilateral Ocer at the Oce of Russian Aairs in the State Department in Washington, DC from 2006 to 2007. He earned his MA in International Relations (Conict Management and International Economics) at the Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2007. 1) This article does not necessarily reect the point of view of the U.S. Department of State.
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/157180610X488182

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conict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has stalled within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-Minsk Group2 negotiation framework. Despite the extensive mediation eorts of the Minsk Group cochairs (the United States, France, and Russia), neither Armenian nor Azeri authorities seem to be wholeheartedly committed to the process. In fact, in the recent past, both sides have been walking the ne line of constructing domestic rhetoric to appeal to nationalistic and hard-line interests, while being very careful not to appear bellicose and intransigent in the eyes of the world community. As a result, Armenian and Azeri heads of state and high-level delegations engage in round after round of formal negotiations in exotic foreign locations, while at home they emphasize the constantly shifting geopolitical imbalance in the South Caucasus. They point to the ineectiveness of the mediation mechanism as a reason for proposing unilateral military action in the near future to resolve the conict, and they exert a great deal of eort to shoring up regional and international support for their cause from Turkey, Iran, Russia, the European Union, and the United States. To a certain extent, todays dicult negotiating atmosphere originates from the perception of the conict as an ethnic problem couched in the rhetoric of a territorial dispute. Further, a prolonged and successful ceasere has entrenched powerful economic and political interests on both sides, which stand to gain from continued limbo. Compounding this, the Minsk Group mediation framework has produced no tangible results because it has focused exclusively on brokering a nal settlement. This article will argue that the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conict should not lie in the signing of a document outlining national borders; rather, a true resolution of the conict will depend on a holistic approach to fundamentally restructure the relationships between all parties involved in the dispute.

Dening the Conict Ethnic Division Manipulated for Political Gain The solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conict cannot be based on a delineation of national boundaries because the roots of the present hostility between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not rooted in a ght for territory; rather, they are part of a complex network of multifaceted antagonisms between the two societies dating back to czarist rule over the Transcaucasus. In the Russian Empire, economic and social developments in the late nineteenth century led to a grow2) The Minsk Group was created in 1992 by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)) to encourage a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

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ing division along class lines between Armenians and Azeris. The latter were generally poor, unskilled, and rural, while the former inhabited the cities and occupied protable positions as entrepreneurs and merchants. Beneting disproportionately from economic advances especially the establishment of a thriving oil industry in Baku at the close of the 1800s and from frequent favoritism on the part of their Russian rulers, the Armenians were able to rise to key economic and political positions in the major cities of Transcaucasia. Among the Azeris, these realities caused feelings of resentment that gradually coalesced into a pervasive anti-Armenian sentiment. While the growth of animosity between the Armenians and Azeris of Transcaucasia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by no means made inevitable the outright conict between the two communities, czarist nationality policies tended to exacerbate the already tense relationship. True to its name, the czarist policy of divide and rule sought to promote jealousy and division among neighboring ethnic groups to ensure the monarchys overall grip on power. When central authority waned during the Russian Revolution of 1905, the tensions that had been building between the Armenian and Azeris exploded into violence throughout the Transcaucasus. As the rule of law in the region began to crumble throughout 1905, chaos reached Bakus shores and environs. Hundreds of Armenian-owned oil wells were set ablaze by Azeris in late September 1905 and the Armenians forcefully defended their properties. Within a week, an estimated 1,500 people had been killed and over two-thirds of the regions oil wells had been destroyed (Croissant 1998: 56). Tentative peace was restored to the Transcaucasus only with the collapse of the revolutionary movement in Russia at the end of the year and the gradual reestablishment of order throughout the Empire in 1907. Still, the rst drops of blood had been shed between the Armenians and Azeris, setting a precedent for future conict between the two ethnic groups. While there had been little progress on the part of the Azeris in developing a collective national consciousness prior to the late nineteenth century, the 1905 bloodshed and the subsequent growth of Armenian irredentism sparked the rise of Azeri nationalism. The Azeris contemptuous view of the Armenians as a privileged class enjoying the favoritism of the Russians was complimented thereafter by a perceived fear of Armenian claims to what were regarded as rightfully and historically Azeri lands. As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh territory claimed by both ethnic groups became a major center for the growth of Azeri nationalism. Nagorno-Karabakh as a Symbol With a total area of 48,000 square kilometers, Nagorno-Karabakh is only slightly larger that the smallest U.S. state, Rhode Island (see Fig. 1). It is a largely mountainous area situated in the easternmost edge of the highlands known as the Armenian plateau. (In fact, the word nagorno is derived from the Russian word

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Nagorno-Karabakh region
Naftalan

Lake Sevan

tar Tar Barda Ashaghy Aghjakend Madagiz Ter-Ter (Mir. Bashir) (Shaumanovsk) Aghdere r n (Mardakert) Khachi rta Ta Bash Karvend Kabadjar Haterk Cheldran

tra Ku

Kura
Agdjabedi

Sirkhavend Istisu Dzormuk Vaghouas Askeran Knodjaiy Stepanakert (Khankendi) Shusha Lachin Sisyan Shakbuz Kapan Zangilan Goris

Agdam ar Garn Khojavond (Martuni)

AZERBAIJAN

Imishly

AR
Yekhegnadzor

ME

NI

Hadrul

Fizuli Horadiz

Guru

Ara

Gubadly

ary Hak
Jabrail

Nakhchivan

Ara

NAKHCHIVAN (AZERBAIJAN)
Dzulfa Ordubad

Kadzaran

IRAN
0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

Megri

Figure 1. Map of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. nagorny, meaning mountainous). Although the ethnic makeup of NagornoKarabakh in the late Soviet period (140,000 Armenians and 48,000 Azeris) has led many observers to portray the current situation as one of a predominantly Armenian-inhabited enclave attempting to break away from Azerbaijan, the Karabakh clash has far more to do with the construction of national histories than with demographics. Armenian scholars have amassed a wealth of historical evidence to support their claim that Nagorno-Karabakh has for centuries been the heartland of Armenian civilization; namely, that the area encompassing the western region of the modern Republic of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, belonged to the Armenians as far back as the formation of the Armenian people in the seventh century B.C. (Anassian 1969: 305). Although conquered by the ancient Mede people of Iran in the sixth century B.C., the area was restored to Armenian control in the second century B.C., and thereafter became the province of Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh, even today) under the Artashes dynasty. When the Sassanid presence in Transcaucasia was usurped by that of the Arabs in the seventh century, the Armenians of mountainous Kara-

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bakh continued to preserve their traditions and cling to a semi-autonomous existence, while the rest of their countrymen fell under foreign rule. Over the next 1000 years, this precedent of Armenian autonomy was upheld, making Nagorno-Karabakh the only part of historic Armenia where a tradition of national sovereignty was preserved unbroken until the late medieval period (Walker 1991: 7374). Thus, even to the casual observer, the Armenians strong emotional and nationalistic attachment to the land is clear. As Hovanissian notes, while the rest of Armenia was submerged under foreign control, a icker of freedom was maintained in Karabakh (1988: 29). The view of contemporary Azeri scholarship, championed by Ziia Buniatovs monograph (1965) entitled Azerbaijanis in the Seventh to Ninth Centuries, maintains that modern Azeris are descendants of the Caucasian Albanians. It is alleged that in antiquity the Albanians were one of the three major peoples of Caucasia (along with the Armenians and Georgians), with a state extending from Lake Sevan eastward to the Caspian Sea and from the Caucasus Mountains southward to the Arax River. Buniatov asserts that while Albanians were initially adherents of Christianity, the majority of the population converted to Islam in the seventh century A.D. and was linguistically Turkied 400 years later (Vorochil 1974: 279). Azeri scholars of this view refute the Armenian claim that the inhabitants of mountainous Karabakh have been ethnically Armenian since earliest times, as compared to the people living on the plains to the east who are descendants of Islamized and Turkied Albanians. In contrast, it is argued in Baku that beginning in the eighth century, immigrating Armenians forced the cultural, linguistic, and religious assimilation of the indigenous Albanian population of Karabakh (Dudwick 1990: 379). Thus, Buniatov and others have argued that the modern Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are not Armenian per se, but are Armenianized Albanians, and thus, Azeris. According to Donabedian (1997: 64), the purpose of this approach is to show that the armenianness of Karabakh is only a myth and that the Albanians who live there should have no reason to challenge their membership in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Illustrating the passion attached to the Karabakh issue by both sides, Armenian and Azeri scholars attempt to depict a clear and exclusive ethnic history of the region when the reality is much more complicated. As a result, the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh is presented not as a ploy for territorial gain, but as an inter-ethnic battle for self-assertion and self-identication. For the Armenians, the nationalistic anity for Nagorno-Karabakh developed over centuries of hardship brought about by foreign rule. Signicantly, the Azeris own attachment to the land is a much more recent historical phenomenon, linked with the rise of Azeri statehood and national identity. Thus, the tiny region of NagornoKarabakh occupies a central place in the national consciousness of both the

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Armenian and Azeri people. For the Armenians, Karabakh is a refuge and bastion the nal stronghold where a tradition of national autonomy was preserved nearly uninterrupted until modern times. For the Azeris, NagornoKarabakh is both a key repository of the ancient civilization to which they trace their ancestry and a focal point of their nationalization process. With the proliferation of mutually reinforcing nationalisms in Nagorno-Karabakh beginning in the early 1900s, all that was needed was a spark to set o an explosion of emotions and violence on both sides. That spark was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Inadequacy of Drawing Lines The background and history of the ght over Nagorno-Karabakh have won it the distinction of being labeled an intractable conict. Essentially, conicts can be classied as having conditions of intractability if they include elements of identity conict, racial/ethnic conict, conict over subsistence resources, and conict over governance and authority. These types of conicts seem to share a sense of perceived intransigence and longevity, making it dicult to distinguish between needs, interests, positions, and security. Thus, intractable conicts entail a relationship between parties that often view their objectives as incompatible. Such conicts have the following two characteristics: 1) the antagonistic parties are engaged in a struggle with excessive eorts to coerce each other, and 2) the adversaries persist too long in the struggle without trying to reduce the level of tension in a way that appears to be directed at reaching mutually acceptable settlements (Kriesberg 1989: 110). It is precisely these types of conicts that require third-party involvement to set in motion elements of conict transformation, understood to be a continuous process aimed at fostering conditions of political will to advance a compromise solution. The transformation process may involve cultural, political, economic, psychological, regional, and international elements all of which can be combined and focused to empower parties to reframe their dierences. This must be the work of the Minsk Group cochairs going forward: to move the conict from a position of stalemate mired in blame and animosity to a forward-looking atmosphere, aimed at resolution and rebuilding. Touval and Zartman (1985: 73) discuss the concept of a hurting stalemate as a situation that is very uncomfortable for both sides, and that appears likely to become very costly. In these situations, they argue, the warring or disagreeing sides will see that the costs of continued struggle have become so high that the potential benets from a negotiated agreement are worth pursuing. According to Simmons (1999: 24), in a hurting stalemate, the confronting parties will continually engage in cost-benet analyses, comparing the costs of entrenchment to the potential benets of negotiation. Similarly, in an essay titled Regional Con-

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ict Resolution, Zartman argues for a necessary link between the notion of ripeness of a conict and the cost-benet calculations involved in working towards the resolution of that conict. Zartman points out that a mutually hurting stalemate, combined with the threat of a looming catastrophe, will lead parties to search for an attractive way out of the dispute through negotiation, rather than continued conict (1991: 353). In the Nagorno-Karabakh context, it is clear that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have reached this point. In fact, it is evident that the prolonged ceasere agreement of May 1994 has allowed the economies and societies in both countries to develop quite successfully, irrespective of and despite the conict. As a corollary to their ideas regarding mutually-hurting stalemates, Simmons and Zartman each go on to discuss the prerequisites of a peace agreement that not only ends present hostilities, but seeks to address the underlying issues of past enmity between contending parties. Simmons points out, favorable trends in public opinion, as well as political will and a pressing need to devote more attention to development, economic, and social issues, [have] set the stage for reconsidering, and with any hope rejecting, the more intransigent positions that have characterized the past (Simmons 1999: 159). Within Armenia and Azerbaijan, not only does there seem to be a vacuum of political will, but leaders on both sides continually incite political sentiment in their respective nations in favor of continued intransigence and unwillingness to compromise. Public opinion in Armenias capital, Yerevan, seems to indicate a fatigue with the struggle and points to greater interest in economic opportunity through open borders and eased trade relations with its neighbors. On the other hand, the Azeri public mood, particularly in Baku, remains contentious and highly charged. Whereas both sides are searching for greater economic development opportunities, neither sees the other as a partner in this quest. Indeed, Azerbaijan is focusing on selling its oil and gas to Western markets and Armenia is seeking closer ties with Russia. Addressing these points, Zartman has suggested that the bridge linking the enmity of the past with the hope of the future must be constructed through forward-looking formulas that concentrate on expanding bilateral and international contacts and not on ideological and nationalist claims (Zartman & Kremenyuk 2005). In an increasingly globalized and regionalized world, border disputes will only have negative repercussions by keeping the competing states out of the arena of potential gain from trade and development. Although the road to resolution is long and arduous, there is much to be gained from a rm commitment to bilateral cooperation with the unwavering support of the international community. Browns work (1996) on the fundamental factors and triggers of internal conict identies a common thread in all of these analyses. Directly addressing the causes of a conict is seen as a necessary step towards achieving a resolving

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formula that sticks. Although Browns analysis focuses on internal conict and not conict between states, the Nagorno-Karabakh case seems to t as it warrants a more uid and exible understanding of borders and national divisions. Thus, negotiations between Armenians, Azeris, and Karabakhis must consider and respond to the structural (ethnic geography), political (nationalization and elite politics), economic/social (paths to sustained and multi-track development), and cultural/perceptual (identity formation) factors that all played a hand in the initiation of conict in the South Caucasus (Brown 1996: 11). Similarly, negotiators must be frank in their discussions of triggers to the conict, whether caused by elite-level or mass-level factors and whether triggered by internal or external developments. It seems clear that all four of the possible causal factors of ethnic conict were present in the escalation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly, it is fair to say that mass support was manipulated by elite, domestic factions, while the geo-strategic interests of regional and international powers exacerbated the already-tense situation. Within this context, it is essential to rethink the model for third-party involvement in the Armenian-Azeri conict. Thus far, the Minsk Group co-chairs have served as shuttle-diplomats and worked to devise a formula for an agreement and cessation of hostilities between the two conicting sides. Bercovitchs compilation of works on the theory and practice of mediation argues that mediation is, in many ways, a continuation of the parties own conict-management eorts and that this involves the non-coercive intervention of a third party who seeks to inuence or resolve a particular conict (1996: 59). Mediators are to fulll their primary objective ending a given hostility by relying on persuasion, appeals to logic, the use of information, and the application of socialinuence strategies. Within the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conict, while both parties welcome the involvement of the international community, neither is committed to the search for a solution through this mechanism. As a result, the Minsk Group functions as a mediator as buer (protecting the face of adversaries by making the conict not only a matter of regional struggle but also giving it international stature) or mediator as coordinator (synchronizing dissonant negotiating conventions and setting a tone and context for talks). Instead, it must become a mediator as interpreter (bridging the intercultural communication gap between the two sides and fostering honest and open dialogue between all sectors of the two societies (Bercovitch 1996: 107). In so doing, the French, American, and Russian representatives will have advanced the peace-building agenda to a state of ripeness and mutually-felt unacceptability for the Armenian and Azeri sides. Since 1994, the Minsk process has been mired in the power-brokerage mediation model (see Table 1), partly as a result of its format three high-level diplomats, restraining each other, each wanting to take the lead, each constrained by its home nations global foreign policy objectives. While the Minsk co-chairs

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Table 1. Four Sets of Indicators of Mediation Success

Mediation Model I. Power-brokerage model Evaluation Criteria Actor: great power Time: short-term (<5 years) Expectations: choice for mediation is pragmatic Actor: policy elites Time: short-and-medium-term (510 years) Expectations: mediation is better than violent means Indicators of Mediation Success 1. Regional stability: Implementation of agreement Reduction of violence 2. Relationship to superpowers: Global context Regional context 1. Perceptions of Armenia, Azeri, and Nagorno-Karabakh policy elites Of agreements Of each other 2. Public support in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh 3. Adoption of defense strategies 1. Success through mediation/ compromise is seen as unacceptable and other means to victory are advocated

II. Political problemsolving model

III. Domination model

Actor: Disenfranchised groups Time: irrelevant Expectations: mediation is counterproductive Actor: identity groups Time: long-term (>10 years) Expectations: mediation is the only way

IV. Restructuring relationships model

Process: 1. Representation of all relevant parties 2. Degree to which parties voluntarily reach an agreement Outcomes: 1. Depth of agreements (shortterm versus long-term changes in relationship) 2. Degree of support among all parties (maximum support versus strong protests of key players)

Source: Kleiboer 1998: 91

have internationalized the conict and brought attention to it, they have not situated it at the center of the regions political and economic development, and have instead allowed those two trends to develop despite and to the detriment of a comprehensive resolution to the conict. As a result, political elites in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh have eschewed the political problemsolving mediation model by devising their economic policies and political platforms around the fear of resumed armed struggle and threats of economic

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suocation. Consequently, they have emboldened the domination model by excluding the grievances and legitimate claims of certain parties to the conict (internally displaced people (IDPs), nationalists, and Karabakhis). As a result of these three concurrent trends in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the parties have not graduated to the restructuring relationship mediation model, where frank and open discussions between all relevant parties could take place, measures for short and long-term changes would be sought, and the process would have the voluntary and maximum support of all primary actors. To correct this trend, the Minsk Group must radically redene its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process, becoming a source of cross-party linkage and relationship enhancement, or risk undermining its own legitimacy through a prolonged search for a perfect solution.

The Minsk Process Shuttle Diplomacy and Major Players As Rothchild (1997) reminds us, the primary role of a mediator in a conict is to shift the balance of a cost-benet analysis in favor of developing a solution versus staying in the conict. The mediator must be free to use both coercive and non-coercive measures to achieve a compromised deal. However, success ultimately depends on the conicting sides willingness to agree to a solution. Hartzell (1999: 39) develops the concept of successful mediation by pointing to three primary elements of an eectively negotiated and lasting peace: 1) the security dilemma (occurring when two or more states each feel insecure vis-vis the others) must be overcome through demilitarization and by dealing with issues of the possible use of coercive force in the future, 2) the control over economic forces must be allocated disproportionately with more funding going to underdeveloped areas, and 3) matters of concern regarding electoral, territorial, and administrative interests must be fully addressed. Finally, Stedman (2002: 74) insists that mediators must carefully construct a strategy when approaching a conict resolution process. Mediators must reduce the fear of agreement on each side by the creation of trust and mutual-interest measures. They must combat the rhetoric of total victory by reassuring the parties that a compromise is the best outcome. They must also encourage and foster contact between informal elements on each side. Stedman goes on to point out that mediators must view the implementation of a negotiated peace agreement as more important than the signing of a deal. Consequently, mediators must ensure follow-through on promises, must create incentives for implementing the agreement, and must be resolute in responding forcefully to cheating. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conict, eorts to mediate a peace agreement have been made by the United Nations and the OSCE, as well as by

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ocials from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran. No single entity has yet been equally acceptable to all parties, and, since 1993, Russia has attempted to claim for itself the role of sole peacekeeper in Karabakh and elsewhere in former Soviet territory. Given the regions geographic placement wedged between Europe and Asia, a crossroads between East and West, and on the cultural border between Islam and Christianity trouble in the Caucasus naturally brings forth the involvement of Iran, Turkey, and Russia. In addition, because of Bakus oil reserves and the insistence of the Armenian-American lobby, the United States has become involved in this distant conict. Also, strategic and security considerations will not allow European interest to wane, bringing in the OSCE as a mediation force acceptable to most. None of these actors are honest brokers; however, their role in the peaceful evolution of this conict is undeniable. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began to work on the Nagorno-Karabakh conict in March 1992, soon after newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined the organization. This coincided with a unique historical moment where the Iron Curtain had been lifted and there appeared to be mutual understanding among the CSCE participating states that cooperation was better than confrontation. Within this euphoric atmosphere, it seemed that the Soviet Unions successor states, especially the Russian Federation, could be included in a world system of equals. The CSCE took the rst steps by transforming itself into the OSCE in December 1994, and addressing issues of common interest in what may now appear a naive belief in mutual trust and shared values prevailing over narrow national interests. By 1994, the CSCE confronted a twofold task: rst, to mediate, facilitate, and support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conict, and second, to negotiate relations among its participating states and determine the role of the CSCE and, specically, the Minsk Process (the mediatory work of the Minsk Group) within the context of the conict. Particularly in the initial phases, friction between key CSCE players complicated both agendas (Jacoby 2005). Russia, in particular, has played a dual role as a member of the Minsk Group and as the dominant regional actor, where its national objectives in the near abroad (including the 14 former Soviet republics, now independent states) have not necessarily been shared by other members of the Minsk Group. This contradiction manifested itself in Russias competing mediation eorts. It was Russia, and not the Minsk Group, that brokered the May 1994 ceasere. The other CSCE participating states honored this agreement, but were reluctant to agree to sending peacekeeping forces. However, all parties to the conict believed that multinational troops would be preferable to only Russian troops and, in December 1994, the now-OSCE established a High Level Planning Group in Vienna, tasked with preparing and stationing OSCE peacekeeping forces in the conict zone. At least from 1994, the United States developed interests in the region linked to the presence of oil in the Caspian basin as part of its agenda of diversifying oil production and transportation while circumventing Iran. Tensions

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between Armenia and Turkey, a Minsk Group member state supporting Azerbaijan, mounted in the aftermath of the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar in March 1993. Turkey declared a blockade on Armenia and admitted to supplying Azerbaijans army with military hardware (Jacoby 2005). In mid-1993, the Minsk Groups Swedish chair, responding to conicts generated by the dierent national agendas, moved to limit the circle of participants in the peace talks. Minsk Group players seen as less important would henceforth be informed, but would not take part in subsequent negotiations. After the ceasere, Russia assumed the role as Minsk Group co-chair along with Sweden, and, in 1997, a permanent troika of co-chairs, consisting of Russia, the U.S., and France, was formed. This development was followed by an active period of shuttle diplomacy to nd a resolution, hampered by the fact that Minsk Group co-chairs were less likely to act exclusively as individual mediators than as representatives of their respective states. The only OSCE body in place on the ground was the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Oce, a post occupied by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk of Poland since 1997. His mandate, however, did not include negotiation or mediation (Jacoby 2005). Once stable working relationships had been established within the Minsk Group, its discussions began to focus on Nagorno-Karabakhs status and security, as well as questions of refugees and IDPs and the problem of the once Azeridominated Karabakh town of Shusha. Between 1997 and 2001, four options, representing dierent methodologies of resolution, were discussed. The rst, referred to as the package solution, favored talking about all issues simultaneously including Karabakhs nal status to achieve the optimum balance. It was believed that given the number of issues on the table, this approach would oer the most leeway for compromise. The proposal presented by the Co-chairs in MayJuly 1997 consisted of two agendas: Agreement I on ending the conict, including troop withdrawals, deployment of peacekeepers, return of displaced persons and security guarantees, and Agreement II on Karabakhs nal status. The agendas were separate, as the 1997 OSCE Ministerial Council reported, to allow the parties to negotiate and implement each at its own pace, but with a clear understanding that at the end of the day all outstanding issues will have to be resolved. Reactions in Baku and Yerevan were encouraging, but the leadership in Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakhs capital city) rejected it (Jacoby 2005). A step-by-step solution, proposed in September 1997, was premised on initially sealing Agreement I before dealing with Agreement II, with the question of the Lachin Corridor the land passage, linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia shifted to Agreement II. Nagorno-Karabakh would continue to exist in its present form until agreement on nal status was reached, but would gain internationally recognized interim status. In principle, the step-by-step solution would build a constructive atmosphere in the early stages by focusing on

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military aspects and paving the road for negotiations on the more complex political issues. However, the Karabakh Armenians were not ready to agree to take the rst step by withdrawing from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan. Stepanakert argued that this buer zone was its main source of leverage, which could not be given up without agreement on what concrete security guarantees it would receive in return (Jacoby 2005). Once again, the Karabakh Armenians demonstrated that despite the restricted status accorded to them in the negotiations, they wielded signicant veto power over possible settlement options. The common state proposal, presented in November 1998, anticipated a vaguely dened common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, featuring more or less horizontal relations between Baku and Stepanakert. It was rejected by Azerbaijan on the grounds that it violated its territorial integrity and the principles set forth by the OSCE at its summit in Lisbon in December 1996. There, Armenia was alone in rejecting a statement that reiterated principles for any settlement stressing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Alstadt 1988: 247). In 2001, President Robert Kocharian of Armenia and President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan discussed a proposal based on an exchange of access to territory, though this never got as far as an OSCE draft agreement. In the course of the domestic debates launched only after the talks, Aliyev reported (and Kocharian denied) that it had involved Armenia surrendering access to a strip of its southern district of Meghri, oering Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhijevan enclave, in return for accepting Armenian control over the Lachin Corridor (Jacoby 2005). Signicant steps forward were taken again during additional summits between Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian. The rst of these was held at Rambouillet, France, on February 1011, 2006, while the second took place on June 45, 2006, in Bucharest, on the sidelines of a forum of Black Sea states. Unfortunately, despite heightened international media speculation prior to these meetings, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian subsequently commented, the most serious dierence between the two sides . . . wasnt solved [in Rambouillet] and it wasnt solved [in Bucharest] either. Many analysts assume current deliberations are revolving around the framework originally proposed in late 2004 by NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Pierre Lellouche and former Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, calling for a compromise settlement that would give Armenia temporary control of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabagh Republic (NKR) in exchange for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory with the nal status of Karabakh to be determined by its inhabitants in a referendum in ve or ten years time. The International Crisis Group unveiled a similar plan in the fall of 2007. As a follow-up to these meetings, the two nations foreign ministers met in Geneva on March 14, 2007. According to media reports, these most recent high-level discussions between the two sides are increasingly going into the

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details of the basic principles proposed by the mediators (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty). In April 2007, Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian sounded upbeat in his assessment of the talks, insisting that he and his counterpart may still be able to signicantly minimize the conicting parties remaining dierences on the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement and arguing that the parties have already created quite a solid base for reaching an agreement. There is a document on the table . . . we believe it is a fairly serious document that allows for a solution to the problem, Oskanian was quoted as saying (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty). Formal and substantive discussions between the two sides were put on hold during the recent presidential elections in Armenia. The Failure of Mediation The typical approaches to conict resolution have not produced concrete results in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh; instead, they have fashioned a process by which mediation has created a sense of false stability and entrenched positions. Azeri authorities have based their current position on the hope of future socioeconomic and geo-political shifts in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, largely due to the continued development and export of Bakus oil reserves, as illustrated by the newly inaugurated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. First, Azeri authorities have shifted the focus of negotiations to the status of non-Karabakh territories taken by Armenian forces during prolonged military campaigns in the early 1990s. The Armenian side responds by stipulating that those territories came under Armenian control not only because there was disagreement about Nagorno-Karabakhs status, but also because Azerbaijan pressed for the complete removal of all Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Second, the Azeris believe that if they do not realize their maximum demands through negotiations, they can always resort to military solutions. However, a realistic assessment of the situation on the ground shows that a successful military solution would require more than conventional arms against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh who are defending their own homes. Azerbaijan can succeed in its attempts to win back land by force only by expelling all Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Third, Azerbaijan is convinced that time is on its side. This belief is rooted in the condence that oil revenues will enhance the Azeri states military capacity. Using the same logic, Armenian authorities maintain that international tendencies today are moving towards reinforcing the right to self-determination, citing Kosovo as an example. Furthermore, Armenia believes that the longer NagornoKarabakh maintains its de facto independence and reinforces its state institutions, the harder it will be to reverse the wheel of history. Finally, the Azerbaijani authorities are hoping that an isolated Armenia will be economically unable to sustain its position and will sooner or later agree to seri-

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ous concessions. This is a highly problematic assumption because it is the people of Nagorno-Karabakh who must rst agree to concessions. Furthermore, both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have gone beyond mere economic survival and are recording high levels of growth, due to the cash inow of remittances from relatives working and living abroad and through substantial international aid. In the words of the Armenian foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian:
The solution will not be found either through military action or international resolutions, and no solution can be imposed from the outside. The only way to a solution is to demonstrate political will and embrace realistic positions. Armenians remain faithful to their initial premises that there cannot be a vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, that it must have a geographic link with Armenia, and that the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh must be assured. For us, the basis of resolution is the armation of the right of the people of NagornoKarabakh to self-determination and international recognition of that right. Azerbaijans acceptance of this fact and its formalization in an agreement will open the way for the resolution of the conict and the elimination of its consequences (Oskanian 2005).

For Azeri authorities, however, the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan cannot be a subject of compromise. Ocially, Azerbaijan does not want war and remains committed to a peaceful resolution; however, recent hard-line rhetoric has asserted that, if forced by deliberate actions to further the occupational status quo, Azerbaijan will be ready to resort to all other available measures to restore its territorial integrity. Azeri authorities assert that in order to veil its aggressive policy towards Azerbaijan, the Armenian side frequently speculates on the international legal principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. In reality, Azeris argue, the practical realization of this right, as stipulated in relevant international documents, does not involve unilateral secession, but rather represents a legitimate process carried out in accordance with international and domestic laws within precisely identied limits. Obviously, the critical factor in addressing the issue of self-determination with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conict is that all actions aimed at tearing away a part of the territory of Azerbaijan are deemed unconstitutional and accompanied by violations of basic rules of international law, particularly those prohibiting the use of force and the acquisition of territory. Azeri ocials adhere to the belief that the legal status of the NagornoKarabakh region can be worked out only with the full and equal participation of the citizens of both Azeri and Armenian communities and within the framework of a lawful and democratic process. For Baku, the resolution strategy would not become a reality without the restoration of Azerbaijans sovereign rights over all occupied territories and the safe and dignied repatriation of the expelled Azerbaijani population. Once an agreement is achieved, ocial policy states, Azeris will require the international communitys help to guarantee implementation through the deployment of multinational peacekeeping forces, support for de-mining eorts,

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restoration of communications, and rehabilitation of lands. There must also be security guarantees for the population in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including the creation of local police forces in the region for both Azerbaijani and Armenian communities. The Government of Azerbaijan seems ready to assist in all possible ways with the rebuilding of infrastructure and economic development, including investments at the local level. Azeri authorities have also said that special attention in the conict settlement should be given to the area of land routes within the region. The Azeri foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, has oered the following glimpse into the Azeri position:
Those who are familiar with the conict often encounter the notion of corridors or unimpeded access. Azerbaijan suggests a policy of shifting from restricted, antagonistic understandings of the corridor concept to the use of all communications in the region for the mutual benet of both sides. This approach acquires particular signicance with regard to the so-called Lachin corridor, which is important for linking both the Armenian population in the Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia and Azerbaijan with its Autonomous Republic of Nakhijevan through the territory of Armenia. The use of the Lachin road in both directions can provide both Azerbaijan and Armenia with guaranteed secure connections . . . This road could become a road of peace of great political, economic and pan-regional importance (Mammadyarov 2005).

Of all these proposed solutions, the approach of a territorial swap oered during the 2001 meeting between the two sides in Key West, Florida possibly yielded the best ideas on resolving the conict by addressing the majority of the underlying issues security for Karabakh Armenians, Azerbaijans territorial integrity, unfettered access to enclaved populations, and greater regional integration. A territorial swap provided a resolving formula. Nevertheless, this approach had to be rejected (and its very existence denied by the principals) because neither constituency had been prepared for the dramatic concessions it required of both sides. A more constructive approach of debating the specics of the proposal through media outlets, bringing both sides closer to acceptance through reiteration of the proposals merits, and having the political will and domestic support to follow-through on its implementation, could have potentially resulted in the conicts resolution at the start of the second millennium. However, neither party could have taken such a step unilaterally and the mediators largely stayed out of the debate.

Towards Restructuring Relations Selling the Deal and Bringing in New Players Because past approaches have failed, the mediating team must radically alter its course in the quest for a durable solution to the conict. Primarily, the Minsk

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Group must insist on the introduction of civil society elements to achieve a lasting peace, and the main participants will not only have to compromise, but will also have to stop propagandizing against the other side, particularly to domestic audiences. Stories of the ght, as long as they are repeated, provide evidence of the enemys treachery and will only provide fuel to the ames of hatred for the next generation. Part of the long-term peace process will sooner or later entail getting past fruitless debates on issues that will not be resolved. Questions such as whose patrimony is this really, who possessed the land in 1920, 620, or 200 B.C., who started this round of bloodshed, or who committed the greater atrocities lead to ultimate dead ends. Eorts to put aside these questions may be met with sneers that only the guilty will want to end calls to investigate or clarify the truth. Special courage will be required to break the cycle and look ahead to the well-being and survival of future generations. Civil society, including independent media, NGOs, and the diaspora, can have a tremendous impact on this process. The capacity of civil society to inuence the Karabakh peace process has always been subject to cycles of opportunity and constraint imposed by internal political developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It may appear in the current period that civil society faces more constraints than opportunities, and in some senses the conict is no closer to resolution, momentum is dicult to maintain, militant rhetoric is on the rise, and there is a danger that individual activists and organizations will become disillusioned by the lack of progress. Even where they enjoy access, civil society actors do not appear able to inuence the decisionmakers. Juxtaposed to this somewhat bleak picture, there is no doubt that since the 1994 ceasere, NGOs have played a key role by maintaining dialogue, promoting a culture of peace and human rights, working toward the release of POWs, and facilitating the meeting of representatives from the conicting sides. Over the years, NGOs have gained experience and developed new skills and capacities, leading even the most conservative circles of government to recognize the potential of civil society action. On June 14, 2005, a statement issued by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Aairs actively supported prior international calls for the establishment of direct contacts between Karabakhs Armenian and Azeri communities (Ministries of Foreign Aairs). According to the statement, direct inter-communal dialogue and associated condence-building measures will contribute to creating the prerequisite conditions for normalizing relations between the two groups. This represents an important opening for these two core constituencies to establish a dialogue for the rst time since the war. Another trend is the growth of civil society in Karabakh itself, a nascent phenomenon tempering the inuence of the military in Karabakhs political reality. Looking to the future, the key priority for civil society must be to act as a conduit for wider and better informed participation in the peace process.

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Broad-based public participation in the peace process is essential for the regions democratic development and the successful implementation of a compromise solution to the conict. This requires civil society to develop proposals on both substantive and procedural issues for consideration by the negotiating parties. It also demands outreach to marginalized communities and internal dialogue on painful, often taboo subjects. The accession of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe in June 2000 and their resulting obligation to resolve the Karabakh conict by peaceful means should serve as indications to peacebuilders in the region that they can count on the support of European institutions. Ultimately, however, the challenge is to include disenfranchised populations in a meaningful dialogue on options for peace, and to thereby instill in them a sense of ownership over the resulting peace process. Revamping the Minsk Process None of the OSCE/Minsk Group-sponsored proposals succeeded in bringing the sides closer to agreement because none were able to adequately reconcile the needs for self-determination with the concept of territorial integrity. Based on the Helsinki principles (named after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE), the OSCE stands for the inviolability of the frontiers of its participating states. Although the principle of territorial integrity is stipulated with a view to interstate conicts, how this aspect should be dealt with regarding intrastate conicts is addressed only implicitly. The Final Act speaks of the right of people to selfdetermination in conformity . . . with . . . territorial integrity of States. This convinces some observers of the OSCEs inability to be a neutral arbiter in the Nagorno-Karabakh conict. However, the Helsinki principles stipulate that any decision to alter frontiers must take place by peaceful means and by agreement. Hence, there is no inherent contradiction between accepting the inviolability of frontiers and being neutral at the same time, provided that any agreement reached is acceptable to the parties to the conict. Azerbaijan perceives the OSCE as an international executor that should help it regain through a negotiation process the territorial integrity it lost on the battleeld. This problem has become clearly evident in the discussions regarding Nagorno-Karabakhs involvement as a party to the conict, where, at present, it is treated only as an interested party with lower negotiating status in the OSCE process than Armenia and Azerbaijan. Within the Minsk Group, it was widely believed, on the one hand, that Yerevan would have enough inuence in Stepanakert to secure the Karabakh Armenians compliance with any peace deal reached, thereby obviating the need for their separate and equal representation in the peace process. This has turned out to be a crucial error. On the other hand, elevating Nagorno-Karabakh to the status of equal party in the negotia-

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tion process is not palatable for Azerbaijan. So far, the Minsk Group has not managed to bridge this gap. The assumption that an agreement can be personally negotiated between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan has also proven to be shortsighted. Armenias rst post-independence president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was forced by his own ministers to step down in 1998 after publicly advocating concessions to Azerbaijan. In 2001, President Heydar Aliyev came under intense pressure when he returned home from talks with Kocharian at Key West. As a result, the breakthroughs achieved in Florida evaporated in the face of domestic criticism. Commenting on what happened in Key West, the Minsk Groups American co-chair, Carey Cavanaugh, commended both presidents for being ahead of their populations. Yet, Ter-Petrossians resignation and Aliyevs rapid abandonment of compromise raised fundamental doubts regarding the sustainability of agreements reached by leaders in isolation from their societies. Without a strategy for involving the two populations, including the political opposition in both countries, peacemaking is likely to fail. The converse argument that it was Ter-Petrossians attempt to include and inform the population that led to his downfall is inaccurate. The 1997 press conference where he appeared to take the Armenian people into his condence was his rst press conference in ve years, preceded by a long silence and no substantial attempts to bring the Armenian population on board with his peace project. The work of the Minsk Process since its inception has been almost exclusively focused on peacemaking achieving an agreement rather than orchestrating a comprehensive solution or a change in attitudes. In contrast, authentic peacebuilding requires changed attitudes to create an atmosphere in which an agreement is a feasible rst step towards a comprehensive solution. Exclusive reliance on political leaders exposes any deals they may reach to the risk of political and social rejection at home. The desirability of complementing peacemaking with peacebuilding is underscored by this need for more communication within the wider societies, without which there can be no sense of public ownership of the peace process. As the Karabakh case shows, no agreement is feasible without popular support. The problem goes beyond questions of public relations, however, and touches upon fundamental concepts of national identity and interest. For example, among Armenians, the diering positions in Stepanakert and Yerevan may each dier from positions originating in the Armenian diaspora. On the Azeri side, there is also a need for greater internal dialogue among the dierent stakeholders, in particular between ocial Baku and the IDP community. A range of conciliation processes within and among all the dierent social groups is required before a stable consensus can be reached at the leadership level. Here, too, there could be a role for the OSCE in supporting forums for conciliatory discussions

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and in encouraging the parties to the conict to embark on processes of establishing a societal consensus on what is meant by national interest on each side regarding Karabakh. The resolution debate must become inclusive of all relevant viewpoints, so that the nal outcome is perceived by all to have their interests in mind. The OSCE has not yet taken up this issue nor worked with the leaders to develop such a complementary approach. Though unprecedented for the OSCE, track one (inter-governmental) negotiations should be complemented by track two (unocial) and track three (third-party) diplomatic eorts undertaken by other actors in an integrated multi-track approach. Obviously, this would mean allowing direct contacts between Armenians and Azeris. Given the rejection of this idea in Azerbaijan, one possible focus of the Minsk Group could be to convince the parties to agree on the complementary nature of peacemaking and peacebuilding. This would also include accepting direct talks with the de facto authorities in Stepanakert. Closely linked to such a step could be the role of the Minsk Group in advocating the opening of a direct road link (possibly under international control) across the line of contact, allowing international organizations access to Nagorno-Karabakh without violating the integrity of de jure Azeri borders. The OSCE can only be as strong as its participating states allow it to be. Yet antagonisms between the interests of OSCE participating states endure. The OSCEs experience of mediating in the Karabakh conict shows there are no grounds to assume that an agglomeration of actors is stronger or more forwardthinking than its individual members. However, mediating in this conict also poses the dilemma of simultaneous and gradual processes. One process is the Armenian-Azeri peace process, another is the development of OSCE capacity within the framework of the conicting agendas of its participating states, and intra-societal discussions comprise a third. This list is not complete. The interconnectedness of all these processes is evident, yet the conceptual and institutional frameworks designated to deal with such complex issues are not suciently evolved. Peace processes elsewhere underscore the importance of third parties maintaining clearly dened roles and highlight the value of complementary eorts between a range of dierent state and non-state actors in support of a multi-level peace process. The eorts and constraints of OSCE mediation symbolize the world we live in and invite us to conceive a completely new, holistic style of negotiation tactics. Towards Ripeness The continued eectiveness and persistent engagement of the Minsk Group is an important and necessary component of the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution story. It does not explain, however, the circumstances that will cause two nations

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embedded in a bitter and hateful rivalry to break free from that cycle of enmity and approach each other through new terms of cooperation and reconciliation. This article has argued that vibrant economic conditions, manipulated public opinion, and ineective international involvement have kept the conict from rising to such a level of mutual discomfort that Armenia and Azerbaijan would both feel compelled to search for a nal, durable solution. Given the status quo, there is little incentive for the emergence of the political will necessary to oppose the nationalist sentiments pushing for continued rivalry. French, Russian, and American diplomats must work tirelessly to create these incentives and bring the urgency of the matter to a head. The eventual agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh will have to be structured along the lines of territorial integrity (of Azerbaijan) now for self-determination (of Nagorno-Karabakh) later. However, the implementation of that formula will either ensure its relevance and eectiveness or its eventual breakdown and failure. For example, the nal arbitrated ruling in the Peru-Ecuador dispute of 1999 was deemed one of the most creative if not unusual transmissions of authority by sovereign legislatures to foreign states. It sought not only to resolve the territorial dispute, but also to look to the future of the region in its complete and holistic approach to conict resolution by addressing elements of cooperative life, such as trade and navigation, electrical interconnection, and educational cooperation (Zartman & Kremenyuk 2005: 262). Despite all this, the true merit of an eventual Armenian-Azeri rapprochement will not be predicated by the signing of an agreement or the mere passing of time; only a permanent change in attitudes will achieve this goal. Fundamentally, the idea of moving the Karabakh conict to ripeness will involve its transformation from a state of intractability. The International Negotiation Network (INN), based at The Carter Centers Conict Resolution Program, has had experience in implementing a new model for third-party mediation in conict situations, mostly in Africa, aimed particularly at constructing a framework within which ripeness can be achieved. As such, the INN has developed a third-party assistance model of participation in the process of conict transformation. Chief among INNs recommendations in addition to points on studying contextual attributes, setting up early warning devices, and mobilizing resources is the notion that one of the best ways to reach the right formula for the negotiation process is to make the design interactive to allow the parties to shape both the substantive agreements and the procedural paths to reaching them. The INN approach assists disputants in creating the socio-political support mechanisms that accompany the conict transformation and trustbuilding components of a successful resolution to conicts. In the context of the Armenian-Azeri conict, the INN approach would force the disputants to take charge of the negotiation mechanism, dictating its fate and taking responsibility for both its failures and successes. The onus would be placed on Armenias and

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Azerbaijans leaders to nd the way forward or pay the price for not doing so (Spencer & Spencer 1995: 195).

Conclusion The negotiations within the Minsk Group framework between Armenia and Azerbaijan have stalled not because the international framework has been unwilling or incapable of putting forward possible solutions. Rather, the idea of peace through compromise and negotiation has not become the best remaining alternative for either confronting party. Azerbaijan hopes that with time and a growing economy through oil revenues, its military will become strong enough to win back by force all lost territory; Armenia is condent of its militarys ability to hold o an Azeri victory through support from Russia and Iran. The conict has not ripened enough and the parties are not facing a mutually hurting stalemate situation. This is not to say that the Minsk Group has made the most of its position as the chief mediator in the Armenian-Azeri conict. Rather than focusing all its eorts and attention on the signing of a peace deal between the belligerent parties, the group should shift its focus to the implementation of condencebuilding measures between the authorities on both sides as well as the three societies involved Armenians, Azeris, and Karabakhis. Although it has been said that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan are ahead of their people in terms of working towards resolution, a strong argument can be made for the prolongation of the conict by the elites in both Armenia and Azerbaijan for domestic political gain. An exchange among civil societies, media representatives, young people, and political and military leaderships will go a long way in humanizing the conict, breaking down convenient stereotypes, and instilling the notion that neither country can rely on a stable and secure future without the others participation and involvement. Armenians and Azeris must be readied for an eventual compromise without this sociological base, no political leader is going to be willing or able to sell a brokered peace that either gives away Karabakh or accepts its de facto annexation by a neighboring state. Also, the role of the Minsk Group co-chairs must change they can no longer just serve as peace brokers, but must be co-signers to the negotiated agreement, emphasizing their role as guarantors of a long-term peace between Armenians and Azeris. This measure will mitigate the insecurity felt by Armenians and Azeris of Nagorno-Karabakh with regard to their rights of return and self-determination. Finally, the central pillar of the Minsk Group-brokered peace agreement cannot be the end to hostilities at any cost. Instead, any agreement that is to have longevity and legitimacy will have to include aspects of mutual economic development, cross-cultural exchange, and socio-political understand-

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ing. Without these crucial elements, any agreement will be a temporary and supercial solution to a long-lasting and multi-layered conict.

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