Latin America in Revolt Against Neo - Edit

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]
LATIN AMERICA IN REVOLT AGAINST NEOLIBERALISM Marcus Kollbrunner Socialismo Revolucionrio Latin America is currently at the cutting edge of class struggle. A continental revolt is taking place from the Rio Grande in the north to Punto del Fuego in the south against governments and ruling elites which have relentlessly followed neo-liberal free-market policies for more than a decade. TONY SAUNOIS, a recent visitor to Brazil and Chile, reports. NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES have been a catastrophe for the Latin American masses. They have been a gift for the multinationals which have plundered the continent, buying up privatised resources and assets at knockdown prices. The price has been paid by the workers and poor whose living standards have been driven further and further down. With over 215 million on the continent officially living in poverty, a staggering 41% live on less than $2 per day and a further 18% struggle to survive on less than $1 per day. The 1980s was dubbed the lost decade in Latin America. The 1990s was little better as the continent was ravaged by exploitation by the main imperialist powers and the corrupt ruling classes. These two decades have clearly revealed the impossibility of developing the economies and ending the endemic mass poverty while capitalism continues. In 1978, income per head in the main imperialist countries was five times greater than the most developed Latin American economies such as Argentina and Brazil. The gap between the poorest countries, such as Bolivia and
Ecuador, and the main imperialist powers was twelve times greater. By 2000, this had grown to seven and 30 times respectively. Any hopes that privatisation and the free market would lead to sustained growth and economic development have long since evaporated amongst the workers, peasants and urban poor. These policies have provoked mass opposition to the governments which implemented them. In Ecuador, mass uprisings toppled three presidents. In Argentina, four presidents were forced out of office in a few weeks when the financial system collapsed in 2001. In Bolivia, during 2005, mass demonstrations demanded renationalisation of the energy industry and the country stood on the brink of civil war, resulting in the election of Evo Morales in January 2006. Struggles of workers, peasants, students and others exploited by capitalism and imperialism in Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia and many other countries have erupted time and again. In Mexico, at the time of writing, 70,000 teachers in the state of Oaxaca are striking for higher wages. Following attacks by 1,700 riot police, teachers armed with sticks and stones fought running battles and eventually overpowered them. The movement has broadened into a popular rebellion demanding the resignation of the state governor, Ulises Ruiz, from the corrupt dictatorial PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) which ruled Mexico for over 70 years. Workers have taken to the streets with banners proclaiming: Popular resistance, and Revolution out with Ulises. According to some reports, teachers have taken over 20 town halls in small villages, the town squares becoming one giant protest. Within these revolts and mass movements, opposition to the market, neo-liberalism, and support for state intervention and nationalisation have featured in the demands. In some, the issue of socialism as an
alternative to capitalism has begun to be discussed amongst a layer. These revolts have opened the way for what many commentators have referred to as a revival of the left and the coming to power of leftwing governments. Most prominent is Hugo Chvez in Venezuela, Ernesto Kirchner in Argentina and Evo Morales in Bolivia. There is also the prospect of the populist, Lpez Obrador, former PRD mayor of Mexico city, coming to power in Mexico, on the doorstep of US imperialism. Although he has not called for nationalisation, as a radical populist, a regime led by him would be a major irritant to George Bush who has thus far only had to deal with the compliant, Thatcherite, president Vicente Fox. His victory will possibly open the floodgates to a new wave of struggles by the Mexican workers and peasants. This will have important repercussions north of the border on the Latino population in the USA who have already been drawn into mass struggle against the Bush regime. The election of Morales was seen by the masses of Latin America as a tremendous victory. An important factor in this was that he is from the indigenous Amaya people. This is the first time that a non-European descendant has been elected to the presidency, despite the fact that indigenous peoples are an overwhelming majority of the population. The revolts of the indigenous peoples throughout Latin America has been one of the dominant features of recent mass movements, especially in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador, along with the struggles of indigenous peoples in Mexico and the Mapuche in Chile. The coming to power of new radical populist governments in Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia represents a point of departure from the ideological and
economic tendencies which dominated the 1990s. Reflecting the massive social crises which have shaken these three countries, the governments represent a break with the neo-liberal policies of privatisation and the unfettered free market. They have been a source of irritation and conflict for US imperialism and European imperialist countries with important investments in Latin America, such as Spain and France. This development has also begun to open a debate on the left in Latin America on what programme and type of government is needed to break from capitalism and imperialism. Lulas role in Brazil HOWEVER, THIS PROCESS has not been uniform. Another layer of new left leaders have come to power in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. The election of the likes of Lula (Brazil), Tabar Vzquez (Uruguay) and more recently Michel Bachelet (Chile) reflected the same anti-neoliberal consciousness that has swept the continent. Colonel Lucio Gutirrez, in Ecuador, was swept to power as a Chvez-type figure on an anti-neoliberal agenda but immediately capitulated to the IMF and imperialism, announcing neo-liberal measures. Consequently, he was overthrown by a mass movement of workers, peasants and indigenous peoples in 2005, the third president to be overthrown by a mass uprising in Ecuador since 1996. The exceptions at this stage are Colombia and Peru. In Colombia, with mass violence and conflicts arising from the drug cartels, right-wing paramilitaries and against the background of the guerrilla campaigns of the FARC and ELN, the US-backed Alvaro Uribe was recently re-
elected. In Peru, the alternative of the nationalistic maverick, Ollanta Humala, was not sufficiently attractive to prevent Alan Garcia, from the oldest populist party in Latin America, APRA (which has now turned to the right), making a comeback. Garcia had been forced from power in the 1980s after heading a government which presided over price increases of 1,000,000%. Yet, in general, the old established politicians and their parties have been swept from office. The new left (as in New Labour), headed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, Partido Socialista in Chile and Frente Amplio in Uruguay, has come to power amidst high expectations for fundamental change. However, the hopes of the workers and youth in these countries have been rapidly dashed. These governments have capitulated to the demands of imperialism and their own ruling classes and continued with the same neo-liberal polices of their predecessors. This process began in Brazil with the election of Lula who, even prior to his election, had convinced the IMF and other imperialist and capitalist institutions that his policy would remain the same as the former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. No headway has been made in tackling the massive inequalities which exist in Brazilian society. While the richest 10% of the population consume 47% of national income, the poorest 10% are left in squalor consuming a mere 0.5%. The majority of the ruling class has been content to rest on the Lula government as a means of carrying through further attacks on the working class. Continued privatisation, the failure to take effective steps to attack inequality, and a series of massive corruption scandals would have provoked major struggles by the
working class and youth if the traditional capitalist parties and politicians were in office. Lula, together with the treacherous role of the leadership of the main trade union confederation, CUT, has partly been able to hold the working class in check during the last four years. The majority of the CUT leadership is now merely an arm of the government, its unofficial ministry of labour. The continuation of a very fragile and ephemeral growth in the economy, because of the world economic situation, fear of the return of the traditional capitalist parties, splits amongst the capitalist politicians and the lack of a powerful alternative, have temporarily allowed Lula to maintain a basis of support amongst older workers. His likely victory for a second term in October, however, will not be a mere repetition of his first mandate. Economic slowdown, even prior to a worldwide recession, is likely to open the way for powerful struggles by workers, landless people, youth and the urban poor after the election. The car producer, Volkswagen, recently announced its intention to reduce its workforce from 21,500 to 15,500 in the next few years. This is a warning of the scale of the attacks that are being prepared by the ruling class and which are certain to produce powerful social movements and struggles by the working class. These will give big opportunities to build support for a socialist alternative to Lulas pro-capitalist policies. Already, there is growing support for a radical socialist alternative. Significant layers of socialists and activists in the workers movement have begun the task of building it. The formation of P-SOL represents an important step forward in this objective. With 7-8% support indicated in opinion polls, P-SOL will have a big opportunity during the presidential election to build a stronger basis of support. If P-SOL can agree a strategy around a radical socialist programme and build a real
party of struggle it will have big opportunities to grow during and after the election. There is, however, a debate taking place about the programme it should adopt and how the party should be built. (See box) Sections of the leadership are attempting to moderate its programme and push the party to the right and prevent a fighting, democratic party struggling for socialism from being built. P-SOL has major possibilities to build a powerful force. These opportunities can be lost if the party fails to defend a socialist alternative and build a base through intervention in the class struggle. The rebuilding of a fighting alternative is also beginning in the trade unions with preparatory steps towards the formation of a new trade union centre. Hundreds of local unions have already disaffiliated from the CUT or have stopped paying affiliation fees. Chilean student protest WHILE LULA HAS been able to fend off powerful social movements in the last few years, socialist president, Bachelet, has not been so lucky in Chile. Less than three months after being sworn in, she faced a mass mobilisation of school students demanding changes to the entire education system, the largest youth movement to rock Chile since the military coup in 1973. The movement compelled the government to grant some concessions, increase the education budget by $200 million, and end the national college entrance exam fee. One feature of this protest was the vicious repression used by the hated riot police. This is a general feature of the situation. The return of democracy following the military police dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s has not meant an end to the use of brutal repression against workers, peasants and the poor in struggle. In
Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and other countries, the masses have still had to confront water cannon, tear gas and, in some cases, bullets when they have taken to the streets to fight for their rights. In Chile this is known as demodura (hard democracy) as opposed to dictadura (dictatorship). The school student protests plunged the government into crisis and have opened a new chapter in the struggle of the Chilean people following the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990. The example set by the youth is set to be followed by further struggles of the workers who were inspired by this movement. Significantly, the students instinctively grasped the need to broaden their support amongst the working class and other sections of the population. Over 80% indicated that they supported the students and a mere 17% backed the government! This movement also has wider implications. Chile has been portrayed as the economic success story of Latin America. With record economic growth, impressive investment in infrastructure, especially transport, this was the neo-liberal model to emulate elsewhere, according to capitalist analysts. Sections of the Chilean ruling class even spoke of the country as a developed economy. Yet the growth was always one-sided. It has gone side by side with a massive increase in the exploitation of the working class. Bank workers are currently involved in a campaign to prevent Sunday opening. Better houses, access to cars and other consumer goods have been paid for largely through the accumulation of massive debt. The vast majority of the increased national income, largely due to high copper prices and exports of agricultural products, fruits and wine, has gone to the rich elite. The richest 20% of the population take 62.2% of national income. The poorest
20% are supposed to survive on 3.3% of national income! This tremendous movement of young people erupted as the economy has begun to slow. In challenging the market orientation of the education system, the youth have put into question the entire neo-liberal model. Not only questioning the privatisation of education and health but the very type of society they want. The full impact of this movement has yet to be felt in Chile and the continent. However, it is clear that the socialist government will not enjoy the relative calm of the preceding coalition governments. Bachelet and her capitalist coalition will undoubtedly attempt to continue with neo-liberal reforms. They are certain to run into much greater resistance amongst the working class. During the month of the student protests, Bachelets approval ratings fell from 67% in May to 56% in June, only three months after becoming president. The governments defence of neoliberal polices and the rapid development of opposition to Bachelet confirm how wrong the Communist Party of Chile and some others who claim to defend Marxist ideas were to support her in the second round of the election. The Communist Party has paid for this mistake with the onset of a massive internal crisis. The CWI and its sister organisation in Chile, Socialismo Revolucionario, argued for a blank vote and a campaign to build a new workers party to fight for socialist policies. The crisis in the Communist Party is in marked contrast to the popularity of the radical candidate for the presidency, Toms Hirsch, a member of the Humanist Party (part of the left alliance, PODEMOS), who called for a blank vote in the second round because of Bachelets neo-liberal policies. State intervention
THE REVOLT AGAINST neo-liberalism has given rise to a new wave of radical, left-populist governments in Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia, reflecting the massive pressure of the masses and the deep social and economic crises in these countries. The emergence of these regimes, which have supported a policy of greater state intervention in the economy, represents an important change in the world situation following the 1990s. The measures have included some limited partial nationalisation. In Venezuela, they have included the setting up of joint ventures between state companies and private multinationals. In Argentina, Kirchner has retaken control of the management of airports, purchased 40% of the privatised state airline, Aerolineas Argentinas, and through a state company has taken over the privatised water supplier in the capital, Buenos Aires. The nationalisation of the oil and gas industries by Morales in Bolivia is, however, the most significant move to date and provoked widespread opposition by the ruling class especially in Brazil and Spain which own the largest part of these industries. Amongst the working class throughout Latin America, however, this nationalisation had a massive impact and was extremely popular. Brazil, the largest regional power, has massive investments in Bolivia and is dependent on Bolivia for 51% of its gas consumption. In Sao Paulo, this rises to more than 75%. Petrobras, the Brazilian company, controls 46% of Bolivias gas resources and 95% of its refining capacity. It has a turnover in Bolivia which equals 19% of that countrys GDP! This state intervention has provoked widespread opposition from imperialism and sections of the national capitalist class. Yet the measures have
represented partial nationalisation, in some cases, and little more than joint ventures in others. Even in Bolivia, all that Morales has done is to establish joint ventures where the state will control 50% plus one of the shares in companies which were nationalised prior to privatisation in 1996. This falls far short of the wholesale nationalisation of Standard Oil in 1937 or Gulf Oil in 1969. It also falls short of the demands of the Bolivian masses who supported the idea of nationalisation of oil and gas. These partial measures are wholly insufficient to break with capitalism. On the contrary, they are part of an alternative supported by Morales, Chvez and Kirchner to attempt to build an Andean capitalism, an alternative to the neo-liberal model capitalism with a more human face. In Argentina, Kirchner is attempting to revert to the traditional Peronism pre-Carlos Menem of state intervention backed by a powerful trade union bureaucracy. The newly stateised water company has a management board which includes representatives from the Peronist trade unions. In the airport industry, the sub-secretary of Transporte Aerocomercial is Ricardo Ciielli, a powerful union leader. However, this reversal to state intervention is not the same as the policies introduced by the Peronist regimes following the second world war. Then, the export of meat to a hungry Europe allowed the ruling class a cushion from which it financed significant reforms that benefited the working class and won the populist, nationalist Peronist movement mass support which endured for decades. Although currently enjoying widespread support, Kirchner does not have the same room for manoeuvre or capacity to grant such lasting reforms.
While the media churn out reports of annual economic growth of over 9% for the last four years, millions have gained nothing 58% of Argentinean children still live in poverty. The rebuilt former dock area of Buenos Aires, Puerto Madera, is awash with expensive cafs and desirable apartments. Yet even here, the opening up of a soup kitchen reveals the unevenness of the boom and the gap between rich and poor which has widened as the economy has expanded. It is a fragile boom, led by construction and a growth in agricultural exports which, like Chiles, will be dramatically brought to an end when the world economy moves into stagnation and/or recession. Kirchners policies of more state intervention have been combined with attacks and repression against sections of workers and the unemployed involved in struggle. Regional conflict THE EMERGENCE OF radical populist regimes has reinforced conflicts between these populist governments and imperialism, and also between the neo-liberal governments in other Latin American countries. Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina, with the support of Cuba, currently form a core group of countries which have come into collision with the interests of imperialism and other regional powers, such as Brazil, Colombia and Chile. These conflicts have reflected the particular national interests of each ruling class. While the core countries led by Venezuela are looking towards greater regional integration and establishing stronger trade relations with other powers than the USA (such as Europe, China and Russia), Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and especially Mexico, favour greater co-operation and integration with the US economy. Even these developments are contradictory. While US imperialism faced a defeat at
the Summit of the Americas in 2005 over its proposal to proceed with the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), many Latin American countries have tried to establish their own bilateral agreements with the USA. At the same time, a series of disputes has emerged between countries over trade and border issues which have boosted nationalist trends. Argentina has been in conflict with Uruguay, Bolivia with Brazil and Chile, Peru with Chile. These pressures have reinforced nationalist features amongst the radical populist movements which have emerged in some countries. This partly reflects the powerful anti-imperialist feeling which exist throughout Latin America, but also attempts by the ruling classes to whip up nationalist sentiment within the continent. It is a potential danger for the masses which the working class, urban and rural poor and others need to overcome by developing a powerful socialist and internationalist alternative to capitalism and imperialism. The partial nationalisation of Petrobras caused shockwaves in the Brazilian ruling class who attempted to unleash a nationalist fervour against Bolivia. The press warned of an imminent threat to gas supplies. Lula protested at the way Morales nationalised oil and gas companies belonging to Petrobras. Morales pointed out that he "had to make a political gesture, to avoid destabilisation Bolivia has had four presidents in four years". If Morales had not enacted some measures against Petrobras and Repsol he would have faced the prospect of a more rapid collision with the workers and peasants who swept him to power. Although Morales has been compelled to carry through a partial nationalisation of oil and gas, at the same time, he has used the army to occupy the airports when
workers from the national airline, Lyoyd Aero Boliviano, demanded its nationalisation in the face of bankruptcy. Tackling mass poverty CHVEZ AND MORALES have been able to carry through some welcome limited reforms, especially in health, education and cheap food distribution. In Venezuela, this has been done through the establishment of missiones, which have brought some relief to the most downtrodden sections of society. In Bolivia, the minimum wage has been increased by 13% from 440 bolivianos a month ($55) to 500 bolivianos ($63), although far less than the 1,500 bolivianos ($192) promised in the election campaign. Yet nearly 30% receive less than the minimum wage in the urban areas. The deployment of Cuban doctors to Bolivia has allowed 7,000 cataract operations to be carried out in two months on the poorest layers of the population, who could never afford the $500-$700 charged by the private clinics in La Paz. While these reforms have been welcomed, they have not resolved the mass poverty which exists in these countries. Capitalism still condemns 67.3% of the Bolivian population to conditions of stark poverty. The same problem exists in Venezuela where the continuation of poverty is compounded by the growth of bureaucracy and corruption throughout the expanded state sector because of the absence of real democratic workers control and management. While Chvez has benefited from the rising price of oil on the world market up until now, this cushion can be removed in the coming months and years which will provoke a major social and political crisis. If the working class does not take the necessary steps to build its own independent organisations and establish a workers and
peasants government, then the threat of counterrevolution and the overthrow of Chvez can re-emerge. In Bolivia, because of a far deeper social and economic crisis, rampant poverty and a powerful tradition of independent revolutionary struggle and organisation by the working class and poor peasants, Morales has even less room to manoeuvre. Although Chvez has the sympathy of the mass of the working class, his failure to overthrow capitalism, the widespread corruption and bureaucracy and the absence of workers control and management have meant that many workers in Latin America are sceptical towards his regime. An opinion poll in the Brazilian daily, O Estado, while pointing to Chvezs popularity in Bolivia, reported that only 14% of Brazilians had a positive image of him. A mere 10% thought that his Bolivarian policy was a model to follow. Yet the same poll found that 60% supported nationalisation of natural resources and 74% and 78% supported state control of the multinationals and banking, and prices! The revolt of the masses against neo-liberalism and the crisis which is now developing throughout the continent pose the need for the working class and poor peasants to begin to build their own independent political and social organisations with a programme that will overthrow capitalism and confront imperialism. The establishment of workers and peasants governments with revolutionary socialist programmes is urgently needed. Such a programme must be based on the nationalisation of the major companies, banks, and multinationals in each country, and a programme of real agricultural reform where necessary. Only then will it be possible to defeat capitalism and begin to plan the
economy to meet the needs of the mass of the population. Such a programme cannot be limited to one country. The current energy crisis illustrates the need for regional integration and planning of the economy. Chvez has called for the establishment of a Latin American oil and gas enterprise Petrosur. Yet how will this be possible on a capitalist basis? It would require the working class and poor peasants to take over the running of society for such a plan to be carried through and to allow the vast resources of the continent to be planned for the needs of the masses rather than the different national ruling classes and imperialism. The establishment of a voluntary, democratic socialist federation of Latin America is the real alternative to capitalism and imperialism, and the only way to begin to tackle the poverty and exploitation which blights the continent. A step towards this would be the establishment of a democratic socialist federation of Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia on the basis of the formation of democratic workers and peasants governments in these countries. This is the way to begin to unify the continent and begin planning the resources and the economies as an alternative to the capitalist trade blocs and agreements which are currently being formed. P-SOL prepares for October election THE Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL), Brazils new left formation, is at an important stage. Will it develop into a party based on activists from the working-class and oppressed, involved in grassroots campaigns against neo-liberal attacks and fighting for a socialist
alternative? Will it limit itself to prioritising election campaigns in the pursuit of office? The P-SOL conference, held in Brasilia, 26-28 May, had been downgraded from a congress to a conference, and this had a profound effect: the agenda was limited to discussing electoral issues, there was no election of the leadership, no discussion on statutes or programme, and delegations were limited to one per 30 affiliated members instead of one per ten. This made it difficult for individual branches to elect delegates. Instead, aggregates were called, many set up to choose delegates from a particular grouping. There were 154 delegates, and a total of 250-300 participants. This was much lower than at the first national meeting that launched the party in 2004, when 900 participated, and the second meeting, held during the World Social Forum last year, with 1,800 participants. Of the 154 delegates, 141-146 were from the six biggest currents: APS, Enlace and ALS (the most moderate wing) had 44; the bloc that dominates the National Executive (CST, MES and Poder Popular) had 80-85; and CSOL had 17.
In effect, the conference rubberstamped positions agreed beforehand by the National Board. There were very few amendments. Socialismo Revolucionrio (CWI Brazil) proposed most of the amendments to the political document on the election campaign. Even though it was not a congress, it was the first meeting with elected rank-and-file delegates and should have reflected the political debates taking place from below. It should also have drawn up a balance sheet of the situation. Instead, the conference reaffirmed the current character of the P-SOL: in practice, a front of different currents, where everything is set beforehand by agreements of the leaderships of the big currents. There were several appeals for unity, but a conference should be a space for political discussion, building unity through democratic debate. Otherwise, we would end up as a new PT (president Lulas Partido dos Trabalhadores). The only major dispute was whether there should be an electoral alliance with the PSTU (Morenoite) and PCB (what is left of the once huge Communist Party). The more moderate currents were opposed, but 110 voted in favour, with 44 against. One outstanding issue is that the PSTU has demanded that P-SOL does not stand
candidates for the senate in the states of So Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. But this would make the alliance unviable and remains to be resolved. The documents approved at the conference were as expected. The proposed electoral programme had a lower socialist profile than the party programme, but PSOL will still be seen as offering a left and radical alternative to the other parties. There was a rally with Helosa Helena and Csar Benjamin (elected as pre-candidates for president and vice-president: electoral law only permits the formal election of candidates after 10 June). Csar prioritised Brazil as a "nation for itself", as opposed to workers as a "class for itself". But he did mention the need for socialism at the end: "It is necessary to re-found the nation, but that is not possible with dependent capitalism, it must be based on socialism". The election of Csar has led to a crisis in the Paran state, as he wrote the economic programme of Roberto Requio, leader of the PMDB (a bourgeois party with a nationalistic view of development). After the conference, 20 P-SOL members announced that they were leaving the party in protest. At the Paran state meeting of P-SOL, 39 voted against Csar as vice-
president with just 11 in favour. At the conference, however, there was no debate on this issue as there was no other proposal. Socialismo Revolucionrio (SR) put forward a number of amendments at the conference. While recognising that the election is a central issue this year, the aim of the SR amendment in the session on strategic objectives was to steer the emphasis away from the electoralist slant of the original resolution and towards using elections as part of an overall strategy of building the party. The SR amendment was overwhelmingly carried. We also proposed an amendment on electoral targets to include building branches of P-SOL from below. This was passed unanimously. On the burning issue of political corruption, SR sought to strengthen the conference resolution by adding: "We must also make clear that corruption is inherent to the economic system. Therefore, the struggle against corruption must also be a struggle against the neoliberal policies of privatisation, PPP, etc". This, too, was carried. Another discussion was on the nature of the system. The original resolution raised: "Winning genuine sovereignty and national independence and breaking
with financial capital". SR aimed to enhance the character of a socialist rupture with the system, and guard against lowering the programme and avoiding confusion with policies of national development. For example, the original said: "...suspension of the payments of the interest of the foreign debt". We changed that to: "...suspension of the payment of the public debt" and added a new sentence: "The suspension of the payment of the internal debt has as a consequence the need to pose the nationalisation of the banks and financial institutions, and a control of the flow of capital". The original resolution also said: "The strategic areas should be under the control of the Brazilian people, such as petrol, telecommunications, energy, steel industry". Our proposed change was "...under the control and ownership of the Brazilian people..." adding a new sentence: "We defend the re-nationalisation of the privatised companies, under democratic control and management of the workers, with a production aimed to fulfil the needs of the working people, not for profits or the market". These proposals were voted as a bloc, with only one vote in favour our delegate! The position of the APS and Enlace was summed up by Joo
Machado at a meeting in So Paulo: "We dont want a programme for an immediate rupture with the system". The CSOL current had previously criticised the
formulation of "suspension of the payment of the interest" and Bab, a CST MP, always speaks against the whole public debt. Bab spoke at the conference about re-nationalisation under workers control, but the CST as a whole only proposed the re-nationalisation of the mining giant, CVRD, and Petrobras. This was approved unanimously together with its proposals to include support for the Bolivian nationalisation of gas and petrol, and for the immediate withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti. SR proposed a resolution for a workers MP on workers wage, and that all candidates should live on the salary of a qualified worker or the same salary they had before being elected (as is the case with Bab and Luciana Genro of MES). The presidium did not put that up for debate on the basis that it was a statutory issue. But immediately afterwards, a proposal was passed (that SR supported) that all public representatives must pay a certain amount to the national election campaign (15,000 reales for MPs, 7,500 for state MPs, and 4,000 for councillors).
The first P-SOL congress will take place in July next year.
Latin America: The Advent of an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism and Authoritarian Socialism

by Dr Emmanuel Broillet*
For a few years, Latin America has increasingly been the focus of media attention. The main reason for this is the development in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Three countries which had suffered under dictatorships or a long time are now treading new political paths. What exactly has changed and what does it mean to the rest of the world? Like Africas, Latin Americas past was full of suffering. The brutal colonization by the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores in the middle of the 16th century started the suppression of Latin America which lasted for 300 years. In the 19th century, the countries gradually liberate from their colonizers, forming independent states. At the same time, the rising United States of
America declared Central and South America their backyard. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 provided them with the possibility to use military power to defend their interests if necessary. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, some of the Latin American countries went through a period of some prosperity when they were able to free from the dictatorships or monarchies formed after the independence from Spain and replace them with democratic governments. The Great Depression of the early 1930s also hit the Latin American states, causing a relapse into authoritarian regimes, now backed by the US. In the second half of the 20th century, civil wars and brutal military dictatorships, kept in power by the USA, plagued many countries including Argentine, Chile, Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Under the pressure of Milton Friedmans Chicago Boys, many leaders including Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentine, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay remodeled their countries into labs of neo-liberalism, exposing their countries to a brutal exploitation. Hardly any of the attempts to get rid of these dictatorships were successful. New governments, even when they had come to power in elections, yielded to pressure from the US and continued the neo-liberal course. The election of Hugo Chvez as President of Venezuela and Evo Morales as President of Bolivia was a turning point for Latin America: Liberation from the neo-liberal giant USA. Ever since, the controlled media in the West have been agitating against the new democratically
elected presidents and their governments. Their policy of a fairer distribution of property, support of the underprivileged and the Indian peoples is a stark contrast against the uninhibited capitalism of US origin and gives many people hope for a fairer and more humane economy, not only in Latin America. The crisis of our economic system has shown us in a brutal way what it means to open the doors for speculation and uncontrolled moneymaking. In spite of all turgid speeches, we are still in the middle of this crisis, some experts even state that the fall has just started. In this perspective, the example of Latin America reveals yet another dimension. The following article of the anthropologist and renowned Latin America expert, Emmanuel Broillet, gives a knowledgeable insight into current developments in South America, showing the positive forces which are at work. In connection with the topic of the conference, I decided to select and describe two aspects of the currently difficult situation of Latin America: The emerging of the neo-Bolivarian leaders in history and the quest for a better situation of the indigenous population. Why these two aspects? If there is a topic that mankind has been occupied with at all times and places, then it is the quest for real social justice, a precondition to structure human relations. In fact, living together in a society needs to be founded upon common rules and values. They govern the relations between individuals and society, between individuals and the power. I am sure that this is the reason why these values have been declared as divine values in all peoples on earth.
My contribution will investigate the discussion about the current emergence of new leaders in the Latin American states, stirring the peoples hope for a better world for the underprivileged. The two topics have more emphasize on the real world than on theoretical considerations. Hence, from the beginning, the analysis of the historical emergence of the neoBolivarian leaders and the quest for a better world will be combined with socio-cultural and especially with political and economic questions. Thus, the anthropological approach towards questions of development, raised during the reform of the social structure, will not only consider the theoretical problems, but also the concrete experiences with liberalization and the improvement of the conditions of life for todays indigenous population of Latin America. In my study, I will first present some historical aspects and then respond to the criticism voiced in connection with these aspects. I will conclude my presentation with some questions and results as well as a discussion trying to extend the point of view beyond the political challenges of Latin America. The emergence of neo-Bolivarian leaders in history I will start with the historical emergence of the neoBolivarian leaders and in order to characterize them, I will shed light on some aspects of this emergence, especially the Venezuelan shock. Then I will finish by raising some questions, giving some results and a discussion.
History The history of the Latin American countries and their socialist leaders has not just started. More than 25 years of neo-liberalism have severely weakened the local industries, the small farms and the chances for employment in the region. This resulted in a progressing economic genocide, causing humiliating poverty for three quarters of the Latin American population. Large parts of the middle class became poor. In addition, there was a fight for survival for the dwindling unionized industry sectors and internal and external migration. Neo-liberalism has also evoked a wave of new social movements and increased tendency to vote on the left side of the spectrum. Of course, there were also strong opposing tendencies, including attempts to destabilize governments, conspiracies and counter-revolutionary movements, increased repression and paramilitary terrorism, an increase of violence against women, homosexuals, transsexuals and ethnic minorities as
well as the non-conformist youth, journalists and human rights groups. In Latin America, the issue at stake is really the national sovereignty of the countries and the control over basic resources like oil, gas, water, cheap labor, schools, hospitals, housing, public transport, pensions, banking and industry. The new social movements fight against the privatization of nature, the commercialization of life and the exploitation imposed by the neo-liberal globalization as well as the overwhelming debts forced upon the countries by their dictatorial regimes. Changes The change of elected presidents from the hard to the soft neo-liberals became evident with the election of Lula in Brazil, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabar Vasquez in Uruguay, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Mauricio Funes in El Salvador and even with the election of Nicanor Duarte in Paraguay. The latter has originally supported the Common Market of South America (Mercosur), the South American alternative to the American Free Trade Zone (NAFTA) which recently has admitted Venezuela. Similar changes through elections are expected in Peru, in Mexico, in Ecuador, in some smaller states of the Caribbean and probably even in Colombia. The candidates always promise to abstain from a fundamentalist policy of free trade or of joining the NAFTA, but as soon as they are elected, they try to rescue the dying model of neo-liberal economy or even to revive it. In part this is a consequence of the decadeold weakening of the states by a policy of privatization, free trade agreements and the oppressing burden of the foreign debts which have made governments susceptible to blackmail by foreign multinational companies. This is why the new social movements are
critics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the American and European imperialism (the Spanish investments in Latin America have surpassed those of the USA). The countries where changes have taken place are

Argentina, presided by Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner since December 2007, Bolivia, presided by Evo Morales since January 2009 Brazil, presided by Luiz Lula da Silva since January 2003, Chile, presided by Michelle Bachelet since January 2006, Colombia, presided by Alvaro Uribe since August 2002, Cuba, presided by Ral Castro (interim) since July 2006, El Salvador, presided by Mauricio Funes since March 2009, Ecuador, presided by Rafael Correa since January 2007, Guyana, presided by Bharrat Jagdeo since August 1999, Mexico, presided by Andrs Lopez Obrador since October 2006, Paraguay, presided by Fernando Lugo since August 2008, Peru, presided by Alan Garca since July 2006, Surinam, presided by Ronald Venetiaan since August 2000,
Uruguay, presided by Tbar Vsquez since March 2005, Venezuela, presided by Hugo Chvez since December 1998.
Confusion The room for a more humane neo-liberalism or for a conservative nationalism has vanished. Even while Evo Morales Bolivia and Hugo Chvez Venezuela collaborate with the other newly elected presidents over some topics, they discard their soft neo-liberal approaches, advocating changes that are more revolutionary and based on state support for the demands of the social movements. Morales calls for a collective socialism, based on mutuality and solidarity while Chvez emphasizes the necessity to internationalize the revolution, demanding a socialism of the 21st century, since a different world inside the capitalist system is not possible (cf. Porto Alegre with its special variants) What is striking about todays new social movements is their growing resistance against electoral tactics, their growing number of supporters from the poor classes and their tactical resourcefulness. Traditional class structures and methods of fighting have all but disappeared since the neo-liberalism in the governments social programs and the employment of flexible labor have led to an erosion of minimum wages, mass poverty, increased unemployment also for academics , to employment at risk and to total exploitation. The borders between the social classes and the new social movements have become blurred. The Indigenous Population For the indigenous population of Latin America, neoliberalism is nothing more than the last episode of 500
years of genocide and tough resistance. Based on this experience, they know a lot about certain historic realities like the continuity of colonialism and imperialism, environmental destruction, the creation and maintaining of an overwhelming debt as an instrument to control peoples as well as a systematic application of abductions, disappearance of persons, of torture and violence against women (cf. Porto Alegre). From the foundation of the first modern organization of Indians among the Shuar (Jivaros) in Equatorial Amazonia in the mid-60s until todays mobilization of the Mapuche Indians in Chile, this resistance has spread increasingly, often with global resonance. It became obvious in the Bolivian Katarism1 whose important representative, Hugo Crdenas from the Aymara tribe, was vice president of the republic from 1993 to 1997; in the guerilla war of the Miskito at the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua which troubled the Sandinista government; in the Guatemalan Indian movement whose tragic fate was sketched by Rigoberta Mench, the winner of the Peace Nobel Prize in 1992; in the rebellion of the Indians in the equatorial Andes which had released several spectacular marches to Quito around 1990; and of course in the uprising of the Zapatistas in Chiapas which shook the Mexican pyramid first in 1994 and caused sympathy and resistance far beyond the Mexican borders. The movements of the Latin American Indians are the main, if not the only social movement of the past decades. In a world shaped by antidemocratic endeavors, they are among the few actors combining the cultural and the social concern with democratic efforts. Through these movements, the Indians have found greater attention in all countries in Latin America, no matter if they represent a substantial part of the population like in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala or
Mexico or if they are just a more or less important minority like in Colombia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama or Chile. The women Women have suffered the most under the economic violence of neo-liberalism not to mention the increasing violence in daily life. Protest rallies against the increasing abuse of women and the sex business (which is now economically more important than the drug trade) have achieved central importance, not only for feminist movements like the feminist action network Marche mondiale des femmes(World March of Women), but also for all new social movements. There are many examples of women as leaders, from the Zapatista female commanders in Mexico or Argentine Piqueteras (unemployed persons blocking crucial switch points to call attention to their economically distressing situation), to the mothers and grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentine. Especially worth mentioning are the women who led the national upheaval to protect President Chvez life (in Venezuela) during the two-day reign of Pedro Carmona Pedro the Short after the US-supported coup on April 11, 2002 and the Bolivian workers, street vendors and the female family heads of El Alto who organized defense and campaign committees.
The rural population In spite of the increasing suppression, farmers and small peasants play a central role. In the majority of the cases, this multi-ethnic group has become a new, cheap, flexible and migrant employment force. Be it the coca farmers in the Andes or the farmers of the movement of landless farmers in Brazil (this movement is member of the Via Campesina, a network of farmers movements in over 87 countries), the rural population has begun to mobilize, even in the cities. The workers A new wave of union-organized protest has formed against multinational trusts and against corrupt union leaders (the so-called charros in Mexico). In all countries, we find independent union trusts like the Frente Autentico de Trabajo (FAT) in Mexico and secessions within the old trusts like the Unin Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) in Venezuela. In Chile, workers collectives have started to fill the union vacuum still remaining from the not yet completely dismantled terrorist state during Pinochets dictatorship. In addition, important struggles are combined internationally, e.g. when the workers of Coca Cola in Guatemala, Colombia and in India synchronize their campaigns or when the workers in the maquiladoras (sweatshops) in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean fight for the formation of unions. The Latin American workers have occupied many factories abandoned by their owners and made them fully operational again. At the end of 2005, a continental
congress for the workers of restored factories was organized in Venezuela. Interest in socialism Interest in socialism is rising in Latin America. Polls in Venezuela and Brazil show that more than half the population of these countries supports socialism a figure unheard of in Chile and Mexico. However, there is a growing debate about the question which kind of socialism is desirable. There is a process under way beginning what could be called two, three, many forms of socialism, starting from the Cuban revolution of 1959. As the famous Peruvian Marxist Jos Carlos Mariategui who died in 1930 wrote, Latin America does not want to be a copy of European socialism but socialism based on its own, in the case of Peru indigenous, reality. Hence, socialism in Cuba is expressly Cuban; in Venezuela, it has its roots in the ideas of Simn Bolvar2 and Bolivian socialism is based on indigenous traditions, while the indigenous leader of Ecuador, Blanca Chancoso, suggests a multinational and multicultural state which we can build together. The Zapatistas, not speaking of socialism, make the case for a system where all power comes from the basis, as in their councils of good government in Chiapas. The debate shows the various socialist perspectives of Latin America which have four things in common:
1.
They are led by human values trying to overcome patriarchy, racism, sexism, the exploitation of classes and genocide; they are based on values like love (like in the works of Che Guevara and Jos Mart), respect for other persons and social justice. Socialism is participative without Stalinist authoritarianism but with a decentralized planning of companies controlled by the workers and with
2.
politics instead of governing with dirty tricks and compromises (according to Fidel Castro), all rooted in a state practice and the participation of the people from the bottom to the top, instead of some party rule or an avant-garde.
3.
Internationalism, planning of national and international markets, protection of peoples from neo-liberalism and from imperialist interventions, the foundation of an international organization without veto rights would promote peace and human rights. The sovereignty of national states, the defense of the principle of non-interference, non-aggression and self-determination, including the right to found new states which combine several peoples (e.g. Bolivia and Venezuela), or the states striving for national independence through an affiliation in a Latin American state or a confederation of states (as described in the concepts Our America by Jos Marti and Grand Fatherland by Bolvar).
4.
The socialist Left searching for a better world I do not have a formula and there are people more competent than me to answer the question for a better world. I would simply say that for a start, all medium and long term efforts to redistribute wealth need to be supported and encouraged. This redistribution should be economically manageable and based on a well organized institutional infrastructure and not only on the illusions of prestidigitators in a pensioners mentality style. At first I will mention two examples: Real democratization is currently taking shape in the tax reform of Ecuador and the restructuring of the Brazilian public health system. Nobody is talking about these two examples, although they seem to me much more important than all those short-lived oil presents to the thankful Bolivarian masses. Secondly it is important to continue fighting all aspects of racism and discrimination and to de-colonialize imagination and the institutions in order to overcome 500 years of mental and material suppression. However one should not fall for the ridiculous idea that what happens today or should be happening in Latin America was some new model of white Christian capitalist Western civilization. In fact there is no such thing as a white Christian capitalist Western civilization. It is nothing else than the fallacious and outdated pretext of colonial domination and the imaginary European racist. Of course, further integration of the South American continent has to be enforced and its pro-active international role as a bloc has to be encouraged, and
not only in symbolic but practical suggestions that is. These should aim at effective coalitions and an alternative consensus for substantial and profound reformation of international relations. Moreover it seems entirely useless to me for the Latin American Left to continue arguing on the basis of a never-ending confrontation with the United States, cultivating a victims rhetoric, especially in a time of melting polar ice and Andean glaciers, with the rising Asian giants ravaging both regional economies. The latter have no reason to give presents to South America. One only has to see the cynical commercial pragmatism of Beijing and its contribution to a dependent re-privatization of South American countries. Fifteen presidential elections Latin America entered a period of political change at the end of 2005, culminating in 13 presidential elections. This period started in Honduras in November 2005 and was to finish in December 2006 when the Venezuelan people were asked to decide in favour or against a continuation of the revolution of Hugo Chavez. Change in Central America
Costa Rica found her political leader when Oscar Aria, who was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize for his role in the Central American peace process of the late 1980s, declared he would run for presidency in July 2005. The government programme of Mr Aria confirms Costa Ricas strong democratic tradition and innovation, since it encourages democracy, the peace process and a change in social relationships based on sustainable and just development in the Central American region.
In Honduras the interplay between the two traditional political powers goes on. There is certain balance between the two big parties, the nationals and the liberals. Regardless of who is going to be the next president no change is likely. In Nicaragua two men from the same party are competing: rival of Daniel Ortega is Herty Lewites, currently mayor of Managua and former chairman of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, from which Daniel Ortega, its first chairman, had him expelled. El Salvador is also going through a change right now. The current president of El Slavador, Mr Funes (of social democratic orientation), former TV journalist at channel 12 and correspondent of the Spanish CNN studio before did not participate in the armed struggle. His Vice President Salvador Sanchez Cern on the other hand is a former guerrilla commander. The victory of the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacin Nacional (FMLN) finished 20 years of hegemony of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). While it was originally founded by the damned soul of the death squadrons, Roberto dAubuisson, this party has step by step moved out of the right-extremist spectre and left its demonic past behind. Nevertheless it still represents the hard right wing. In an attempt to stop the Left, the other two conservative political bodies the National Reconciliation Party (PCN) as the representation of the military governments 1961-1976 and the Christian Democratic Party (in power 1984-1989) abstained from presidential candidates of their own and formed an alliance with Arena.
Latin America conveys hope Latin America is on the move. She conveys hope once again. Fifteen years ago Clinton ended his first presidential term without crossing the Rio Grande, he did not even bother to travel to Mexico to sign the NAFTA agreement. Latin America was well-behaved from a US perspective. Ten years later the Bush administration could not get any support for the invasion into Iraq from one single Latin America country, not even Mexico, their closest ally. The favourite US strategic project for the region, the socalled ZLEA (a free-trade zone for America, in Spanish ALCA) is dead. After having served as a world laboratory for neoliberal experiments and exactly for that reason Latin America has become the weakest link in the neoliberal chain in the world. One could say in a simple but exact manner that todays world is dominated by three powers, three big monopolies: the weapon monopoly, the money monopoly and the language monopoly. Latin America has profound experience in fighting the first two monopolies in order to create a multi-polar world: The majority of its governments today concentrate on regional integration projects like Mercosur, Alba, Bank of the South and continental gas pipelines instead of the freetrade agreements proposed by the US. From this point of view the US have just one major ally Columbia, where one of the endless wars of the Empire has taken place. The government is isolated in the region, though. The US military base in Ecuador will be closed down. For this reason the presidential election in Paraguay next April is of great importance. By the way, the US have stationed a lot of troops in a region where their interests are challenged.
Latin America plays a positive role So Latin America plays a positive role in the fight against a unipolar world. This is an important precondition to break the power of weapons once and for all. In Latin America, ideas rooted in folk traditions mingle with selective constraints and certainties to form a bloody struggle for survival. From the beginning of this world there has been knowledge and the quest for truth, and that means that non-violent cultural development is not only a dream, although we can never know for sure. As for the power of money pushed by the neoliberal model Latin America makes its contribution too, however a less important one than in the cultural field. Governments like those of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Nicaragua may privilege the process of regional integration, but they have not escaped the neoliberal model. Still they are different from their predecessor governments. In some cases one could detect a certain flexibility of the model. An effective social policy develops regarding the re-distribution of incomes. Moreover these governments are implement ing an independent foreign policy. However they remain controversial, since they restore the hegemony of the financial capital, the power of big land owners to export natural resources and the politics of freetrade.
Initiatives In this context a number of extraordinary initiatives are currently evolving. I do not have enough time here to mention all of them. Still I do mention the Bank of the South, which also represents countries not organized in the economic area of ALBA, like Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. This bank promotes the plan of a new financial architecture; that way the countries of the region can finance their own projects an alternative to the policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Another example is the initiative Operacin Milagro (Operation Miracle) launched in Cuba which gives a new perspective to thousands of mainly poor people. This initiative has been expanded to Venezuela and Bolivia now. In this context the first generation of medical doctors from lower social class background developed, who were trained in Latin American medical schools in Cuba and Venezuela. According to UNESCO, in this co-operation illiteracy has already been eliminated in Venezuela and 60% of illiterates have been educated in Bolivia. Bolivia, and without doubt Nicaragua, too, may be able to announce this year that together with Cuba and Venezuela they are the only countries in Latin America without illiterates. All this became possible by means of noncommercial relations, not aiming at cost calculations, profit and its maximization, but at a process trying to move away from traditional trade (demerchandisation). Democratization, in the age of neoliberal hegemony, means getting rid of old-style trading (de-merchandisation). As they say in France, the essential has no prize. And the essential issues are peoples rights and not the merchandise.
A different world is possible and not utopian Building a different world can only succeed by political means, involving states and their governments new states, anti-neoliberal governments, but also governments not entirely anti-neoliberal. In a different world social movements must not replace the productive field. Social movements have to engage in a new dialogue with politics. With a false understanding of this dialogue the social movements would exclude themselves from political processes of profound economic, social, political and cultural change. In Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and some other countries the social movements might get into opposition that way and hold their corporative positions against the development of political alternatives. (I am not talking about non-government organizations, a much more severe case.) In the name of the autonomy of the social movements, which has developed into a fundamental issue in some cases, they exclude themselves from building a different possible world. If it is about the question of maintaining autonomy against the subordination of popular interests, there is no problem. But if social movements and the political level oppose each other, we fall back on corporatist positions supposedly in the name of the civil society with the risk to give up the political struggle with the traditional forces, which reproduce the dominating system. This autonomy can be good to resist neo-liberalism but it is an absolute obstacle if we want to build another possible world and not only claim it to be possible. The best way to talk about it is to build it and that will be impossible without a new hegemonic model economic, social, political and cultural, a new type of power, a new society, a new world in all its globality.
Resuming the political struggle in a new manner means for the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre to focus on the fight against war above all. Moreover, it means to seriously take into account the new possible world which has started to be built in Latin America. Neo-liberalism tries to discourage any form of regulation by the state and to discredit the role of the policy and of all forms of government in favor of an expanded market. The quest for a different political practice is thus part of the struggle for another possible world, and Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador show that is at the same time possible and essential for the construction of a new type of society. Conclusion Liberalization To conclude, we can say that many developing countries in Latin America take the route of liberalization. We can also suppose that these countries will adopt a new developmental strategy because their leaders think that an approach favorable to the market is the optimal strategy. The selected strategy promises to cure two fundamental deficiencies simultaneously: the lack of financial means and the absence of a clear definition of the states role in this development. I claim that these two fundamental problems have not yet been solved, but short-circuited by the indetermination of the reforms during the current historical period, known as period of transition. The long period of transition, which the strategy based on liberalism or liberalization implies, requires important intervention by the state; whereas the launching of reforms undoubtedly does not allow meeting the financing needs of the economy, the social reorganization, the recognition of the cultural affairs as
well as the freedom of expression, of thought and basic rights. This was the case in Chile. From the present analysis, we can draw the following conclusions: Phase 1: The transitional period is very long and difficult to manage. The liberalization of foreign trade, interior markets, and the social reforms related to the governmental structures, all these aspects are combined with those of acceptable political programs. Phase 2: The period of stabilization may last for a very long time, at least until the completion of phase 1, when the country will have restored its reputation of solvency. Phase 3: The period of determining the effects of certain measurements, because it is not true that the economy proves that liberalized markets are always the best. Phase 4: The period of stagnation and balance will only eventuate if the chronological order of the reforms has been applied. Ideology, utopia and identity I would like to add one last optimistic reflection which will put an end to my contribution. According to what I tried to show before, the ideas and the different interests of a whole people generally join in a sanguinary struggle for life. This ideology should be taken serious because, actually, with the appearance of the human consciousness of what is good and what is evil, the structure of our socio-cultural environment based on the finality of peace and non-violence is no longer a utopian dream, but also a necessary objective, both essential for all the Latin-Americans and the whole humanity.
If this utopia determines the discussions of a group, it is not only an ideological unit, but also a mentality or a structure which organizes the dominant ideas a transcendent ideal, and the rebellion of an oppressed class. The positive function of a utopia is thus to explore what is feasible, and to exploit the possibilities reality offers. Without closing too quickly, I would say that the significance of ideology and utopia enables us to illustrate the two sides of the dynamics between power and imagination. The problem of power and imagination remains, for me, the most attractive structure of existence. To open ourselves to the imaginary unexpected and unforeseen belongs to our identity. The identity of the Latin-American people and communities is also an unsettled prospective identity. This also applies to the structure of identity as a symbolic structure which constitutes imagination and which is reflected not only as ideology and utopia, but also as reality and fiction. My conviction is that we are always captured in this oscillation between ideology and utopia. Those who have neither projects nor objectives do not have anything to describe. Neo-liberalism It is necessary to mention some elements in this context. In Latin America, we find a concentration of wealth with a small minority which is the highest in comparison to the rest of the planet. 230 million LatinAmericans i.e. 44% of the population live below the poverty line. The Gini coefficient which measures the degree of inequality reached the record of 0.57 (compared with 0.29 in Europe and 0.34 in the United States). This extraordinary social inequality whose first victims are the natives, regardless of the country, adds to the weariness and frustration resulting from a strictly
formal democratization of the states in the region. According to an extended study of the UN Development Program (UNDP) carried out in 2004, more than half of the Latin-Americans would be willing to give up democracy and accept an authoritative government, if it proved to be able to solve their socio-economic problems. As far as the penetration of multinational corporations beyond the old sectoral and geographical borders of capitalism is concerned, as well as the opportunities offered by the development of communications, they will play in full support of the self-assertiveness of these marginalized populations and the articulation of their organizations and claims. On the internal level, these incipient mobilizations will gain new strength at the same time from the specific dynamics caused by modernization (generation gap, emergence of young innovative elites, rupture of traditional values ) of the rural communities from which they result. They will also gain strength from the multiple cultural and political influences which the proponents have experienced in the last few decades. They are, on the religious level, being inspired by theories of liberation theology, or on a more sociopolitical level by rural organizations, trade unions or even revolutionary organizations. Multiculturalism Multiculturalism, just like its terminological substitutes, is a term whose usage varies according to the places, the historical and national contexts and the approaches, epistemological or ideological. In addition, there is a basic difference in meaning and use of this term among the countries to which people immigrate where multiculturalism results in the integration (or
assimilation) of the representatives of foreign cultures on the one hand. On the other hand, there are the postcolonized countries where multiculturalism results in a relationship between the autochthonous populations (fourth-world groups) and the national society, managed and set up according to euro-modernistic principles. In this respect, another differentiation of multiculturalism applies in the post-colonized countries. It is the differentiation between the countries which the colonizers left (all while leaving euro-modernistic structures there, as in Africa or Asia) and those countries where the colonizers and their descendants settled and thus currently make up a sector of the national society. The texts which compose this issue of the Alhim Books (Alhim Amrique Latine Histoire et Mmoire) have revealed this last case, i.e. the countries of Latin America with their component of indigenous or non-indigenous populations, having been involved in multicultural relations for more than five centuries. The sovereignty of the people As a whole, the unexpected survival of the social and popular movements during the last twenty years of serious conflicts and multiple forms of violence is nothing less than extraordinary. They continue to exist, whereas a big number of parties and political groups, which were founded at the same time according to the traditional rules of an organization, quickly disappeared. In spite of the breaches, the inevitable tensions and internal imbalances, and in spite of the assassinations, the imprisonments and torture, these movements have continued to exist and have developed to the point that they now include whole socio-geographic areas with the help of existing networks and mechanisms of coordination (e.g. the unification of local councils, local voluntary working
groups, cooperatives of low-rent apartments or slums, campaigns for public education). Thus linked, they continue to resist every attempt to be instrumentalized by groups of the radicalized left and the offensives to be taken over and subordinated which are directed against them and their leaders by the resident parties and governments. It is true that these movements knew some desertions and that specific political operations have been revealed. However, given the enormous discredit of many official organizations, people do no longer think that adhering to the latter or resuming to their reactionary and immoral practices or their unspecified reinforcement are of advantage to those engaged in social movements. Many dominant institutions, such as the traditional parties, lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the people, partly because they are no longer able to intervene or support the interests of defenseless or persecuted groups, and partly because they let the decline infiltrate the social structure, of which the situation of violence in Colombia gives evidence. Genuine Democracy Carlos Mariategul, the real founder of LatinAmerican Marxism, wrote in an article that was published in 1928: We do not wish socialism in LatinAmerica to be a blueprint or a copy of socialism (calco y copia). It must be a heroic creation. We have to bring to life Indo-American socialism with our own reality, in our own language. That is a mission fit for a new generation. Unfortunately, his message was not heeded. Just the same year, when he wrote these lines, the Latin-American communist movement came under the influence of the Stalinist paradigm and forced on it the blueprint and copy of the ideology of the Soviet bureaucracy and its so-called really existing socialism. We of today do not know whether Che
Guevara knew about Mariateguis text but it is possible that his wife, Hilda Gadea borrowed him the writings of Mariategui in the years before the Cuban revolution. Anyway, we note that a great deal of his thought and of his political practice particularly during the sixties aimed at leaving the dead-end path which followed slave-like the soviet and Eastern-European model. His ideas concerning the construction of socialism are the attempt of a heroic creation of something new, the search for a socialism of another character, a search however that was interrupted and stayed uncompleted. This own socialism was opposed to the caricature of the really existing socialism in many aspects. From 1959 up to 1967 Che Guevaras way of thinking changed considerably. He distanced himself from the initial illusions about Soviet socialism and the Soviet model of Marxism, which actually was a Stalinist one. In a 1965 letter to a Cuban friend he criticized the ideological cult following with hard words which became manifest in the edition of Soviet text books on Marxism. These textbooks which he called soviet bricks have the disadvantage that they do not permit you to think. The Party has thought for you and it is up to you to digest them. Mainly in his writings from 1963 on his rejection of the blueprint and copy and the search for an alternative model becomes more and more apparent: the attempt to put into words another path to socialism that was more radical, more brotherly, more humane and more consequent with respect to communist ethics. His death in October 1967 interrupted an independent maturing process. Thus his work is not a closed system, not a completed doctrine, which provides an answer to all questions. With respect to many problems, like the planning of democracy and the battle against bureaucracy, his considerations
remained incomplete. The main drive for the search for a new way beyond the specific economic issue is the conviction that socialism doesnt make sense and cannot prevail if it does not include a project for civilization, a social ethic, a model of society that is completely different from those values of a primitive individualism, of a wild and rampant egotism, of a competition of war of all against all, values that are embodied in capitalist society this world in which man is a wolf to man. The construction of socialism is inseperable from certain ethical values in opposition to the economist concepts from Stalin to Cruchtschev and his successors, who considered nothing but the development of the productive forces. In his famous conversation with the journalist Jean Daniel (July 1963) Che Guevara explained, criticizing the real socialism that I am not interested in economic socialism without communist morality. We fight to overcome misery, but also to overcome alienation [...]. If communism passes by the realm of the Conscience, it may be a model of distribution but it will never constitute a really revolutionary morality. If socialism pretends to fight capitalism and to overcome it on its very field, i.e. productivism and consumism [exaggerated consumption, the translator] using its own weapons its form of trade, its competition, its selfish individualism it is doomed to fail. We cannot maintain that Guevara foresaw the breakdown of the USSR, but in a way he had the intuition that a socialist system, that does not tolerate any deviating opinions which means any new values that tries to copy its enemies and knows no other ambition than to catch up with and overtake the production in the capitalist mtropoles, that such a system will have no future. For Che Guevara socialism was a historical project of a new society, built on the values of equality,
solidarity, collectivity, revolutionary altruism, free discussion and participation of the people. His growing criticism of real socialism just as his practice as a leader and his considerations with respect to the Cuban experiment were inspired by this utopia, which is (in the sense of Ernst Bloch), a communist one.
*As a cultural anthropologist, Dr Emmanuel Broillet worked at the International Bureau of Education (IBE, UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO, UN) in Geneva. He currently works as a counselor and gives lectures. He graduated with a masters degree at the University of Queensland (Australia) and finished his doctorate at the University of Berne. Since the early 1990s, Dr Broillet accomplished ethnographic studies in Melanesia (New Caledonia) as well as in Central America (El Salvador). He is about to finish the last part of his habilitation paper at the University of Fribourg/Switzerland. The text is based on the notes of E. Broillets lecture at the Mut zur Ethik Conference on Sovereignty of the People or Imperialism? What is True Democracy? from 4 to 6 September 2009 in Feldkirch/Austria. 1 Katarism which refers to the Indgena leader Tupac Katari, who led an insurgence in the vicinity of La Paz at the end of the 18th century, is a movement which has contributed to a renewal of the peasant union movement which had previously formed an alliance with the military. Its leaders tried to prevent the corruption of union leaders and to develop an Indian ideology which formed the basis of their quest. Katarism allowed the Indgenas, which were seen just as farmers by the military and the governments, to re-establish their identity. From this, the theory of double suppression was formulated, both in an economic way as farmers and as Indgenas who are victims of discrimination in a colonial state. Later, the most important leaders such as Genaro Flores played a crucial role in the fight for the restoring of democracy. The relationship with the military was finally ended when the CSUTCB (Bolivian Farmers Federation) was founded in 1979 which joined the COB one year later which was the start of the first stage of the establishment of a militant farmers union movement in Bolivia. 2 Simn Bolvar, born on 24 July, 1783 in Caracas, is seen as the liberator of South America from Spanish rule. To this day, he is a national hero of
many South American countries. A whole Latin American state is named after Bolvar: Bolivia. From a rich family which had emigrated from Spain to South America in the 17th century, he enjoyed a liberal education in the spirit of Rousseau. On April 19, 1810, the resistance junta in Caracas which Bolvar had joined declared the self-administration of Venezuela. In 1811, he was involved in the foundation of a congress which declared Venezuelas independence on 5 July, 1811 and proclaimed the first republic. In the following years, Bolvar, who was officially ratified as El Libertador, participated in the fight for independence. In August 1819, he won over Spain and its supporters in Boyac; in December, a congress declared the formation of the Republic of Gran Colombia, a state covering most of modern Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. Bolvar was the president. The war with Spain was not decided before the victory at Carabobo in 1821. Simn Bolvar died in 1830 near Santa Marta in Colombia. The same year, Gran Colombia was dissolved and Venezuela received independence.
Liberalism or Neo-Socialism in Latin America? The following is abridged from a speech delivered at Evenings at FEE in April 2007.Many years ago I
attended a seminar here at the Foundation for Economic Education, and in the 13 years that I have been writing for The Wall Street Journal, I have always considered FEE a guiding light for economic freedom. It is very exciting to see the renewed energy and spirit here. It&s great to be back at FEE! I chose the title for my presentation tonight for a reason. Ever since the limited economic experiments of the 1990s we have seen a tendency in Latin America to give the name liberalism (in its classical sense) to antiliberal policies, such as taking public monopolies and changing them into private ones through government intervention. That is what made Mexican media tycoon Carlos Slim the richest man in Latin America and the second-richest man in the world. When this application of the word liberalism was criticized it was changed to neo-liberalism. That is when my friends and I decided that there is no such thing as neo-liberalism but instead there should exist a word neo-socialism, sort of a new rerun of the old values of socialism. Look at Venezuela. You see a democracy with an elected president, Hugo Chvez, but with the absence of any individual or economic freedoms. What you see is in fact a very sharp slide toward socialism. It is highly improbable that the Venezuelans can become free people any time soon. The situation there looks very grimmuch closer, I think, to what we are seeing in Russia right now. There is a group of Latin American countries that are following Chvez, and that tend to have more closed economies and underdeveloped institutions. Among them are definitely Bolivia and Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Nicaragua, which we have to remain vigilant about.
However, it is also very important to recognize that not everyone is following Venezuela. There is a whole other part of Latin America that we should be cautiously hopeful about, which includes Colombia, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and several Central American countries (although there is a very serious problem with the rule of law in Guatemala right now). In those countries political institutions are more or less holding up: the elected presidents in fact leave office at the end of their term and a new president gets elected; congress and courts (i.e. the competing branches of power) actually exist. Of course none of the courts functions adequately, but at least we see a semblance of institutional order which makes me somewhat hopeful. Chile, for example, has done a good job of setting up a rule of law, opening the economy, and becoming very competitive. But to the surprise of many, the ideas in Chile have failed to infect other Latin-American countries. Chile is simply too small to affect the development of the whole region. The Case of Brazil There is a definite need for one of the larger economies on the continent to start a more positive trend. One such possible country is Brazil. But on this count, Brazil has been a very big disappointment. Today most people think of Brazil as one of the biggest developing economies in the world, along with Russia, India, and China. Those four countries are often referred to as BRIC. But Brazil has actually underperformed its BRIC peers. My economist friends in Brazil have been telling me for years, Don&t worry, there is not going to be a big collapse, but do not expect anything on the upside either. Brazil simply is going to be mediocre forever.
How can this be? I spent two weeks there last summer and saw the incredible potential:
The
natural resources are boundless.
Immigrants, Brazilian
with their work ethic, give the country a huge advantage in human capital. entrepreneurs are competitive, outward looking, and educated. You meet them all around the world! And if you go to the informal markets in So Paulo, Rio, or Bella Horizonte, you see the same entrepreneurial hunger in the general population.
Why is it that Brazil, as an old joke has it, remains and always will remain the country of the future? Why then do we have Brazilian mediocrity instead of the Brazilian miracle? The Brazilian government under the leadership of President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, takes pride when announcing a 3.5 percent annual GDP growth with interest rates at a lowbelow 15 percent. That is how low the expectations are for a large country with great economic potential. What is the politically correct explanation for this inadequacy? It is, of course, inequality: there are too many rich people who refuse to share their assets with the less fortunate. Foreign-aid experts, who will do very well as long as Brazil stays poor, offer their own reasons and solutions. First, Brazilians are uneducated. The government&s failure to spend enough money on education is one of the justifications for constantly raising taxes and redistributing wealth. The second reason is inequality in health care. The answer is to undermine pharmaceutical patents and to aggressively promote the production and sales of cheap generic medicines so that every Brazilian can have free health care.
These are some of the solutions that according to foreign-aid experts will change the Brazilian picture. To them foreign aid should simply provide enough money for the poverty to go away. They fail to see that the experiment in Brazil, which has really been a 25-year experiment with socialism, shows that this is a losing battle. But the Brazilian people are beginning to see the real problem: low growth. As prominent free-market economist Peter Bauer once said, Lack of money is not the cause of poverty, it is poverty. Another obstacle on the way to prosperity is the lack of understanding of the proper role of government. Have you have ever seen the Brazilian constitution? A pocket-book version of it is 400 pages long! Obviously the government has a host of obligations to meet. The government is charged with doing everything, including guaranteeing that the people will have enough leisure time. Of course this particular obligation is easy to meet: the unemployment rate is so high that Brazilians are guaranteed lots of leisure time. A Vicious Cycle of Poverty With Brazil and its neighbors, I think we are facing three major problems:
1.
The failure of the constitution to limit the power of government. The failure to ensure equal rights under the law. The idea of equality is in everybody&s mind, but they understand it as equality of incomes, rather than rights. The protectionist policies and high tariffs that were established in the middle of the 19th century and have been pushing the whole region back considerably.
2.
3.
In the 20th century this policy continued. There was a very short period of time before World War II when the tariffs were lifted only to be reintroduced during the war. Around 1950, an Argentinean economist, Ral Prebisch from the UN&s economic commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), suggested that Latin America should introduce extremely high tariffs, which would allow infant industries to grow and mature. Then lift the tariffs. More good advice from the UN! Now, 70 years later, we are still waiting. The infants have never grown up. Central America experienced the highest import tariffs and import protection in the world. These policies caused the extreme poverty in Central America, which continues to proliferate to this day. The region not only lost investment, but also the information and the connection with the rest of the world. As a result, Central American countries were not part of the process of innovation and discovery that fueled the growth of the countries with more open economies. Latin America continues to be a closed economy with very strong domestic interests in each respective country. Government-protected domestic monopolies have the money to lobby the policy makers for further protection from all competition. This creates a vicious cycle propagating a closed economy and thus poverty. Unfortunately Brazil is no exception. In his book, The Power of Productivity, William Lewis (the founder of the McKinsey Global Institute) observes that Brazil has an impressively high level of productivity in its formal sector and yet is condemned to suffer the consequences of a huge informal sector mired in misery. He completely dismisses the idea that the lack of education of the Brazilian workforce is the reason for
the country&s inability to close this productivity gap. It is rather an excuse for poor economic performance. There are many examplesfrom banking to food processingwhere companies have been able to match productivity levels at the economic frontier with the existing Brazilian workforce. In other words, the job training provided by the private sector, not government schooling, is the primary avenue through which workers attain the skills necessary to perform at the economic frontier. So the true problem is not education, but the high cost of conducting legitimate business in the formal sector. Big government demands big taxation. Companies in the formal sector have high productivity, but they are also the ones paying all the taxes. The common incentive thus is to work in the informal sector, where you don&t have to meet regulations or pay taxes, and that&s how you survive. And he says the two characteristics of Brazil&s economy are the large size of the informal sector and the large size of government. They are connected. Half of all Brazil&s workers are in fact outside the formal economy and their low productivity fuels poverty. In a developing country the problem should take care of itself as more productive formal businesses with lower prices and better services overtake the informal enterprises. But it is not happening in Brazil. In fact, the informal sector is growing bigger and bigger. Now what&s the problem with the informal sector? The problem is that in the informal sector you cannot take advantage of the efficiency or technology of large-scale production. Otherwise you run the risk of getting on the government&s radar screen and being nailed for tax evasion.
The culprit here is the voracious appetite of big Brazilian government, which constantly needs resources. Despite higher productivity, legitimate enterprises do not have any pricing advantage against informal, less-productive businesses because they&re saddled with the payroll tax, value-added tax, sales tax, income tax, and corporate tax, which is scandalously high in Brazil. As a result Brazilian companies pay 85 percent of all taxes collected, compared with 41 percent for U.S. corporations. This not only hampers legal businesses, it also deters small informal businesses from growing and moving into the legal sector. Today the Brazilian government spends 39 percent of the country&s GDP compared to 37 percent in the United States. For a developing country, that is outrageous. No country could ever hope to pull itself from the grips of poverty with such a high and destructive level of taxation. Cut the Size of Government There is only one prescription for this disease: cut the size of government! One would hope that Brazilians would all go to the polls and vote to oppose all of those regulations, interventions, and taxes. But instead the masses keep voting for more and more government. They do not have much confidence in politicians& ability to establish equality under the law and thus the opportunity to move up the social ladder. Under those circumstances people simply vote for whoever promises them the biggest piece of the redistributive welfare pie. They have no incentive whatsoever to support the idea of limited government. One avenue for change is free trade. Besides obvious economic benefits, trade encourages information exchange as well as discovery and innovation. That
triggers change in the climate of ideas, the way people think and relate to each other. Suddenly a monopolistking of everything becomes just another competitor in a global market. Part of the problem is bad incentives created by foreign aid and faulty advice, both coming from Washington, D.C. We put pressure on those countries to implement more labor regulations, to pour more money into government health care and public education. Such an additional financial burden is counter-productive to the growth of the economy and makes their potential to overcome poverty even more doubtful. We Americans should do better. We should stand for open trade. We should repeal the protectionist regulations, which hold Latin Americans in poverty and hurt consumers at home. We should stop pushing social safety networks and labor regulations, and encourage the emergence and growth of the freemarket institutions that generate economic prosperity and safeguard the rule of law in the United States. It is very difficult to break the vicious cycle of poverty, but it is not impossible. Every year we see more and more believers in the free market across Latin America. Those talented and dedicated people from many walks of life really want to change their countries. And with our help, I am hopeful they will.
Mary Anastasia O&Grady is a leading editorial writer for The Wall Street Journal and a member of the Journal&s Editorial Board. As the editor of the Americas column, she regularly exposes the never-ending corruption and failed policies of the socialist regimes in Latin America. In addition to her post at The Wall Street Journal, Mary O&Grady is a co-editor of the Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage Foundation. In 1997 she won the Inter American Press Association&s Daily Gleaner
Award for editorial commentary; in 2005 she was awarded the Bastiat Prize for Journalism. Ms. O&Grady is equally disliked by the left-leaning American media and by Latin America&s socialist governments. The Cuban government named her a counterrevolutionary for her uncompromising criticism of Fidel Castro, Hugo Chvez, and the like.
Latin Americas Twenty-First Century Socialism in Historical Perspective

Introduction The electoral victory of center left regimes in at least three Latin American countries, and the search for a new ideological identity to justify their rule, led ideologues and the incumbent presidents to embrace the notion that they represent a new 21st century version of socialism (21cs). Prominent writers, academics and regime spokespeople celebrated a totally new variant of socialism, as completely at odds with what they dubbed as the failed 20th century,
Soviet-style socialism. The advocates and publicists of 21cs claims of a novel political-economic model rested on what they ascribed as a radical break with both the free market neo-liberal regimes which preceded, and the past statist version of socialism embodied by the former Soviet Union as well as China and Cuba. In this paper we will proceed by examining the variety of critiques put forth by 21cs of both neo-liberalism and 20 century socialism (20cs), the authenticity of their claims of a novelty and originality, and a critical analysis of their actual performance. The 21cs Critique of Neo-Liberalism The rise of 21cs regimes grew out of the crises and demise of neo-liberal regimes which pervaded Latin America from the mid 1970s to the end of the 1990s. Their demise was hastened by a string of popular uprisings which propelled the ascent of center-left regimes based on their rejection of neo-liberal socioeconomic doctrines and promise of basic changes favoring the great majorities. While there are important programmatic differences among the 21cs regimes, they all shared a common critique of six features of neo-liberal policies.
(1)
They rejected the idea that the market should have precedence and dominance over the state, by which they meant that the logic of capitalist class profit maximization should exclusively shape public policy. The collapse of the market driven capitalism in the recession of 2000 -2002 and mass impoverishment discredited the doctrine of rational markets as banks and business bankruptcies skyrocketed, the middle class lost their savings and the streets and plazas filled with unemployed workers and peasants.
(2)
The 21cs regimes condemned deregulation of the economy which led to the rise of speculators over an above productive capitalism. Under the aegis of neo-liberal rulers regulatory legislation in place since the Great Depression was abrogated and in its place, the policies of capital controls, and financial oversight were suspended in favor of a selfregulated regime in which market players established their own rules, thus leading, according to their critics, to speculation, financial swindles and the pillage of public and private treasuries. The predominance of finance over production was the centerpiece of the anti-capitalist discourse of the 21cs regimes. Implicit was a differentiation between bad capitalism which earned wealth without producing goods and services over good capitalism, which presumably did produce value of social utility. Related to its overall critique of neo-liberalism was a specific critique of the lowering of tariff barriers, the privatization of public enterprises at below their true market value, the denationalization of ownership of strategic resources and the massive growth of inequality. The 21cs argued that neo-liberal regimes surrendered the economic levers of the economy to private and foreign bankers (like the IMF) who imposed deflationary measures instead of reflating the economy through infusions of stale spending. The political leaders of the center-left used this critique of neo-liberalism and the implicit future promise to break decisively with neo-liberal capitalism, without committing themselves to a specific break with capitalism of another variety.
(3)
(4)
(5)
While the center-left critique of neo-liberal capitalism appealed to the popular classes, their rejection of 20cs, was directed at the middle class and to reassure the productive classes (business class) that they would not encroach on private ownership as a whole. Critique of 20th Century Socialism In a kind of political balancing act to their opposition to neo-liberalism, 21cs advocates have also put distance to what they dub twentieth century socialism. Partly as a political tactic to disarm or neutralize the numerous and powerful critics of past socialist regimes and partly to further claims of a novel, up-to-date variant socialism in tune with the times, the 21cs make the following critique and highlight their differences with 20th century socialism.
1.
Past socialism was dominated, by a heavy handed bureaucracy that misallocated resources and stifled innovation and personal choices. The old socialism was profoundly undemocratic both in the way it ruled, the organization of elections and the one part state. The repression of civil rights, and all market activity figures large in the 21cs narrative. The 21cs conflate democracy as a system with the electoral road to power or regime change. Changes of government resulting from armed struggle, especially guerilla movements are condemned, though all three 21cs governments came to power via elections which followed popular upheavals. One of the key arguments put forth by 21cs regimes is that in the past socialists failed to take account of the specifications of each country. Concretely they emphasize differences in racial,
2.
3.
4.
ethnic, geographic, cultural, historical traditions, political practices etc. which are now considered in defining 21st cs.
5.
Related to the previous point 21cs emphasize the new global configuration of power in the 21st century which shapes the policies and potentialities of 21cs. Among the new factors, they cite the disappearance of the former USSR and Chinas conversion to capitalism; the rise and relative decline of a US centered global economy; the rise of Asia, especially China; the emergence of Venezuelan promoted regional initiatives; the rise of center-left regimes throughout Latin America; and diversified markets, in Asia, within Latin America the Middle East and elsewhere. The 21cs regimes claim that the new configuration of society and state is not a copy of any other past or present socialist state. It is almost as if every measure, policy, or institution is the design of the contemporary 21cs regime. Originality or novelty is an argument to enhance the legitimacy of the regime before external and internal critics from the anti-communist Right and to dismiss substantive criticism from the Left. The 21cs regimes make a point of emphasizing the fact that the leadership has no links past or present with Communism and in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador openly reject Marxism both as a tool of analysis or as a bases for policy prescription. The exception is President Chavez whose ideology is a blend of Marxism and nationalism linked to the thought of Simon Bolivar. Both Correa and Morales eschew class divisions, counterpoising a citizens revolution against a corrupt party oligarchy, in the case of the former, and a culturally oppressed
6.
7.
Andean Indian communities against an European oligarchy. Critique of 21st Century Socialist Regimes While 21cs regimes have more or less clearly stated what they are not and what they reject in the past both on the Left and the Right, and have in general terms stated what they are, their practices, policies and institutional configurations have raised serious doubts about their revolutionary claims, their originality and their capacity to meet the expectations of their popular electorate. While a number of ideologues, political leaders, and commentators refer to themselves as 21cs, there is a great variety of differences in theory and practice between them. A critical examination of the country experiences will highlight both the differences between the regimes and the validity of their claims of originality. Venezuela: The Birthplace of 21cs President Chavez was the first and foremost advocate and practioner of 21cs. Though the following presidents and publicists in Latin America, North America and Europe have jumped on the bandwagon; there is no uniform practice to match the public rhetoric. In many ways President Chavezs discourse and the Venezuelan governments policies define the radical outer limits of 21cs both in terms of its foreign policy challenging Washingtons war policies and in terms of domestic socio-economic reforms. Nevertheless, while there are innovative and novel features to the Venezuelan model of 21cs, there are strong resemblances to previous radical populist nationalist
regimes in Latin America and European welfare state reforms. The most striking novelty and original feature of Venezuelan versions of 21cs is the strong blend of historical Bolivarian nationalism, 20th century Marxism and Latin American populism. President Chavez conception of 21cs is informed and legitimated by his close reading of the writings, speeches and actions of Simon Bolivar, the 19th century founding father of Venezuela independence. Chavezs conception of a deep rupture with imperial powers, the reliance on mass support against untrustworthy domestic elites capable of selling out the country to defend their privileges is deeply embedded in his readings of the rise and fall of Simon Bolivar. Though Chavez makes no pretext of identifying Bolivar with Marxism, he does make a strong case for the endogenous, national roots, of his ideology and practice. While supporting the Cuban revolution and maintaining a close relation with Fidel Castro, he clearly makes no effort to assimilate or copy the Cuban model even as he adapts to Venezuelan realities certain features of mass organization. Chavez economic practice includes extensive nationalization and expropriation (with compensation) of large sectors of the petrol industry, selective nationalization of key enterprises based on pragmatic political considerations including capital-labor conflict (steel, cement, telecoms) and in pursuit of greater food security (land reform). His political agenda includes the formation of a mass competitive socialist party within the framework of a multi-party system and the convoking of free and open referendums to secure constitutional reforms. The novelty is found in his encouraging of local self government through the
formation of non-sectarian communal councils based in the neighborhoods to bypass the dead hand of an inefficient, hostile and corrupt bureaucracy. Chavezs goal appears, at times, to be the replacement of representative electoral politics run by the professional political class by a system of direct democracy based on self-management, in factories and neighborhoods. In terms of social policy Chavez has funded a plethora of programs designed to raise living standards of 60% of the population that includes the working class, self-employed, poor, peasants and female heads of households. These reforms include universal free medical care and education, up to and including university enrollment. The contracting of over 20,000 Cuban doctors, dentists and technicians and a massive program encompassing the building of clinics, hospitals and mobile units criss-cross the entire countryside, with a priority to low income neighborhoods ignored by previous capitalist regimes and private medical staffers. The Chavez regime has built and financed a large network of publicly run supermarkets that sell food and related household items at subsidized prices to low income families. In foreign policy President Chavez has consistently opposed US wars in the Middle East and South Asia, and the entire rationale for imperial wars embedded in the War on Terror doctrine. Critique: How Novel is Venezuelas 21cs? Several questions arise regarding the Venezuelan version of 21cs: (1) Is it really socialist or better still does it represent a break with 20 century socialism in all of its variants? (2) What is the balance between past and existing capitalist features of the economy and the socialist reforms introduced during the Chavez decade? (3) To what degree have the social changes
reduced inequalities and provided greater security for the mass of the people in this transitional period. Venezuela today is a mixed economy, with the private sector still predominant in the banking, agricultural, commercial, foreign trade sector. Government ownership has grown and national social priorities have dictated the allocation of oil resources. While the mixed economy of Venezuela resembles the early post World War II social democratic configurations in Europe, there is one key difference: the state owns the most lucrative export sector and the principal earner of foreign exchange. While the government has vastly increased social expenditures comparable or exceeding spending in some of the earlier social democratic governments, it has not reduced the great concentrations of wealth and income of the upper classes, via steep progressive tax rates as in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Inequalities are still far greater than existed under 20th century socialist societies and comparable to existing Latin American societies. Moreover, the upper and upper middle levels of the state bureaucracy especially in the oil and related industries have levels of remuneration which are comparable to their capitalist counterparts, as was the case in nationalized industries in England and France. Self-management of public enterprises, a relative new idea in Venezuela , has moved beyond the limits of German social democratic co-participation schemes but are confined to less than a half-dozen major enterprises a far cry from the extensive, nationwide networks found in socialist Yugoslavia between the 1940s 1980s.
The agrarian reform proposals of the Chavez regime though radical in intent and forcibly promoted by President Chavez has failed to change the relationship between farm workers, peasants and large landowners. Where inroads have been made in land distribution, the government bureaucracy has failed to provide the extension services, financing, infrastructure, and security to land reform beneficiaries. The National Guard has by commission or omission failed to end landlord assassinations of leaders and supporters of land reform by the hired guns of landlords. Over 200 unsolved killing of peasants were on the books by the end of 2009. While publicists of 21cs have emphasized the governments nationalizations of oil enterprises from existing owners, they have failed to take account of the growing number of new joint ventures with multinational corporations from China, Russia, Iran and the European Union. In other words while the role of some US multi-nationals has declined, foreign capital investment in mineral and petrol fields has actually increased especially in the vast Orinoco tar fields. While the shift of investment partners in oil reduces Venezuelas strategic vulnerability to US pressure, it does not enhance the socialist character of the economy. Joint ventures do add weight to the argument that Venezuelas mixed public-private economy approximates the social democratic model of the mid 20th century. The most questionable aspect of Venezuelas claim to socialism is its continued dependence on a single commodity (oil) for 70% of its export earnings and its dependence on a single market, the United States, an openly hostile and destabilizing trading partner. The Chavez regimes efforts to diversify trading partners has
taken on greater urgency with Obamas military pact with Columbian President Alviro Uribe, to occupy 7 bases. Equally threatening to the mass base of the Chavez road to socialism is the skyrocketing crime rate based on the growth of a lumpen-proletariat and its links to Columbian drug traffickers and civilian and military officials. In many popular barrios the lumpen compete with the leaders of the communal councils for hegemony, using unrest and violence to exercise dominance. The ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Interior and the police and their lack of a close working relation with neighborhood organizations represent a serious weakness in mobilizing civil society and mark a limitation in the effectiveness of the communal council movement. The remarkable reforms instituted by the Chavez government, and the original synthesis of Bolivarian empancipatory anti-colonialism, with Marxism and antiimperialism mark a rupture with the predominant neoliberal practice pervasive in Latin America over the previous quarter century and still operative under numerous contemporary regimes, who claim otherwise. What is doubtful, however, is whether all the changes amount to a new version of socialism given the predominance of capitalist property relations in strategic sectors of the economy and the continuing class inequalities in both the private and public sector. Yet one should keep in mind that socialism is not a static concept, but an ongoing process, and the bulk of recent measures are tending to extend popular power in factories and neighborhoods.
Ecuador
In Ecuador, President Correa has adopted the rhetoric of 21cs and it has gained credibility in association with several foreign policy initiatives. These include the termination of US military base lease in Manta; the questioning of parts of the foreign debt incurred by previous regimes; the critique of Columbias border incursions and military assault of a clandestine Columbian guerilla camp; his criticism of US free trade policies and support of Venezuelas regional integration program (ALBA). President Correa has been identified as part of the new wave of leftist Presidents by the mass media including the NY Times, The Financial Times and numerous leftist journalists, North and South. In terms of domestic policy issues, President Correas claim to be a founding member of 21cs rests on his critique of the traditional Rightist parties and the oligarchy. In other words, his socialism is defined by what and who he opposes, rather than any social structural changes. His main domestic achievements revolve around his denunciation of the major electoral parties; his support for and leadership of a citizens movement, and its success in overthrowing the rightist US backed authoritarian electoral regime of Lucio Gutierrez, the convoking of a constitutional assembly and the writing of a new constitution. These legal and political transformations define the outer limits of Correas radicalism and provide the substantive bases for his claim of being a 21cs. While these foreign policy and domestic political changes, especially when taken in the context of increased social expenditures during his first three years of office, warrant his being included as a center-leftist they hardly suffice or add up to a
socialist agenda especially if they are seen in the large socio-economic structural matrix. Critique of the Ecuadorian Practice of 21cs The most striking departure of any credible claim to socialism is the persistence and expansion of foreign private capitalist ownership of the strategic mining and energy resources: fifty-seven percent of petrol is produced by overseas petroleum multi-nationals. Large scale, long term mining contracts have been signed and renewed giving foreign owned mineral companies majority control over the principal foreign exchange and export earning sectors. What is worse, Correa has violently repressed and rejected the long-standing claims of the Amazonian and Andean Indian communities living and working on the lands signed off to the mineral multi-nationals. In rejecting negotiations, Correa has dismissed the 4 major Indian movements and their allies in the ecology movements as little more than a handful of backward elements or worse. The contamination of waters, air and land leading to serious illnesses and deaths by the foreign oil companies has been demonstrated in US courts where Texaco faces a billion dollar law suit. Despite adverse court rulings, Correa has vigorously pursued his push to make foreign led mineral exploitation the centerpiece of his development strategy. While Correa has vigorously attacked the coastal financial agro-commercial capitalist class, centered in Guayaquil, he has vigorously supported and subsidized the Quito (Andean based) capitalist class. His antioligarchy rhetoric is certainly not anti-capitalist as his embrace of 21cs would imply. President Correas success in building a mass citizen electoral movement is measured by his impressive electoral victories, securing presidential majorities
under multi-party competition, and over seventy percent in the constitutional elections. Despite his popularity, Correas popular backing is largely based on short term concessions, in the form of wage and salary increases and credit concessions to small business, measures which are not sustainable with the onset of the world recession. His granting of telecommunication monopolies to private firms, his opposition to land reform, and the restrictions of trade union strikes, while not provoking systemic challenges have led to a increasing number of strikes and protests. More important, the strengthening of capitalist, especially foreign ownership, control of strategic banking, commercial export and mineral sectors, reduces the claims of 21cs to a merely symbolic, rhetorical exercise. What is apparent is that the basis for 21cs is rooted in foreign policy pronouncements (which are subject to reversal) rather than changes in class relations, property ownership and popular power. 21cs socialism, in the case of Ecuador, appears as a convenient way of combining innovative foreign policy measures with neo-liberal modernization development strategies. Moreover, initial radical measures do not preclude subsequent conservative backsliding as is evidenced in the questioning of the foreign debt (which caused premature leftist ejaculations of glee) and subsequent return to full debt payments. Bolivian Socialism White Capital, Indian Labor The greatest contrast between 20th and 21st century :socialism is found between the current regime of Evo Morales (2005 - ) and the short lived Presidency of J. J. Torres (1970-1971). While the former has openly and publicly invited mineral and extractive multi-national companies from 5 continents to exploit gas, oil, copper, iron, lithium, zinc,
tin, gold, silver and a long list of other minerals, under the 20th century Torres regime, foreign and local capitalist firms were nationalized, expropriated. While billions of profits are currently repatriated both during and after the commodity boon; under Torres, state control over capital flows and foreign trade limited the de-capitalization of the country. While Evo Morales provides hundreds of millions in loans, export subsidies and tax incentives to the wealthiest agro exporters and expels landless Indian squatters from large estates, under President Torres land takeovers were encouraged as furthering the regimes agrarian reform policies. There is an abundance of socio-economic data demonstrating that the socialist polices undertaken during President Torres term of office stand in polar opposition to the social liberal policies practiced by the Morales regime. In the following sections we will outline the major social and liberal policies of the Morales regime in order to assess the true meaning of the self-declared 21cs politics in Bolivia. The Social Changes Numerous social changes have been implemented by the Morales regime during its first 5 years in power (2005 2009). The question is whether these changes add up to any of the most generous definitions of socialism or even to transitional measures pointing to socialism in the near or even distant future, given the scope and depth of the liberal economic policies adopted. Morales has implemented socio-political changes in nine policy areas. The most significant domestic change is in the area political cultural legal rights of the indigenous people. The regime has granted local governance rights for Indian municipalities, recognized and promoted by-lingualism for carrying out local
affairs and education, given national importance to Indian religious and holiday celebrations and promoted prosecution of those who violate or persecute Indian civil rights. Under Morales the state has slightly increased its share of revenues in its joint ventures with multi-national corporations, increased the price of gas sold to Brazil and Argentina, while increasing the share going to the national government over and against provincial governments. Given the record prices received by Bolivias agro-mineral exports between 2005 2008, the local municipalities increased their revenue flow, though actually investments in productive and service sectors lagged because of bureaucratic bottlenecks. Morales allowed for incremental increases in the minimum wage, salaries and wages, thus marginally improving living conditions. The increases, however, were far below Morales electoral promise to double the minimum wage and certainly not comenserate with the large scale windfall profits resulting from the commodity boom. Morales prosecution of local officials and the provincial governor of Pando province and rightist terrorists for the assault and murder of Indian activists put an end to impunity of white assaults on Indian citizens. The regimes biggest boast was the accumulation of foreign reserves from $2 billion to $6 billion dollars, fiscal discipline and strict control over social spending and the favorable balance of payments. In this regard Morales practices were more in line with the IMF than anything remotely resembling the expansive economic practices of socialist and social democratic regimes. Tripling reserves in the face of continued 60% poverty levels for the mostly rural Indian population is a novel
policy for any regime claiming socialist credentials. Even contemporary capitalist, North American and EU regimes have not been as orthodox as the Morales political cultural revolutionary regime. Morales has promoted trade union organizations and mostly avoided repression of miners and peasant movements, but at the same time has co-opted their leaders, thus lessening the number of strikes and independent class action, despite the continued inequalities in the society. De facto greater tolerance is matched by the increased corporatist relation between regime and the popular sectors of civil society. Morales economic strategy is based on a triple alliance between agro-mineral multi-nationals, small and medium size capitalists and the Indian and trade union movements. Morales has poured millions in subsidies to so-called cooperatives which are in reality private small and medium size mine owners who exploit wage labor at or below standard wages of miners in larger operations. The principle changes under the Morales regime are in its foreign policy and rhetoric. Morales has aligned with Venezuela in supporting Cuba, joining ALBA, developing ties with Iran, and above all, opposing US policy in several important areas. Bolivia opposes the US embargo against Cuba, the seven military bases in Columbia, the coup in Honduras and its lifting of tariff preferences. Equally important Bolivia has terminated the presence of the US DEA and curtailed some of the activities of AID for subsidizing right wing socio-political organizations and destabilization activity. Morales has spoken out forcefully against the US wars in Afghanistan, and Iraq, condemned Israels assaults against the Palestinians and has been a consistent
supporter of non-intervention, except in the case of Haiti, where Morales continues to dispatch troops. Critique of Bolivias Version of 21cs The most striking aspect of Bolivias economic policy is the increased size and scope of foreign owned multinational corporate (MNC) extractive capital investments. Close to a hundred MNC are currently exploiting Bolivias mineral and energy resources, under very lucrative conditions, including low wages, and weak environmental regulations. Moreover, in a speech in Madrid (September 2009) Morales told an audience of elite bankers and investors that they were welcome to invest as long as they didnt intervene in politics and agreed to joint ownership. Whatever the merits of Bolivias foreign capital driven mineral export strategies, (and the historical record is not encouraging), it puts a peculiar twist on 21cs: replacing proletarian and peasants with overseas CEOs and local technocrats: a novel way to practice socialism in any century but more fittingly associated with free market capitalism. In line with Morales open door policy toward extractive capital, he has strengthened and provided generous subsidies and low interest loans to the agrobusiness sector, even in those provinces like the media luna where big agro has backed extreme rightist politicians destabilizing his regime. Morales willingness to overlook the political hostility of the agrobusiness elite and to finance their expansion is a clear indication of the high priority which he gives to orthodox capitalist growth over and above any concern with developing an alternative development pole built around peasants and landless rural workers. On site visits to rural areas and urban slums, reinforce published reports about the unchanged nature of class
inequalities. The super rich 100 families of Santa Cruz continue to own over 80% of the fertile lands and over 80% of the peasants and rural Indians are below the poverty line. Mine ownership, retail and wholesale trade, banking and credit continues concentrated in an oligarchy which has in recent years diversified its portfolio across economic sectors, creating a more integrated ruling class with greater links with global capitalist actors. Morales has fulfilled his promise to protect and secure the traditional multi-sector economic elite, but he has also added and promoted new private and bureaucratic entrants, to the ruling class, mainly foreign CEOs and high paid functionaries directing public private partnership. While most socialists (of any century) would agree that big landowners are hardly the building blocks to a socialist transition, Morales has in fact depended upon and promoted agro-export production over family farming for local food production. Even worse the conditions of farm workers has barely improved; in extreme cases several thousand Indians were still exploited via slave labor, into and beyond the third year of Morales administration. The harsh exploitation of farm laborers is far lessar concern than the increase of productivity, exports, and state revenues to the regime. While labor legislation facilitating labor activity has been approved, it has not been enforced in the countryside especially in the media luna provinces, where labor inspectors avoid any confrontations with well entrenched landowner associations. The few land occupations by the landless rural workers have been denounced by the government. Any grass roots movements pressing for land reform in extensive under cultivated estates have been strongly opposed by the
government, violating its own norms that cultivated farms would not be expropriated.
only
Given the regimes emphasis on the cultural and political aspects of its version of 21cs it is not surprising that it has spent more time and funds celebrating Indian fiestas, song and dances, than it has in expropriating and distributing fertile lands to the malnourished mass of Indians. The regimes effort to deflect attention from agrarian reform, by settling landless Indians on public lands in distant tropics was a disaster. This colonization plan organized by the so-called agrarian reform institute, dumped highland Indians in disease ridden lands which were not cleared, without farm tools, seeds, fertilizers and even living quarters. Needless to say in less than two weeks the Indians demanded bus transportation back to their impoverished villages, an improvement over these remote malaria ridden ill planned settlements. To compensate for the lack of any comprehensive land redistribution program, Evo Morales occasionally organizes, with pomp, ceremony and much publicity, gifts of tractors to middle and small scale farmers, more a political patronage opportunity rather than an integral part of a social transformation. The two most striking aspects of Morales economic and political strategies is the emphasis on the traditional extractive mineral exports and the construction of a typical corporatist-patronage based electoral machine. Into the fifth year of his regime the joint ventures signed with foreign MNC have extracted and exported raw materials with a little of value added. To an astonishing degree there has been a minimal degree of industrialization and final product manufacture which
would generate greater industrial employment. The same story is true of agricultural exports most grains and other agricultural products are not processed in Bolivia, which would provide thousands of jobs for the poverty stricken mass of landless Indians. The regime has accumulated huge reserves, but has failed to finance or foment local industry to substitute for imports of capital, intermediate and durable consumer imports. Morales political strategy closely resembles that adopted by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) a half century ago, in which trade unions and especially peasant movements were incorporated to the dominant party state. In the absence of significant socio-economic changes, the government has relied on public patronage, channeled through trade union and peasant and Indian leaders, which trickles down in the form of local favors for party loyalists. Morales style clientelism is constantly reinforced by the symbolic gestures re-affirming the Indian ethnic identity and solidarity between the giver and recipient of political patronage. The 21cs of Morales political practice is far less innovative and socialist and far closer in political style to 20th century corporatist predecessors. Observers with little knowledge of Bolivias past, impressionistic journalists enamored with symbolic politics and financial writers who pin the socialist label indiscriminately on politicians who even rhetorically question the free market doctrine, have reinforced the radical or 21cs image of the Morales regime. Given what we have described about the real practices of the 21cs regimes it is useful to place them in a broader historical-comparative framework to make some sense of their possible impact on Latin American society.
Comparative-Historical Analyses of 3 Cases of 21 Century Socialism: Despite claims by regime publicists, the most striking aspect of 21cs regimes is what is not novel or special about their policies. Their adoption of a mixed economy and playing politics according to the institutional rules of a liberal capitalist state, differs little from the practices of European Social Democratic parties of the late 1940s to the mid 1970s. To the degree that the 21cs pursue nationalist politics (and we should note that nationalization means expropriatism and public ownership) they are a pale reflection of the measures taken between the 1930s mid 1970s. With the exception of the Chavez regime, the rest of what passes as 21cs has at best nationalized bankrupt private firms, increased shares in joint ventures and raised taxes on agro-mineral exporters. The indigenismo most forcefully expressed by two Andean regimes, Bolivia and Ecuador, resonated with the rhetoric of the indo-americanismo of the 1930s. This was forcefully pronounced by Peruvian Marxist writer Mariatagui and APRA political leader Haya de la Torre, as well as the Chilean Socialist Party, a number of Bolivian and Mexican writers, Augusto Sandino the Nicaraguan guerilla leader, and the revolutionary El Salvadorean leader Farabundo Marti. In striking contrast to the 21cs indigenistas, their predecessors in Central America, pursued profound agrarian reforms, including the restoration of millions of acres of confiscated fertile lands and a profound rejection of the agro-business export model. The earlier version of indigenismo combined symbolic identification with deep substantive changes in contrast to the contemporary indigenistas who rely mostly on symbolic gestures and identity politics.
The current policies relying on joint ventures resonates with the reformist alternatives to the Cuban revolution, which found expression in JF Kennedys Alliance for Progress, which was taken up by the Christian and Social Democratic counter-insurgency regimes of the 1960s. In opposition to the 20th century socialists and communists who favored the socialization of the economy, the Chilean Christian Democratic government (1964-70) promoted an alternative Chileanization, which resembles Evo Morales and Correas joint ventures. In other words the economic model of 21cs is far closer to the anti-socialist US backed reformist model of the 1960s than to any socialist variant of the past. 21cs and 20th Century Social Democracy While the scope and depth of socio-economic changes pursued by 21cs does not approximate the structural changes of 20cs regime, how does it measure up to the reformist or social democratic variant? Three cases of social democratic regimes based on electoral politics come to mind: the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (1952-4); the Goulart regime in Brazil (1962-64) and the Allende regime in Chile (1970-73). All 3 past social democratic regimes pursued agrarcan reforms of greater impact, with thousands of peasant beneficiaries, than the contemporary 21cs. More substantial real nationalizations of foreign firms took place than in two of the three contemporary 21cs social democratic regimes (Venezuela has expropriated a comparable number of firms). In terms of foreign policy pronouncements and practices the anti-imperialist political rhetoric is similar, but the earlier social democrats were more likely to expropriate foreign capital. For example Arbenz
expropriated land from United Fruit, Goulart nationalised ITT and Allende expropriated Anaconda copper. In contrast our 21cs have promoted and invited foreign agro-businesses and MNC mining corporations to exploit land and mineral resources. The different foreign economic policies correspond to the different internal class composition and economic alignments between 20th and 21st century social democracy. In contrast to conventional misconceptions, the 21cs have consummated pacts between regime technocrats, the multi-nationals, and domestic agro-mineral elites which weigh far heavier in decision making centers, than the mass electoral base of Indians and workers. In contrast the peasant and worker movements had greater representation and independence of action within and without the 20th century social democratic regimes.
21cs Defining a New Historical Configuration or a Cyclical Political Process? An examination of Latin Americans past 60 years of history reveals a consistent cyclical pattern of alternating left and right waves of political regimes. The underlying constant has been the struggle between, on the one hand US imperialist projections of power either through direction intervention, military dictatorships and client civillians regimes and on the other hand, popular democratic and socialist movements and regimes. The question of whether the latest wave of center-left regimes is simply the latest expression of this cyclical pattern or whether basic alterations in the underlying internal and external structural relations are operating to provide a more sustainable process? We will proceed to outline the past cyclical pattern of left/right politics in the past and
follow with a discussion of some key contemporary global and regional changes which might lead to greater sustainability for left political hegemony. Post WWII Latin American history has experienced roughly 5 cycles of left/right predominance. The immediate period after WW II, following the defeat of fascism, witnessed the world wide advance of democracy, anti-colonialism and socialist revolutions. Latin America was no exception. Center-left social democratic, nationalist populist, popular front governments took power in Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Brazil and Bolivia between 1945-52. Juan and Eva Peron nationalized the railroads, legislated one of the most advanced welfare programs and elaborated a regional third way foreign policy, independent of the US. A coalition of socialists, communists and radicals won the 1947 election in Chile on the promise of extensive labor and social reforms. In Costa Rica a political upheaval dismantled the national army. In Venezuela a social democratic party (Accion Democratica) promised to extend public control over petroleum resources and increase tax revenues. In Guatemala, newly elected President Arbenz expropriated uncultivated fields of the United Fruit Company, implemented far reaching labor legislation promoting the growth of unionization and ended debt peonage of Indians. In Bolivia a social revolution resulted in the nationalization of the tin mines, a profound agrarian reform, the destruction of the army and the formation of workers and peasant militia. In Brazil Getulio Vargas promoted state ownership, a mixed economy and national industrialization. The launching of the Truman doctrine in the late 1940s, the US invasion of Korea (1950), the aggressive pursuit of the Cold war entailed vigorous US
intervention against democratic left of center and nationalist regimes in Latin America. Given the green light in Washington, the Latin American oligarchies and US corporate interests backed a series of military coups and dictatorships throughout the 1950s. In Peru General Odria seized power; Perez Jimenez seized power in Venezuela; General Castillo Armas was put in power by the CIA in Guatemala; elected President Peron was overthrown by the Argentine military in 1955; Brazilian President Vargas was driven to suicide. The US succeeded in forcing the break-up of the popular front and the outlawing of the Communist Part in Chile. The US backed Batistas coup in Cuba, the Duvaeier and Trujillo dictatorships in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The rise of the extreme right, the overthrow of center-left regimes and the bloody repression of trade unions and peasant movements, secured US hegemony, assured conformity with US Cold war policies and opened the door wide for a corporate economic invasion. By the end of the 1950s the very extremities of US domination and exploitation, the brutal repression of all democratic social movements and left parties and the oligarchies pillage of the public treasury led to popular upheavals and the return of leftist hegemony. Between 1959 through 1976, leftist regimes ruled or challenged for power throughout the continent with varying degrees of success and duration. The social revolution in Cuba in 1959 and a political revolution in Venezuela in 1958, was followed by the election of nationalist populist regimes of Jango Goulart in Brazil (1962-64), Juan Bosch, (1963) reinstated for a brief moment in (1965), Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73), and Peron in Argentina (1973-75). Progressive nationalist populist military rulers took power in Peru
(Velasco), 1968, Rodriquez in Ecuador (1970), Ovando (1968) and J. J. Torrs (1970) in Bolivia, Torrijos in Panama. All challenged US hegemony to one degree or another. All were backed by mass popular movements, clamoring for radical socio-economic reforms. Some regimes nationalized strategic economic sectors and implemented far-reaching anti-capitalist measures. However, all but the Cuban revolution had a short life span. Even in the midst of the 1960s 70s left turn, the US and its military clients intervened vigorously to revert the prospect of progressive social changes. Brazils Goulart fell to a US backed military coup (1964); preceded by Juan Bosch (1963) and followed by the US military invasion against the restorationist revolution of 1965/66; a US backed military coup in Bolivia overthrew Torres in 1971; Chiles Allende was overthrown by a joint CIA military coup in 1973; followed by Perus Velasco(1974) and Argentinas Peron, 1976. The promising and deep going leftist wave was over for most of the duration of the 20th century. Between 1976 2000, with the notable exception of the victory of the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the right was in ascendancy. Its long rule secure through the worst continent wide repression in the history of Latin America. The military regimes and the subsequent authoritarian neo-liberal civilian electoral regimes dismantled all tariffs and capital controls in a wild plunge into the most extreme and damaging freemarket, imperial centered economic policies. Between 1976 2000 over five thousand public firms were privatized and most were taken over by foreign multinationals; over a trillion and a half dollars were transferred overseas via profits, royalties, interest payments, pillage of public treasuries, tax evasion and
money laundering. However, the golden era for US capital during the 1990s was a period of economic stagnation, social polarization and growing vulnerability to crises. The stage was set for the popular revolts of the early years of the new millennium and rise of the latest wave of center-left regimes in the region, which brings us back to the question of the sustainability of this new wave of leftist regimes. Some World Historical Structural Changes One of the key factors reversing past leftist waves in Latin America was the economic power and interventionary capacity of the US. There is strong evidence that US power has suffered a relative decline on both counts. The US is no longer a creditor country; it is no longer the leading trading partner with Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina and is losing ground in the rest of Latin America, except for Mexico. Washington has lost influence even in it patio, the Caribbean and Central America, where several countries have signed up for the Venezuelan subsidized petroleum agreement (Petrocaribe). Washington, as if to compensate for its lost of economic leverage, (highlighted by the rejection of its proposed Latin American Free Trade Agreement) has increased its military presence, by expanding 7 military bases in Columbia, backing a coup in Honduras against a social liberal president and increased the presence of the Fourth Fleet off Latin Americas coast. Despite the projection of military power, circumstances outside of Latin America have weakened US interventionary capacity, namely the prolonged costly unending wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the military confrontation with Iran. The already high levels of public exhaustion and opposition, makes it difficult for Washington to launch fourth war in Latin America.
Therefore, it relies on and finances local client military civilian power configurations to destabilize and overthrow center-left adversaries. The increase in global markets, especially in Asia, has allowed Latin regimes to diversify their markets and investment partners, which limits the role of US MNC and limits their possible political role as purveyors of State Department policies. The financialization of the US economy, has eroded the US industrial base and limited its demand for agro-mineral export products from Latin America, shifting the latters dependence on new emerging powers. Moreover having suffered the consequence of financial crises, Latin regimes have imposed some regulations on capital movements, which limits the operation of US investment bank speculators, prime movers in the US economy. While Washington talks free markets its application of protectionist measures (on overseas leading) and subsidies to agriculture (sugar, ethanol) have antagonized key Latin American countries like Brazil. As the leading exponent of failed free market neoliberal doctrine, the US has suffered a major loss of ideological influence in the region as a consequence of the global recession of 2007 2010. For these reasons, one of the major actors (US imperialism) which has been responsible for the cyclical rise and fall of leftist regimes, has been structurally weakened, improving the chances for longer duration. Yet, the US is still a major factor acting with potent resources based on its close ties with major rightist military and economic forces in the region. Secondly, by the very nature of the development strategies chosen by the center-left regimes they are very vulnerable to crises namely the agro-mineral export policies based on foreign and domestic economic elites and fluctuating world demand. Thirdly, the center-left
regimes have failed to resolve basic regional imbalances, to significantly lessen social inequalities and to recapture ownership and control of strategic economic sectors. These considerations call into question the middle term durability of contemporary center left regimes. There are few internal changes in the nature of the state apparatus and class structure which could prevent a reversion back to neo-liberal policies. The basic question of whether the current 21cs regimes are stepping stones toward further socialization or simply transitory regimes opening the way for a restoration of neo-liberal pro US regions, is still open to dispute, even as evidence is accumulating that the latter outcome is more likely than the former. Conclusion The question of whether 21cs is better or worse than 20th cs depends on what versions of each we choose to compare and what political dimensions we select in our comparative evaluation. First and foremost there is no single model of 20th century socialism, despite the facile equation of 20th century socialism with the Soviet variant. There were essentially four radically different types of 20th century socialist regimes, which in turn were internally varied.
1.
Revolutionary single party regimes, which includes Cuba, North Korea, China, Vietnam and the USSR. The first four combined socialist and national liberation struggles and were consummated independently of the USSR and exhibited at different times greater and lesser degree of openness to debate and individual freedoms. The four all fought US invasions and were all subject to embargos and under intense destabilization
campaigns measures.
2.
requiring
high
level
of
security
Electoral revolutionary socialist regimes include Chile (1970 73), Grenada (1981 33), Guyana (1950s), Bolivia (1970 71) and Nicaragua (1979 89). Multi-party competition and the four freedoms were encouraged even at the expense of national security. All were subject to successful US backed military intervention, military coups and economic embargoes. Self-managed socialism was put in practice in Yugoslavia factories from the late 1940s to the mid 1980s and was briefly experimented in Algeria between 1963-64. US and European promoted separatist movements dissolved the Yugoslavia state and a military coup ended the Algerian experiment. Social democracy based on large scale, long term social welfare program linked to state management of macro-economic policy was implemented in the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden.
3.
4.
The stereotype of the Soviet model of externally imposed authoritarian socialism was applicable only to Eastern Europe; even that was subject to changes and democratic moments such as 1968 in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 1980s. Likewise there are significant variations among 21cs socialists. Venezuela has nationalized major foreign and nationally owned enterprises (oil, steel, cement, banking, telecoms) expropriated large tracts of farmland and settled over 100,000 families, financed universal public health and educational programs and encouraged
community councils and worker self-management in a few instances. Bolivia has expropriated few if any major firms. Instead Morales has promoted and signed public-private joint ventures, opened the door to dozens of foreign mining consortiums, supported political reform enhancing and extending civil rights to Indians and increased social expenditures for housing, infrastructure and poverty alleviation. No agrarian reform has taken place and none is foreseen. The third and most conservative variant of 21cs is found in Ecuador, where major concessions to mining and petroleum companies is accompanied by the privatization of telecom concessions and subsidies to regional business elites. Rather than land reform, Correa has transferred Indian lands to mining companies for exploitation. Major claims to socialism are found in increased levels of social expenditures, the revoking of US use of a military base in Manta and a general criticism of US military and free trade policies. Correa retained the dollarized economy, limiting any expansionary fiscal policies. By drawing on commonly agreed criteria for evaluating the socialist nature of both 20th and 21st century socialism we can form an informed judgment on their performance in achieving greater economic independence, social justice and political freedom. Public Ownership All variants of 20th century socialism except the Scandinavian model achieved greater public control over the commanding heights of the economy than their 21st century counterparts. Venezuela is the closest approximation of the 20th century experience. The comparative performance of the public, publicprivate and private models varies: in terms of growth
and productivity, the public enterprises in the 20th century have a mixed record, of high growth tailing off to stagnation; the mixed enterprises are subject to the vagaries of the market and world demand, alternating between high growth in times of boom and depressed output in times of low commodity prices. In terms of social relations, the social benefits and work conditions in the public sector socialism are generally more generous than in mixed and privately owned industries, though wage remuneration may be higher in the latter. Agrarian Reform The 20cs were far more successful in redistributing land and breaking the power of the landlord class than any measures applied by the 21cs. The redistributive reforms of the 20cs contrast with the agro-export strategies by most contemporary 21cs who have actually promoted greater concentration of landownership and inequality between agro-business elites and peasants and rural landless workers. The agrarian reforms, however, were poorly managed, especially in the case of Cuba and China and led to a second transformation, redistributing state farms to family farmers and cooperatives. On the whole 20th century socialists were much more successful in reducing inequalities of income (but not eliminating them) than their contemporary counterparts. Because 21st century capitalists, especially big mine owners, agro-business capitalists and bankers, still control the commanding heights of the economies, the historic inequalities between the top five percent and the bottom sixty percent remain unchanged.
In terms of social welfare, 21st century socialist have increased social spending, raised the minimum wage but with the notable exception of Venezuela, do not match the universal free public health and educational programs financed by the 20th century socialism. While there were regional imbalances between the countryside and the city under 20th century socialism; free medical care, social security and basic health care was available to the rural poor under 20cs and is still lacking in most 21cs regimes. In terms of anti-imperialist struggles the record of 20th century is far superior to that of the 21cs. For example, Cuba sent troops and military aid to Southern Africa (especially Angola) to repulse an invasion by the racist South African regime. China sent troops in solidarity with Korea and secured the north half region from the US invading army. The USSR provided essential arms and air defense missiles in support of the Vietnamese national liberation struggle and provided Cuba with almost a half decade of economic subsidies and military aid allowing it to survive the US embargo. Todays 21cs with the partial exception of Venezuela have provided no material support for ongoing liberation struggles. On the contrary, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina continue to provide military forces in support of the US sponsored occupation of Haiti. At best the 21cs condemn the US backed coup in Honduras (2009), Venezuela (2002) and military bases in Ecuador and Columbia and reject a US centered free trade agreement. The one area in which the 21cs have an apparent advantage is in the promotion of greater individual freedoms and electoral processes. There is greater tolerance of public debate, competitive elections and
political parties than was allowed in some variants of 21cs. None the less economic democracy, or workers power was far more advanced in 20th century Chilean socialism and Yugoslavian self-management than is the case of 21cs parliamentary elections. Moreover, in the past there was greater concern for workers opinions in making policy even in the authoritarian systems than takes place in the current agro-mineral 21cs states. The greater openness of 21cs is related to the fact that they face less high intensity military threats. In part this is because they have not altered the basically capitalist nature of their economics. In comparison with 20cs, the 21cs are generally more conservative, work closer with MNC are less consistently anti-imperialist and are based on multiclass coalitions that span the class hierarchy, linking the impoverished poor sectors of the middle class to the very powerful agro-mineral elites. Though 21cs may occasionally make reference to class analysis, in times of crises their operative concepts obscure class divisions through the use vague non-specific populist categories. Perhaps the radical image of the 21cs results from their contrast with the previous extremist rightwing regimes which ruled during the previous quarter century. The socialist label pinned on contemporary regime by Washington and the western media represents a nostalgia for a past of unfettered political submission, unregulated economic pillage, and robust repression of popular movements rather than an empirical analysis of their socio-economic policies. Even as the 21cs are less radical and perhaps distant from commonly accepted definitions of socialist politics, they still have drawn the line in opposition to US
militarism and interventionism, have put a cap on control over natural resources and provide greater tolerance for the organization of social movements.
Latin America Rising Class Struggle Forces Socialism onto the Agenda By Roberto Antezana, Revolutionary Socialist Alternative (CWI-Bolivia) How many times have we been told that socialism is dead and that free market capitalism is the only road toward human development and prosperity? Well, free market capitalism (neo-liberalism) has dominated for more than 20 years and the results are clear: crushing poverty, mind-blowing inequality, endless wars, and environmental catastrophe. This concrete reality speaks louder than all the corporate-controlled politicians and media outlets combined and, as a result, resistance and the search for an alternative have been building for years. Latin America is the undisputed leader of the antineo-liberal resistance movements and proof that, far from being dead, a new socialist movement is just being born. After a 20-year bonanza of neo-liberal privatizations, Latin America is the most unequal region in the world: home to both 215 million poor people and Mexican telecommunications magnate Carlos Slim, who just surpassed Bill Gates as the worlds richest man. But in recent years, instead of accepting the neoliberal disaster, Latin Americans began organizing and fighting against it. At the forefront of this process has been Venezuela, where Hugo Chvez came to power in
1998 with his anti-neo-liberal, anti-U.S. imperialist populist program. Bolivia has also been a trailblazer, where in 2000 the people of Cochabamba, Bolivia kicked out the multinational corporations and retook control of their water. Left-wing Governments Elected Recently, Ecuador and Nicaragua elected nominally left-wing presidents Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega (Sandinista leader) based on promises to reverse neo-liberal policies and enact pro-poor reforms. In Brazil, President Lula of the Workers Party (who was originally elected because of his anti-neo-liberal rhetoric and history as a union leader) is facing increasing resistance from the working class and peasantry to his pro-capitalist, anti-working-class policies. The newly-formed Party for Socialism and Liberation (P-SOL) recently got an excellent 7 million votes in its first national election with its strong antineo-liberal, pro-socialist platform. In Chile, the new neo-liberal president Michelle Bachelet (ironically of the Socialist Party) faced a massive student strike last year involving over 700,000 young people demanding a more equitable education system. Over the past few weeks, there has been an outbreak of huge workers demonstrations for higher wages that have been violently repressed by the government. In Mexico, the conservative candidate Felipe Caldern stole the presidency from insurgent candidate Obrador, and the country remains polarized because of the accusations of massive electoral fraud. Mass protests have plagued the new Mexican government from the start. Reforms by Left Governments As the struggle against neo-liberalism and imperialism has been expanding to more countries, it has been deepening in Venezuela and Bolivia, where it
is increasingly clear that the problems of poverty and inequality require the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist society. After easily winning re-election in December 2006, Hugo Chvez declared we are heading towards a Socialist Republic of Venezuela and announced the partial nationalization of important sections of the telecommunication and electricity industry, while also increasing state control of valuable oil projects. In Bolivia, Evo Morales Movement towards Socialism (MAS) government is carrying out an aggressive program of partial nationalizations and agrarian reform. Recently, it has expanded the partial nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, buying 100% control of two refineries, while announcing the nationalization of the telecommunications and railroad industries. In August, Morales announced the expropriation of 600,000 hectares (almost 1.5 million acres) of unused land from large landowners to be distributed to indigenous communities. By carrying out radical pro-poor reforms, Chvez and Morales have maintained their popularity with the poor majority. Money that would have gone to multinational corporations and the domestic elite is instead being poured into social programs. Chvez opened public universities that are affordable to the poor, built hospitals and organized doctor exchange programs with Cuba so that poor people can get medical care, and created state-run supermarkets that guarantee low food prices. In Bolivia, the governments oil income has increased from $300 million in 2005 to $1.6 billion in 2007, money that has been spent on social programs and to rebuild the countrys deteriorating infrastructure. Venezuela and Bolivia are a huge inspiration to workers and peasants throughout Latin America. But as
these movements develop, it is clear that pro-poor reforms are not enough. 25% of the Venezuelan population still lives on less than $1 per day and the richest 10% of the population receives 50% of the national income. In Bolivia, 60% of the population is still poor, 33% extremely poor, and 60% of Bolivian homes cant satisfy basic nutritional requirements. In both countries, the economy is still controlled mainly by the capitalist opposition, which uses this control to attack the social movements and government. While capitalism still exists, the ruling class will use their position of power to destabilize these reforms, if necessary by economic or military sabotage. In Venezuela, opposition forces tried a coup attempt in 2002, an employers lockout in 2003, and a recall referendum in 2004. Each attempt failed because the Venezuelan masses rose up to defend Chvez. In Bolivia, a powerful autonomy movement led by the right-wing opposition in the resource-rich, more industrialized eastern states threatens to drag the country into civil war. Inflation threatens many of Morales pro-worker and peasant reforms, with the price of bread, beef, chicken, and dairy products skyrocketing. To eradicate poverty and inequality and defeat the right-wing opposition, the working class and poor in Bolivia and Venezuela need to develop their own independent organizations that fight to end capitalism and landlordism and place the economy under the democratic control of the working class and the poor peasants. A socialist revolution in Bolivia and Venezuela will inspire the millions of Latin Americans who are already in struggle and lay the foundation for a socialist revolution to eradicate poverty and inequality in Latin America as a whole.
Latin Americas New Left Governments

Claudio Katz This is a slightly edited version of an article by one of Argentinas best known Marxist economists circulated internationally in Spanish earlier this year. Its original title was The centre left, nationalism and socialism.1 It was written before the most recent upheavals in Ecuador and Bolivia. This translation is by Mike Gonzalez. Footnotes have been added where we thought it helpful; endnotes are Katzs own. The new governments of Latin America share a critique of neo-liberalism, rampant privatisation, an excessive openness of economies to global capital and of social inequality. They propose to erect more productive and autonomous capitalist forms under greater regulation by the state. But will they form a common bloc and will they offer the people access to power? The failures of neo-liberalism
Lula came to power in Brazil and Kirchner in Argentina because neo-liberal policies could not reverse the decline in Latin Americas role in the world market, a decline shown by the stagnation of investment and per capita GDP, and which contrasted notably with what was happening in China and South East Asia. Cycles of growth continued to depend on the flows of foreign capital and the price of exports - that is why capitalist profits lacked stability in the 1990s. A falling wage bill did not compensate for the shrinking internal market, and a decline in purchasing power affected capital accumulation. The opening of their economies emphasised the disadvantages of Latin American businesses vis vis their competitors. Many capitalists profited from the growing public debt, but the failure to control it hampered the ability of governments to intervene with tax policies to protect them from the periods of recession. Neo-liberalism did not reduce social struggle, and the ruling classes were not able to achieve the kinds of victories they had won in previous decades; on the contrary, they have had to face risings which have brought down several presidents in the Andean region and the southern cone. Direct action on the land (Peru), an indigenous rising (Ecuador), pressure from the street (Argentina), an insurrectionary climate (Bolivia), land occupations (Brazil), anti-imperialist protests (Chile), a new political movement (Uruguay) and the resistance to military coups (Venezuela) have inspired a new cycle of resistance throughout the region. The ruling classes have lost the confidence they displayed in the 1990s and many of their principal representatives have withdrawn from the scene (Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, Salinas in Mexico, Prez in Venezuela, Lozada in Bolivia). A
decade of embezzlement of public funds confirmed the corruption of all regimes that mediate with big capital. Characteristic Behavior With Lula and Kirchner the political framework that the ruling classes have controlled for decades has begun to change. The businessmen and bankers who profited from deregulation have now jumped on the interventionist bandwagon. The sectors worst affected by the disasters of the 1990s are especially keen to enjoy the benefits of state subsidies and to put limits on the interventions of foreign competition. The dominant alliance of financiers, industrialists and agro-export companies which controls the system of power is not the same as the classical national bourgeoisie of the 1960s. They have strengthened their integration into the international financial circuits (as receivers of credit and debtors to the state), they have consolidated their role in exports at the expense of the internal markets, and they have major investments abroad. Yet this increasing transnationalisation has not destroyed their local roots. By maintaining their principal activities within the region, the ruling classes of Latin America remain a distinct sector in competition with the corporations based outside the region. They are the principal support of the new governments and are behind their increasingly conservative direction. Lula and Kirchner avoid populist rhetoric and avoid any conflict with the US State Department because they share interests with the regions major capitalists. This caution explains why they are prepared to negotiate with the World Trade Organisation and the various light versions of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and why they have avoided building any real customs union. They implement fiscal reforms, accept funds from the IMF and refuse to consider any joint organisation of debtor nations.
The new presidents have refused to participate in the imperialist occupation of Iraq - but then very few world leaders have supported Bush in his crusade. But they have sent troops to Haiti, allowing the Pentagon to free some of its troops based in the Caribbean for the war in the Arab world. Lula, Kirchner and Tabar have colluded with the formation of a puppet government which has legitimised the coup against Aristide, regulated drug trafficking and restricted the high levels of emigration to Miami. The fact that Latin American military personnel are wearing UN insignia does not change the fact that they are serving US interests. The role of the centre left governments has been to soften the resistance movements in the region. That was the role of Lula and Kirchners envoys during the Bolivian debacle of 2003, for example, when they intervened in the middle of a popular rising to support the establishment of a government that would continue the policies of its predecessor and guarantee the privatisation of oil. Other presidents with progressive credentials have played the same role without need of outside intervention. Gutierrez in Ecuador, for example, promised national independence and instead governed through repression and continued to privatise. Brazil and Argentina The new presidents emerged in different conditions. Lula assumed the presidency in the final phase of an economic crisis which accentuated Brazils urban inequality and rural poverty. Kirchner came to power at the end of the deepest depression in Argentinas history, which had brought the collapse of the banking system, the confiscation of bank deposits and unprecedented levels of poverty, hunger and unemployment. Lula has won plaudits from Wall Street for maintaining his predecessor Fernando Henrique
Cardosos neo-liberal model. His arguments are the same (we must win the confidence of the market in order to attract investment) and serve only to strengthen the role of the financiers who run the Central Bank. He has also protected the profits of the banks with a budget surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP and the highest interest rate of recent decades. These methods ensure that creditors will continue to receive repayments that amount to double the level of public spending. Kirchner avoided this kind of continuity because he was obliged to rebuild the ill-fated circuit of accumulation and so adopted more heterodox policies to restore capitalist profits. He took advantage of an upturn in the economic cycle to combine tax changes with a range of subsidies and re-established the balance between the groups who gained during the period when the Argentinian peso was convertible into one US dollar (bankers and privatisers) and those who lost out (exporters and industrialists). Both governments defend profits against the interests of workers. The Brazilian president has already imposed a regressive pension reform, frozen agrarian reform and reinforced the fall in the value of wages. His party holds back trade union struggles and has succeeded in holding down the level of popular resistance. Kirchner, on the other hand, is facing a more complex social situation because he came to power amid a popular rising. He has tried to defuse protest through co-optation (giving government jobs to activists), by wearing down the most combative sectors through constant media attacks, and by criminalising many of them - there are dozens of prisoners and thousands facing trial. And he has succeeded in diluting the impact of the picket lines and the cacerolazos,^a^ although mass mobilisations continue to be the backdrop of Argentinian political life. His administration
is conservative, but he is much more careful than his Brazilian colleague to hide his links with the neo-liberal past. While Lulas rise to power occurred without major institutional fractures, Kirchner reached the presidency unexpectedly after a turbulent sequence of temporary governments. What in Brazil was a calm transfer of power, in Argentina was a delicate operation to restore the credibility of the state in the face of mass rejection of the political system (expressed in the slogan que se vayan todos - get rid of the lot of them). Lula marks the final phase of the transformation of the PT^b^ into a classic bourgeois party, breaking with its left wing past and becoming integrated into a bipartisan system. Its patronage finances an army of bureaucrats who upheld the expulsion of those members of parliament opposed to the pension reforms. This transformation of a popular movement into an appendage of capitalist domination was what happened with Peronism^c^ a long time ago. Kirchner was able to renew yet again the party that has guaranteed governability for the ruling class. But he has shown an uncharacteristic duplicity, veiling clientilism with gestures in defence of human rights, the independence of the judiciary and an attack on corruption. Uruguay and Bolivia The case of Uruguay is similar to Argentinas in terms of the degree of economic breakdown, but closer to Brazil with respect to a lower level of social struggle and the greater stability of the political system. Although the GDP and investment levels fell dramatically, the crisis never took on Argentinian dimensions in Uruguay. The Frente Amplio (Broad Front)^d^ managed to maintain institutional continuity and to avoid political breakdown or a vacuum. Now its
ministers are rushing to implement Lulas orthodox economic orientation. They have promised to pay the debt, introduced a regressive tax system, and they continue to offer a bankers paradise and sustain the enormous budget surplus that is required to avoid defaulting on debt. This development can be explained in part by a weakening of resistance through unemployment, emigration and the ageing of the population. But the historical traditions of a country which has never experienced popular uprisings or significant breaks in institutional structures also have an influence. The Frente Amplios official line is that a small country cannot act alone, as if progressive policies were the exclusive province of big countries. But this discourse justifies inaction and will conflict with the expectations awoken by the coalitions electoral victory. The social base, the cultural hegemony and the mass organisations of the Frente sit uneasily with the spurious political realism of its leadership. In Bolivia the centre left (Evo Morales^e^) is not in government but has supported the unstable presidency of Mesa^f^ and is working to replace him in 2007. But this timeline does not square with the breakdown in the regions or the uneasy administration of a ruling class that has neither resources, political tools nor mediating institutions to help it deal with the crisis. The displacement of the nations productive axis from the mines of the east to the oil fields of the west has only served to deepen the economic crisis. If the closure of the mines raised the level of unemployment, the attempt to stop coca cultivation sowed devastation among the peasantry. This impoverishment accentuated the tendency to disintegration of the country, which the business sector of Santa Cruz was happy to intensify in order to appropriate petroleum income. Its ambitions clashed with the popular demand
that brought down the Lozada government in 2003 the nationalisation of natural gas so that it could be used for industrialisation. In Bolivia there is a vibrant tradition of popular uprisings. That is why Mesa used a fraudulent plebiscite to mask the continuing privatisation of the energy industry behind promises of nationalisation. The support of Evo Morales allowed him to suggest he was moving towards state ownership when in fact he was planning to continue with private contracts for many decades yet. If they are to govern like Lula the centre left will have to deactivate popular resistance and win the confidence of the ruling class at the same time. The moderate policies and acceptable candidates coming from the MAS suggest that this is their objective. But the territorial integrity of Bolivia is also threatened by a tendency to balkanisation which coexists with the always latent possibility of a new popular insurrection. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that the demobilising formula applied elsewhere in the southern cone can function in Bolivia. Venezuela: the Bolivarian process Does Chvez belong to this centre left current? The international press regularly distinguishes his populism from the other modernising governments; and there are indeed significant differences between Lula and Kirchner and Chvez. Chvez did not maintain the institutional structures as Lula did, nor did he oversee the rebuilding of the traditional parties like Kirchner. He emerged from a popular rising (the Caracazo of 1989) and a military rebellion (in 1992) which led to a major electoral victory in 1998. He began by making social concessions and introducing a very progressive constitution. His government has radicalised alongside the mass
movement and in response to the conspiracies of the right. This dynamic distinguishes him from the other centre left governments because he acted against the bosses (in December 2001), the attempted coup (April 2002), the oil establishment (December 2002) and the challenge of the referendum of August 2004. And there are many other features that distinguish the Venezuelan process. Chvez displaced the traditional parties of the ruling class which lost their control of the state. His base is the mass movement and there is no sector of the capitalist class who see him as a potential ally. He does not just promise reforms but has initiated genuine land redistribution programmes, extended credit to cooperatives and provided health and education for the whole population. Chvez stands, therefore, in the nationalist tradition of Crdenas in Mexico, Peron, Torrijos of Panama and Velasco Alvarado in Peru. And this makes him an exception among the centre left responses to imperialism. The explanation probably lies in the peculiarities of a Venezuelan army which had little contact with the Pentagon but was influenced by the guerrilla tradition, and in the weight of the oil-producing sector with its powerful bureaucracy, its conflicts with its customers in the US and the limited role of private enterprise. But Chvezs anti-imperialism places him at the opposite end of the spectrum from any dictatorship - Chvez has much in common with Peron, but nothing at all with Videla.^g^ He shares with the Peron of the 1950s, for example, his social programmes and the redirection of national income towards welfare services. He enjoys the same kind of social support, though if Perons base was the organised working class. Chvezs support comes from the local organisations of casual workers. Chvez is different from his South American colleagues, too, in his confrontation with the right. He
has scored some victories, but as long as their privileges are under threat, they will not cease to conspire to remove Chvez or to force him into a conservative turn (of the kind taken by the PRI^h^ in Mexico). The US pulls the strings of any coup attempt or terrorist provocation from Colombia, but Washington has no Pinochet to turn to and has to rely on its friends in the Organisation of American States to undermine Chvez. Bush cannot act in too barefaced a way while he is stuck in the Middle East quagmire. He does not dare to compare Chvez to Saddam - and Chvez cannot be tamed like Gaddafi. The US needs Venezuelan oil and it needs to combat Venezuelas active involvement in OPEC and its attempts to redirect crude oil to new clients in China and Latin America. Chvez supplies oil to Cuba and maintains diplomatic relations with Havana, defying the embargo, which further aggravates the tensions with imperialism. Venezuela sent no troops to Haiti nor will it bend to Washingtons demands on trade; and the presence of Cuban doctors and teachers has made Venezuelans very sensitive to the issue. Chvezs understanding of Bolivarianism is sympathetic to socialism. The country is divided into two camps by income, culture and skin colour. The oligarchys reaction to the presence of the marginalised in the political process is to manipulate the middle classes, and there are almost daily confrontations. Chvez, on the other hand, has shown great skill in mobilising his supporters against the manipulations of the right wing media. There is much in common between the Venezuelan situation and Nicaragua in the 1980s or Portugal after the revolution of 1974. Its oil income has allowed Venezuela to raise its public spending from 24 percent of GDP in 1999 to 34 percent in 2004 and to address the external debt
without major difficulties. These special circumstances explain the vitality of the Bolivarian revolution compared with other regional centre left governments, but they also raise questions as to how far its experience can be generalised. A regional bloc? Chvezs proposals for regional integration met a lukewarm reception from his centre left colleagues, none of whom expressed any readiness to replace the Free Trade Areas of the Americas with Chvezs proposed ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas). They echoed his rhetoric, but showed little will to build anti-imperialist regional organisations. Chvez has proposed three: Petrosur, bringing the oil companies into a single entity; Bansur, a regional bank bringing together national reserves; and a common market (from Mercosur^j^ to Comersur). In some senses, these associations would embrace businesses that already link a number of capitalist enterprises. On the other hand, these agreements will not produce the autonomous integration Chvez is hoping for. That would require social transformations that no centre left government is willing to carry through. For Petrosur to control the regions oil production, for example, would require the renationalisation of oil in Argentina and Bolivia - it would make no sense to link this organism with foreign private oil companies. In any event both Kirchner and Mesa have forged strategic alliances with Repsol to maintain privatisation. The creation of Enarsa (the Argentinian state energy company), with neither resources nor wells of its own, can contribute nothing to integration, any more than the fact that Brazils Petrobras has bought the shares of an Argentinian corporation (Perez Companc) or that the Venezuela National Oil Corporation has united with Enarsa in
acquiring service stations. None of these moves challenges the exploitative character of oil production in the region. Petrosur could expose the profits of some providers but it will not be able to guarantee the energy provision that would make it possible for new industries to develop in the interests of the majority. The reserves for a regional bank do exist, but are controlled by the IMF. For Bansur to come into being would require first the creation of a debtors club capable of resisting the IMFs interventions and putting an end to the haemorrhage of funds from the area - and no government in the region is proposing any such thing. Any attempt to achieve major agreements on trade face the counterpressure of bilateral agreements encouraged by the US which are favoured by Latin Americas ruling classes, who trade more with the metropolis than with their neighbours. Mercosurs difficulties reflect this tension: its customs agreements, for example, contain 800 exceptions. And while 50 percent of European Union exports are between member countries, in Mercosur that figure is only 11 percent. Brazil certainly does not perform an economic role like Germany, nor is Argentina Frances political equivalent. Integration is vital to counter the tendencies to fragmentation already visible in Bolivia and Ecuador, for example. But the regions capitalists have other priorities; it is not true that the national bourgeoisies that have survived neo-liberalism are drawn towards the formation of a common bloc.2 On the contrary, transnationalisation has reduced their interest in integration - hence their hostility to Chvez. The presidential summits issue rhetorical calls to forge a South American Community, but do little practical about it.
Transnational firms, on the other hand, have prospered and they are actively behind moves to ease capital movements in order to cheapen labour, rationalise subsidies and maximise the gains from tariff reductions. But this kind of integration is of no benefit to the people. So Chvezs attempt to spread the Bolivarian spirit has come up against a structural obstacle. No official argument or mass mobilisation has been able to leap this hurdle. While capitalists retain their power the dream of Bolivar and San Martin cannot be fulfilled. Governments in conflict? Some analysts have argued that the process of integration will advance through the integration of nationalism and the centre left, on the assumption that Lula and Kirchner will later move to the left.3 And this opens the second area of debate - can the governments of the centre left bring the people closer to power? It is a common view that both governments are in conflict - but the clashes with business interests which are normal in any capitalist government are not to be confused with the involvement of popular forces in these conflicts. And they certainly play no role in the clashes between bankers and industrialists that have divided Lulas team nor with the arguments over subsidies that have split Kirchners cabinet. These clashes arise from capitalisms competitive nature itself. And it is particularly revealing in the case of Lula, who has opted to follow in the footsteps of Blair and Felipe Gonzalez (the former Socialist Party prime minister of Spain) in the absence of any pressure from the right. His working class origins have not held him back from this orientation, and his continuation of previous policies cannot be attributed to what he has inherited nor to the fact that he is leading a government of transition. Some people argue that it is
a tactical move on Lulas part because he has not yet conquered power. That would be credible if he showed any signs of opposing the ruling class; control of the state could be a step towards effective control of the economy if he had any intention of transforming the status quo. But today Lula is a close ally of the same capitalist groups that are behind Kirchner. Unreal options Obviously Lula is not Cardoso and Kirchner is not Menem - but that only tells us that each new government adapts to the changing needs of the capitalist class. Both governments have strengthened the mechanism of state control - but for whose benefit? The neo-liberals used the state to carry through privatisations and rescue bankrupt banks. Lulas interventions serve to block wage rises, guarantee high interest rates and channel the benefits of economic revival into the pockets of the agro-exporters. This does not contradict the notion of an independent foreign policy, because every Brazilian government has tried to diversify its trade and China today is in the sights of every entrepreneur. But he introduced the Fame Zero (Zero Hunger) policy at least, some will say, to eliminate hunger; yet the programme never had adequate resources and never got off the ground. Despite the agrarian reform, landowners are still threatening those who occupy land, and while 27,000 oligarchs still control over half of Brazils land, the promised agricultural settlements are advancing at a snails pace. Even the modest economic recovery of recent times cannot be ascribed to Lula, since every country in the region is experiencing something similar, the result of foreign investments. The resurgence of the Argentinian economy is often attributed to Kirchner - some even say there are signs of a redistribution of income, though there is no
evidence for this. If deepening poverty has been halted in this new cycle, it is worth recalling that the same thing happened in the early 1990s. What is really significant about the recent period is how little unemployment and social exclusion figures have fallen, given the tax surpluses that the government has found to pay off the debt. Lulas supporters are still hoping that he will go back to his roots, and Lula is happy to encourage people to think that way. Kirchners defenders say much the same thing, but the more secure he is the more he will impose the bosses model, just as he did during his governorship of Santa Cruz province. And the vigorous advocacy of Mercosur by both presidents is not the sign of change their supporters might have hoped for; in fact they are solely concerned with defending capitalist interests in both countries and protecting the private interests that might be harmed by closer cooperation between Brazil and Argentina. They have no plans to transform Mercosur into a project for integration from below and resisting imperialism. Contradictions on the right Some still argue that a defeat for Lula would let in the right - but the reality is that, unlike Venezuela, there is no sign that the right in Brazil have any desire to destabilise Lula. Others affirm that compromise with the IMF and the right is the only way of ensuring reform - but since Lula has adopted the programme of his opponents, those reforms are no longer on the agenda. Lula has changed sides, and the working class now needs to develop its own alternative. The spectre of the right is also used in Argentina, even though the capitalist class has much to be grateful to Kirchner for. Some writers have argued the need to form a common front with the government against the right,
using Maos distinction between primary and secondary contradictions as a rationale. But the issue here is not one of socialist strategy. Kirchner is not leading a national bourgeoisie in a conflict with imperialism nor is he involved in a conflict which could lead to an insoluble crisis for capitalism. And even if that were so, it would be wrong to abandon popular demands; pacts with the class enemy can only lead to a disarming of the oppressed and the kind of internal divisions that will destroy the revolutionary project. Addressing only the secondary contradictions simply serves to break the link between minimum and maximum demands and frustrate the development of social struggles. There are those who argue that the PT has not lost its identity under Lula. But a party that serves the interests of the bankers, while it may preserve an electoral base, can no longer claim to represent the working class. Lula made compromises with neoliberalism, promoted regressive labour legislation and buried any mention of socialism in the PTs manifestos to ease its alliances with the right. Power has undermined the PTs origins in struggle, just as it did with Peron in Argentina many years earlier. The lesser evil argument leads to a series of subsequent capitulations. Lulas open collusion with the right is more obvious than Kirchners development; yet he too has set out to demobilise the mass movement and ensure the dominance of capital. But however these governments are characterised, there can be no justification for militants or activists to participate in either of them;5 to be part of the government is to collude directly in the application of policies directed against the mass movement. There is no possibility of representing the people inside a cabinet dominated by the interests of capital, as the history of 20th century social democracy has clearly shown. Progressive ministers end up masking the
realities - that is why Lula and Kirchner have appointed well-known figures to the ministries of justice, culture and human rights, leaving political and economic questions in the hands of the establishment. Comparative Justifications Some Brazilian intellectuals have argued that the lack of the level of struggle that could place socialism on the agenda explains Lulas move to the right. In Argentina the suggestion is that Kirchner is a moderate because the movement did not exist in the first place. In both cases, commentators hypnotised by power have expressed no anger at the sufferings of the people. Instead there is talk of an unfavourable balance of forces - yet there is no mention of the fact that both governments have actively demobilised the movement, reinforcing the trade union bureaucracy through the CUT in Brazil and the Peronists in Argentina. Any reduction in the levels of struggle, therefore, is not an objective fact but the result of government policies. Any discussion of a balance of forces assumes that both presidents have remained within the camp of the oppressed, whereas in fact both have placed themselves firmly alongside business in opposing social reforms. In these circumstances there can be no defence of Lula or Kirchner. Some argue that this is not the moment to discuss alternatives - when will the moment then be right? We need not await any further signs than the turn that the PT has taken. The danger now is not a premature break, but the effect of growing popular disillusionment. The fatalists in Argentina affirm, What do you expect? - Kirchner is a capitalist. In that case, there is only one conclusion: we should resist government assaults, expose its manoeuvres and build a left alternative. Neither is Uruguays Frente Amplio a
model to imitate: it has just entered government and is already following Lulas path, and the argument that it was an organisation built from below is contradicted by its many years of adaptation to the institutions of capitalism. Venezuelas Dilemma In Venezuela, by contrast, there does exist a government in conflict; the major struggles in which Chvez is involved bring face to face capitalist interests and those of the masses. Any attempts by business groups to curry favour with Chvez fall foul of this constant confrontation, which in its turn has created a radical anti-imperialist dynamic. Venezuela has the same levels of inequality and underdevelopment as the rest of the continent: 80 percent of the population lives in poverty and three quarters of the population work in the informal sector of the economy. Any resolution of these problems must begin by going beyond the limits which frustrated all previous attempts at independent national development. Social welfare policies, the distribution of unproductive land and credits to co-operatives can initiate a gradual redistribution of wealth. But it will take massive state investment to reverse the structural unemployment and deepening inequality of recent years. This demands a programme of industrial planning that will eradicate the privileges of the big capitalists and their allies in the bureaucracy. The people who pilfered the national oil wealth will not now become agents of development. The sacking of the management of the state oil company was a major step forward; the increased level of royalties and the reduction of dependence on the US market (50 percent of exports and eight refineries on US territory) increase the level of economic independence. But there is still manipulation,
exploration rights given without permission, and suspect investments to be dealt with. All Chavez's ambitious social reforms require a radicalisation of the process, while Kirchner, Lula (and the new Spanish prime minister Zapatero) are all working to encourage him to build bridges with the oppositionechoing the position of the Organisaton of American States, Jimmy Carter and Human Rights Watch. Yet the main block on this process lies within the Chavez government itself, dominated as it is by an inept and opportunist bureaucracy which will happily change sides should the wind change direction. One section of Chavez's supporters (the Comando Ayacucho) brought that moment nearer by validating the collection of fraudulent signatures for the referendum. All this tells us that victories that are frozen get diluted, that a blocked Bolivarian revolution could easily follow the road of Mexico's PRI and become an instrument of the ruling class. The Cuban Revolution followed the opposite pathand while Chavez has often expressed his admiration for Cuba he has not set in motion any break with capitalism as the Cubans did in the 1960s. The institutions of the Venezuelan state are undergoing a process of democratic radicalisationalthough the system has not collapsed as it did in Nicaragua, the possibility of a revolutionary turn is there. It is a mistake to imagine that nothing is happening in Venezuela, and that a populist Chavez will not lead a social revolution. The formation of new trade unions and the growing self-organisation of the missions and the Bolivarian circles suggests that a radical change is already under way. Globalisation And Unipolarity
While it is widely recognised that the climate has changed in Latin America, it is often argued that globalisation has forced the left to retrench.6 And it is important to discuss the impact of the information revolution, financial globalisation and the internationalisation of production on the region. The reality is that the process that allowed a partial recovery of profit rates in some developed countries has also had a brutal polarising effect. Latin America has suffered deepening impoverishment, deeapitahsation and an increasing dependence on primary exports. The question is, can it recover the level of independence that would enable it to reverse that regressive process? The theorists of the centre left insist that the solution is a model of regionally integrated capitalist production. But this project addresses only those niches that exist for opening up new businesses, without discussing the distortions that global accumulation has produced on the periphery and neither do they acknowledge that no Latin American capitalism will be able to compete with the imperialist metropolises or reproduce their historical development. In any event it is difficult to imagine the space in which such a model could operate, given that its implementation would require anti-imperialist measures and a radical break with neo-liberalism. Since no existing government is prepared to do that, it is difficult to know where this 'alternative capitalism' can develop. The new presidents all began with anti-liberal declarations then moved to support the status quo. The only certain route to progress, then, is a radical anticapitalism with a socialist perspective. But does the awful power of US imperialism not make any such option an impossibility7? This power is not new of course; every 20th century national independence movement has had to confront it and on
several occasions hasbrought the enemy to its knees. The very existence after 40 years of the-Cuban Revolution is testimony to that. The US has certainly built up its military potential and recovered its economic dominance in the last decade; but its leadership is unstable and it is facing resistance. Iraq bears witness to the limits of American power. The expansion of Bush's preventive wars is deeplv disturbingbut that does not mean that we should accept neo-conservative triumphalism. US aggression is producing both financial and political crises which challenge its global dominance. The USSR and the balance of world forces There is a general impression that the fall of Eastern Europe removed an important ally of the leftbut in fact it only supported those governments and movements that reflected its strategic interests. The Cuban leadership was fiercely critical in this respect. Latin America was always a pawn in the USSR's diplomacy. So the end of the Cold War had contradictory, and not always negative, effects on the region. If it left the left feeling disarmed on the one hand, on the other it removed the identification in the popular mind of socialism with totalitarian regimes. This analysis suggests that we move our gaze from what is happening 'above' (between states) to what is going on 'below' (in the mass movements and class consciousness). That is the basis on which to make an assessment of the balance of class forces. The other perspective can only lead us back to the search for an 'anti-imperialist camp' whose membership is unclear is it Europe, China, the Arab world? The key question is who is on the offensive in the struggle between workers and capitalists? In general, the initiative has been with the ruling class since the
advent of neo-liberalism. But a great deal of water has flowed under the bridge since the 1980s. In many countries there have been popular risingsand here Latin America is in the vanguard. You cannot suggest that the balance of forces is against the popular movement while saying at the same time that the new centre left governments are the products of advances in the mass movement. Hostile forces, internal and external It is true that an anti-imperialist victory cannot be limited to one country though Cuba has shown that it is possible to survive under conditions of imperialist siege. Every revolution has occurred in unfavourable conditions and has begun within a single country before transforming the wider scene by its example. In Central America several countries were involved, though never simultaneously; and though this was a problem it was internal conditions which became the main block, as the Sandinistas' experience proved. Imperialist aggression was a major factor, but what undermined the project was the transformation of the Sandinista leadership into a new wealth elite which negotiated power-sharing with the right. Twenty five years after this revolution, there remains not a trace of the agrarian reforms or literacy programmes in a country torn apart by poverty and inequality almost equalling the tragedy of Haiti. Does this mean that the socialist project is no longer viable? Is the centre left project all that we can aspire to? The popular risings in Bolivia, Ecuador and elsewhere give the lie to that, testifying to the readiness of many to develop a radical anti-imperialist solution to Latin Americas poverty and degradation. The main obstacles to the growth of that possibility are
not found in the international context but in the errors (and betrayals) within the struggle itself. The popular classes take to the streets and confront the systembut the initiative passes back to the enemy whenever they have to define the future political direction of their country. The centre left governments that accompany the demonstrations in the streets and then betray them in the presidential palaces are the clearest example of this paradox. The turn to the local Asserting that the revolutionary cycle has ended leads first to support for Lula and Kirchner and then to a strategy for local activity which privileges the municipal level. Some people suggest that a prefigurative participatory democracy can be built here even if the bourgeois order prevents its establishment at the national level. This idea informed many of the activities of the PT and the Frente Amplio prior to their winning government. Yet in the case of the PT it was a precursor to their absorption into the establishment and their recent electoral defeats in Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo demonstrate that the citizens will take only so much frustration before they punish them like any other party. None of this invalidates activity- at the local level indeed it can be an important contribution to the building of a left alternative. The mistake is to imagine that what cannot be built nationally can happen in one municipality, all the more so when local areas are starved of resources and suffering the effects of public spending cuts and regressive taxation, as is the case in most of Latin America. And above all, it is private property which represents the biggest barrier to change. The PT introduced the practice of'participatory budgets' in several places, encouraging notions ot local self-
government. But these experiments were never linked to any struggles against the ruling classand quickly became an exercise in administering poverty; and they did nothing to stop Lula's drift to the right. For years the municipal reformism practised in Europe transformed fighters into functionaries and dissolved the militant energies of a whole generation. The arguments used then are the same as those used nowgradual reform from within, building consensus, avoiding confrontation and so on. But this gradualist approach, and the hope of reforms, always foundered on two rocks: first, that accumulation is a crisis-ridden process that does not offer long periods of calm in which to implement this strategy, and secondly, that the crisis drives capitalists to resist social concessions. And in these circumstances the bourgeoisie always reclaims power, unless social democracy has been totally incorporated. The current scene As Lula and Kirchner approach the end of their terms they will still be feeing a turbulent and unequal region that is economically vulnerable and living in imperialism's shadow. The loss of resources that is implied by debt repayment adds one more factor, because any financial disturbance will tend to produce capital flight. And the multinational corporations will persist in pressing meantime for more privatisation and lower tariffs. The most explosive factor of all is the increasing militarisation of the continent under Bush's presidency of the USthe public embrace of Bush and Colombia's Uribe is ample evidence of the Pentagon's continuing prominent role in Latin America. The new presidents may respond to imperialist pressures with fine rhetoric and clever manoeuvres, but the reality is that the
context is determined by a rightward-moving US administration. The hopes awoken by the election of Lula and Kirchner remain alive to a greater or lesser extent among the populationand these persistent illusions will have an effect on the strategies of the left. But to recognise popular expectations is one thing; encouraging them quite another. It is and always has been the left's duty to speak the truth however much it hurts, and that includes addressing Castro's and Chavez's support for the centre left presidents. In any event the support is not mutual: Lula and Kirchner have remained silent on events in Venezuela, because neither wants to provoke the enmity of the State Department, while Chavez and Castro support them in order to avoid isolation and to counter imperialist propaganda. But diplomacy does not require a political support which is counterproductive as far as the movement in Brazil and Argentina is concerned. The left should have learned not to adapt its activities to the foreign policy requirements of states; the defence of the Soviet Union produced far too many capitulations for us to repeat them now. The Latin American left needs now to reaffirm that its field of action is in struggle with the oppressed not in discussing their concerns with the business sector. What matters is not what kind of capitalism we would preferbe it 'capitalism with a human face' or 'the creation of a society with opportunities for all'but how to develop a socialist project. The left will have no future unless it marches under the banner of equality and freedom. Today many young people are joining the movement and expressing admiration for the revolutionary legacy of past generations. But they also see how some of those who came from that past have joined the establishment and conceded victory to the powerful. If we are to recover the legacy of the 1970s
we will need courage, determination and a deep conviction.

NOTES
I: 'Centroizquierda, Nacionalismo y Socialismo . available on the author's web page www.netforsys.com/claudiokatz 2: See M Rolando, 'Bolivarismo revolu-cionario y unidad suramericana , Question, September 2004. 3: Representatives of this view include, in Brazil: F Betto, Ahora Lula conquistar el poder", Pagina 12, 20 September 2004; P Valter, 'La gauche a l'heure du choix , Inprecor 4-97, September 2004.; M Pont and R Rosseto, 'Ideias', Agencia Carta Mayor, 3 May 2O04; E Sader. 'Brasil y Lula desde un enfoque de izquierda', Propuesta, TOjune 2004= Articulacao de Esquerda e Democracia Socialista, 'Carta aos Petistas', Democracia Socialista, no Cj-January-February 2 005; Editorial'. Correio da ciuadania; 'Un nouveaux parti socialiste', Inprecor 497-September 2004- In Argentina: H Tumini. En marcha, 14 October 2O04; IRudnik '^Quien confronta con el FMI?\ Desde los barrios, 12 December 2004. In Uruguay: E F Huidobro, O estamos fritos', Pagina 12, 25 January 2005. 4: H Tumini, as above. 5: As has happened in Brazil with the DS (Democracia Socialista) current and in Argentina with Barrios de Pie'. 6: These issues are discussed for example in M Harnecker. La izquierda lati-noamericana y la construccion de alternatives'. Laberinto no 6, June 2001. and 'Sobre la estrategia de la izquierda en America Latina , Venezuela: Una revolu-cion sui generis , Conac, Caracas, 2004.J Petras, ' Imperialism o y resist encia en Latinoamerica'. S Ellner, 'La situacion actual en America Latina'. Los intelec-tuales y la glohahsacion (Abya-Yala, Quito. 2004)- Leftist goals and debate in Latin America , Science and Society, vol 68. no I (spring 2004).
THE FUTURE FOR SOCIALISM Latin America: Neo-liberal robbery and mass struggle Latin America is a continent undergoing "reform", which is a code word for neo-liberal economic counterrevolution. Bourgeois economists internationally even suggest that the continent could develop as a model for Europe, as a society without welfare and social security. These imperialist neo-liberal policies throughout Latin America are paid for by dramatically increasing poverty in the mass of the population. In 1980, the continents poor numbered 136 million (49 per cent); ten years later the number had doubled to 270 million (61,8 per cent). This in turn has created a climate for mass struggle, and some really militant examples have shown a much more real "Latin American model" for the rest of the world. The 12 million strong general strike in Brazil in June is the latest example. All developments in Latin America are for the short term, nothing is really stable. In the last ten years, different Brazilian governments have tried to introduce five entirely new economic models, including new currencies. In 1992 Brazils growth in GDP was negative, the economy was shrinking. Two years later, hyper inflation was a seemingly incurable disease. And then in 1995, with the new currency, the Real, Brazil again was the great success story, with inflation down to one digit and accompanied by strong growth. In
1996, business as usual is back again, now with an industrial crisis and the GDP turning down again. Political crises are linked to economic problems - with todays Brazil now coming into collision with yesterdays hero, President Cardoso. Dramatic swings between alleged successes and real crisis are taking place in most Latin American countries.
Whats economic reform? In Latin America, economic reform was a reply to the debt crisis of the 80s. It is a way for international capital to earn money out of state deficits and debts, thereby turning the risks of the 80s into advantages in the 90s. It is the programme of imperialism all over the globe, perhaps taking its most advanced form so far in Latin America. There are four cornerstones of the "reform" programme:
1.
2.
Tariffs slashed This is intended to give multinationals free access to the markets. In Mexico, average tariffs on imported consumer goods were cut from 60 per cent in 1985 to 20 per cent in 1992. One of the effects was to cut the markets for wheat and maize from Chiapas, thereby increasing poverty in that region. In Brazil, it is calculated that 500 000 "agrojobs" have been lost because of imports. Deregulation Limits on private or foreign ownership have generally been abolished. Foreign banks have been established. Investment capital can move in and out more or less without restrictions. For example, well known short term super speculator George Soros is now buying land and agribusinesses in
3.
Argentina. Deregulation also covers scrapping of minimum wages, workplace safety etc. Dramatic state budget cuts Just some examples: In Argentina, pensions and unemployment benefits have been reduced from 70 per cent of wages to 45 per cent. In Mexico, state support to rural areas in 1995 was less then a quarter than in 1980. In Brazil, a wage freeze is proposed for state employees, and the health system is collapsing. In Paraguay, 100 000 state jobs are threatened if budget targets are to be met.
Large scale privatization Since the break through with Telmex, Mexicos Telecom, this is the area where Latin America has taken a leading position internationally. The now 80 per cent private Telefonica Espana, Spanish Telecom, today controls telephone companies in Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. An illustration of the scale of what is involved is shown by the following example: In 1996, financial companies JP Morgan and Merryl Lynch organised a presentation in 23 cities in Europe, the US and Japan - and this was just for the sale of a part of Telecom of Peru. In Mexico there were 1 200 state companies 1995, and only 200 ten years later. In Argentina, only one in five state employees remained in work after the privatisations of 1991-94. On the railways, 110 000 out of 130 000 workers lost their jobs after the privatisation. The latest state assets up for sale in Argentina are three nuclear power stations and an international nuclear waste dump, without any environmental restrictions. Privatisations have
4.
improved the Argentinean telephone network, but it is also four times more expensive to make a call now than it was before. In Brazil, so far 45 companies have been privatised for $ 12 billion. Much more is now to come, since the constitution has been changed to allow the sale of for example the worlds biggest iron ore mine, CVRD. Sao Paulo and other Brazilian states are now in for big privatisations. In Bolivia, the neo-liberal president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada has started a privatisation programme of 50 per cent of all state industries. Speculators are now demanding the privatisation of the jewel in the crown of state companies in most Latin American countries, the oil industry. In Peru, the sale of Petroperu has already started. The sale of state industries for much less than their real value has nevertheless given money to the state budgets, and a short term breathing space. The question is what is left to sell when even the oil is private? In the last ten years, financial markets have become the first really globalised markets. This means that imperialist capital can establish a new discipline on governments. Without the pressure from revolutionary movements, any detour from neo-liberalism will be extremely short-lived. Classic Latin American bourgeois populism state lead protectionist economic development plans, balancing between different international powers, and limited reforms is dead. This spring, this was again proved by the u-turn of Venezuelas president Caldera. He won the elections in 1993 with a new party standing against the two parties which had been in power for 35 years. His rhetoric was strongly anti imperialist, basing himself on the mass protests in 1989 against IMF austerity plans. Now, he has agreed with the same IMF to cut the state deficit
from 6,1 per cent of GDP to 2 per cent. This means a threat against 500 000 of 1,4 million public sector jobs. The newly elected president of Ecuador, Abdala Bucaram, will go the same way, despite some populist rhetoric. And, in both cases, against the opinion of the mass of the people who elected them. In Ecuador, a referendum proposing a strike ban "in essential services" was defeated in 1995. For a year or two, the policy of economic reform claimed to have achieved spectacular results. In 199194, $163 billion poured into Latin America. Of this, $70 billion was foreign direct investments (FDI), $50 billion equities and $43 billion state bonds. Hyper inflation fell to a figure below 10 per cent in Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia. "Success for Bolivia", shouted a headline in a Swedish paper. Among other statements, it claimed that pensioners in Bolivia would gain from privatisation. This is in a country where the retirement age is 65, and life expectancy age is 60. Spectacular economic growth was recorded in Chile, with 6-9 per cent a year in almost 15 years. And Argentina seemed to be on the same track, its economy growing 30 per cent in 1990-94. Shares in 50 Latin American companies are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The new economic blocks, NAFTA and Mercosur, opened a new chapter for the Latin American economies. On top of this, Mexico became member number 25 in the OECD, the club of the advanced capitalist countries. Then came December 1994... The Mexican crisis a turning point The "Mexican miracle", as an example for the rest of the region, was the focus of the main discussions at the "Summit of the Americas", organised in Miami only 18 months ago in December 1994. The "club of rich
nations hails it(Mexico) as the perfect student of economics", the Economist wrote in an adulatory survey in 1993. Credit was given to the "half dozen men running Mexico - nearly all US-educated". Mexicos president Carlos Salinas expressed hope to become "one of the great men of the 20th century". That was of course before it was publicly known that his brother had $120 million in European banks, apart from suspected involvement in murders within the ruling party PRI. A few weeks after the Miami gathering came "the first crisis of the 21st century", as it was named by the IMF boss, Michel Camdessas. An attempted limited devaluation started a crisis which today is in its eighteenth month. In the first months the Mexican peso fell from 3,5 to a US dollar to 7,5, and the stock market value was cut by half. GDP fell by 6,9 per cent in 1995, and one million jobs were lost. The crisis sent shock waves all over the world. Stock markets fell in Asia; decisions on investments in China and other developing countries were reconsidered; currencies in Spain, Portugal, Sweden and other countries were affected. The biggest effects were of course in Latin America, with a sharp crisis developing in Argentina. Why did the Mexican crisis occur? From 1990-93 Mexico attracted most of the capital entering Latin America - $ 92 billion. The bulk was short term money, "while the party lasts". The Mexican peso was connected to the US dollar, but with much lower productivity. To sustain the exchange rate and attract capital, Mexico had to offer high interest rates, which in turn pushed the current account deficit up, eventually reaching 8 per cent of GDP. The limited devaluation of the peso threatened the safe return of capital invested in Mexican bonds and shares. The run started. Behind
this was the weak performance of the real economy. Between 1950 and 1980, the Mexican economy was growing on average 6,6 per cent a year. In the 90s, no year exceeded 4 per cent growth, and GDP per capita was still lower than 1980. The instability was of course increased by the Zapatista uprising of 1994 and the profound political crisis of the PRI. US imperialism had no choice but to intervene, not to save "Mexico", but to assure US investors in Mexico, as well as the political stability of its neighbour and the prestigious NAFTA. The rescue fund totalled $ 51 billion. $20 billion came from US government funds, $18 billion from the IMF (its biggest project ever), and $10 billion from the Bank of International Settlements and three from commercial banks. Unlike any previous crisis in Mexico, the conditions linked to the package was further "economic reform" and austerity programmes. Prices increased dramatically: tortilla, the basic food, increased by 27 per cent, petrol by 35 per cent, electricity by 20 per cent. VAT was increased from 10 per cent to 15 per cent. New budget discipline means public spending cuts of 10 per cent in 1996. The pension system will be "reformed" (i.e. privatised), like in Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and other Latin American countries. Even more important, the US is keeping Mexicos oil income as a guarantee to ensure debt payments. In 1996, more than one third of Mexicos export income, $ 28,7 billion, is being set aside for debt payments. The stabilisation plan also contains further privatisation programmes. In the last months, some optimistic reports on Mexicos economy have appeared in the international press. These are mainly based on increased export, which is an inevitable result of the fall of the peso, and on the Mexican governments
commitment to further "reform". Still, the dominating feature is further crisis, not least in the key banking sector, with seven collapsed banks so far. The Chilean "miracle" can not be repeated The Mexican crisis exposed the hollowness of the boom in Argentina. GDP fell 4,4 per cent 1995, plus a fall in the "sister economy" in Uruguay with 2,2 per cent. As in Mexico, the Argentinean stock market fell by 50 per cent and speculative capital fled the country. The IMF conditions of a balanced state budget in 1996 will fail, and the situation is still getting worse. Since 1992, the Argentinean peso was connected to the US dollar by law, so formally the Mexican way out through devaluation is closed. To sustain this position means a partial East German scenario, with a further slaughter of industry and jobs. On the other hand, to break or change the currency law, probably inevitable at a certain stage, would mean a similar catastrophe, with complete loss of political confidence and prestige, loss of foreign investment and a likely return to hyper inflation. Argentina is therefore in for explosive crises in the coming years. What about the "economic revolution" in Chile, then? Doesnt this show the way out? There is without doubt real economic growth and important changes. From his visit earlier this year, Tony Saunois of the International Secretariat compared the sale of individual tea bags in the 80s with the widespread use of walkmans in the 90s. The Chilean government is now planning to invest $ 1,4 billion in education. This would give three extra school hours a day, and a small library in every class room. The Chilean economic growth is based on peculiar circumstances which do not exist in other countries. The Chilean boom is a "post civil war boom". The military junta killed thousands from 1973 onwards,
destroyed the unions, slashed the productive forces and created a deep depression. Economic policy since then has been led and directed by the head of the state and the military. The worlds biggest copper mine, Coldeco, is still in state hands, and pays more taxes than all private companies combined. On this basis the upswing has been possible because of the natural resources of Chile. The strong export growth is based on raw materials, with the export of copper, fruit, fish, wood and wine. Finally, Chile is a small part of the Latin American economy, only 4 per cent, and therefore not able to give an impulse to the economy of the whole continent. The presence of former dictator Augusto Pinochet as head of the military is still an important factor holding back struggle. But now in Chile, there are reports of a new mood developing, with questioning of who is gaining from the boom. Last year, health workers and teachers were on strike, and this year has seen a miners strike against wage cuts and worsening conditions. The economic future of Latin America will be decided by Brazil, accounting for 35 per cent of the continents economy. At present, the Brazilian economy has been hit by a deep industrial downturn. For example the Swedish truck company Volvo in Sao Paulo has gone from producing 37 trucks a day to 30 a week. But even when production is increased, jobs are cut. The car industry in Sao Paulo increased production by 57 per cent from 1990-95, but with 7 per cent fewer workers employed. In those five years, it is reckoned that 1,6 million industrial jobs were lost in Brazil. At the same time, industrial companies in Brazil earn more from financial deals than from production. Economic perspectives for Brazil has to be conditional, but new events like the debt crisis in the different states of
Brazil or a bank collapse, could send the economy further down wards. There is still room for manoeuvre with privatisation, but this can in turn create mass protests and militant struggle. Brazils strategy is to develop the trading block Mercosur as a platform. The trade between the Mercosur members has increased fourfold since 1990, and in October, Chile becomes an associate member. But this block is still far away from offering any real way forward. Of the present four member countries, Paraguay and Uruguay make up for only 3 per cent of the economy of Mercosur. Of Brazils own exports, Mercosur receives 13 per cent, compared to 27 per cent for the European Union and 19 per cent for the US. Many goods are still outside the free trade agreements within Mercosur, and Brazil is in conflict with Uruguay over textile products and Argentina over cars. Mercosur will develop its own "EU-rhythm", taking some steps forward, combined with crisis and limitations. The economic impasse of Latin American capitalism is reflected in the crisis of the bourgeoisie politically. Last years presidential election "heroes", Menem in Argentina and Cardoso in Brazil, won because of the lack of a real alternative and their threat of " vote for me or for hyper inflation". Now, they are on the run. Menems Peronists faced a humiliating defeat in June in the elections for mayor in Buenos Aires, coming third with only 18 per cent of the votes. Cardoso has faced a dramatic drop in support because of privatisation plans for pensions and the cover up of corruption. The two of them could soon join the number of ex-presidents who have been driven out of office, like Collor de Mellor in Brazil in 1992, or even forced to flee abroad, like Alan Garcia of Peru and Carlos Salinas. Struggle everywhere
In March this year, the council in Yumbo, Colombia, announced the sacking of 271 council workers. The workers reply showed their desperation. Three local union leaders crucified themselves, with nails through bleeding hands and feet. Thousands of local workers and the oppressed then carried the crosses on protest marches around the town. After three days, ambulances came to pick up the leaders, among them the council workers leader named Fidel Castro! As soon as the ambulances left, police attacked the crowd. Two of the protesters were killed and 50 wounded. The situation in Colombia is particularly desperate. There are ten political murders every day, and every fifth killed is an union activist. The guerrilla war has lead to 17 000 dead from 1991-94. This spring, the guerrillas have increased their attacks. The president Ernesto Samper is linked to drug money and the US authorities have put him on a black list. "The crisis have shown up a vacuum and the lack of organised opposition - no one know what they want", one political science professor commented. There are now rumours of a coup, planned by a new "National restoration movement", backed by businessmen and the US. This could even get some initial support, if it promised to stop killings and corruption. In Venezuela, there were two attempted coups from 1992-93, where a populist anti-IMF-profile got public support. Over the last year, Latin America has seen a number of generalised strikes by the working class, the only force to show a way out. On the 21st of June, 12 million Brazilian workers took part in a general strike, which in numbers must have been one of the biggest in Brazilian history. This was proceeded by a one day strike in April by federal public workers against a wage freeze. In 1995-96, Bolivia has seen the most widespread strikes and struggle for a decade, against the neo-liberal
education reform. In 1995, general strikes were organised in Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and general strikes combined with local revolts in at least eight of Argentinas regions. The oil workers in Mexico and Brazil have been out on month-long militant occupations and strikes against privatisation and in defence of the environment. In Mexico the strike was supported by a local uprising in Tabasco. Politically it seems that the Brazilian workers party, the PT, is going through the same process of bourgeoisification as the Social Democratic and Socialist Parties in Europe. The party leader Lula even went on television condemning the oil workers strike. The Chilean Socialist Party is in a bourgeois coalition with the Christian Democrats. The Communist Party has gained in union elections in Chile, without putting forward a decisively alternative programme. In most Latin American countries there never have existed any mass workers parties. The task in front of the working class in for example, Argentina, is the creation of a workers party, with a revolutionary programme. Todays political vacuum opens the way for bourgeois opposition parties like PAN in Mexico and the Radicals in Argentina, or for future Latin American Berlusconis gaining support. The new world situation has meant the end of classical left wing guerrilla movements like FMLN/FDR in El Salvador. Their political leaders have followed Social Democratic and Stalinist leaders internationally to openly pro capitalist positions. In the same period, we have seen the formation of EZLN, the Zapatista movement in Mexico. The Zapatista uprising started as a broad revolt, triggered by the NAFTA agreement, which abolished article 27 in the Mexican constitution. This article, a legacy of the revolution, promised land to
every group of workers who asked for it. But the basis of EZLN was the situation facing Indians in Chiapas: 55 per cent are illiterate; life expectancy is 44 years; 70 per cent malnutrition etc. The Zapatistas have broad support in the cities and other parts of Mexico. A Swedish reporter met three brothers drinking tequila in a bar in northern Mexico. Only one of them had job, working part time. Neither economic miracles or crisis meant so much to them, but they were "dreaming of revolution and a Marcos-led government for Mexico". The Zapatistas have set an example, and a new guerrilla movement the ERP has been formed in the state of Guererro. In this state, the repression is the worst in the whole of Mexico, with 19 peasants killed by a police ambush in June 1995. The EZLN started as a fighting and revolutionary force, but its future is still unclear, lacking a clear programme. The land question is the focus of militant struggle in Brazil. When the movement of the landless, the MST, organised a march of 2 000 in the state of Para in April, 23 of them were killed, ten of them after being arrested. It was then exposed that the and owners had paid $100 000 to the local police chief to carry out this repression. Today, 40 000 people live on 109 occupied estates in Brazil. The MST has gone from undertaking occupations secretly to declaring their intentions openly in advance, and marching with red banners to the estates. The land question is another field where president Cardoso promised to be different compared to previous presidents, and has failed. Any new movement in Latin America has a tendency to become anti-imperialist. This is shown by the example of El Barzan, a campaign which claims to organise more than one million debt-trapped Mexicans: farmers, shop owners, self-employed etc. In June they
stopped the Mexican finance minister from entering a conference in Monterey, demanding an end of their debt-nightmare. Their slogans are against Wall Street, and they are described as "cant pay, wont pay". Where is Cuba going? Anti-imperialist feelings in Latin America are strengthened by US imperialisms actions against Cuba. The Castro regime is the biggest remaining thorn in the side of US imperialism. As part of imperialisms strategy to roll back what workers have achieved, to restore capitalism in Cuba is essential. So also is the defence of Cuba in the eyes of millions of workers. Cuba is an example of revolution, and of social reforms. But, because of the isolation and the policy of the regime, the process of capitalist restoration is on its way. However, the situation is different to Eastern Europe, Soviet Union and China. The regime still has popular support, even though it has been eroded by more recent developments, especially among the youth. Cuba has a ruling class in exile, which never will accept a Nelson Mandela-like role for Castro. While the masses in Eastern Europe looked to the richer West, Cubas neighbours are not only the USA, with huge riches alongside all the poverty, but also the absolute destitution of Central America and Caribbean states like Haiti. This points towards the likelihood that the Cuban regime must be overthrown to re-establish capitalism. The other possible perspective is the one of the European Union and of regimes in Latin America, of reconciliation, to win at least a majority of the Cuban regime over to the idea of capitalist restoration. Cuba experienced a drop in GDP of 35 per cent from 1989-93. This forced the regime to find support from new sources, instead of the Soviet Union and the
Stalinist world. Already, 100 per cent foreign ownership of companies is allowed. Fiat, Mercedes Benz, Benetton, Heineken and Canon are among the new established companies. Along side this, there are new cooperatives, self employed and more independently working state companies. This has increased the wage differentials and created a new pro-capitalist petty bourgeoisie. Today, dollars are needed to get full access to medicine, food and clothes. In 1996, two more steps have been taken. Industrial zones will give 12 years rebates on taxes, labour costs etc. A bank reform aims to "offer services as in all other countries". The new Helms-Burton blockade decided by the US in March this year has again united the opposition to imperialism in Cuba. But to sustain this, the regime has to offer economic growth and avoid further steps towards the market. Even a healthy workers regime could be forced to make deals with capitalist companies. But only to win time, never for a second losing the perspective that only the international revolution could save Cuba. The worst scenario would be for the Cuban regime going so far in direction of capitalism that it undermines the possible resistance against imperialism. Different international events can effect the development in Cuba, but despite the rhetoric of the regime it has entered the road to capitalist restoration. Latin American revolution and the CWI Latin America is a continent of enormous contradictions. In Brazil, the richest 10 per cent owns 43 times more then the poorest 10 per cent. In the mother country of inequality, the USA, the difference is 24 times. The poverty and distribution of wealth is similar in Argentina and Mexico. Latin America is also a continent characterised by reaction at different times in
its history. The last military regime in Brazil lasted 21 years, from 1964-85. At the end of the 70s most countries were military dictatorships. In the last two years, there have been rumours of coups in Colombia, Paraguay, and even Mexico and Brazil. As The Economist put it in an article on Paraguay, from a capitalist point of view: "the problem is democracy". In other words, the programme of "reform" has to be implemented against the resistance of the masses. At the same time, any attempt towards military regimes in the near future will meet even stronger movements, and are therefore unlikely. The economic counterrevolution has to rely on the fact that there are no a mass political alternatives. The local bourgeoisie are more than ever in the grip of imperialism. Any stand they would take against imperialism could provoke mass movements, which they fear much more than imperialist robbery and domination. This pressure from imperialism is today also extended to unions, workers leaders, guerrilla movements etc. Latin America is also a continent of rich revolutionary traditions. With a clear Marxist leadership and mass revolutionary workers parties, victorious struggles in Chile, Nicaragua, Bolivia and other countries could have given a new start for the world revolution. Our task is to link Marxism of the 90s to those traditions. In the last year the CWI has taken important steps forward in all countries where we have a presence in Latin America. The work and debates inside the PSTU in Brazil has strengthened the CWIs section, there, and this autumn the organisation is standing candidates in elections in Sao Paulo and Cotia. Socialismo Revolucionario has organised student protests, and had 30 in a delegation at the Sao Paulo student federation conference. As well in Chile, the CWIs section, Alternativa Organizacon
Socialista, is standing independent candidates on the PC (Communist Party) lists in the forthcoming elections in Santiago and Talca. We have intervened successfully in the miners strike, and a comrade is standing as candidate for leader of the Santiago federation of the Textile workers union. In Mexico, our comrades have produced a platform for intervention in the struggle. There are also CWI members in Argentina, and a number of openings in other parts of the continent. The next step will be a Latin American CWI-bulletin. Important work like this is a key part in forming a mass international, as the first step towards securing a socialist future for Latin America and indeed the whole world.

Latin America in Revolt Against Neo - Edit

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Latin America in Revolt Against Neo - Edit

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

Latin America: The Advent of an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism and Authoritarian Socialism

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

natural resources are boundless.

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]

27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM] 27 JULI 2013 [NEO-SOCIALISM]