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Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2003 12:22:44-0400
From: Mark Bittinger <mbittinger@9-11commission.gov>4''
To: Sam Caspersen <scaspersen@9-11 commission.gov><P
Subject: ATF meeting
Sam, FYI. I'll send you a draft of our ATF document request for your review.
Mark

Original Message- ^^^_^_^_^_^_^__^

From: | |3)atf.gov [mailto] [6atf.gov]
Sent^Thursday, July 24, 2003 9:30 AM
To: ijibittinger@9-llcommission.gov , a/-,
Cc: /John. Malone@atf.gov .,-'' _..,---"" y/11 Personal Privacy
Subject: meeting ..-•' ... '

Ma.rk- it was nice to meet with you yesterday i Here are my contact numbers.
Office 202-927-0141, cell! "|

t guess you will be seeking my after action report. That request should go
to AD John Malone. Please keep in mind- it was written as an internal memo,
with examples of issues that we hoped our Director would discuss with Dir.
Mueller. We never intended to embarrass anyone.

The bottom line of my issues, as you will see, is the fact that the U.S.
Gov't should use the best resources available when an event happens. One
agency cannot do it all. Congress appropriates funds for a number of
specialized agencies- we should use what we have available- not try to
"learn11 it when an event occurs.

The individual occurrences I noted don't need to be repeated as it only

causes more animosity between the agencies. Lesson to be learned is- use
/ the experts that are available- don't try to create experts during the
investigation of an event. thanks

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http://kinesis.swishmail.coin/webmaiyimp/message.php?index=992 8/4/2003
 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL. TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

2 5 2001

900000:MRB

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Arson and Explosives

Programs Division

FROM: NRT- Special Agent in

Charge

SUBJECT: After Action Report- NRT-01-29,

Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia

INCIDENT BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 9:30

a.m., American Airlines flight 77 was hijacked
and intentionally crashed into the Pentagon. The
crash is one of four that occurred on this date,
and are believed to be terrorist acts. Initial
reports indicated that 189 people were killed in
the Pentagon incident.

The incident was covered by news agencies from

around the world.

There were numerous visits to the scene by

congressional members, members of the President's
cabinet, various military leaders, the Vice-
President, and on two occasions, the President of
the United States.

On September 11, 2001, the northeast and

southeast national response teams were activated
and later staged in the Washington, DC area.

ATF101-0001
 Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

On September 12, 2001, per the Washington Field

Division (WFD) special agent in charge, (SAC) a
response team consisting of 30 members was
requested by the FBI to assist at the Pentagon.
The WFD SAC stated the FBI would integrate the
ATF team into their ERT operations.

After numerous attempts at trying to contact the

FBI ERT at the scene, and watching an ongoing
crime scene search on television, a team of 30
KRT members arrived at the Pentagon at
approximately 2:00 p.m.

Upon arrival at the scene, the FBI on-site

supervisor stated he was not aware that ATP was
asked to assist at the scene. Immediately
thereafter, there were discussions between the
WFD SAC and the FBI WFO SAC wherein the FBI SAC
asked that all ATF personnel leave the scene.

The onsite FBI supervisor was notified of this

decision and he asked that 8 agents remain at the
scene to assist with a crime scene search. The
remaining agents were dismissed by the NRT SAC
and instructed to remain on call for duty.

Later, on September 12, 2001, the FBI on site

supervisor requested another 30 NRT members to
assist at the scene. The additional agents were *•
to be used for search teams in and around the
building, as well as for sifting operations.

On September 13, 2001. the total number of ATF

agents at the scene was 47. Thie included the
two team leaders, two team SAC's and four agents
to ataff the NRT truck and the Command vehicle,
which had been loaned to the Arlington Fire
Department. (The teams worked two 12-hour shifts,
each truck staffed with one agent per shift).

ATF101-0002

r
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

On September 13bh, the FBI asked for additional 6-

8 agentB to assist in logging evidence in. They
arrived on September 14th.

During the first few days of operations, numerous

other ATF personnel arrived to deliver equipment,
supplies, fix radios, telephones etc.

During the first three days of operations, ATP

NRT members were scheduled to work with the FBI
on entry teams to collect bodies, evidence, sift
debris, act as safety officers in the building,
as well as log evidence and photograph the scene
for the FBI. However, the manpower was not
utilized as planned due to a number of issues.
The lack of coordination and use of resources
will be discussed under "Problems and
Recommendations."

Due to the building collapse, heavy equipment was

utilized. it was acquired through FEMA. ATF
also utilized two "Gators" to transport equipment
and supplies between the Pentagon and the north
parking lot where sifting operations were
conducted. The NRT was advised that FEMA would
pay for the "Gators" . They were returned to the
Arlington Fire Department logistics center. No v
agreements between ATF and the rental company
were executed.

Also, Verizon provided 47 Nextel phones to ATF.

These phones were provided as part of the FBI
agreement with Verizon. (According to the
Verizon representative, the phone and service
were loaned to those at the scene.) ATF's Voice
and Radio Branch were instructed to handle the
transaction with Verizon. All phones were
returned to Verizon when the NRT left the scene.

ATF101-0003
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

No other equipment rental or procurement was

authorized at the scene. However, there was a
great deal of supplies, small tools and
protective gear that were procured with
individual government issued MasterCards. The •
WFD, except for those acquired by NRT Team
Supervisors collected all receipts.

The local Home Depot representative offered to

establish an "open purchase order" for the team.
The offer was declined. The team supervisors
were instructed to advise the team members that
no purchases were to be made without
authorization, and all purchases should be made
through a MasterCard.

The ATF Command vehicle was offered to the

Arlington Fire Chief because as incident
commander, he did not have an adequate command
post. The chief accepted the offer through
Battalion Chief Schwartz.

He also accepted the offer to use a tent

(provided by ATF) to protect his expensive gear.
This was placed next to the command post.

The FBI also accepted ATF's offer to provide a

protective tent for those at the sifting site.
They later asked that the tent be removed,
however, they later reconsidered after
determining their staff was utilizing the tent
for peer support, employee assistance and minor
medical needs.

A FBI ERT team leader also accepted ATF's offer

to supply a second command vehicle at the sifting
site. The team leader accepted after stating she
only had a "pick-up truck" to use as an
administrative poet. The Atlanta Command Vehicle
departed for Washington after this request was

ATF101-0004
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

made. The FBI on-site supervisor later cancelled

the request for the bus stating the FBI had one
on its way. (The FBI did not have a command
vehicle delivered to the scene. They borrowed
one from the DC Disaster Management Agency, 2
days after they declined ATF's offer.)

The equipment and supplies on the NRT truck were

utilized by a number of agencies (including FBI
ERT). Many expressed thanks and commented on how
well equipped the truck was.

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Several problems were encountered during this

investigation. It is recommended that a meeting
between FEA and the DAD'B (FO) be held so they
can hear all of the details about these issues,
Many of the problems should be addressed through
agreements with the FBI. While attempts have
been made in the past, perhaps a new approach
should be made under the premise of both agencies
discussing an "after-action" assessment of
activities. While there were numerous issues
that arose, only a few will be addressed here.

Problem - The FBI lacks the experience to manage

every facet of crime scene investigations. This
revolves around the fact that the FBI managers
and ERT members are more familiar with protocols-
for ^general" crime scene searches. They lack
sufficient experience in overseeing overhaul
operations at large fire and explosion scenes.

Recommendation- Executive level managers from ATF

should meet with the FBI to fully explain our
level of expertise, the number of large scenes we
routinely handle and attempt to establish a
protocol wherein ATF and the FBI technical
"experts" can work together at scenes. Each
agency has its strengths and they should be
recognized. For instance, the beat use of ATF's

ATF101-0005
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

resources would have been to allow ATF NRT

members to oversee the removal of debris from the
building, as well as the sifting operations.
While this case was clearly under the FBI's
jurisdiction, they should have allowed our
experts to handle jobs they are familiar with.

A good analogy is the fact that the FBI stood

back while the search and rescue teams did safety
assessments and shored up the building. While
the FBI was present when decisions were made and
executed, they deferred to these teams because of
their training and expertise. The same actions
were not taken with respect to our expertise.
While this has traditionally been the problem,
perhaps the new FBI director should be made aware
of the level of expertise available to assist
them at these types of scenes.

The lack of experience was most evident when FBI

managers and team leaders stated it could take
4-6 months to complete the processing of the
scene. The NRT supervisors informed them within
the first 2 days that this scene should take no
more than 2-3 weeks to complete. The experience
levels in dealing with these types of scenes were
clearly shown.

Another example was found when the FBI ERT team

leader charged with overseeing the removal of
debris inside of the building explained the
extent of the damage in the building to the NRT
SAC and team supervisors. Also present were the
FBI SAC and ASAC.

The FBI team leader tried to explain the fire

progression, blast effects and fire damage but
repeatedly stated "I don't know much about fire
or explosions but..." He also prefaced many of his
statements by saying "the ATF agents explained it
to me...." After one of the ATF team supervisor's

ATF101-0006
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

explained the fire progression, basic fire

dynamics and blast effects, the FBI SAC asked to
"sit down some day so you can explain how fire
works."

This same FBI team leader consistently praised

ATF's efforts and relied upon our knowledge by
asking for ATP agents to be assigned to his team.
His superiors overruled him after the third day
at the scene.

At the same time, perhaps ATF should utilize the

FBI's expertise at ATF controlled scenes. For
instance, their teams are more used to collecting
trace evidence such as hair, fibers, blood, etc.

Perhaps if the two directors could agree to

utilize the expertise of each agency, teams could
•work/train together, much like they will be doing
for the upcoming Olympics.

Problem - The FBI'a command structure for their

ERT's is disjointed. For instance, each team
operated independently of the others, they
changed team leaders on a daily basis, switched
people between jobs on a daily basis so they
could be "trained" in various duties. It was
difficult to determine whom the "team leaders"
report to, and who dictates the goals and
objectives for the overall mission.

Since many of the FBI team leaders and managers

have little to no experience in dealing with
these types of scenes, they can offer little to
no guidance to others.

Rec ommenda t i on - It is recommended that as part of

the protocol, both agencies include team leaders
and supervisors in certain decision making
processes. For instance, the NRT team

ATF101-0007
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

supervisoars should have been allowed to work

inside of the building and work closely with the
FBI managers in planning the overall strategy in
processing the scene. The NRT made numerous
recommendations that would have expedited
activities and drastically minimized the manpower
needed to complete the job and more importantly
ensured the safety of those working in the scene.
Most of the recommendations were ignored.

Problem- There were no daily meetings between

agency heads at the site. If there were, ATF was
not included.

Recommendation- Daily meetings with all agency

heads should be held to ensure that clear lines
of communication are established. The overall
strategy at approaching the scene was never
shared with all of the agencies; therefore, it
was difficult to understand what was being done,
how resources would be used etc. It would have
been beneficial to all if FEMA would have taken a
more aggressive approach at managing the overall
situation, particularly with meeting with agency
heads to share the overall goals, strategies etc,
If this was done, many of the problems,
misunderstandings etc., could have been
addressed. Instead, many agencies were "left in
the dark" as to what the plans were.

Problem- The EPA and OSHA declared this a

hazardous material site. Specifically, they
referred to contamination from human remains as
well as asbestos and silica dusts. Therefore,
protective clothing and respirators were worn in
certain areas.

Some agencies did not meet OSHA guidelines with

respect to the use of protective equipment; in
particular, respirators were worn by those with
facial hair. NRT members with facial hair shaved
before wearing respirators. The OSHA officials
commented on the quality of the equipment ATF

ATF101-0008
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

wore and the methods used to monitor employee

safety.

Several ATF agents from the WFD (non-NRT members)

who were assigned to assist the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force arrived at the scene under
the instruction of an FBI supervisor. They
borrowed respirators and worked at the sifting
site. Two of these agents had beards and and
none of them had received HazMat training, were
never fit-tested, or had the proper medical
clearance. The agents were asked to leave the
scene and the WFD was notified of the incident.
The FBI was also advised not to send ATF
employees to the scene without notifying the NRT.

Recoinmandationi ATF continue with its current

policy toward the use of personal protective
equipment. Agents should be made aware of the PPE
policy and its importance.

Problem- The FBI is reluctant to utilize ATF

expertise or its equipment. For that matter,
they did not rely on all of the available
expertise from other agencies. For instance, the
FBI declined ATF's offer to utilize a command
vehicle. Instead, they waited 2 additional days
and borrowed one from the District of Columbia.
They also declined the offer of a large tent
(however they used it anyway), and in one
instance, refused to allow an experienced ATF
bomb technician to handle a suspicious package
outside of the Pentagon grounds. In fact the ATF
bomb technician had to remind the FBI bomb tech
not to approach the package without a bomb suit
to perform an assessment because two explosive
detecting canines had alerted to the presence of
explosives.

In this instance, two FBI bomb technicians

arrived and between them did not have a bomb suit
that fit them, nor did they have a shock tube to
use with their "Pan-Disrupter." One FBI bomb

ATF101-0009
 10

Chief, Arson and Explosives

Programs Division

technician had never performed a render safe

procedure (RSP)(except in class) and the other
had only assisted with one. The ATF bomb
technician has performed numerous RSP's and in
fact was an instructor with the U.S. Navy EOD.
Instead of allowing the experienced bomb
technician to handle the package, the two FBI
agents borrowed the ATF bomb suit and shock tube
and performed an RSP on the package. (Later to be
determined to be a briefcase full of ammunition.)

Within an hour preceding this incident, the FBI

SAC advised the NRT SAC that he no longer
required the services of any ATF chemists or bomb
technicians.

Recommendation- This should be brought to the

attention of senior level managers at the FBI.
It involves the safety of not only bomb
technicians but also citizens.

Also, it would be beneficial if each agency knew

what capabilities each can provide, what
specialized equipment was available, and how it
could be best used. For instance, debris kept
piling up at the sifting site until ATF notified
the FBI that several NRT members were proficient
in driving "BobcatB" which were parked at the
site. The FBI had its own "Bobcat" however they
had nobody to operate it. Once this was
resolved, NRT members operated most of the
equipment. After several days, the FBI asked if
ATF could train their people to operate Bobcats.
They also began to allow several of their
employees (without experience) to operate the
"Bobcats." This was minimized after safety
concerns were brought to their attention.

Also, it would have made more sense to use

trained military mortuary teams, with one FBI
agent to remove bodies, rather than use full
teams of special agents. It is unclear why

ATF101-0010
 11

Chief, Arson and Explosives

Programs Division

untrained agents should be used for activities

SUCll as body removals when better-trained and
equipped agencies are available to handle the
duties. If the argument is because potential
evidence must be collected; the presence of an
FBI agent with these teams would be sufficient.

Problem- Initially, there was little to no

control or documentation over who was working in
the building and where they were. There were
inadequate safeguards to ensure the safety of the
NRT members.

Recommendation- Ensure the NRT continues to

provide its own safety officers when NRT
employees are working under the control of
another agency. This was addressed and the FBI
later initiated an accountability system for
those working in the building.

Problem- There was inadequate administrative

support at the scene. For instance, hhe team
supervisors had to handle all of the scheduling,
listing of hotel rooms, SOT sheets, and the
collection of receipts.

Recconmendation- During major events, it would be

advantageous to have an administrative support
member to assist with scheduling, hotel
arrangements, handling of receipts, as well as
other administrative duties.

Problem- There should be more coordination within

Headquarters in sending peer support, EAF
resources to the scene. For instance, the team
SAC was called by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Arrangements were made to have peer support
available at the hotel after the shifts ended for
ATF employees. Instead, an EAP contractor

ATF101-0011
 12

Chief, Arson and Explosives

Programs Division

arrived, and no peer support members were

available. The contractors later admitted there
was a mix-up in communications.
It was our understanding that the employee calls
EAP when they are needed.

Recommendation- Peer support should be the first

resource available to the employees. They should
be told of EAP availability and allowed to call
them if necessary. Instead, some of the
employees felt that EAP was being offered instead
of peer support.

Problem- There were numerous requests from the HQ

CMIST that seemed to be synonymous with requests
from the field division CMIRT.

The NRT supervisors were called several

times by CMIST employee asking for details
such as the room numbers for NRT members in
hotels.

There were several other similar incidents. This

detracts from the ability of the supervisors to
perform their on-scene duties. While everyone
understands the value of a. CMIST, there were
times when the NRT managers spent more time
answering requests from the CMIST than they spent
performing on-scene duties. A great deal of this
same information was also answered for the field
division CMIRT.

Recommendation- These duties should be handled by

administrative support staff. The CMIST employee
stated the reason for asking for hotel room
numbers was "in case someone asks me for them."
The agents were all lodged in the same hotel, and
if they had co be reached, a call to the hotel
desk would have connected them with the agent.
This type of request is unnecessary.

ATF101-0012
 13

Chief, Arson and Explosives

Programs Division

Highlights - EPA held daily safety meetings with

all of the involved agencies. They were
forthright and informative. Every agency at the
scene was informed about conditions, problems
etc., and there was an open dialogue between the
agencies.

The NRT teams performed in an exemplary manner.

Morale remained high despite the way the team
members were treated by the FBI. The team
member's attitudes remained positive and their
work showed it. Numerous agencies took note of
their performance and often sought their
guidance. Additionally, many of the agencies
relied on ATF's NRT truck for specialized tools
and equipment.

CONCLUSION

This has been characterized as an act of

terrorism. The FBI will issue the final report
on the series of events leading up to the crash.

It is essential that a protocol is reached to

ensure both agencies can work together and
utilize the best resources available. Along
these lines, it is essential that an agreement is
reached identifying who will do what at major
incidents, therefore, embarrassing situations
will be avoided. This is apparently a regional
. problem as many areas in the country do not
experience the issues that were encountered at
this scene.

Perhaps this could be resolved if the two

directors agreed on a set protocol.

ATF101-0013
Chief, Arson and Explosives
Programs Division

POINTS OF CONTACT

Since there were ao many agencies involved and

due to the fact that the NRT assisted the FBI,
there is no need for points of contact.

Michael R. Bouchard

ATF101-0014
 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

October 23,2001

902050:TRH

MEMORANDUM TO: Division Chief

Firearms, Explosives and Aison Programs Division

FROM: Harry Eberhardt, Western NRT Team Supervisor

Thomas R Hahn, Jr., MW NRT Team Supervisor
Brian Hoback, Western NRT Team Supervisor
Frank Matter, SE NRT Team Supervisor
Jerry Rudden, NE NRT Team Supervisor

SUBJECT: NRT Activation to Pentagon, Washington D. C

i
RE: Pentagon
Washington, D. C.
IN #701300-01-0003

INCIDENT BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2001, at approximately 9:30 a.nz, American Airlines Flight 77, a
Boeing 757, was hijacked soon after it departed from Dulles Airport After a short time
in the air, the plane was diverted and intentionally crashed into the west side of the
Pentagon, Washington, D. C. There were 189 victims killed in the Pentagon and on the
aircraft. Repairs to the Pentagon have been estimated to be $500 million. No cost for the
aircraft was available. After the ensuing explosion and fire, the FBI requested the
assistance of the ATF National Response Team to assist. them in the investigation.
Initially both the Northeast and Southeast National Response Teams responded. After
approximately 12 days the Midwest and Western National Response Teams rotated a
contingent of NRT members in to replace those already there.

WWW.ATF.TREAS.GOV ATFO01-0001
 NRT RESPONSE

The Northeast and Southeast National Response Teams were activated at approximately
12:30 p.m. on September 11, 2001 and responded that same day. An initial team briefing
was held at the Hampton Inn, Manassas, Virginia also on that same date.

The NRT responded with 30 members to the Pentagon site on September 12, 2001.
Initially 10 members were utilized in the damaged building itself. Two members were
attached to each of five teams that made entry to work the building. The additional
members were utilized in designing the North Parking lot into a work area where the
debris was transported from the Pentagon for examination. Many members were placed
in positions such as Site Supervisors, Safety Officers and bobcat operators. The
remaining members assisted in raking through the debris attempting to identify body
pans, persona] belongings, aircraft pieces, weapons utilized by the hijackers and
classified documents. On September 14, 2001, all NRT personnel, still on site, were
relocated to the Residence Tnr^ Pentagon City.

Plans were made to replace the Southeast and Northeast teams with members of the
Midwest and Western NRT teams. When this contingent of Midwest and Western team
members began to arrive on September 20, 2001, ATF was being utilized to work with
the FBI and conduct the North parking lot examination. These members were only
placed in positions as Site Supervisors, Safety Officers and bobcat operators.

NRT PERSONNEL

The following NRT members responded to this activation:

Mike Bouchard NRTSAC

Dondi Albritton NRT SAC
Ray Rowley NRTSAC
Jerry Rudden NE Team Supervisor
Frank Matter SE Team Supervisor
Brian Hoback Western Team Supervisor
TomHahn MW Team Supervisor
Harry Eberhardt Western Team Supervisor

NORTHEAST TEAM
Mike Murray
Don Harris
Larry Hall
Jennifer Clarke
Tom Gallagher
Donna Shisser
Tom Rooney
Richie Coccaro
Rick Price

ATF001-0002
Tom Bowen
Veronica Hnat
John Morgan
GregHine
Tom Daley
EricPena
Paul Gemmato
Scott Taylor
Steve Avato
Dave Sherman
Francis Neely
Kevin Washington
Lou Weiers
Bill Grom
Bill Oterson

SOUTHEAST TEAM
Dave Sanford
Bill Marshall
Ken Andrews
John Paul
Kent Slay
Tony Waldrop
Dennis Hampton
Joe Mann
Gene Fleming
John Springer
Penny Goodreau
Brian Lett
MarkTeufert
Mark Ho back
Mike Roland
John Colder
Steve Gillis
James "Williams
Joey Russell
Nick Chenneta
Barney Waggoner
Jeff Brown
Dennis Kennamer
Jerome Gant
Luis Velazco
Bobby McCormick
L. A. Bykowsky
Lester Rich
E. C Painter

ATFO01-0003
Cordell Malone
VanTuley
Mike Durham

WESTERN TEAM
Steve Beggs
Lance Hart
Martin Young
Larry Smith
Jamie Lopez
DanHeenan
Marshall Littleton
MIDWEST TEAM
John Mirocha
Tad Heitzler
Marty Hill
Greg Baker
Tony Piwowarc2yk
PeteLobdell
CHEMISTS
Rick Lute
Doug Klapec
Steve Linahan
Sherrie Thomas
Greg Czarnopys
Julia Dolan
KathyKlcmz

ETB
Tom Waskom
Mike EggJeston
Rich Campbell
Alex Guerrero

FIELD DIVISION PERSONNEL

The following ATF Special Agents from different Field Division also responded and
assisted in the scene investigation:

Larry Sanders Beaumont Field Office, Dallas Field Division

Tim Wilson Reading Field Office, Philadelphia Field Division
Mark Semear Grand Rapids Field Office, Detroit Field Division
Bill Joa Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division

ATF001-0004
Kevin Kelm HQ, FEA, Profiling Section, Quantico, Virginia
Pete Pappas HQ, FEA, Canine Branch, Front Royal, Virginia
Steve Patrick Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division
Vic Castro Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division
Sue Poorbaugb Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division
Doug Quartetti Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division
Brian Berryman Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division

OTHER AGENCIES/PERSONNEL INVOLVED

Due the large number of individuals utilized in this investigation, only the agency names
will be listed as contributing.

FBI
Arlington County Police Department
EEOC, OIG
NASA
U. S. Postal Service
Department of Defense, OIG
Department of Defense, CIS
FDIC OIG
Naval Investigative Service
U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Division
U. S. Air Force, Office of Special Investigations
Virginia State Police
U. S. Marshal
Fairfax County Police
D. C. Metropolitan Police
Department of Education, OIG
Department of Commerce, OIG
National Transportation and Safety Board
Federal Aviation Administration
Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control
Fairfax County Fire Department
Environmental Protection Agency
OSHA
Fairfax County Search and Rescue Team
Montgomery County Search and Rescue Team
Miami-Dade County Search and Rescue Team
Orange County Search and Rescue Team
New Mexico Search and Rescue Team
Memphis Search and Rescue Team
Puget Sound Search and Rescue Team

ATFO01-0005