CIVREV.PARENTAL AUTHORITY.152
Mary’s
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA,
respondents.
FACTS: Pardo, J.
1. Petitioner conducted an enrolment drive for the school
year 1995-1996. A facet of said campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrolless were studying. The
deceased, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning
group. He, along with other high school students, was riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School in Dapitan City. James Daniel
II, then 15 y/o also a student of petitioner, was the one
driving the said vehicle. He allegedly drove the latter in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Consequently, Sherwin died of the injuries he sustained from the
accident.
2. Thus, respondent spouses Carpitanos filed a case against
James Daniel II and his parents – James Daniel Sr and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner Vivencio Villanueva, and petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy for the death of their son Sherwin Carpitanos.
3. The RTC held petitioner primarily liable to the Carpitanos
in the total amount of P600,000.00; while the parents of James
Daniel II were only held subsidiarily liable (to pay the said amount
in case of insolvency of petitioner); James Daniel II was absolved
from liability for being a minor at the time of the commission of the
tort and was then under special authority of petitioner; and
Villanueva was was absolved of any liability.
4. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount of damages, but
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Petitioner filed an MR but it was
denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES: 1. Is petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos?
2. Who should be liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos?
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St.
Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles
218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.’”
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and
testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of
the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the
Family Code that “those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
WHO IS LIABLE FOR SHERWIN’s DEATH:
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor,
to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact
admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City.
-oLay!

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the

detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable

for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may

be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the
accident was not attributable to petitioner.Hence, liability for the
accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

CIVREV. PROPERTY. 172
G.R. No. 109262 November 21, 1996
DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and
FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR.,
CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN, SEGUNDA
BAUTISTA, CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T. CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T.
CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T. CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T.
CATAPUSAN, REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T.
CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES, CATAPUSAN and FLORA DIAZ
CATAPUSAN, respondents.
FACTS: Francisco, J.
Dominga Piguing
|
|
(1910+)Narcissa Tanjuatco—1m—Bonifacio Catapusan (1940++)—
2m (1927)—Paula Reyes
|-Felix(+) |-Domingo
|-Vicente(+) |-Minelio
|-Benicio(+) |-Filomeno
|-Loreto
(Felix, Vicente and Benicio, Bonifacio's sons from the first marriage,
died before the institution of this case, survived by their respective
widows and children, respondents herein.)
1. Petitioners filed an action for partition of the Wawa Lot,
alleging that the same belongs to their father Bonifcaio, and should
therefore be partitioned among the heirs of the 1st and 2nd
marriages. They presented 4 tax declarations of the adjoining
lot owners which noted that they each border on one side the
Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio.
2. Respondents asserted that said lot was originally owned
by their grand-mom Dominga and was inherited by their mother
Narcissa as her paraphernal property. Thus upon her death, this lot
passed to her 4 children – the predecessor-in-interest of
respondents.
3. Said 4 children had possessed and occupied said lot, and
had secured tax declarations thereon in their names. Respondents
further alleged that they had been in OPEN, CONTINUOUS and
UNINTERRUPTED possession of the said lot for more than 50years
when the suit was filed in 1974. They invoked laches and
prescription against petitioner’s action.
4. Petitioners argue that their action had not lapsed since
respondents REPUDIATED the co-ownerhips only in 1968. They
questioned respondents’ lack of documentary proof (titulo real) period, they become strong evidence to support the claim
w/regard to Dominga and Narcissa’s title as they lived during the of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The possession
Spanish era. contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one
under claim of title or adverse to or in concept of owner.
5. RTC dismissed the complaint and held respondents as the
true and lawful owners of the Wawa lot. On appeal, the CA affirmed Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the
said decision. Pets filed MR but denied. Hence the instant appeal. kind of possession that may lead to title by prescription. It is the
respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession far beyond the 30 year extraordinary period for
ISSUES: 1. whether an action for partition includes the question of
acquisitive prescription, 23 coupled with the tax declarations of their
ownership
predecessors-in-interest, that constitutes a superior weight of
2. whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot
evidence that clinched their claim. Moreover, petitioners bare and
3. whether petitioner's action is barred by laches and/or
unsubstantiated allegation that respondents' tax declarations were
prescription.
fraudulently issued is insufficient to sustain the imputation of fraud
considering that good faith is always presumed. Besides,
HELD: 1. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
respondents' tax declarations are deemed regularly issued. Being
order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination
an action involving property, the petitioners must rely on the
as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle
strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. 18
respondents' claim.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant
The instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of the Court
has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1
of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
-oLay!
complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate.
Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. 19 Hence,
on the first issue we rule in the affirmative.

2. Anent the second and third issues, it is a basic rule of evidence

that the arty making an allegation has the burden of proving it by
preponderance of evidence.

In this case, petitioners' evidence of their father's (Bonifacio)

ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent
lot owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw
Bonifacio working on the lot. On the other hand, respondents
presented tax declarations which indicated that the same
lot is owned by their predecessors-in-interest, the children
of the first marriage, evidence which carry more weight as
they constitute proof of respondents' ownership of the land
in their possession. The statement in the neighboring lot
owners' tax declarations is not a conclusive proof that
Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot. In fact, petitioners
cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of their
ownership over the same lot. Although tax declarations and
receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet when
accompanied by proof of actual possession for the required