War-Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History Author(s): George Raudzens Source: The Journal of Military

History, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), pp. 403-434 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986064 . Accessed: 15/10/2013 10:10
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Weapons: War-Winning The MeasurementofTechnological History in Military Determinism

George Raudzens

Dr. RichardGatlingbelieved his machine gun would not only butwouldalso helpstopwars.' and end slavery, defeat theConfederacy vehicleswere war winJ. F. C. Fullerbelieved thatarmoredfighting ners.2"Bomber"Harrispromisedin 1942 he could forcea German surrender by means of his heavybombers alone.3 There are other the stressing historians examples.Thereare also newbooksby military in modernwar4as thereare ongoingpreocoftechnology importance increasesin firewith plannersand commanders cupationsofmilitary Butare thereclear examplesoftherealization powerand itsantidotes. ofweaponsexpectations? as weaponsimpactanalysis, Evenincluding thelatestpublications, capaoftheoretical from descriptions or assessments hardware distinct from scholars. attention bilities, has not receivedmorethanmarginal The several hundredlatest books on weapons hardware-the guns, devicesofcombat-contain and other ships, planes,electronics, tanks,
1. See p. 418 below. 2. See p. 422 below. 3. See p. 428 below. 4. Outstandingamong historiansstressing the importanceof military technology are Carlo Cipolla, Shelford Bidwell, Ian Hogg, Kenneth Macksey, William McNeill,Geoffrey Parker, JohnTerraine,and Martinvan Creveld.Theirworksare discussed in more detail below. The latest thoroughoverview is RobertL. O'Connell's OfArms and Men (Oxford,1989).

DO better to. beenexpected haveclearly win battles? They weapons

The Journal ofMilitaryHistory 54 (October 1990): 403-33

? AmericanMilitary Institute

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GEORGE RAUDZENS

recentstudiesofthe imporlittlehistorical analysis.5 The much fewer ofindustrial armaments tanceofweaponsdemonstrate thedomination and hownewtechnolomostly byshowing howmodernwarsare fought gies have altered the methodsand experiencesof battle. Impact of at weaponson theoutcomesofbattleis not nearlyso obvious,though contribution to changes timesit is strongly implied.The proportional made by weapons is only occasionally recognizedas an important forexample,to question.Tim Travers is one of the fewwho attempts, operseparateoutand weighup thehumanand themechanicalfactors that But he does not demonstrate atingon WorldWar I battlefields.6 on battle improved technologies had more than marginalinfluences outcomes. weaponshave increasedcasualtiesis not The beliefthatindustrial helpful either.There is littleevidence to showthatcasualtiesproporbytechnological tionalto soldiers engagedhavebeen muchinfluenced ofcombatants thenumbers change; theyhave gone up and downwith of the most popular Even one ratherthan the volume of firepower.7 thedecisivefailsto support examplesoftechnological war,Blitzkrieg, to about seem disagree everything ness ofweapons. Blitzkrieg experts its exceptthe idea thatsuperior tanksand planes had littleto do with or itsimpact.8Evenwhereweaponssuperiority seems indisdefinition armaputable,as in cases whereone side had a monopolyofimproved Thisis thecase thedegreeoftechnological impactis ill defined. ments, experiences in examplesfrom Europeancolonial conquestsand from tanksat Cambrai or German with"secret" weapons such as British in 1944. Ifthereis indeedinsufficient evidenceto demonstrate rockets has thatimproved increased casualtiesor wonbatmilitary technology from of impactseems remarkably different tles,thenthismarginality on in Yet the the impact of civiliantechnology society peacetime.
historiesis Ray Reilling's 5. A dated but comprehensiveoverviewof firearms Guns and Shooting: A Selected Chronological Bibliography (New York,1951). Armsand ArmourPress,and dozens ofotherpublishers Janes,Brassey's, specialize in hardwarestudies. 6. See Tim Travers,The Killing Ground: The BritishArmy, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987). Travers argues that even thoughwar machines were becoming more dominant, human factorssuch as morale, leadership,skill, discipline, and so forth, remained very important. The degree of importanceis not assessed. 7. George Raudzens, "Firepower Limitations in Modern MilitaryHistory," Journal ofthe SocietyforArmyHistorical Research 67 (Autumn1989): 130-53. 8. George Raudzens, "BlitzkriegAmbiguities:Doubtful Usage of a Famous Word,"War and Society 7 (September 1989): 77-94.

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War-Winning Weapons

leadinghistoriographic examplesofseemingdecisiveness in factyield onlyambiguous formilitary support technological determinism. Among the most revealingtendenciesin themis the absence of rigorous definition ofweaponscombinedwith to stress a tendency that specific pieces oftechnology wereactiveingredients in shaping military outcomes. In some cases, especiallyamong those who writeforthe generalreader, themachinesbecome quitecentral. As I. B. Holleyputs it, "even the mostcursory survey of military history the substantiates premisethatsuperior weapons givetheirusersan advantagefavoring victory."9 Scholarly writers moreoften emphasizethecontext in which suchtechnology mustfit and recognizeweaponsas partsofa system of armaments and institutions rather thanas isolateddevices.Butfew are clear about theboundariesofsuchsystems. A famous case is Blitzkrieg, treatedbelow. To some it was only Panzers and Stukas,to some a combination ofall arms,to some a higher orderofmartial and to skills, stillothers theproficiency oftheentireGermanwarmachine.Perhaps by a form ofdefault, whatoftenemergesfrom even the mostsophisticated assessments is a focuson specificmachinery. Loose definitions encouragetendenciestoward technological determinism. Mostoftheexamplescome from thegunpowder and industrial eras of Europe. W. H. McNeill'sarguments forthe decisiveness of Mesopotamianchariots and Chinesecross-bows are exceptional. Between1800 and 1500 B.C. two-wheeled archersequipped with chariotscarrying whichhad themtheMesopotamian cultures compoundbows overran selvesrisento dominanceby the earlyuse ofbronze armsand armor. In India charioteers disrupted the Indus civilization around 1500 B.C. and in ChinatheyconsolidatedthecontroloftheShangdynasty. They werecentralto theriseand fallofwholecultures. The comingofcheap ironfrom about 1200 B.C. in theMiddleEast,in turn, made armsand armoravailableto less culturally developedbut more numerouscomwho displacedthe "chariotaristocracies." petitors The Assyrians fora timegaineddominanceoverothersuchironinfantry groups byprofestheir forces. sionalising Theytheninvented light cavalry armed,again, with composite bows,but Central tookthistechnique Asianpastoralists overfrom about the 690s B.C. and became militarily invincible forthe nexttwothousandyears.The Iraniansinvented heavycavalryto keep the Asian nomad cavalryat bay, the Europeans-according to Lynn ofthestirrup-didthesame,creatWhite, Jr., because ofthediscovery ing feudalism, and the Chinese relied on the cross-bow to fend off
9. I. B. Holley,Ideas and Weapons (Hamden, Conn., 1971), 175.

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Mongols, Tartars, and theirrelatives. The cross-bow, invented as early as the 540s B.C., along withvariousgunpowder devices fromabout 1000 A.D., stopped the nomad cavalryoftenenough to preventthe permanent disruption ofChineseculture.In theend itwasonlyduring thesixteenth century A.D., with thewidespread Europeanintroduction ofhand-held firearms, thatthe ancient nomad cavalrywas itself conquered,both from the Westand the East. Thus,priorto the firearms and institutional, revolution, amongthemain military techniques economic and intellectual the rise and fallof ancient forcesgenerating empiresin East and Westand exerting clearlyargued forceson the shapingoftheworld's cultures, thechariotand cross-bow standout as specific and decisively influential mechanisms. Yet theythemselves emergedfromunique culturalcontexts, and standwith dozens oflesserdevices-such as thecomposite bow (which requiredeitherchariotsor horsesfor best effect and thusdid not produce an independent impact),metalbodyarmor, incendiary devices, siegeengines, and evenearlyChinesecannon and handguns-none of whichexertedthe same kindsof influences. Bothchariotsand crossbowsworked their wonders againstunequallyarmedopponents.They were technologicalmonopolies.Although he presentsno directevidence suchas accountsbywitnesses tobattleimpacts, testifying McNeill is not ambivalentin his claims. But forhim also the clear cases of technological domination are rare.For mostofancientwarfare things 10 otherthanweaponsprobably made mostofthedifference. In the modern era thereare a largernumberof well-discussed examplesof military technologicaldomination.McNeillis joined by Geoffrey Parker, CarloCipolla,Paul Kennedy, and others in pointing to theforces exerted by theEuropeangunpowder revolution.11 The Europeans had had chariots, but,accordingto McNeill, misusedthem.They counteredthenomad cavalry with their heavyknights, but theseseem to havebeen moreeffective in defense thanin offence, as shown bythe Crusades.Theyadoptedcross-bows aboutthesame timeas gunpowder,
10. W. H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology,Armed Forces, and Society since A.D.1 000 (Chicago, 1982), 10-20, 36-40, 60. On stirrups, see Lynn White,Jr.,Medieval Technologyand Social Change (Oxford,1962). He is also discussedin R. L. O'Connell's OfArms and Men, 87, 90, 92. 11. See Geoffrey Parker, The MilitaryRevolution:MilitaryInnovation and the Rise ofthe West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge,1988); Carlo Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400-1700 (London, 1965); and Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York,1987).

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Weapons War-Winning

longbows thatthemoreprimitive might suggest butCrecyand Poitiers era,their In theearlyphasesofthegunpowder ofEnglandwerebetter. on battlesthan big and smallgunsseemed to exertno moreinfluence Charles theyhad in China earlier.Butby 1494, whenthe Frenchking, guns werebecomingdominantin Europe.McNeill VIII, invadedItaly, both agree withearlierscholarsthattherewas a Parker and Geoffrey themilitary ascenand thatit was linkedwith revolution" "gunpowder So does Carlo Cipolla.13 dancyofEuropeansoverotherfolk.12 consisting mostly earlysiegeartillery, century, Duringthefifteenth ofgigantic proporwrought iron"bombardes"often ofbreech-loading used by European monarchsin thecentralizations,was increasingly especiallyin France,to smashcastlesand town tionofpoliticalpower, Thisartillery rivalfeudallordsand burghers. wallsand thusto suppress yearsof the latter did muchto drivethe Englishout of France during 14 Evenmoredramatic wastheuse ofartillery in theHundred YearsWar. in 1453; Cipollastresses thesuccessful Turkish siegeofConstantinople thesuperiorofthetechnology, showing clearly theEuropeancharacter But 1494 armsoverearlierAsian types.1s ityof Europeangunpowder bronzemuzzle-loaders, point.Bythisdate superior wastherealturning siegeoperawhich notonlyfacilitated byCharleson carriages mounted use, wereavailable in large tionsbut also enabled limitedbattlefield effects. Along withinfantry enough numbersto have two powerful the Frenchfieldguns began to ignitions, arquebuseswithmatchlock adopted shape the outcomesofland battles;all Europeanfieldforces led by theSpanish"tercios," firearms, bothartillery and thehand-held who combinedarquebuseswithpike,sword,and shieldtroopsinto a Theyweresoon imitated. combination.16 winning In addition,from1494 it was clear thatno medievalfortification this revolution, The result wasanother could standagainstartillery fire. with theItalians,Europebegan to timein defense Starting technology. fewerand largerthan medieval fortresses, build new cannon-proof and costlier.Theywereknownas the trace but much stronger works italienne, and thosewhobuiltthem,thatis, the main Europeanstates, in armaments; to all non-European invulnerable became defensively

12. McNeill,Pursuit ofPower, 79, and Parker,The MilitaryRevolution,9-12. 13. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, 28 and elsewhere. 14. McNeill,Pursuit ofPower, 83. 15. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, 93-94. 16. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, 28, and McNeill,Pursuit ofPower, 89-95.

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facttheywere largelyinvulnerable to theirown firepower as well,at leastuntiltheend oftheeighteenth century.17 However, both Parker and Kennedyalso pointout thatinsteadof bringingdecisive victories,withinEurope these new technologies brought stalemate. Theycame outoftheinterplay ofmarket forces and hostilecompetition betweenstatesas well as otherexclusively European circumstances; theybroughthuge changes in the natureand methods ofwar, but little since their advantageto innovators competitorsquickly imitated each new weapon.18 Parker Geoffrey sumsup the gunpowder revolution as follows:
in earlymodernEuropewas certainly Warfare transformed by three relateddevelopments-a newuse offirepower, important, a newtypeoffortifications, and an increasein army size. Butthe ofthetransformation timing was far and theimpactless slower, thanwas once thought.19 total,

Mostvictories weregained "through a strategy ofattrition,"20 that is,through theapplication ofquantity rather thanquality ofthemeans of military violence. Perhapsthisis not a surprising conclusionifan explicit distinction is made betweenchanging theexperienceofwaras opposed to the outcomesofbattle.The point remains,however, that thenewgunpowder armsdid little to changebattleoutcomes.Evenat thepointof introduction, wherethe innovative side had a monopoly, thedecisiveness ofimpactwas at best modest.As Cipolla putsit,"It is generally admitted thatat Ravennain 1512 and at Marignano in 1515 field battleswerewonby artillery for thefirst timein history, but ithas also to be admittedthatothercircumstances heavilyinfluenced the result ofthesebattles.-"21 If betterweapons withinEurope had marginaleffects, however, whenapplied againstless technologically developedpeople theydid
17. Parker,The MilitaryRevolution, 12; McNeill, Pursuit of Power,,90; and Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare:The Fortressin theEarly Modern World,14941660 (London, 1979), 1-2. 18. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 23-30, 31-72. Kennedy argues thatlimitedfundsas well as equivalentarmamentskeptEurope in military stalemate fromthe sixteenthto the eighteenthcenturies. M. E. Mallettand J. R. Hale, in The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c.1400 to 1617 (Cambridge,1984), whilearguing thatsuch revolutionary gunpowder changes occurredquite graduallyand should not be exaggerated, agree thattheywerevery evenlydistributed among the leading statesofthe day. 19. Parker,The MilitaryRevolution,43. 20. Ibid. 21. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, 28.

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appear to have spectacularimpacts.The example about whichthere is the thoughonly modestrecognition, seems to be mostagreement, with thegunintoAsian trade.Coinciding Portuguese naval incursion ocean-going of the long-range was the perfection powderrevolution as sailingship.In itsearlyforms sailingship,oftencalled theAtlantic to qualitiessuperior or nao, italreadyhad sea-keeping caravel,carrack, junks,whichhad otheradvanced typessuch as Chinese ocean-going decree. The confinedto home watersby government been recently difficult to manipartillery, still very brassmuzzle-loading newEuropean and bulk,was in land war because of weight ulate by muscle-power the mountedon the new ships,whichmovedit easilyby wind-power; to equisuperior Atlantic ship,thoughnot immensely cannon-armed valentChinese types,gave Europeans a unique means of projecting from base thanany otherpeople, to all islands military powerfurther and Vasco Da Columbus, Bartolome Dias, Christopher and continents. theglobal rangeofthisnewcomto demonstrate Gama werethe first showeditsdecisive followers immediate munications equipment;their effect. military thePortuguese oftheMalabarcoast werehostile, Because therulers theirway into Asian commerce in a series of one-sided had to fight thecoast in 1501. off with a majorengagement navalbattles, beginning werevery because the Portuguese Therewas a mutualone-sidedness, much outnumberedand because theiropponentswere completely outgunned.
thana battle,butitshouldstandout in It was a massacrerather to a prearnaval history as the first recordedsea battlefought action by squadronssailartillery as a stand-off rangedpattern line ahead.... The Atlantic-gunned sailing ingin close-hauled in theIndianOcean.22 irresistible shipwas quitesimply

consolidatedtheirmariIn subsequentsea battlesthe Portuguese it withfortified time ascendancy in Asian watersand supplemented landassaults fortresses proof against European-style bases equippedwith Asians. In the wordsof Carlo Cipolla, "The roar of by under-gunned EuropeanordnanceawakeChinese,Indiansand Japaneseto thefrighthad appeared alien people thatunexpectedly ofa strange, eningreality ofsuperwith the menace their coasts under and the protection along with thenatives' life." interfered weaponsand ruthlessly ior,formidable by thecannon.23 was facilitated Europeanimperialism
22. PeterPadfield,Tide ofEmpires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in theRise of the West,1481-1654 (London, 1979), 1:52. 23. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, 108.

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It played an almost equally decisive part at another turningpoint, the contest between Turks and Europeans for domination of eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. At the great galley battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Europeans carried 1,815 guns to the Turkish750. Otherwise the Turkswere at least equally formidable.Although the role of European artilleryhere was not as prominent as offMalabar seventyyears earlier,it helped to smash or seize two hundred Turkishgalleys and win a great victory.24 By this time, however, Portuguese naval supremacy had been successfullycountered by Asian powers who had acquired an equivalency in armaments, and the firstEuropean overseas empire went into slow retreat.25 But superior guns had done theirworkagainst weaker and fewerAsian guns. The case fortechnological superiority seems clear. Yet other factors were also veryimportantin the Asian break-in.Larger numbers ofguns suggest quantitative superiorityrather than technological advantage, and the role of the essentially nonmilitarygun-platform, the Atlantic sailing ship, was perhaps larger than that of the cannon. Furthermore, Bailey Diffieand George Winius, in theirassessment of the beginnings of the Portuguese empire, provide good examples of superior firepower at places like Diu in 1509 and Malacca in 151126 but nevertheless conclude that PorThe captureof Malacca strongly thatthebrilliant suggests feats ashorein Asiaweredue lessto thesuperior tuguese military armament or technology theEuropeanspossessedat sea thanto As at Goa, thePortuguese a superior and coordination. tenacity in Malacca wereexperienced in fighting as a team.27 soldiers They had military strengthin other than just technological areas. In the equally cataclysmic Spanish conquest of the Aztecs, superior arms seemed to be major reasons for what William Prescott called a "miraculous" victory.28 A mere "handful of adventurers,indifferently a mighty armed and equipped," he argued, overthrew civilizationinjust a fewmonths ofbattle, intrigue,and diplomacy.29A fewhundred Europeans faced thousands of Aztec warriorsin repeated pitched battles,
24. Parker,The MilitaryRevolution,87-88, 24. 25. Ibid., 104-6. 26. B. W. Diffieand G. D. Winius,Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580 (Minneapolis, 1977), 241, 256-57. 27. Ibid., 259. 28. William H. Prescott, The History of the Conquest of Mexico (Chicago, 1966), 373. 29. Ibid.

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War-Winning Weapons and generally won. In the final siege of Tenochtitlan in 1521 they foughtcontinuously forninety-three days. There is no doubt that the Aztecs contested the issue withthe highestdegree of resolution. There is also no question that their arms were inferior, being wood, stone, bone, and cotton, while Spanish equipment included small cannon, arquebuses, steel side arms, and steel armor. Even the cross-bowsof the conquistadores had great advantages in hittingand penetratingpower over Aztecs long-bows and lightjavelins.30 In his description of the battle, participant Bernal Diaz del Castillo again and again cites the firepower of cannon, arquebuses, and cross-bowsas the key to victory. In the second desperate battle against the Tlascalans on 5 February 1519, Diaz explains that The steadfastness of our artillery, and bowmen musketeers, did muchto save us, and we inflicted greatcasual[crossbows] ties on them.... One thingalone saved our lives:the enemy wereso massedand so numerous thatevery shotwrought havoc amongthem.31 On the other hand, he also stressed the value of the horse. It was the charges of the small squadron of heavy armored lancers at Otumba, says Diaz, who won another desperate day.32And ofcourse the skilland courage of the Spanish swordsmen, contrasting with inept Aztec tactics, as well as a whole range of other factors,also played theirpart in the victory.The Europeans had many advantages. Most historians, in fact, play down technology. Prescott himself concludes that intrigue and diplomacy were the most important factors. "The Indian empire was in a manner conquered by Indians."33 J. H. Parryspells out some ofthe doubts about technological superiority. The armywith whichCortesinvadedMexicohad a few cannon, takenout of the shipsat Vera Cruzand carriedalong withthe thenby Indianauxiliararmy.Theywerehauledfirst by sailors, ies,and finally mountedon boats on Lake Texcoco for thesiege of Tenochtitlan. smalland probably Theymusthavebeen very notvery no doubttheir effective noiseand smoke pieces,though made a greatimpression. the cannon, Corteshad Apartfrom thirteen muskets.Horses were perhaps more important than
30. See Alberto Mario Salas, Las Armas De La Conquista (Buenos Aires, 1950). 31. Bernal Diaz, The Conquest of New Spain (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963), 149. 32. Ibid.,303-5. 33. Prescott, Conquest ofMexico,374.

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fire-arms....BernalDiaz on several occasionsattributed victory 'under God, to the horse',but Corteshad only sixteenhorses whenhe landedand some oftheseweresoon killed inbattle.For themostparthismen fought on foot with sword, pikeand crossbow. Theyhad theadvantageofsteel overstone;but they were nota well-equipped Europeanarmyfighting a hordeofhelpless savages.34

Parry's figures are misleading. Up to the first breakoutfrom Tenochtitlan,Diaz counted twenty-seven cavalry, crossbows eighty and eighty in a force musketeers ofthirteen hundred men.35 Nevertheless, instead ofclear assertions about the impactofconquistadoreweaponsadvantages,thereis again ambivalenceabout technology. There is also ambivalenceabout weapons advantagesthroughout the subsequentEuropeaninvasionofAmerindian territory during the settlement of the Americas.None of the Americantribeswerebetter armed than the Aztecs. Most subsequent white settlershad more advanced, more accurate, fastershootingguns than the conquistadores.Yetthefrontiers in North for America, example,advancednotin responseto technological and military superiorities, but at the rate of European migration and land occupation,and at the speed of relatively close agricultural settlement. Where theAmnerindians werenotin effect swampedby superior ofEuropeanmigrants, numbers theymanaged to hold on to territories and cultures forverymuch longerthan theAztecs,or theIncas. Yet thereare some striking examples of weapons superiority in European-Amerindian conflict. Amongthebestis Samuel Champlain's fight withthe Iroquois in 1609. In order to cement the furtrading alliance with the Huronand AlgonquinIndians,on whomthesurvival of New France seemed to depend, Champlain,twootherFrenchmen, and their threearquebuses joined their Indian partners on a warparty againstthe Iroquoisliving near whatwas latercalled Lake Champlain. On the day of battle, as the two bands of warriors came together, Champlain advancedto thirty yards range,"tookaim with myarquebus and shotstraight at one ofthethreechiefs, and with thisshottwofell to theground, and one oftheir companionswas woundedwhodied thereofa little later.I had putfour bulletsintomyarquebus."Whenanother oftheFrenchmen fired hispiece also, the Iroquoisbrokeand fled.36
34. J. H. Parry, The Age ofReconnaissance (New York,1964), 143-44. 35. Diaz, Conquest ofNew Spain, 305. 36. Quoted in Morris Bishop, Champlain: The Life of Fortitude (Toronto, 1963), 128.

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Champlain'sbiographer MorrisBishop concludes that "at Ticonderoga, on the green shore of Champlain'slake, was firedthe first musket shotin a warthatwas to continue,in effect, fortwohundred years."ThiswasthewarbetweentheFrench and theIroquois, so vitalin theimperial for North America."Thebattlewaswon,as we competition are told,warsare usuallywon,by the NewWeapon. This new weapon was to transform completely the warsof red men and white, and red men and red."37Indeed, accordingto some authorities, the Iroquois concentrated on gainingtheirown firearms superiority by tradewith the Dutchand English;withthisadvantagein musketry theybecame the most formidable warriors in eastern NorthAmerica duringthe seventeenth century.38 WhileChamplain'smighty shotis clearlya technological triumph, however, itslargehistorical impactis no longerwidely accepted.39 Nor is therelatedfirearms superiority ofthe Iroquoisundisputed; the Indians allied to Francewereprobably as heavily gunnedas theIroquois.40 Judging by the scarcityof commenton weapons technology in the historical ofEuropeanconflict literature in thecolonwith Amerindians ial period,41 and considering all theotherfactors in thewhite involved takeover ofNorth America, whatever influence did weaponstechnology exertseems clearlyto havebeen marginal indeed. But whatabout the settingup of the British Raj in India in the eighteenth century?European technologicaladvantageseems clear. Superior field and tightly artillery controlled wielded flintlock musketry, by Europeansor European-trained sepoys, dominated all Indianbattlefields at leastfrom Plassyin 1757 onwards. The cruderheavygunsand obsoletematchlocks oftheIndiannativeforces wereeverywhere defeated.42Whileagreeingwiththisview,WilliamMcNeill,however, argues moreforinstitutional superiority thantechnological advantage.It was ofclose orderdrill, thedevelopment which especially allowedtheuse of volleyfire, whichin turnextractedthe maximumpossible firepower
37. Ibid., 128. 38. See forexample RichardAquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier,1701-1754 (Detroit,1983), 37. 39. See Bruce Trigger,Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Kingstonand Montreal,1985), 307-10. 40. For a discussionofIroquois gun supplies,see George Hunt,The Wars ofthe Iroquois: A Study in IntertribalTrade Relations (Madison, Wisc., 1967), 165-75. 41. For example, probablythe best book on American colonial wars says very littleon firearms. See Douglas Leach, Armsfor Empire: A MilitaryHistoryof the BritishColonies in NorthAmerica, 1607-1 763 (New York,1973). 42. Parker,The MilitaryRevolution,133-36.

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and shock effect from smoothbore the inaccurate,slow-loading flintlockmusket. Volley fire was first developed bythetwoprincesofNassau at the end of the sixteenth refinedinto centuryand subsequently machine-like perfection theGreat'sPrussian by Frederick This infantry. was the real source of European global superiority duringthe eighteenth In other century.43 itwasalso professionalism, words, standardization, ofsuperior and projection concentration, and dozens resources, ofother things besidesweaponssuperiority, which made thedifference. It was not so muchtheguns,butthesystems whichused themand the waysthey wereused. Before thepreindustrial leaving one other world, exampleofalleged weapons superiority stands out in Englishlanguage historiography, especiallyof the Americankind.This is the triumph of the Kentucky long rifle, and the story of Patrick Ferguson's breech-loading antidote to it. Here was a case of non-Europeans seemingly applying superior in thefirst technology greatNewWorldrevolt againstEuropeanimperialism. It is stillan articleoffaith among popularAmerican historians thattheindigenous and ingenious Kentucky, or Pennsylvania, longrifle played a major role in winningindependence.Withit farmers and frontiersmen could pickoff theRedcoatsat twoor three times therange ofBritish muskets. The Americanrifles wereas accurateas anyfirearm in existenceand much more accurate than armyissue BrownBess smoothbores. Theywere unique because unlikeslow-loading foreign rifles, theywere fastloading. The Americanloading secret was the greasedpatch.Insteadoftrying tojam thebulletintotherifling grooves ofthebarrelby main forcetheAmericans slippedtheir smaller bullets down the barrelsmoothly withthe aid of a piece of greasedcloth or leather. The threebiggest rifle victories oftheRevolutionary Warwere SaratogaunderDaniel Morganin 1777, King'sMountainin 1780, and Cowpens,again under Daniel Morgan,in 1781. Saratoga and King's Mountain are bothregarded as majorturning pointsin thewar. But did thisAmericanriflereallywin the war? In the wordsof hardware expertM. L. Brown, "The romantic nonsensepurveyed over theyears bynumerous historians has exaggerated beyondcredencethe role of the Americanriflein the War of Independence."44The supposedlyinnovative greasedpatchwas commonlyused in Europefrom at leastthe 1590s.45 The British had muzzle-loading Jaeger rifles every
43. McNeill,Pursuit ofPower,,128-35. 44. M. L. Brown,Firearms in Colonial America, 1492-1792 (Washington, 1980), 335. 45. Ibid., 263.

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mostof the rifles, thoughless numerous, bit as good as Pennsylvania just liketheBritish, smooth-bores troopswereequippedwith American from musketbayonetcharges werecutto piecesbyBritish and riflemen armed troopsmore oftenthan theyshot up such troopsby superior rifle tech;iolhad thesuperior In facttheBritish shooting.46 long-range produced Regiment ogy. In 1776 PatrickFergusonof the Seventieth rifleon limited practicalbreech-loading whatwas probablythe first advanced usedthis and hisspecialunitofexperts troops, issueto regular but weapon withsuccess on severaloccasions. It firedas accurately by was killed rifle. ButFerguson thantheAmerican muchmorequickly enemies at King's Mountain,a contestbetween two his rifle-armed rifles Ferguson on one side and one hundred thousand Americanrifles volumeof Superior on the other.47 muskets plus one thousandBritish did not. technology theday.Superior did carry accuratefire so far, industrialithedoubtsaboutweapons'decisiveness Whatever appeared to make European armacentury zation in the nineteenth The overwhelming. unequivocally cultures overother mentsadvantages by means ofsuperior wereoverrun partsofAsia and Africa remaining Despite all sorts of handicaps, argues Daniel Headrick, firepower. wereable to conquer largepartsofAsia and Africa "Europeanforces lowcost. Napoleonicproportions-atan astonishingly empiresoftruly ofEuropeanfiresuperiority Whatmade thispossiblewas thecrushing of mid-century."48 revolution powerthat resultedfromthe firearms magofbreech-loading bythe 1870s saw theperfection Thisrevolution accuraterangesoutto four with effective and machine-guns azine rifles thousandmeters.There are plentyof examples of theirdevastation. and iron steamersto railways, who adds telegraphs, Parker, Geoffrey European ascendancy points to the long-sought the breech-loaders, overChina and Japangained at Canton in 1841 and at Kagoshimain navyin 1854 overtheTurkish 1863. He also notesthe Russianvictory by means of iron-cladsteamerspittedagainstwooden sailingships. foundedupon the milsuperiority, "Thanksabove all to theirmilitary thewestern centuries, and seventeenth ofthesixteenth revolution itary in history."49 globalhegemony nationshad managedto createthefirst
46. Ibid., and see also Joe D. Huddleston,Colonial Riflemenin theAmerican Revolution (York, Pa., 1978), and James B. Bright,"The Riflein Washington's The American Rifleman,August,1947. Army," 47. Brown,Firearms in Colonial America, 346-47. and European Impe48. Daniel R. Headrick,The Tools ofEmpire: Technology rialism in the NineteenthCentury(Oxford,1981), 84. 49. Parker,The MilitaryRevolution,154.

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by citinga series of argument his firepower Headrickillustrates and Italian of French,British, exampleswheresmall numbers African In equipped tribespeople. soldiersshotto pieces hordesof primitively 25,000 1891, forexample,"a Frenchdetachmentof300 men, firing in a two and a halfhourbattle,defeatedthe roundsof ammunition In the best knowncase, Omdurmanin 1898, entireFon army."50 moweddown eleven thousand Kitchener's Maximsand Lee Metfords thebattlehe does not hours.5'One oftheimagesfrom in five Dervishes cases at the heaps of emptycartridge mentionis the pictureof rising general in the firing lines. Duringthe first infantry feetof the British thousandrounds some twohundred fired Mahdist assaultthe infantry or half sixthousand alone, killing ammunition ofsmall-arms dervishes, theassaultforce.52 superfirepower does admitthatevensuchoverwhelming Headrick natives ioritydid not alwaysbringvictories.Occasionally ill-armed as at Adowa in 1896, wherethe whiteforces, could wipeout invading wipedout a seventeenthousandman Italianand auxiliary Ethiopians had accumulateda thatthe Ethiopians however, army.He does stress, large stockof modernor nearlymodernEuropean weaparticularly in 1879. Abouttenthousand Isandlwhana He does notmention pons.53 command Zulusoverran eighteenhundredmen of Lord Chelmsford's Martinion relatively open groundin thefaceofrapidand devastating ammuniopeningtheir had trouble rifle fire. ItseemstheBritish Henry were tion boxes and ran out of bullets. It is also clear thatAfricans In Europeanfirepower.54 superior occasionallycapable ofovercoming to nineteenth century of fifteenth effects a special studyof firearms a numberofexperts in 1971 in theJournalofAfricanHistory, Africa between and in wars conflict that bothin terms ofinter-African stressed Gavin was limited. the impact of firearms Europeans and Africans in firearms of impact "the articlestatedthat in his introductory White was not as decisiveas had been expected."55 Humwarfare African in discussing gunsin theSudan, and Virginia Rowland, J. Fisher phrey mayhave had, on variousoccasions in concludedthat"whilefirearms
50. Headrick,Tools ofEmpire, 117. 51. Ibid, 117-18. A Good Dusting: A CentenaryReview of the Sudan 52. HenryKeown-Boyd, Campaigns, 1883-1899 (London, 1986), 224-36. 53. Headrick, Tools of Empire, 120. Note that Headrick spells "Adowa" as Aduwa. 54. Donald R. Morris,The Washing of the Spears (London, 1973), 374-75. 55. Gavin White,"Firearmsin Africa:An Introduction,"Journal qf African History12 (1971): 173-84.

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and perhapseven the fifteenth the sixteenth the CentralSudan from centuryonwards,a sudden dramatic impact, yet this impact was we S6 J.J.Guycomments on theZuluwars:"While sustained." nowhere caused by cannot deny the physicaldamage and the demoralization to emphasizethe in Zululand,it is clearlymisleading fire-power British in the of the major engagements and the importance role of firearms war,and to ignorethe broadersocial and politicalissues Anglo-Zulu 57 thatwereinvolved." was only admitthatfirepower themselves and Parker BothHeadrick discussion oftheEuropeans.Headrick's superiority partofthematerial of weapons impact covers 43 out of a total of 210 pages on the full expantheimperial during advantages rangeofEurope'stechnological Weapons share influenceover noncentury. sion of the nineteenth items. and other telegraphs, railroads, drugs, steamships, with Europeans superior werevastly generally It is also obviousthatEurope'sresources domination. had a lotto do with thatsheerwealth to "native" resources, Europeans could project theirpersonnel,machines, food supplies, and maintain tribes, to the furthest and even amusements medicines, home base. Weaponswere at greatdistancesfrom troopsand settlers impact firepower claimsfor strong one superiority amongmany.While remain, theyare neitherquantifiedas to approximatedegree nor undisputed. wonbattleswhenonlyone side had Ifsuperior weaponssometimes in a contextof victory has brought them,the cases wheretechnology culturalequivalency-wherethe combatantshave had at least equal the latestweaponstechnologies, and applying ofproducing capability to in equal quantities-are stillmore difficult thoughnot necessarily involved, complexities thetechnological find. It maybe thatthehigher outcomesbecome. Perhapsthemost themoreambiguousthemilitary weaponsimpactexamplesare the century twentieth recognized widely tanks,and heavybombers. The influenceof cases of machine-guns, is disputed. each, however, is a case fordecisivenessin reverse.Instead of The machine-gun them.It made thedefense itis said to haveprevented victories, gaining between trenches and stalemate thuscreating to theoffence, superior but the to trench warfare, 1914 and 1918; othernewarmscontributed influence. was theoutstanding machine-gun
in theCentralSudan," J. Fisherand VirginiaRowland,"Firearms 56. Humphrey Journal ofAfricanHistory12(1971): 215-39, especially237-38. 57. J.J. Guy,"A Note on Firearmsin the Zulu KingdomwithSpecial Reference War,1879," Journal ofAfricanHistory12 (1971): 557-70. to theAnglo-Zulu

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In 1877 Dr. Richard Gatling explained whyhe invented his 250 shot per minute hand-cranked black powder machine-gun. Having seen the veryhigh incidence of mortalityfrombattle wounds and illness during the Civil War,it occurred to him that IfI could invent a machine,a gun,which could byitsrapidity of fire enable one man to do as muchbattleduty as a hundred, that it would, to a great extent,supersedethe necessityof large armies,and consequently, exposureto battle and disease be greatly diminished. I thought over the subject and finally this idea tookpracticalform in theinvention oftheGatling Gun.58 The gun would diminishwarfare.But his gun was the fourth main multishot device of the machine-gun type introduced during the Civil War, none ofwhichwere successful.59 After the war,however,the Gatling was perfectedand saw service in the American West against Indians and in the British Empire where it shared battle honors with similar handcranked Gardiner and Nordenfeld guns. Even more famous was the French MontignyMitrailleuse,whichactually beat the Gatling Gun in a French army competition. It is widelybelieved that ifthe French command had trained the Mitrailleusecrews adequately and had used it for infantry supportratherthan as artillery duringthe Franco-Prussianwar, the French mighthave won, as indeed the French press had expected. The Mitrailleusewas supposed to be theirsecret weapon, theiredge. But it was mismanaged.60 Perhaps it was also overestimated. In the opinion of hardware experts it was so poorly designed that it was "the laughing stock of most militarymen in Europe outside of France. . .. Actually the Germans were fullyaware of what the gun could and couldn't do, and theymerelydeployed theirinfantry so the Mitrailleusewould waste ammunition."'61The French had done betterwiththeirnew bolt-action single-shot breech-loading infantry rifle, the Chassepot, which itself had been touted as the antidote to the Prussian Dryse Needle-gun, mislead-

58. Quoted in William B. Edwards, Civil War Guns (Secaucas, N.J., 1962), 233. 59. Ibid., 232-33. 60. For example, see C. H. B. Pridham,SuperiorityofFire: A Short Historyof Riflesand Machine-Guns (London, 1945), 28-29; Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970 (Bungay, Suffolk, 1984), p. 18; and Kenneth Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact ofScience on Weapon Developmentand Modern Battle (London, 1986), 23. 61. W. H. B. Smith,Small Arms ofthe World(Harrisburg, Pa., 1962), 100.

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ingly credited with winning the Austro-Prussianwar of 1866 by the losing side.62 automatic water-cooledweapon But then came Hiram Maxim's fully in 1885, and a revolution in warfarewas at hand. The standard view of its impact is that despite the firepowerlessons of small wars like the Russo-Japaneseand Boer wars,in which machine-guns along withmagcould anniartillery recoiling-gun-carriage azine riflesand quick-firing attack, European generals seriouslyunderestimated hilate any infantry the defensivepotency of the new technology. Tactics were adjustedbetter by some than others-but not enough to preventtrench warfare before the end of WorldWar Major C. H. B. Pridham,writing attrition.63 II, feltthat if the machine-gun had been more completely utilized by the Britishit would have speeded victoryin World War I, and that it remained a decisive weapon into 1945.64 Both J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hartbelieved it dominated the World War I battlefield.As John Ellis put it, Frontit had been the machinegun morethan On the Western Chamtheattackers at Verdun, anything else thathad destroyed were infantry pagne or Passchendale.Because ofit unprotected lines in suffithegap betweenthetrench incapable ofcrossing them.65 to puncha gap through cientnumbers One of the most vivid recent illustrations of machine-gun impact is Martin Middlebrook's analysis of the firstday of the Somme. As the advanced out of theirtrenches into No Man's Land, Britishinfantry The first were soon in action and foundeasy machine-guns some ofthegaps in theBritish targets.... The Germansspotted soon turnedthese narrowalleys wireand theirmachine-guns intodeath-traps.... Itwas in theseopen spaces in themiddleof foundtheir No Man's Land thatthe Germanmachine-gunners of choicesttargets. Fromtheirtrenchescame the 'tac-tac-tac' theguns as theytraversed to and froalong the endlesslines of Wave advancingmen. Wholewavesweresweptoverby thefire.

62. See Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Koniggratz (London, 1964), 184-85, and D. E. Showalter, "Railroadsand Rifles:The Influenceof Technological Development on German Military Thought and Practice, 1815-1866," University of Minnesota Ph.D., 1969, 428, 478. 63. Bond, War and Society in Europe, 101-2 and elsewhere. Until recent writings specifiedbelow,thedefensive ofthe machine-gun superiority was an article of faith in military historiography. 64. Pridham, SuperiorityofFire, 53-136. 65. JohnEllis, The Social Historyofthe Machine Gun (London, 1975), 169.

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afterwave of the Geordies were cut down but stilltheykept fired the Germanmachine-gunners comingon.... Furiously target.66 beltafter beltofbulletsintothisfantastic By the end of the day 57,470 Britishsoldiers were down, a casualty rate of 75 percent whichwas never equalled in a British battle. The Germans lost 8000 men, one foreveryseven theycut down.67 Denis Winter,in one of the fewgood and detailed historicalassessments of weapons performance in combat conditions, adds the followof the machine-gun: ing technical reasons forthe effectiveness Thisrather wasthetrump cardofthemachinethanspeed offire themachine-gun became a nervegun-accuracy. On itstripod teeth,dripping less weapon; the human factorof chattering A terror-stricken sweat and faecesin man'spantswaseliminated. Moreaccurately evenbynight. man could fire hismachine-gun over the weapon,thoughwiththe firepowerof fifty riflemen, and thuspresenteda occupied a front just two feetin length, minutetarget to enemysnipersor batteries.The end product one couldholdup a brigade; wasindisputable. Six machine-guns from had got200 yards before they guncould halttwobattalions opinionitwasthemachine-gun their front line. In LiddellHart's above all otherweaponswhich heldthearmiesfast.68 After all thissupportingdetail, however,neitherWinternor Middlebrook can agree withearlier writersthat the World War I machine-gun was in facta decisive shaper ofbattle outcomes. It contributed,but did not dominate. Winterlists it as one of a group of deadly new weapons, Often rifleswere more deadly. "The and not always the most effective. real killer was the sniper," causing more casualties overall than more formidableseeming armaments.69As forthe machine-gun massacre of the Somme, Middlebrook himself concludes that the slaughter was caused by two basic Britishmistakes,failureto concentrate a sufficient quantityofartillery against the objective, and the tactical erroroflifting the finalartillery barrage too soon, thus allowing the Germans to get to their machine-guns while the assaulting infantrywere still some distance fromthe German trenchesbut fully exposed in open ground.70
66. Martin Middlebrook, The First Day On the Somme, 1 July 1916 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,1984), 123-25, 141. 67. Ibid., 263-64. 68. Denis Winter, Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,1979), 112. 69. Ibid., 90. 70. Middlebrook, First Day on the Somme, 278-87.

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Current leadingweapons scholarsdo not highlight the role of the machine-guneither. ShelfordBidwell and Dominick Graham, for example,agree thatweapons technology was a vitalshapingforcein WorldWarI, but so werelogistics, and economic, social and political factors. Of theweaponstheydiscussin detailtheystress As artillery.71 Ian Hoggstates, Themachine gun,in thehands ofbothsidesin theFirst World War, becamea potent factor. Itwasnever a major killing device, as hasoften beenasserted; this dubious distinction belonged to theartillery, sincemedical records eventually showed that somelike60 per cent of casualties thing came from artillery fire, 30 percentfrom about small arms fire, andtheremainder from grenades, gas,andother weapons.72 In his detailedassessments of WorldWarI weaponsand tactics, John Terraine also neglects in favor machine-guns ofother newarmaments.73 Artillery wasmoredevastating thanall theother arms;combinations of weaponswereinvolved in all ofthe important fights, and "The idea of the machine-gun as a supremekilleris literary, not historical."74 He disagreeswithhistorians such as Ellis and Pridham whobelievedthat theBritish misunderstood and misusedmachine-guns, to theirserious military disadvantage. BrianBond,in hiseffective summation ofmuch of thiskindof scholarship, notes briefly that"Fire powerand barbed wireruled out mobile cavalryoperationsand renderedunsupported infantry attackssuicidal,"75 and agrees thatrifles and machine-guns together "had giventhe defensive a markedadvantage,"76 but neither emphasizesmachine-guns by themselves nor discussesthe impact of weaponsin detail;weaponry as a shapingforce seemed to be marginal to themanyotherfactors on warfrom operating thecivilian world, and from warback on society. No recent scholar seems to agree withthe older view that the machine-guns exerciseda specificand measurableimpact on Allied or indeed anybody's defeats, defeats. Norhas anyoneseen fit to try to
71. ShelfordBidwelland Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: BritishArmyWeapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (London, 1982), and ShelfordBidwell, Gunners at War:A Tactical StudyoftheRoyal Artillery in the TwentiethCentury (London, 1970). 72. Ian Hogg, The Weapons that Changed the World (London, 1986), 28. 73. JohnTerraine,WhiteHeat: The New Warfare,1914-18 (London, 1982). 74. John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Mythsand Anti-Myths of War, 1861-1945 (London, 1980), 132. 75. Bond, War and Society in Europe, 102. 76. Ibid., 101.

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measure such an impact in detail, except perhaps in the negative sense of Bidwell,Terraine, and Middlebrook. The tank seems to be a better example of a battle winner. In many ways its impact as an example of militarytechnology has been more rigorouslyassessed than any other allegedly decisive weapon. There were the usual early disagreementsabout the impact. It won at Cambrai in 1917 and at Amiens in 1918; clearly it won in Poland in 1939, in France in May 1940, and in Russia between Julyand December 1941, when it was the central technology of the German Blitzkrieg.But again there are ambiguities. Its decisiveness in World War I, when it was an Anglo-French monopoly and thus potentially in its most influential mode, is most often measured in terms of overcoming the previous decisiveness of the machine-gun. To John Ellis, the tank was the technological antidote to the machine-gun.77To the principal architect of modern tank warfare, J. F. C. Fuller,78neither the "bayonet school" of militarythinkers,advocating frontalassaults against entrenched firepower, nor the "shell school," proposing to pulverize enemy trenches by weight of artillery, had a solution to the stalemate of the Western Front. That solution was the "tank idea," or armored warfare.The tank, or "self-propelled armored artillery," revolutionizedcombat as follows: It increasedmobility bysubstituting mechanicalpowerfor muscle; it increasedsecurity by neutralizing thebulletwith armour plate; and it increasedoffensive powerby relieving the soldier from the necessity ofcarrying his weaponsand the horsefrom haulingthem.Because the tankprotected the soldierdynamically,it enabled him to fight statically; it superimposed naval tacticson land warfare.79 At Cambrai on 20 November 1917, a massed Britishtank attack broke rightthroughthe German defenses. Unfortunately this was almost as big a surprise for the British command as for the Germans. Thus "although this battle showed that a true solution of the stalemate had been discovered, lack of reserves led to tactical failure,and it was not untilthe battle ofAmiens thaton a grand scale the same solution led to

77. Ellis,Social Historyofthe Machine Gun, 169. 78. For Fuller'srole as tankwarfare innovator, see A. J.Trythall, "Boney"Fuller: Soldier, Strategistand Writer, 1878-1966 (New Brunswick, N.J.,1977), 70, 274, and elsewhere,and Kenneth Macksey,The Tank Pioneers (London, 1981), 220 and elsewhere. 79. J. F. C. Fuller,The Decisive Battles ofthe WesternWorldand Their Influence Upon History (London, 1963), 3: 279.

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complete success."80 When Allied victory was finallyachieved, "The nearly universal reason alleged forthe German defeat was the employment of tanks in masses by the Allied Powers.81 Most historians agree with Fuller, at least in broad terms. B. H. Liddell Hart supports his fellowtank lobbyist fully.82 In basic terms,so does Fuller'sbiographer,AnthonyTrythall.83 Less directly, so does A. J. Smithers; although they still had many defects in the 1918 battles, tanks were clearly effectivein breaking German resistance, and furthermore, The number ofinfantry livesthey had savedis beyondcomputation.To putthefigures intothehideousperspective ofFirst War losses,theTank Corpshad in ninety-six dayssuffered less than manyan infantry division in a singleday on theSomme.84 The machine-gun had been overcome. But the tanks have critics too. John Terraine points out theirmany limitations in combat, especially their mechanical unreliabilityand vulnerability to German fieldartillery, and concludes that "No tanks of the First World War were war-winnersby themselves."85 Bidwell and Graham agree. BetweenCambraiand thebreaching ofthe Hindenburg system at the end of September1918, the tankswereconceived,variously,as armouredcavalry, as armouredinfantry and as selfpropelledartillery. Visionaries, lookingforward to 1919, imagined themas landshipsemployedin fleets.But the dominant factaboutthetankwas thatitwas notdurable.AtCambrai, 324 fighting tankswerecommitted, notincluding supply tanks, wire pullers, wireless tanksand tankscarrying bridging material and cable. Attheend ofthefirst 71 day 65 had receiveddirecthits, had brokendown, 43 were ditchedand many othersneeded minorrepairs. The casualtieson 8 August 1918 werehigher still and reflectedimprovingGerman anti-tankartillery.Four hundred and fourteen started, butonly145 wererunners on the second day,85 on thethird, 38 on thefourth and 6 remained on
80. Ibid., 279. 81. Ibid., 296. 82. B. H. Liddell Hart,The Tanks: A Historyof the Royal Tank Regimentand its Predecessors Heavy Branch Machine-Guns Corps, Tank Corps and Royal Tank Corps, 1914-1945 (London, 1959), 1:154, 185. 83. Trythall, "Boney"Fuller,35, 56, 66, and elsewhere. 84. A. J. Smithers, A New Excalibur: The Developmentofthe Tank, 1909-1939 (London, 1988), 212-24. 85. Terraine,WhiteHeat, 224, 238-46.

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thefifth.... Neither men nor machineswereofmuchuse on a seconddayoffighting.... After thewartheimpression remained amonginfantrymen thattanksweredecisivein set-piece battles butonlya useful auxiliary in theextended fighting that followed.86 These critics argue that no single technology dominated the world of trenchwarfare,thoughartillery came closest. They are not prepared to support either machine-guns or tanks as battle winners. First the stalemate and then the breakthroughswere shaped by the whole range of complex wartime factors,both material and human. Denis Winter, withoutspecificallydiscussing tanks,relegates technologyas a whole to a subordinate role; The artifacts of the twentieth centurycommingledwiththe thought processesof prehistoric man. Infantry became merely hunters and hunted,whiletechnologists in khakimanipulated theprimitive cutting edge oftheir sophisticated tools.87 back-up Even Fuller himselfdid not emphasize the tank as an isolated piece of war-winningtechnology. It was not the machine, but rather the tactical system which he stressed. Terms like tank and armor were merely short formsforquite complex militaryinstitutions.In explaining his Plan 1919-where he proposed entire motorized and armored armies consisting of thousands of tanks, lorries, aircraft,and other vehicles-for the defeat of Germany in the event thatthe 1918 offensive failed,he argued: Had thewarlastedanother year, itwouldhavebecome apparent that in themselves tanksand aircraft were not weapons,but insteadvehiclesin whichanything could be carriedup to their maximum loads. Further, it would havebeen seen thatas their dominant characteristic was a new means of movement, made practical bythecommonprime-mover, petroleum, new entirely fighting organizations could be built around them-namely, self-propelled armouredarmiesand airbornearmies,and not merely self-propelled armoured gunsand airborne artillery.88 The shortformforthis new type of army was tank army,and Plan 1919 became the blueprint forBlitzkrieg. The point is, however,thatthe tank itself-not an individual weapon in Fuller's view-was only a part of a larger institutionalizedwhole. Neverthelesswas the tank itself decisive later on in Blitzkrieg? Heinz Guderian usually shares withFuller the status of foundingfather of tank
86. Bidwelland Graham,Fire-Power,137-38. 87. Winter, Death's Men, 128. 88. Fuller,Decisive Battles,3:379-80.

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warfare. He relatesa conversation withHitlerin 1939 on one of the Polish battlefields. "Atthesight ofthesmashedartillery regiment, Hitler had asked me: 'Our dive bombersdid that?'When I replied'No, our panzers!'he was plainlyastonished."89 Butaside from such rhetorical muchexploited by the media thenand since, forthe most flourishes, part Guderian, with other World War II Blitzkrieg practitioners,90 stressed thatthekeyweaponsfeature ofGermanarmoredforces was in facta combinationofall armsrather thana relianceon a singletechnology.The panzersthemselves wereimportant, but onlyas partsofa coordinatedgroupingof arms; artillery and panzer grenadiers with small arms, not to mention Luftwaffe tactical air support,were all But Fullerand Liddell Hart were also chagrinedthat it was the Germansand not the British whobuiltthesuccessful Blitzkrieg instrument. They,and supporting historians, have tended to explain this failure in wayswhich putthefocus back on thehardware. The Germans in 1939 had a lot more tanksthan the British, organizedinto coordinated armored forces,and theyhad bettertanks as well. The best British tankwas the Matilda,as A. J. Smithers states,named after"a duckin a contemporary comic strip" because ofthewayitwaddledat a mere eightmilesper hour;it could "absorbendlesspunishment" but inflict verylittle.92 By contrast the GermanPZKWIs, Ils, IIIs and IVs, while very basic,weremuchsuperior. The Germantankswerenot,however, superior to thebest French and indeedprovedto be inferior tanks, to theSovietT-34s.Nordid the Germanshavethelargest oftanks.The Frenchhad almostas numbers many,and the Russianshad a lot more. Blitzkrieg victories, therefore, werenottankvictories no matter howmuchthesemachinesfeatured in them.Theywereprobably victories ofsuperior tacticaland operational methodratherthan of technology.93 in them Indeed the technology was neithernew nor did the Germanshave a monopolyor even an edge. By 1942 and 1943 tanksfought in tanks, sometimes, as at Kursk,
89. Heinz Guderian,Panzer Leader (Aylesbury, Bucks,1976), 73. 90. See for example F. W Von Mellenthin,Panzer Battles: A Study of the EmploymentofArmor in the Second World War (Norman, Okla., 1971), xv-xvi and elsewhere. 91. See Guderian, Panzer Leader; Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg (London, 1976); and BryanPerrett, LightningWar: A HistoryofBlitzkrieg(London, 1985), 69-98. 92. Smithers, A New Excalibur, 266-75. 93. Raudzens,"Blitzkrieg ambiguities."

absolutely vital.91Fuller agreed.

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rather thanqualitywhich greatattrition battleswhereit was numbers ofthetankhas not made the difference. The case forthedecisiveness been demonstrated technologically. A consensus is The technologicalanalysis has been thorough. No scholaris nowlikely to credit thetank,Germanor otheremerging. wise,with an unaidedimpacton theoutcomesofmodernwar.Evenas comprising major partsof modern partofa complexweaponssystem institutions itwas not decisive.The mosttechnically armsand military the German,won some battlesbut lost othersand proficient system, thewar. War ofWorld ButifBritain did nothavegood tankson theoutbreak in Europe.While bomberforce heavy II, itdid havetheonlylong-range influeneven Fullerdid not putthetankforward as a wonder-weapon, in Britain bomber tialairwarenthusiasts emphatically sawthestrategic as a war-winner. It seems that one reason for the poor tanks was moneywentintobombers.94 because so muchofBritain's rearmament The onlyotherforce Fortress ofthistypewastheAmericanB-17Flying in combat readinessbut wellahead of armada,lagging behind Britain the restof the world.The British Lancasterand the B-17both have a of decisivenessis powerful continuing media image. The impression as strongas forthe tank.The historical impact is probably probably for thisnewweaponwereunrivalled greater. Certainly theexpectations at thestart ofthewar. The story of thebeginnings ofair forcesis familiar enoughto dispense withreiteration, but the propheciesforheavybombersbear in America, Giulio Douhet in Italy, and Hugh BillyMitchell repeating. in Britain of Trenchard bombardment, long-range agreedthatstrategic thekindtheGermanshad begunagainstLondon with their Gothasand Trenchard had started at theend ofWorld WarI, could againsttheRuhr be expandedby means ofmoreand biggeraircraft intoan alternative tobothbloodyland and costly The answerto theslaughter sea warfare. of the trencheswas not tank armies. It was bombers. They would Amonghis several entirely eliminatethe need forgroundwarfare.95 scenariosforthe warsof the future Douhet postulated the case where one belligerent had a heavy bomberforce and theotherhad not.
94. G. C. Peden, "The Burden of Imperial Defence and the ContinentalCommitment Reconsidered,"The Historical Journal 27 (1984): 405-23; and Malcolm Smith,BritishAir Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford,1984), 310-22. 95. A shortup-to-date surveyof the ideas of the air innovatorsis in Michael Sherry'sThe Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Conn., 1987), 23-33.

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Weapons War-Winning For example,take the centreof a largecityand imaginewhat would happen among the civilianpopulationduringa single some a few minutes attackbya singlebombingunit.... Within incendiary, and gas bombswouldrain 20 tonsofhigh-explosive, thendeadlygasses down.First fires, wouldcome explosions,then any approach to the floating on the surfaceand preventing advanced,thefires stricken area. As thehourspassed and night wouldspreadwhilethe poison gas paralysedall life.... What could happen to a singlecityin a singleday could also happen to ten,twenty, fifty cities.... And ifon thesecond dayanother or fifty ten,twenty, citieswerebombed,whocould keepall those fleeing to theopen countryside lost,panic-stricken people from of theair? ... A completebreakdown to escape thisterror from subjected thesocial structure cannotbuttakeplace in a country from theair.The timewould pounding to their kindofmerciless the soon come when,to put an end to horrorand suffering, drivenby the instinctof self-preservation, people themselves, wouldriseup and demand an end to thewar-thisbeforetheir armyand navyhad timeto mobilizeat all!96 bombRonald Schaffer has called thisthe formulaof "Douhetian terror

theBritish and thentheAmeriing"which, without thepoisongas, first of cans bothappliedto World called itthedoctrine WarII.97The British area bombing.In bothcases theobject was to breakcivilianmoraleby centers.In neither case is it possibleto fire-bombing urbanpopulation thewaror evenbattles.Norcan saythattheheavy bomberswoneither contribitbe determined some degree,they to whatdegree,aside from or ofJapan. utedto either thedefeatofGermany Yet the beliefin the powerof the four-engined bomber was very had convinced bombinglobbyin Britain strong. By 1932 thestrategic both the publicand manypoliticians thattheirproposedweapon was "No poweron wordsofStanleyBaldwin, supreme.In theoften-quoted earthcan protect from the man in thestreet beingbombed. Whatever Thisbelief people maytellhim,thebomberwillalwaysget through."98 at Munichin 1938. The may well have shaped the Allied surrender so R.A.F.was too unprepared to take on the menace of the Luftwaffe, But Baldwinand the air force Chamberlaingave groundto Hitler.99
96. Giulio Douhet, The Command oftheAir (New York,1942), 58. American Bombing in WorldWar II WingsofJudgement: 97. Ronald Schaffer, (Oxford,1985), 28, 80, and elsewhere. 98. Quoted in Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear ofAir Attack and BritishPolitics, 1932-1939 (London, 1980), 14. Rise ofAmerican Air Power, 77. 99. Sherry,

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lobbywerewrong. As the air war opened, Germanfighters first swept the British strategic bombersfrom the sky, and then,whenthe R.A.F. to night switched bombing,theircrewscould not findtheirtargets in the dark.Whenthe AmericanFortresses joined in 1942, theoretically mounting enough.50 calibermachine-guns to blasttheLuftwaffe from theirpaths,theytoo were virtually drivenout of the Germanskyby fighters. In Europe "Bomber"Harristestedthe area bombingtheory mostthoroughly. After in Lubeckand Hamburg, creating firestorms he became convincedthatwith enoughplanes,crews, and bombshe could burnout so much of urbanGermany the Nazis wouldcall fora negotiatedsettlement. There wouldbe no need foran invasionwithland forces. In 1942 in a seriesofhigh-level he promised memoranda victory by either1943 or 1944. On 17 June1942, he toldChurchill inthemeshes Germany, entangled ofvast landcampaigns, cannotnow airpower disengage her for strategically proper application. Shemissed victory through airpower bya hair's in breadth 1940.Shemissed then only through faulty equipment andtraining,and thetactical misdirection ofan AirForcebarely adequateto thepurpose. Thatis a historical fact. Weourselves are nowat thecrossroads. ifwe will, We are free, to employ our rapidly increasing airstrength in theproper manner. In sucha manner as would availto knock Germany outofthewarin a matter ofmonths.100 On 3 Septemberhe arguedthat"the air wardecisionalone may well decideall. Itmayend thewarin ourfavor in a year;byno other method can we hope to end it-either way-in years."'10l TheAmerican bomberlobby-Hap Arnold, Ira Eaker, and Curtis Le May-whilenotso specific aboutthedate ofvictory, sharedthisfaith in theirwonder-weapon. Initially, theybelieved that daylight precision ofeconomically bombing vitaltargets wouldfatally crippletheGerman warmachine.By 1944, however, after being themselves crippledin the Schweinfurt ball bearingattack of 14 to 15 October 1943, in which German fighters shot down 60 out of 288 B-17-and other costly attacks-the Americansalso accepted area terror bombing.In 1945 attackon Dresden, theyjoined Bomber Command in the fire-storm and morevigorously, B-29fire 102 raidsagainst launching Japanesecities. Althoughthe war did not end in 1944 as promisedby Harris,
100. Quoted in Dudley Saward, "Bomber"Harris (London, 1986), 209. 101. Ibid., 222-23. 102. Schaffer, WingsofJudgement, 29-30, 39-79, and Sherry, Rise ofAmerin can Air Power, 147-76.

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although he complainedhe nevergot the fullresourcesto do thejob continuedto bleed Bomber properly, although Germannightfighters thebulkofthebombsdropped Commandright until1945,and although failed to createtheconcentrated havoconlyachievedat Liibeck,Hamburg, and Dresden-even afterthe Americansin 1944 gained full command of the daylight skiesover Germanyby means of theirnew scholarsstillconsider long-range P-38,P-47 and P-51 fighters--some that the heavybombers inflicted decisive damage on the Germans. Harris's official biographer, DudleySaward,arguesthatBomberCommand so crippledGerman war production, reduced manpowerand demoralizedthe defenders that"The ease withwhichtheAlliesswept from June acrosstheGermanoccupied territories itself, and Germany executed 1944, . . . was unquestionably due to thelong and brilliantly which by Harris from February strategic bomberoffensive was directed 103 1942 untiltheend ofthewar." too highfor In Marchand April1945 Curtis Le May'sB-29s,flying hugeareas ofTokyo, Nagoya, defending fighter interception, destroyed in Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama,and Kawasakiby generatingfirestorms highly flammable Japanese suburbs.It was probablyas close as the wouldforce a Japanese Americans came to realizing thehope thatthey the surrender without an invasionofthehome islandsbeforedropping atom bombs on Hiroshima Countingthe and Nagasakiin August.104 largest A-bombs, the B-29s wiped out 43 percentof Japan's sixty-six cities and caused some two millionciviliancasualties,nine hundred did not thousand ofthemfatal. bombing Schaffer concludesthat"While
wholly eliminate Japan's ability to make war . . . the American air

105 which offensive is to say capacity," severely reducedJapan'smilitary thatit was indeed decisive.Or was itjust the A-bombs, as weaponsin and through shock effect theirown right, spectacularpsychological additionalto physicaldamage, whichproduced the decisiveresults? to negotiate. untiltheyfelltheJapaneserefused Clearly, on bombingimpactsuch as those RecentAmericaninvestigations ofShaffer and Sherry do not so muchdwellon decisiveness as theydo on the morality The debate on the issue of terror attackson civilians. necessityof the two A-bombs,or whetherJapan could have been defeated without or without massiveadditionallosses usingthem,with oflifeduring Theredoes not appear strength. invasion, continueswith
103. Saward, "Bomber"Harris, 402-3. Rise ofAmerican Air Power, 299-300. 104. Sherry, 148. WingsofJudgement, 105. Schaffer,

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to be a clear consensuson the questionof thewar-winning impactof theA-bombs. Nor is thereconsensus about the degree to which non-nuclear bomberscontributed to victory. If anything, scholarship seems to be minimizing theirimpact.Japan was alreadycrippledto the point of military impotencein anything but home defense by thetimeLe May in March1945. Germany struck wasground to piecesbymassive Soviet and substantial Anglo-American and infantry tank, The artillery, forces. heavy bombers, repeatedly repelled by Germanairdefenses, weremarginalauxiliaries. In his detailedanalysisofBomberCommand'sBattle Middlebrook ofBerlinfrom August1943 to March1944, Martin points to surHarris out some oftheshort-comings. hoped to driveGermany renderbeforeD-day,but the aim ofhis crews,despitea long seriesof technologicaland tactical remedies,remainedtoo poor to produce concentrated devastation. Of9,560 bomberswhichreachedthetarget in nineteenmajorraids,625, or 5.8 percent, wereshotdown,about 70 percentof themby Luftwaffe nightfighters; 2,690 R.A.F.personnel died. "The Luftwaffe hurtBomberCommandmorethanBomberCommand hurtBerlin."106 In the SummaryReportof the UnitedStates Strategic Bombing Survey, dated30 September 1945, theinvestigating committeestated that "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe . .. [but] the 'fulleffect' ofthecollapse caused by air overrunby Allied forces."107 Furthermore, "Air power had not yet reached maturity" in 1945, so clear-cut conclusionsabout its impact could notbe made.108 The equivalentBritish survey, not made public, came to similar conclusions. Charles Websterand Noble Franklandargue thatboth reportscontain many areas of doubt about the degree of bombing impact."Thereis indisputable evidencethatarea bombingpracticed in the strategic offensive againstGermanydid not produceany sensible effect on German production of armaments until the closing or after months,"109 Alliedland forces wereoverGermany's frontiers. Thereare otherdoubtersof heavybomberdecisiveness, among them
106. MartinMiddlebrook,The Berlin Raids, R.A.F. Bomber Command, Winter,1943-44 (London, 1988), 325. See also 306-24. 107. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Summary Report (Washington,1945), 15-16. 108. Ibid., 1. 109. CharlesWebster and Noble Frankland,The StrategicAir Offensive Against Germany,1939-1945 (London, 1961), 4:40-56, quoted on 54.

power . .. had not reached the enemy's frontlines when they were

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CharlesMessenger and R.J.Overy.110 Thereis no doubtthata newand important means ofwaging warwas fully established. As Harris argued, and as JohnTerraine in his history has stressed oftheR.A.F.,111 theair weapon was the only offensive arm Britain-and its allies-had for muchoftheearlypartofthewar.To thebombercrews, whosuffered a 20 percentcasualtyrate,second onlyto GermanU-boatcrewsamong the most devastatedfighting forcesof Europe, the air battle was as toughas any hard fought combat in history. The technology was all and shapeda newtypeofmechanizedcombatant.Butthere pervasive, is no agreement thatthebombersplayeda major role in winning the war eitherin Europe or in the Pacific. On the whole, theywere a disappointment. The Germansalso had a monopolyon some hightechnology weapons. Bylate 1944 theyhad theMesserschmit 262 jets, admittedly the bestfighter aircraft ofthewar, with theclear technological of capability regaining air supremacy from theAmericanLightnings and Mustangs. But only some fivehundredwere put into combat, usuallywithilltrainedpilots.Theywere too littleand too late. There were more of Hitler's very hightechnology V-is and V-2s.FromJune1944 5,823 V-is struckBritish targetsor territory, some ten thousandpeople, killing causinggreatdamage,and inflicting costsat therateoffive poundsfor one pound'sworth every ofGermanexpenditure.112 "The Nevertheless, battleoftheflying bombswas wonbytheAllies.... The Vi ... failed to delaythe landingin Normandy, or to cause theAlliesto change their overallplan ofcampaign.Anyeffect it had in raisingGermanmorale 113 The V-2 was an even betterdevice. Therewas no was shortlived." defenseagainstit. As a weapon "it could have become a war-winning one." But it did not. Of 1,403 rocketslaunched, 1,054 hit Britain, killingor wounding9,277 people,114 or inflicting 8.8 casualties per successful missile.Again it was too littletoo late. WilliamMcNeillhas that"IfHitler had not refused to puthis fullsupport suggested behind theV-2rocketuntil July 1943, for example,itis hardto believethatthe
110. Charles Messenger,"Bomber" Harris and the StrategicBombing Offensive, 1 939-1 945 (London, 1984), 208-9, and R. J. Overy,TheAir War,1 939-1 945 (London, 1980), 206-9. 111. JohnTerraine,A Timefor Courage: The Royal Air Force in theEuropean War, 1939-1945 (New York,1985), 682-83. 112. Norman Longmate, The Doodlebugs (London, 1981), 474-79. 113. Ibid., 473. 114. Norman Longmate, Hitler's Rockets: The Story of the V-2's (London, 1985),382.

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-_:-_-_--_-

_-

Alliedlandingsin Normandy could have takenplace,"115 whichmight havechangedtheresults ofthewar.Butitseemsthehumanfactor here negatedpotential technological decisiveness. Noteven theatombomb wasa clear-cut warwinner. Givenourcollectiveconviction aboutmutuallyassurednucleardestruction, it is not even seen as a prospective warwinner anymore. van Creveld, in whatis thelastscholarly Martin wordon thissubject to date, argues thattherewere only "twosituations in WorldWar II whentechnological superiority proveddecisive."One was thedefeat of theGermanU-boats byAllieddecimetric radarearlyin 1943, and the other wasthedefeat oftheLuftwaffe fighter defenses oftheReichbythe little P-51Mustangs American in 1944.116 He provides supporting detail in or quantification; thesetwotechnologies have notbeen emphasized thiswayby earlierwriters. In any case, van Creveldis not primarily therelationship concernedwith betweentechnology and victory. Thus, "although technological superiority can be veryimportant in war,... on itsownwillseldomdecide a war."'117 The objective technology ofhis ofW. H. excellentassessment-one which clearlyrankswith theworks McNeilland Geoffrey Parker-is much broader,to demonstrate that historically "waris completely permeated by technology and governed by it."18 For him,technology dominatesmethodsand practices, but not outcomes. of technological So we have assertions, images,and impressions or in warbutwe have no detailedmeasurement, decisiveness analysis, consensus.We do not even appear to havebodies ofunexplored primsituaarysourceson which analysismight be based. Evenin monopoly on tionswheretechnological advantages havebeen pronounced, effect to surprise battleoutcomesseems to be limited situations such as that of Champlainand the Iroquois or tanksat Cambrai,or it has been and materialadvanembeddedamong a seriesof othertechnological tages. It has been more obviousin its effects on the waypeople fight than on the outcomesof combat. New weapons have changed rather
115. McNeill,Pursuit ofPower, 359. 116. Martinvan Creveld,Technologyand War: From 2000 B. C. to thePresent to note that Dan Van der Vat, in his recent (London, 1989), 229. It is interesting at Sea (New York, studyTheAtlanticCampaign: WorldWar II's GreatestStruggle in thewaron submarines(309, 1988), agrees thatcentimetncradarwas important as the chiefreason for 339), but stressesthat no single factorcan be put forward overthe U-boats(260, 352). victory 117. Van Creveld,Technologyand War,232. 118. Ibid., 1.

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soldiers'behavior.Theydo not seem to have prolongedor improved soldiers'livesto thesame degree.Why is war,to whichEuropeanshave so eagerlysoughtto apply new technology, so littlesusceptible to it, remaining so unaltered in itsprimitive humandimensions? Philosophers are busy studyingthe complex relationships between people and machines.119 Maybemilitary historians need to have a closer look as well.

119. For example, see F. Rapp, Analytical Philosophy of Technology (Dordrecht,1981), and S. Turkle,The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York,1984).

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