Article

Peace through Transformation? Political Realism and the Progressivism of National Security
Robert Schuett

International Relations 25(2) 185203 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0047117811404445 ire.sagepub.com

Abstract
Transformationalist thinking is plentiful. The Iraq invasion is the latest example of its failure. Is international political reality destined to be the realm of recurrence and repetition? This article delineates a political theory of moderate progress found in Hans Morgenthaus political realism (Realism). Realism recognises the potentiality of transforming international relations, but, warned by its political anthropology, it envisions a distinct philosophy of politics as an effective means for achieving peace. It makes the case for a foreign policy of national security and humility, believing in progress by other means. Based on a renewed engagement with its concepts of the state, national interest and national security, Realism is shown to be critical and progressivist, restrained and realistic. Its nature and structure makes it intellectually incompatible with conservative organicist projects; nor is it reconcilable with radical critical agendas. In search for allies, Realism shows a potential affinity to a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy.

Keywords
Hans Morgenthau, national interest, national security, political realism, the state

Introduction
The idea of achieving peace through a transformation of international political reality is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of international relations. Often victims of mockery or cynicism, many have dreamed of a pacified world based on cosmopolitan principles of justice. Others continue to argue that the flaws of human nature do not allow for grandiose plans to transform international relations.1 This debate over the potentiality of
Corresponding author: Robert Schuett, Durham University, School of Government and International Affairs, The Al-Qasimi Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham DH1 3TU, UK. Email: robert.schuett@durham.ac.uk

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moving beyond the international(ised) struggle for power is usually portrayed along the so-called idealism/realism divide. The former believes in perfectibility, reason and science to transcend current tragedies; the latter stresses the imperfections of man, warning that ber-moralisms threaten the fragile fabrics of world order. Such portrayals are true, though not the whole truth of a more complicated matter. To be sure, scholarship at the IR/Political Theory intersection and deeper engagements with consequential thinkers of the pre-behavioralist era have shown that conventional boundaries of international political theory are becoming increasingly porous. Consider, for example, the case of Rawls realistic utopia a Kantian project too realistic for many cosmopolitans; or the case of the Iraq War architects conservative ideologues falling prey to an idealism with a sword.2 In terms of the shifting sands of international political theory, the philosophy of political realism, too, has come under scrutiny. A series of careful re-readings of Morgenthau, Herz, Carr and Niebuhr has challenged many customary preconceptions and equations; in this context, William Scheuerman has pushed the debate to a new level of sophistication: So-called classical Realism remains a rich source for thinking about political and social change beyond the nation state to an extent underappreciated even by some auspicious recent attempts to revisit its reformist impulses.3 This article supports such a line of revisionist scholarship, agreeing that these realists enrich our theorising about the potentiality of transforming post-9/11 international relations. Yet, we may not take the transformationalist ambitions of these earlier realists too far. What follows is an attempt to delineate, from Morgenthaus philosophy of political realism, a political theory of moderate progress, a normative foreign policy position perhaps called progress through humility. Morgenthaus complex version of political realism must not be reduced to one single category or concept. But, as I hope to demonstrate, his political realism can help progressively minded theorists and practitioners of foreign policy and international security to navigate more effectively through current tragedies, never losing sight of the realistic potentiality of transforming the human condition. Key to such Morgenthauian logic is a form of practised humility: that is, a foreign policy of the national interest narrowly defined in terms of national security. This sets Morgenthauian political realism apart from radical transformationalist ambitions of neoconservative ideologues and critical theorists, although its critical, progressivist and transformationalist impetus is clearly visible. In terms of an intellectual-political appropriation, the moderate progressivism identified in Morgenthaus political realism gives it a potential affinity to a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy. The argument for the moderate progressivism inherent in Morgenthaus realist philosophy of politics and international relations (henceforth: Realism4) is developed in three stages. The first section deals with an awkwardly neglected concept in Realism the state. Often caricatured as a sort of organicist, personified animus dominandi state, Morgenthaus concept of the state is quite distinct from conservative theorising about the philosophical nature and reality of the state. By distinguishing between Morgenthaus political anthropology of the state and his concept of the state, it can be shown that the latter follows, philosophically and conceptually, the example of Hans Kelsens pure theory of law. This reinterpretation provides the analytical foundation for my defence of Realisms concept of the national interest. The second section seeks to demonstrate the

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intentional, normative purity of the national interest; it is pure because, although the political is driven by human nature, the realm of politics belongs to the sphere of ought. This helps to lay bare the ways in which the philosophical nature and internal conceptual structure of Realism is positivistic, progressive and critical of conservative organicist, fatalist and nationalist ideologies. Building on the reinterpretation of the concepts of state and national interest, the third section is concerned with Realisms grand strategy. Its advocacy of a foreign policy of the national interest is often criticised as predisposition towards an anarchical system of sovereign nation-states. This misses a crucial point. For under the surface of a foreign policy strictly driven by national security lies hidden the philosophical seed of moderate progressivism the potentiality for transforming international political reality towards the world-state, albeit by different means. The implications of Realism understood in terms of advocating a form of progress through humility are discussed in a lengthy conclusion. This includes the question of its potential affinity to a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy.

The progressivism of Realisms concept of the state

The argument for Realisms moderate progressivism is rooted in a renewed analysis of its concept of the state. Perhaps seconded only by the conundrum of human nature, the state is a foundational philosophical cornerstone of any genuine philosophy of international relations; an engagement is important in its own right. It is particularly pressing, however, regarding political realism, let alone Realism. Virtually all philosophies and theories of international relations (have to) deal with the state: they make assumptions about its ontology, internal structure and external behaviour; they criticise its negative moral implications or worship its form of enclosed political community. Political realism has always been subjected to intense analytical and normative criticisms.5 Morgenthaus concept of the state, however, can be defended from conventionally accepted confusions. The criticism of the realist state takes on many forms, coming from different philosophical persuasions. And, surely, the (sometimes crude) ways in which some selfidentified realists conceptualise the state, their strong analytical and normative emphasis on this historicised form of political community, and their often deep-seated scepticism of virtually all ideas of moving international relations beyond the system of sovereign states, virtually beg for criticism.6 Part and parcel of such criticism is the charge that the realist state is the sort of aggressive, powerful and organicist nationstate of much conservative political thought. Realism, too, is accused of being based on an essentially conservative organicist concept of the state, and of promoting the following analytical and normative features: the state is a natural entity; developing organically, it follows the laws of natural causality; positive law is of secondary significance; there exists a natural conflict between individual interests and the public good, thus the normative purpose of the state is to maintain peace and order, offering protection against external threats; the integrity of the nation-state serves as a guideline for all political action; patriotic identification is a virtuous civic duty; the state is a unified body endowed with an autonomous will. A natural and cosmic necessity, the Morgenthauian state is, critics argue, the reified Morgenthauian man raised to the international level, pursuing self-preservation and power.7

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Morgenthau cannot be fully absolved from at least a partial responsibility for such interpretations and, consequently, ideological abuses. Nowhere has he presented us with a systematic exposition of his concept of the state; this is an awkward omission, particularly in light of his academic background in law and his work with Hugo Sinzheimer, and especially Hans Kelsen, one of the most careful theorists of law and the state.8 Taken together with Morgenthaus insistence on the significance and limitations of human nature for social, political and international affairs, and his emphasis on the (in)famous animus dominandi and impervious laws of human nature, it is hardly surprising that Realism is often considered a conservative philosophy or, worse, a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo.9 In a similar vein, Morgenthaus failure to explain at greater length how a set of social-psychological dynamics helps transform mans animus dominandi into the yearning for power of states has reinforced the view that the Morgenthauian state is, literally, Morgenthauian man writ large. Thus, John Mearsheimer speaks of a human nature realism, declaring that the principal driving force in international politics is the will to power inherent in every state; Kenneth Waltz suspects that what Morgenthau did was translate Meinecke from German into English.10 This, however, requires qualification. Realism is, philosophically and conceptually, at odds with conservative organicist theories of the state. It can hardly be associated with the organicism and essentialism of a Treitschke or Meinecke, an intellectual trajectory denied by Morgenthau: to call me a disciple of Meinecke is untrue and somewhat far-fetched.11 In similar language, then, when it comes to the concept of the state (and only in this regard, as far as the present article is concerned), Morgenthau may be described as a disciple of Kelsen. The reinterpretation of Morgenthaus concept of the state along the lines of Kelsens pure theory of law and state helps lay bare that an important feature of Realism the state often criticised for its alleged conservative nature and structure, constitutes, from a philosophical and conceptual viewpoint, a fairly foundational and, more importantly, a fairly progressive politico-theoretical part of its wider philosophy. This in turn adds to our understanding of Realisms intellectual substructure, Morgenthaus intellectual family tree, and, more importantly, to our understanding of Realism as advocating a politics and foreign policy of humility, informed by a deep-seated moderate progressivism. To come to the conclusion of the purity and progressivism of Realisms concept of the state requires, in a first instance, a distinction between two separate, though often conflated, intellectual tasks any genuine philosophy or theory of international relations must come to terms with: to search for the underlying dynamics of the political and international political reality by means of a well-specified political anthropology on the one hand; and to make a statement on the reality or ontology of the state on the other.12 The former deals with the concept of human nature; the latter is concerned with the concept of the state. Such cognitive separation of two different analytical spheres is important, but it has been neglected in the debates about Realisms internal nature and structure. We must not confuse Morgenthaus concept of the state with Realisms underlying political anthropology of the state. It is a truism that a well-specified political anthropology is the philosophical starting point of any genuine realist philosophy or theory of international relations; in this regard, Realism is no exception.13 In Realism, the concept of human nature serves essentially

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two foundational purposes: to enquire into the nature and structure of the political and the dynamics inherent in international political reality (the is); and to help determine the limits and potentialities in politics and foreign policy (the ought). With regard to the former, still a cause of controversy in neorealist and critical circles, Morgenthau defends the methodological and philosophical purpose of the concept of human nature. We have no other access to the knowledge of social structures, he argues, than through individual beings. All data which we call political lead to the soul of man as conveyor of Politics and knowledge of mans nature is the key to politics.14 All social, political and international political reality is, the methodological individualist declares, but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane, being but man writ large.15 On the basis of a subtle political anthropology, Realism engages with, and helps explain, the timeless philosophical questions about the nature of the political, the internal dynamics of the state and politics, and the externalised struggle and yearning for power and prestige. This analytical reliance on a positivised political anthropology when confronting the intricate tragedies of the human condition and international relations distinguishes Realism significantly from many of todays more Waltzian-style realisms. Much more importantly, however, Morgenthaus argument that international political reality has its roots in the dynamics of human nature, and that understanding the universal patterns of state behaviour requires an understanding of how individual/mass psychological dynamics make the animus dominandi such a powerful and persistent international political phenomenon, does not mean that Realism anthropomorphises the state along conservative organicist lines, endowing it with a reified will-to-power. The Morgenthauian state may appear to be a power-driven macroanthropos, as the personification of mans animus dominandi. But, in terms of the question of its ontology, the state is not real. Morgenthaus concept of the state sits ill with dangerous, age-old aberrations which continue to proclaim that states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality.16 It is worth quoting Morgenthau at length:
State is but another name for the compulsory organization of society for the legal order that determines the condition under which society may employ its monopoly of organized violence for the preservation of order and peace. When we have spoken in the preceding pages of the compulsory organization and of the legal order of society we have really spoken of the State.17

This signifies that, rather than being anthropomorphic or conservative organicist, Morgenthaus concept of the state may be more Kelsenian. Before proceeding along this line, some remarks about the wider Morgenthau/Kelsen relationship are indispensible. At the nexus of legal/political theory and international law/ international politics, their story is one of the twentieth centurys most fascinating and complicated. Some aspects are known, others remain shadowy; in any case, a comprehensive common intellectual biography of these two towering thinkers is yet to be written.18 On the one hand, Morgenthau stood under the influence of Kelsen. He received his professoral qualification (Habilitation), a thesis on the reality of norms, largely due to Kelsens advocacy, and would never forget that If it had not been for Kelsen, my academic career would probably have come to a very premature end.19 Morgenthau was

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inspired by the ideology-critical impetus of Kelsen and praised him for having demonstrated the unity of the legal and political order, domestic and international.20 Further, the image of (international) law propagated in Politics among Nations appears to be unmistakably Kelsenite.21 On the other hand, Morgenthau was sceptical of Kelsens positivism for allegedly closing its eyes to the necessity of a hard-headed realistic or sociological account of international law capable of forthrightly analyzing real-life power relations.22 And, surely, there are other areas of dispute, some real, others imagined or invented, along the usual realism/idealism divide. But no wonder, for these are two different intellectual endeavours: a legal theory, a political theory; and these are, almost necessarily, of a different nature, structure and normative persuasion. Hence, the present argument makes no wider claim other than the narrower argument that, from a philosophical and conceptual viewpoint, Morgenthaus concept of the state seems to be that of Kelsen. Morgenthaus Kelsenianism regarding the concept of the state is a significant moment in the intellectual nature and structure of Realism. For Kelsens concept of the state, embedded as it is in the legal positivism of his pure theory of law, represents perhaps one of the most powerful intellectual critiques of conservative organicist theories of the state and the philosophy of natural law. The progressive and ideology-critical impetus of Kelsens philosophy of law, politics and international relations stems, to a large degree, from its outright rejection of all forms of animisms, anthropomorphisations, hypostatisations, reifications or personifications. Kelsens concept of the state is profoundly antiessentialist, as the pure theory of law aims to free the science of law from all non-legal elements, such as psychological, sociological, ethical or theological theorising. The sole object of jurisprudential cognition is the norm, an ought proposition. This is not merely a technical matter of legal methodology but the foundation and manifestation of a deeply progressivist project concerning law, the state and politics. The law is a system of positivised norms; the wills of God or Nature are extra-legal, carrying no intrinsic legal validity. Purifying the law from all extra-legal elements, the dualism of law and state is rejected. As Kelsen argues, There is only a juristic concept of the State: the State as centralised legal order.23 The intellectual, normative implications are profound and progressivist. The state has no intrinsic will; it is not a deterministic creature. Instead, the state wills what the law, the positivised ought, wants it to will. With this, Kelsen presented a consequential attack on the then-dominant German public law tradition, on Schmittian-style conceptions of the theological state.24 Conceptualising the state in terms of normative imputation rather than natural causality or law, the Kelsenian Rechtsstaat (a tautology) is intrinsically incompatible with conservative organicist theories of the state. Realisms concept of the state is based on a similar notion of identity of law and state. This may have been obscured by Morgenthaus occasional misleading and martial rhetoric: for example, when he writes about the power drives of nations.25 Still, on quite numerous, though scattered, occasions, Morgenthau makes the case that the state is not an organic entity and does not, ontologically, really exist. Already in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau refers to the state as the legal fiction.26 Surely, the Morgenthauian state does not really possess an animus dominandi or other human drives or traits, be they benevolent or not. When we speak in empirical terms of the power or of the foreign policy of a certain nation, Morgenthau knows that we can only mean the power of certain individuals who belong to the same nation; for a nation as such is

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obviously not a empirical thing.27 The Morgenthauian state is not the living, organicist creature of much of conservative or natural-law theorising; it is, following Kelsens example, conceptualised as an abstraction, a normative legal order. Such conceptualisation of the state is not compromised by the analytical and normative significance which Realism ascribes to the concept of human nature. This brings us back to the earlier distinction between searching for the underlying dynamics of international political reality through a political anthropology and enquiring into the reality of the state. Answering the latter along Kelsenian lines does not imply a disregard of the actualities of human nature in society and politics. Here, Kelsen is insightful. His concept of the state posits the state as the law, as positivised human acts of wills embodied through various constitutional organs. And some may ridicule this as nave formalism. But this misses a crucial point: namely, that Kelsens system of legal, political and international thought is very well aware of the intricacies of human nature. Like Nietzsche, Freud, Weber or, for that matter, Morgenthau, Kelsen recognises the limitations placed upon the social and political sphere by the dynamics inherent in human nature. Indeed, Kelsens political theory of pluralist democracy, including his criticism of Marxism, receives its impetus from the belief that the phenomena of power struggles, mass cohesion and individual and collective irrationality have their roots in mans conflictual (Freudian-style) drive configuration.28 It is one thing to use a political anthropology as the philosophical basis for theorising about the internal and external dynamics of the state, but it is quite another to argue that the state is a macroanthropos. To Kelsen and Morgenthau, a positivised political anthropology is a significant, unavoidable philosophical ingredient for confronting the dynamics, tragedies and potentialities of the social, political and international. At the same time, however, their systems of thought reject the idea of the state as a living, really existing creature. Morgenthaus conceptualisation of the state along the lines of Kelsens pure theory of law is, then, a significant feature. For it helps understand the progressive character, nature and structuring of Realism. Surely, theory is not always consonant with practice. The positivisation of a progressivist concept of the state does not necessarily lead to what may currently be understood as a progressivist stance in politics and foreign policy; and Morgenthau provides some proof here. Still, the Kelsenian influx with regard to Morgenthaus concept of the state adds to our understanding that Realism is, intellectually and conceptually, at odds with conservative political thought. It may be appropriated for conservative political projects only by means of consciously overlooking (or twisting) a fairly foundational progressivist politico-philosophical part.

The progressivism of Realisms concept of the national interest

A similar line of argument applies to the concept of the national interest, a no less challenging and controversial feature of Realism. As with the concept of the state, Morgenthaus insistence on its analytical and normative centrality in the theory and practice of international relations and foreign policy seems to be not so much an indication of a deep-seated philosophical and political conservatism, but instead the manifestation of a progressivist impetus.

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There has always been criticism associated with Morgenthaus conceptualisation and use of the notion of the national interest. Perhaps the most prominent point of criticism is that the Morgenthauian version of the national interest is empty or shallow. Neoconservatives point out that the national interest must reach beyond narrowly defined technical and material interests and incorporate universal moral principles and values.29 Progressively minded theorists of international relations and cosmopolitans argue that a foreign policy based on national interest stifles progress towards some form of postnational structuring of the world.30 A politics and foreign policy of pure interests is confronted with the criticism of being essentially conservative, not to mention when the already controversial notion of interest is prefixed with the even more controversial notion of the national. In this regard, it is often critically alleged that Realisms advocacy of a foreign policy focused on national interest prioritises and promotes the pursuit of the national interest in terms of natural necessity or natural law. Further, it is alleged that Morgenthaus concept of the national interest unduly elevates the national over the international or universal, representing nothing more than a nationalist bias aimed at the perpetuation of the nation-state and the system of nation-states. An alliance of otherwise distinct politico-philosophical positions is in some agreement that Morgenthaus concept of national interest badly fails the test of all political and moral logic. The concept of the national interest, critics argue, is to be widened; to have any meaning at all, it must reflect, at a minimum, the ambition for pursuing more humanistic or universal goals.31 Morgenthaus concept of the national interest may be described as thin. It is often unappreciated or misunderstood, however, that this minimalism stems from Realisms intellectually progressivist design, purpose and structure. Morgenthaus lyrical insistence on the significance of the concept of interest is well known:
And, above all, remember always that it is not only a political necessity but also a moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealing with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: The National Interest.32

This normative statement belongs to the praxis of foreign policy, the sphere of ought. The concept of national interest, however, has also an important function in the analytical part of Realism, dealing with the is. All analytical political thought of international relations requires a theoretical or conceptual means to rationalise the irrationalities of international political reality: that is, to systematise, collect and analyse the data and facts to which they give rise. To approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, Morgenthau seeks to solve this theoretical dilemma by introducing the concept of interest defined in terms of power.33 This is not merely a technical theoretical-methodological concern. With this, Morgenthau makes explicit the theoretical significance of a concept which he had already sought to conceptualise much earlier and which stands at the heart of any genuine philosophy or theory of international relations: the concept of the political. Derived ultimately from mans conflictual drive configuration, Realism theorises the political in terms of power.34 Without such a conceptual framework in Morgenthaus case, interest defined in terms of power it would be theoretically, methodologically and cognitively impossible for a distinctively political theory of international relations to make an

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analytical distinction between the distinctively political inherent in social reality and other facts of social life, be they economic, ethical, aesthetical, theological or juridical. Perhaps inspired by the example of Kelsen, a systematic thinker and conscious methodologist, Morgenthau is well aware that only the positivisation of a central concept against which international political reality can be judged provides Realism with the necessary descriptive analytical precision and desired ideology-critical impetus. Kelsen and Morgenthau are deeply imbued with the philosophical conviction that theory is, after all, science (Wissenschaft), not ideology. The ideology-critical and progressivist impetus of Realism may be understood as Morgenthaus attempt to create a sort of pure theory of international relations. In this sense, Realism is a positivistic theory of international relations or, for that matter, a positivistic theory of international politics, which is similar to the internal intellectual methodological structuring of Kelsens pure theory of law. The latter, as Kelsen famously proclaims, seeks to answer the question, What is the law? but not the question, What ought it to be?35 Similarly, Realism is, first and foremost, a theoretical scientific attempt to answer the question: what is the international political? The pure theory of law seeks to delimit the cognition and study of law against other scientific disciplines or modes of thought, opposing the intellectual perils of what Kelsen called methodological syncretism.36 Likewise, in order to delimit the cognition and study of the international political from related intellectual efforts, Realism makes use of the concept of interest defined in terms of power. It does so, not because Morgenthau ignores or denies the analytical connection of the economic, psychological or sociological to international phenomena but to avoid obscuring the distinctively political element in international relations: the keeping, seeking or demonstrating of power. The positivisation of the concept of interest and its centrality in Realism serves a purpose that is similar to the concept of the norm in Kelsens pure theory of law. Focusing strictly on the concept of interest defined in terms of power allows Realism to detect any influx of extra-political facts or elements in the spheres of politics and foreign policy. In doing so, it guards against the fallacy of thinking of the international political in terms of causal laws or natural law. The nature and dynamics of the international political may have their roots in the nature of man, but the international political or the demands and requirements of foreign policy and diplomatic practice do not follow the laws of causality as known to the natural sciences. Where law is the system of norms understood in terms of the systematic positivisation of human acts of wills or propositions of the ought in Kelsens pure theory of law, Realism conceptualises the political or international political in terms of human acts of wills or propositions of ought namely, interests defined in terms of power. This is a significant moment in Realism. The political and international political belong to the normative sphere of the ought, not to the sphere of causality or nature. The positivisation of the concept of interest defined in terms of power allows for the identification of ideological and organicist-determinist elements in the theory and practice of foreign policy and international relations. This underscores Realisms critical and progressivist impetus. It is, first and foremost (though not exclusively), a positivistic political theory of international relations. And, in this regard, the concept of interest must necessarily be hollow or empty: Realism does not endow its key concept of interest defined in terms of power with a meaning that is

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fixed once and for all.37 Only this ensures that the analytical side of Realism is not an ideology of politics/foreign policy and helps prevent blurring the boundaries between the spheres of the is and the ought, between analytical and normative theorising. Kelsens pure theory of law (and political philosophy) represents one of the most forceful and consequential attacks on the philosophy and theory of natural law in law, politics and international relations. Of a similar category is Realism. Its emphasis on the significance of interests and the role of power in international relations may be appealing to the powerful, but, at the same time, Realism can turn into a worst enemy of the practitioners of foreign policy, as its internal structure is designed to excavate the purely ideological elements of their thoughts, doctrines and foreign policy actions; this applies particularly to conservative organicist and natural-law theories. Taken together with the way in which Morgenthau conceptualises the state along Kelsenian lines, the analytical emphasis on the concept of interest and its conceptualisation in terms of power help demonstrate that Realism is deeply imbued with the principles of critique and positive human agency.

The progressivism of Realisms concept of national security

No wonder, then, that the goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can, as Morgenthau declares, run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.38 Yet the contingent, voluntaristic nature of the political, politics and foreign policy does not imply that there are no limits placed upon political agency, particularly regarding the question of transforming international political reality. This signifies the distinction, often overlooked, between the analytical positivistic and the normative prescriptive dimension of Realism two very different intellectual projects.39 The concept of national security plays an important role in the latter, dealing with the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed.40 Morgenthau never said that it was impossible to achieve progress in politics, foreign policy and international relations. Compared to other progressivist projects, however, Realism is based on a different intellectual and political logic. Progress may be achieved through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future.41 And this may, at some point, lead to an entire transformation of our present Westphalian international political reality the erection of the world-state.42 Such a transformation of an anarchical system of sovereign states into a unified, monistic world-state is deemed possible (and desired), but Realism warns that we must never lose sight of the dangerous dynamics of nationalism and nationalistic universalism; this is where political anthropology becomes significant again, in the positive and negative. It is, however, false to accuse Realism of an intrinsic nationalistic, organicist conservative bias. To be sure, Realism emphasises and endorses the concepts of national interest and national security. Yet, perhaps an irony in light of much criticism, Morgenthaus defence and support of a foreign policy of national security is imbued with the motive of transcending the national towards the global, the world-state. Morgenthaus logic of the limits and potentialities for transforming international political reality is heavily informed by Realisms positivised political anthropology. It is the peculiar nature of man that leads to the uncomfortable fact that much of international

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political life revolves around some form of enclosed political community. Morgenthauian man is possessed by an animus dominandi; that man is a power-seeker is an all permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence.43 At the same time, man wants to preserve his life, expressed by his striving and yearning for food, shelter, physical security. Through a series of individual/mass psychological dynamics, this explosive mix of Freudian/Nietzschean-style drives leads, almost invariably, to the erection of political communities.44 These entities of monopolised physical force seek to curb mans antisocial inclinations. The tragedy, however, is that because of the inherent antagonism between man and political community, the repression of mans drives required to make possible some form of sociability within borders is the constitutive factor of much unsociability beyond borders. For man is inclined to project all his unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene where they find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the power drives of the nation.45 Since the political community is the sole bearer of collectivised individual power drives, nationalism becomes a powerful and often disturbing force in foreign policy and international relations. Perhaps one of the most essential facts of the human condition, the force of these individual and collectivised power drives is often aggravated by societal-political circumstances. As Morgenthau argues:
The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, especially in the lower strata, and the atomization of Western society in general have magnified enormously the frustration of individual power drives. This, in turn, has given rise to an increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national aspirations for power.46

Surely Realism cannot be taken without its baggage of human nature. The analytical side of Realism emphasises the perennial and problematic forces inherent in the nature of man, as well as the equally perennial and problematic forces of nationalistic ambitions in foreign policy and international relations to which mans peculiar drive configuration gives rise. But this does not imply that, normatively, it legitimises or seeks to further the cause of nationalistic ideologies of politics and foreign policy. It is part and parcel of Realism that we cannot simply wish away the dynamics of human nature and nationalism, for in order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives.47 Still, Realism is hardly associable with conservative organicist or nationalistic philosophies of politics and international relations, and is hardly suitable as a philosophical basis for a politics and foreign policy seeking to perpetuate indefinitely the present world order:
Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world.48

In other words, nothing militates, in principle, against the eventual erection of a worldstate. But, given present international political dynamics and circumstances, such a world-state cannot simply be created by means of a simple, artificial political or legal act. Rather, it is the creation of a functioning form of world community that must antedate a world state.49 And Morgenthau was not unoptimistic, recognising that the awareness of the unity of mankind has never disappeared even in the heyday of nationalism.50

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In any case, Realism reminds us that nothing can be achieved through an imposition of the willing, let alone through the belief in teleological or natural law. Instead, required is time and tolerance, as the realisation of the idea of progress in international relations can, at any rate, only be the result of a long, slow and difficult international political process. Realism suggests a philosophy and practice of foreign policy based on the concepts of national interest and national security; and here once again political anthropology plays an important role. In contradistinction to a Marcusean-style belief in the creativity of Eros, Morgenthau makes the case for the positive power of mans yearning for security. Morgenthauian man possesses some form of social drive, an Eros that seeks to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind.51 But what the creation of a world community, and then a world-state, really requires is a shared interest an interest so common to all that it bears within the potentiality to outweigh particularistic interests. To Morgenthau, perhaps the most profound interest of all is individual and collective security. It is potentially powerful enough to move collective man beyond the nationstate. For the longing for security is the most profound manifestation of one of the most profound forces in human nature. The world-state is the solution that is most conducive to freeing humankind from the tragedies of present international political reality, as Morgenthau argues, for it helps fulfil the desire, innate in all men, for self-preservation.52 In this regard, Realisms political anthropology is both the philosophical and analytical basis for theorising the ills and dynamics inherent in man, society and politics, and also, though this is often overlooked, the philosophical and normative driving force for theorising the potentialities of the human condition and international relations. The positivisation of mans relentless yearning for security helps, philosophically, prepare the groundwork for a foreign policy driven by the idea of security; it is the task of diplomacy to put it into foreign policy praxis and work unceasingly towards its realisation. With other progressively inspired philosophies and projects, Realism shares the intention of achieving progress in international relations and the potential transformation of international political reality by means of a world-state, but the means differ. The creation of a world community and a world-state requires, first and foremost, the abandonment of a pretentious idealistic foreign policy defined in terms of moralistic universalisms. The basic requirement for a realistic and progressively minded course of politics and foreign policy is the pursuit of the national interest defined in terms of national security. This does not, in principle, serve an organicist nationalistic bias, for what is nationally of interest derives in large part from what is internationally possible and desirable. It is both a necessity for securing survival and a requirement of political morality that the concept of the national interest is defined in such a manner that it is, principally, compatible with the national interests of others.53 Realism makes the case for a community of interests. The specific task and political imperative of foreign policy is to accommodate the variety of national interests to which the processes and structures of diplomacy give rise. The success in establishing a community of interests is contingent upon many factors, including the actual performance of the foreign policy apparatus. In the first instance, however, it is a philosophical and theoretical question, a question of how the concept of interest is defined. In light of ethical, cultural and socio-economic pluralism, defining the concept of national interest in terms of all sorts of economic, social, cultural

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or moral universalisms, the balancing and reconciling of various national interests is destined to fail, despite the best intentions. Recognising the perils of nationalisticmoralistic crusading, Realism believes in a progressivist dimension of the concept of national interest narrowly defined in terms of national security. Since the social, cultural, moral or religious are too complex to agree and compromise on, perhaps the only normative idea that could form the basis of a widely shared or common interest may be the interest in security, individual and collective. A tolerant, minimalist concept of interest helps reconcile the particular interests of individual nations with the general interest in peace and order.54 It is a grand strategy of foreign policy based on the concept of national interest defined in terms of national security that may pave the way or lay the groundwork for a world community out of which the world-state may eventually be successfully erected.

Conclusion: Realism, the moderate Left and progress through humility

Much of Realisms language and rhetoric about human nature, power, interests, diplomacy or national security appears to be a manifestation of pessimistic fatalism. And surely Morgenthau is not a genuine optimist, if this is to mean a belief in the essential goodness and harmony of human nature and society. The specific, minimalist and pure ways in which Morgenthau conceptualises the nature, structure and intellectual purpose of the concepts of state, national interest and national security, however, sets Realism in intellectual opposition to conservative organicist, nationalist and natural-law theorising. Indeed, the conceptual theoretical nature and structure of Realism signifies a strong intellectual commitment to the idea of progress in both the theory and practice of foreign policy and international relations. The intrinsic humanism and progressivist impetus of Realism, however, translates into a philosophy or art of politics and foreign policy that is quite different from that envisioned and practised by more radical forms of progressivism and transformationalism. This progressivist dimension of Realism may be described as a philosophy and practice of progress by other means: perhaps as progress through humility. Why attach the notion of humility to a rich, diverse and distinctively political theory about nature, distribution and use or abuse of power in international relations? Humility is a tricky concept. It has been criticised for being laden with theological connotations, ridiculed as the philosophy of the weak or the manifestation of a Nietzschean slave morality, charged with its alleged conservative implications; it is now almost entirely devoid of any positive value. On the other hand, humility used to be one of the prime virtues in the ethical and social life of the individual of a liberal democratic persuasion.55 And, to be sure, Realism, too, is a tricky, rich and complicated international political theory, much more subtle and complex than is often appreciated.56 Still, many of its basic concepts, intellectual tenets and policy prescriptions embody and articulate a healthy respect for the idea and importance of humility in foreign policy and international relations. In this sense, Morgenthaus political realism is a true philosophy and art of the political: an active, public and humanistic ethos of politics and foreign policy. It has its emphasis on power, justified as it is in terms of theory and history. But it does so in a cultivated

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and meaningful sense, demonstrating a subtle sensitivity towards the limitations that are placed upon society, politics and international political reality. Realism helps us understand that the complexities and tragedies of the human condition and the international political cannot be wished away. Reductionist or pseudo-political means such as preaching the word of Eros, retreating solely into the world of scientific man, or believing in the transformationalist effect of dropping bombs, will achieve nothing. For we must always reckon with the complex and tragic nature of man and, ergo, political communities, standing in the way of the realisation of perfectionist projects. There is no telos towards an inevitable, pacified world-state, not much hope for perpetual peace in terms of an eradication of all conflicts. However, nor will there necessarily be perpetual war. Recognising the philosophical potentialities inherent in mans yearning for security and the practical potentialities inherent in a rational, narrow foreign policy based on diplomacy and interests defined in terms of national security/ies, Realism provides a substantial foundation for a philosophy and practice of foreign policy that is both critical and restrained, progressivist and realistic. Part and parcel of such realist(ic) and progressively minded philosophy is Realisms enlightened commitment to the principle of human, collective and political agency. Here, the concepts of state, national interest and national security are key to understanding its moderate progressivism. The state is a normative order. All ideology-critical impetus would have been lost had Morgenthau personified the state in terms of natural law or causality. Eschewing conservative organicist logic, the Morgenthauian state follows the logic of imputation: of imputing acts of positivised wills. This is intrinsically progressivist, as the state has no autonomous natural will. The concept of national interest is, necessarily, being left empty or hollow, as grand strategy and foreign policy receive their inspiration from an ought, not an impersonal causal-natural law. The rejection of God and Nature as the legislators of interests, however, does not mean that international political reality is the realm of infinite agency, voluntarism or progress. Realism does not immortalise the nation-state, legitimise nationalistic ideologies or fetishise power. But it recognises and confronts the powerful dynamics that give rise to these intricate phenomena. These have their roots in mans complicated drive configuration, placing limits upon what is possible in politics and ways achieving progress in international relations. This makes Realism peculiarly fascinating. On the one hand, it emphasises the limitations inherent in the human condition and international relations, particularly on the basis of its political anthropology. On the other hand, many of its core concepts bear within them an intrinsically progressivist dimension, particularly the concept of the state. The latter sets Realism apart from genuinely conservative philosophies of politics and international relations. And, taken together with its fear of unilateral impositions, universalist moralisms and national-greatness rhetoric in politics and foreign policy, attempts to appropriate Morgenthau for essentially (neo)conservative political projects seem odd; it may be safe to say that there is no such thing as a neoconservative realism or crusading realism.57 Likewise, however, recent attempts to appropriate Morgenthau for criticalminded projects also seem questionable. It is correct that the analytical and normative theorising of Morgenthau (or, for that matter, of Herz, Carr or Niebuhr) must be carefully distinguished from the intellectual premises and concerns of many of the so-called neorealists. But reconstructing Realism as a sort of uneasy/critical realism, or questioning

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whether it makes sense to think of it as political realism, is troublesome.58 Rather than seeking to de-realise Realism, it may be more adequate and truer to the nature, structure and spirit of Morgenthau to recognise its intrinsically critical, progressivist impetus. Some elements and intentions may overlap. But Realism and radical theories of society, politics and international relations remain fairly distinct intellectual enterprises, not least because of Realisms ideology-critical stance, moderate progressivism and narrow vision of politics in terms of humility. This raises the question of which political project Realism may be compatible with. Such theory/practice questions are complex, complicated and contingent upon several factors. But they cannot be avoided, important as they are for international political theory, grand strategy and foreign policy making. In this regard, Realism may show a potential affinity to a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy. This derives to a great deal, though not exclusively, from Morgenthaus conceptualisation of the state. The Morgenthauian state follows, in nature and structure, Kelsens pure theory of law. And the specific way in which Kelsen has conceptualised the state in his philosophy of law and politics is profoundly progressivist, humanist and imbued with the Enlightenment ideal of human agency; moreover, it is also firmly tied to the idea of liberal constitutional democracy. The Kelsenian state is one of the most consequential challengers of both conservative organicist and Marxist theories of the state and, ergo, their wider philosophical and political projects.59 From the perspective of the concept of the state alone, Realism can provide the philosophical seed for a moderately Leftist politics and foreign policy devoted to the principles of (national) security and progress. One of the many problems along the theory/practice divide is, of course, the standing of political realism, including Morgenthaus distinctive version. To paraphrase Robert Gilpin, no one really loves, even likes, a political realist.60 Or, as John Mearsheimer writes, political realism is a hard sell.61 It does not appear as spectacular as other grand visions (or castles in the air); its ideology-critical persuasion makes it the enemy of pure ideologues and demagogues. The dislike of foreign policy realism can be currently witnessed. Defining the national interest narrowly and avoiding much national-greatness rhetoric, the Obama administration draws criticism from all sides from (neo)conservatives and, worse, from its own clientele who feel betrayed by what is considered a conservative course. The confusion of political realism with amoral statism, crude conservatism and cynical status quo politics is disastrous. For the natural law of democratic politics suggests that most political agendas are ill-fated when faced with the pressures of public opinion. Hence, political realism must gain greater acceptance in progressivist circles, particularly in light of the worry that some self-styled realists will, as Leslie Gelb warned, foolishly keep trying to bond with neoconservatives, only to relearn that neocons treat them almost as poorly as they treat liberals.62 Here, Realism may be suitable for helping to reconcile political realism with a moderately Leftist politics. The autonomous laws and peculiarities of politics and political culture make the successful uniting of these two bodies of political philosophy uncertain, particularly when almost all areas of society, politics and foreign policy appear to be heavily berideologised. From a purely philosophical point of view, however, it seems possible. The moderate progressivism of Realism is a critical safeguard against pessimistic and fatalistic statism. It may have some elitist connotations, yet not because of any conservative

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organicist logic, but because of a profound anxiety over the worst implications of nationalistic mass pathos. Further, Realism is a timely, challenging intellectual foundation for a realistic yet progressively minded grand strategy the pursuit of a narrow foreign policy of national security/ies based on the principles of compromise and pluralism, a potentially powerful form of humility that helps create a community of interests the groundwork for the pursuit of a world-state. In any case, for those who believe in a Kantian duty to work unceasingly towards perpetual peace, yet recognise the intricacies of man and are therefore sceptical of radical transformationalist ideas, Morgenthaus philosophy of political realism is an indispensable source of inspiration for realistic, critical and progressively minded theory and practice. Acknowledgement
The article was written during the authors visiting scholarship at the University of California, San Diego, in 2010; the usual disclaimers apply. More importantly, for their insightful comments and suggestions I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and the journal editor, Ken Booth.

Notes
1 Keir Lieber, Introduction, in Lieber (ed.), War, Peace, and International Political Realism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), p. 28. 2 Brent Scowcroft, quoted in Joel Rosenthal, A Sit-Down with Brent Scowcroft, The National Interest, 99, Jan./Feb. 2009, p. 4. On Rawls and his critics, see Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights, and Justice (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 16779. 3 William Scheuerman, The (Classical) Realist Vision of Global Reform, International Theory, 2(2), 2010, p. 247. The literature on Morgenthau is now large: see Michael Williams, (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Williams Scheuerman, Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 4 Unless noted otherwise, Realism refers exclusively to Morgenthaus version of political realism. 5 John Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Lake, The State and International Relations, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 4161. 6 See, e.g., the unimaginative, so-called realist response to so-called utopian thinking in Randall Schweller, Fantasy Theory, Review of International Studies, 25(1), 1999, pp. 14750. 7 Ronen Palan and Brook Blair, On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations, Review of International Studies, 19(4), 1993, pp. 38599. For conservative theories/ concepts of the state, see Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Washington: Regnery, 2001 [1953]). 8 Kelsen has received much praise for his innovations in legal theory and constitutional and international law: jurist of our century, leading jurist of our time, most important theory of law in our century: from Richard Tur and William Twining, Introduction, in Tur and Twining (eds), Essays on Kelsen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 143. 9 Robert Rothstein, On the Costs of Realism, Political Science Quarterly, 87(3), 1972, p. 359; similarly, e.g., Piki Ish-Shalom, The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism, International Studies Quarterly, 8(3), 2006, pp. 44168.

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10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 19; Kenneth Waltz, Interview with Ken Waltz, Review of International Studies, 24(3), 1998, p. 386. 11 Quoted in Christoph Rohde, Hans J. Morgenthau und der weltpolitische Realismus [The Political Realism of Morgenthau] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), p. 155n2. 12 Perhaps the most famous argument about the intimate, triadic relationship between the political, the state and human nature is given by the infamous Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996 [1932]). For a recent statement about the significance of political anthropology, see Robert Schuett, Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 87182. 13 See the more critical Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgment of Human Nature (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), and, more affirmatively, Schuett, Political Realism. 14 Hans Morgenthau, ber die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen [On the Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man], unpublished manuscript (Hans J. Morgenthau papers, Box 151, Library of Congress, Washington), 1930, pp. 34. This manuscript is discussed in Robert Schuett, Freudian Roots of Political Realism: The Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. Morgenthaus Theory of International Power Politics, History of the Human Sciences, 20(4), 2007, pp. 5378; Scheuerman, Morgenthau, 378. 15 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Moral Dilemma of Politics, in Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 [1960]), p. 7. 16 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 197. On state-personhood, see recently Mika Luoma-aho, Political Theology, Anthropomorphism, and Person-Hood of the State: The Religion of IR, International Political Sociology, 3(3), 2009, pp. 293309. 17 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4th edn (New York: Knopf, 1967 [1948]), p. 489. 18 See, however, the discussions in Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), pp. 489, 117; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 4559; Scheuerman, Morgenthau, pp. 201, 245, 1836. 19 Hans Morgenthau, Bernard Johnsons Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau, in Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds), Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1984), p. 354. 20 Hans Morgenthau, The Impartiality of the International Police, in Salo Engel (ed.), Law, State, and International Legal Order: Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1964), p. 209. 21 Oliver Jtersonke, The Image of Law in Politics among Nations, in Williams, Realism Reconsidered, p. 110. On the roots of Morgenthaus ideas and concepts in European/American legal debates of the 1920s/30s, see Oliver Jtersonke, Morgenthau, Law, and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 22 Scheuerman, Morgenthau, p. 21. 23 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 1999 [1945]), p. 189. 24 See, e.g., Peter Stirk, Twentieth-Century German Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 256. More generally, see Hedley Bull, Hans Kelsen and International Law, in Tur and Twining, Essays on Kelsen, pp. 32136; Hidemi Suganami, Understanding Sovereignty through Kelsen/Schmitt, Review of International Studies, 33(3),

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2007, pp. 51130; Peter Stirk, John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich, International Relations, 22(4), 2008, pp. 42740. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 202. Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (London: Latimer House, 1946), p. 197. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 97. See Hans Kelsen, The Conception of the State and Social Psychology, with a Special Reference to Freuds Group Theory, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 5, 1924, pp. 138; also Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen and His Circle: The Viennese Years, European Journal of International Law, 9(2), 1998, pp. 36885; Schuett, Political Realism, pp. 10911. See Michael Williams, What Is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory, European Journal of International Relations, 11(3), 2005, pp. 30737; also Brian Schmidt and Michael Williams. The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives vs. Realists, Security Studies, 17(2), 2008, pp. 191220. For a systematic, critical analysis of the concept of national interest, see Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). W. David Clinton, The National Interest: Normative Foundations, Review of Politics, 48(4), 1986, pp. 495519; Vronique Pin-Fat, The Metaphysics of the National Interest and the Mysticism of the Nation-State: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau, Review of International Studies, 31(2), 2005, pp. 21736; Scheuerman, Morgenthau, pp. 70100. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 242. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5. For Morgenthaus original definition of the concept of the political, see Morgenthau, Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law: Its Method and Fundamental Concepts Part I, Law Quarterly Review, 50, 1934, p. 477. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967 [1934]), p. 1. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 8. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9. Kelsen strictly separates is from ought. The pure theory of law studies what the law is; his politico-philosophical writings are concerned with the ought of the law. For a glimpse of the latter, see Hans Kelsen (ed.), What Is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957). Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9. Campbell Craig, Hans Morgenthau and World State Revisited, in Williams, Realism Reconsidered, pp. 195215. Kelsen, too, supports the idea of the world-state, recognising the many forces of resistance against such a State suicide: Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2000 [1944]), p. 11. Hans Morgenthau, The Escape from Power, in Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 312. Often misunderstood, the will-to-power is not a sort of crudely Lorenzian fighting instinct, but ultimately the manifestation of a fruitless search for love: Hans Morgenthau, Love and Power, Commentary, 33(3), 1962, p. 250. The cases for Nietzsche and Freud are made, respectively, in Ulrik Peterson, Breathing Nietzsches Air: New Reflections on Morgenthaus Concept of Power and Human Nature, Alternatives, 24(1), 1999, pp. 8311, and Schuett, Freudian Roots of Political Realism. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 99. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 100.

25 26 27 28

29

30

31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43

44

45 46

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47 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 4. In this regard, consider also the allegedly naveidealistic Kelsen, who, of course, is well aware that to improve international relations one must reckon with this phenomenon as with other decisive facts if one is considering the establishment of a universal community of States (Kelsen, Peace through Law, pp. 101). 48 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9. 49 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 500. 50 Hans Morgenthau, International Relations, in Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3: The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 [1961]), pp. 1745. 51 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 21 (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), p. 122. For a discussion of Eros in Morgenthaus political anthropology, see Schuett, Political Realism, pp. 2732. 52 Morgenthau, International Relations, pp. 1745. 53 Hans Morgenthau, Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States, American Political Science Review, 46(4), 1952, p. 977. 54 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p. 120. See also Politics among Nations, pp. 811, chapters 29, 31. 55 Mark Button, A Monkish Kind of Virtue? For and against Humility, Political Theory, 33(6), 2005, pp. 84068. 56 Richard Little, The Balance of Power in Politics among Nations, in Williams, Realism Reconsidered, p. 137. 57 See Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Beyond the Realist Theories: Neo-Conservative Realism and the American Invasion of Iraq, International Studies Perspectives, 7(3), 2006, pp. 239 53; Lamont Colucci, Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values after 9/11 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008). 58 See William Scheuerman, A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as Critical Realist, in Duncan Bell (ed.), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 4162; Scheuerman, Morgenthau; Scheuerman, The (Classical) Realist Vision of Global Reform, pp. 2728. 59 Unfortunately, it is often neglected in IR how a particular conceptualisation of the state codetermines the politico-philosophical or ideological standing of a particular philosophy or theory of international relations; occasionally, positivised conceptions of states stand, normatively, in stark contradiction to the otherwise alleged philosophical inspiration. 60 Robert Gilpin, No One Loves a Political Realist, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewals (London: Cass, 1996), pp. 326. 61 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 23, 227. 62 Leslie Gelb, A Realist Rally, The National Interest, 97, Sep./Oct. 2008, p. 7. Robert Schuett is Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. His research interests are primarily based in the political theory of international relations and security / strategic studies, with a particular emphasis on political realism. Recent publications include Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations (2010).