(21) Cabreza v Cabreza, G.R. No.

181962, January 16, 2012 NATURE: ISSUE : Petition seeking to annul the Court of Appeals Decision that reversed a lower courts dismissal of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale of a conjugal dwelling on the ground of litis pendentia. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Pasig Branch 70 (RTCBr. 70) in JDRC Case No. 3705 declared void ab initio the marriage between Ceferino Cabreza, Jr. (Ceferino) and Amparo Cabreza (Amparo) and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code. Ceferino moved that their only conjugal property, the conjugal home, be sold and the proceeds distributed as mandated by law. RTC Br. 70 granted his Motion in a 26 May 2003 Order which became final. Ceferino in behalf of Amparo, he executed the Deed of Sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then filed a Motion for Writ of Possession and to Divide the Purchase Price, which RTC Pasig Branch 70 granted in its 12 May 2004 Order. In response to RTC Br. 70s issuance of a Writ of Possession, followed by a 30 June 2004 Notice to Vacate, Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that: (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart from the conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the Family Code, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the spouse, with whom four of the five Cabreza children were staying. Amparo filed with the Pasig RTC, Branch 67 a Complaint to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being void due to lack of her consent

thereto. RTC Br. 67 dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis pendentia and forum shopping.

1. Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of litis pendentia? YES. 2. Whether the decision of the RTC with regard to the sale of the conjugal dwelling is final and cannot be impugned in another case? YES. RATIO: 1. The following requisites must be present for the proper invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an action: A. Identity of parties or representation in both cases; B. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts and the same basis; and C. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases have substantially the same parties. Anent the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and

the second causes of action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. There is substantial identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between the two cases. RTC Br. 70 issued an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparos behalf. This same Order also contained, in its dispositive portion, a directive that (a)fter the sale of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the same to enable the buyer to take complete possession and control of the property. Thus, using the first test, the same evidence the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 would defeat both Amparos Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession. Accordingly, using the second test, the same defense (i.e., the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70) will defeat both the Complaint to nullify the Deed of Sale and the Petition to impugn the Writ of Possession. In fact, the subsequent Writ of Possession issued by RTC Br. 70 was the logical consequence of, and merely gave effect to, theDeed of Sale which it had previously approved. As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res judicata 2. The Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In

view of this Courts consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn the already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of the conjugal dwelling.

(e) On legitimes of the common children FC 50-53, FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888; FAMILY CODE 50-53 Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. CIVIL CODE 886; 888 Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806)

consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) NCC 908, 1061 Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a) Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)

Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003 RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

FC 176 Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall COMPARE TO: FC 147 Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall

be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) (f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213 Art. 54. Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards, and any female of the age of fourteen years or upwards, not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 to 84, may contract marriage.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.

(22) Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995 FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in

Art. 213. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains.

(g) On use of surnames, NCC Art. 371, 364, 369

the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname. ISSUE: Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. HELD: NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her

former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. B. M. NO. 1625 -JOSEPHINE P. UY-TIMOSA PETITION TO USE MAIDEN NAME FACTS : For our Resolution is the letter dated June 14, 2006 of Josephine P. Uy-Timosa, petitioner herein, praying that she be allowed to use her maiden name, Josephine P. Uy, in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations. Petitioner alleged that, despite her marriage, she has continuously used her maiden name in all her transactions, except in her school records and those in the Commission on Higher Education and other offices. However, all her records in the University of Santo Tomas reflect her maiden name. Petitioner further alleged that she and her husband have beenseparated since May 2000 and that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriageis now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Manila. The case is set to be submitted for decision on August 1, 2006.

ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner would be allowed to use her maiden name considering the impossibility of facilitating on time the amendment of her surname appearing in all the records concerned.

HELD ART. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2)

Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." This provision clearly indicates that the wife's use of her husband's surname is optional, not obligatory. Following; is the explanation given by the prominent civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino: Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This in is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article." The Court adopted this view in Yasin v. Judge, Shari'a District Court, thus: "Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after the annulment of marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code)is permissive and not obligatoryx xx. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it." Clearly, petitioner has the right to use her maiden name Jospehine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations.

Section 14, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men". This is our nation's response to the increasing clamor of women worldwide for gender equality. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, in her Concurring Opinion in Yasin, expounded that if this constitutional provision means anything at all, "it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage." ACCORDINGLY, we GRANT petitioner's request to use her maiden name Josephine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations.

(23) Remo v DFA, March 2010 Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was then expiring on October 27, 2000 Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear: surname: Rallonza given name: Maria Virginia middle name: Remo Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport Petitioners request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar request On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) the request, stating: it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of

marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied (#3) in a letter dated October 13, 2000 On November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the President dismissed (#4) the appeal with the same argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239) The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control over the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, it should yield to RA 8239. The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28, 2004, the Office of the President denied (#5) the motion. Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied (#7) in its Resolution dated August 2, 2005. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. 2. Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil Code Article 370) and the special law (RA 8239). HELD 1. No. Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage because she used her husbands last name when she applied for her passport for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. And once a the woman adopted her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239.

2. No. There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is a general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that special law prevails over a general law. The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27, 2005 Decision and August 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The petitioner used her maiden first name and her husbands last name, thus, Maria Virginia V. Remo. This is in accord to Article 370(2), Title XIII of the Civil Code of the Philippines. it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions. DFA Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota

(h) On hereditary rights, FC 43, 50, 54 Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited

in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

(i) Effect of death, Art. 103, 130 Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

subsequent marriage.

Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? RATIO NO. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. NONETHELESS, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Also, it should not impair vested rights.

(24) Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 FACTS Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners). Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. RTC DECISION: affirmed the validity of the sale declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina) that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife

ISSUE