CHINA STUDIES CENTRE

Policy Paper Series

PAPER 5 JULY 2013

Chinese diplomacy the people as the state

Merriden Varrall Macquarie University Sydney/Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Preface

Merriden Varrall in her paper, based on her Ph D thesis successfully completed in 2013, wrestles with a fundamental problem of contemporary China: what is the state? This is not a straightforward question in China, if only because the relationship between the state and the country and Party are interlinked in ways which political elites have never yet felt able to constitutionally spell out. The 1982 country constitution comes closest where it states in its preamble that China is a multi-ethnic country under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, which is the expression of the peoples will. But of course, this statement raises as many questions as it seeks to answer. We are still faced with the challenge of how to conceptualise the state, the party and the country and find the best way of seeing the links between them. This paper is based on field work that Merriden has undertaken since 2010 while based in Beijing, talking to young Chinese about their views of the state, whether they find it has a coherent role in their lives, a narrative within which they can fit, an identity they can relate to. Unsurprisingly, there are diverse perspectives on this issue. For some the state comes across as a protector, for others an irritant, often deploying language or instructions that they chose to take heed of or simply try to ignore. The state itself through its multiple agents is also busy working on this engagement strategy between the public and itself this lies behind the comments that current Party Secretary Xi Jinping made when first elevated to the Party Secretary position on the 15th November 2012 about the need to reduce the gap between the governed and those governing. Dr Varrell is careful to avoid eliding the state with the country, or the Party. Looking at social media, commentary and analysis from within China, one gets the sense that there is a hierarchy of emotional responsiveness. Chinese (that is to say inhabitants of the Peoples Republic of China today) feel a strong bond to their sense of country and its cultural and spiritual identity. They feel some bonds with the state largely because it is a functional entity that they have to deal with in their daily lives, for good or bad. But towards the Party, there is a deeper ambiguity. No one is rewarded in China now for saying bad things about the party, and the restraints are strong and ever present. And yet, the Party has perhaps the least powerful link with people. Perhaps we can locate the fundamental structural problem of contemporary China here. 1

This paper marries detailed field research with the overarching challenge of how we understand Chinese peoples own understanding of their relationship with the state. This lies at the heart of what sort of identity China has of itself, and how it then faces the world around it. To give this sort of complex issue a useable, useful and robust analytic framework as this paper does is already an achievement. We hope in publishing this that it will stimulate more debate on the crucial issue of the state and its role in modern China, and the ways in which it impacts on the lives of Chinese, and, of course, on those outside China.

Professor Kerry Brown Executive Director, China Studies Centre, and Professor of Chinese Politics University of Sydney

Chinese diplomacy the people as the state

Merriden Varrall Macquarie University Sydney/Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam April 2013

Executive summary
As China becomes a global superpower, Chinese diplomats and foreign policy officials are increasingly important players in global relations. It is therefore critical that their interlocutors around the world understand the unique way in which Chinese policy elites construct and experience the state.

While it is commonly presumed that the state is the natural and pre-existent starting point for international relations, not all states have been created in the same manner. The trajectory of state-formation in China was very different from that in Western Europe, from where current norms of international relations based on the Westphalian system have emerged. Likewise, the relationship between society and the state is philosophically and historically derived. In China, unlike in Western liberal democracies, the moral order and nexus of governance do not rest on an assumption that the state exists as a discrete entity outside of society. This is not to argue that in China the state does not exercise a palpable power in many obvious and also banal ways, it exercises demonstrable and daily control over Chinese peoples lives. However, who or what constitutes this power is not readily identifiable.

Young Chinese students training to be diplomats and government officials at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), learn to embody norms of Chinese national identity both through what they are taught and how their daily lives are governed, and expect to find the same embodiment in their peers, friends, and teachers. In conditions of network-style mutual interdependence, such as those at CFAU, state power is not only transmitted from the powerful to the powerless, it is also intricately resisted, reshaped, co-opted, absorbed, re-issued and owned by all

actors within the social group. Chinese foreign officials-in-training do not merely learn to represent the state, they become the state.

China is becoming a global superpower, and its role in the world is a topic of great interest in international relations and foreign policy discussions. However, mainstream debates tend to overlook the training of the elite professionals who will staff the Party-state and make decisions in the international realm. In this paper I examine some of the people and ideas behind Chinas international behaviour and shed light on international debates around Chinas role in the world: scholarly, political and popular. My research takes an anthropological approach to analysing the education, training and institutionalisation of a group of around 150 students that I taught at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU, Zhongguo waijiao xueyuan:
) in Beijing, and the students relationship with the Chinese Party-state. I

will use this to argue that in China, the people are the state.

I begin with a discussion of the concept of the state in the Chinese context, and how it differs from the Western European model. I then investigate how my students at CFAU understood their relationship with this particular construction of the state. To do so, I examine a key pillar in the Chinese Party-states construction of what China and being Chinese mean, namely, a unifying ideology of integrated Chinese identity. In this paper I discuss how my students views aligned with the Chinese Party-states self-representation as an extension of the family.

The State but not as we know it

Disciplines such as International Relations take the state as their analytical point of departure. However, as Spencer argues, we should ask what we mean by the state, despite the questions apparent absurdity.1 What then is the state in China, and what differences and similarities does it have with its Western European cousin? Examining how the state is constructed and experienced by people, including the semi-permeable boundary between people and state, allows us to examine the

Jonathan Spencer, Anthropology, Politics and the State: Democracy and Violence in South Asia, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 101. Italics added.

relationship between CFAU students and state power that moves away from a presumption of the feel-good dystopia of state versus people.2

Recent studies of state-making in China have noted how different the trajectories of state-formation in China and Western Europe have been. 3 As Patricia Thornton explains,4 the modern Chinese state-making process has been very different from that in Western Europe, where states evolved as war machines, 5 focused largely on achieving military goals. Focusing on the states repressive or coercive capacities results in the presumption that it is the monopolisation of power that produces legitimacy rather than the possibility that the monopolisation of legitimacy might in turn produce power.6 Thornton argues that the Chinese process has been less driven by competition for trade and territory, and thus is less concerned with mobilising troops and material resources for war. Rather, modern Chinese leaders socio-ethical agendas are the primary factor, and Chinese state-making rests more on the recurring need to define and redefine the centre as a moral agent in fact, the moral agent in modern Chinese history.7 The notion of the state as the object of humanitys distrust and resistance prevalent in Western discourses is a philosophically and historically specific one, deriving from a vision of moral order that is based on ideas of Natural Law developed in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. 8 The contemporary Chinese moral order is very different. The Chinese state is not a thing that exists external to society, brooding and ominous. The fundamental nexus of governance is not a jurisdictional top-down system that controls the actions of every individual through the imposition of rules.9

2 3

Ibid., 111. Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence and State-Making in Modern China (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 6; see also Lucian Pye, How Chinas Nationalism was Shanghaied, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29 (1993), 10733. 4 Thornton 2007, 2. 5 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD990-1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). 6 Ibid., 23. 7 Thornton 2007, 2. 8 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 3. 9 Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng, Introduction, in From the Soil, Fei Xiaotong (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992 [1947]), 29.

To understand state power in China, we not only need to move beyond the idea that the state is outside of society, but also the idea that it is in society, as Migdal argues.10 Rather, as Pieke prefers to explain it, the state is better viewed as society,11 and this is certainly the way my CFAU students experienced it. By reconceptualising the state in this way, subalterns can be seen as having an authentic, and not merely reactive response to power.12

One of the key difficulties in understanding politics in China is that it is virtually impossible to separate the government administration and the politically focused Party system. Indeed, it is the absence of strict authority boundaries or elite boundaries between the Party and non-Party institutions together with the primacy of the Party that has for so many years given politics in communist systems its distinctive character.13 In China, technologies of administrative and political power are not so much parallel and intertwined as inextricably interwoven in complicated and unclear ways. The Party is not parallel to other state and administrative structures, rather, it is intrinsically interwoven into them to the most local level. There are 41,636 Party Township Committees and 780,000 Village Committees monitoring and reporting on peoples daily lives.14 Every senior government minister or official is a Party member, with a few symbolic exceptions. The Party controls staffing in government ministries and agencies through a complicated and opaque appointments system and guides them on their political posture and correct policy position through committee meetings.15 In Washington or Westminster systems (or, in Australia, the hybrid Washminster system), the term the government refers to the people whose clearly stated political views or ideologies steer the policies of the administrative and bureaucratic sector. In
10

Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 116. 11 Frank Pieke, Contours of an Anthropology of the Chinese State: Political Structure, Agency and Economic Development in Rural China, Royal Anthropological Institute, 10 (2004): 51738; p. 533. Emphasis added. 12 Sherry Ortner, Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37, no. 1 (1995): 17393; p. 181. 13 Amos Perlmutter and W.M. Leo Grande, The Party in Uniform: Towards a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, The American Political Science Review, 76, no. 4 (1976): 77889; p. 778. 14 Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of Chinas Communist Rulers (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), vi. 15 Ibid., 15.

China, the government could therefore be understood to mean the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in that it is the organisation that directs the administration of the country. However, the Chinese government is a combination of Party and administrative bureaucracy: the Party does not exist outside of the bureaucracy; rather, the Party is an inseparable part of it.

Many non-Chinese observers and commentators, particularly those in the West, tend to try and make sense of the Chinese Party-state system through readily recognisable prisms. However, using familiar nomenclature to describe Chinese political structures does not so much clarify as oversimplify and subsume important differences. For example, Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao are widely described in Western discussions as President, a term associated with a particular set of roles and responsibilities. However, what is now widely understood to be the highest position in Chinese politics, which Xi currently holds, is General Secretary of the Communist Party, a role with no direct equivalent in European or North American liberal democracies. Simultaneously, he is Chairman of the State Council and head of the Central Military Commission of the Peoples Republic of China. Without holding all of these roles simultaneously, an individual cannot be Chinas Head of State. As Brown points out, the CCP is not simply a political party but rather an embodiment and institutionalisation of politics itself in China that shares very few characteristics with political parties in Liberal democracies. Therefore, trying to see it simply as a political party along the same lines as them creates immediate conceptual problems.16 Politics, power, and the relationships between the mechanisms of control and the people in China are in many fundamental ways simply not comparable to Western notions of the same.

A common misperception in Western commentary that arises from the application of Western models to explain Chinese politics is the way in which commentators tend to understand reforms in Chinas central planning as the retreat of the state. This kind of commentary usually includes a concomitant celebration of the restoration of individual agency which will allow Chinese people to have the opportunity to be

Kerry Brown, The Party: where it is and what it is doing and saying, talk given at the AustraliaChina Youth Association, Beijing, June 2011, n.p.
16

who they really are.17 However, contentions that state authority is being supplanted by liberal reforms, such as those put forward by Strange,18 overestimate the retreat of the state. As Hoffman argues, changes and reforms should be interpreted not so much as the onset of freedom but rather as a different but equally present technique of governing adopted by the post-Mao government.19

One effect of this governmentalisation is the way in which desires are educated, habits are configured, and aspirations and beliefs are moulded to align with the goals of the state. As Bourdieu argues, every established order tends to produce the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness, or field of doxa, in which knowledge of the social world comes to be seen as self-evident and undisputed.20 When internalised norms and values fit neatly with objective structures and external norms, the established cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one possible order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned. 21 In producing doxa, Bourdieu notes the importance of highly stable objective structures which reproduce themselves in the agents dispositions. The more they do so, the greater the extent
17

Lisa Hoffman, Patriotic Professionalism in Urban China: Fostering Talent (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 11. For debates about the relationship among economic reform (liberalisation), the rise of the public sphere, and democratic political movements, see for example Abdul Rahman Embong (ed.), Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change And Democratisation (Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001); Merle Goldman, Is Democracy Possible? Current History, (September 1995): 25963; Merle Goldman, The emergence of politically independent intellectuals, in The Paradox of Chinas Post-Mao reforms, eds. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 283307; Richard Madsen, The public sphere, civil society and moral community, Modern China, 19, Issue 2 (1993): 18398; Margaret M. Pearson, Chinas New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ngai Pun, Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Tony Saich, The search for civil society and democracy in China, Current History (September 1994): 26064; and Frederic Wakeman, The civil society and public sphere debate: Western reflections on Chinese political culture, Modern China 19, Issue 2 (1993): 10838. However, a number of studies have questioned the existence of a causal link between economic liberalisation and political resistance (such as Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Is China Moving Towards Enlightened but Plutocratic Authoritarianism?, China Perspectives [Online], Volume 55, September - October 2004, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/412, accessed 12 December 2011; Hoffman, 2010; and Frank Pieke in cooperation with Duan Eryu, The Communist Party and Social Management in China, China Information, 26, Issue 2 (2012): 14965), although there is still a tendency by some to use this process, the chances for political evolution, and the search for the political will to act to frame their analyses, for example Pearson (p. 27); and also Goodman (1996). 18 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 19 Hoffman, 2010, 12. 20 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 164. 21 Ibid., 166.

of the field of doxa, of that which is taken for granted. 22 Reproduction and reduplication in every possible sphere of socialisation helps the world conform to the myth, so that between the child and the world there is nothing that intervenes or disenchants, but rather the whole universe of ritual practises, and also of discourses, sayings, proverbs are all structured to concord with the doxa.23 To be able to create this self-reinforcing universe of truth requires the dominant classes to very deliberately prevent the exposure of the arbitrariness of the taken for granted. Those in power must diligently toil to defend the integrity of the doxa.24

An increasing number of issues, such as media censorship, are now in what might be termed the realm of the disputable, a non-doxical space in which debate is acceptable. However, these debates tend to be about technical questions, the how to of running the state. While my CFAU students generally felt comfortable discussing these subjects, the vast majority tended to adopt an orthodox position and agree with the official line, that is to think and do as they ought, in their own self-interest.25 For example, in a discussion about media controls, Cello26 said that she felt that our government is way too sensitive, it acts like a baby, no, a child of three, it is not mature, it has to see that problems do exist, they wont just disappear. She had carefully prefaced this remark with, Im not anti-government, this is just a useful suggestion for improving. Despite this, a classmate asked whether her comments meant she would consider herself anti-government. Cello hastily replied, no, no! Im critical of Im anti-corrupt government, Im anti-manipulative government. Cellos remarks show how, while some students were aware of the way power operated around them, and were prepared to critique this control to some extent, they ultimately limited themselves to making their criticisms in the form of technicalised suggestions for improvement. At the same time, themes particularly fundamental to the Party-states construction of China and being Chinese, such as the legitimacy of

Ibid., 1656. Ibid., 167. 24 Ibid., 169. 25 Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 26 All names in this thesis have been changed to protect the identity of the students, but given how seriously the students took the selection of their English names, I have attempted to keep the spirit of what they chose for themselves.
22 23

the Party-state system, or the nation-state as a family, remained firmly within the realm of doxa.

State reforms and an increasingly sophisticated governmentalisation do not equate to a rollback of the state, or deny the existence of palpable state power to which CFAU students are subject. As Pieke points out, the vertically integrated hierarchical state is much more than a loose configuration of bureaucratic institutions and practices.27 In China, the Party-state, in both dressed up and flag-waving and in banal, quotidian, intangible ways, exercises demonstrable and daily control over peoples lives. However understanding who or what constitutes state power is not as simple as pointing a finger at the imposing buildings behind Tiananmen Square that house the leadership, or familiarising oneself with the Constitution. While the state does exist, and does have obligations to the people on which its legitimacy rests, the state is not always clearly distinguishable from the Party, the country, the family or indeed, according to the perceptions of many of my students, from the individual. Conceptualising power as resting in the state as opposed to in the individual underestimates the depth to which my students themselves embodied and articulated institutions of social control, both over themselves and over others around them.

The way in which my students understood their relationship with state power is based on a concentric circle model of social relations. In the relationship-based social formation which characterises Chinese social life, roles, responsibilities, obligations and privileges shift constantly according to context. 28 In network-style, mutually interdependent relationships, as was the case for students living on campus at CFAU, power is not only transmitted from the powerful to the powerless. It is also intricately resisted, reshaped, co-opted, absorbed, re-issued, and owned by all actors within the social group. Evasdottir argues that in such situations, the very definitions of concepts such as hierarchy, authority, power and autonomy must change.29 Power is everywhere, but not only in the sense that the state is panoptically watching and controlling the students. The students are also watching and controlling their peers,
27 28

Pieke 2004, 532. Erika Evasdottir, Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of Orderly Life (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004); Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1947] 1992 English edition); Mayfair Yang Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The art of social relationships in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 296-298. 29 Evasdottir 2004, xi.

10

and themselves. This complex inter-relationship of power is, I argue, a way to understand the concept of state as family, or guojia (). In my CFAU students social imaginary, their relationship with the state was conceived of as analogous to that of a family unit, with the Party-state as parent. In this conceptualisation, boundaries between the state and the individual student are extremely nebulous and inconstant. In many ways, the students are the state (e.g. Fongs filial nationalism30).

How the Chinese Party-state defines itself

Understanding power in China is further complicated because the Party has radically transformed the definition of its role over the course of its history, both in and of itself, as well as in relation to other institutions. From its foundation in 1921, the CCP has evolved from being a party of revolution and change (up to the founding of the New China (the PRC) in 1949), to one of governance. Having been an institution dedicated to the primary cause of class struggle, after Maos death the CCP entirely transformed its mantra under Deng Xiaoping to promote economic productivity as its key performance benchmark. During the nine decades of its existence, the CCP has faced some extraordinary challenges that have required it to take radical changes in direction, which have then needed to be justified and explained. As Pieke notes, At the heart of the CCPs strategy lies the fact that it is prepared to reinvent itself, while retaining core Leninist principles that guarantee its authoritarian leading role over state and society.31

While the Party has changed ideological tack and injected foreign concepts into its lexicon, it has always and consistently deployed narratives of longevity and continuity to maintain its legitimacy. In these narratives, the Party characterises itself as the entity which unified, pacified and developed China to arrive at where it is today, and as the only means through which Chinas recent peace and stability can continue into the future.

Vanessa L. Fong, Filial Nationalism among Chinese Teenagers with Global Identities, American Ethnologist, 31, no 4 (2004): 63148. 31 Pieke 2012, 150
30

11

My students firmly believed that the Party can and should adjust its ideology and role in response to changing times, and likewise accepted that the key themes of its propaganda messages can, and should, also change. During the Mao era, propaganda and thought work focused on Chinas social transformation; however, after Maos death, this approach was rejected. From 1991, the Party identified new central themes, namely patriotism, collectivism and socialism, to justify the apparent aboutface from the policies and ideology of the Mao era and to encourage people to embrace the new economic order of market liberalism. 32 Indeed, the CCP had an explicit policy to indoctrinate the masses with economic-related ideology, such as awareness of the successes of Dengs Opening Up and Reform policies, and the importance of science, law, competition and efficiency.33

A unifying ideology of integrated identity Today, the CCP presents itself as the guardian of a timeless Chinese state and the unified Chinese people. A key pillar critical to this construction is a unifying ideology of integrated identity, 34 a motif my CFAU students very commonly deployed to explain what the Chinese state-as-idea meant to them. Following Li, Evasdottir and Hoffman, among others, who discuss recent shifts in techniques of governmentality in China, I argue that my students could agree or disagree with certain technical questions as long as they chose to accept that other questions remained in the realm of doxa, undiscussed and undisputed.

Projecting unity and coherence is a core task of state-making anywhere. In China, the states projection of itself as a moral actor with the ultimate right to define what constitutes Chineseness has played a central role in the state-building process. 35 According to this ideology of unified Chineseness, the Party, the state, the country and the people are all foundational elements of an overarching and mutually constitutive common identity, in which if one dimension of the whole fails, the entire structure is in danger of collapsing. As such, each part of the unified whole relies on the continued existence of all the others. A critical element in the CCPs narrative of
Anne-Marie Brady, Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and Chinas Popular Authoritarianism, American Behavioral Scientist, 53, no. 3 (2009): 43457; p. 448. 33 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 2011, cited in Brady, 448. 34 Jyrki Kallio, Tradition in Chinese Politics: The Party-States Reinvention of the Past (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 123. 35 Thornton 2007, 12, 14.
32

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its own continuity and ongoing legitimacy is to engender a sense that each individual is Chinese above all else, sharing a particular and agreed Chinese history, experiencing a certain Chinese present, and moving forward into a greater Chinese future. This sense of integrated identity underpinned my students conception of what it means to be a good Chinese citizen. Students explained to me that the essence of this sense of being a part of a greater Chinese whole is contained in the Chinese word for country or state guojia (), which is made up of the character for country (guo
) and the character for family (jia ). For these students, the integrated identity of

Chineseness transcends ethnic boundaries, and links to the state-sponsored image of a strong, rich and unified China.

On many occasions, Chinese friends and colleagues, as well as CFAU students, explained to me that the nature of the relationship between the Chinese state and the people is fundamentally different from that in the West. For example, while at a conference in Papua New Guinea on Asias growing role in the Pacific, I was talking to a young, male Chinese professor from the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) who had been sent to the conference to present Chinas perspective. He raised the topic of Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo winning the Nobel Peace Prize, and said that while basically most Chinese people understood that human rights and democracy were good and important, pushing the issue in that way, from the outside would not work: Doing so just serves to make the Chinese government angry and the people upset. He then said, because, you know, so many people dont understand things like how the relationship between people and state in China is ... is like a family. My students at CFAU felt very strongly that the idea of guojia, or country-family expressed the relationship between people and the state in China very well. They believed that the term encapsulated a relationship that is different from the traditional Western understanding of a social contract between two mutually exclusive, rational, self-interested entities. Indeed, one student in the Diplomacy major argued that guojia traditionally meant the whole of society, that is, that society is the state, and t he state is society. This intermeshing between people and the state arose on several occasions in my CFAU classes. For example, in one lesson focused on the role of culture in Chinese foreign policy, we discussed what constitutes Chinese culture. The 13

reading for the week was Social and Political Life, chapter six of Lin Yutangs book, My Country and My People.36 In this chapter, Lin argues that Chinese society is based on obligation to family rather than society, and thereby individuals seek interests and honour for themselves and their family sometimes at a cost to society at a larger level, in the form of corruption and nepotism. From discussing the issues raised by the chapter, several points about how the students understood their relationship with the state and country as being part of an integrated whole emerged. Lins chapter explained how Chinese society was based on the family mind rather than the social mind. As one student explained, the term family mind implied that the family system is the spring for the whole social system, including the government. Other students understood the family mind to mean that, just as in a family, where relationships mattered more than rules and regulations, so it was in the larger family of the Chinese nation-state. In this larger family, the government (not clearly defined as being either the Party or the administrative system) took the role of parent, and the Chinese people were the children. As such, students explained, strict parenting was appropriate and also necessary. As one female student observed,

Some parents let their children decide and choose for themselves. The government should be ... well, it depends on how old the child is. I mean, if they are babies, well of course the parents have to have more control. Chinese people are teenagers. We are trying to fight for the ability to be adults, but sometimes we are immature, so we need the government to tell us how to behave. Most students tended to agree with this position, saying that, for example, children, the Chinese people, still have to check with their parents, the government, to approve things.37 In another class, Ricky argued that as Confucius says, if the family was well, the country will be well. So, if the leaders treat the country as a family, the country will get better. His friend Ken added,
36

Lin Yutang, My Country and My People (Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 1998 [1935]). I gave students the Lin reading without revealing the identity of the author, and the overall reaction was very negative until students discovered that Lin was in fact a Chinese writer.
37

For example, Fong 2004.

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Controlling the country is just like cooking a meal. The idea is that you cant treat it too luan, I mean, let it be too chaotic, it has to be more ordered. Ricky means the family is the basic unit of society, if one family is stable, many families are stable, society is stable. Everyone is related. The government is the parent or the chef.

According to this characterisation, students believed that it was right that the government, in a parental role, should exercise control over the immature people for the benefit of society as a whole. Students attitude towards media censorship is a useful illustration of the way in which they conceived of society and state as forming a family unit. That the Chinese media exercises censorship was a well-accepted fact among my students; however, to what extent the government ought to be controlling access to information was hotly debated. Most of my students felt that it was appropriate for the government to censor and control the availability of information to protect the Chinese people. Generally, students saw media censorship as good parenting, and argued that while perhaps the government should move towards less censorship, the transition should be slow and careful. For example, in one class in which we were discussing the media, one student commented that he hated censorship in any media system. Immediately, his friend Ricky joked that its Chinese culture to censor the media, a Chinese characteristic to ask the media to stabilise society. Laura replied that, Any country has censorship, its necessary, its fundamental. We need it in order to prevent confusion in the mind of the people, to prevent chaos. The government needs to control culture via the media to keep things clear.

Carolyn noted that she thought that government control of online opinions was a good thing, as people without proper knowledge could otherwise just say whatever they liked and stir up trouble. She felt that it would be disastrous to be completely open. Several students agreed that lifting government controls over the media too quickly would indeed be disastrous. Further, students said they felt that government media controls are important as, if anybody can access all the facts all at once, we cant 15

accept them; so the government should open up our access to information slowly. Another student, Sebastian, argued that, It is very important to dominate [peoples] minds, to make sure their minds go along with the mainstream I think allowing views on the net is a good way to let out emotion, but whenever a country cant dominate peoples minds, problems appear. This is the most important thing, because China has such a unique context, like its large population, so if everybody thinks the same way, the force goes in a straight line, China is more powerful. At this point, Cello shot back, that is extremely frightening to me, to which Sebastian responded, maybe Cello misunderstood me, what I meant was that in a larger sense, it is important to stay together, that is how to make China strong. Like Sebastian, many students saw the censorship of the media as a necessary, if at times annoying, means to ensure social unity and stability. These broader social goals were considered far more important than any individuals ability to access the media at will.

Despite the general trend among students to adopt the prevailing orthodoxy on issues like media censorship, this did not mean that students were not able to express any negative views or criticisms at all. I noticed a remarkable difference between the students I had taught in Tianjin in 1999 and my CFAU students in 2009-2010 regarding their willingness to discuss government policy. In 1999, students were visibly afraid to even mention the topic of media censorship. Over a decade later, my students at CFAU were able to express dissatisfaction with the Party-state regarding particular topics, as long as they did not go beyond the accepted parameters. Another example was how my students quite comfortably railed against what they saw as isolated incidences of local corruption. They seemed to regard corruption among local officials as a well-known fact. This suspicion extended to some higher-level officials though never to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who they understood as clean. Students willingness to discuss issues like media censorship and Party corruption reflects a new government approach to monitoring and control. For example, in the media, the government is no longer as concerned with politically critical content as 16

perceived encouragement to translate criticism into real-life action.

38

This

sophisticated system of controlled flexibility in the blogosphere aims censorship at curtailing collective action rather than focusing on expressions of political opinion. It does so by focusing on silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilisation, regardless of content.39 The approach of controlled flexibility reflects Hoffmans analysis of new modes of governmentality in China. She argues that in this new model, while the state appears to be loosening its restrictions, it is rather shifting to an emphasis on self-governance in which self-directed self-improvement moves the locus of control from central authorities to subjects.40 Pieke makes similar observations about the changes in the presence of government in contemporary Chinese society, describing it as more powerful and resourceful and less direct and invasive.
41

This flexible

authoritarianism is representative of a sophisticated shifting of the mechanisms of governmentality as a means of more effectively maintaining state power. 42 My students negotiation of topics that had formerly been in the realm of doxa reflected how extensively they had internalised this model of controlled flexibility. My students ability to express views that not so long ago would have been unthinkable reflects the Party-states sophisticated management of integrated identity. Certain technical aspects of how the state should be run are now debateable. Being aware of and frustrated with government corruption and media censorship are just two examples of issues which have been allowed to move from the realm of doxa into a realm in which students could choose to take a position somewhere between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. For the most part, my students chose to align more closely with the orthodox perspective. However, their belief in the importance of unity and coherence remained firmly undisputed. It was very difficult for them to conceive of themselves as anything other than unchangeably Chinese, and being part of a Chinese family in which the state was a firm but fair parental figure. Any suggestion to the
Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, Harvard University Research Paper June 18 2012, http://gking.harvard.edu/gking/files/censored.pdf. 39 Ibid. 40 Hoffman 2010, 11-13. 41 Pieke 2012,149. 42 Cabestan 2004, 27.
38

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contrary was met with emotional and inarticulate responses, often anger, suggesting the extent to which these notions had not been thought about or any position consciously decided upon. The difference between we Chinese and you, the rest of the world One of the implications of the integrated identity discourse was how students conceptualised anything or anyone not Chinese. Because my students did not conceive of the state and society as separate, discrete elements, but rather as being inextricably linked within a metaphorical family unit, everything and everyone not Chinese was simply part of a single imagined community of outside China. I came across this sense of we Chinese (women Zhongguoren: ) as a unique category that you outsiders (nimen waiguoren: , that is [mostly undifferentiated] foreigners) could never hope to genuinely understand on many occasions during my time in China. During my fieldwork at CFAU, and in casual conversations with friends, shopkeepers, hairdressers, taxi drivers, or university professors, many new or apparently inexplicably Chinese things were described (not explained) to me by calling on this trope of difference. Fong found that the Chinese citizens in her study often experienced and discussed the developed world as if it were one imagined community. 43 She describes how her Chinese interlocutors contrasted how things were done in China by Chinese people with how foreigners did things in foreign countries, as if all foreign countries were part of one single country, and all the foreigners shared the same nationality.44 Similarly, when my friends and students explained how we Chinese did things, they usually did so with the assumption that I would not be able to understand, and they were rather simply demonstrating that how Chinese people saw and did things was fundamentally different from the West. For example, my students at CFAU would explain their reluctance to do the readings I set them and participate in class discussions in terms of we Chinese dont study in this way.

43

Vanessa L. Fong, Paradise Redefined: Transnational Chinese Students and the Quest for Flexible Citizenship in the Developing World (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 6. 44 Ibid., 67.

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One particularly distinctive example of how the outsider could never truly understand the Chinese was in relation to face. The concept came up many times in my classes at CFAU, often in relation to how it underpinned political decisionmaking, both domestically and in regard to Chinas role in the international arena, now as well as in the past. In conversations across all the classes in which we discussed the concept of face, I noticed a very strong tendency for students to assume that, because I was a foreigner, I would never be able to understand what face really meant. They told me that there was simply no equivalent word in English, and as soon as we started to use English words to try and describe the concept, the term lost its essential sense. Students epistemological position in which concepts and ideas existed that were common only to Chinese people led into discussions about what made a person Chinese, whether Chinese people could ever stop being Chinese, and whether outsiders could ever become Chinese. Students considered it possible that people born overseas of Chinese parents could become citizens of another country, but that this did not equate to them becoming not-Chinese. Students used the term ABCs or BBCs to describe individuals with Chinese heritage born overseas. The acronyms stood for American/Australian or British-born Chinese and imply that, despite being born elsewhere, they are still fundamentally Chinese. Similarly, it was inconceivable to my students that foreigners born and raised in China could ever become Chinese. Indeed, the very notion met with furrowed brows and confused shaking of heads. My students first reaction, for the most part, would be to laugh at such an absurd notion. As one student explained, foreigners cant become Chinese because they believe in God, okay, well, even if they dont believe in God, that idea has too deeply influenced them. Even if an individual was born in China from parents who themselves were born in China, students did not believe they could really be considered truly Chinese. When I tried to clarify why this was the case, students once again seemed unable to express themselves. As when discussing nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment, knowing what constituted Chineseness was difficult for students to articulate. The students had so internalised the immutability of Chineseness that they simply knew that only Chinese people could ever be Chinese, and could never stop being Chinese.

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Mass persuasion: how the Chinese state presents itself as a technique of governance
This internalised sense of Chineseness is dependent on, and indeed co-creative with, the Chinese national identity that the state has so deliberately crafted and controlled. At different points of time and in different spaces, the way in which the Chinese national community has been imagined, to use the words of Benedict Anderson,45 has changed remarkably, as have the discourses and practices involved in creating, transmitting and perpetuating that imagined entity. The structures and processes of power, the means of communicating ideals, and the contestations and negotiations of meaning have seen remarkable and often radical shifts in direction in China over the past 60 years. The Chinese Communist Party must exert considerable ongoing efforts to produce the nation and clearly articulate the Party-state ideology and political programme in order to retain the support of the people.46 There is a long list of institutions whose job it is to analyse these very issues, including but not limited to: the Party History Teaching and Research Department at the Central Party School; the Party History Research Centre, the Party Literature Research Centre and the Party Building Bureau Policy Research Office in the Central Committee; the Party Building Research Institute; the General Office in the Central Commission and Inspection, CCP; and the Research Office of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee. However despite all this research activity, garnering agreement on a consistent narrative acceptable across all the wings and flanks of the CCP has been a challenge, both in the current time and throughout the Partys history.47

Considerable skill is required to communicate these shifting messages at the same time as maintaining the continuity of the other narratives central to the Party-states continued relevance. In recent years there have been concerted efforts to build popular support for Party rule through what Brady terms mass persuasion, 48
45

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London, New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]). 46 Brown, n.p. 47 Ibid. 48 Brady, Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and Chinas Popular Authoritarianism, American Behavioral Scientist 53,no. 3 (2009): 43457

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particularly after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Citing internal Party documents, Brady argues that the current Chinese government recognises the importance of communication propaganda and thought work as integral, the life line (shengmingxian ) of the Party-state. She notes that since 1989, considerable resources have been deployed to update CCP ideology so that it better matches Chinas rapidly changing social and economic environment. 49 Many in the CCP blamed the events of 1989 on too much of a focus on ensuring support through performance (economic growth) and neglecting the importance of strategic communication a reaction to the decreased emphasis on ideological control after Maos death in 1976. In the years following, the CCP began to very deliberately adopt a two-handed approach, in which both performance-based and persuasionbased legitimacy were deemed equally important. To strengthen its ability to persuade, since 1989 the CCP has deliberately deployed methods of political public relations, mass communication, social psychology, and other modern techniques of mass persuasion commonly used in Western societies.50 As in Maos era, the Partystate today uses the full range of available resources to transmit its message to the Chinese people, working on the theory that the more popular a medium is, the more it can get into their ears, their brains, their hearts (rue er, ru nao, ru xin: ), as Ding Guangen, propaganda chief from 1992 to 2002, was fond of saying.51

The media play an important role in imagining the nation-state and communicating what it is to be a proper Chinese. In the 1990s, the Central Propaganda Department designated television as the key tool for domestic and foreign audiences alike, making it the preferred medium for presenting propaganda and delivering indications about

49 50

Ibid., 453. Ibid., 434. 51 Ibid., 442. Despite these efforts, the CCP is reportedly deeply frustrated at how its message is not getting through not only to the rest of the world, but to many of its own people (Brown, n.p.). Browns research, conducted with David Shambaugh, suggests that the Party is looking for a new kind of language with which to capture peoples imaginations and reconnect with them. As Brown points out, the Party-state not only has to meet the challenges of running the country, but also needs to simultaneously communicate its achievements to an impossibly complex constituency. The vast differences within the Chinese population in geographical location, ethnic identity, and increasingly disparate socio-economic levels create considerable difficulties in communicating in a way that appeals to the majority of the population. Of late the Party has found that the language it has traditionally used to deliver propaganda about economic achievements has been judged as stilted and formulaic, and lacking in emotional appeal.

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correct attitudes.52 Three per cent of prime time advertising space was required to be allocated for sophisticated, well-made institutional television partymercials in order to support general propaganda themes, such as national unity, or to stress the central and historically inevitable role of the CCP in Chinas development.53 While in the late 1970s, there was only one television set per 1000 people in China, by 2007 the rate of television ownership was almost 100 per cent. Thanks also to a government project to donate televisions and extend satellite coverage to all corners of China, even the most remote communities can now watch government-made, normatively-loaded partymercials and prime time soap operas.

In addition to the management of information in the arena of television, text messaging and the internet, far from being a means of contesting power, have functioned to strengthen the Partys mass communication work. As part of a carefully considered response to the Colour Revolutions calling for political change in Eastern Europe, 54 in December 2005 the government stepped up its vigilance and text messaging is now monitored closely by 2800 surveillance centres. The CCP has also embraced internet technology and developed a system of controls which it regularly updates as part of its vigilant surveillance. Various government agencies, including the Ministry of Public Security, the State Council Information Office, and the newly established State Internet Information Office, all carry responsibilities for regulating the internet in China.

Besides overseeing the content of various forms of media, the Party-state is also attentive to the way in which language itself is deployed in official messages to create the national imaginary. Since well before the first days of the Peoples Republic of China, Chinese leaders have been acutely sensitive to the power of the word. As Thornton argues, the persistent power of the written word as a technique of rule is evident in the commitment of successive Chinese regimes to the careful compilation

Stefan R. Landsberger, Learning by What Example? Educational Propaganda in Twenty-firstCentury China, Critical Asian Studies 33, Issue 4 (2010): 541571, p. 567. 53 Ibid., 576. One particularly good example of how television has been used to subtly but effectively transmit norms and values is the Beijing TV series, Golden Wedding (Jin Hun ). The series allowed viewers to see a highly selective version of Chinas political history through the lives of a married couple (Brady 2009, 442). 54 Brady 2009, 443.
52

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of canonical texts and standard histories, as well as the suppression of unofficial and alternative accounts.55 The concern with linguistic form to ensure the common people know what is right is particularly noticeable in CCP political communications since 1949. 56 Michael Schoenhals argues that while the leadership of the CCP agrees on few issues, they have achieved a remarkable consensus about the crucial role of perlocutionary acts57 in gaining, consolidating and retaining Party legitimacy.58 Mao was well known for choosing his words with extreme care to avoid the dangerous causal relationship between erroneous formulations, confused notions and, ultimately, inappropriate practices. As he said in 1963, one single [correct linguistic] formulation, and the whole nation will flourish; one single [incorrect] formulation and the whole nation will decline. What is referred to here is the transformation of the spiritual into the material.59 Certain formulations with their associated fixed forms are approved as being correct and scientific referring to their political utility in producing the desired results, rather than being scientifically verifiable.60 Regulations stipulate that synonyms may not replace approved words, in case their utility should be affected.

What is critical in the use of words is a certain and carefully considered formalisation through what some have termed a kind of linguistic impoverishment, in which political language is limited to a selection of options which constitute a restricted code for conveying meaning. 61 As Maurice Bloch notes, the formulation of how things are said is a far more powerful means of control than simply creating a list of taboo topics. The reason that correct formulation is more effective is that by defining
55 56

Thornton 2007, 15. This concern has a long history, for example, in pre-modern China, political philosophers paid extensive attention to the use of language. Confucius argued in the Analects that when names are not correct and what is said is therefore not reasonable the affairs of state will not culminate in success, and the common people will not know how to do what is right. As such, the Prince is never casual in his choice of words (Confucius, Analects, 12, iii, 5-6). 57 John L. Austin uses this term to describe the intentional use of language to produce consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts and actions of people (John L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 101) 58 Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies (Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley: University of California, 1992), 5. 59 Ibid., 6. This particular example of how erroneous formulations in language ultimately lead to inappropriate practices comes from the winter of 197879, when the CCP leadership reversed its previously positive verdict on Maos final decade. 60 Ibid., 9. 61 Ibid., 1.

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and regulating the manner [in which things are expressed] the content is also, albeit indirectly, restricted, and this type of restriction is much more powerful than a direct one on content, since it goes right through the whole range of political responses.62 The use of prescribed linguistic formulations (tifa ) is the topic of constant and ongoing strategic deliberation in the very highest levels of the CCP.63

Communication to produce a collective national imaginary also requires an audience for and by whom it is conjured into being. The effectiveness of the nation-states message is mediated and negotiated by the audience, rather than having a uniform effect on public minds. Many of the officials-in-training at the CFAU had a sophisticated awareness of the machinations of power and control going on around them particularly media censorship but, for the most part, they seemed to choose to align themselves with the orthodox perspective that national unity and stability and CCP legitimacy are the most important social goals. For example, most of my students knew of at least one proxy server through which they could access sensitive internet information. However, most of those who used proxy servers and VPNs (virtual private networks) to access sites outside of China were not seeking information on politics or foreign affairs, but were logging on to social websites such as Facebook and YouTube. But even that was rare, given the popularity of the Chinese equivalents. Students strongly believed that media censorship was, ultimately, valuable in the pursuit of greater social stability.

However, there were a number of incidents outside of the classroom in which students did express views that went against the prevailing discourses. I noticed a discrepancy between what students would express in the classroom and among their peers, and what they would say to me directly. Each group generally had at least one student who would come up to me in the break or after the lesson to tell me that he or she did not agree with the sentiments that were being expressed by his or her classmates, but that he or she had not wanted to put forward a different opinion in class. For example, Cello spoke to me after class following her outburst about

62 63

Maurice Bloch (ed.) Political Oratory in Traditional Society (London: Academic Press, 1975), 5. Schoenhals, 3; see also Pl Nyiri, On Language, in China Cant Stop Saying No, (online 2006), http://chinasaysno.wordpress.com/chapters/language/.

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manipulative government to tell me that she had wanted to say more, but she felt that she would be best to not cause any trouble with her classmates.

After one class, a student lingered, cleaning the blackboard while his classmates packed up their books and went to lunch. After the room had emptied, he said that he wanted to tell me that he had not agreed with what his classmates had been saying about Japan and he was sorry that he had not put forward his point of view in class. He was anxious for me to know that this was not because he had not carefully considered the issues, but rather because he was afraid of what his classmates might say. I asked what he was afraid of. He replied with great sincerity that while perhaps nothing negative would happen now, he was scared of what could happen in another twenty or thirty years if there was another Cultural Revolution, and his classmates remembered him as the one who had disputed Party authority, or disagreed with government policy. He said he simply could not take the risk. This confession came as quite a shock to me because of the depth of insecurity and fear he seemed to feel. These students were illustrative examples of what Evasdottir terms obedient autonomy, that is, getting ahead by accepting and working within the confines of power and control, in that success in a system of interdependence such as at CFAU relies on participating in self-directed self-control. In this way, the complex and multi-directional processes of power, the state as society, were experienced and lived in students daily lives.

On other occasions, some students explicitly acknowledged that they were choosing to align with the orthodoxy. For example, I asked two of my students outside of class how much they genuinely believed that China had been carved up by Western imperialists, and that regaining Taiwan was paramount to Chinas national pride. One, a class monitor, replied casually that he believed it to be true about 8 out of 10. He said, Its part of the education system, its what were all taught. The history were taught is very shallow, its just a few dynasties, a few events, a few dates, there is never any analysis or deep reflection. In fact, history is not a hot topic or major to choose at schools, nobody wants to do it it doesnt get you

25

anywhere. Nobody really believes that old if you dont know history youre doomed to repeat it line.

As these rare cases suggest, at least some of my CFAU students were ambivalent about their relationship with the dominant narratives. Paul Willis classic work Learning to Labour addresses how relationships of power involve a mixture of both penetrations of power and the limitations on those penetrations.64 Resistance, likewise, derives from culturally specific understandings of order, justice, success, and the like. 65 Ortners argument that specific cultural factors play an important role in how individuals resist or absorb power can elucidate why students tended to align themselves with the dominant narratives of the state. One key aspect is the respect a civil service career commands. Chinese society has long admired the civil servant as a model of what it is to be a good and successful person. In addition, the career is considered very secure, with many non-salary perquisites. Being a civil servant also allows an individual to participate in a complex network of social and professional contacts from which his or her family can perhaps benefit. A fellow teacher (Chinese) at the CFAU explained the importance of this network to me when she described how angry and perplexed her family and friends were when she announced her decision to resign from the civil service and follow a career as an academic instead. When I asked why it mattered so much to them, she said that they thought she had been extremely selfish in her choice, because while the change might have suited her own goals, the new position would do her husband, her daughter, her nieces and her nephews no good at all. In her familys eyes, she had thrown away an opportunity for all of them, not just herself. My CFAU students would have been operating under similar assumptions from their family members. However, in the contemporary Chinese society into which my CFAU students have now graduated it is notoriously difficult to gain entrance to a career in the civil service. Many students have had to take any job that they can get, at low starting salaries of around RMB3000 (approximately USD500) per month, despite their intelligence, diligence and loyalty to the Chinese Party-state.
64

Paul Willis, Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 65 Ortner 1995, 18081.

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As Kipnis points out, young people in China today may have a better chance of wellpaid employment if they follow vocational training instead of tertiary studies at university.66 Despite this well-known difficulty, Kipnis describes the almost universal desire for young people to enrol in university education across rural China. He depicts the lengths to which parents will go in order to provide their children with the opportunity for tertiary study. Fong portrays a similar phenomenon in the desire to study overseas.67 Even members of the extended family will take out loans, or scrimp on their own standards of living, to help send a young person to university. The social value of a university education is so high that all such sacrifices are deemed worthwhile. In addition to the social status, however, is the expectation that the money spent will represent a good investment. Students are all burdened with the knowledge of how much their families have given up for them to study at university. In this context of obligation and reciprocity, students are in no position to squander the opportunity they have been offered. Rather, they seek the most effective ways to succeed, and, as Evasdottir argues, this is often through maintaining the system as it currently exists.

The CCP leadership is aware of the ongoing difficulty of communicating effectively in fast changing times to a rapidly diversifying audience both domestic and international. However, the Party-state-sponsored national logic was reflected in the explicit worldview of most of the CFAU students I taught. Among that group, Chinese government efforts to create an undisputable realm of doxa have been successful.

Conclusion
This paper opened with the question of how my students at CFAU related with the particular construction of the state in the Chinese context. Central to this construction was their perception of the relationship between the state and the people. For my students, this relationship was not one of dominance and subordination, but rather a family in which the Party-state took the role of the omniscient parent.
66

Andrew B. Kipnis, Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics and Schooling in China (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 845. 67 Fong 2011.

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The Party-state presents itself as the guardian of an integrated identity of Chineseness. My research suggests that this identity was unquestioned in my students social imaginary. The great majority of my students at the CFAU felt passionately about the Chinese state and what it meant to be part of the unified Chinese identity. They became angry when these notions were questioned or challenged, but were unable to clearly articulate the logic of their opinions, suggesting that these beliefs were deeply emotionally ingrained; where topics were open for discussion in the realm of the debatable, students tended to align themselves with the orthodoxy.

Some chose to align themselves with the orthodoxy because, as one student said, it was the best thing to do. However, none of my students ever went so far as to suggest that problems facing contemporary China could have been related to the inherent structure and functioning of the Party-state system. The majority of students never strayed outside the realm of the debatable, the parameters of criticism tolerated by the Party-state as a safety valve for discontent. Dissatisfaction never went so far as criticising the uppermost levels of Party-state power. Critique was limited to individual cases usually at local level, and not seen as symptomatic of a more systemically institutionalised phenomenon. Ultimately, students seemed to perceive Chinas Party-state system as an inevitability that remained outside the realm of the debateable.

As Yurchak argues in regard to late-socialist Soviet Russia, understanding the performative dimensions of ritualised speech acts is central to moving beyond binary understandings of state/people relations as repressive-resistive. 68 What can seem to be contradictory views within my students social imaginary can be more helpfully understood as a paradoxical mix of alienation and association with the ideals and realities of socialist life.69 As Perry and Selden also point out, Chinese patterns of resistance are rooted in historic contests and display time-honoured

68

Alexei Yurchak, Everything was Forever, Until it Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 69 Luahona Ganguly, Review: Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, International Journal of Communication, 1 (2007): 513, p. 51.

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beliefs and behaviours. 70 Following Bourdieus notion of doxa as the system of beliefs that are taken for granted to the extent that no other possibilities can even be conceived, it appeared that a conceptual framework for thinking critically about the structures and functions of the Party-state was simply not a part of students perceptual architecture. As Ortner argues, in a relationship of power, the dominant often has something to offer, and sometimes a great deal (though always of course at the price of continuing in power). The subordinate thus has many grounds for ambivalence about resisting the relationship.71 Incidents of privately voiced dissent like those outlined above led me to conclude that while most of my students accepted the messages with which they had been socialised, there were some who did not, but who chose to say nothing at all.

Because of the complex and multi-directional relationship between state power and the students at CFAU, students did not simply fully accept the message communicated by the Party-state. Rather, they had internalised the utility of selfdirected self-control, and displayed an ambivalence towards resisting power. The reason for this is neatly explained through Evasdottirs lens of obedient autonomy. While fear of retribution did certainly play some role in students reluctance to publicly dispute the official doctrine, intimidation was only one of many complex elements that explain why CFAU students for the most part made great efforts to demonstrate their alignment with the dominant discourses of the state. Equally or, I would argue, more important, was the complex system of social relations and obligations in which students were enmeshed. I argue that the way in which my students participated in rather than resisted orthodoxy, regardless of whether they genuinely believed it or not, is based on these social relations.

Evasdottir discusses how power relations work in an interdependent environment, that is, in a context in which it is taken as a given that a person cannot be (and would not desire to be) subjected to a separation from society but is instead always immersed in a web of social rules, hierarchies, structures, stereotypes, and norms. 72 Such an
70

Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 3rd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 3. 71 Ortner 1995, 175. Ortner defines the terms dominant and subaltern not as single or unitary, but always within psychologically ambivalent and socially complex settings. 72 Evasdottir 2004, ix.

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environment, as is the case at the CFAU, gives rise to a self-directed control over change that takes effect only through the concerted effort to achieve and maintain a discourse of order and immutability.73 That is, those hierarchically junior individuals seeking to become successful within the system have the most compelling incentives to maintain the stability of the system as it stands. Change, where it is required or desired at all, comes from participating in, rather than challenging or resisting, this system.74

Over the past decades, the Chinese Communist Party has been trying to transform itself into a Weberian bureaucratic machine. As Pieke has argued, after the shocking revelation in 1989 of just how weakly the states vision for China had permeated society, the Party began to actively create a Weberian state with a rule-bound bureaucracy that had never really existed before. The state-building project in China is predicated on a process of selective borrowing and mixing, producing a unique and evolving governmental rationality that Pieke has termed neo-socialism. 75 Under this model of government, the communist utopia of the decades up until Maos death has been replaced by a technocratic objective of a strong, peaceful, and modern China that is almost synonymous with strong, effective, and forward-looking government.76 Strategic communication, or propaganda, and national education have been key elements in achieving this new approach to governmentality in China. The diversity in students attitudes towards the notion of guojia; the debates in class around topics such as media censorship and control, and the way in which some students chose to participate in the mainstream discourses of power despite their personal feelings, suggest a relationship between people and power in China that is far more complex and nuanced than some commentators on China would allow. While the Chinese Party-state in all its institutionalised forms of coercive power is forceful enough, it is the alignment with the idea of the state that silences protest, excuses force and convinces almost all of us that the fate of the victims is just and

73 74

Ibid., x. Ibid. 75 Pieke 2012, 150. 76 Ibid.

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necessary.77 The ambivalent relationship my students had with state power brings to mind Ortners concept of ethnographic refusal. Ortner observes that studies of resistance often position subalterns as monolithic heroes dedicated to a struggle against power. She writes that resistance studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity the intentions, desires, fears, projects of the actors involved in those dramas.78 The understanding that state and society are a priori in clear and culturally unspecific relations of power and resistance very much disallows the great complexities in the way the state, the Party, and the people are inextricably interrelated in China.

Philip Abrams, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State, Journal of Historical Sociology, 1, Issue 1, (March 1988 [1977]): 5889; p. 81. 78 Ortner 1995, 190.
77

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