Genetic Weapons Core a bidirectional file

Explanation page If you are advancing the Genetic Weapons Argument Impact shells o the massive impact card o Genetic Weapons Kill Billions o Genocide Scenario o Ag-Terrorism Scenario Answering your opponents attacks o Genetic Weapons Coming Now/Inevitable o Risk is high o A-to Not Technologically Feasible o A-to Genetics Weapons will not work BWC key to solve genetic weapons Genetic Weapons Takeouts Frontline BWC does not solve Genetic Weapons Genetic Weapons risk is low Genetic Variation too Complex Can't Weaponize p. 2

p. 3 p. 4 p. 5 p. 6 p. 7 p. 8-9 p. 10 p. 11 p. 12-14

p. 15-17 p. 18 p. 19-20 p. 21-22 p. 23

Explanation page
The short story a genetic weapon is a biological weapon designed to kill a specific group of people (usually an ethnic group) based-upon specific genetic distinctions. The military aim would be to produce a weapon that would kill the opponents, but not kill your forces. Genetically speaking, this is easier said-than-done. That said, States have tried to produce these weapons, and the idea behind is obviously very ugly and scary. Basically, I think this file will be one of those handy impact takeout files I sense the topic of genetic weapons will come-up more than once on a disease-related topic. However, this bidirectional file will be most immediately useful for people that run (or debate against) the disease surveillance Aff that came-out during the SDI 5 week. It has a genetic weapons impact scenario. Let me know if you have questions, -- Will repkowil@msu.edu

Genetic Weapons the massive impact card

Genetic Weapons should be halted for 3 reasons: They are instruments of genocide The research process creates errors that risk extinction The weapons themselves outweigh all other security threats

Krug 99

(Wayne -- The Threat of Genobiological Weapons -http://www.kingdomofprussia.com/GenobiologicalWeapons.htm)

Scientists have been able to successfully isolate, study, and even splice the genes of many animals, even humans. These wondrous findings have allowed doctors and biologists to trace to
Many advances have been made in recent years in the areas of gene research. the cause many previously baffling disorders, and even treat a few. These processes and procedures, collectively known as genetic engineering, have opened new doors for discovering why and how humans are what they are. The most revolutionary advances have been in the isolation and examination of the human genome, the actual genetic blueprint which gives a person physiological traits. A similar process allowed Scottish scientists to successfully clone a sheep. This process could also, theoretically, be used to clone humans.

In a slight deviation from this, it could also be used to create horrifying new weapons.

There are two major avenues down which genobiological weapons technology could progress. The first directly involves the technology and techniques discovered during the attempts to clone a living organism. In order to do so the scientists involved first needed to unlock the genetic code. The DNA method (introduced to pop culture by such movies as Jurassic Park) is only a small part of the process. The DNA is contained on chromosomes inside each cell (there are 46 in a human). The collection of genetic material of the chromosomes that holds the entire code for an individual organism is called the genome. This genome is unique to each person and holds the blueprint for the growth of the entire organism. It regulates such things as eye color, hair color, and even gender. Much work has been done by scientists to map and sequence the genomes of humans and various other living things. By a process called transformation, DNA from outside a cell can be incorporated into the cell's genome, altering the cell's genetic makeup. This has been postulated by scientists as a way to practically choose the qualities given to a newborn child. This could also be used to create genetically engineered weapons. This is an idea popularized recently in science fiction movies and literature, and most people see it as such and nothing else. Unfortunately, such a prospect is not as far off as many people think. Now that scientists have the technology and knowledge to clone living organisms from a single genome, it is possible for scientists to create a genome for a perfect soldier or killing machine, and replicate that organism in a laboratory. The possible ramifications of such experimentation are intense. There is a very real likelihood that the genetic alteration process will create an emotionally unstable organism that may or may not respond to the commands of its creators, and as such could backlash uncontrollably. This is to say nothing of the moral implications of such actions. The second, more dangerous, and more realistic threat is from genetically engineered biological agents. The more common biological agents in use today include diseases such as anthrax, smallpox, plague, ebola, marburg, botulism, and tularemia. All of these except the last are extremely deadly, and most have no cure or treatment. Genetic engineering can do two things for such biological agents. Firstly, it can be used to create new, deadlier forms of these agents. It could change their make-up to a point that vaccines and treatments, if they exist, no longer work. It could also create entirely new agents. Second,

genetic engineering can be used to create gene-specific agents. In other words, ebola could be re-engineered to create a bacteria that only infects people with green eyes. Such a weapon could make mass genocide like the Holocaust seem trivial. A genetically engineered weapon of that sort could make real the threats of genocidal extremists. There are many other unintended repercussions which could and would arise from such tampering as will almost certainly be mutations during these attempts to genetically engineer these weapons. The threats of mutation have already been discussed concerning the genome
experimentation. The agents discussed in the second section could undergo unexpected mutations when exposed to the atmosphere during use. The genetic tampering could cause a plague beyond comprehension, an epidemic unseen since the "Black Death". They could mutate to such a point that a vaccine, if it was ever

before mentioned. There

made, would be useless against it. That brings up another point. If someone does begin tampering with the genetic makeup of these biological agents,
will he have enough sense, for that matter would it be possible, to create a vaccine or anti-virus for the new agent? The possibilities of what could happen, both advertantly and inadvertently, are horrifying. These threats, at least that posed by biological agents, is very real. There are 17 countries known to have biological weapons programs: Iran, Libya, and Syria are just three. The

genetic weapons discussed are also close. Former head of Sweden's defense research establishment, General Bo Rybeck, said that "genetic weapons might be around the corner". That was in 1996, in Jane's Foreign Report. Recently, Jane's received a report that at least one unnamed country is actively developing genetic weapons. These programs pose the most serious threat ever to the nations of the world. The number of biochemists and geneticists is growing
rapidly. The advances in these fields are flying by. Yet for all their progress, none of them has properly acknowledged the threat such activities could pose to humanity.

Genetic Weapons Kill Billions ( ) Genetic weapons kill everyone -- only 20 grams would will 5 billion people Blake 02
(R.Roy Free Press contributor, Author of the published book The Gary Hart Set-up, and contributor to SpeakEasy.org: January 4th, Genetic Bullets Ethnically Specific Bioweapons, http://www.rense.com/general18/spbio.htm)

such weapons could be delivered to humans not only in the anticipated forms such as gas and aerosol but also might be introduced into water supplies. Backing off of any suggestion that such weapons might be capable of eliminating the majority of the world's population all at once, he suggested that the weapons might be used not only to induce death but to cause sterility and deformed births in the targeted groups. The result, just as certain as genocide but a slower, more insidious and therefore potentially undetectable attack. Current estimates of the cost of developing a "gene weapon" were placed at around $50 million, still quite a stretch for isolated bands of neo-Nazis but well within the capabilities of covert government programs. The former Soviet Union, for example, was said to have developed a gene weapon utilizing the transplantation of the microbes that caused "liegu fever" into germs of ordinary wine yeast, which would have allowed the yeast to spread what the Soviets predicted would have been a "genocidal" plague of liegu fever. On another occasion the Soviets attempted to combine the genes of cobra venom with the influenza virus, which would have made for a deadly combination indeed. It was unclear, however, if the Soviets (whose potential enemies ran the gamut from Germans and Latvians to Chinese and Pakistanis) had intended to target any particular group. What was clear was the potency of the weapon. It was estimated that a mere 20 grams of liegu fever virus could potentially kill up to 5 billion people.
Nathanson warned that

Genetic Weapons Genocide Scenario

( ) Genetic Weapons are agents of genocide. Ramares 03
(Kellia Ramares earned a B.A. in economics degree, with honors, from Fordham University in New York in 1977. She also earned a law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in 1980. She has been a reporter for KPFA-FM in Berkeley, CA for nearly four years. There, her specialty is toxics reporting. Kellia is also an Associate Producer for WINGS - Women's International News Gathering Service and a Contributing Editor for OnlineJournal.com. Unholy Grail: The Quest for Genetic Weapons From the Wilderness Part I -http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/030403_genetic_p1.html)

So far, there is no proof that genetic weapons targeting any organism have actually been developed. But several countries have researched or are researching the subject. The possibilities for genetic weapons range from botanical pathogens that could wipe out a region's crops in an act of military or economic warfare, or terrorism, to the ultimate Hitlerian nightmare: the "ethno-bomb," a weapon targeted at unique or nearly unique genetic characteristics of a population. n (For the purposes of this article, pathogens that can harm anyone, but which are distributed, intentionally or accidentally, to a specific racial or ethnic group are not considered "ethno-bombs" or "ethnic weapons." A strong case for HIV being a laboratory created virus distributed intentionally or accidentally to Central Africa and the New York gay community via smallpox and hepatitis B vaccines is made by Dr. Leonard Horowitz in Emerging Viruses: AIDS & Ebola - Nature, Accident or Intentional?, (Tetrahedron, Inc., Rockport MA, 1996). In the worst case scenario of unintended consequences,

government and corporate genome research intended for legitimate medical applications may someday provide the knowledge required to develop genetically specific ethnic weapons.

Genetic Weapons -- Ag-Terrorism Scenario

( ) Genetic weapons will be used on agriculture this would still be an instrument of genocide and would also kill the global economy. Ramares 03
(Kellia Ramares earned a B.A. in economics degree, with honors, from Fordham University in New York in 1977. She also earned a law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in 1980. She has been a reporter for KPFA-FM in Berkeley, CA for nearly four years. There, her specialty is toxics reporting. Kellia is also an Associate Producer for WINGS - Women's International News Gathering Service and a Contributing Editor for OnlineJournal.com. Unholy Grail: The Quest for Genetic Weapons From the Wilderness Part II http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/031103_genetic_p2.html)

The first genetic weapons are likely to be aimed, not at humans, but at agriculture. This is because so much more is known about plant and animal genetics through years of work sequencing their genomes and because modern agriculture has developed genetically uniform crops, which could be more easily attacked than people. Agricultural genetic weapons could also have a similar effect on a people as a direct genetic weapon, by wiping out many of the food sources of a geographically concentrated ethnic group. Dr. Mark Wheelis, a microbial biochemist and geneticist at the University of California Davis, focuses his research on the history of biological warfare, and on biological weapons control. He sees anti-agricultural bioweapons as being within the reach, not only of states, but also of agricultural corporations, organized crime, terrorist groups and individuals.59 According to Wheelis, reasons to attack agriculture would include: attacking the food supply of an enemy belligerent; destabilizing a government by initiating food shortages or unemployment; altering supply and demand patterns for a commodity, or commodity futures, and for other manipulations and disruptions of trade and financial markets.60 An agricultural bioattack would be easier to carry out than one directly against humans because there are many plant and animal diseases that humans could disperse without harming themselves by handling the bioagents. Fields have little or no security. If the goal is an economic one, such as to disrupt trade, the creation of only a few cases may be necessary to require the quarantine or destruction of a regions crops or animals.61 One example of the havoc an agricultural disease can wreak on farm economies occurred in England in 2001, when over the course of 9 months, 5.7 million animals were slaughtered at a cost of 2.7 billion pounds after an outbreak of foot and mouth disease.62

Genetic Weapons Coming Now/Inevitable

( ) Genetic weapons use inevitable Ramares 03
(quoting Edward Hammond -- director of the Sunshine Project -- Kellia Ramares earned a B.A. in economics degree, with honors, from Fordham University in New York in 1977. She also earned a law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in 1980. She has been a reporter for KPFA-FM in Berkeley, CA for nearly four years. There, her specialty is toxics reporting. Kellia is also an Associate Producer for WINGS - Women's International News Gathering Service and a Contributing Editor for OnlineJournal.com. Unholy Grail: The Quest for Genetic Weapons From the Wilderness Part I -- http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/030403_genetic_p1.html)

When it comes to the development of "ethno bombs," it's the study of SNPs that most worries Edward Hammond, director of the Sunshine Project31 and a former RAFI staff member. It's the primary focus of the Sunshine Project to prevent new breakthroughs in biotechnology from being applied for military purposes. In an interview with FTW in January, 2003, Hammond said of SNPs:
What these are, put in more simple language, are little, small differences in the genetic code that are in all of us, but ones which can be at least theoretically related to a particular ethnic group or a particular kind of people. And so the fear is that these discoveries that there are some very minor genetic differences that do seem to roughly break down somewhat along culturally defined ethnic lines could become exploitable, particularly once we reach the point where genetic constructs that could be created by science could take advantage of a group of these. What I mean by that is that there are very, very few genetic differences that in and of themselves are markedly different from one population to another. However, if you could do a combination of factors, a combination of small differences in genes there might be ways to roughly create something that you would call a genetic weapon.

If we arrive at the point where genetic weapons are possible, and I do believe that this will happen, the thing that I'm most concerned about are not the individual "disease" genes that have been identified in the past.[Ethnically related genetic disorders such as Cystic Fibrosis, Sickle Cell Anemia, or Tay-Sachs Disease]. Rather it is a combination of genes that occur in particular frequencies in different populations and by targeting the absence or the presence of a particularly small group of genes that seems to have some sort of ethnic association, than by that way, I think genetic weapons may become possible. The rapid developments in genome mapping have enabled the Human Genome Project32 to meet all its goals for 19941998, and to add two new goals for 1999-2003: the determination of human sequence variation [mapping the SNPs] and functional analysis of the operation of the whole genome [understanding how the whole system works]. These are two goals vital to creating ethnic-specific genetic weapons.33

Genetic Weapons -- Risk is high

( ) Genetic Weapons are a genuine risk top experts confirm Ramares 03
(Kellia Ramares earned a B.A. in economics degree, with honors, from Fordham University in New York in 1977. She also earned a law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in 1980. She has been a reporter for KPFA-FM in Berkeley, CA for nearly four years. There, her specialty is toxics reporting. Kellia is also an Associate Producer for WINGS - Women's International News Gathering Service and a Contributing Editor for OnlineJournal.com. Unholy Grail: The Quest for Genetic Weapons From the Wilderness Part I -http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/030403_genetic_p1.html)

But in 1996, Dr. Vivienne Nathanson, the British Medical Association's (BMA) Head of Science and Ethics told a congress of the World Medical Association that ethnically targeted genetic weapons were now possible, and she cited as example the possibility of designing an agent that could sterilize or pass on a lethal hereditary defect in specific ethnic groups.24 In 1999, the BMA issued a report called Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity25, which warned that genetic knowledge could be misused to develop weapons aimed at specific ethnic groups. The executive summary, available online, stated: Over the last few decades rapid advances in molecular biology have allowed the heritable material (DNA) of different organisms to be interchanged. The Human Genome Project and the Human Genetic Diversity Projects are allowing the identification of human genetic coding and differences in normal genetic material between different ethnic groups. During the review conferences on the BTWC, an increasing level of concern has been expressed by national governments over the potential use of genetic knowledge in the development of a new generation of biological and toxin weapons.

Genetic Weapons Risk is High cont

( ) Genetic Weapons risk high highly-qualified sources confirm BBC 99 (January 21st -- http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/259222.stm)

Advances in genetic knowledge could be misused to develop powerful biological weapons that could be tailored to strike at specific ethnic groups, the British Medical Association has warned.
A BMA report Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity says that concerted international action is necessary to block the development of new, biological weapons. It warns the window of opportunity to do so is very narrow as technology is developing rapidly and becoming ever more accessible. "Recipes" for developing biological agents are freely available on the Internet, the report warns. As genetic manipulation becomes a standard laboratory technique, there is a risk that this new information will also become widely available. Procedures to monitor against the misuse of this new knowledge are urgently needed, the BMA says. Abuse of knowledge The report identifies two principal ways in which advancing genetic knowledge could be misused for weapons development: * Genetic information is already being used to "improve" elements of biological weapons, for example by increasing their antibiotic resistance. These developments raise the spectre of highly targeted biological weapons being used on the battlefield. * Weapons could theoretically be developed which affect particular versions of genes clustered in specific ethnic or family groups. Although genetic weapons which target a particular ethnic group are not currently a practical possibility, the report concludes it would be complacent to assume that they could never be developed in the future. Humans from apparently widely divergent social groups actually have more similarities than differences in their genetic make up. But differences do exist and as the Human Genome Project advances, these differences can increasingly be identified. The BMA report warns that legitimate research into microbiological agents and genetically targeted therapeutic agents could be difficult to distinguish from research geared towards developing more effective weapons. The BMA says that urgent action is needed to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This has not been effective in prohibiting the development of biological weapons, the BMA says, because it does not have adequate verification provisions. The BMA has called on doctors and medical organisations to campaign against the development of biological weapons.

Dr Vivienne Nathanson, BMA Head of Health Policy Research said: "The history of humanity is a history of war. "Scientific advances quickly lead to developments in weapons technology. "Biotechnology and genetic knowledge are equally open to this type of malign use. "Doctors and other scientists have an important role in prevention. They have a duty to persuade politicians and international agencies such as the UN to take this threat seriously and to take action to prevent the production of such weapons."

( ) Gene weapons are already a threat

Blake 02

(R.Roy Free Press contributor, Author of the published book The Gary Hart Setup, and contributor to SpeakEasy.org: January 4th, Genetic Bullets Ethnically Specific Bioweapons, http://www.rense.com/general18/spbio.htm)

Scientist have called for a "definitely enforceable order to ban gene weapons, an important first step to the control of this perhaps most ultimate weapon. Certainly an international consensus on this issue is far preferable than continuing to ignore the issue until it is too late. Unlike genetically specific bioweapons, the absolute feasibility of such a ban is suspect. Indeed, if the experts are correct and

genetically specific bioweapons can be developed for a mere $50 million, it puts them well within the reach of well-funded terrorists such as Osama bin Laden who already has expressed a desire to eliminate at least two groups, Israelis and Americans. The reported existence of the israeli ethnic bullet will almost predictably trigger a gene weapons arms race in the Middle East. Worse still the research and development of such weapons can be carried out in amazingly small facilities that are next to impossible to monitor. Perhaps most ominously, the "science" of genetically specific bioweapons is still in its infancy and no one knows if breakthroughs might reduce the cost of their production to the point that small and extremely malevolent groups such as the neoNazis may attempt to bring about a new Final Solution.

Genetic Weapons Aff A-to Not Technologically Feasible

Current science now allows the creation of genetic weapons- prefer this evidence for its recency. Alexander Kouzminov, intelligence operative in the 1980s and early 1990s for the KGB and its successor, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. He is the author of Biological Espionage, March 31st 2007, False Flags, Ethnic Bombs and Day X, http://calitreview.com/2007/03/31/false-flags-ethnic-bombs-and-day-x/, bjx Ethnic, or population-specific-weapons may be defined as weapons which will kill or damage only specific ethnic groups. Some genetic research experiments may lead to identification and isolation of specific traits of the unique genetic profiles of some ethnic groups. These research experiments show that ethnic specific genetic sequences (or target sequences) do exist in considerable high numbers. New modern genetic engineering methods are indeed available to translate specific genetic sequences into markers or triggers for certain biological activity. It appears that so-called ethnic specific biological weapons may indeed become possible in the near future. Ethnic, or genotype-targetable weapons, would employ differences in gene frequencies among specific human populations to incapacitate or kill selected target population groups with a selected genetic cluster. Future insights into the genetic basis (DNA ethnic groups profiles uncovered by the Human Genome and the Human Genome Diversity Projects) of biological differences between human beings are likely to uncover hereditary traits that could be used to military advantage. It's possible to construct ethnically targeted weapons- Israel proves The Australian, November 16, 1998, Israeli scientists aim for a weapon that only kills Arabs, lexis, bjx ISRAEL is working on a biological weapon that will harm Arabs but not Jews, Israeli military and Western intelligence sources say. The weapon, targeting victims by ethnic origin, is seen as Israel's response to Iraq's threat of chemical and biological attacks. It has been claimed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could be only weeks away from completing the construction of offensive biological weapons mounted on Scud missiles. Israel was hit by Scuds during the Gulf War and fears it would be the prime target. In developing their "ethnobomb", Israeli scientists are trying to exploit medical advances by identifying distinctive genes carried by some Arabs, then create a genetically modified bacterium or virus. The intention is to use the ability of viruses and certain bacteria to alter the DNA inside their host's living cells. The scientists are trying to engineer deadly microorganisms that attack only those bearing the distinctive genes. The program is based at the biological institute in Nes Tziyona, the main research facility for Israel's clandestine arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. A scientist there said the task was hugely complicated because Arabs and Jews were of semitic origin. But he said: "They have, however, succeeded in pinpointing a particular characteristic in the genetic profile of certain Arab communities, particularly the Iraqi people."

The technology is now available to construct genetic weapons. The Sunshine Project, bioweapons activist group, November 2003, Emerging Technologies Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/bk12.html, bjx Current wisdom holds that population specific biological weapons are practically and theoretically impossible. Practically, many consider it impossibly difficult to use genetic variability to kill or otherwise affect populations. Others, including geneticists, argue that no suitable ethnic specific genes exist in the first place. Both notions are wrong. New technologies are indeed available to translate specific genetic sequences into markers or triggers for biological activity. And a recent analysis of human genome data in public databases revealed that hundreds, possibly thousands, of target sequences for ethnic specific weapons do exist. It appears that ethnic specific biological weapons may indeed become possible in the near future.

10

Genetic Weapons Aff A-to Genetics Weapons will not work Genetic weapons can work- empirical observations prove the existence of great genetic variation between ethnic groups. Bryan D. Ness, Professor/ Department Head of genetics, cell biology and development at University of Minnesota, 2004, Biological Weapons, Encyclopedia of Genetics, Rev. Ed.,
http://salempress.com/Store/samples/encyclopedia_of_genetics_rev/encyclopedia_of_genetics_rev_biologi cal_weapons.htm, bjx Some scientists and politicians believe that a nation's best defense against bioterrorism is advanced genetic knowledge, so that vaccines can be tailored to respond to traditional and new BWs. For example, the Human Genome Project, which succeeded in mapping the human genetic material, has the potential for revealing both the vulnerabilities and defenses of the immune system. (The human genome sequence contains 3.2 billion bases and approximately 34,000 genes. These data freely are available on the Internet in a variety of forms, including text files and graphical "genome browsers.") On the other hand, such knowledge could prove dangerous if the genetic vulnerabilities of certain ethnic groups could be targeted by bioengineered microbes. Some scientists find these speculations about genocidal BWs unevidenced and unsubstantial. Genetic similarities between different ethnic groups are more significant than their differences. Other scientists point out that dramatic genetic differences between ethnic groups are a reality. For example, milk is a poison for certain Southeast Asian populations. Other genetic differences could therefore be exploited to create BWs to attack group-specific gene clusters. Believers in ethnic BWs point to existing techniques for selectively killing certain cells and for inactivating certain DNA sequences. These techniques, developed with the hope of curing genetic diseases, could also be used to cause harm. Knowledge of the structure of the human genome will increasingly lead to knowledge of its function, and this knowledge will make it possible to manipulate, in both benign and malign ways, these information-laden molecules.

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Genetic Weapons BWC key to solve genetic weapons

( ) strong BWC norms are the best way to solve for genetic weapons Ramares 03
(Kellia Ramares earned a B.A. in economics degree, with honors, from Fordham University in New York in 1977. She also earned a law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in 1980. She has been a reporter for KPFA-FM in Berkeley, CA for nearly four years. There, her specialty is toxics reporting. Kellia is also an Associate Producer for WINGS - Women's International News Gathering Service and a Contributing Editor for OnlineJournal.com. Unholy Grail: The Quest for Genetic Weapons From the Wilderness -http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/031103_genetic_p2.html)

Even a cursory survey of the scientific literature in genetics indicates scientific interest in the genetic differences within and between peoples. In addition to possible medical applications of this research, there are other intriguing questions, about historical human migration patterns and the distribution and relationships of languages, for example, which should be of no military interest. But research that does turn up differences in the genetics of socially defined ethic groups is open to abuse, in all likelihood by governments, even if the scientists doing that research intended no such thing. The way to prevent such abuse is to strengthen the moral repugnance biological, chemical and genetic weapons and to create legal means to enforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Right now, the political and
ethical dialogues are simply not keeping up with the pace of scientific advancements in genome research.

( ) BWC solves genetic weapons keeping the BWC afloat allows anti-genetic weapon bargains to stay afloat. Anbarasan 99
(Ethirajan Anbarasan of the BBC World Service quoting multiple genetics experts -UNESCO COURIER a publication of the United Nations -- March -- http://www.unesco.org/courier/1999_03/uk/ethique/txt1.htm)

The BMA report cited earlier says professional scientists and physicians should shoulder their ethical responsibilities and take no part in biological and genetic weapon projects. It calls for close monitoring of developments in biotechnology worldwide and open debate, particularly in relation to the use of genome mapping. However, These measures can minimize the threats but not eliminate them, says Nathanson.

There is also growing concern about the misuse of genetic information available on Internet. Scientists worldwide share information on new findings in biological research through Internet which could be manipulated by private groups. Nathanson says Internet service providers have an ethical obligation to ensure information on biological weapons is not available on their websites.
One big problem in monitoring is how to distinguish between research carried out for good and evil ends. The fact is that genetic research which develops specific therapeutic agents is scientifically indistinguishable from research to develop a lethal or disabling agent targeted at specific clusters of genes in an ethnic group. This makes it all the more necessary to make sure that information is used for positive purposes.

According to Dando, one avenue to be explored is to ensure that developing countries are given the opportunity to share the benefits of the modern revolution in biotechnologies which can be used for disease control and economic development. In return they would be required to promise that malign research would not be carried out in their laboratories. This is currently being negotiated by countries which are party to the BTWC, he says.

( ) Strong BWC is the best solution for genetic weapons BBC 99 (January 21st -- http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/259222.stm)

Advances in genetic knowledge could be misused to develop powerful biological weapons that could be tailored to strike at specific ethnic groups, the British Medical Association has warned. A BMA report Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity says that concerted international action is necessary to block the development of new, biological weapons.
It warns the window of opportunity to do so is very narrow as technology is developing rapidly and becoming ever more accessible. "Recipes" for developing biological agents are freely available on the Internet, the report warns. As genetic manipulation becomes a standard laboratory technique, there is a risk that this new information will also become widely available. Procedures to monitor against the misuse of this new knowledge are urgently needed, the BMA says. Abuse of knowledge The report identifies two principal ways in which advancing genetic knowledge could be misused for weapons development: * Genetic information is already being used to "improve" elements of biological weapons, for example by increasing their antibiotic resistance. These developments raise the spectre of highly targeted biological weapons being used on the battlefield. * Weapons could theoretically be developed which affect particular versions of genes clustered in specific ethnic or family groups. Although genetic weapons which target a particular ethnic group are not currently a practical possibility, the report concludes it would be complacent to assume that they could never be developed in the future. Humans from apparently widely divergent social groups actually have more similarities than differences in their genetic make up. But differences do exist and as the Human Genome Project advances, these differences can increasingly be identified. The BMA report warns that legitimate research into microbiological agents and genetically targeted therapeutic agents could be difficult to distinguish from research geared towards developing more effective weapons.

The BMA says that urgent action is needed to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

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Genetic Weapons BWC key to solve genetic weapons cont Terrorists could soon have genetically targeted weapons, and strengthening the BWC is key to check. Leigh Dayton, October 27, 2004, Scientists warn of 'ethnic weapons', The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,11197760%255E401, 00.html, bjx
BIOLOGICAL weapons that target selected ethnic groups could become part of the terrorists' arsenal unless governments and scientists act now, the British Medical Association warns. Such designer weapons would be based on the growing ability of scientists to unravel and compare human DNA. In theory, experts could engineer organisms to attack genetic variations commonly found in, say, Chinese or German populations. Genetically engineered anthrax, smallpox and polio viruses are also "approaching reality", the BMA claims in a new report, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II. The report, released yesterday in London, adds that organisms designed to attack food crops and even human immune and nervous systems are serious threats. For instance, the agent used by Russian authorities to end the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002, a fentanyl derivative, is an example of a "bio-regulator" targeted against the human nervous system. "All of the above are feasible or possible if anyone would be mad enough or evil enough to do it," commented University of Melbourne immunologist Sir Gus Nossal. "There already exist potential biological weapons of enormous destructive power, chief among them smallpox and anthrax," added Professor Emeritus Nossal, who in 1979 announced the eradication of smallpox on behalf of the World Health Organisation. He agreed with BMA head of science and ethics Vivienne Nathanson that, "If we wait too long it will be virtually impossible to defend ourselves (against biological weapons)". According to the BMA report the "window of opportunity" to control the spread of powerful biological weapons is shrinking fast. That's so, said the report's author, Malcolm Dando of Britain's Bradford University, because "the same technology being used to develop new vaccines and find cure's for Alzheimer's and other debilitating diseases could also be used for malign purposes". Professor Dando said it was essential that governments worldwide beef up the international Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention when it comes up for review in 2006.

Genetically targeted weapons are possible now, and strengthening the BWC is key to stop their use. Dr. Robin Coupland, medical doctor at the ICRC Chief Medical Unit in Geneva, 1999, New biological
weapons: Science fiction or moral imperative?, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine399/31999_7.asp, bjx The British Medical Association followed up the issues raised during the symposium and made a study which started with the question: Will advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering and specific knowledge of the human genetic make-up permit the production of biological weapons which can target specific genetic characters or ethnic groups? The report, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, published in January 1999, answers this question with a guarded "yes". It concludes that the medical profession has a responsibility to address this issue; the Biological Weapons Convention must be strengthened and supported; a strong and effective protocol to verify that states are abiding by the convention must be adopted; controls must be put in place within the medical and scientific communities to ensure that the know-how resulting from these remarkable scientific advances remains in the hands of responsible people.

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Genetic Weapons BWC key to solve genetic weapons cont

Genetic Weapons are a realistic threat, and a strong BWC is vital to check them Anbarasan 99 (Ethirajan Anbarasan of the BBC World Service quoting multiple genetics experts -UNESCO COURIER a publication of the United Nations -- March -http://www.unesco.org/courier/1999_03/uk/ethique/txt1.htm)

Scientists have warned that recent advances in biological research could eventually lead to the creation of a new type of biological arsenal capable of targeting a specific group of human beings with common genetic characteristics, as may be the case with certain ethnic groups. It will unfortunately be possible to design biological weapons of this type when more information on genome research is available, says Dr Vivienne Nathanson, head of science and health policy at the British Medical Association (BMA), the body which represents the medical profession in the United Kingdom. This terrifying prospect may be an unwelcome piece of spin-off from research being carried out under the Human Genome Project (see box), an international scientific effort to map and sequence the genes in the human body and find out more about human DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), the molecule which provides the biological instructions to make a human being.
Repairing defective genes Late last year, genome research achieved a breakthrough when scientists for the first time deciphered the full genetic programming of an animal. The creature was a microscopic roundworm known as Caenorhabditis elegans, but because worms and humans have turned out to share many genes in common, the worm genome is regarded by biologists as an essential basis for understanding how the human genome works. Scientists say a detailed understanding of genetic mechanisms of human beings will help them to find out the causes of many diseases. For example, knowledge of an individuals genetic make-up will enable doctors to predict whether or not a specific drug will work on a particular patient, allowing therapies to be more accurately targeted. Similarly, genetic testing for predisposition to a range of illnesses could become feasible, and by using what is known as gene therapy doctors would be able to replace deficient genes or repair defective ones.

However, genome research may turn out to have a grim downside.

It has proved that biologically there are more similarities between human beings than differences, further dissolving traditional prejudices of race and ethnicity. However, differences do exist, and if investigations provide sufficient data about ethnic genetic differences between population groups, it may one day be possible to target the groups with dangerous micro-organisms. One specialist who takes this eventuality very seriously is Malcom R. Dando, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, England. In Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, a newly published report which he wrote for the BMA, he examines the whole question of how the revolution in biotechnology might be used to attack the genetic constitution of an ethnic group.

The social and ethical safeguards which may prevent ethnic conflict and weapons development need to be discussed urgently, he said in an interview. Although scientists agree that the technology to produce ethnic weapons is not a reality now, some feel there is a real chance that it may be
developed within the next ten years. No need to wait till the project is completed. Efforts to regulate genetic research should begin now, says Dando. Prof. Dando says the world community is already struggling to eliminate existing biological weapons. These weapons, which carry agents spreading deadly diseases like anthrax and other lethal toxins, can devastate human beings without causing damage to buildings or infrastructure. Experts say that a few hundred kilograms of a weaponized bacterial preparation has the potential to wipe out up to three million inhabitants concentrated in a city like New York.

The apartheid regime in South Africa is widely believed to have developed forms of biological weaponry for use against the black population. In the past, however, countries have rarely used such biological weapons in warfare, partly because of their fear of eliminating friendly
populations and killing their own combatants. The new developments in genetic research described by Professor Dando would remove these limitations. Genetic information is already being used in some countries to improve biological weapons, e.g. by equipping them with agents to provide increased antibiotic resistanceand it is likely that this trend will accelerate as the knowledge and understanding of its applications become more widely known. In the hands of terrorists or cult groups

The problem of the proliferation of biological weapon research has been aggravated by fall-out from the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Most of the nearly 30,000 scientists who were involved in biological research in the USSR during the 1980s are now out of a job because of the
countrys economic difficulties. Last year, some of them disclosed that they had been approached by certain countries which have shown particular interest in learning about microbes that can be used in war to destroy or protect crops, as well as genetic engineering techniques that could be used to make deadly germs for which there may be no antidotes. Dando argues that scientists in countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union should be diverted from involvement in programmes with sinister motives by schemes such as scientist-to-scientist exchanges, joint research projects and the conversion to civilian use of laboratories and institutes once associated with the Soviet military effort. One prospect that alarms arms control experts is that biological weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist or cult groups. Twelve people were killed and 5,000 injured in the Tokyo subway in 1995 in an attack launched by the Aum Shinrykyo cult using sarin, a lethal nerve gas that produces asphyxia. Investigations later revealed that the cult group had had no problem in recruiting scientists to work on biological weapons but could not employ the weapons due to lack of a proper delivery system.

As a first step in coping with the problem of potential new biological weapons, arms control experts are calling for the bolstering of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), an international treaty signed in 1972. The convention prohibits its signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling and acquiring biological weapons.

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Genetic Weapons Frontline (1/3)

( ) BWC does not solve genetic weapons the language does not explicitly outlaw GWs Hauck 05 (Daryl J. Hauck, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF -- Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College, Air University -- Pandoras Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons November -http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/bugs_ch08.pdf)

The 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) is the current cornerstone of non-proliferation; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and self-defense doctrines also lend insight as to whether the hypothetical threat system is banned by existing legal conventions. The first relevant convention was the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that prohibited the use of both poison gas and bacteriological methods in warfare following extensive use of poison gas in World War I.104 By the late 1960s, a desire to separate treatment of chemical and biological weapons was favored in order to make faster progress on eliminating existing stockpiles and stopping further research/production programs that were not banned by the 1925 convention. It was thought that parties would agree to the biological conventions well in advance of ironing out differences on chemical stockpiles.105 These efforts resulted in the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. Article I of this convention states: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; and 2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.106 At first glance, this seems like a fairly broad ban applying to the hypothetical threat system; however, upon deeper examination, a few shortcomings are noted. The preamble and additional articles continually use the words bacteriological and toxin to reinforce what is banned. Use of the term bacteriological also reinforces the same term used in the 1925 Geneva Convention. The word toxin is defined to be a substance falling between biologicals and chemicals in that they act like chemicals but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbic processes.107 This language does not appear to cover the aforementioned potential application of artificial chromosome insertion of modified genes that could affect apoptosis or HER pathway regulatory processesno infectious bacteria, virus, or toxin (as defined by the convention) is involved. Is this semantics or a legitimate case of novel discoveries presenting scenarios that could not have been considered when the conventions were formed? One must also consider Germanys first use of asphyxiating gas in WWI. Though apparently banned by the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions that prohibited asphyxiating gases delivered by projectiles, Germany claimed they were not in technical violation as they delivered it by releasing it from containers on the ground when wind conditions were favorable.108 It would be prudent to address any emerging loopholes in the 1972 BWC Convention.

( ) Genetic weapons risk is exaggerated- genetic populations intermix too much for them to be accurately deployed or even guaranteed safe for the user. Adequacy.org, News Site, October 15 2001, Genetic Warfare and Matrilineal Cultures, http://www.adequacy.org/stories/2001.8.27.101151.276.html, bjx
It has been a well known anthropological fact for many decades that there is no such thing as a "pure" race; more recently, thanks to the results of the Human Genome Project, we know even more: there is no such thing as a coherent concept of "race". All cultures are formed by individuals of mixed heredity. Genetic populations intermix with each other very extensively. While cultures tend to have some ideology of being a "race," all descended from the same mythical ancestors, this is never the case. Thus the prospects of inventing a weapon that can distinguish two ethnic groups from each other are very slim, and even more so when we talk about groups that have lived close to each other for thousands of years. For the two groups will certainly have mixed to a large degree, despite the strong ideologies they may keep about being separate "races". A "gene bomb" designed for one group will certainly kill many members of both groups. From looking at a person's genes, scientists can't tell which "race" this person belongs to; why should we expect an unintelligent weapon to do so?

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Genetic Weapons Frontline (2/3)

( ) Genetic weapons are overhyped- even if they could be developed at all, the process would be incredibly difficult, subject to a high probability of failure, and be too expensive. This puts the timeframe for such weapons development at 25 years even in a huge national program. Raymond Zilinskas, Senior Scientist-in-Residence for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Oct. 20, 1999, ASSESSING THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM: Congressional Testimony, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm, bjx
It has been suggested that functional genomics some day will generate data that may be used to identify genetic markers peculiar to specific human populations. If this was done, pathogens and toxins might be developed that mainly affect persons of populations possessing specified genetic markers (Larson, 1970; Hammerschlag, 1974; Lancet editorial staff and International Advisory Board, 1996; British Medical Association, 1999). This type of weapons has been called "ethnic" weapons; i.e., weapons that preferentially harm or kill designated national or ethnic populations. While stories about ethnic weapons make for exciting reading, the research required to develop an ethnic weapon would be extremely difficult, have a high probability of failing, take a long time to carry out, and be expensive. Realistically, the probability of such research being undertaken at all is low; and even if it were to be done by, for example, a well-supported national program, it would probably take more than 25 years to realize findings meaningful for biological weapons development.

( ) No way that US can set a precedent against genetic weapons- we're developing them ourselves. The Sunshine Project, 19 February 2002, Pentagon Tests Ethnically-Targeted Crowd Control Weapons, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr190202.html, bjx
Whether the malodorants work or fail, research on any ethnic weapon raises serious legal questions and could set a very dangerous precedent. If the Pentagon saw any major legal barriers to ethnic weapons it would not have approved the malodorant research. The Pentagon's conclusion that ethnic weapons are permissible must be challenged. All such weapons should be universally considered intrinsically racist and to repudiate international law. To do this, governments should establish that the development, stockpiling, or use of ethnic weapons is prima facie evidence of intent to violate international law prohibiting racism, including prohibitions on genocide. Inside the US, the malodorants research program must be cancelled, and the secretive Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program opened to public scrutiny and transparency. Among the questions that the Joint NonLethal Weapons Program must publicly discuss is how its focus on building weapons systems that primarily target civilians is legally and ethically justified.

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Genetic Weapons Frontline (3/3)

( ) It's difficult to perform even minor genetic modifications to pathogens- a modification to create genetically targeted weapons would be beyond all current science. Raymond Zilinskas, Senior Scientist-in-Residence for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Oct. 20, 1999, ASSESSING THE
THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM: Congressional Testimony, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm, bjx First, complex research undertaken to weaponize pathogens is risky because it is more likely to fail than achieve its objectives. The problem of pleomorphic effects is particularly daunting. Pleomorphic effects are manifested as undesirable characteristics that appear in a genetically engineered organism simultaneously to sought-after positive characteristics. Thus, even if a laboratory succeeded in genetically engineering a pathogen so it exhibited a new or enhanced characteristic desirable for weapons use, such as antibiotic resistance or added toxin production, the newly developed organism might simultaneously present a weakness to environmental stresses and/or decreased virulence. If so, a new cycle of research, development, and field-testing would have to be done to remove the pleomorphic effects while retaining the sought-after characteristics. If the researcher was unskilled and/or unlucky, he or she might have to undertake several subsequent research, development, and testing cycles before being able to field a strain of pathogen that had improved weapons capabilities over the parent strain. As a consequence of potential difficulties with pleomorphic effects, it is likely that in the next five years or more only well supported, long-term national BW programs would attempt genetic engineering projects for the purpose of weaponizing pathogens. Second, sciences understanding of many natural phenomena, such as infectivity, pathogenesis, host-parasite relationships, and others, is rudimentary. Lack of fundamental information about these phenomena prevents the undertaking of much applied research to, for example, enhance the ability of organisms to infect target hosts, cause severe damage to host systems, and be more specific as to preferred hosts. Further, some important phenomena, such as virulence factors and the ability of a pathogen to penetrate the hosts skin or intestinal wall, are controlled by several or many genes; however, the present level of scientific capability allows bioscientists to transfer or modify only single genes. It therefore is impossible to modify phenomena controlled by multiple genes, thus severely circumscribing approaches to weaponizing pathogens.

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Backlines -- BWC does not solve Genetic Weapons (1/1)

( ) BWC does not solve genetic weapons loopholes and enforcement problems prevent solvency. Hauck 05 (Daryl J. Hauck, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF -- Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College, Air University -- Pandoras Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons November -http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/bugs_ch08.pdf)

While genetic research holds the promise of advanced vaccines, treatment of disease, and repair of damaged cell structures; the same knowledge has a dual-use dark side in that it could be applied to selectively target crops, individuals, and groups of people with genetic pathogens.109 The BWC convention permits peaceful research which, given the potential dual-use nature of genetic research, may take you right to the point of actual weaponization, leaving little time for inspection regimes to uncover any violations or for a response to nations exercising their article XIII right to withdraw: each party to this convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.110 It is imperative to note that the Peoples Republic of China has not signed this important convention, using the rationale that it is a sham since it does not include chemical weapons.111 Even if treaties banning such weapons applied, non-proliferation in this area is problematic. Former Soviet biowarfare leader Ken Alibek concisely describes the non-proliferation challenge: If somebody decides to develop biological weapons, youre not going to detect itmaybe our only response is defenseall the information you need you can get from the scientific journalsmuch genetic weapon research can pass as legitimate research.112 When the World Health Organization was preparing to eradicate smallpox, Alibeks team sequenced the viruss genes for future studiesthe work was legal and open, but conducted for the true purpose of engineering chimera viruses that could evade vaccines or treatments.113

( ) BWC does not solve genetic weapons only blocks offensive weapons Popular Mechanics 01 (quoting Jonathan Moreno, a biomedical ethicist at the University of Virginia February -http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/1281406.html)

Jonathan Moreno, a biomedical ethicist at the University of Virginia (UV) in Charlottesville, revealed the project in a presentation at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which met the week of Feb. 19, 2001 in San Francisco. AAAS is the umbrella organization for the nations leading scientific organizations. "Under the old apartheid government, the South African Defense Force conducted research for the possible development of biological agents that could be used against the black population," Moreno tells POPULAR MECHANICS. "They were particularly interested in seeking ways to sterilize women of color." Rumors of the existence of weapons that could distinguish among individuals based on their DNA have circulated since the late 1970s, and had been repeatedly denied by the South African government. Morenos remarks have reopened the issue because of his reputation for uncovering secret government experiments. Prior to becoming director of the UV Center for Biomedical Ethics, he served on the senior staff for two Clinton administration advisory commissions that investigated the use of unwitting human subjects in radiation experiments financed by the U.S. government. "It was during my commission work on human radiation experiments that I became aware of the potential threat from ethically targeted biological weapons," he says. Unlike conventional biological weapons that kill by disabling the nervous system, Moreno believes that the genetic weapons would work subtly, and for this reason could strike undetected. "Genetically, target agents could affect the birthrates of a population, infant mortality rates, disease proclivity or even crop production," he explains. "It might take decades to realize an attack has even occurred. By that point, a population of people might be seriously diminished." Moreno says that although the United States has signed a treaty prohibiting biological weapons research, it extended only to offensive weapons. He says that experiments that advance genetic weapons could be easily disguised as attempts to create defensive measures against bioweapons, or as basic medical research.

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Backlines -- Genetic Weapons risk is low (1/2)

( ) Risk of GWs incredibly low now Moores 02 (LEON E. MOORES, M.D. -- Pediatric Neurosurgery, National Capital Consortium, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, -- Washington, D.C. -- Neurosurg Focus 12 (3):Article 1, 2002 -- http://aans.org/education/journal/neurosurgical/mar02/12-3-1.pdf)

Gene-based weaponry is not currently a credible threat. The sophisticated methods which we now have to probe the human genome, however, introduce the possibility that these techniques may be used to create weapons. Viruses may be developed that can be genetically targeted to a particular nationality or race based on certain genetic characteristics. Biological weapons may be created that are tailored to produce symptoms weeks after exposure but are contagious much earlier, allowing the agent to spread for extended periods prior to medical experts becoming aware that an epidemic has started. Biological agents may be used to produce debilitating but not fatal diseases, requiring the use of tremendous resources for palliative care.5 The strain on the medical resources and psychological strength of a society could potentially be crippling. CONCLUSIONS In summary, threat assessment for WMD is a complex task, requiring many assumptions. As a general rule, WMD are expensive, complex, and difficult to use. It is not likely that any current terrorist group has the capability to strike the United States with a weapon capable of producing millions of casualties. Smaller scale attacks with WMD, however, may result in significant disruption due to social and psychological changes, even though actual casualty rates would likely be quite low. ( ) Genetic Weapons risk is exaggerated Adam 04 (David Adam, science correspondent for the Guardian Guardian October 28th -http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2004/oct/28/thisweekssciencequestions.weaponstechn ology)

Others say the concerns are exaggerated. "Trying to find a weapon that affects quite a few of one ethnic group and none of another ethnic group is just not going to happen," says David Goldstein, who studies population genetics at University College London. "Because all groups are quite similar you will never get something that is highly selective. The best you would probably do is something that kills 20% of one group and 28% of another." The groups in question are also far broader than those associated with ethnic conflict. Geneticists can only distinguish between people with ancestry traced to regions such as Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.

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Backlines -- Genetic Weapons risk is low (2/2)

Ethnically targeted weapons have minimal theoretical base and are not practicalmultiple experts confirm. Jeff Stein, an investigative reporter of long standing, specializing in U.S. intelligence, defense and foreign policy, December 2, 1998, Debunking the "ethno-bomb", salon.com, lexis, bjx
American biological warfare experts are reacting skeptically to a report that Israel is working on a biological weapon that could infect and kill Arabs but not Jews. The top secret Israeli "ethnobomb" project is the product of medical research that has identified distinctive genes carried by some Arabs, particularly Iraqis, according to a report last month in the London Sunday Times. The project's aim is to manufacture a genetically engineered bacterium or virus that would kill certain Arab ethnic groups, the paper said. The notion that the Jewish state is developing a bomb targeting people by "race" outraged some members of Israel's parliament. But ethics and morality aside, American experts are skeptical that such a weapon is possible today. "I think it's nonsense," said Bill Richardson, a deputy assistant secretary of defense responsible for chemical and biological warfare programs in the Reagan and Bush administrations. Even if an "ethno-bomb" were developed in a petri dish, he said, "there's a long leap from having a mechanism to having an environmental viability, a weapon, or vector, or means of dissemination," he said. Likewise, Dr. Daphne Kamely, a leading microbiologist who has worked on environmental safety issues for the Defense Department, as well as the National Institutes for Health and the Environmental Protection Agency, said, "That sounds too far-fetched to me." "It's like saying to a person, because your skin is black, the rest of you is different, too," added Kamely, who has led several delegations to Middle East scientific conferences. "It's not. It just doesn't make much sense, from a scientific point of view." One hurdle in assessing the report is that Israel's chemical and biological weapons program is shrouded in secrecy. The program is said to be based at the biological institute in Nes Tziyona, the main research facility for Israel's clandestine arsenal of chemical and biological weapons."I have no doubt that Israel has worked on both chemical and biological offensive things for a long time," Richardson said. "I don't think you'll find much on it. We've always seemed to have a double standard on Israel, compared to talking about the threats from other countries. There's no doubt they've had stuff for years, but getting anybody to say anything publicly about it is going to be pretty hard." Yoram Shapira, a scientific attache at the Israeli embassy in Washington, said he hadn't read the story and wouldn't comment on it. Richardson and others said Israel's biotechnology industry is as good as, if not better than, that of the United States, having pioneered such devices as pregnancy tests and means of detecting an anthrax attack. "Basically, that's pretty much state of the art in biological detection right now, little tickets or strips that change color, or a tape that goes through a machine and changes color when it detects anthrax," Richardson said. Dr. Victor Delvecchio, a University of Scranton (Pa.) scientist who has developed means for detecting poisonous gases, said the "ethno-bomb" was "theoretically possible, but I don't know if it's been done yet. I don't think we know enough about the human genome yet to say that one particular race has a particular gene that could be targeted by these organisms. But again, theoretically, it's possible." White scientists in South Africa tried for years to develop a "pigmentation weapon" targeting blacks but failed, according to Dr. Daan Goosen, who ran one of the apartheid regime's chemical and biological warfare plants. The regime did produce a wide variety of poisons and assassination devices, such as a lipstick injected with the drug ecstasy, but the program was more Keystone Kops than Frankenstein, according to many analysts. Reacting to the London Times story in November, a leading South Africa weekly, the Mail & Guardian, ridiculed Israel if it was depending on any South African expertise for its "ethno-bomb." "I don't want to say it's not possible," said Kamely. "They have research institutes , they're capable of doing research that's equivalent to ours if not further ahead of ours. But you're talking about producing a complex immunological reaction in an entire population. It doesn't sound possible."

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Backlines -- Genetic Variation too Complex (1/2)

Ethnic weapons aren't feasible- genetic differences are too complex to target ethnic groups reliably. Scott Canon, Knight Ridder Newspapers, December 17, 2005, Wisconsin State Journal, POTENTIAL BIOTECH WEAPONS SCIENTISTS WORRY ABOUT MILITARY USE OF THEIR WORK, lexis, bjx
Among weapons and biotechnology experts, the authors' predictions of specific breakthroughs seem fanciful for the near future. Take the ethnic weapons, for example. Geneticists find greater difference from one Frenchman to the next than between Frenchmen in general and Egyptians or Japanese. So singling out an ethnic group might prove too complex.

Genetic weapons are unlikely to be effective- several reasons. GeneExpression.com, April 26, 2003, http://www.gnxp.com/MT2/archives/000204.html, bjx
A genetic weapon targeted to a particular ethnic group is so unlikely as to be impossible. Reasons: 1) There are few known gene variants that are ONLY present in particular ethnic groups. 2) Targeting these DNA stretches or the proteins produced would be extremely difficult, and unlikely to kill the desired numbers of people because of inter-group variations. 3) It would be impossible in a large, diverse group like the 300+ million Arabs, who run the gamut from previously Hellenized Levantine Arabs to half-sub-Saharan African Egyptians/Sudanese to completely mixed-up Yemeni Arabs (who probably have Jewish, East African, Indian and Arab genes) to Moroccan Berbers. This does remind me of a simple conspiracy theory by Arabs and some other Muslims who ascribe every nefarious motive they think of to the Jews. As an aside, to all the aspiring bioterrorists or weapons makers out there, it's much much easier conceptually to simply engineer a virus to be fast-spreading and deadly and then vaccinate your own people against it, while releasing it to your enemies.

Intragroup human genetic variation is often greater than intergroup variation, making it almost impossible to create effective ethnic weapons. Mark Wheelis, Senior Lecturer in the Section of Microbiology at the University of California at Davis;
his research interests have for more than ten years focused on the history of biological warfare, and on epidemiology as a component of biological arms control., and Malcolm Dando, Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. Professor Dando trained originally as a biologist and has worked on issues of arms control and disarmament for the last twenty years., 2000, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FROM THE BWC TO BIOTECH, bjx It is also, unfortunately, possible to imagine new biological weapons with specificity for particular subpopulations of organisms. These kinds of novel bioweapon developed from the application of genomics and proteomics only affect individuals with the particular target protein or structure against which they were designed. In many cases the target would be nearly universal within the species. However, in other cases there might be alternative structures, and only individuals with a particular form of the structure would be vulnerable to the toxic effects of the new weapon. This possibility has led to speculation about "ethnic weapons", ones that would affect one ethnic or racial group while leaving others untouched. However, among humans the amount of intragroup genetic variation is generally greater than the intergroup variation,26 making such weapons almost certainly highly non-specific. Absent a lucky accident, it is unlikely that an appropriate target for an effective "ethnic weapon" could be found.

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Backlines -- Genetic Variation too Complex (2/2)

Genetic weapons won't be developed- their premise is based on a flawed understanding of genetic variation, and a delivery system would be difficult to manufacture. Kathryn Nixdorff, professor in the Department of Microbiology and Genetics at Darmstadt University of
Technology. Her research interests include microbial immunology and regulation of cytokine production. She is a member of the interdisciplinary research group JANUS, which is concerned with questions involving science, technology and security. and Wolfgang Bender, professor in the Department of Theology and Social Ethics at Darmstadt University of Technology. His research interests include several aspects of bio-ethics. He is also a member of JANUS, 2002, Minerva 40: 1535, 2002., ETHICS OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND POTENTIAL MILITARY SPIN-OFF, bjx However, several arguments speak against the possibility of ethnic or genetic weapons. First, many have pointed out that races do not exist genetically but are social categories, reflecting slightly different genetic constitutions, which are in part the result of local adaptations in populations living under different environmental conditions.11 These differences reflect only gradients of change in the frequencies of allelic (alternative) forms of genes in particular populations.12 In other words, the full complement of allelic forms of a particular gene will be found in all populations, but the frequency of the expression of those allelels will vary among the populations. It must also be remembered that there is generally more genetic variation within groups than between groups.13 Another difficulty facing an ethnic or genetic weapon is the efficacy of its delivery system. The problem is not unlike that encountered today in certain gene therapy approaches, with respect to the delivery of a sufficient amount of the gene to the correct target cells and the maintenance of the expression of the gene.14

Genetic weapons won't be created- it's too hard to find the genes needed. Sergei Netesov, Deputy General Director of the Vektor Novosibirsk State Research Center for Bioengineering and Virology, 02 March 2004, Politically Desireable, Genetically Unviable (an interview),
http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_217728.php, bjx How realistic would it be to develop biological weapons that could kill people according to a genetic marker? You know, there are politicians who set goals for scientists. These goals are often never accomplished, but nonetheless, why not set goals and why not get money for research? Creating genetic weapons is a goal of this kind. In reality, it would be quite difficult to create this kind of weapon. A lot of currently published research is dedicated to the structure of the human genome and the difference between various races. It has been proven that the differences are very slight, and scientists have only begun to identify them. We probably could find particular, very important genes that control immunity or receptor proteins in cells that vary significantly among different races but that major task is far from complete. The problem is that there are millions of genes in the human body and to try to pick out the ones responsible for ethnic difference is like looking for a needle in a haystack.

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Backlines Can't Weaponize (1/1)

Lack of effective delivery systems makes a terrorist bioweapon attack unlikely. The only real successes in creating a delivery system were done by large biowarfare programs lead by the US and USSR governments. Jan van Aken and Edward Hammond, members of The Sunshine Project, a biological weapons activist group, in Hamburg, Germany, and Austin, Texas, USA., 2003, EMBO Rep. 2003 June; 4(Supp1):
S57S60., Genetic engineering and biological weapons, bjx The development of reliable, effective biological weapons requires an intense and resourcedemanding research programme that must, step by step, solve increasingly complex problems: the procurement of virulent strains of suitable agents, the mass production of the agents without loss of pathogenicity, and the development of an effective means of delivery. In particular, the third step is very demanding, and has rarely been accomplished, with the exception of the huge former biowarfare programmes in the USA (Fig. 2) and the USSR. Even Iraq, after several years of an active biowarfare programme, had developed only rudimentary methods of delivery.

Bioweapons formulation is difficult- improperly performing this process renders the weapon ineffective. Raymond Zilinskas, Senior Scientist-in-Residence for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Oct. 20, 1999, ASSESSING THE
THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM: Congressional Testimony, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm, bjx The problem of formulation, especially formulations for airborne attacks, is a difficult one to overcome. Briefly, after they have been produced, pathogens and toxins must be suspended in formulations in preparation for storage or attack. Possibly the major remaining secret of both the pre-1969 U.S. and pre-1992 Soviet BW programs pertains to the formulation of BW agents. After much empirical experimentation, both programs were able to develop methodologies for suspending or dissolving optimal quantities of weaponized pathogens and toxins in special solutions containing preservatives, adjuvants, and anti-static chemicals. The final emulsion or mixture is what is commonly called formulation. A specific formulation is required for every weaponized pathogen and toxin. Without properly constituted formulation, pathogens or toxins in storage or being transported are likely to loose their virulence or toxicity after a relatively short time (days to weeks); during spraying, solutions containing pathogens or toxins might foul nozzles so that no aerosol is emitted; after being emitted through the spray nozzle, electrostatic attraction between particles made up of pathogens or toxins can cause them to clump (bacteria as colloidal particles have electric charges), after which the clumps will fall ineffectually to the ground; and/or environmental stresses, such as UV light and desiccation, will kill or inactivate the aerosolized pathogens or toxins.

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