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1. TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE 2. PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION 3. PEOPLE vs. BELTRAN 4. PEOPLE vs. ESCARLOS 5. SANCHEZ vs.

PEOPLE 6. PEOPLE vs. DAGANI 7. RIMANO vs. PEOPLE 8. PEOPLE vs. GENOSA 9. TY vs. PEOPLE 10. POMOY vs. PEOPLE 11. PEOPLE vs. STA. MARIA

G.R. No. 158057 G.R. No. 169060 G.R. No. 168051 G.R. No. 148912 G.R. No. 161007 G.R. No. 153875 G.R. No. 156567 G.R. No. 135981 G.R. No. 149275 G.R. No. 150647 G.R. No. 171019

September 24, 2004 February 6, 2007 September 27, 2006 September 10, 2003 December 6, 2006 August 16, 2006 November 27, 2003 January 15, 2004 September 27, 2004 September 29, 2004 February 23, 2007

Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94) Accident Art. 12 Exempting Circumstances Facts: The accused Toledo was charged with homicide for the killing of one Ricky Duarte. Toledo insisted that when he killed the victim, the same was purely accidental. He claimed that the victim was so drunk that the same charged at the door of his house. This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when he tried to prevent Ricky from entering, he accidentally hit the latter whereby killing him. But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty. And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his actions were purely on selfdefense. It was done when the victim attacked him and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte. Issue: Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying? Decision: The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as accidental self-defense. The accused cannot claim the death purely accidental and when the findings of the lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his defense by alleging that what happened was purely self-defense. The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally inconsistent with each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression which could have killed or injure him. And so, such acts are not in tune with ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated or planned but purely accidental. PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION

People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051) Voluntary Surrender Art. 13 Mitigating Circumstances Facts: On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information for Murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00 oclock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifiying circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack

with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning one Norman Conception y Habla while the latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the victims death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to the charge therein. Thereafter, trial ensued. Appellant, on his defense admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he did the same in self-defense. Furthermore, appellant also claimed that Norman is taller than him; that he was forced to kill Norman because the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to surrender to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City. The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran, Jr. is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Decision: Appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that the offenders criminal liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent. Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the bext day, to his sister in Lipa City. It took him three long days to surrender to the police authorities. Moreover, the flight of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circcumstance of voluntary surrender. People vs. Escarlos SELF DEFENSE? Art. 11 Justifying Circumstances A fight already ensuedbefore the aggression appeared. The accusedcannot claim self-defense because by that fightalone (immediately prior to the stabbing) theaccused was forewarned of an impedingaggression from the victim. People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007) Self-defense Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances Facts: Sanchez's account of the facts shows that he and Jamero were tenants of adjacent lots located in San Jose, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of September 4, 1993, Sanchez saw Jamero destroying the dike which served as the boundary between the two lots. Sanchez confronted

Jamero and told the latter that he was encroaching on his land. Jamero struck him with a shovel. The shovel got stuck in the mud so Jamero resorted to throwing mud at Sanchez. Fighting back, Sanchez hacked Jamero with a bolo, resulting in the latter's death. Sanchez then proceeded to the municipal building to surrender upon the advice of his son-in-law. According to the OSG, Jamero's attack on Sanchez was unsuccessful because the latter was able to evade it and Jamero's shovel got stuck in the mud. Jamero fled toward the ricefield when Sanchez unsheathed his bolo. Sanchez pursued him and struck his head with a bolo. Jamero fell down but was able to stand up again. He ran away but after a short distance, fell down again. Sanchez approached him and stabbed him several times. Not satisfied, Sanchez pushed Jamero's face down into the knee-deep mud. After Jamero's aggression ceased when he fled and left his shovel stuck in the mud, there was no longer any justification for Sanchez to go after him and hack him to death. Issue: Whether or not unlawful aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense? Decision: There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the accused proves the first essential requisiteunlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.

In this case, the twin circumstances of Jamero's shovel getting stuck in the mud and his running away from Sanchez convincingly indicate that there was no longer any danger to the latter's life and limb which could have justified his pursuit of Jamero and subsequent hacking and killing of the latter.

Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression by Jamero and the prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor completely discounts Sanchez's claim of selfdefense. Even incomplete self-defense by its very nature and essence would always require the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown. RIMANO vs. PEOPLE

PEOPLE vs. DAGANI

People of the R.P. vs. Genosa G.R.No. 135981 FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten

by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense. 2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa. Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the battererspouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and

mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

People of the R.P. vs. Genosa G.R.No. 135981 ART. 11 (1), AND ART 14 (16) OF THE R.P.C Facts: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995. The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep. ISSUES: Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery? No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor. HELD: The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. ADDENDUM: When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated? Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275) Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear Art. 12 Exempting Circumstances Facts: This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino several post-dated checks. The said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.

The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case. Issue: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability? Decision: No. Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. Pomoy vs. People (439 SCRA 439) Fulfillment of Duty Art. 11 Justifying Circumstances Facts: Tomas Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Iloilo. On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at and arrested Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained along with another suspect, Edgar Samudio. At about 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, a police sergeant, directed Balboa to come out from the jail where he is detained, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. Certain Dr. Palma, who happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary, examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the accused was committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. Held: Yes. The act of the petitioner to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody, is a lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer. Aside from the fact that all the elements of accident as an Exempting Circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code were present in this case, which exonerate the accused from criminal liability, the accused was also in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer at that time of the incident. He was a member, specifically one of the investigators of the PNP stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, and that under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself. The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.

People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019) Entrapment v. Instigation Art. 12 Exempting Circumstances Facts: On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latters house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellants house and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellants house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine

hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram. The accused was charged of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision denying the appeal. Issue: Whether or not instigation was the act which preceded Sta. Marias arrest? Decision: In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of the course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.