FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4), 129, 138 Art. 50.

The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. Buenaventura v CA, G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005 Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.

The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or

involved in said distribution. (37) Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

(e) On presumptive legitimes/hereditary rights

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.

FC 50-53, 43 (2), FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888; Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. FC 176 Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. NCC 908, 1061 Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a) FC 102 (5) and (6), 129 (8) and (9) Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n) Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a)

(38) Yu v Reyes-Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011 FACTS:

Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Erics partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. Eric opposed this motion saying be Eric that the incident without that the

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. ISSUES/HELD: Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) NO. RATIO: It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due

on declaration support, and

of nullity property

cannot relations.

resolved added

presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Erics opposition. Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge ReyesCarpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declarationon nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.

course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each partys psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties respective petitions fordeclaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties marriage.

Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition: Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial courts wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part. (f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213 Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n) (g) On use of surnames, NCC Art. 371, 364, 369

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the trial judges decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or

be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname. ISSUE: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. HELD: NO When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. (39) Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995 FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to

divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n) Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)

I. Marriage when one spouse is absent

FC 41-44, compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2) Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows: (2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other; cf. RPC 349 Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been

legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. (40) SSS vs. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006 In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clementes death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husbands SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alices presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parents place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clementes marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before

the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary. ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clementes death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clementes death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clementes death.