Coles 1 Taylor Coles Final Secularism Paper Prof. Berlinerblau Atheism: Irrelevant or Irreverent?

A casual survey of the intellectual history of atheism provides a striking glimpse of chaotic and unique emergence of the concept in the modern period. While previous centuries had battled heretical doctrines and used the specter of atheism as an insult, atheism as a full-throated philosophy first emerged in the 18th century alongside the ongoing development of modern philosophy, economics, and art (Hyman 30). Both historically and conceptually, atheism and modernity seem to be inextricably linked (Hyman 28). Contemporary atheism still relies on the vocabulary and opinions of this Enlightenment movement, leaving many to wonder how closely atheism is tied to its intellectual roots. This is an especially ripe issue for those who believe that modernism and its accompanying assumptions and narratives are headed for the waste-bin of history because of the emergence of a postmodern culture in the Western world. Will atheism follow it and become irrelevant as well? To answer this question, I will examine some of the major themes of both atheism and religion to see how they may adapt under postmodern pressure, all with the goal of redefining atheism in a way that might better reflect its future. At the outset, it is of paramount importance to address the concerns of those who, like Jacques Berlinerblau, object to the tendency of so-called postmodern1 scholarship to refuse to define the very matter it has set out to study (Let the Study of American Secularisms Begin! 5). Expressing a general sense of hostility towards the opaque and self-referential language common

I place scare quotes around this term to note that very few of those that are commonly listed in the postmodern canon accept that label. It is almost certainly impossible to separate the influence of post -structuralism or a similar trend from postmodernism, but I will attempt to highlight the ambiguities involved in determining who is a postmodernist when it is relevant to the content of this paper.

Coles 2 to postmodern authors, many thinkers have complained that it is not altogether clear what the devil [postmodernism] is (Gellner 22). Despite this criticism, I do not believe that a complete definition of postmodernism is possible or necessary in order to discuss some of the impacts it may have on atheism and theology. First and foremost, postmodernism does not have a manifesto of core beliefs. Although I will resist the temptation to use the word postmodernisms, there is so much diversity in the materials labeled postmodern that it would be hard to argue that its intellectual influences form a discernible program. Even those who think that postmodernists are united by their impenetrable prose and cryptic vocabulary are grouping writers with vastly different styles and techniques of persuasion. One need only try to compare passages from Hlne Cixous and Richard Rorty in order to see the problem with this generalization2. This paper will treat postmodernism as a culture, style, and atmosphere in which modernist assumptions about the nature of truth and subjectivity have failed to remain persuasive. Following Lyotards concise example, postmodernism is best understood as an incredulity to [the] metanarratives that have been used to justify the scientific, political, religious, philosophical, and economic pursuits of modernism (xxiv). While this treatment is by no means complete or exclusive of any other approach to the topic, it is important to recognize that the need for definition is born out of a modernist instinct to apply rigorous and social scientific language to the domain of culture. It is no longer tenable to hold that all who claim access to intellectual space must follow social scientific rules. In some sense, this dilemma is endemic in postmodernism. It used to be the case that a thinker could not be accurately described as a sociologist or a philosopher if he or she was not interested in

Such an exercise is much more likely to inspire a book called Why the French are bad at philosophy or Why the Americans are bad at writing (depending on your preferred point of view and side of the Atlantic).

Coles 3 rigorously defining his or her subject matter. Whatever such a person was doing, he or she was not doing sociology or philosophy, since those were disciplines with self-images and understandings of purpose that precluded such carelessness. This is no longer the case. Postmodernists are problematizing the styles in which academics are accustomed to writing and reading about culture. It is impossible to charitably and accurately engage with postmodern work, if one requires that postmodernists write with traditional codes in order to be understood. In this vain, I respectfully disagree with Berlinerblaus sweeping characterization of postmodern, post-Foucauldian, and post-colonial theorists as having a school of thought that has remained remarkably stable (Let the Study of American Secularisms Begin! 4). Postmodernism is more productively thought of as an intellectual environment, rather than a school of thought. Those who write about postmodernism are attempting to describe the epistemic and intellectual condition of the contemporary age. This point requires serious emphasis. Postmodernism is dangerous and destabilizing for both modern religion and atheism, but this is not because philosophy has finally progressed to the conclusion that epistemology and metaphysics are lame-duck disciplines without any correct arguments. Instead, postmodernism is built on the recognition that social and historical location determines what forms intellectual may take and which arguments will be persuasive. The cultural and linguistic background on which our intellectual foundations are built that has shifted. Old language games have fallen into disuse and disrepute. This paper does not attempt to find the truth in human knowledge practices. Instead, it seeks to shed light on the future ahead for atheism, given that it is so centrally involved with modernisms most contentious and dated claims.

Coles 4 Contemporary atheists, especially those associated with the New Atheist movement, have shown no reluctance to invoke the triumphalist rhetoric of their rationalist forbearers. That much is made abundantly clear when on the fifth page of Sam Harriss End of Faith, the reader learns that authentic engagement with humanitys deepest spiritual purpose requires absolutely no involvement with untestable propositions (16). Although the abundance of this sort of rhetoric in the active atheist community is not exactly surprising, it helps to demonstrate that contemporary atheism is not merely limited to simple disbelief in God. Rather, the contemporary self-identified atheist is overwhelmingly likely to hold certain beliefs about science, ethics, and politics that betray their movements modernist origins. In particular, one may find an almost universal belief in the existence and availability of objective facts, and above all in the possibility of explaining the said facts by means of an objective and testable theory, not itself essentially linked to any one culture, observer or mood (Gellner 25). It just so happens that this collection of positivist principles, the core of the contemporary atheists belief system, may have taken more academic punishment over the past one hundred years than any other intellectual position. Newly emerging feminism, race theory, queer theory, constructivist accounts of science, and many more revolutionary developments in the social sciences and philosophy have all conspired to deny the supposed objectivity of positivist science. Postmodernist thinkers have acted as field generals in this assault, mustering all of the critical firepower of the left into an organized metatheoretical unit poised to rout their scientifically minded enemy, which seems perfectly happy to remain blissfully ignorant of the impending danger. Postmodernism provides a thorough critique of the entire cultural mode in which positivist claims were possible and offers a potentially devastating sketch of modernist theoretical failings. By many accounts, the

Coles 5 transition to a post-positivist, postmodern world will be inevitable once a few more cartoonish academics look down and realize they have run over a cliff and must begin to fall. In regards to atheism, postmodernists have advanced two main types of argument which cut away the foundations of the contemporary atheists belief system. First, postmodernists have attacked the epistemological justification of science, arguing that science relies on the grand meta-narratives of Western civilization in order to support its structure. As Lyotard puts it: To the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game (xxiii). In order to do so, science has represented itself as the path to the liberation of the rational human subject, a cultural project with considerable ethical baggage. Requiring that statements about the world fit into a scientific form is merely another way of imposing a normative view of what a knowing subject should be. Moreover, science itself is unscientific, since one cannot justify the use of science by appeal to a scientific method. Postmodernists extend this argument to claim that scientific knowledge is not self-justifying and requires a historically white, straight, male subject that claims to be neutral. Second, postmodernists have argued, following Nietzsche, that contemporary positivist atheism is merely an attempt at replacing a dead God, while keeping an unsustainable religious structure intact. The speech of Nietzsches madman in The Gay Science could be rewritten as speaking directly to Richard Dawkins, with the ensuing consequence that modern society continues to hang over the precipice of nihilism. As Mark Taylor puts it, contemporary atheism is not radical enough to reject completely the notions of center and centeredness (26). The humanistic atheist removes one center, God, in the name of another, humanity, without creating a truly new way of thinking (Taylor 26). Eventually, the Nietzschean argues, man will lose faith in theologically -laden concepts like order and rationality just as they have lost faith in God.

Coles 6 If these arguments succeed in undermining the legitimacy of modernist claims about religion, what will happen to atheism? Will postmodernism kill atheism only to cede religious debate to fundamentalists? Given that postmodernism undermines the ability of philosophers to reject scientifically unjustified belief, many critics have worried that postmodern culture may be a fertile garden bed for religious traditionalism. Indeed, more generally, critical heroes like Edward Said have been deeply skeptical of the ability of jargonistic postmodernisms to effectively object to actually existing conservative powers, of which religious fundamentalism is certainly one (Said 316). While it may seem as though the demise of critical reason would be a boon for religious fundamentalism, I would argue that postmodernism is not simply a cover for traditional religious worldviews, which will face their own serious problems transitioning into a postmodern world. These difficulties should demonstrate why it is fruitful for atheists to engage with the ongoing growth of religious postmodernism. After all, if atheism is dependent on what it rejects, a brief examination of how the modern atheists fundamentalist enemies will be challenged by postmodernism cannot but assist in our project to describe atheisms future. Ernest Gellners description of religious fundamentalism as the underlying idea that a given faith is to be upheld firmly in its full and literal form, free of compromise, softening, reinterpretation or diminution should already raise a few flags for those sensitive to postmodern concerns (2). Under this depiction, religious fundamentalism seems to require that religious propositions and texts remain closed to interpretation and inter-textual analysis. Religion becomes the devotional exercise of believing in the divine origin of a set of pallid, mummified verses. Fundamentalist religion seems to hold that its doctrine can be fixed with precision and finality around a literal and unchanging truth (Gellner 2). From a postmodern perspective, this view of the world is domineering and violent, since it completely severs the relationship between

Coles 7 text and reader and prefers one totalitarian interpretation over the infinite play of different meanings and readings that make up the way people actually engage with texts. For the postmodernist, fundamentalism may not be factually incorrect in some absolute metaphysical sense, but it certainly impoverishes the religious worldview and stands against the joyous affirmation of ambiguity that motivates so many postmodern projects. Considering that it is common for postmodernists to describe the activity of human life as ultimately textual, perhaps an analogy with literature can demonstrate this point. While postmodernism finds religion, above all, to be a fascinating and intriguing subject for interpretation and interrogation, fundamentalism seems to doom the believer to the equivalent of a lifetime of the worlds worst high school English class. For the entirety of ones life, the task presented is to read and re-read one novel, the texts and doctrine of the religion, while being tested on your interpretation of the work. In addition, one must accept the following: the author of the novel is perfectly infallible, the texts have a clear literal meaning, and deviation from the correct interpretation will not be tolerated3. Speaking for myself, I could not imagine a more terrifying picture of hell. Whatever postmodernism lacks in rigor or theoretical persuasiveness, its love of textual intricacy and free interpretation provides an excellent contrast to the stilted and boring nature of the fundamentalists literal truth. Gellner goes on to compare the fundamentalists stance towards truth with Sren Kierkegaards existentialist philosophy. The idea that religion is of its essence not persuasion of the truth of a doctrine, but commitment to a position which is inherently absurd is central to the fundamentalists position, he argues (Gellner 3). One might persuasively argue that the religious belief described here is much closer to one that can survive the postmodern gauntlet of

To extend the metaphor, history also shows that the teacher would not be particularly friendly in disciplining those who violate this commandment.

Coles 8 skepticism. After all, since all cultural performances are ultimately groundless gestures, the logical consistency of ones belief is no longer relevant. A Christian following Kierkegaards leap of faith into unknowability seems to share a great deal with a practitioner of deconstruction seeking textual aporia. Does this sort of position open the door for a postmodern version of religious fundamentalism? I disagree with Gellners characterization, because it seems that modern religious fundamentalisms are not based around the assumption of absolute doubt, but rather treat faith as a way to legitimize claims to absolute truth. Gellner is of course right that fundamentalism, particularly Christian fundamentalism, does not rely on rational techniques of persuasion in order to communicate their truths. However, because Gellner treats the use of persuasion and evidence as the only legitimate ways to know the world, he ignores the fervent and enthusiastic claims fundamentalists make about metaphysical truth. Todays Westboro Baptist Church member4 is uninterested by the idea of radical doubt, because the literal truth has been shown to him or her through a faith experience. As was discussed above, it seems likely that the idea of a truth that one can possess with certainty or clarity has lost its persuasiveness. Contrary to the fears of its opponents, the culture of postmodernism does not easily lend itself to fundamentalism. Although positivist standards of evidence have lost their authoritative appeal as reasons to reject religious belief, making religious truth claims is equally as problematic. While I believe Gellner may have incorrectly described fundamentalism by making the all-too-common mistake of making fundamentalist religion seem much more interesting than it actually is, he may have incidentally laid out a blueprint for a more postmodern form of religious, and perhaps even non-religious, expression.
4

Anyone who believes that this example is unfairly cherry-picking the least intellectual of the fundamentalist cohort would do well to listen to some of the Churchs more thorough public interviews. I fully believe that their views are consistent and well-thought out, even if they are abhorrent.

Coles 9 Now that it is clear that both atheistic and theological fundamentalisms are deeply challenged by the questions and attitude of postmodern culture, is it possible to find an alternative beyond or between theism and atheism and could that alternative still be included in a definition of atheism (Hymen 44)? Although there are many different possible religious perspectives other than fundamentalism that, because they do not make claims to a unique or stable truth, are completely compatible with postmodern culture, atheism has often signified a kind of closed belief system surrounding a definitive metaphysical claim about the existence of God (Hyman 30). Is it possible for atheism to be persuasive in a world where no one particular methodology has exclusive access to truth? As I suggested in the introduction, the answer to that question will depend heavily on how atheism is defined, a question which I turn to now. Atheism need not be defined so narrowly as to restrict it to the time period in which it emerged. Plainly, if definitions and understandings of God change and vary, so too our definitions and understandings of atheism will change and vary (Hyman 28-29). Therefore, following Hymans lead, I propose that atheism cannot be easily defined as the belief God does not exist, if it is to continue to be relevant in a postmodern era (cited in Hyman 28). Instead, I would define an atheist as someone who is irreverent towards, or dismissive of, the claim that a God possesses factual existence. I believe that this definition helps capture some of the essential differences between modern and postmodern atheism in a way that opens the door to further investigation of the concept. Harkening back to an age where atheism signified heresy from the received doctrines of the Church, this definition makes an explicit attempt to move atheism away from a formal propositional system of belief and towards a personal stance or gesture which reflects a practice of living skepticism or deconstruction (Hyman 29). This development mirrors an emerging focus

Coles 10 of contemporary theology on ritual and community as the durable sources of meaning, shifting the terms of religious debate away from abstract beliefs. Yet another aspect of the changing intellectual terrain, the history of religion has seen the stress shifted from lived ritual to transcendent doctrine, and it looks as if now the wheel has come full circle (Gellner 5). Atheism would do well to mirror this trend as well. Postmodernism also tends to focus on personal method over abstract, interpersonal dogma. The postmodern atheist in unlikely to have a firm conception of what sorts of things can exist in the universe, because her or his goal in approaching the world is not to seek knowledge for knowledges sake. The postmodern atheist is skeptical that there are truths about the world that are universal and neutral, and thus sees truth as an element of contextual interpretation, a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms which serve the purposes of the societies and cultures that wield them (Nietzsche On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense). To state this point a different way, the postmodern atheist is able to acknowledge the Foucauldian insight that knowledge and its social application is always political. She or he is an atheist, not because she or he knows God does not exist through empirical testing, but because she or he sees value in the very act of denying or criticizing religion. Modernist atheists took pains to cast themselves as neutral observers taking the correct method of epistemological investigation to its full conclusion. Postmodern atheists will embrace the subjectivity of their position and see their irreverence or dismissal as a strategic gesture, fully recognizing that they cannot hide behind a method or an institution that guarantees them access to truth. The definition of atheism should also be able to include those who have no interest in making definitive pronouncements about metaphysical truth. Mark Taylors deconstruction of modernist religion in his book Erring provides a perfect example of a stance towards religion

Coles 11 that does not fit into the traditional definition of atheism, but may be indicative of a new style of non-belief. Taylor himself describes the postmodern condition as one in which suspended between the loss of old certainties and the discovery of new beliefs, marginal people constantly live on the border that both joins and separates belief and unbelief (5). For Taylor, the ambiguities and contradictions involved in the deconstructive project force it to stand outside the realm of clear meanings and belief systems. Its projects are always incomplete and its conclusions are never unproblematic. He is not someone who could ever be in a position to say that he firmly believes there is no God. Nevertheless, he recognizes that to traditional eyesa/theology is, in fact, heresy (Taylor 13). His thought lies perpetually and necessarily outside any particular faith tradition, yet it would be flatly absurd to attempt to classify him as having the same sort of fundamental non-religious outlook as Bertrand Russell. Taylors style of approach is emblematic of one of the possibilities for postmodern religious thought. Unfettered by any argumentative rigor, Taylors creative work is as much an artwork as a treatise. He shares almost none of the traditional motivations, techniques, or conclusions held by modernist atheists. Nevertheless, his creative and joyful attempt to establish an a/theology that draws on deconstructive philosophy and subvert everything once deemed holy shows readers a radical, mischievous, and controversial attitude towards religion that seriously attempts to problematize religion(Taylor 6). The definition of atheism should accommodate Taylors style in order to capture the irreligious spirit of postmodernism and move atheism forward to new intellectual territory. This paper only begins to suggest some of the developments that could occur as the terrain of religious and irreligious thought shifts ina the postmodern era. There is a tremendous amount of necessary uncertainty and speculation in this analysis, as postmodern atheism remains

Coles 12 the unexplored territory where predictions are more than usually perilous (Hyman 44). However, it is clearer that the development of postmodernism offers serious challenges to the foundational assumptions of both atheistic and religious discourses. This paper has examined the structure of both scientific and religious fundamentalism, concluding that their methods and vocabularies are at risk of being fundamentally unpersuasive in postmodern culture. Hypothesizing about the changes postmodernism might elicit, I argued that the definition of atheism would have to change to reflect a new emphasis on ritual and practice over belief and doctrine. It is admittedly hard to define such a complex term as atheism in the abstract, but a reorientation is clearly necessary if atheism is to move away from the stale use of modernist reason. I wish to demonstrate that nothing about the philosophy of positivism is an essential part of rejecting dominant religious ways of viewing the world. Postmodernism is a cultural trend that will force a radical shift away from Enlightenment metanarratives. If theorists and historians of atheism are not careful to adapt their definitions, they may lose the thread of irreligious thought in the scuffle.

Coles 13 Works Cited Berlinerblau, Jacques. "Let the Study of American Secularism Begin." Chronicle of Higher Education (2013): n. pag. Web. Gellner, Ernest. Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge, 1992. Print. Harris, Sam. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2004. Print. Hyman, Gavin. A Short History of Atheism. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010. Print. Lyotard, Jean-Franois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984. Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich. On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. N.p.: n.p., 1873. Print. Said, Edward W. The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Selfdetermination, 1969-1994. New York: Pantheon, 1994. Taylor, Mark C. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984. Print.