Describe the Administrative Code of 1987.

Ople v Torres: The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance (Third Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) and embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people. (Fourth Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The Code is divided into seven (7) books. These books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration, i.e., internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government.

What is an administrative order?

EO 292 An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

What is administrative power?

EO 292 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

What is the government of the Philippines?

Sec. 2(1) of EO 292: "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

What is a department?

Sec. 2(7) of EO 292: "Department" refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation.

What is an agency of the government?

EO 292 Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

What is a chartered institution?

Sec 2(12) of EO 292: "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

What is a government owned and controlled corporation?

Sec 2(13) of EO292: "Governmentowned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to theextent of at least fiftyone(51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That governmentowned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commissio on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

When is a GOCC performing a regulatory function?

Blaquera v. Alcala: Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as proprietary are those intended for private advantage and benefit

When does government estoppel apply?

Uy vs COA: We subscribe to the time-honored doctrine that estoppel will not lie against the State. In the case of CIR v. CA, however, we held that "admittedly the government is not estopped from collecting taxes legally due because of mistakes or errors of its agents. But like other principles of law, this admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fair play, as where injustice will result to the taxpayer." In the case at bar, a stringent application of the rule exempting the state from the equitable principle of estoppel will prejudice petitioners who are lowly employees of government.

When does prescription apply against the government?

Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals: The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes (ex. GOCC), it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons.

When may a state invoke immunity?

GTZ vs CA: The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. Who or what consists of the State? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid unduly vexing the peace of nations. Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office. If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued. State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. These include the National Irrigation Administration, the former Central Bank, the SSS and the National Power Corporation.

Discuss the nature and functions of: NLRC DOLE

Labor Code 213, 217-225 Title VII of EO 292

NTC

Republic vs Express Telecommunication Co Inc: The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 x x x. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the Board of Communications and the Communications Control Bureau, which were both abolished under the said Executive Order. Previously, the NTCs function were merely those of the defunct Public Service Commission (PSC), created under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, considering that the Board of Communications was the successor-in-interest of the PSC. Under Executive Order No. 125-A, issued in April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communications. In the regulatory communications industry, the NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public services within the Philippines whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. (Commonwealth Act No. 146, Section 16[a]) The procedure governing the issuance of such authorizations is set forth in Section 29 of the said Act

BIR DSWD DOH

Title II Chapter 4 of EO 292 Title XVI of EO 292 Titiel IX of EO 292

When can a regulation be enforced? (operative act)

The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1987 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs (Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 7). In a similar case, we held: This does not imply, however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads: Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. X x x The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera stated, thus: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.

Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided (E.O. 200, Section 1). The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act, fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera. Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exception are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties (PHILSA International Placement & Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 174). Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Section 20 thereof). In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that govern. (Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres[29], the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.

May a person be held liable for an administrative regulation not published?

Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and Employment: Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. There is merit in the argument. In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the

Peoples Republic of China; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code x x x. It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. (Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 174, April 4, 2001, 3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])

What are the powers of the CHR? Can it adjudicate? Issue injunctive writs? Execute its own decision?

x x x [T]he Commission on Human Rights x x x was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 125, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid services mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The order to desist (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. x x x

When do administrative agencies have contempt powers? Subpoena powers?

The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherentin administrative bodies.It is settled that administrative bodies may summon witnesses andrequire the production of evidence only when duly allowed by law, andalways only in connection with the matter they are authorized toinvestigate. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid or Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case falls. The Court may punish customacyor refusal as contempt. Like the subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is essentially judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by the administrativebody. To be validly exercised, it must be expressly conferred upon the bodyand, additionally, must be used only in connection with its quasi-judicialas distinguished from its purely administrative or routinary functions.

What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])

What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts jurisdiction is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.

Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. This doctrine is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. [Paat vs CA]